

HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

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HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

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TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED
ANSWERS TO SOME ATTACKS IN ROBINSON'S LIFE OF PICTON,
AND IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW;

WITH
COUNTER-REMARKS TO MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL'S REMARKS
UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER'S FOURTH VOLUME OF THE
HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR; AND
SEVERAL JUSTIFICATORY PIECES IN REPLY TO COLONEL GURWOOD,
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STANDARD WORKS

Uniform with this Volume.

Macfarlane's British India.

Whiston's Josephus.

Froissart's Chronicles.

Milman's History of the Jews.

Plutarch's Lives.

Lemprière's Classical Dictionary.

Smith's Wealth of Nations. •

Napier's Peninsular War, 1807-1810.

Napier's Peninsular War, 1810-1812.

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^{*} Since colonel and surveyor-general of South Australia.

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NOTICE.

1. In the present volume will be found a plan of the Peninsula on a very small scale, yet sufficient to indicate the general range of operations. A large map would be enormously expensive without any correspondent advantages to the reader; and it would only be a repetition of errors, because there are no materials for an accurate plan. The small one now furnished, together with the sketches which I have drawn and published with each volume, and which are more accurate than might be supposed, will give a clear general notion of the operations. Those who desire to have more detailed information will find it in Lieutenant Godwyn's fine atlas of the battles in the Peninsula—a work undertaken by that officer with the sole view of forming a record of the glorious actions of the British army.

2. Most of the manuscript authorities consulted for former volumes have been also consulted for this volume, and in addition the official correspondence of Lord William Bentinck; some notes by Lord Hill; the journal and correspondence of Sir Rufane Donkin; a journal of Colonel Oglander, 26th regiment; a memoir by Sir George Gipps, royal engineers; and a variety of communications by other officers. Lastly, authenticated copies of the official journals and correspondence of most of the marshals and generals who commanded armies in Spain. These were at my request supplied by the French War-office with a prompt liberality indicative of that military frankness and just pride which ought and does characterize the officers of Napoleon's army. The publication of this volume also enables me with convenience to produce additional authorities for former statements, while answering, as I now do, the attacks upon my work which have appeared in the "Life of Sir Thomas Picton," and in the *Quarterly Review*.

THIS volume was nearly printed when my attention was called to a passage in an article upon the Duke of Wellington's despatches, published in the last number of the "*British and Foreign Quarterly Review*."

After describing Colonel Gurwood's proceedings to procure the publication of the despatches the reviewer says,

"We here distinctly state, that no other person ever had access to *any* documents of the duke, by his grace's permission, for any historical or other purpose, and that all inferential pretensions to such privilege are not founded in fact."

This assertion, which if not wholly directed against my History certainly includes it with others, *I distinctly state to be untrue.*

For firstly, the Duke of Wellington gave me access to the original morning states of his army for the use of my history; he permitted me to take them into my possession, and I still have possession of them.

Secondly, the Duke of Wellington voluntarily directed me to apply to Sir George Murray for the "*orders of movements*." That is to say the orders of battle issued by him to the different generals previous to every great action. Sir George Murray thought proper, as the reader will see in the justificatory pieces of this volume, to deny all knowledge of these "*orders of movements*." I have since obtained some of them from others, but the permission to get them all was given to me at Strathfieldsaye, in the presence of Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who was at the same time directed to give me the morning states and he did so. These were documents of no ordinary importance for a history of the war.

Thirdly, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, with the consent of the Duke of Wellington, put into my hands king Joseph's portfolio, taken at Vittoria, and containing that monarch's correspondence with the emperor, with the French minister of war, and with the marshals and generals who at different periods were employed in the Peninsula. These also were documents of no slight importance for a history of the war, and they are still in my possession.

When I first resolved to write this History, I applied verbally to the Duke of Wellington

to give me papers in aid of my undertaking. His answer in substance was, that he had arranged all his own papers with a view to publication himself—that he had not decided in what form they should be given to the world, or when, probably not during his lifetime, but he thought his plan would be to “*write a plain didactic history*” to be published after his death—that he was resolved never to publish anything unless he could tell the whole truth, but at that time he could not tell the whole truth without wounding the feelings of many worthy men, without doing mischief: adding in a laughing way “*I should do as much mischief as Buonaparte.*” Then expatiating upon the subject he related to me many anecdotes illustrative of this observation, showing errors committed by generals and others acting with him, or under him, especially at Waterloo; errors so materially affecting his operations that he could not do justice to himself if he suppressed them, and yet by giving them publicity he would ungraciously affect the fame of many worthy men whose only fault was dulness.

For these reasons he would not, he said, give me his own private papers, but he gave me the documents I have already noticed, and told me he would then, and always, answer any questions as to facts which I might in the course of my work think necessary to put. And he has fulfilled that promise rigidly, for I did then put many questions to him verbally and took notes of his answers, and many of the facts in my History which have been most cavilled at and denied by my critics have been related by me solely upon his authority. Moreover I have since, at various times, sent to the duke a number of questions in writing, and always they have been fully and carefully answered without delay, though often put when his mind must have been harassed and his attention deeply occupied by momentous affairs.

But though the Duke of Wellington denied me access to his own peculiar documents, the greatest part of those documents existed in duplicate; they were in other persons' hands, and in two instances were voluntarily transferred with other interesting papers to mine. Of this truth the reader may easily satisfy himself by referring to my five first volumes, some of which were published years before Colonel Gurwood's compilation appeared. He will find in those volumes frequent allusions to the substance of the duke's private communications with the governments he served; and in the Appendix a number of his letters, printed precisely as they have since been given by Colonel Gurwood. I could have greatly augmented the number if I had been disposed so to swell my work. Another proof will be found in the Justificatory Pieces of this volume, where I have restored the whole reading of a remarkable letter of the duke's which has been garbled in Colonel Gurwood's compilation, and this not from any unworthy desire to promulgate what the Duke of Wellington desired to suppress, but that having long before attributed, on the strength of that passage, certain strong opinions to his grace, I was bound in defence of my own probity as an historian to reproduce my authority.

W. F. P. NAPIER.

March 28th, 1840.

ANSWER TO SOME ATTACKS IN ROBINSON'S LIFE OF PICTON.

“Many there are that trouble me and persecute me; yet do I not swerve from thy testimonies.”—PSALM CXIX.

THIS writer of an English general's life is so entirely unacquainted with English military customs, that he quotes a common order of the day, accrediting a new staff officer to the army, as a remarkable testimony to that staff officer's talents. And he is so unacquainted with French military customs, that, treating of the battle of Busaco, he places a French marshal, Marmont, who by the way was not then even in Spain, at the head of a *division* of Ney's corps. He dogmatizes upon military movements freely, and is yet so incapable of forming a right judgment upon the materials within his reach, as to say, that Sir John Moore should not have retreated, because as he was able to beat the French at Coruña, he could also have beaten them in the heart of Spain. Thus setting aside the facts that at Coruña Moore had 15,000 men to fight 20,000 and in the heart of Spain he had only 23,000 to fight more than 300,000.

And lest this display of incompetency should not be sufficient, he affirms, that the same Sir John Moore had, comparatively, greater means at Sahagun to beat the enemy than Lord Wellington had in the lines of Torres Vedras.* Now those lines, which Wellington had been fortifying for more than a year, offered three nearly impregnable positions, defended by 100,000 men. There was a fortress, that of St. Julian's, and a fleet, close at hand as a final resource, and only 60,000 French commanded by Massena were in front. But Sir John Moore, having only 23,000 men at Sahagun, had no lines, no fortifications for defence, and no time to form them, he was nearly 300 miles from his fleet, and Napoleon in person had turned 100,000 men against him, while 200,000 more remained in reserve!

Any lengthened argument in opposition to a writer so totally unqualified to treat of warlike affairs, would be a sinful waste of words; but Mr. Robinson has been at pains to question the accuracy of certain passages of my work, and with what justice the reader shall now learn.

1. *Combat on the Coa*.—The substance of Mr. Robinson's complaint on this subject is, that I have imputed to General Picton the odious crime of refusing, from personal animosity, to support General Craufurd;—that such a serious accusation should not be made without ample proof;—that I cannot say whether Picton's instructions did not forbid him to aid Craufurd;—that the roads were so bad, the distance so great, and the time so short, Picton could not have aided him;—that my account of the action differs from General Craufurd's;—that I was only a lieutenant of the 43rd, and consequently could know nothing of the matter;—that I have not praised Picton—that he was a Roman hero, and so forth. Finally, it is denied that Picton ever quarrelled with Craufurd at all; and that, so far from having an altercation with him on the day of the action he did not on that day even quit his own quarters at Pinhel. Something also there is about general Cole's refusing to quit Guarda.

To all this I reply that I never did accuse General Picton of acting from personal animosity, and neither the letter nor the spirit of my statement will bear out such a meaning, which is a pure hallucination of this author. That the light division was not supported is notorious. The propriety of supporting it I have endeavoured to show, the cause why it was not so supported I have not attempted to divine; yet it was neither the distance, nor the badness of the roads,

* In a recent number of the *Quarterly Review* the writer of an article upon the correspondence of Louis the XVIII. quotes me as saying that Massena had *one hundred and thirty-five thousand men* under his orders, as if he had invaded Portugal with an army of that amount, whereas I have expressly said that he invaded Portugal with *sixty-five thousand*, the rest being extended as far as Biscay. The assertion of the Reviewer is therefore essentially false with the appearance of truth. The same writer, while rebuking the Editor of the Correspondence for ignorance, asserts that the battle of Busaco was fought between the 9th of October and the 5th of November! It was fought on the 27th of September.

Another writer in the same No. treating of Professor Drumann's work, speaks of “*following* an impulse which is from *behind*,” a figure of speech which must appear singularly felicitous to those who have watched a puppy dog chasing his own tail; but your *Quarterly Reviewers* are your only men for accuracy of fact and expression!

nor the want of time ; for the action, which took place in July, lasted from day-break until late in the evening, the roads, and there were several, were good at that season, and the distance not more than eight miles.

It is quite true, as Mr. Robinson observes, that I cannot affirm of my own knowledge whether the Duke of Wellington forbade Picton to succour Craufurd, but I can certainly affirm that he ordered him to support him, because it is so set down in his grace's despatches, volume V., pages 535 and 547; and it is not probable that this order should have been rescinded and one of a contrary tendency substituted to meet an event, namely, the action on the Coa, which Craufurd had been forbidden to fight. Picton acted no doubt upon the dictates of his judgment, but all men are not bound to approve of that judgment ; and as to the charge of faintly praising his military talents, a point was forced by me in his favour, when I compared him to General Craufurd, of whose ability there was no question ; more could not be done in conscience, even under Mr. Robinson's assurance that he was a Roman hero.

The exact object of Mr Robinson's reasoning upon the subject of General Cole's refusal to quit Guarda it is difficult to discover ; but the passage to which it relates, is the simple enunciation of a fact, which is now repeated, namely, that General Cole being requested by General Craufurd to come down with his whole division to the Coa, refused, and that Lord Wellington approved of that refusal, though he ordered Cole to support Craufurd under certain circumstances. Such, however, is Mr. Robinson's desire to monopolize all correctness, that he will not permit me to know anything about the action, though I was present, because, as he says, being only a lieutenant, I could not know anything about it. He is yet abundantly satisfied with the accuracy of his own knowledge, although he was not present, and was neither a captain nor lieutenant. I happened to be a captain of seven years' standing, but surely, though we should admit all subalterns to be blind, like young puppies, and that rank in the one case, as age in the other, is absolutely necessary to open their eyes, it might still be asked, why I should not have been able, after having obtained a rank which gave me the right of seeing, to gather information from others as well as Mr. Robinson? Let us to the proof.

In support of his views, he has produced the rather vague testimony of an anonymous officer on General Picton's staff, which he deems conclusive as to the fact, that Picton never quarrelled with Craufurd, that he did not even quit Pinhel on the day of the action, and consequently could not have had any altercation with him on the Coa. But the following letters from officers on Craufurd's staff, not anonymous, show that Picton did all these things. In fine, that Mr. Robinson has undertaken a task for which he is not qualified.

Testimony of **LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SHAW KENNEDY**, *who was on GENERAL CRAFTURD'S staff at the action of the Coa, July 24, 1810.*

Manchester, 7th November, 1835.

I have received your letter in which you mention Robinson's "Life of Picton;" that work I have not seen. It surprises me that any one should doubt that Picton and Craufurd met on the day the French army invested Almeida, in 1810. I was wounded previously, and did not therefore witness their interview ; but I consider it certain that Picton and Craufurd did meet on the 24th July, 1810, on the high ground on the left bank of the Coa during the progress of the action, and that a brisk altercation took place between them. They were primed and ready for such an altercation, as angry communications had passed between them previously regarding the disposal of some sick of the light division. I have heard Craufurd mention in joke his and Picton's testiness with each other, and I considered that he alluded both to the quarrel as to the sick ; and to that which occurred when they met during the action at Almeida.

J. S. KENNEDY.

Colonel Napier, etc., etc., etc.

Testimony of **COLONEL WILLIAM CAMPBELL**, *who was on GENERAL CRAFTURD'S staff at the action on the Coa, July 24, 1810.*

Esplanade, Dover, 13th Nov., 1835.

Your letter from Freshford has not been many minutes in my hands ; I hasten to reply. General Picton *did* come out of Pinhel on the day of the Coa combat as you term it. It was in the afternoon of that day when all the regiments were in retreat, and General Craufurd was with his staff and others on the heights above, that, I think, on notice being given of General Picton's approach, General Craufurd turned and moved to meet him. Slight was the converse, short the interview, for upon Craufurd's asking inquiringly, whether General Picton did not consider it advisable to move out something from Pinhel in demonstration of support, or to cover the light division, in terms not bland, the general made it understood that "he should do no such thing." This as you may suppose put an end to the meeting, further than some violent rejoinder on the part of my much-loved friend, and fiery looks returned ! We went our several ways, General Picton, I think, proceeding onwards a hundred yards to take a peep at the bridge. This is my testimony.

Yours truly, **WILLIAM CAMPBELL.**

Colonel Napier, etc., etc., etc.

Battle of Busaco.—Mr. Robinson, upon the authority of one of General Picton's letters, has endeavoured to show that my description of this battle is a mass of errors; but it shall be proved that his criticism is so, and that General Picton's letter is very bad authority.

In my work it is said that the allies resisted vigorously, yet the French gained the summit of the ridge, and while the leading battalions established themselves on the crowning rocks, others wheeled to their right, intending to sweep the summit of the Sierra, but were driven down again in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

Picton's letter says, that the head of the enemy's column got possession of a rocky point on the crest of the position, and that they were followed by the remainder of a large column which was driven down in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

So far we are agreed. But Picton gives the merit of the charge to the light companies of the 74th and 88th regiments, and a wing of the 45th aided by the 8th Portuguese regiment under Major Birmingham, whereas in the History the whole merit is given to the 88th and 45th regiments. Lord Wellington's despatch gives the merit to the 45th and 88th, aided by the 8th Portuguese regiment, under Colonel Douglas. The "Reminiscences of a Subaltern," written by an officer of the 88th regiment, and published in the *United Service Journal* in like manner, gives the merit to the 88th and 45th British regiments, and the 8th Portuguese.

It will presently be seen why I took no notice of the share the 8th Portuguese are said to have had in this brilliant achievement. Meanwhile the reader will observe that Picton's letter indicates the *centre* of his division as being forced by the French, and he affirms that he drove them down again with his *left* wing without aid from the fifth division. But my statement makes both the *right* and *centre* of his division to be forced, and gives the fifth division, and especially Colonel Cameron and the 9th British regiment, a very large share in the glory, moreover I say that the 8th Portuguese was broken to pieces. Mr. Robinson argues that this must be wrong, for, says he, the 8th Portuguese were not broken, and if the right of the third division had been forced, the French would have encountered the fifth division. To this he adds, with a confidence singularly rash, his scanty knowledge of facts considered, that Colonel Cameron and the 9th regiment would doubtless have made as good a charge as I have described, "*only they were not there.*"

In reply, it is now affirmed, distinctly and positively, that the French did break the 8th Portuguese regiment, did gain the rocks on the summit of the position, and on the *right* of the third division; did ensconce themselves in those rocks, and were going to sweep the summit of the Sierra when the fifth division under General Leith, attacked them; and the 9th regiment led by Colonel Cameron did form under fire, as described, did charge, and did beat the enemy out of those rocks; and if they had not done so, the third division, then engaged with other troops, would have been in a very critical situation. Not only is all this re-affirmed, but it shall be proved by the most irrefragable testimony. It will then follow that the History is accurate, that General Picton's letter is inaccurate, and the writer of his life incompetent to censure others.

Mr. Robinson may notwithstanding choose to abide by the authority of General Picton's letter, which he "fortunately found amongst that general's manuscripts," but which others less fortunate had found in *print* many years before; and he is the more likely to do so, because he has asserted that if General Picton's letters are false, they are wilfully so, an assertion which it is impossible to assent to. It would be hard indeed if a man's veracity was to be called in question because his letters, written in the hurry of service, gave inaccurate details of a battle. General Picton wrote what he believed to be the fact, but to give any historical weight to his letter on this occasion, in opposition to the testimony which shall now be adduced against its accuracy, would be weakness. And with the more reason it is rejected, because Mr. Robinson himself admits that another letter, written by General Picton on this occasion to the Duke of Queensbury, was so inaccurate as to give general offence to the army; and because his letters on two other occasions are as incorrect as on this of Busaco.

Thus writing of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, Picton says, "about this time, namely, when the third division carried the main breach, the light division, which was rather late in their attack, also succeeded in getting possession of the breach they were ordered to attack." Now it has been proved to demonstration, that the light division carried the small breach, and were actually attacking the flank of the French troops defending the great breach, when the third division carried that point. This indeed is so certain, that Mr. Uniack of the 95th, and others of the light division, were destroyed on the ramparts close to the great breach by that very explosion which was said to have killed General M'Kinnon; and some have gone so far as to assert that it is doubtful if the great breach would have been carried at all but for the flank attack of the light division.

Again, General Picton, writing of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, says, "the light division under General Craufurd was rather *roughly handled by the enemy's cavalry*, and had that arm of the French army been as daring and active upon this occasion, as they were when following us to the lines of Torres Vedras, they would doubtless have cut off the light division to a man."

Nevertheless as an eye-witness, and, being then a field-officer on the staff, by Mr. Robinson's rule entitled to see, I declare most solemnly that the French cavalry, though they often menaced to charge, never came within sure shot distance of the light division. The latter, with the exception of the 95th rifles, who were skirmishing in the wood of Pozo Velho, was

formed by regiments in three squares, flanking and protecting each other, they retired over the plain leisurely without the loss of a man, without a sabre-wound being received, without giving or receiving fire; they moved in the most majestic manner, secure in their discipline and strength, which was such as would have defied all the cavalry that ever charged under Tamerlane or Ghenghis.

But it is time to give the proofs relative to Busaco, the reader being requested to compare them with the description of that battle in my History.

Extracts from MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN CAMERON'S letters to COLONEL NAPIER.

"Government House, Devonport, Aug. 9th, 1834.

"—I am sorry to perceive in the recent publication of Lord Beresford, his *"Refutation of your justification of your third volume,"* some remarks on the battle of Busaco which disfigure, not intentionally I should hope, the operations of the British brigade in Major-General Leith's corps on that occasion, of which I, as commanding officer of one of the regiments composing it, may perhaps be permitted to know something. I shall however content myself at present with giving you a detail of the operations of the British brigade in Major-General Leith's *own words*, extracted from a document in my possession, every syllable of which can be verified by many distinguished officers now living, some of them actors in, all of them eyewitnesses to the affair.

"The ground where the British brigade was now moving, was behind a chain of rocky eminences where it had appeared clearly, the enemy was successfully pushing to establish himself and precluded Major-General Leith from seeing at that moment the progress the enemy was making, but by the information of staff officers stationed on purpose who communicated his direction and progress. Major-General Leith moved the British brigade so as to endeavour to meet and check the enemy when he had gained the ascendancy. At this time a heavy fire of musketry was kept upon the height, the smoke of which prevented a clear view of the state of things. When however the rock forming the high part of the Sierra became visible, the enemy appeared in full possession of it, and a French officer was in the act of cheering with his hat off, while a continual fire was kept up from thence and along the whole face of the Sierra, in a diagonal direction towards the bottom, by the enemy ascending rapidly from the successive columns formed for the attack, on a mass of soldiers from the 8th and 9th Portuguese regiments, who having been severely pressed had given way and were rapidly retiring in complete confusion and disorder. Major-General Leith on that occasion spoke to Major Birmingham (who was on foot, having had his horse killed), who stated that the fugitives were of the 9th Portuguese as well as the 8th regiment, and that he had ineffectually tried to check their retreat. Major-General Leith addressed and succeeded in stopping them, and they cheered when he ordered them to be collected and formed in the rear. They were passing as they retired diagonally to the right of the 9th British regiment. The face of affairs in this quarter now bore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant, having dispersed or driven everything opposed to him, was in possession of the rocky eminence of the Sierra at this part of Major-General Picton's position without a shot then being fired at him. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-General Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the 9th British regiment, which had hitherto been moving rapidly by its left in column in order, to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time perceived the British brigade under him. Major-General Leith had intended that the 38th regiment should have moved on in rear of, and to the left of, the 9th British regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the Sierra, while the 9th should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height; the royal Scots to have been posted (as they were) in reserve. But the enemy, having driven everything before him in that quarter, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting and frequently in double-quick time. The 38th regiment was therefore directed to form also and support when Major-General Leith led the 9th regiment to attack the enemy on the rocky ridge, which they did without firing a shot. That part which looks behind the Sierra (as already stated) was inaccessible and afforded the enemy the advantage of outflanking the 9th on the left as they advanced, but the order, celerity, and coolness with which they attacked panic-struck the enemy, who immediately gave way on being charged with the bayonet, and the whole was driven down the face of the Sierra in confusion and with immense loss, from a destructive fire which the 9th regiment opened upon him as he fled with precipitation after the charge."

"I shall merely add two observations on what has been asserted in the *'Refutation.'*

"First with regard to the confusion and retreat of a portion of the Portuguese troops, I certainly did not know at the moment what Portuguese corps the fugitives were of, but after the action I understood they were belonging to the 8th Portuguese; a very considerable number of them were crossing the front of the British column dispersed in sixes and sevens over the field, just before I wheeled the 9th regiment into line for the attack. I pushed on a few yards to

entreat them to keep out of our way, which they understood and called out 'viva los Ingleses, valerosos Portugueses.'

"As regards any support which the Portuguese afforded the British brigade in the pursuit, I beg to say that during the charge, while leading the regiment in front of the centre, my horse was killed under me, which for a moment retarded my own personal advance, and on extricating myself from under him, I turned round and saw the 38th regiment close up with us and the royal Scots appearing over the ridge in support; but did not see any Portuguese join in the pursuit, indeed it would have been imprudent in them to attempt such a thing, for at the time a brisk cannonade was opened upon us from the opposite side of the ravine.

"This, my dear colonel, is, on my honour, an account of the operations of the British brigade in Major-General Leith's corps at Busaco. It will be satisfactory to you to know that the information you received has been correct. The anonymous officer of the 9th regiment I do not know. There were several very capable of furnishing you with good information on the transactions of that day, not only as regarded their own immediate corps, but those around them. Colonel Waller I should consider excellent authority; that gallant officer must have been an eye-witness to all that passed in the divisions of Picton and Leith. I remember on our approach to the scene of confusion he delivered me a message from General Picton, intended for General Leith, at the time reconnoitring, to hasten our advance."

Government House, Devonport, Aug. 21, 1834.

"—The fact really is that both the 8th and 9th Portuguese regiments gave way that morning, and I am positive that I am not far wrong in saying, that there were not of Portuguese troops within my view, at the moment I wheeled the 9th regiment into line, 100 men prepared either for attack or defence. Sir James Douglas partly admits that his wing was broken when he says that 'if we were at any time broken it was from the too ardent wish of a corps of boy recruits to close.' Now it is perfectly clear that the wing of the regiment under Major Birmingham fled, from what that officer said to General Leith. Sir James Douglas states also that 'no candid man will deny that he supported the royals and 9th regiment, though before that he says, that 'by an oblique movement he joined in the charge.' I might safely declare on oath that the Portuguese never showed themselves beyond the ridge of the Sierra that morning.

"Very faithfully yours,

"JOHN CAMERON."

As these letters from General Cameron refer to some of Marshal Beresford's errors, as well as Mr. Robinson's, an extract from a letter of Colonel Thorne's upon the same subject will not be misplaced here.

COLONEL THORNE to COLONEL NAPIER.

'Harborne Lodge, 28th Aug., 1834.

Extract.—"Viscount Beresford in the '*Refutation of your Justification of your third volume*,' has doubted the accuracy of the strength of the third dragoon guards and fourth dragoons on the 20th March, 1811, as extracted by you from the journal which I lent to you. As I felt confident I had not inserted anything therein, which I did not obtain from *official documents*, that were in my possession at the time it was written, I have, since the perusal of the '*Refutation*,' looked over some of my Peninsula papers, and I am happy to say I have succeeded in finding amongst them the monthly returns of quarters of the division of cavalry, commanded by Brigadier-General Long, dated Los Santos, April 20th, 1811, which was then sent to me by the deputy assistant quarter-master-general of that division, and which I beg to enclose for your perusal, in order that you may see the statement I have made of the strength of that force in my journal *is to be relied upon, although his lordship insinuates to the contrary, and that it contains something more than 'the depositary of the rumours of a camp.'*"

Extract from memorandum of the battle of Busaco, by COLONEL WALLER, assistant quarter-master-general to the second division.

"—The attack commenced on the right wing, consisting of Picton's division, by the enemy opening a fire of artillery upon the right of the British which did but little injury, the range being too great to prove effective. At this moment were seen the heads of the several attacking columns, THREE, I THINK, in number, and deploying into line with the most beautiful precision, celerity, and gallantry.

"As they formed on the plateau they were cannonaded from our position, and the regiment of Portuguese, either the 8th or the 16th infantry, which were formed in advance in front of the 74th regiment, threw in some volleys of musketry into the enemy's columns in a flank direction, but the regiment was quickly driven into the position.

"More undaunted courage never was displayed by French troops than on this occasion: it could not have been surpassed, for their columns advanced in despite of a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from our troops in position in the rocks, and overcoming all opposition, although repeatedly charged by Lightburne's brigade, or rather by the whole of Picton's division, they advanced, and fairly drove the BRITISH RIGHT wing from the rocky part of the position.

"*Being an eye-witness* of this critical moment, and seeing that unless the ground was quickly recovered *the right flank* of the army would *infallibly* be turned, and the *great road* to Coimbra *unmasked*, seeing also that heavy columns of the enemy were descending into the valley to operate by the *road*, and to support the attack of the Sierra, and to cut off Lord Wellington's communication with Coimbra, I instantly galloped off to the rear to bring up General Hill's corps to Picton's support. Having proceeded about *two miles* along the upper edge and reverse side of the Sierra, I fell in with the head of General Leith's column moving *left in front*, at the head of which was Colonel Cameron's brigade, led by the 9th regiment. I immediately rode up to Colonel Cameron, and addressed him in an anxious tone as follows: "Pray, sir, who commands this brigade?" 'I do,' replied the colonel, 'I am Colonel Cameron.'

"Then for God's sake, sir, move off instantly at *double quick* with your brigade to Picton's support; *not one moment* is to be lost, the enemy in great force are already in possession of the *right of the position* on the Sierra and have driven Picton's troops out of it. Move on, and when the rear of your brigade has passed the Coimbra road wheel into line, and you will embrace the point of attack.' Colonel Cameron did not hesitate or *balance* an instant, but giving the word '*double-quick*' to his brigade nobly led them to battle and to victory.

"The brave colonel attacked the enemy with such a gallant and irresistible impetuosity, that after some time fighting he recovered the ground which Picton had lost, inflicting *heavy slaughter* on the elite of the enemy's troops. The 9th regiment behaved on this occasion with conspicuous gallantry, as *indeed* did ALL the REGIMENT'S engaged. Great numbers of the enemy had descended low down in the rear of the position towards the Coimbra road, and were killed; the whole position was thickly strewn with their killed and wounded; amongst which *were many of our own troops*. The French were the finest men I ever saw. I spoke to several of the wounded men, light infantry and grenadiers, who were bewailing their unhappy fate on being defeated, assuring me they were the heroes of Austerlitz who had never before met with defeat!

"ROBERT WALLER, *Lieut.-Colonel*."

Extract of a letter from COLONEL TAYLOR, 9th regiment, to COLONEL NAPIER.

"DEAR SIR,

"*Fernhill, near Evesham, 26th April, 1832.*

"I have just received a letter from Colonel Shaw, in which he quotes a passage from one of yours to him, expressive of your wish, if necessary, to print a passage from a statement which I made respecting the conduct of the 9th regiment at Busaco, and in reference to which, I have alluded to the discomforture of the 8th Portuguese upon the same occasion. I do not exactly recollect the terms I made use of to Colonel Shaw (nor indeed the shape which my communication wore) but, my object was to bring to light the distinguished conduct of the 9th without any wish to, unnecessarily, obscure laurels, which others wore, even at their expense!

"To account for the affair in question, I could not however well omit to state, that it was in consequence of the overthrow of the 8th Portuguese, that Sir James Leith's British brigade was called upon, and it is remarkable, that at the time, there was a considerable force of Portuguese (I think it was the old Lusitanian Legion which had just been modelled into two battalions) *between* Leith's British and where the 8th were being engaged, Leith pushed on his brigade double-quick, column of sections left in front, past these Portuguese, nor did he halt until he came in contact with the enemy who had *crowned the heights* and were firing from behind the rocks, the 9th wheeled up into line, fired and charged, and all of the 8th Portuguese that was to be seen, at least by me, a company officer at the time, was some ten or a dozen men *at the outside*, with their commanding officer, but he and they were amongst the very foremost in the ranks of the 9th British. As an officer in the ranks of course I could not see much of what was going on generally, neither could I well have been mistaken as to what I did see, coming almost within my very contact! Colonel Waller, now, I believe on the Liverpool staff, was the officer who came to Sir James Leith for assistance, I presume from Picton.

"Yours, etc.

"J. TAYLOR."

Second communication from MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN CAMERON to COLONEL NAPIER.

"MY DEAR COLONEL,

"*Stoke Devonport, Nov. 21st, 1835.*

"Some months ago I took the liberty of pointing out to you certain misstatements contained in a publication of Lord Beresford regarding the operations of the British brigade in Major-General Leith's corps at the battle of Busaco, and as those misstatements are again brought before the public in Robinson's "*Life of Sir Thomas Picton*" I am induced to trouble you with some remarks upon what is therein advanced. A paragraph in Major-General Picton's letter to Lord Wellington, dated 10th November, 1810, which I first discovered some years ago in the Appendix No. 12 of Jones's "*War in Spain, etc., etc.*" would appear to be the document upon which Mr. Robinson grounds his contradiction of your statement of the conduct of the 9th regiment at Busaco, but *that* paragraph, which runs as follows, I am bound to say is *not* the truth. 'Major-General Leith's brigade in consequence marched on, and arrived in time to *join* the five companies of the 45th regiment under the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel

Meade and the 8th Portuguese regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas in repulsing the enemy.' This assertion of Major-General Picton is, I repeat, *not true*, for, in the first place I did not see the 45th regiment on that day, nor was I at any period during the action near them or any other British regiment to my left. In the second, as regards the 8th Portuguese regiment, the 9th British did not most assuredly join *that* corps in its retrograde movement. That Major-General Picton left his right flank exposed, there can be no question, and had not assistance, and *British* assistance too, come up to his aid as it did, I am inclined to believe that Sir Thomas would have cut a very different figure in the despatch to what he did!! Having already given you a detail of the defeat of the enemy's column which was permitted to gain the ascendancy in considerable force on the right of the third division, I beg leave to refer you to the gallant officers I mentioned in a former letter, who were not only eye-witnesses to the charge made by the 9th regiment but actually distinguished themselves in front of the regiment at the side of their brave accomplished general during that charge. I believe the whole of Sir Rowland Hill's division, from a bend in the Sierra, could see the 9th in their pursuit of the enemy, and though last not the least in importance, as a party concerned, I may mention the present Major-General Sir James T. Barns, who commanded the British brigade under Major-General Leith (I omitted this gallant officer's name in my former letter), as the major-general took the entire command and from him alone I received all orders during the action.

"I have now done with Mr. Robinson and his work, which was perhaps hardly worth my notice.

"I am, my dear Colonel,

"Very sincerely yours,

"J. CAMERON."

Having now sufficiently exposed the weakness of Mr. Robinson's attack upon me, it would be well perhaps, to say with Sir J. Cameron "I have done with his work," but I am tempted to notice two points more.

Treating of the storming of Badajos, Mr. Robinson says, "Near the appointed time, while the men were waiting with increased anxiety, Picton with his staff came up. The troops fell in, all were in a moment silent until the general in his calm and impressive manner addressed a few words to each regiment. The signal was not yet given, but the enemy by means of lighted carcasses discovered the position of Picton's soldiers; to delay longer would only have been to expose his men unnecessarily; he therefore gave the word to march."—"Picton's soldiers set up a loud shout and rushed forward up the steep *to the ditch at the foot of the castle walls*. General Kempt, who had thus far been with Picton at the head of the division, was here badly wounded and carried to the rear. Picton was therefore left alone to conduct the assault."

Now, strange to say, Picton was not present when the signal was given, and consequently could neither address his men in his "usual calm impressive manner," nor give them the word to march. There was no ditch at the foot of the castle walls to rush up to, and, as the following letter proves, General Kempt alone led the division to the attack.

Extract of a letter from LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JAMES KEMPT, K.C.B., Master-General of the Ordnance, etc., etc.

"*Pall Mall, 10th May, 1833.*

"According to the first arrangement made by Lord Wellington, my brigade only of the third division was destined to attack the castle by escalade. The two other brigades were to have attacked the bastion adjoining the castle, and to open a communication with it. *On the day, however, before the assault* took place, this arrangement was changed by Lord Wellington, a French deserter from the castle (a sergeant of sappers) gave information that no communication could be established between the castle and the adjoining bastion, there being, he stated, only one communication between the castle and the town, and upon learning this, the whole of the third division were ordered by Lord Wellington to attack the castle. But as my brigade only was originally destined for the service, and was to lead the attack, the arrangements for the escalade were in a great measure confided to me by General Picton.

"The division had to *file* across a very narrow bridge to the attack under a fire from the castle and the troops in the covered way. It was ordered to commence at ten o'clock, but by means of fire-balls the formation of our troops at the head of the trench was discovered by the French, who opened a heavy fire on them, and the attack was commenced *from necessity* nearly half an hour before the time ordered. I was severely wounded in the foot on the glacis after passing the Rivillas almost at the commencement of the attack *in the trenches*, and met Picton coming to the front on my being carried to the rear. If the attack had not commenced till the hour ordered, he, I have no doubt, would have been on the spot to direct in person the commencement of the operations. I have no *personal* knowledge of what took place afterwards, but I was informed that after surmounting the most formidable difficulties, the escalade was effected by means of *two* ladders only in the first instance in the middle of the night, and there can be no question that Picton was present in the assault. In giving an account of this operation, pray bear in mind that *he* commanded the division, and to *him* and the enthusiastic valour and determination of the troops ought its success alone to be attributed.

"Yours, etc.,

"JAMES KEMPT."

"Colonel Napier, etc."

The other point to which I would allude is the battle of Salamanca. Mr. Robinson, with his baton of military criticism, belabours the unfortunate Marmont unmercifully, and with an unhappy minuteness of detail, first places General Foy's troops on the *left* of the French army and then destroys them by the bayonets of the third division, although the poor man and his unlucky soldiers were all the time on the *right* of the French army, and were never engaged with the third division at all. This is, however, but a slight blemish for Mr. Robinson's book, and his competence to criticise Marmont's movements is no whit impaired thereby. I wish, however, to assure him that the expression put into the mouth of the late Sir Edward Pakenham is "*né vero né ben trovato*." Vulgar swaggering was no part of that amiable man's character, which was composed of as much gentleness, as much generosity, as much frankness, and as much spirit as ever commingled in a noble mind. Alas! that he should have fallen so soon and so sadly! His answer to Lord Wellington, when the latter ordered him to attack, was not, "I will, my lord, by God!" With the bearing of a gallant gentleman who had resolved to win or perish, he replied, "Yes, if you will give me one grasp of that conquering right hand." But these finer lines do not suit Mr. Robinson's carving of a hero; his manner is more after the coarse menacing idols of the South-Sea Islands, than the delicate gracious forms of Greece.

Advice to authors is generally thrown away, yet Mr. Robinson would do well to re-write his book with fewer inaccuracies, and fewer military disquisitions, avoiding to swell its bulk with such long extracts from my work, and remembering also that English commissaries are not "*fera natura*" to be hanged, or otherwise destroyed at the pleasure of divisional generals. This will save him the trouble of attributing to Sir Thomas Picton all the standard jokes and smart sayings, for the scaring of those gentry, which have been current ever since the American war, and which have probably come down to us from the Greeks. The reduction of bulk, which an attention to these matters will produce, may be compensated by giving us more information of Picton's real services, towards which I contribute the following information. Picton in his youth served as a marine, troops being then used in that capacity, and it is believed he was in one of the great naval victories. Mr. Robinson has not mentioned this, and it would be well also, if he were to learn and set forth some of the general's generous actions towards the widows of officers who fell under his command: they are to be discovered, and would do more honour to his memory than a thousand blustering anecdotes. With these changes and improvements, the life of Sir Thomas Picton may perhaps, in future, escape the equivocal compliment of the newspaper puffers, namely, that it is "a military romance."

ANSWERS TO SOME ATTACKS IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

THIS is but a sorry attack to repel. "*Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*," but "rats and mice and such small deer have been Tom's food for many a year."

The reviewer does not like my work, and he invokes the vinous vagaries of Mr. Coleridge in aid of his own spleen. I do not like his work, or Mr. Coleridge either, and I console myself with a maxim of the late eccentric General Meadows, who being displeased to see his officers wear their cocked hats awry, issued an order beginning thus:—"All men have fancy, few have taste." Let that pass. I am ready to acknowledge real errors, and to give my authorities for disputed facts.

1. I admit that the road which leads over the Pyrenees to Pampeluna does not *unite* at that town with the royal causeway; yet the error was *typographical*, not *topographical*, because the course of the royal causeway was shown, just before, to be through towns very distant from Pampeluna. The true reading should be "*united with the first by a branch road commencing at Pampeluna*."

2. The reviewer says, the mountains round Madrid do not touch the Tagus at both ends within the frontier of Spain, that river is not the chord of their arc; neither are the heights of Palmela and Almada near Lisbon one and the same. This is very true, although not very important. I should have written the heights of Palmela and Almada, instead of the heights of Palmela *or* Almada. But though the mountains round Madrid do not to the westward, actually touch the Tagus within the Spanish frontier, their shoots are scarcely three miles from that river near Talavera, and my description was general, being intended merely to show that Madrid could not be approached from the eastward or northward, except over one of the mountain ranges, a fact not to be disputed.

3. It is hinted by the reviewer that Lord Melville's degrading observation, namely, that "the worst men made the best soldiers," was picked by me out of General Foy's historical fragment. Now, that passage in my history was written many months before General Foy's work was published; and my authority was a very clear recollection of Lord Melville's speech, as reported in the papers of the day. The time was just before his impeachment for malversation.

General Foy's work seems a favourite authority with the reviewer, and he treats General Thiebault's work with disdain; yet both were Frenchmen of eminence, and the ennobling patriotism of vituperation might have been impartially exercised, the weakness of discrimination avoided. However, General Thiebault's work, with some apparent inaccuracies as to numbers, is written with great ability and elegance, and is genuine, whereas General Foy's history is not even General Foy's writing; Colonel D'Esmenard, in his recent translation of the Prince of Peace's "Memoirs," has the following conclusive passage upon that head:

"The illustrious General Foy undertook a history of the war in Spain, his premature death prevented him from revising and purifying his first sketch, he did me the honour to speak of it several times, and even attached some value to my observations; the imperfect manuscripts of this brilliant orator have been re-handled and re-made by other hands. In this posthumous history, he has been gratuitously provided with inaccurate and malignant assertions."

While upon this subject, it is right to do justice to Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace. A sensual and corrupt man he was generally said to be, and I called him so, without sufficient consideration of the extreme exaggerations which the Spaniards always display in their hatred. The prince has now defended himself; Colonel D'Esmenard and other persons well acquainted with the dissolute manners of the Spanish capital, and having personal experience of Godoy's character and disposition, have testified that his social demeanour was decent and reserved, and his disposition generous; wherefore I express my regret at having ignorantly and unintentionally calumniated him.

To return to the reviewer. He is continually observing that he does not know my authority for such and such a fact, and therefore he insinuates that no such fact had place, thus making his ignorance the measure of my accuracy. This logic seems to be akin to that of the wild-beast showman, who declares that "the little negro boys tie the ostrich bird's leg to a tree,

which fully accounts for the milk in the cocoa-nuts." I might reply generally as the late Alderman Coombe did to a certain baronet, who, in a dispute, was constantly exclaiming, "I don't know that, Mr. Alderman! I don't know that!" "Ah, Sir George! all that you *don't know* would make a large book!" However, it will be less witty, but more conclusive to furnish at least some of my authorities.

1. In opposition to the supposititious General Foy's account of Solano's murder, and in support of my own history, I give the authority of Sir Hew Dalrymple, from whom the information was obtained; a much better authority than Foy, because he was in close correspondence with the insurgents of Seville at the time, and had an active intelligent agent there.

2. Against the supposititious Foy's authority as to the numbers of the French army in June, 1808, the authority of Napoleon's imperial returns is pleaded. From these returns my estimate of the French forces in Spain during May, 1808, was taken, and it is so stated in my Appendix. The inconsistency of the reviewer himself may also be noticed, for he marks my number as *exclusive* of Junot's army, and yet *includes* that army in what he calls Foy's estimate! But Junot's army was more than 29,000 and not 24,000, as the supposititious Foy has it, and that number taken from 116,000 which, though wrong, is Foy's estimate of the whole, leaves less than 87,000. I said 80,000. The difference is not great, yet my authority is the best, and the reviewer feels that it is so, or he would also have adopted General Foy's numbers of the French at the combat of Roliça. In Foy's history they are set down as less than 2500, in mine they are called 5000. He may be right, but it would not suit the reviewer to adopt a *truth* from a French writer.

3. On the negative proofs afforded, 1st, by the absence of any quoted voucher in my work; 2nd, by the absence of any acknowledgment of such a fact in General Anstruther's manuscript journal, which journal may or may not be garbled, the reviewer asserts that the English ministers never contemplated the appointing of a military governor for Cadiz. Against this, let the Duke of Wellington's authority be pleaded, for in my note-book of conversations held with his grace upon the subject of my history, the following passage occurs:—

"The ministers were always wishing to occupy Cadiz, Lord Wellington thinks this a folly, Cadiz was rather a burthen to him, but either General Spencer or General Anstruther was intended to command there, thinks it was Anstruther, he came out with his appointment."

Now it is possible that as Acland's arrival was also the subject of conversation, his name was mentioned instead of Anstruther's; and it is also possible, as the note shows, that Spencer was the man, but the main fact relative to the government could not have been mistaken. To balance this, however, there undoubtedly is an error as to the situation of General Anstruther's brigade at the battle of Vimiero. It appears by an extract from his journal, that it was disposed, not, as the reviewer says, on the right of Fane's brigade, but at various places, part being on the right of Fane, part upon his left, part held in reserve. The 43rd were on the left of Fane, the 52nd and 97th on his right, the 9th in reserve, the error is therefore very trivial, being simply the describing two regiments as of Fane's brigade, when they were of Anstruther's, without altering their position. What does the public care whether it was a general called Fane, or a general called Anstruther, who was on the right hand if the important points of the action are correctly described? The fighting of the 52nd and 97th has indeed been but slightly noticed, in my history, under the denomination of Fane's right, whereas those regiments made a good figure, and justly so, in Anstruther's journal, because it is the story of the brigade; but general history ought not to enter into the details of regimental fighting, save where the effects are decisive on the general result, as in the case of the 50th and 43rd on this occasion. The whole loss of the 97th and 52nd together did not exceed 60 killed and wounded, whereas the 50th alone lost 90, and the 43rd 118.

While on the subject of Anstruther's brigade, it is right also to admit another error, one of place; that is if it be true, as the reviewer says, that Anstruther landed at Paymayo bay, and not at Maceira bay. The distance between those places may be about five miles, and the fact had no influence whatever on the operations; nevertheless the error was not drawn from Mr. Southey's history, though I readily acknowledge I could not go to a more copious source of error. With respect to the imputed mistake as to time, viz., the day of Anstruther's landing, it is set down in my first edition as the 19th, wherefore the 18th in the third edition is simply a mistake of the press! Alas! poor reviewer!

But there are graver charges. I have maligned the worthy bishop of Oporto; and ill-used the patriotic Gallician junta! Reader, the bishop of Oporto and the patriarch of Lisbon are one and the same person! Examine then my history and especially its appendix and judge for yourself, whether the reviewer may not justly be addressed as the pope was by Richard I. when he sent him the Bishop of Beauvais' bloody suit of mail. "See now if this be thy son's coat." But the junta! Why it is true that I said they glossed over the battle of Rio Seco after the Spanish manner; that their policy was but a desire to obtain money, and to avoid personal inconvenience; that they gave Sir Arthur Wellesley incorrect statements of the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards at Oporto, and a more inaccurate estimate of the French army under Junot. All this is true. It is true that I have said it, true that they did it. The reviewer *says* my statement is a "gratuitous misrepresentation." I will *prove* that the reviewer's remark is a gratuitous impertinence.

1. The junta informed Sir Arthur Wellesley, that Bessieres had 20,000 men in the battle, whereas he had but 15,000.

2. That Cuesta lost only two guns, whereas he lost 18.
3. That Bessieres lost 7000 men and six guns, whereas he lost only 350 men, and no guns.
4. That the Spanish army had retired to Benevente, as if it still preserved its consistence, whereas Blake and Cuesta had quarrelled and separated, all the magazines of the latter had been captured, and the whole country was at the mercy of the French. This was glossing it over in the Spanish manner.

Again, the junta pretended that they desired the deliverance of Portugal to enable them to unite with the southern provinces in a general effort; but Mr. Stuart's letters prove that they would never unite at all with any other province, and that their aim was to separate from Spain altogether and join Portugal. Their wish to avoid personal inconvenience was notorious, it was the cause of their refusal to let Sir David Baird's troops disembark, it was apparent to all who had to deal with them, and it belongs to the national character. Then their eagerness to obtain money, and their unpatriotic use of it when obtained, has been so amply set forth in various parts of my history that I need not do more than refer to that, and to my quoted authorities, especially in the second chapters of the 3rd and 14th books. Moreover the reviewer's quotations belie his comments, and like the slow-worm defined by Johnson "a blind worm, a large viper, *venomous, not mortal*," he is at once dull and malignant.

The junta told Sir Arthur Wellesley that 10,000 Portuguese troops were at Oporto, and that 2000 Spaniards, who had marched the 15th, would be there on the 25th of July; yet when Sir Arthur arrived at Oporto, on the 25th, he found only 1500 Portuguese and 300 Spaniards; the 2000 men said to be in march had never moved and were not expected. Here, then, instead of 12,000 men, there were only 1800! At Coimbra indeed 80 miles from Oporto, there were 5000 militia and regulars, one third of which were unarmed, and according to Colonel Browne's letter, as given in the folio edition of the inquiry upon the Cintra convention, there were also 1200 armed peasants which the reviewer has magnified into 12,000. Thus without dwelling on the difference of place, the difference between the true numbers and the statements of the Gallician junta, was 4000; nor will it mend the matter if we admit the armed peasants to be 12,000, for that would make a greater difference on the other side.

The junta estimated the French at 15,000 men, but the embarkation returns of the number shipped after the convention gave 25,760, making a difference of more than 10,000 men, exclusive of those who had fallen or been captured in the battles of Vimiero and Roliça, and of those who had died in hospital! Have I not a right to treat these as inaccurate statements; and the reviewer's remark as an impertinence?

The reviewer, speaking of the battle of Baylen, scoffs at the inconsistency of calling it an insignificant event and yet attributing to it immense results. But my expression was, an insignificant *action in itself*, which at once reconciles the seeming contradiction, and this the writer who has no honest healthy criticism, suppresses. My allusion to the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, as being the saviours of American independence, also excites his morbid spleen, and assuming what is not true, namely, that I selected that period as the time of the greatest improvement in American discipline, he says, their soldiers there were few, as if that bore at all upon the question.

But my expression is *at Valley Forge* not "*of Valley Forge*." The allusion was used figuratively to show that an armed peasantry cannot resist regular troops, and Washington's correspondence is one continued enforcement of the principle, yet the expression may also be taken literally. It was with the battalions *of Valley Forge* that Washington drew Howe to the Delaware, and twice crossing that river in winter, surprised the Germans at Trenton and beat the British at Prince Town. It was with those battalions he made his attacks at German's-town; with those battalions he prevented Howe from sending assistance to Burgoyne's army, which was in consequence captured. In fine, to use his own expression, "The British eagle's wings were spread, and with those battalions he clipped them." The American general, however, at one time occupied, close to Valley Forge, a camp in the Jerseys, bearing the odd name of *Quibble-town*, on which probably the reviewer's eye was fixed.

But, notwithstanding Quibble-town, enthusiasm will not avail in the long run against discipline. Is authority wanted? We have had Napoleon's and Washington's, and now we have Wellington's, for in the fifth volume of his "*Despatches*," p. 215, as compiled by Colonel Gurwood, will be found the following passage upon the arming of the Spanish and Portuguese people:

"Reflection, and, above all, experience have shown me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view, and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French, will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies by any notion that the people when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much, use to them. The subject is too large for discussion in a paper of this description, but I can show hundreds of instances to prove the truth of as many reasons why exertions of this description ought not to be relied on. At all events no officer can calculate upon an operation to be performed against the French by persons of this description, and I believe that no officer will enter upon an operation against the French without calculating his means most anxiously."

It is said that some officers of rank have furnished the reviewer's military criticisms, I can understand why, if the fact be true, but it is difficult to believe that any officer would even for the gratification of a contemptible jealousy, have lent himself to the assertion that Sir

Arthur Wellesley could not have made a *forced or a secret march* from Vimiero to Mafra, because he was encumbered with 400 bullock-carts. Sir Arthur did certainly intend to make that march, and he would as certainly not have attempted such a flank movement *openly and deliberately* while thus encumbered and moving at the rate of two miles an hour, within a short distance of a general having a more experienced army and an overwhelming cavalry. The sneer is therefore directed more against Sir Arthur Wellesley than against me.

This supposed officer of rank says that because the enemy had a shorter road to move in retreat, his line of march could not even be menaced, still less intercepted by his opponent moving on the longer route! How then did Caesar intercept Afranius and Petreius, Pompey's lieutenants, on the Sicoris? How Pompey himself at Dyrrachium? How did Napoleon pass Beaulieu on the Po and gain Lodi? How did Massena dislodge Wellington from Busaco? How did Marmont turn him on the Guarena, in 1812? How did Wellington himself turn the French on the Douro and on the Ebro, in 1813? And above all, how did he propose to turn Torres Vedras by the very march in question, seeing that from Torres Vedras to Mafra is only 12 miles and from Vimiero to Mafra is 19 miles, the roads leading besides over a river and through narrow ways and defiles? But who ever commended such dangerous movements, if they were not masked or their success insured by some peculiar circumstances, or by some stratagem? And what is my speculation but a suggestion of this nature? "Under certain circumstances," said Sir Arthur Wellesley at the inquiry, "an army might have gained three hours' start in such a march." The argument of the supposititious officer of rank is therefore a foolish sophism; nor is that relative to Sir John Moore's moving upon Santarem, nor the assertion that my plan was at variance with all Sir Arthur Wellesley's objects, more respectable.

My plan, as it is invidiously and falsely called, was simply a reasoning upon the advantages of Sir Arthur Wellesley's plan, and the calculation of days by the reviewer is mere mysticism. Sir Arthur wished Sir John Moore to go to Santarem, and if Sir Arthur's recommendation had been followed, Sir John Moore, who, instead of taking five days as this writer would have him do, actually disembarked the greatest part of his troops in the Mondego in half a day, that is before one o'clock on the 22nd, might have been at Santarem the 27th even according to the reviewer's scale of march, 10 miles a day! Was he to remain idle there, if the enemy did not abandon Lisbon and the strong positions covering that city? If he could stop Junot's retreat either at Santarem or in the Alentejo, a cavalry country, he could surely as safely operate towards Saccavem, a strong country. What was Sir A. Wellesley's observation on that head? "If the march to Mafra had been made as I had ordered it on the 21st of August in the morning, the position of Torres Vedras would have been turned, and there was no position in the enemy's possession, excepting that in our front at Cabeça de Montechique and those in rear of it. And I must observe to the court that if Sir John Moore's corps had gone to Santarem as proposed as soon as it disembarked in the Mondego, there would have been no great safety in those positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in our power to beat the French." Lo! then, my plan is not at variance with Sir Arthur Wellesley's object. But the whole of the reviewer's sophistry is directed, both as to this march and that to Mafra, not against me, but through me against the Duke of Wellington, whom the writer dare not attack openly; witness his cunning defence of that "*wet-blanket*" counsel which stopped Sir Arthur Wellesley's pursuit of Junot from the field of Vimiero. Officer of rank! Aye, it sounds grandly! but it was a shrewd thing of Agesilaus when any one was strongly recommended to him to ask "who will vouch for the voucher?"

Passing now from the officer of rank, I affirm, notwithstanding Mr. Southey's "magnificent chapters" and Sir Charles Vaughan's "brief and elegant work," that the statement about Palafox and Zaragoza is correct. My authority is well known to Sir Charles Vaughan, and is such as he is not likely to dispute; that gentlemen will not, I feel well assured, now guarantee the accuracy of the tales he was told at Zaragoza. But my real offence is not the disparagement of Palafox, it is the having spoiled some magnificent romances, present or to come; for I remembered the Roman saying about the "Lying Greek fable," and endeavoured so to record the glorious feats of my countrymen, that even our enemies should admit the facts. And they have hitherto done so, with a magnanimity becoming brave men who are conscious of merit in misfortune, thus putting to shame the grovelling spirit that would make calumny and vituperation the test of patriotism.

Since writing the above a second article has appeared in the same review, to which the only reply necessary, is the giving of more proofs that the passages of my history, contradicted by the reviewer, are strictly accurate. And to begin, it is necessary to inform him, that a man may be perfectly disciplined and a superb soldier, and yet be a raw soldier as to real service; and further, that staff officers may have been a long time in the English service, and yet be quite inexperienced. Even a quarter-master-general of an army has been known to commit all kinds of errors, and discover negligence and ignorance of his duty, in his first campaigns, who yet by dint of long practice became a very good officer in his line, though perhaps not so great a general as he would pass himself off for; for it was no ill saying of a Scotchman, that "some men, if bought at the world's price, might be profitably sold at their own." Now requesting the reader to observe that in the following quotations the impugned passages of my history are first given, and are followed by the authority, though not all the authority which might be adduced in support of each fact, I shall proceed to expose the reviewer's fallacies.

1. History.—“*Napoleon, accompanied by the Dukes of Dalmatia and Montebello, quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached Vittoria in the evening.*”

The reviewer contradicts this on the authority of Savary's “Memoirs,” quoting twice the pages and volume, namely, vol. iv, pages 12, 40, and 41. Now Savary is a writer so careless about dates, and small facts, as to have made errors of a month as to time in affairs which he conducted himself. Thus he says King Joseph abandoned Madrid on the 3rd of July, 1808, whereas it was on the 3rd of August. He also says the landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal was made known to him before the council of war relative to the evacuation of Madrid was held at that capital; but the council was held the 29th of July, and Sir Arthur did not land until the 1st of August! Savary is therefore no authority on such points. But there is no such passage as the reviewer quotes, in Savary's work. The reader will look for it in vain in pages 12, 40, and 41. It is neither in the fourth volume nor in any other volume. However at page 8 of the second volume, second part, he will find the following passage: “*L'Empereur prit la route d'Espagne avec toute son armée. Il arriva à Bayonne avec la rapidité d'un trait, de même que de Bayonne à Vittoria. Il fit ce dernier trajet à cheval en deux courses, de la première il alla à Tolosa et de la seconde à Vittoria.*” The words “*deux courses*” the reviewer with his usual candour translates, “*the first day to Tolosa, the second day to Vittoria.*” But notwithstanding this I repeat, that the emperor made his journey in one day. My authority is the assurance of a French officer of the general staff who was present, and if the value of the fact were worth the pains, I could show that it was very easy for Napoleon to do so, inasmuch as a private gentleman, the correspondent of one of the newspapers, has recently performed the same journey in fourteen hours. But my only object in noticing it at all is to show the flagrant falseness of the reviewer.

2. History.—“*Sir John Moore had to organize an army of raw soldiers, and in a poor unsettled country just relieved from the pressure of a harsh and gripping enemy, he had to procure the transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for the conveyance of the officers' baggage. Every branch of the administration, civil and military, was composed of men zealous and willing indeed, yet new to a service where no energy can prevent the effects of inexperience being severely felt.*”

Authorities.—Extracts from Sir John Moore's Journal and Letters:

“I am equipping the troops here and moving them towards the frontier, but I found the army without the least preparation, without any precise information with respect to roads, and no arrangement for feeding the troops upon their march.”—“The army is without equipments of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or any other appendage to an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the routes.”—“The commissariat has at its head Mr. Erskine, a gentleman of great integrity and honour, and of considerable ability, but neither he nor any of his officers have any experience of what an army of this magnitude requires to put it in motion.”—“Everything is, however, going on with zeal; there is no want of that in an English army, and though the difficulties are considerable, and we have to move through a very impracticable country, I expect to be past the frontier early in November.”

Extract from a memoir by Sir John Colborne, military secretary to Sir John Moore:

“The heads of departments were all zeal, but they had but little experience, and their means for supplying the wants of the army about to enter on an active campaign were in many respects limited.”

3. History.—“*One Sataro, the same person who has been already mentioned as an agent of Junot's in the negotiations, engaged to supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract so embarrassed the operations,*” etc., etc.

Authority.—Extract from Sir John Colborne's Memoir quoted above:

“Satara, a contractor at Lisbon, had agreed to supply the divisions on the march through Portugal. He failed in his contract, and daily complaints were transmitted to head-quarters of want of provisions on this account. The divisions of Generals Fraser and Beresford were halted, and had it not been for the exertions of these generals and of the Portuguese magistrates the army would have been long delayed.”

4. History.—“*General Anstruther had unadvisedly halted the leading columns in Almeida.*”

Authority.—Extract from Sir John Moore's Journal:

“Br.-General Anstruther, who took possession of Almeida from the French, and who has been there ever since, and to whom I had written to make preparations for the passage of the troops on this route and Coimbra, has stopt them within the Portuguese frontier instead of making them proceed as I had directed to Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca.”

5. History.—“*Sir John Moore did not hear of the total defeat and dispersion of Belvedere's Estremaduran army until a week after it happened, and then only through one official channel.*” That channel was Mr. Stuart. Sir John had heard indeed that the Estremadurans had been forced from Burgos, but nothing of their utter defeat and ruin: the difference is cunningly overlooked by the reviewer.

Authority.—Extract of a letter from Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, November 16, 1808:

“I had last night the honour to receive your letter of the 13th, together with letters of the 14th from Mr. Stuart and Lord William Bentinck.” “I did not know, until I received Mr. Stuart's letter, that the defeat of the Estremaduran army had been so complete.”

Now that army was destroyed on the morning of the 10th, and here we see that the intelligence of it did not reach Sir John Moore till the night of the 15th, which if not absolutely a whole week is near enough to justify the expression.

6. History.—“*Thousands of arms were stored up in the great towns.*”

Authority.—Extract from Sir John Moore's letter to Mr. Stuart :

1st December, 1808. “At Zamora there are *three or four thousand* stand of arms, in other places *there may be more*. If they remain collected in towns they will be taken by the enemy.”

7. History.—“*Sir John Hope's division was ordered to pass the Duero at Tordesillas.*”

Authority.—Extract of a letter from Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird, 12th December, 1808 :

“Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the reserve and General Beresford's brigade, the rest of the troops from thence are moving to the Duero, my quarters to-morrow will be at Alaejos, *Hope's at Tordesillas.*”

Now it is true that on the 14th, Sir John Moore, writing from Alaejos, to Sir David Baird, says that he had *then* resolved to change his direction, and instead of going to Valladolid should be at Toro on the 15th with all the troops ; but as Hope was to have been at Tordesillas the same day that Moore was at Alaejos, namely, on the 13th, he must have marched from thence to Toro ; and where was the danger ? The cavalry of his division, under General C. Stewart, had already surprised the French at Rueda, higher up the Duero, and it was well known, no infantry were nearer than the Carion.

8. History.—“*Sir John Moore was not put in communication with any person with whom he could communicate at all.*”

Authority.—Extracts from Sir John Moore's Letters and Journal, 19th and 28th November :

“I am not in communication with any of the Spanish generals, and neither know their plans nor those of their government. No channel of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy, but what as a stranger I picked up.”—

“I am in communication with no one Spanish army, nor am I acquainted with the intentions of the Spanish government or any of its generals. Castaños, with whom I was put in correspondence, is deprived of his command at the moment I might have expected to hear from him, and La Romana, with whom I suppose I am now to correspond, (for it has not been officially communicated to me), is absent, God knows where.”

9. History.—“*Sir John's first intention was to move upon Valladolid, but at Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the Prince of Neufchatel was brought to head-quarters, and the contents were important enough to change the direction of the march. Valderas was given as the point of union with Baird.*”

Authority.—Extract from Sir John Moore's Journal :

“I marched on the 13th from Salamanca ; head-quarters, Alaejos ; there I saw an intercepted letter from Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel, to Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, which determined me to unite the army without loss of time. I therefore moved on the 15th to Toro instead of Valladolid. At Valderas I was joined by Sir David Baird with two brigades.”

10. History.—“*No assistance could be expected from Romana.*”—“*He did not destroy the bridge of Mansilla.*”—“*Contrary to his promise he re-occupied Astorga, and when there proposed offensive plans of an absurd nature.*”

Authority.—1. Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, December 19th, 1808 :

“I have heard nothing from the Marquis de la Romana in answer to the letters I wrote to him on the 6th and 8th instants. *I am thus disappointed of his co-operation or of knowing what plan he proposes.*”

2. Colonel Symes to Sir David Baird, 14th December :

“In the morning I waited on the marquis and pressed him as far as I could with propriety on the subject of joining Sir John Moore, to which he evaded giving any more than general assurances.”

3. Extract from Sir John Moore's Journal :

At two I received a letter from Romana, brought to me by his aide-de-camp, stating that he had 22,000, (he only brought up 6000), and would be happy to co-operate with me.”—“At Castro Nuevo Sir D. Baird sent me a letter he had addressed to him of rather a later date, stating that he was retiring into the Gallicias. I sent his aide-de-camp back to him with a letter requesting to know if such was his intention, but without expressing either approbation or disapprobation. *In truth I placed no dependance on him or his army.*”

4. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Astorga, 31st December :

I arrived here yesterday, when *contrary to his promise* and to my expectations I find the Marquis de la Romana with a great part of his troops.”—“He said to me in direct terms that had he known how things were, he neither would have accepted the command nor have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are *quite absurd*, and then returns to the helpless state of his army.” “*He could not be persuaded to destroy the bridge at Mansillas, he posted some troops at it which were forced and taken prisoners by the French on their march from Mayorga.*”

The reviewer must now be content to swallow his disgust at finding Napoleon's genius admired, Soult's authority accepted, and Romana's military talents condemned in my history ; these proofs of my accuracy are more than enough, and instead of adding to them, an apology

is necessary for having taken so much notice of two articles only remarkable for malevolent imbecility and systematic violation of truth. But if the reader wishes to have a good standard of value, let him throw away this silly fellow's carpings, and look at the Duke of Wellington's "Despatches" as compiled by Colonel Gurwood, fifth and sixth volumes. He will there find that my opinions are generally corroborated, never invalidated by the duke's letters, and that while no fact of consequence is left out by me, new light has been thrown upon many events, the true bearings of which were unknown at the time to the English general. Thus at page 337 of the "Despatches," Lord Wellington speaks in doubt about some obscure negotiations of Marshal Victor, which I have shown, Book VII. chapter iii., to be a secret intrigue for the treacherous surrender of Badajos. The proceedings in Joseph's council of war, related by me, and I am the first writer who was ever informed of them, show the real causes of the various attacks made by the French at the battle of Talavera. I have shown also, and I am the first English writer who has shown it, that the French had in Spain 100,000 more men than the English general knew of, that Soult brought down to the valley of the Tagus after the fight of Talavera, a force which was stronger by more than 20,000 men than Sir Arthur Wellesley estimated it to be; and without this knowledge the imminence of the danger, which the English army escaped by crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, cannot be understood.

Again, the means of correcting the error which Wellington fell into, in 1810 relative to Soult, who he supposed to have been at the head of the second corps in Placentia when he was really at Seville, has been furnished by me, inasmuch as I have shown that it was Mermet who was at the head of that corps, and that Wellington was deceived by the name of the younger Soult, who commanded Mermet's cavalry.

Two facts only have been misstated in my history:

1. Treating of the conspiracy in Soult's camp at Oporto, I said that D'Argenton, to save his life, readily told all he knew of the British, but *with respect to his accomplices, was immovable.*

2. Treating of Cuesta's conduct in the Talavera campaign I have enumerated amongst his reasons for not fighting that it was Sunday.

Now the Duke of Wellington says D'Argenton did betray his accomplices, and yet my information was drawn from authority only second to the duke's, viz., Major-General Sir James Douglas, who conducted the interviews with D'Argenton, and was the suggester and attendant of his journey to the British head-quarters. He was probably deceived by that conspirator, but the following extract from his narrative proves that the fact was not lightly stated in my History.

"D'Argenton was willing enough to save his life by revealing everything he knew about the English, and among other things assured Soult it would be 19 days before any serious attack could be made upon Oporto; and there can be little doubt that Soult, giving credit to this information, lost his formidable barrier of the Douro by surprise. *As no threats on the part of the marshal could induce D'Argenton to reveal the name of his accomplices,* he was twice brought out to be shot and remanded in the expectation that between hope and intimidation he might be led to a full confession. On the morning of the attack he was hurried out of prison by the gens-d'armes, and, no other conveyance for him being at hand, he was placed upon a horse of his own, and that one the very best he had. The gens-d'armes in their hurry did not perceive what he very soon found out himself, that he was the best mounted man of the party, and watching his opportunity he sprang his horse over a wall into the fields, and made his escape to the English, who were following close."

For the second error so good a plea cannot be offered, and yet there was authority for that also. The story was circulated, and generally believed at the time, as being quite consonant with the temper of the Spanish general; and it has since been repeated in a narrative of the campaign of 1809, published by Lord Munster. Nevertheless, it appears from Colonel Gurwood's compilation, fifth volume, p. 343, that it is not true.

Having thus disposed of the *Quarterly Review* I request the reader's attention to the following corrections of errors, as to facts, which having lately reached me, are inserted here in preference to waiting for a new edition of the volumes to which they refer:—

1. *The storming of Badajos.*—"General Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Cristoval, where they all surrendered the next morning to Lord Fitzroy Somerset."

Correction by COLONEL WARRE, assented to by LORD FITZROY SOMERSET.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Warre was the senior officer present at the surrender, having joined Lord Fitzroy Somerset (who was in search of the governor and the missing part of the garrison) just as he was collecting a few men wherewith to summon, in his capacity of aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, the tête-du-pont of San Cristoval.

2. *Assault of Tarifa.*—"The Spaniards and the 47th British regiment guarded the breach."

Correction by SIR HUGH GOUGH.

"The only part of the 47th engaged *during the assault* were two companies under Captain Livelys, stationed on the east bastion 150 paces from the breach, and the Spaniards were nowhere to be seen, except behind a palisade in the street, a considerable way from the breach.

The 87th, and the 87th alone, defended the breach. The two companies of the 47th, I before mentioned, and the two companies of the rifles, which latter were stationed on my left but all under my orders, did all that discipline and brave troops could do in support, and the two 6-pounders, under Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchel of the artillery, most effectively did their duty while their fire could tell, the immediate front of the breach from the great dip of the ground not being under their range."

This correction renders it proper that I should give my authority for saying the Spaniards were at the breach.

Extract from a letter of SIR CHARLES SMITH, the engineer who defended Tarifa, to COLONEL NAPIER.

"The next great measure of opposition was to assign to the Spaniards the defence of the breach. This would have been insupportable: the able advocacy of Lord Proby proved that it would be a positive insult to the Spanish nation to deprive its troops of the honour, and all my solemn remonstrances could produce, was to split the difference, and take upon myself to determine which half of the breach should be entrusted to our ally."

The discrepancy between Sir Charles Smith's and Sir Hugh Gough's statement is however easily reconciled, being more apparent than real. The Spaniards were *ordered* to defend half the breach, but in *fact* did not appear there.

To the above it is proper here to add a fact made known to me since my fourth volume was published, and very honourable to Major Henry King, of the 82nd regiment. Being commandant of the town of Tarifa, a command distinct from the island, he was called to a council of war on the 29th of December, and when most of those present were for abandoning the place he gave in the following note:

"I am decidedly of opinion that the defence of Tarifa will afford the British garrison an opportunity of gaining eternal honour, and it ought to be defended to the last extremity."

"I. H. S. KING,

Commandant of Tarifa."

3. *Battle of Barosa.*—"The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some guerilla cavalry, turned indeed without orders, coming up just as the action ceased, and it was expected that Colonel Whittingham, an Englishman, commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as much, but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed 250 men, and it is evident that the 800 under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin's division, have rendered the defeat ruinous."—History, vol. ii. p. 159.

Extract of a letter from SIR SAMFORD WHITTINGHAM.

"I am free to confess that the statement of the historian of the Peninsular War, as regards my conduct on the day of the battle of Barosa, is just and correct; but I owe it to myself, to declare that my conduct was the result of obedience to the repeated orders of the general commanding-in-chief under whose command I acted. In the given strength of the Spanish cavalry under my command on that day, there is an error. The total number of the Spanish cavalry, at the commencement of the expedition, is correctly stated; but so many detachments had taken place by orders from head-quarters that I had only one squadron of Spanish cavalry under my command on that day."

COUNTER-REMARKS

TO MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL'S

REMARKS

UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER'S FOURTH VOLUME OF
HIS HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

"The evil, that men do, lives after them."

IN the fourth volume of my "History of the Peninsular War" I assailed the public character of the late Mr. Perceval; his son has published a defence of it, after having vainly endeavoured, in a private correspondence, to convince me that my attack was unfounded. The younger Mr. Perceval's motive is to be respected, and had he confined himself to argument and authority, it was my intention to have relied on our correspondence, and left the subject matter in dispute to the judgment of the public. But Mr. Perceval used expressions which obliged me to seek a personal explanation, when I learned that he, unable to see any difference between invective directed against the public acts of a minister, and terms of insult addressed to a private person, thinks he is entitled to use such expressions; and while he emphatically "disavows all meaning or purpose of offence or insult," does yet offer most grievous insult, denying at the same time my right of redress after the customary mode, and explicitly declining, he says from principle, an appeal to any other weapon than the pen.

It is not for me to impugn this principle in any case, still less in that of a son defending the memory of his father; but it gives me the right which I now assert to disregard any verbal insult which Mr. Perceval, intentionally or unintentionally, has offered to me, or may offer to me in future. When a gentleman relieves himself from personal responsibility by the adoption of this principle, his language can no longer convey insult to those who do not reject such responsibility; and it would be as unmanly to use insulting terms towards him in return as it would be to submit to them from a person not so shielded. Henceforth, therefore, I hold Mr. Perceval's language to be innocuous, but for the support of my own accuracy, veracity, and justice, as an historian, I offer these my "*Counter-Remarks*." They must of necessity lacerate Mr. Perceval's feelings, but they are, I believe, scrupulously cleared of any personal incivility, and if any passage having that tendency has escaped me I thus apologize before hand.

Mr. Perceval's pamphlet is copious in declamatory expressions of his own feelings; and it is also duly besprinkled with animadversions on Napoleon's villainy, the horrors of jacobinism, the wickedness of democrats, the propriety of coercing the Irish, and such sour dogmas of melancholy ultra-toryism. Of these I reckon not. Assuredly I did not write with any expectation of pleasing men of Mr. Perceval's political opinions, and hence I shall let his general strictures pass, without affixing my mark to them, and the more readily as I can comprehend the necessity of eking out a scanty subject. But where he has adduced specific argument and authority for his own peculiar cause,—weak argument indeed, for it is his own, but strong authority, for it is the Duke of Wellington's,—I will not decline discussion. Let the most honoured come first.

The Duke of Wellington, replying to a letter from Mr. Perceval, in which the point at issue is most earnestly and movingly begged by the latter, writes as follows:—

DEAR SIR,

London, June 6th, 1835.

I received last night your letter of the 5th. Notwithstanding my great respect for Colonel Napier and his work, I have never read a line of it; because I wished to avoid being led into a literary controversy, which I should probably find more troublesome than the operations which it is the design of the colonel's work to describe and record.

I have no knowledge, therefore, of what he has written of your father, Mr. Spencer Perceval. Of this I am certain, that I never, whether in public or in private, said one word of the ministers, or of any minister who was employed in the conduct of the affairs of the public during the war, excepting in praise of them;—that I have repeatedly declared in public my obligations to them for the cordial support and encouragement which I received from them; and I should have been ungrateful and unjust indeed, if I had excepted Mr. Perceval, than whom a more honest, zealous, and able minister never served the king.

It is true that the army was in want of money, that is to say, *specie*, during the war. Bank-notes could not be used abroad; and we were obliged to pay for everything in the currency of the country which was the seat of the operations. It must not be forgotten, however, that at that period the Bank was restricted from making its payments in *specie*. That commodity became therefore exceedingly scarce in England; and very frequently was not to be procured at all. I believe, that from the commencement of the war in Spain up to the period of the lamented death of Mr. Perceval, the difficulty in procuring *specie* was much greater than it was found to be from the year 1812 to the end of the war; because at the former period all intercourse with the Continent was suspended: in the latter, as soon as the war in Russia commenced, the communication with the Continent was in some degree restored; and it became less difficult to procure *specie*.

But it is obvious that, from some cause or other, there was a want of money in the army, as the pay of the troops was six months in arrear; a circumstance which had never been heard of in a British army in Europe: and large sums were due in different parts of the country for supplies, means of transport, etc., etc.

Upon other points referred to in your letter, I have really no recollection of having made complaints. I am convinced that there was no real ground for them; as I must repeat, that throughout the war, I received from the king's servants every encouragement and support that they had in their power to give.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Ever yours most faithfully,

Dudley Montagu Perceval, Esq.

WELLINGTON.

This letter imports, if I rightly understand it, that any complaints, by whomsoever preferred, against the ministers, and especially against Mr. Perceval, during the war in the Peninsula, had no real foundation. Nevertheless his grace and others did make many, and very bitter complaints, as the following extracts will prove.

No. 1.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART, *Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon.*

"I apprised Government more than two months ago of our probable want of money, and of the necessity that we should be supplied, not only with a large sum but with a regular sum monthly, equal in amount to the increase of expense occasioned by the increased subsidy to the Portuguese, and by the increase of our own army. *They have not attended to either of these demands, and I must write again.* But I wish you would mention the subject in your letter to Lord Wellesley."

No. 2.

"*February 23rd, 1810.*
"It is obvious that the sums will fall short of those which *His Majesty's Government have engaged to supply* to the Portuguese Government, but that *is the fault of His Majesty's Government in England, and they have been repeatedly informed that it was necessary that they should send out money.* The funds for the expenses of the British army are insufficient in the same proportion, and all that I can do is to divide the deficiency in its due proportions between the two bodies which are to be supported by the funds at our disposal."

No. 3.

"*March 1st, 1810.*
"In respect to the 15,000 men, in addition to those which Government did propose to maintain in this country, I have only to say, that I don't care how many men they send here, *provided they will supply us with proportionate means to feed and pay them;* but I suspect they will fall short rather than exceed the 30,000 men."

No. 4.

"*March 5th, 1810.*
Mr. Stuart, speaking of the Portuguese emigrating, says:
"*If the determination of ministers at home or events here bring matters to that extremity.*"

No. 5.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART, *in reference to Cadiz.*

"*30th March, 1810.*
"I don't understand the arrangement which Government have made of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered them as a part of the army, and from the arrangement which I made with the Spanish Government they cost us nothing but their pay, and all the money procured by bills was applicable to the service in this country. *The instructions to General Graham alter this entirely, and they have even gone so far as to desire him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with provisions from the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted that the Spaniards should feed our troops. The first conse-*

quence of this arrangement will be that we shall have no more money from Cadiz. I had considered the troops at Cadiz so much a part of my army that I had written to my brother to desire his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from Cadiz, when they should attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into Portugal, at least the troops, which I had sent there. But I consider this now to be at an end."

No. 6.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART.

"1st April, 1810.
"I agree with you respecting the disposition of the people of Lisbon. In fact all they wish for is to be saved from the French, and they were riotous last winter because they imagined, with some reason, that we intended to abandon them."—"The arrangement made by Government for the command at Cadiz will totally ruin us in the way of money."

No. 7.

DITTO to DITTO.

"April 20th, 1810.
"The state of opinions in England is very unfavourable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public or as the opposition pretend to be, and they appear to be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle, which is to answer no purpose. Their private letters are in some degree at variance with their public instructions, and I have called for an explanation of the former, which when it arrives will show me more clearly what they intend. The instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under them, although they throw upon me the whole responsibility for bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till it will be necessary to evacuate it. But it will not answer in these times to receive private hints and opinions from ministers, which, if attended to, would lead to an act directly contrary to the spirit, and even to the letter, of the public instructions; at the same time that, if not attended to, the danger of the responsibility imposed by the public instructions is increased tenfold."

No. 8.

DITTO to DITTO.

"May, 1810.
"It is impossible for Portugal to aid in feeding Cadiz. We have neither money nor provisions in this country, and the measures which they are adopting to feed the people there will positively oblige us to evacuate this country for want of money to support the army, and to perform the king's engagements, unless the Government in England should enable us to remain by sending out large and regular supplies of specie. I have written fully to Government upon this subject."

No. 9.

GENERAL GRAHAM to MR. STUART.

"Isla, 22nd May, 1810.
In reference to his command at Cadiz, says, "Lord Liverpool has decided the doubt by declaring this a part of Lord Wellington's army, and saying it is the wish of Government that though I am second in command to him I should be left here for the present." "This is odd enough; I mean that it should not have been left to his judgment to decide where I was to be employed; one would think he could judge fully better according to circumstances than people in England."

No. 10.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART.

"June 5, 1810.
"This letter will show you the difficulties under which we labour for want of provisions and of money to buy them. I am really ashamed of writing to the Government (Portuguese) upon this subject (of the militia), feeling as I do that we owe them so much money which we are unable to pay. According to my account the military chest is now indebted to the chest of the aids nearly £400,000. At the same time I have no money to pay the army, which is approaching the end of the second month in arrears, and which ought to be paid in advance. The bat and forage to the officers for March is still due, and we are in debt everywhere."—"The miserable and pitiful want of money prevents me from doing many things which might and ought to be done for the safety of the country."—"The corps ought to be assembled and placed in their stations. But want of provisions and money obliges me to leave them in winter-quarters till the last moment. Yet if anything fails, I shall not be forgiven."

No. 11.

MR. STUART to LORD WELLINGTON.

"June 9, 1810.

"I have received two letters from Government, the one relative to licenses, the other containing a letter from Mr. Harrison of the Treasury, addressed to Colonel Bunbury, in which, after referring to the different estimates both for the British and Portuguese, and stating the sums at their disposal, *they not only conclude that we have more than is absolutely necessary, but state specie to be so scarce in England that we must not rely on further supplies from home, and must content ourselves with such sums as come from Gibraltar and Cadiz,*" etc., etc.

"From hand to mouth we may perhaps make shift, taking care to pay the Portuguese in kind and not in money, until the supplies, which the Treasury say in three or four months will be ready, are forthcoming. Government desire me to report to them any explanation which either your lordship or myself may be able to communicate on the subject of Mr. Harrison's letter. As it principally relates to army finance, I do not feel myself quite competent to risk an opinion in opposition to what that gentleman has laid down. *I have, however, so often and so strongly written to them the embarrassment we all labour under, both respecting corn and money, that there must be some misconception, or some inaccuracy has taken place in calculations which are so far invalidated by the fact, without obliging us to go into the detail necessary to find out what part of the statement is erroneous.*"

No. 12.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART.

"June, 1810.

"I received from the Secretary of State a copy of Mr. Hamilton's letter to Colonel Bunbury, and we have completely refuted him. He took an estimate made for September, October, and November, as the rate of expense for eight months, without adverting to the alteration of circumstances occasioned by change of position, increase of price, of numbers, etc., *and then concluded upon his own statement, that we ought to have money in hand (having included in it by the bye some sums which we had not received), notwithstanding that our distress had been complained of by every post, and I had particularly desired, in December, that £200,000 might be sent out, and a sum monthly equal in amount to the increased Portuguese subsidy.*"

No. 13.

DITTO to DITTO.

"June, 1810.

"All our militia in these provinces [*Tras os Montes and Entre Minho y Douro*] are disposable, and we might throw them upon the enemy's flank in advance in these quarters [*Leon*] and increase our means of defence here and to the north of the Tagus very much indeed. *But we cannot collect them as an army, nor move them without money and magazines, and I am upon my last legs in regard to both.*"

No. 14.

DITTO to DITTO.

"November, 1810.

"*I have repeatedly written to Government respecting the pecuniary wants of Portugal, but hitherto without effect.*"

No. 15.

DITTO to DITTO.

"December 22.

"It is useless to expect more money from England, as the desire of economy has overcome even the fears of the ministers, *and they have gone so far as to desire me to send home the transports in order to save money!*"

No. 16.

DITTO to DITTO.

"28th January, 1811.

"I think the Portuguese are still looking to assistance from England, and I have written to the king's Government strongly upon the subject in their favour. *But I should deceive myself if I believed we shall get anything, and them if I were to tell them we should; they must, therefore, look to their own resources.*"

No. 17.

DITTO to DITTO.

In reference to the Portuguese intrigue against him.

"18th February, 1811.

"I think also that they will be supported in the Brazils, and *I have no reason to believe that I shall be supported in England.*"

No. 18.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART.

"13th April, 1811.

"If the Government choose to undertake large services and not supply us with sufficient pecuniary means, and leave to me the distribution of the means with which they do supply us, I must exercise my own judgment upon the distribution for which I am to be responsible."

No. 19.

DITTO to DITTO.

"4th July, 1811.

"The pay of the British troops is now nearly two months in arrears, instead of being paid one month in advance, according to his Majesty's regulations. The muleteers, upon whose services the army depends almost as much as upon those of the soldiers, are six months in arrears; there are now bills to a large amount drawn by the commissioners in the country on the commissary at Lisbon still remaining unpaid, by which delay the credit of the British army and Government is much impaired, and you are aware of the pressing demands of the Portuguese Government for specie. There is but little money in hand to be applied to the several services; there is no prospect that any will be sent from England, and the supplies derived from the negotiation of bills upon the treasury at Cadiz and Lisbon have been gradually decreasing."

No. 20.

LORD WELLINGTON to LORD WELLESLEY.

"26th July, 1811.

"Although there are, I understand, provisions in Lisbon in sufficient quantities to last the inhabitants and army for a year, about 12,000 or 14,000 Portuguese troops which I have on the right bank of the Tagus are literally starving; even those in the cantonments on the Tagus cannot get bread, because the Government have not money to pay for means of transport. The soldiers in the hospitals die because the Government have not money to pay for the hospital necessities for them; and it is really disgusting to reflect upon the detail of the distresses occasioned by the lamentable want of funds to support the machine which we have put in motion."

"Either Great Britain is interested in maintaining the war in the Peninsula, or she is not. If she is, there can be no doubt of the expediency of making an effort to put in motion against the enemy the largest force which the Peninsula can produce. The Spaniards would not allow, I believe, of that active interference by us in their affairs which might affect and ameliorate their circumstances, but that cannot be a reason for doing nothing. Subsidies, given without stipulating for the performance of specific services, would, in my opinion, answer no purpose."

No. 21.

MR. SYDENHAM to MR. STUART.

"27th September, 1811.

"I take great shame to myself for having neglected so long writing to you, etc., but in truth I did not wish to write to you until I could give you some notion of the result of my mission and the measures which our Government would have adopted in consequence of the information and opinion which I brought with me from Portugal, but God knows how long I am to wait if I do not write to you until I could give you the information which you must naturally be so anxious to receive. From week to week I have anxiously expected that something would be concluded, and I as regularly deferred writing; however, I am now so much in your debt that I am afraid you will attribute my silence to inattention rather than to the uncertainty and indecision of our further proceedings. During the 10 days agreeable voyage in the *Armide* I arranged all the papers of information which I had procured in Portugal, and I made out a paper on which I expressed in plain and strong terms all I thought regarding the state of affairs both in Portugal and Spain. These papers, together with the notes which I procured from Lord Wellington and yourself, appeared to me to comprehend everything which the ministers could possibly require, both to form a deliberate opinion upon every part of the subject and to shape their future measures. The letters which I had written to Lord Wellesley during my absence from England, and which had been regularly submitted to the prince, had prepared them for most of the opinions which I had to enforce on my arrival. Lord Wellesley perfectly coincided in all the leading points, and a short paper of proposals was prepared for the consideration of the cabinet, supported by the most interesting papers which I brought from Portugal."

Then followed an abstract of the proposals, after which Mr. Sydenham continues thus:—

"I really conceived that all this would have been concluded in a week, but a month has elapsed, and nothing has yet been done."—"Campbell will be able to tell you that I have done everything in my power to get people here to attend to their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamoured for money, money, money, in every office to which I have had access. To all my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the same answer 'that the

thing is impossible.' The prince himself certainly appears to be *à la hauteur des circonstances*, and has expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote the good cause in the Peninsula. *Lord Wellesley has a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the present government that I really despair of witnessing any decided and adequate effort on our part to save the Peninsula. The present feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all that is in our power; that the rest must be left to all-bounteous Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious as we deserved. This feeling you will allow is wonderfully moral and Christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more vigorous military system, and a ministry capable of directing the resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents and embarkations.*—"Nothing can be more satisfactory than the state of affairs in the north; all that I am afraid of is that we have not a ministry capable of taking advantage of so fine a prospect."

Mr. Sydenham's statement of the opinions of Lord Wellesley at the time of the negotiations, which ended in that Lord's retirement in February is as follows:—

"1. That Lord Wellesley was the only man in power who had a just view of affairs in the Peninsula, or a military thought amongst them."

"2. That he did not agree with Perceval that they were to shut the door against the Catholics, neither did he agree with Grenville that they were to be conciliated by emancipation without securities."

"3. That with respect to the Peninsula, he rejected the notion that we were to withdraw from the Peninsula to husband our resources at home, but he thought a great deal more both in men and money could be done than the Percevals admitted, and he could no longer act under Perceval with credit, or comfort, or use to the country."

No. 22.

Extract of a letter from MR. HAMILTON, Under Secretary of State.

"April 9th, 1810.

"I hope by next mail will be sent something more satisfactory and useful than we have yet done by way of instructions, but I am afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of our great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget more distant but not less interesting concerns. With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the inefficiency of the Portuguese Government, the people here are by no means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) as you who are on the spot. *Here we judge only of the results, the details we read over, but being unable to remedy, forget them the next day.*"

No. 23.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART.

"6th May, 1812.

"In regard to money for the Portuguese Government, I begged Mr. Bisset to suggest to you, that if you were not satisfied with the sum he was enabled to supply, you should make your complaint on the subject to the king's Government. I am not the minister of finance, nor is the commissary-general. *It is the duty of the king's ministers to provide supplies for the service, and not to undertake a service for which they cannot provide adequate supplies of money and every other requisite. They have thrown upon me a very unpleasant task, in leaving to me to decide what proportion of the money which comes into the hands of the Commissary-General shall be applied to the service of the British army; and what shall be paid to the king's minister, in order to enable him to make good the king's engagements to the Portuguese Government; and at the same time that they have laid upon me this task, and have left me to carry on the war as I could, they have by their orders cut off some of the resources which I had.*"

"*The British army have not been paid for nearly three months. We owe nearly a year's hire to the muleteers of the army. We are in debt for supplies in all parts of the country; and we are on the point of failing in our payments for some supplies essentially necessary to both armies, which cannot be procured excepting with ready money.*"

No. 24.

The following extracts are of a late date, but being retrospective, and to the point, are proper to be inserted here. In 1813 Lord Castlereagh complained of some proceedings described in my history, as having been adopted by Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, to feed the army in 1810 and 1811, and his censure elicited the letters from which these extracts are given.

No. 25.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART.

"3rd May, 1813.

"I have read your letter, No. 2, 28th April, in which you have enclosed some papers transmitted by Lord Castlereagh, including a letter from the Board of Trade in regard to the pur-

chases of corn made by your authority in concert with me, in Brazil, America, and Egypt. When I see a letter from the Board of Trade, I am convinced that the latter complaint originates with the jobbing British merchants at Lisbon; and although I am delighted to see the Government turn their attention to the subject, as it will eventually save me a great deal of trouble, I am quite convinced that if we had not adopted, nearly three years ago, the system of measures now disapproved of, not only would Lisbon and the army and this part of the Peninsula have been starved; but if we had, according to the suggestions of the commander-in-chief, and the Treasury, and the Board of Trade, carried on transactions of a similar nature through the sharks at Lisbon, above referred to, calling themselves British merchants, the expense of the army crippled in its operations, and depending upon those who, I verily believe, are the worst subjects that his Majesty has; and enormous as that expense is, it would have been very much increased."

"In regard to the particular subject under consideration, it is obvious to me that the authorities in England have taken a very confined view of the question.

"It appears to me to be extraordinary that when Lord Castlereagh read the statement that the commissary-general had in his stores a supply of corn and flour to last 100,000 men for nine months, he should not have adverted to the fact, that the greatest part of the Portuguese subsidy, indeed all in the last year, but £600,000, was paid in kind, and principally in corn, and that he should not have seen that a supply for 100,000 men for nine months was not exorbitant under these circumstances. Then the Government appears to me to have forgotten all that passed on the particular subject of your purchases. *The advantage derived from them in saving a starving people during the scarcity of 1810-1811; in bringing large sums into the military chest which otherwise would not have found their way there; and in positive profit of money.*"—"If all this be true, which I believe you have it in your power to prove, I cannot understand why Government find fault with these transactions, unless it is that they are betrayed into disapprobation of them by merchants who are interested in their being discontinued. *I admit that your time and mine would be much better employed than in speculation of corn, etc. But when it is necessary to carry on an extensive system of war with one-sixth of the money in specie which would be necessary to carry it on, we must consider questions and adopt measures of this sort, and we ought to have the confidence and support of the Government in adopting them.* It is only the other day that I recommended to my brother something of the same kind to assist in paying the Spanish subsidy; and I have adopted measures in respect to corn and other articles in Galicia, with a view to get a little money for the army in that quarter. *If these measures were not adopted, not only would it be impossible to perform the king's engagement, but even to support our own army.*"

MR. STUART to MR. HAMILTON.

"3th May.

"Though I thank you for the letter from the Admiralty contained in yours of the 21st April, I propose rather to refer Government to the communication of Lord Wellington and the admiral, by whose desire I originally adverted to the subject, than to continue my representations of the consequences to be expected from a state of things the navy department are not disposed to remedy. My private letter to Lord Castlereagh, enclosing Lord Wellington's observations on the letter from the Treasury, will, I think, satisfy his lordship that the arrangements which had been adopted for the supply of the army and population of this country are of more importance than is generally imagined. *I am indeed convinced that if they had been left to private merchants, and that I had not taken the measures which are condemned, the army must have embarked, and a famine must have taken place.*"

Now if these complaints thus made in the duke's letters, written at the time, were unfounded, his grace's present letter is, for so much, a defence of Mr. Perceval; if they were not unfounded his present letter is worth nothing, unless as a proof, that with him, the memory of good is longer-lived than the memory of ill. But in either supposition the complaints are of historical interest, as showing the difficulties, real or supposed, under which the general laboured. They are also sound vouchers for my historical assertions, because no man but the duke could have contradicted them; no man could have doubted their accuracy on less authority than his own declaration; and no man could have been so hardy as to put to him the direct question of their correctness.

Mr. Perceval objects to my quoting Lord Wellesley's manifesto, because that nobleman expressed sorrow at its appearance, and denied that he had composed it. But the very passage of Lord Wellesley's speech on which Mr. Perceval relies, proves that the sentiments and opinions of the manifesto were really entertained by Lord Wellesley, who repudiates the style only, and regrets, not that the statement appeared, but that it should have appeared at the moment when Mr. Perceval had been killed. The expression of this very natural feeling, he, however, took care to guard from any mistake, by reasserting his contempt for Mr. Perceval's political character. Thus he identified his opinions with those contained in the manifesto. And this view of the matter is confirmed by those extracts which I have given from the correspondence of Mr. Sydenham, no mean authority, for he was a man of high honour and great capacity; and he was the confidential agent employed by Lord Wellesley, to ascertain and report

upon the feelings and views of Lord Wellington, with respect to the war; and also upon those obstacles to his success, which were daily arising, either from the conduct of the ministers at home, or from the intrigues of their diplomatists abroad.

Thus it appears that if Lord Wellington's complaints, as exhibited in these extracts, were unfounded, they were at least so plausible as to mislead Mr. Sydenham on the spot, and Lord Wellesley at a distance, and I may well be excused if they also deceived me. But was I deceived? Am I to be condemned as an historian, because Lord Wellington, in the evening of his life, and in the ease and fulness of his glory, generously forgets the crosses, and remembers only the benefits of by-gone years? It may be said, indeed, that his difficulties were real, and yet the government not to blame, seeing that it could not relieve them. To this I can oppose the ordering away of the transports, on which, in case of failure, the safety of the army depended! To this I can oppose the discrepancy between the public and private instructions of the ministers! To this I can oppose those most bitter passages, "*If anything fails I shall not be forgiven,*" and "*I have no reason to believe that I shall be supported in England.*"

I say I can oppose these passages from the duke's letters, but I need them not. Lord Wellesley, a man of acknowledged talent, practised in governing, well acquainted with the resources of England, and actually a member of the administration at the time, was placed in a better position to make a sound judgment than Lord Wellington; Lord Wellesley, an ambitious man, delighting in power, and naturally anxious to direct the political measures, while his brother wielded the military strength of the state; Lord Wellesley, tempted to keep office by natural inclination, by actual possession, by every motive that could stir ambition and soothe the whisperings of conscience, actually quitted the cabinet.

Because he could not prevail on Mr. Perceval to support the war as it ought to be supported; and he could therefore no longer act under him with credit, or comfort, or use to the country;

Because the war could be maintained on a far greater scale than Mr. Perceval maintained it, and it was dishonest to the allies and unsafe not to do it;

Because the cabinet, and he particularized Mr. Perceval as of a mean capacity, had neither ability and knowledge to devise a good plan, nor temper and discretion to adopt another's plan.

Do I depend even upon this authority? No! In Lord Wellington's letter, stress is laid upon the word *specie*, the want of which, it is implied, was the only distress, because bank notes would not pass on the continent; but several extracts speak of corn and hospital stores, and the transport vessels ordered home were chiefly paid in paper. Notes certainly would not pass on the continent, nor in England neither, for their nominal value, and why? Because they were not money; they were the signs of debt; the signs that the labour, and property, and happiness of unborn millions, were recklessly forestalled, by bad ministers, to meet the exigency of the moment. Now admitting, which I do not, that this exigency was real and unavoidable; admitting, which I do not, that one generation has a right to mortgage the labour and prosperity of another and unborn generation, it still remains a question whether a minister, only empowered by a corrupt oligarchy, has such a right. And there can be no excuse for a man who, while protesting that the country was unable to support the war as it ought to be supported, continued that war, and thus proceeded to sink the nation in hopeless debt, and risk the loss of her armies, and her honour, at the same time; there is no excuse for that man who, while denying the ability of the country to support her troops abroad, did yet uphold all manner of corruption and extravagance at home.

There was no specie, because the fictitious, ruinous, incontrovertible paper-money system had driven it away, and who more forward than Mr. Perceval to maintain and extend that system—the bane of the happiness and morals of the country; a system which then gave power and riches to evil men, but has since plunged thousands upon thousands into ruin and misery; a system which, swinging like a pendulum between high taxes and low prices, at every oscillation strikes down the laborious part of the community, spreading desolation far and wide and threatening to break up the very foundations of society. And why did Mr. Perceval thus nourish the accursed thing? Was it that one bad king might be placed on the throne of France; another on the throne of Spain; a third on the throne of Naples? That Italy might be the prey of the barbarian, or, last, not least, that the hateful power of the English oligarchy, which he called social order and legitimate rights, might be confirmed? But lo! his narrow capacity! what has been the result? In the former countries insurrection, civil war, and hostile invasion, followed by the free use of the axe and the cord, the torture and the secret dungeon; and in England it would have been the same, if her people, more powerful and enlightened in their generation, had not torn the baleful oppression down, to be in due time trampled to dust as it deserves.

Mr. Perceval was pre-eminently an "honest, zealous, and able servant of the king!"

Not to be the servant of the monarch is not then to be the servant of the people. For if the country could not afford to support the war, as it ought to be supported, without detriment to greater interests, the war should have been given up; or the minister, who felt oppressed by the difficulty, should have resigned his place to those who thought differently. "*It is the duty of the king's ministers to provide supplies for the service, and not to undertake a ser-*

vice for which they cannot provide adequate supplies of money and every other requisite!" These are the words of Wellington, and wise words they are. Did Mr. Perceval act on this maxim? No! he suffered the war to starve on "*one-sixth of the money necessary to keep it up,*" and would neither withdraw from the contest, nor resign the conduct of it to Lord Wellesley, who, with a full knowledge of the subject, declared himself able and willing to support it efficiently. Nay, Mr. Perceval, while professing his inability to furnish Wellington efficiently for one war in the Peninsula, was by his orders in council, those complicated specimens of political insolence, folly, and fraud, provoking a new and unjust war with America, which was sure to render the supply of that in the Peninsula more difficult than ever.

But how could the real resources of the country for supplying the war be known, until all possible economy was used in the expenditure upon objects of less importance? Was there any economy used by Mr. Perceval? Was not that the blooming period of places, pensions, sinecures, and jobbing contracts? Did not the Government, and all belonging thereto, then shout and revel in their extravagance? Did not corruption the most extensive and the most sordid overspread the land? Was not that the palmy state of the system which the indignant nation has since risen in its moral strength to reform? Why did not Mr. Perceval reduce the home and the colonial expenses, admit the necessity of honest retrenchment, and then manfully call upon the people of England to bear the real burthen of the war, because it was necessary, and because their money was fairly expended to sustain their honour and their true interests? This would have been the conduct of an able, zealous, and faithful servant of the country; and am I to be silenced by a phrase, when I charge with a narrow, factious, and contemptible policy, and a desire to keep himself in power, the man, who supposed and extended this system of corruption at home, clinging to it as a child clings to its nurse, while the armies of his country were languishing abroad for that assistance which his pitiful genius could not perceive the means of providing, and which, if he had been capable of seeing it, his more pitiful system of administration would not have suffered him to furnish. Profuseness and corruption marked Mr. Perceval's government at home, but the army withered for want abroad; the loan-contractors got fat in London, but the soldiers in hospital died because there was no money to provide for their necessities. The funds of the country could not supply both, and so he directed his economy against the troops, and reserved his extravagance to nourish the foul abuses at home, and this is to be a pre-eminently "*honest, zealous, and able servant of the king!*"

This was the man who projected to establish fortresses to awe London and other great towns. This was the man who could not support the war in Spain, but who did support the tithe war in Ireland, and who persecuted the press of England with a ferocity that at last defeated its own object. This was the man who called down vindictive punishment on the head of the poor tinman, Hamlyn, of Plymouth, because, in his ignorant simplicity, he openly offered money to a minister for a place; and this also was the man who sheltered himself from investigation, under the vote of an unreformed House of Commons, when Mr. Maddocks solemnly offered to prove at the bar, that he, Mr. Perceval, had been privy to, and connived at a transaction, more corrupt and far more mischievous and illegal in its aim than that of the poor tinman. This is the Mr. Perceval, who after asserting, with a view to obtain heavier punishment on Hamlyn, the distinguished purity of the public men of his day, called for that heavy punishment on Hamlyn for the sake of public justice, and yet took shelter himself from that public justice under a vote of an unreformed house, and suffered Mr. Ponsonby to defend that vote by the plea that such foul transactions were as "*glaring as the sun at noon-day.*" And this man is not to be called factious!

Mr. Perceval the younger in his first letter to me says, "*the good name of my father is the only inheritance he left to his children.*" A melancholy inheritance indeed, if it be so, and that he refers to his public reputation. But I find that during his life the minister Perceval had salaries to the amount of about £8,000 a-year, and the reversion of a place worth £12,000 a-year, then enjoyed by his brother, Lord Arden. And also I find that after his death, his family received a grant of £50,000, and £3,000 a-year from the public money. Nay, Mr. Perceval the son, forgetting his former observation, partly founds his father's claim to reputation upon this large amount of money so given to his family. Money and praise, he says, were profusely bestowed, money to the family, praise to the father; wherefore Mr. Perceval must have been an admirable minister! Admirable proof!

But was he praised and regretted by an admiring grateful people? No! the people rejoiced at his death. Bonfires and illuminations signalized their joy in the country, and in London many would have rescued his murderer; a multitude even blessed him on the scaffold. No! He was not praised by the English people, for they had felt his heavy gripping hand; nor by the people of Ireland, for they had groaned under his harsh, his unmitigated bigotry. Who then praised him? Why his coadjutors in evil, his colleagues in misrule; the majority of a corrupt House of Commons, the nominees of the borough faction in England, of the Orange faction in Ireland; those factions by which he ruled and had his political being, by whose support, and for whose corrupt interests he run his public "career of unmixed evil," unmixed, unless the extreme narrowness of his capacity, which led him to push his horrid system forward too fast for its stability, may be called a good.

By the nominees of such factions, by men placed in the situation, but without the con-

science of Mr. Quentin Dick, Mr. Perceval was praised, and the grant of money to his family was carried; but there were many to oppose the grant, even in that house of corruption. The grant was a ministerial measure, and carried, as such, by the same means, and by the same men, which, and who, had so long baffled the desire of the nation for Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform. And yet the people! emphatically, the people! have since wrung those measures from the factions; ay! and the same people loathe the very memory of the minister who would have denied both for ever, if it had been in his power.

"Mr. Perceval's bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence."

This passage is, by the younger Mr. Perceval, pronounced to be utterly untrue, because bark is only *one medicine*, and not *medicines*; because there was no raging deadly general pestilence in France at the time; and because the measure was only retaliation for Napoleon's Milan and Berlin decrees, a sort of war which even quakers might wink at. What the extent of a quaker's conscience on such occasions may be I know not, since I have heard of one, who, while professing his hatred of blood-shedding, told the mate of his ship that if he did not port his helm, he would not run down his enemy's boat. But this I do know, that Napoleon's decrees were retaliation for our paper blockades; that both sides gave licenses for a traffic in objects which were convenient to them, while they denied to unoffending neutrals their natural rights of commerce; that to war against hospitals is inhuman, unchristianlike, and uncivilized, and that the avowal of the principle is more abhorrent than even the act. The avowed principle in this case was to distress the enemy. It was known that the French were in great want of bark, therefore it was resolved they should not have it, unless Napoleon gave up his great scheme of policy called the continental system. Now men do not want Jesuit's bark unless to cure disease, and to prevent them from getting it, was literally to war against hospitals. It was no metaphor of Mr. Whitbread's, it was a plain truth.

Oh! exclaims Mr. Perceval, there was no deadly, raging, general pestilence! What then? Is not the principle the same? Must millions suffer, must the earth be cumbered with carcases, before the Christian statesman will deviate from his barbarous policy? Is a momentary expediency to set aside the principle in such a case? Oh! no! by no means! exclaims the pious minister, Perceval. My policy is just, and humane; fixed on immutable truths, emanating directly from true religion, and quite consonant to the Christian dispensation; the sick people shall have bark, I am far from wishing to prevent them from getting bark. God forbid! I am not so inhuman. Yes, they shall have bark, but their ruler must first submit to me. "Port thy helm," quoth the quaker, "or thee wilt miss her, friend!" War against hospitals! Oh! No! I do not war against the hospital, I see the black flag waving over it and I respect it; to be sure: I throw my shells on to it continually, but that is not to hurt the sick, it is only to make the governor capitulate." And this is the pious sophistry by which the Christian Mr. Perceval is to be defended!

But Mr. Cobbett was in favour of this measure! Listen to him? By all means! Let us hear Mr. Cobbett; let us hear his "vigorous sentences," his opinions, his proofs, his arguments, the overflowings of his "true English spirit and feeling" upon the subject of Mr. Perceval's administration. Yes! yes! I will listen to Mr. Cobbett, and what is more, I will yield implicit belief to Mr. Cobbett, where I cannot, with any feeling of truth, refute his arguments and assertions.

Mr. Cobbett defended the Jesuit's bark bill upon the avowed ground that it was to assert our sovereignty of the seas, not our actual power on that element, but our right to rule there as we listed. That is to say, that the other people of the world were not to dare traffic, not to dare move upon that high road of nations, not to presume to push their commercial intercourse with each other, nay, not even to communicate save under the control and with the license of England. Now, if we are endowed by Heaven with such a right, in the name of all that is patriotic and English, let it be maintained. Yet it seems a strange plea in justification of the Christian Mr. Perceval—it seems strange that he should be applauded for prohibiting the use of bark to the sick people of Portugal and Spain, and France, Holland, Flanders, Italy, and the Ionians islands, for to all these countries the prohibition extended, on the ground of our right to domineer on the wide sea; and that he should also be applauded for declaiming against the cruelty, the ambition, the domineering spirit of Napoleon. I suppose we were appointed by Heaven to rule on the ocean according to our caprice, and Napoleon had only the devil to sanction his power over the continent. We were Christians, "truly British Christians," as the Tory phrase goes; and he was an infidel, a Corsican infidel. Nevertheless we joined together, each under our different dispensations, yes, we joined together, we agreed to trample upon the rest of the world; and that trade, which we would not allow to neutrals, we, by mutual licenses, carried on ourselves, until it was discovered that the sick wanted bark, sorely wanted it; then we, the truly British Christians, prohibited that article. We deprived the sick people of the succour of bark; and without any imputation on our christianity, no doubt because the tenets of our faith permit us to be merciless to our enemies, provided a quaker winks at the act! Truly the logic, the justice, and the christianity of this position, seem to be on a par.

All sufferings lead to sickness, but we must make our enemies suffer, if we wish to get the better of them, let them give up the contest and their sufferings will cease: wherefore there is

nothing in this stopping of medicine. This is Mr. Cobbett's argument, and Mr. Cobbett's words are adopted by Mr. Perceval's son. To inflict suffering on the enemy was then the object of the measure, and of course the wider the suffering spread the more desirable the measure. Now suffering of mind as well as of body must be here meant, because the dead and dying are not those who can of themselves oblige the government of a great nation to give up a war; it must be the dread of such sufferings increasing, that disposes the great body of the people to stop the career of their rulers. Let us then torture our prisoners; let us destroy towns with all their inhabitants; burn ships at sea with all their crews; carry off children and women, and torment them until their friends offer peace to save them. Why do we not? Is it because we dread retaliation? or because it is abhorrent to the usages of Christian nations? The former undoubtedly, if the younger Mr. Perceval's argument adopted from Cobbett is just; the latter if there is such a thing as Christian principle. That principle once sacrificed to expediency, there is nothing to limit the extent of cruelty in war.

So much for Mr. Cobbett upon the Jesuit's bark bill, but one swallow does not make a summer; his "true English spirit and feeling" breaks out on other occasions regarding Mr. Perceval's policy, and there, being quite unable to find any weakness in him, I am content to take him as a guide. Something more, however, there is, to advance on the subject of the Jesuit's bark bill, ere I yield to the temptation of enlivening my pages with Cobbett's "vigorous sentences."

Mr. Wilberforce, no small name amongst religious men and no very rigorous opponent of ministers, described this measure in the house, as a bill "*which might add to the ferocity and unfeeling character of the contest, but could not possibly put an end to the contest.*"

Mr. Grattan said, "*we might refuse our Jesuit's bark to the French soldiers; we might inflict pains and penalties, by the acrimony of our statutes, upon those who were saved from the severity of war; but the calculation was contemptible.*"

Mr. Whitbread characterized the bill as "*a most abominable measure calculated to hold the country up to universal execration. It united in itself detestable cruelty with absurd policy.*"

Lord Holland combated the principle of the bill, which he said "*would distress the women and children of Spain and Portugal more than the enemy.*"

Lord Grenville "*cautioned the house to look well at the consideration they were to receive as the price of the honour, justice, and humanity of the country.*"

Then alluding to the speech of Lord Mulgrave (who, repudiating the flimsy veil of the bill being merely a commercial regulation, boldly avowed that it was an exercise of our right to resort to whatever mode of warfare was adopted against us), Lord Grenville, I say, observed, that such a doctrine did not a little surprise him. "*If,*" said he, "*we are at war with the Red Indians, are we to scalp our enemies because the Indians scalp our men? When Lyons was attacked by Robespierre he directed his cannon more especially against the hospital of that city than against any other part, the destruction of it gave delight to his sanguinary inhuman disposition. In adopting the present measure we endeavour to assimilate ourselves to that monster of inhumanity, for what else is the bill but a cannon directed against the hospitals on the continent.*"

But all this, says Mr. Perceval the younger, is but "*declamatory invective, the answered and refuted fallacies of a minister's opponents in debate.*" And yet Mr. Perceval, who thus assumes that all the opposition speeches were fallacies, does very complacently quote Lord Bathurst's speech in defence of the measure, and thus, in a most compendious manner, decides the question. Bellarmin says yes! exclaimed an obscure Scotch preacher to his congregation, Bellarmin says yes! but I say no! and Bellarmin being thus confuted, we'll proceed. Even so Mr. Perceval. But I am not to be confuted so concisely as Bellarmin. Lord Erskine, after hearing Lord Bathurst's explanation, maintained that "*the bill was contrary to the dictates of religion and the principles of humanity,*" and this, he said, he felt so strongly, that he was "*resolved to embody his opinion in the shape of a protest that it might go down in a record to posterity.*" It is also a fact not to be disregarded in this case, that the bishops, who were constant in voting for all other ministerial measures, wisely and religiously abstained from attending the discussions of this bill. Lord Erskine was as good as his word, 11 other lords joined him, and their protest contained the following deliberate and solemn testimony against the bill:

"*Because the Jesuit's bark, the exportation of which is prohibited by this bill, has been found, by long experience, to be a specific for many dangerous diseases which war has a tendency to spread and exasperate; and because to employ as an engine of war the privation of the only remedy for some of the greatest sufferings which war is capable of inflicting, is manifestly repugnant to the principles of the Christian religion, contrary to humanity, and not to be justified by any practice of civilized nations.*"

"*Because the means to which recourse has been hitherto had in war, have no analogy to the barbarous enactments of this bill, inasmuch as it is not even contended that the privations to be created by it, have any tendency whatever to self-defence, or to compel the enemy to a restoration of peace, the only legitimate object by which the infliction of the calamities of war can in any manner be justified.*"

Such was the religious, moral, and political character, given to this bill of Mr. Perceval's,

by our own statesmen. Let us now hear the yet more solemnly recorded opinion of the statesmen of another nation upon Mr. Perceval's orders in council, of which this formed a part. In the American president's message to Congress, the following passages occur :

"The Government of Great Britain had already introduced into her commerce during war, a system *which at once violating the rights of other nations, and resting on a mass of perjury and forgery, unknown to other times, was making an unfortunate progress in undermining those principles of morality and religion which are the best foundations of national happiness.*"

One more testimony. Napoleon, whose authority, whatever Mr. Perceval and men of his stamp may think, will always have a wonderful influence; Napoleon, at St. Helena, declared, "that posterity would more bitterly reproach Mr. Pitt for the hideous school he left behind him, than for any of his own acts; *a school marked by its insolent Machiavelism, its profound immorality, its cold egotism, its contempt for the well-being of men and the justice of things.*" Mr. Perceval was an eminent champion of this hideous school, which we thus find the leading men of England, France, and America, uniting to condemn. And shall a musty Latin proverb protect such a politician from the avenging page of history? The human mind is not to be so fettered. Already the work of retribution is in progress.

Mr. Perceval the younger, with something of fatuity, hath called up Mr. Cobbett to testify to his father's political merit. Commending that rugged monitor of evil statesmen for his "*vigorous sentences,*" for his "*real English spirit and feeling,*" he cannot now demur to his authority; let him then read and reflect deeply on the following passages from that eminent writer's works, and he may perhaps discover, that to defend his father's political reputation with success will prove a difficult and complicate task. If the passages are painful to Mr. Perceval, if the lesson is severe, I am not to blame. It is not I but himself who has called up the mighty seer, and if the stern grim spirit, thus invoked, will not cease to speak until all be told, it is not my fault.

EXTRACTS FROM MR. COBBETT'S WRITINGS.

Extract 1.—Of MR. PERCEVAL'S harshness.

"But there now came a man amongst them who soon surpassed all the rest in power, as well as in impudence and insolence towards the people. This was that Spencer Perceval of whose signal death we shall have to speak by and bye. This man, a sharp lawyer, inured, from his first days at the bar, to the carrying on of state prosecutions; a sort of understrapper, in London, to the attorneys-general in London, and frequently their deputy in the counties; a short, spare, pale-faced, hard, keen, sour-looking man, with a voice well suited to the rest, with words in abundance at his command, with the industry of a laborious attorney, with no knowledge of the great interest of the nation, foreign or domestic, but with a thorough knowledge of those means by which power is obtained and preserved in England, and with no troublesome scruples as to the employment of those means. He had been Solicitor-General under Pitt, up to 1801, and Attorney-General under Addington and Pitt up to February, 1806. This man became the *adviser of the Princess*, during the period of the investigation and correspondence of which we have just seen the history; and, as we are now about to see, the power he obtained, by the means of that office, *made him the Prime Minister of England to the day of his death*, though no more fit for that office than any other barrister in London, taken by tossing up or by ballot."

Extract 2.—Of PERCEVAL'S illiberal, factious, and crooked policy.

"We have seen that the King was told that the *publication*" (the publication of the Princess of Wales's justification) "*would take place on the Monday.*" That Monday was the *9th of March*. In this difficulty what was to be done? The Whig ministry, with their eyes fixed on the *probable speedy succession of the Prince*, or at least, *his accession to power*, the King having recently been in a very shaky state; the Whig ministry, with their eyes fixed on this expected event, and not perceiving, as Perceval did, the power that the *unpublished book* (for "*The Book*" it is now called) *would give them with the Prince* as well as with the King, the Whig ministry would not consent to the terms of the Princess, thinking, too, that in spite of her anger and her threats, she would not throw away the scabbard as towards the King.

In the meanwhile, however, Perceval, wholly unknown to the Whigs, had got the book actually *printed*, and bound up *ready for publication*, and it is clear that it was intended to be published on the Monday named in the Princess's letter; namely, on the *9th of March*, unless prevented by the King's *yielding to the wishes of Perceval*. He did yield, that is to say, he resolved to *change his ministers*! A ground for doing this, was, however, a difficulty to be got over. To allege and promulgate the *true* ground would never do; for then the public would have cried aloud for the publication, which contained matter so deeply scandalous to the King and all the royal family. Therefore *another ground* was alleged; and herein we are going to behold another and another important consequence, and other national calamities proceeding from this dispute between the Prince and his wife. This other ground that was

chosen was the Catholic Bill. The Whigs stood pledged to grant a bill for the further relief of the Catholics. They had, in September, 1806, *dissolved the parliament*, though it was only four years old, for the purpose of securing a majority in the House of Commons; and into this new house, which had met on the 10th of December, 1806, they had introduced the Catholic Bill, by the hands of Mr. Grey (now become Lord Howick,) with the *great and general approbation of the House*, and with a clear understanding, that, notwithstanding all the cant and hypocrisy that the foes of the Catholics had, at different times, played off about the *conscientious scruples of the king*, the king had now explicitly and cheerfully *given his consent* to the bringing in of this bill.

The new ministry had nominally at its head *the late Duke of Portland*; but Perceval, who was *Chancellor of the Exchequer*, was, in fact, the master of the whole affair, co-operating, however, cordially with Eldon, who now again became chancellor. The moment the dismissal of the Whigs was resolved on, the other party set up the cry of "No Popery." The walls and houses, not only of London, but of the country towns and villages, were covered with these words, sometimes in chalk and sometimes in print; the clergy and corporations were all in motion, even the cottages on the skirts of the commons and the forests heard fervent *blessings* poured out on the head of the *good old King* for preserving the nation from a rekindling of the "*fires in Smithfield*!" Never was delusion equal to this! Never a people so deceived; never public credulity so great; never hypocrisy so profound and so detestably malignant as that of the deceivers! The mind shrinks back at the thought of an eternity of suffering, even as the lot of the deliberate murderer; but if the thought were to be endured, it would be as applicable to that awful sentence awarded to hypocrisy like this."

Extract 3.

"The great and interesting question was, not whether the act (Regency Act) were agreeable to the laws and constitution of the country or not; not whether it was right or wrong thus to defer the full exercise of the royal authority for a year; *but whether limited as the powers were, the Prince, upon being invested with them, would take his old friends and companions, the Whigs, to be his ministers.*"—"Men in general, unacquainted with the hidden motives that were at work, no more expected that Perceval and Eldon would continue for one moment to be ministers under the Regent than they expected the end of the world."

"But a very solid reason for not turning out PERCEVAL was found in the power which he had with regard to the PRINCESS and the BOOK. He had, as has been before observed, the power of bringing her forward, and making her the triumphant rival of her husband. This power he had completely in his hands, backed as he was by the indignant feelings of an enterprising, brave, and injured woman. But, it was necessary for him to do something to keep this great and terrific power in his own hands. If he lost the Princess he lost his only prop; and, even without losing her, if he lost the book, or rather, if the secrets of the book escaped and became public, he then lost his power. It was therefore of the greatest importance to him that nobody should possess a copy of this book but *himself*!

"The reader will now please to turn back to paragraph 73, which he will find in chapter XI. He will there find that Perceval ousted the Whigs by the means of the book, and not by the means of the Catholic question, as the hoodwinked nation were taught to believe. The book had been purchased by Perceval himself; it had been printed, in a considerable edition, by Mr. Edwards, printer, in the Strand; the whole edition had been put into the hands of a bookseller; the day of publication was named, that being the 9th of March, 1807; but on the 7th of March, or thereabouts, the King determined upon turning out the Whigs and taking in Perceval. Instantly PERCEVAL suppressed THE BOOK; took the edition out of the hands of the booksellers, thinking that he had every copy in his own possession. The story has been in print about his having burned the books in the courtyard of his country house; but be this as it may, he certainly appears to have thought that no one but himself had a copy of THE BOOK. In this, however, he was deceived; for several copies of this book, as many as four or five, at least, were in the hands of private individuals."—"To get at these copies advertisements appeared in all the public papers, as soon as the Prince had determined to keep Perceval as his minister. These advertisements plainly enough described the contents of the book, and contained offers of high prices for the book to such persons as might have a copy to dispose of. In this manner the copies were bought up: one was sold for £300, one or two for £500 each, one for £1000, and the last for £1500.

Extract 4.—Of MR. PERCEVAL'S harshness and illiberality.

—"Thus Perceval really ruled the country in precisely what manner he pleased. Whole troops of victims to the libel law were crammed into jails, the corrupt part of the press was more audacious than ever, and the other part of it (never very considerable) was reduced nearly to silence. But human enjoyments of every description are of uncertain duration: political power when founded on force, is of a nature still more mutable than human enjoyments in general; of which observations this haughty and insolent Perceval was destined, in the spring of 1812, to afford to the world a striking, a memorable, and a most awful example. He had got possession of the highest office in the state; by *his secret*, relative to the Princess and her BOOK, had secured his influence with the Prince Regent for their joint lives; he had bent

the proud necks of the landlords to fine, imprisonment, and transportation, if they attempted to make inroads on his system to support the all-corrupting paper-money; the press he had extinguished or had rendered the tool of his absolute will; the most eminent amongst the writers who opposed him, Cobbett (the author of this history,) Leigh and John Hunt, Finerty, Drakard, Lovel, together with many more, were closely shut up in jail for long terms, with heavy fines on their heads, and long bail at the termination of their imprisonment. Not content with all this, he meditated the complete subjugation of London to the control and command of a military force. Not only did he meditate this, but had the audacity to propose it to the parliament; and if his life had not been taken in the evening of the 11th of May, 1812, he, that very evening, was going to propose, in due form, a resolution for the establishment of a permanent army to be stationed in Marybonne-park, for the openly avowed purpose of *keeping the metropolis in awe.*"

Extract 5.—Of MR. PERCEVAL'S unpopularity.

"Upon the news of the death of Perceval arriving at Nottingham, at Leicester, at Truro, and indeed all over the country, demonstrations of joy were shown by the ringing of bells, the making of bonfires, and the like; and at Nottingham particularly, soldiers were called out to disperse the people upon the occasion."—"At the place of execution, the prisoner (Bellingham) thanked God for having enabled him to meet his fate with so much fortitude and resignation. At the moment when the hangman was making the usual preparations; at the moment that he was going out of the world, at the moment when he was expecting every breath to be his last, his ears were saluted with—*God bless you, God bless you, God Almighty bless you, God Almighty bless you!* issuing from the lips of many thousands of persons."—"With regard to the fact of the offender going out of the world amidst the blessings of the people, I, the author of this history, can vouch for its truth, having been an eye and ear witness of the awful and most memorable scene, standing, as I did, at the window of that prison out of which he went to be executed, and into which I had been put in consequence of a prosecution ordered by this very Perceval, and the result of which prosecution was a sentence to be imprisoned *two years* amongst felons in Newgate, to pay a *thousand pounds* to the Prince Regent at the end of the two years, and to be held in bonds for *seven years* afterwards; all which was executed upon me to the very letter, except that I rescued myself from the society of the felons by a cost of 20 guineas a week, for the *hundred and four weeks*; and all this I had to suffer for having published a paragraph, in which I expressed my indignation at the flogging of English local militiamen, at the town of Ely, in England, *under a guard of Hanoverian bayonets.* From this cause, I was placed in a situation to witness the execution of this unfortunate man. The crowd was assembled in the open space just under the window at which I stood. I saw the anxious looks, I saw the half horrified countenances; I saw the mournful tears run down; and I heard the unanimous blessings."

"The nation was grown heartily tired of the war; it despaired of seeing an end to it without utter ruin to the country; the expenditure was arrived at an amount that frightened even loan-mongers and stock-jobbers; and the shock given to people's confidence by Perceval's recent acts, which had proclaimed to the whole world the fact of the depreciation of the paper-money; these things made even the pretended exclusively loyal secretly rejoice at his death, which they could not help hoping would lead to some very material change in the managing of the affairs of the country."

Extract 6.—Of MR. HAMLYN, the Tinman.

"I shall now address you, though it need not be much at length, upon the subject of Lord Castlereagh's conduct. The business was brought forward by Lord Archibald Hamilton, who concluded his speech with moving the following resolutions: 1st. That it appears to the House, from the evidence on the table, that Lord Viscount Castlereagh, in the year 1805, shortly after he had quitted the situation of President of the Board of Control, and being a Privy Councillor and Secretary of State, did place at the disposal of Lord Clancarty, a member of the same board, the nomination to a writership, in order to facilitate his procuring a seat in Parliament. 2nd. That it was owing to a disagreement among the subordinate parties that this transaction did not take effect; and 3rd, that by this conduct Lord Castlereagh had been guilty of a gross violation of his duty as a servant of the crown; an abuse of his patronage as President of the Board of Control; and an attack upon the purity of that House."

"Well, but what did the House agree to? Why, to this: 'Resolved, that it is the duty of this House to maintain a *jealous guard over the purity of election*; but considering that the attempt of Lord Viscount Castlereagh to interfere in the election of a member *had not been successful*, this House does not consider it necessary to enter into any criminal proceedings against him.'"

"Now, then, let us see what was done in the case of Philip Hamlyn, the tinman of Plymouth, who offered a bribe to Mr. Addington, when the latter was minister. The case was this: in the year 1802, Philip Hamlyn, a tinman, of Plymouth, wrote a letter to Mr. Henry Addington, the first Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, offering him the sum of £2000 to give him, Hamlyn, the place of Land Surveyor of Customs at Plymouth. In consequence of this a criminal information was filed against the said Hamlyn, by Mr. Spencer Perceval,

who was then the King's Attorney-General, and who, in pleading against the offender, asserted *the distinguished purity of persons in power in the present day*. The tinman was found guilty; he was sentenced to pay a fine of £100 to the king, and to be imprisoned for three months. His business was ruined, and he himself died, in a few months after his release from prison.

"Hamlyn confessed his guilt; he stated, in his affidavit, that he sincerely repented of his crime; that he was 40 years of age; that his business was the sole means of supporting himself and family; that a severe judgment might be the total ruin of himself and that family; and that, therefore, he threw himself upon, and implored, the mercy of his prosecutors and the court. In reference to this, Mr. Perceval, *the present Chancellor of the Exchequer*, observe; said: "The circumstances which the defendant discloses, respecting his own situation in life and of his family are all of them topics, very well adapted to affect the private feelings of individuals; and as far as that consideration goes, nothing further need be said; but, there would have been no prosecution at all, in this case, upon the ground of personal feeling; it was set on foot upon grounds of a public nature, and the spirit in which the prosecution originated still remains; it is, therefore, submitted to your lordships, not on a point of individual feeling, but of PUBLIC JUSTICE, in which case your lordships will consider how far the affidavits ought to operate in mitigation of punishment."—"For Lord Archibald Hamilton's motion, the speakers were, Lord A. Hamilton, Mr. C. W. Wynn, Lord Milton, Mr. W. Smith, Mr. Grattan, Mr. Ponsonby, Sir Francis Burdett, Mr. Whitbread, and Mr. Tierny. *Against it*, Lord Castlereagh himself, Lord Binning, Mr. Croker, MR. PERCEVAL (who prosecuted Hamlyn), Mr. Banks, Mr. G. Johnstone, Mr. H. Lascelles, Mr. Windham, and Mr. Canning."

Extract 7.—Of MR. QUENTIN DICK.

(On the 11th of May, 1809, Mr. Maddocks made a charge against Mr. Perceval and Lord Castlereagh, relative to the selling of a seat in Parliament to Mr. Quentin Dick, and to the influence exercised with Mr. Dick, as to his voting upon the recent important question.) Mr. Maddocks, in the course of his speech, said:—"I affirm, then, that Mr. Dick *purchased a seat in the House of Commons* for the borough of Cashel, through the agency of the Hon. Henry Wellesley, who acted for, and on behalf of, the Treasury; that upon a *recent question* of the last importance, when Mr. Dick had determined to vote according to his conscience, the noble lord, Castlereagh, did intimate to that gentleman the necessity of either his *voting with the government, or resigning his seat in that house*; and that Mr. Dick, sooner than vote against principle, did make choice of the latter alternative, and vacate his seat accordingly. To this transaction I charge the right honourable gentleman, *Mr. Perceval, as being privy and having connived at it*. This I will ENGAGE TO PROVE BY WITNESSES AT YOUR BAR, if the House will give me leave to call them." Mr. Perceval argued against receiving the charge at all, putting it to the House, "*whether AT SUCH A TIME it would be wise to warrant such species of charges as merely introductory to the agitation of the great question of reform, he left it to the House to determine*: but as far as he might be allowed to judge, he rather thought that it would be more consistent with what was due from him to the House and to the public, *if he FOR THE PRESENT declined putting in the plea* (he could so conscientiously put in) *until that House had come to a determination on the propriety of entertaining that charge or not*."

The House voted *not* to entertain the charge, and Mr. Ponsonby and others declared, in the course of the debate, that such transactions ought not to be inquired into, because they "were notorious," and had become "as glaring as the noon-day sun."

Now let the younger Mr. Perceval grapple with this historian and public writer, whose opinions he has invoked, whose "*true English spirit and feeling*" he has eulogised. Let him grapple with these extracts from his works, which, however, are but a tithe of the charges Mr. Cobbett has brought against his father. For my part, I have given my proofs, and reasons, and authorities, and am entitled to assert, that my public character of Mr. Perceval, the minister, is, historically, "*fair, just, and true*."

JUSTIFICATORY NOTES.

HAVING in my former volumes printed several controversial papers relating to this History, I now complete them, thus giving the reader all that I think necessary to offer in the way of answer to those who have assailed me. The Letter to Marshal Beresford and the continuation of my Reply to the *Quarterly Review* has been published before, the first as a pamphlet, the second in the *London and Westminster Review*. And the former is here reproduced, not with any design to provoke the renewal of a controversy which has been at rest for some years, but to complete the justification of a work which, written honestly and in good faith, from excellent materials, has cost me 16 years of incessant labour. The other papers, being new, shall be placed first in order and must speak for themselves.

ALISON.

Some extracts from Alison's "History of the French Revolution," reflecting upon the conduct of Sir John Moore, have been shown to me by a friend. In one of them I find, in reference to the magazines at Lugo, a false quotation from my own work, not from carelessness, but to sustain a miserable censure of that great man. This requires no further notice, but the following specimen of disingenuous writing shall not pass with impunity.

Speaking of the prevalent opinion that England was unable to succeed in military operations on the continent, Mr. Alison says:—

"In Sir John Moore's case this universal and perhaps unavoidable error was greatly enhanced by his connection with the opposition party, by whom the military strength of England had been always underrated, the system of continental operations uniformly descried, and the power and capacity of the French emperor, great as they were, unworthily magnified."

Mr. Alison here proves himself to be one of those enemies to Sir John Moore who draw upon their imaginations for facts and upon their malice for conclusions.

Sir John Moore never had any connection with any political party, but during the short time he was in Parliament he voted with the government. He may in society have met with some of the leading men of opposition thus grossly assailed by Mr. Alison, yet it is doubtful if he ever conversed with any of them, unless perhaps Mr. Wyndham, with whom, when the latter was secretary at war, he had a dispute upon a military subject. He was, however, the intimate friend of Mr. Pitt, and of Mr. Pitt's family. It is untrue that Sir John Moore entertained or even leaned towards exaggerated notions of French prowess; his experience and his natural spirit and greatness of mind swayed him the other way. How, indeed, could the man who stormed the forts of Fiorenza and the breach of Calvi in Corsica, he who led the disembarkation at Aboukir Bay, the advance to Alexandria on the 13th, and defended the ruins of the camp of Cæsar on the 21st of March, he who had never been personally foiled in any military exploit feel otherwise than confident in arms? Mr. Alison may calumniate, but he cannot hurt Sir John Moore.

SIR WALTER SCOTT.

In the last volume of "Sir Walter Scott's Life," by Mr. Lockhart, p. 143, the following passage from Sir Walter's diary occurs:—

"He (Napier) has, however, given a bad sample of accuracy in the case of Lord Strangford, *where* his pointed affirmation has been as pointedly repelled."

This peremptory decision is false in respect of grammar, of logic, and of fact.

Of grammar, because *where*, an adverb of place, has no proper antecedent. Of logic, because a truth may be pointedly repelled without ceasing to be a truth. Of fact, because Lord Strangford did not repel, but admitted the essential parts of my affirmation, namely, that he had falsified the date and place of writing his despatch, and attributed to himself the chief merit of causing the royal emigration from Lisbon. Lord Strangford, indeed, published two pamphlets to prove that the merit really attached to him, but the hollowness of his pretensions was exposed in my reply to his *first pamphlet*; the accuracy of my statement was supported by the testimony of disinterested persons, and, moreover, many writers, professing to know the facts, did, at the time, in the newspapers, contradict Lord Strangford's statements.

The chief point of his *second pamphlet*, was the reiterated assertion that he accompanied the Prince Regent over the bar of Lisbon.

To this I could have replied, 1st. That I had seen a letter, written at the time by Mr.

Smith, the naval officer commanding the boat which conveyed Lord Strangford from Lisbon to the prince's ship, and in that letter it was distinctly stated, *that they did not reach that vessel until after she had passed the bar.* 2nd. That I possessed letters from other persons present at the emigration of the same tenor, and that between the writers of those letters and the writer of the Bruton Street despatch, to decide which were the better testimony, offered no difficulty.

Why did I not so reply? For a reason twice before published, namely, that Mr. Justice Bailey had done it for me. Sir Walter takes no notice of the judge's answer, neither does Mr. Lockhart; and yet it was the most important point of the case. Let the reader judge.

The editor of the *Sun* newspaper, after quoting an article from the *Times* upon the subject of my controversy with Lord Strangford, remarked that his lordship "*would hardly be believed upon his oath, certainly not upon his honour at the Old Bailey.*"

Lord Strangford obtained a rule to show cause why a criminal information should not be filed against the editor for a libel. The present Lord Brougham appeared for the defence, and justified the offensive passage by references to Lord Strangford's own admissions in his controversy with me. The judges, thinking the justification good, discharged the rule by the mouth of Lord Tenterden.

During the proceedings in court the Attorney-General, on the part of Lord Strangford, referring to that nobleman's despatch which, though purporting to be written on the 29th of November, from H.M.S. *Hibernia* off the Tagus, was really written the 29th of December, in Bruton Street, said, "Everybody knew that in diplomacy there were two copies prepared of all documents, No. 1 for the minister's inspection, No. 2 for the public."

Mr. Justice Bailey shook his head in disapprobation.

Attorney-General: "Well, my lord, it is the practice of these departments, and may be justified by necessity."

Mr. Justice Bailey: "*I like honesty in all places, Mr. Attorney.*"

And so do I, wherefore I recommend this pointed repeller to Mr. Lockhart when he publishes another edition of his father-in-law's life.

COLONEL GURWOOD.

In the eighth volume of the Duke of Wellington's "Despatches," page 531, Colonel Gurwood has inserted the following note:—

"Lieutenant Gurwood, 52nd regiment, led the "forlorn hope" of the light division in the assault of the lesser breach. He afterwards took the French governor-general, Barrié, in the citadel; and from the hands of Lord Wellington, on the breach by which he had entered, he received the sword of his prisoner. The permission accorded by the Duke of Wellington to compile this work has doubtless been one of the distinguished consequences resulting from this service, and Lieutenant Gurwood feels pride as a soldier of fortune in here offering himself as an encouraging example to the subaltern in future wars."—"The detail of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo by the lesser breach is of too little importance except to those who served in it to become a matter of history. The compiler, however, takes this opportunity of observing that Colonel William Napier has been misinformed, respecting the conduct of the "forlorn hope," in the account given of it by him as it appears in the Appendix of the fourth volume of his "History of the Peninsular War." A correct statement and proofs of it have been since furnished to Colonel William Napier for any future addition of his book, which will render any further notice of it *here* unnecessary."

My account is not to be disposed of in this summary manner, and this note, though put forth as it were with the weight of the Duke of Wellington's name by being inserted amongst his "Despatches," shall have an answer.

Colonel Gurwood sent me what in the above note he calls "*a correct statement and proofs of it.*" I know of no *proofs*, and the correctness of his statement depends on his own recollections, which the wound he received in the head at this time seems to have rendered extremely confused, at least the following recollections of other officers are directly at variance with his. Colonel Gurwood, in his "*correct statement*," says, "When I first went up the breach there were still some of the enemy in it, it was very steep, and on my arrival at the top of it under the gun, I was knocked down either by a shot or stone thrown at me. I can assure you that not a lock was snapped as you describe, but finding it impossible that the breach from its steepness and narrowness could be carried by the bayonet, I ordered the men to load, certainly before the arrival of the storming party, and having placed some of the men on each side of the breach, I went up the middle with the remainder, and when in the act of climbing over the disabled gun at the top of the breach, which you describe, I was wounded in the head by a musket shot, fired so close to me that it blew my cap to pieces, and I was tumbled over senseless from the top to the bottom of the breach. When I recovered my senses I found myself close to George,* who was sitting on a stone with his arm broken. I asked him how the thing was going on," etc., etc.

Now to the above statement I oppose the following letters from the authors of the statements given in the Appendix to my fourth volume.

* The present Major-General Sir George Napier.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR GEORGE NAPIER to COLONEL WILLIAM NAPIER.

"I am sorry our gallant friend Gurwood is not satisfied with and disputes the accuracy of your account of the assault of the lesser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo as detailed in your fourth volume. I can only say, that account was principally, if not wholly taken from Colonel Fergusson's, he being one of my storming captains, and my own narrative of that transaction up to the period when we were each of us wounded. *I adhere to the correctness of all I stated to you*, and beg further to say that my friend, Colonel Mitchell, who was also one of my captains in the storming party, told me the last time I saw him at the commander-in-chief's *levée*, that my statement was "*perfectly correct*." And both he and Colonel Fergusson recollected the circumstance of my not permitting the party to load, and also that upon being checked, when nearly two-thirds up the breach, by the enemy's fire, the men, forgetting their pieces were not loaded, snapped them off, but I called to them and reminded them of my orders to force their way with the bayonet alone! It was at that moment I was wounded and fell, and I never either spoke to or saw Gurwood afterwards during that night, as he rushed on with the other officers of the party to the top of the breach. Upon looking over a small manuscript of the various events of my life as a soldier, written many years ago, I find all I stated to you corroborated in every particular. Of course, as Colonel Gurwood tells you, he was *twice* at the top of the breach, before any of the storming party entered it, I cannot take upon myself to contradict him, but I certainly do not conceive how it was possible, as he and myself jumped into the ditch together. I saw him wounded, and spoke to him *after* having mounted the *fausse-braye* with him, and *before* we rushed up the breach in the body of the place. I never saw him or spoke to him after I was struck down, the whole affair did not last above 25 or 30 minutes, but as I fell when about two-thirds up the breach I can only answer for the correctness of my account to that period, as soon after I was assisted to get down the breach by the Prince of Orange (who kindly gave his sash to tie up my shattered arm, and which sash is now in my possession), by the present Duke of Richmond, and Lord Fitzroy Somerset, all three of whom I believe were actively engaged in the assault. Our friend Gurwood did his duty like a gallant and active soldier, but I cannot admit of his having been *twice in the breach before the other officers of the storming party and myself*!

"I believe yourself, and every man in the army with whom I have the honour to be acquainted, will acquit me of any wish or intention to deprive a gallant comrade and brother-officer of the credit and honour due to his bravery, more particularly one with whom I have long been on terms of intimate friendship, and whose abilities I admire as much as I respect and esteem his conduct as a soldier; therefore this statement can or ought only to be attributed to my sense of *what is due* to the other gallant officers and soldiers who were under my command in the assault of the lesser breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, and not to any *wish or intention* on my part to detract from the distinguished services of, or the laurels gained by Colonel Gurwood on that occasion. Of course you are at liberty to refer to me if necessary, and to make what use you please of this letter privately, or publicly, either now or at any future period, as *I steadily adhere to all I have ever stated to you or any one else*, and I am, etc., etc.

"GEORGE NAPIER."

Extract of a letter from COLONEL JAMES FERGUSSON, 52nd regiment (formerly a captain of the 43rd, and one of the storming party.) Addressed to SIR GEORGE NAPIER.

"I send you a memorandum I made some time back from memory, and in consequence of having seen various accounts respecting our assault. You are perfectly correct as to Gurwood and your description of the way we carried the breach is accurate; and now I have seen your memorandum I recollect the circumstance of the men's arms not being loaded and the snapping of the firelocks."—"I was not certain when you were wounded; but your description of the scene on the breach, and the way in which it was carried, is perfectly accurate."

Extract of a letter from COLONEL FERGUSSON to COLONEL WILLIAM NAPIER.

"I think the account you give in your fourth volume of the attack of the little breach at Ciudad Rodrigo is as favourable to Gurwood as he has any right to expect, and agrees perfectly both with your brother George's recollections of that attack and with mine. Our late friend Alexander Steele, who was one of my officers, declared he was with Gurwood the whole of the time, for a great part of the storming party of the 43rd joined Gurwood's party who were placing the ladders against the work, and it was the engineer officer calling out that they were wrong, and pointing out the way to the breach in the *fausse-braye* that directed our attention to it. Jonathan Wyld* of the 43rd was the first man that run up the *fausse-braye*, and we made directly for the little breach, which was defended *exactly as you describe*. We were on the breach some little time, and when we collected about 30 men (some of the 3rd battalion rifle brigade in the number) we made a simultaneous rush, cheered, and run in, so that positively no claim could be made as to the first who entered the breach. I do not want to dispute

* A splendid soldier.

with Gurwood, but I again say (in which your brother agrees) that some of the storming party were *before* the forlorn hope. I do not dispute that Gurwood and some of his party were among the number that rushed in at the breach, but as to his having twice mounted the breach before us, *I cannot understand it*, and Steele always *positively denied it*."

Having thus justified myself from the charge of writing upon bad information about the assault of the little breach, I shall add something about that of the great breach.

Colonel Gurwood offers himself as an encouraging example for the subalterns of the British army in future wars; but the following extract from a statement of the late Major Mackie, so well known for his bravery, worth, and modesty, and who as a subaltern led the forlorn hope at the great breach of Ciudad Rodrigo, denies Colonel Gurwood's claim to the particular merit upon which he seems inclined to found his good fortune in after life.

Extracts from a memoir addressed by the late MAJOR MACKIE to COLONEL NAPIER.
October 1838.

"The troops being immediately ordered to advance were soon across the ditch, and upon the breach at the same instant with the 94th, who had advanced along the ditch. To mount under the fire of the defenders was the work of a moment, but when there difficulties of a formidable nature presented themselves; on each flank a deep trench was cut across the rampart isolating the breach, which was enfiladed with cannon and musketry, while in front, from the rampart into the streets of the town, was a perpendicular fall of ten or twelve feet; the whole preventing the soldiers from making that bold and rapid onset so effective in facilitating the success of such an enterprise. The great body of the fire of defence being from the houses and from an open space in front of the breach, in the first impulse of the moment I dropt from the rampart into the town. Finding myself here quite alone and no one following, I discovered that the trench upon the right of the breach was cut across the whole length of the rampart, thereby opening a free access to our troops and rendering what was intended by the enemy as a defence completely the reverse. By this opening I again mounted to the top of the breach and led the men down into the town. The enemy's fire which I have stated had been, after we gained the summit of the wall, confined to the houses and open space alluded to, now began to slacken, and ultimately they abandoned the defence. Being at this time in advance of the whole of the third division, I led what men I could collect along the street, leading in a direct line from the great breach into the centre of the town, by which street the great body of the enemy were precipitately retreating. Having advanced considerably and passed across a street running to the left, a body of the enemy came suddenly from that street, rushed through our ranks and escaped. In pursuit of this body, which after passing us held their course to the right, I urged the party forwards in that direction until we reached the citadel, where the governor and garrison had taken refuge. The outer gate of the enclosure being open, I entered at the head of the party composed of men of different regiments who by this time had joined the advance. Immediately on entering I was hailed by a French officer asking for an English general to whom they might surrender. Pointing to my epauletts in token of their security, the door of the keep or stronghold of the place was opened and a sword presented to me in token of surrender, which sword I accordingly received. This I had scarcely done when two of their officers laid hold of me for protection, one on each arm, and *it was while I was thus situated that Lieutenant Gurwood came up and obtained the sword of the governor.*

"In this way, the governor, with Lieutenant Gurwood and the two officers I have mentioned still clinging to my arms, the whole party moved towards the rampart. Having found when there, that in the confusion incident to such a scene I had lost as it were by accident that prize which was actually within my reach, and which I had justly considered as my own, in the chagrin of the moment I turned upon my heel and left the spot. The following day, in company with Captain Lindsay of the 88th regiment I waited upon Colonel Pakenham, then assistant adjutant-general to the third division, to know if my name had been mentioned by General Picton as having led the advance of the right brigade. He told me that it had and I therefore took no further notice of the circumstance, feeling assured that I should be mentioned in the way of which all officers in similar circumstances must be so ambitious. My chagrin and disappointment may be easily imagined when Lord Wellington's despatches reached the army from England to find my name altogether omitted, and the right brigade deprived of their just meed of praise."—"Sir, it is evident that the tendency of this note" (Colonel Gurwood's note quoted from the "Despatches") "is unavoidably, though I do him the justice to believe by no means intentionally upon Colonel Gurwood's part, to impress the public with the belief that he was himself the first British officer that entered the citadel of Ciudad Rodrigo, consequently the one to whom its garrison surrendered. This impression the language he employs is the more likely to convey, inasmuch as to his exertions and good fortune in this particular instance he refers the whole of his professional success, to which he points the attention of the future aspirant as a pledge of the rewards to be expected from similar efforts to deserve them. To obviate this impression and in bare justice to the right brigade of the third division and, as a member of it, to myself, I feel called on to declare that

though I do not claim for that brigade exclusively the credit of forcing the defences of the great breach, the left brigade having joined in it contrary to the intention of Lord Wellington under the circumstances stated, yet I do declare on the word of a man of honour, that *I was the first individual who effected the descent from the main breach into the streets of the town, that I preceded the advance into the body of the place, that I was the first who entered the citadel, and that the enemy there assembled had surrendered to myself and party before Lieutenant Gurwood came up.* Referring to the inference which Colonel Gurwood has been pleased to draw from his own good fortune as to the certainty and value of the rewards awaiting the exertions of the British soldier, permit me, sir, in bare justice to myself, to say that at the time I volunteered the forlorn hope on this occasion, I was senior lieutenant of my own regiment, consequently the first for promotion. Having as such succeeded so immediately after to a company, I could scarcely expect nor did I ask further promotion at the time, but after many years of additional service, I did still conceive and do still maintain, that I was entitled to bring forward my services on that day as a ground for asking that step of rank which every officer leading a forlorn hope had received with the exception of myself."

"May I, sir, appeal to your sense of justice in lending me your aid to prevent my being deprived of the only reward I had hitherto enjoyed, in the satisfaction of thinking that the services which I am now compelled most reluctantly to bring in some way to the notice of the public, had during the period that has since elapsed, never once been called in question. It was certainly hard enough that a service of this nature should have been productive of no advantage to me in my military life. I feel it, however, infinitely more annoying that I should now find myself in danger of being stript of any credit to which it might entitle me, by the looseness of the manner in which Colonel Gurwood words his statement. I need not say that this danger is only the more imminent from his statement appearing in a work which, as being published under the auspices of the Duke of Wellington as well as of the Horse Guards, has at least the appearance of coming in the guise of an official authority."—"I agree most cordially with Colonel Gurwood in the opinion he has expressed in his note, that he is himself an instance where reward and merit have gone hand in hand. I feel compelled, however, for the reasons given to differ from him materially as to the precise ground on which he considers the honours and advantages that have followed his deserts to be not only the distinguished but the just and natural consequences of his achievements on that day. *I allude to the claim advanced by Colonel Gurwood to be considered the individual by whom the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo was made prisoner of war.* It could scarcely be expected that at such a moment I could be aware that the sword which I received was not the governor's, being in fact that of one of his aide-de-camps. I repeat, however, that before Lieutenant Gurwood and his party came up, the enemy had expressed their wish to surrender, that a sword was presented by them in token of submission and received by me as a pledge, on the honour of a British officer, that according to the laws of war, I held myself responsible for their safety as prisoners under the protection of the British arms. Not a shadow of resistance was afterwards made, and I appeal to every impartial mind in the least degree acquainted with the rules of modern warfare, if under these circumstances I am not justified in asserting that before, and at the time Lieutenant Gurwood arrived, the whole of the enemy's garrison within the walls of the citadel, governor included, were both *de jure* and *de facto* prisoners to myself. In so far, therefore, as he being the individual who made its owner captive, could give either of us a claim to receive that sword to which Colonel Gurwood ascribes such magic influence in the furthering of his after fortunes, I do maintain that at the time it became *de facto* his, it was *de jure* mine."

Something still remains to set Colonel Gurwood right upon matters which he has apparently touched upon without due consideration. In a note appended to that part of the Duke of Wellington's "Despatches" which relate to the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo he says that the late Captain Dobbs of the 52nd at Sabugal "recovered the howitzer taken by the 43rd regiment but retaken by the enemy." This is totally incorrect. The howitzer was taken by the 43rd and retaken by the 43rd. The 52nd regiment never even knew of its capture until the action was over. Captain Dobbs was a brave officer and a very generous-minded man, he was more likely to keep his own just claims to distinction in the back-ground than to appropriate the merit of others to himself. I am therefore quite at a loss to know upon what authority Colonel Gurwood has stated a fact inaccurate itself and unsupported by the Duke of Wellington's despatch about the battle of Sabugal, which distinctly says the howitzer was taken by the 43rd regiment, as in truth it was, and it was kept by that regiment also.

While upon the subject of Colonel Gurwood's compilation I must observe that in my fifth volume, when treating of General Hill's enterprise against the French forts at Almaraz I make Lord Wellington complain to the ministers that his generals were so fearful of responsibility the slightest movements of the enemy deprived them of their judgment. Trusting that the despatches then in progress of publication would bear me out, I did not give my authority at large in the Appendix; since then, the letter on which I relied has indeed been published by Colonel Gurwood in the "Despatches," but purged of the passage to which I allude, and without any indication of its being so garbled. This omission might hereafter gave a handle to accuse me of bad faith, wherefore I now give the letter in full, the italics marking the restored passage :—

From LORD WELLINGTON to the EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fuente Guinaldo, May 28th, 1812.

You will be as well pleased as I am at General Hill's success, which certainly would have been still more satisfactory if he had taken the garrison of Mirabete; which he would have done if General Chowne had got on a little better in the night of the 16th, and if Sir William Erskine had not very unnecessarily alarmed him, by informing him that Soult's whole army were in movement, and in Estremadura. Sir Rowland therefore, according to his instructions, came back on the 21st, whereas if he had staid a day or two he would have brought his heavy howitzers to bear on the castle and he would either have stormed it under his fire or the garrison would have surrendered. *But notwithstanding all that has passed I cannot prevail upon the general officers to feel a little confidence in their situation. They take alarm at the least movement of the enemy and then spread the alarm, and interrupt everything, and the extraordinary circumstance is, that if they are not in command they are as stout as any private soldiers in the army.* Your lordship will observe that I have marked some passages in Hill's report not to be published. My opinion is that the enemy must evacuate the tower of Mirabete, and indeed it is useless to keep that post, unless they have another bridge, which I doubt. But if they see that we entertain a favourable opinion of the strength of Mirabete, they will keep their garrison there, which might be inconvenient to us hereafter, if we should wish to establish there our own bridge. I enclose a Madrid *Gazette*, in which you will see a curious description of the state of King Joseph's authority and his affairs in general, from the most authentic sources.

Ever, my dear lord, etc., etc.

WELLINGTON.

VILLA MURIEL.

The following statement of the operations of the fifth division at the combat of Muriel, 25th October, 1812, is inserted at the desire of Sir John Oswald. It proves that I have erroneously attributed to him the first and as it appeared to me unskilful disposition of the troops; but with respect to the other portions of his statement, without denying or admitting the accuracy of his recollections, I shall give the authority I chiefly followed, first printing his statement.

AFFAIR OF VILLA MURIEL.

On the morning 25th of October, 1812, Major-General Oswald joined and assumed the command of the fifth division, at Villa Muriel, on the Carion. Major-General Pringle had already posted the troops, and the greater portion of the division were admirably disposed of about the village as also in the dry bed of a canal running in its rear, in some places parallel to the Carion. Certain of the corps were formed in columns of attack supported by reserves, ready to fall upon the enemy if in consequence of the mine failing he should venture to push a column along the narrow bridge. The river had at some points been reported fordable, but these were said to be at all times difficult and in the then rise of water, as they proved, hardly practicable. As the enemy closed towards the bridge, he opened a heavy fire of artillery on the village. At that moment Lord Wellington entered it and passed the formed columns well sheltered both from fire and observation. His lordship approved of the manner the post was occupied and of the advantage taken of the *canal and village* to mask the troops. The French supported by a heavy and superior fire rushed gallantly on the bridge, the mine not exploding and destroying the arch till the leading section had almost reached the spot. Shortly after, the main body retired, leaving only a few light troops. Immediately previous to this an orderly officer announced to Lord Wellington that Palencia and its bridges were gained by the foe. He ordered the main body of the division immediately to ascend the heights in its rear, and along the plateau to move towards Palencia in order to meet an attack from that quarter. Whilst the division was in the act of ascending, a report was made by Major Hill of the 8th caçadores that the ford had been won, passed by a body of cavalry, causing the caçadores to fall back on the broken ground. The enemy, it appears, were from the first acquainted with these fords, for his push to them was nearly simultaneous with his assault on the bridge. The division moved on the heights towards Palencia, it had not however proceeded far, before an order came directing it to retire and form on the right of the Spaniards, and when collected to remain on the heights till further orders. About this time the cavalry repassed the river, nor had either infantry or artillery passed by the ford to aid in the attack, but in consequence of the troops being withdrawn from the village and canal a partial repair was given to the bridge, and small bodies of infantry were passed over skirmishing with the Spaniards whose post on the heights was directly in front of Villa Muriel. No serious attack from that quarter was to be apprehended until an advance from Palencia. It was on that point therefore that attention was fixed. Day was closing when Lord Wellington came upon the heights and said all was quiet at Palencia, and that the enemy must now be driven from the right bank. General Oswald inquired if after clearing the village the division was to remain there for the night. His lordship replied, the village was to be occupied in

force and held by the division till it was withdrawn, which would probably be very early in the morning. He directed the first brigade under Brigadier-General Barnes to attack the enemy's flank, the second under Pringle to advance in support, extending to the left so as to succour the Spaniards, who were unsuccessfully contending with the enemy in their front. The casualties in the division were not numerous, especially when the fire it was exposed to is considered. The enemy sustained a comparative heavy loss. The troops were, by a rapid advance of the first brigade cut off from the bridge and forced into the river, where many were drowned. The allies fell back in the morning unmolested.

JOHN OSWALD, etc., etc.

Memoir on the combat of Muriel by CAPTAIN HOPKINS, 4th regiment.

As we approached Villa Muriel the face of the country upon our left flank as we were then retrograding appeared open, in our front ran the river Carion, and immediately on the opposite side of the river and parallel to it there was a broad, deep, dry canal. On our passing the bridge at Villa Muriel we had that village on our left, from the margin of the canal the ground sloped gradually up into heights, the summit forming a fine plateau. Villa Muriel was occupied by the brigadier Pringle with a *small* detachment of infantry, but at the time we considered that it required a larger force, as its maintenance appeared of the utmost importance to the army, we were aware that the enemy had passed the Carion with cavalry and also that Hill's caçadores had given way at another part of the river. Our engineers had partly destroyed the bridge of Villa Muriel, the enemy attacked the village, at the time the brigadier and his staff were there,* passing the ruins of the bridge by means of ladders, etc. The enemy in driving the detachment from the village made some prisoners. We retired to the plateau of the heights, under a fire of musketry and artillery, where we halted in close column; the enemy strengthened the village.

Lord Wellington arrived with his staff on the plateau, and immediately reconnoitred the enemy, whose reinforcements had arrived and were forming strong columns on the other side of the river. Lord Wellington immediately ordered some artillery to be opened on the enemy. I happened to be close to the head-quarter staff, and heard Lord Wellington say to an aide-de-camp, "Tell Oswald I want him." On Sir John Oswald arriving he said, "Oswald, you will get the division under arms and drive the enemy from the village and retain possession of it." He replied, "My lord, if the village should be taken I do not consider it as tenable." Wellington then said, "It is my orders, general." Oswald replied, "My lord, as it is your orders, they shall be obeyed." Wellington then gave orders to him "that he should take the second brigade of the division and attack in line, that the first brigade should in column first descend the heights on the right of the second, enter the canal and assist in clearing it of the enemy," and saying, "I will tell you what I will do, Oswald. I will give you the Spaniards and Alava into the bargain, headed by a company of the 9th regiment upon your left." The attack was made accordingly, the second battalion of the 4th regiment being left in reserve in column on the slope of the hill exposed to a severe cannonade, which for a short time caused them some confusion. The enemy were driven from the canal and village, and the prisoners which they made in the morning were retaken. The enemy lost some men in this affair, but General Alava was wounded, the officer commanding the company of Brunswickers killed, and several of the division killed and wounded. During the attack Lord Wellington sent the Prince of Orange under a heavy fire for the purpose of preventing the troops exposing themselves at the canal, two companies defended the bridge with a detachment just arrived from England. The possession of the village proved of the utmost importance, as the retrograde movement we made that night could not have been effected with safety had the enemy been on our side of the river, as it was we were enabled to pass along the river with all arms in the most perfect security.

*A false stopping here misled me about the bridge. I made the allies pass by ladders instead of the French.

A LETTER

TO GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,

BEING AN ANSWER TO HIS LORDSHIP'S ASSUMED REFUTATION OF
COL. NAPIER'S JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.

MY LORD,

You have at last appeared in print without any disguise. Had you done so at first it might have spared us both some trouble. I should have paid more deference to your argument and would willingly have corrected any error fairly pointed out. Now having virtually acknowledged yourself the author of the two publications entitled "*Strictures*" and "*Further Strictures*," etc., I will not suffer you to have the advantage of using two kinds of weapons, without making you also feel their inconvenience. I will treat your present publication as a mere continuation of your former two, and then, my lord, how will you stand in this controversy?

Starting anonymously, you wrote with all the scurrility that bad taste and mortified vanity could suggest to damage an opponent, because in the fair exercise of his judgment he had ventured to deny your claim to the title of a great commander: and you coupled this with such fulsome adulation of yourself that even in a dependent's mouth it would have been sickening. Now, when you have suffered defeat, when all the errors, misquotations, and misrepresentations of your anonymous publications have been detected and exposed, you come forward in your own name as if a new and unexceptionable party had appeared, and you expect to be allowed all the advantage of fresh statements and arguments and fresh assertions, without the least reference to your former damaged evidence. You expect that I should have that deference for you, which your age, your rank, your services, and your authority under other circumstances might have fairly claimed at my hands; that I should acknowledge by my silence how much I was in error, or that I should defend myself by another tedious dissection and exposition of your production. My lord, you will be disappointed. I have neither time nor inclination to enter for the third time upon such a task; and yet I will not suffer you to claim a victory which you have not gained. I deny the strength of your arguments, I will expose some prominent inconsistencies, and as an answer to those which I do not notice I will refer to your former publications to show, that in this controversy, I am now entitled to disregard anything you may choose to advance, and that I am in justice exonerated from the necessity of producing any more proofs.

You have published above 600 pages, at three different periods, and you have taken above a year to digest and arrange the arguments and evidence contained in your present work; a few lines will suffice for the answer. The object of your literary labours is to convince the world that at Campo Mayor you proved yourself an excellent general, and that at Albuera you were superlatively great! Greater even than Cæsar! My lord, the Duke of Wellington, did not take a much longer time to establish his European reputation by driving the French from the Peninsula; and methinks, if your exploits vouch not for themselves, your writings will scarcely do it for them. At all events, a plain, simple statement at first, having your name affixed, would have been more effectual with the public, and would certainly have been more dignified than the anonymous publications with which you endeavoured to feel your way. Why should not all the main points contained in the laboured pleadings of your "*Further Strictures*," and the still more laboured pleadings of your present work, have been condensed and published at once with your name? if, indeed, it was necessary to publish at all! Was it that by anonymous abuse of your opponent and anonymous praise of yourself you hoped to create a favourable impression on the public before you appeared in person? This, my lord, seems very like a consciousness of weakness. And then how is it that so few of the arguments and evidences now adduced should have been thought of before? It is a strange thing that in the first defence of your generalship, for one short campaign, you should have neglected proofs and arguments sufficient to form a second defence of 200 pages.

You tell us that you disdained to notice my "*Reply to various Opponents*," because you knew the good sense of the public would never be misled by a production containing such numerous contradictions and palpable inconsistencies, and that your friends' advice confirmed you in this view of the matter. There were nevertheless some things in that work which required an answer, even though the greatest part of it had been weak; and it is a pity your friends did not tell you that an affected contempt for an adversary who has hit hard only

makes the bystanders laugh. Having condescended to an anonymous attack it would have been wiser to refute the proofs offered of your own inaccuracy than to shrink with mock grandeur from a contest which you had yourself provoked. My friends, my lord, gave me the same advice with respect to your anonymous publications, and with more reason, because they were anonymous; but I had the proofs of your weakness in my hands, I preferred writing an answer, and if you had been provided in the same manner you would like me have neglected your friends' advice.

My lord, I shall now proceed with my task in the manner I have before alluded to. You have indeed left me no room for that refined courtesy with which I could have wished to soften the asperities of this controversy, but I must request of you to be assured, and I say it in all sincerity, that I attribute the errors to which I must revert, not to any wilful perversion or wilful suppression of facts, but entirely to a natural weakness of memory, and the irritation of a mind confused by the working of wounded vanity. I acknowledge that it is a hard trial to have long-settled habits of self satisfaction suddenly disturbed,—

“Cursed be my harp and broke be every chord,
If I forget thy worth, *victorious Beresford.*”

It was thus the flattering muse of poetry lulled you with her sweet strains into a happy dream of glory, and none can wonder at your irritation when the muse of history awakened you with the solemn clangour of her trumpet to the painful reality that you were only an ordinary person. My lord, it would have been wiser to have preserved your equanimity, there would have been some greatness in that.

In your first “*Strictures*” you began by asserting that I knew nothing whatever of you or your services; and that I was actuated entirely by vulgar political rancour when I denied your talents as a general. To this I replied that I was not ignorant of your exploits. That I knew something of your proceedings at Buenos Ayres, at Madeira, and at Coruña; and in proof thereof I offered to enter into the details of the first, if you desired it. To this I have received no answer.

You affirmed that your perfect knowledge of the Portuguese language was one of your principal claims to be commander of the Portuguese army. In reply I quoted from your own letter to Lord Wellington, your confession, that such was your ignorance of that language at the time, you could not even read the communication from the regency relative to your own appointment.

You asserted that no officer, save Sir John Murray, objected at the first moment to your sudden elevation of rank. In answer I published Sir John Sherbrooke's letter to Sir J. Cradock complaining of it.

You said the stores (which the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo refused to let you have in 1809) had not been formed by Lord Wellington. In reply I published Lord Wellington's declaration that they had been formed by him.

You denied that you had ever written a letter to the junta of Badajos, and this not doubtfully or hastily, but positively, and accompanied with much scorn and ridicule of my assertion to that effect. You harped upon the new and surprising information I had obtained relative to your actions, and were, in truth, very facetious upon the subject. In answer I published your own letter to that junta! So much for your first “*Strictures.*”

In your second publication (page 42) you asserted that Colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action at Campo Mayor; and now in your third publication (page 48) you show very clearly that he took an active part in those operations.

You called the distance from Campo Mayor to Merida *two marches*, and now you say it is *four marches*.

Again, in your first “*Strictures*” you declared that the extent of the intrigues against you in Portugal were exaggerated by me; and you were very indignant that I should have supposed you either needed, or had the support and protection of the Duke of Wellington while in command of the Portuguese army. In my third and fourth volumes, published since, I have shown what the extent of those intrigues was: and I have still something in reserve to add when time shall be fitting. Meanwhile I will stay your lordship's appetite by two extracts bearing upon this subject, and upon the support which you derived from the Duke of Wellington.

1. Mr. Stuart, writing to Lord Wellesley, in 1810, after noticing the violence of the Souza faction relative to the fall of Almeida, says,—“I could have borne all this with patience if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the Tagus, and that the regency should send an order to Marshal Beresford to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary; followed by reflections on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purport respecting the Portuguese who are attached to Lord Wellington.”

2. Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beira by Marshal Beresford, and dated 6th September, 1810.—“However, as I mentioned, I have no great desire to hold my situation beyond the period Lord Wellington retains his situation, or after active operations have ceased in this country, even should things turn out favourably, of which I really at this instant have better hopes than I ever had though I have been usually sanguine. But in regard to myself,

though I do not pretend to say the situation I hold is not at all times desirable to hold, yet I am fully persuaded that if tranquillity is ever restored to this country under its legal government, that I should be too much vexed and thwarted by intrigues of all sorts to reconcile either my temper or my conscience to what would then be my situation."

For the further exposition of the other numerous errors and failures of your two first publications, I must refer the reader to my "*Reply*" and "*Justification*," but the points above noticed it was necessary to fix attention upon, because they give me the right to call upon the public to disregard your present work. And this right I cannot relinquish. I happened fortunately to have the means of repelling your reckless assaults in the instances above mentioned, but I cannot always be provided with your own letters to disprove your own assertions. The combat is not equal, my lord, I cannot contend with such odds, and must therefore, although reluctantly, use the advantages which by the detection of such errors I have already obtained.

These then are strong proofs of an unsound memory upon essential points, and they deprive your present work of all weight as an authority in this controversy. Yet the strangest part of your new book (see page 135) is, that you avow an admiration for what you call the *generous principle* which leads French authors to *misstate facts for the honour of their country*; and not only do you do this but sneer at me very openly for not doing the same! you sneer at me, my lord, for not falsifying facts to pander to the morbid vanity of my countrymen, and at the same time, with a preposterous inconsistency, you condemn me for being an inaccurate historian! My lord, I have indeed yet to learn that the *honour* of my country either requires to be or can be supported by deliberate historical falsehoods. Your lordship's personal experience in the field may perhaps have led you to a different conclusion, but I will not be your historian: and coupling this, your expressed sentiment, with your forgetfulness on the points which I have before noticed, I am undoubtedly entitled to laugh at your mode of attacking others. What, my lord? like Banquo's ghost you rise, "with twenty mortal murders on your crown to push us from our stools." You have indeed a most awful and ghost-like way of arguing: all your oracular sentences are to be implicitly believed, and all my witnesses to facts sound and substantial, are to be discarded for your airy nothings.

Captain Squire! heed him not, he was a dissatisfied, talking, self-sufficient, ignorant officer.

The officer of dragoons who charged at Campo Mayor! He is nameless, his narrative teems with misrepresentations, he cannot tell whether he charged or not.

Colonel Light! sponge him out, he was only a subaltern.

Captain Gregory! believe him not, his statement cannot be correct, he is too minute, and has no diffidence.

Sir Julius Hartman, Colonel Wildman, Colonel Leighton! Oh! very honourable men, but they know nothing of the fact they speak of, all their evidence put together is worth nothing! But, my lord, it is very exactly corroborated by additional evidence contained in Mr. Long's publication. Aye! aye! all are wrong; their eyes, their ears, their recollections, all deceived them. They were not competent to judge. But they speak to single facts! no matter!

Well, then, my lord, I push to you your own despatch! Away with it! It is worthless, bad evidence, not to be trusted! Nothing more likely, my lord, but what then, and who is to be trusted? Nobody who contradicts me: everybody who coincides with me, nay, the same person is to be believed or disbelieved exactly as he supports or opposes my assertion; even those French authors whose generous principles lead them to write falsehoods for the *honour of their country*. Such, my lord, after a year's labour of cogitation, is nearly the extent of your "*Refutation*."

In your first publication you said that I should have excluded all hearsay evidence, and have confined myself to what could be proved in a court of justice; and now when I bring your testimony which no court of justice could refuse, with a lawyer's coolness you tell the jury that none of it is worthy of credit; that my witnesses, being generally of a low rank in the army, are not to be regarded, that they were not competent to judge. My lord, this is a little too much: there would be some show of reason if these subaltern's opinions had been given upon the general dispositions of the campaign, but they are all witnesses to facts which came under their personal observation. What! hath not a subaltern eyes? Hath he not ears? Hath he not understanding? You were once a subaltern yourself, and you cannot blind the world by such arrogant pride of station, such overweening contempt for men's capacity because they happen to be of lower rank than yourself. Long habits of imperious command may have so vitiated your mind that you cannot dispossess yourself of such injurious feelings, yet, believe me it would be much more dignified to avoid this indecent display of them.

I shall now, my lord, proceed to remark upon such parts of your new publication as I think necessary for the farther support of my history, that is, where new proofs, or apparent proofs, are brought forward. For I am, as I have already shown, exonerated by your former inaccuracies from noticing any part of your "*Refutation*" save where new evidence is brought forward; and that only in deference to those gentlemen, who, being unmixed with your former works, have a right either to my acquiescence in the weight of their testimony, or my reasons for declining to accept it. I have, however, on my hands a much more important

labour than contending with your lordship, and I shall therefore leave the greatest part of your book to those who choose to take the trouble to compare your pretended "Refutation" with my original "Justification" in combination with this letter, being satisfied that in so doing I shall suffer nothing by their award.

1st. With respect to the death of the Lieutenant-Governor of Almeida, you still harp upon my phrase that it was the *only* evidence. The expression is common amongst persons when speaking of trials; it is said the prisoner was condemned by such or such a person's evidence, never meaning that there was no other testimony, but that in default of that particular evidence he would not have been condemned. Now you say that there was other evidence, yet you do not venture to affirm that Cox's letter was not *the* testimony upon which the lieutenant-governor was condemned, while the extract from Lord Stuart's letter, quoted by me, says it was. And, my lord, his lordship's letter to you, in answer to your inquiry, neither contradicts nor is intended to contradict my statement; nor yet does it in any manner deny the authenticity of my extracts, which indeed were copied verbatim from his letter to Lord Castlereagh.

Lord Stuart says that extract is the only thing bearing on the question *which he can find*. Were there nothing more it would be quite sufficient, but his papers are very voluminous, more than 50 large volumes, and he would naturally only have looked for his letter of the 25th of July, 1812, to which you drew his attention. However, in my notes and extracts taken from his documents, I find, under the date of August, 1812, the following passage:—

"The Lieutenant-Governor of Almeida was executed by Beresford's order, he, Beresford, having full powers, and the government none, to interfere. Great interest was made to save him, but in vain. The sentence and trial were published before being carried into execution, and were much criticized. Both the evidence and the choice of officers were blamed; and moreover the time chosen was one of triumph, just after the battle of Salamanca, and the place Lisbon."

This passage I have not marked in my book of notes as being Lord Stuart's words; it must therefore be only taken as an abstract of the contents of one of his papers; but comparing it with the former passage, and with the facts that your lordship's words are still very vague and uncertain as to the main point in question, namely, the evidence on which this man was really condemned, I see no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of the statement in my first edition, nor the perfect accuracy of it as amended in the second edition of my third volume, published many months ago. You will find that I have there expunged the word "*only*," and made the sentence exactly to accord with the extract from Lord Stuart's letter. You will also observe, my lord, that I never did do more than mention the simple fact, for which I had such good authority; and that so far from imputing blame to you for the execution of the sentence I expressly stated that the man richly deserved death.

Passing now to the subject of the 8th Portuguese regiment, I will first observe, that when I said the 8th Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces I imputed no blame to it. No regiment in the world could have stemmed the first fury of that French column which attacked the mountain where the 8th was posted. If the 8th was not broken by it, as Sir James Douglas's letter would seem to imply, what was it doing while the enemy, by their flank movement, gained the crest of the position in such numbers as to make it a most daring exploit of the 9th British regiment to attack them there. It is a strange thing that a heavy column of French, who were resolute to gain the crest of such a position, should have made "*a flank movement*" to avoid one wing of a regiment of Portuguese conscripts. I should rather imagine, with all deference, that it was the conscripts who made the flank movement, and that some optical deception had taken place, like that which induces children while travelling in a carriage to think the trees and rocks are moving instead of themselves. However, with this I have nothing to do; I have given my authority, namely, the statement of Major Waller, a staff officer present, and the statement of Colonel Taylor (for he is my nameless eye-witness) of the 9th, the very regiment to which Sir James Douglas appeals for support of his account. These are my authorities, and if their recollections are irreconcilable with that of Sir James Douglas it only shows how vain it is to expect perfect accuracy of detail. I knew not of Sir James Douglas's negative testimony, but I had two positive testimonies to my statement, and as I have still two to one, I am within the rules of the courts of justice to which your lordship would refer all matter of history; moreover, some grains of allowance must be made for the natural partiality of every officer for his own regiment. The following extract from Sir James Leith's report on the occasion is also good circumstantial evidence in favour of my side of the question.

"The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different aspect, for the enemy, who had been the assailant, *having dispersed or driven everything there opposed to him*, was in possession of the rocky eminence of the sierra at this part of Major-General Picton's position *without a shot being fired at him*. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-General Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the 9th British regiment, which had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in columns in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time also perceived the British brigade under him. Major-

General Leith had intended that the 38th, second battalion, should have moved on in the rear and to the left of the 9th regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the sierra, while the 9th should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height, the royals to have been posted (as they were) in reserve; but the enemy *having driven everything before them in that quarter*, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting and frequently in double-quick time."

Here we have nothing of flank movements to avoid a wing of Portuguese conscripts, but the plain and distinct assertion twice over, that *everything in front was dispersed or driven away*—and that not even a shot was fired at the enemy. Where then was the 8th Portuguese? Did the French column turn aside merely at the menacing looks of these conscripts? If so, what a pity the latter had not been placed to keep the crest of the position. There is also another difficulty. Sir James Douglas says he was with the royals in the attack, and Sir James Leith says that the royals were held in reserve while the 9th drove away the enemy; besides which, the 8th Portuguese might have been broke by the enemy when the latter were mounting the hill and yet have rallied and joined in the pursuit when the 9th had broken the French. Moreover, my lord, as you affirm that both yourself and the Duke of Wellington *saw* all the operations of the 8th Portuguese on this occasion, I will extend my former extract from Colonel Taylor's letter, wherein you will perceive something which may perhaps lead you to doubt the accuracy of your recollection on that head.

"No doubt General Leith's letter to the duke was intended to describe the aspect of affairs in so critical a situation, and where the duke himself could not *possibly* have made his observations; and also Leith wished to have due credit given to his brigade, which was not done in the despatches. On the contrary, their exertions were made light of, and the 8th Portuguese regiment was extolled, which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and 10 or 12 men at the outside; but he and they were amongst the very foremost ranks of the 9th British."—"General Leith's correspondence would be an interesting document to Colonel Napier, as throwing considerable light upon the operations at Busaco, between Picton and Hill's corps, a very considerable extent of position *which could not of possibility be overlooked from any other part of the field.*"

Charge of the 19th Portuguese.—Your lordship has here gained an advantage; I cannot indeed understand some of General M'Bean's expressions, but it is impossible for me to doubt his positive statement; I believe therefore that he was in front of the convent wall, and that he charged some body of the enemy. It is however necessary to restore the question at issue between your lordship and myself to its true bearing. You accused me of a desire to damage the reputation of the Portuguese army, and you asked why I did not speak of a particular charge made by the 19th Portuguese regiment at Busaco. This charge you described as being against one of *Ney's attacking columns*, which had, you said, *gained the ascent of the position, and then forming advanced on the plain above* before it was charged by the 19th regiment. As this description was certainly wrong I treated the whole as a magniloquent allusion to an advance which I had observed to have been made by a Portuguese regiment posted on the mountain to the right. (General M'Bean is mistaken when he quotes me as saying that his line was never nearer to the enemy's lines than 100 yards. I spoke of a *Portuguese regiment which might possibly be the 19th*.) I never denied that any charge had been made, but that a charge *such as described by you* had taken place, and in fact General M'Bean's letter while it confirms the truth of your general description, by implication denies the accuracy of the particulars. Certainly Ney's columns never passed the front of the light division nor advanced on the plain behind it.

The difficulty I have to reconcile General M'Bean's statement with my own recollections and with the ground and position of the light division, may perhaps arise from the general's meaning to use certain terms in a less precise sense than I take them. Thus he says he was posted in front of the convent-wall, and also on the right of the light division; but the light division was half a mile in front of the convent-wall, and hence I suppose he does not mean as his words might imply, immediately under the wall. He speaks also of the light division as being to his left, but unless he speaks of the line of battle with reference to the sinuosities of the ground, the light division, was with respect to the enemy and the convent, in his front; and if he does speak with regard to those sinuosities, his front would have been nearly at right angles to the front of the 52nd and 43rd, which I suppose to be really the case. Again, he says that he charged and drove the French from *their position* down to the bottom of the ravine; but the enemy's position, properly so called, was on the opposite side of the great ravine, and as all his artillery and cavalry, all the 8th corps and the reserves of the 6th corps, were in order of battle there, 10 regiments, much less one, dared not to have crossed the ravine which was of such depth that it was difficult to distinguish troops at the bottom. I conclude, therefore, General M'Bean here means by the word position some accidental ground on which the enemy had formed. Taking this to be so, I will now endeavour to reconcile General M'Bean's statement with my own recollection; because certainly I do still hold my description of the action at that part to be accurate as to all the main points.

The edge of the table-land or tongue on which the light division stood was very abrupt, and formed a salient angle, behind the apex of which the 43rd and 52nd were drawn up in a line, the right of the one and the left of the other resting on the very edges; the artillery was at the apex, looking down the descent, and far below the caçadores and the 95th were spread on the mountain side as skirmishers. Ney employed only two columns of attack. The one came straight against the light division; the head of it striking the right company of the 52nd and the left company of the 43rd was broken as against a wall; and at the same time the wings of those regiments reinforced by the skirmishers of the 95th, who had retired on the right of the 43rd, advanced and lapped over the broken column on both sides. No other troops fought with them at that point. In this I cannot be mistaken, because my company was in the right wing of the 43rd, we followed the enemy down to the first village, which was several hundred yards below the edge, and we returned leisurely; the ground was open to the view on the right and on the left, we saw no other column, and heard of none save that which we were pursuing.

When we returned from this pursuit the light division had been reformed on the little plain above, and some time after several German battalions, coming from under the convent wall, passed through our ranks and commenced skirmishing with Ney's reserve in the woods below.

General M'Bean says he saw no German infantry, and hence it is clear that it was not at this point his charge had place. But it is also certain Ney had only two columns of attack. Now his second, under the command of General Marchand, moved up the hollow curve of the great mountain to the right of the light division, and having reached a pine-wood, which however was far below the height on which the light division stood, he sent skirmishers out against Pack's brigade which was in his front. A part of Ross's troops of artillery, under the direction of Lieutenant, now Colonel M'Donald, played very sharply upon this column in the pine-wood. I was standing in company with Captain Loyd of my own regiment, close to the guns watching their effect, and it was then I saw the advance of the Portuguese regiment to which I have alluded; but General M'Bean again assures me that the 19th regiment was not there. Two suppositions therefore present themselves. The enemy's skirmishers from this column were very numerous. Some of them might have passed the left flank of Pack's skirmishers, and gathering in a body have reached the edge of the hill on which the light division were posted, and then rising behind it have been attacked by General M'Bean; or, what is more likely, the skirmishers, or a small flanking detachment from the column which attacked the light division, might have passed under the edge of the descent on the right of the light division, and gathering in a like manner have risen under General M'Bean's line.

Either of these suppositions, and especially the last, would render the matter clear to me in all points save that of attacking the enemy's position, which as I have before observed, may be only a loose expression of the general's to denote the ground which the French opposed to him had attained on our position. This second supposition seems also to be confirmed by a fact mentioned by General M'Bean, namely, that the enemy's guns opened on him immediately after his charge. The French guns did open also on that part of the light division which followed the enemy down the hill to the first village, thus the time that the 19th charged seems marked, and as I was one of those who went to the village, it also accounts for my not seeing that charge. However, considering all things, I must admit that I was so far in error that I really did not, nor do I now possess any clear recollection of this exploit of the 19th regiment; and in proof of the difficulty of attaining strict accuracy on such occasions, I can here adduce the observation of General M'Bean viz., that he saw no Germans save the artillery; yet there was a whole brigade of that nation near the convent wall, and they advanced and skirmished sharply with the enemy soon after the charge of the 19th would appear to have taken place. Very often also, things appear greater to those who perform them than to the by-standers, and I would therefore ask how many men the 19th lost in the charge, how many prisoners it took, and how many French were opposed to it? for I still maintain that neither by the 19th Portuguese, nor by any other regiment, save those of the light division, was any charge made which called for particular notice on my part as a general historian. I am not bound to relate all the minor occurrences of a great battle; "those things belong to the history of regiments," is the just observation of Napoleon. Yet General M'Bean may be assured that no desire to underrate either his services or the gallantry of the Portuguese soldiers ever actuated me, and to prove it, if my third volume should ever come to a third edition, I will take his letter as my ground for noticing this charge, although I will not promise to make it appear so prominent as your lordship would have me to do.

Your lordship closes this subject by the following observation: "As Colonel Napier represents himself as having been an eye-witness of a gallant movement made by a certain Portuguese regiment,—which regiment he does not profess to know,—but which movement took place a mile distant from the position given to the 19th regiment, it is evident he could not also have been an eye-witness of what was passing a mile to the left. Nor can he therefore negative what is said to have occurred there. It is extraordinary that the historian should not have perceived the predicament in which he has placed himself." Now your lordship does not say that the two events occurred at the *same time*, wherefore your conclusion is what the renowned Partridge calls a "*non sequitur*;" and as General M'Bean expressly

affirms his charge to have taken place on the *right* of the light division, it was not absolutely necessary that I should look to the *left* in order to see the said charge. Hence the predicament in which I am placed, is that of being obliged to remark your lordship's inability to reason upon your own materials.

Your next subject is Captain Squire, but I will pass over that matter as having been I think sufficiently discussed before, and I am well assured that the memory of that very gallant and able officer will never suffer from your lordship's angry epithets. Campo Mayor follows. In your "*Further Strictures*" you said that Colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action; you now show in detail that he was actively engaged in it. You denied also that he was in support of the advanced guard, and yet quote his own report explaining how he happened to be separated from the advanced guard just before the action, thus proving that he was marching in support of it. You refuse any credit to the statements of Captain Gregory and Colonel Light; and you endeavour to discredit and trample upon the evidence of the officer of the 13th dragoons who was an actor in the charge of that regiment, but with respect to him a few remarks are necessary.

1st. The accuracy of that gentleman's narrative concerns my Justification very little, except in one part. I published it whole as he gave it to me, because I thought it threw light upon the subject. I think so still, and I see nothing in your lordship's observation to make me doubt its general correctness. But it was only the part which I printed in italics that concerned me. I had described a remarkable combat of cavalry, wherein the hostile squadrons *had twice passed through each other*, and then the British put the French to flight. Your lordship ridiculed this as a nursery tale; you called my description of it a "*country dance*," and you still call it my "*scenic effect*." Did the hostile masses meet twice, and did the British then put their opponents to flight? These were the real questions. The unusual fact of two cavalry bodies charging through each other, was the point in dispute; it is scenic, but is it true? Now my first authority, whom I have designated as an "*eye-witness*," was Colonel Colborne; my second authority Colonel Dogherty of the 13th dragoons, an *actor*; and when your lordship so coolly says the latter's statement does not afford "the slightest support to my scenic description," I must take the liberty of laughing at you. Why, my lord, you really seem disposed to treat common sense as if it were a subaltern. Colonel Dogherty bears me out even to the letter; for as the second charge took place with the same violence that the third did, if the hostile bodies had not passed through to their original position, the French must have fled towards the allied army; but they fled towards Badajoz. The English must therefore have passed through and turned, and it was then, that in the personal conflict with the sabre which followed the second charge, the 13th dragoons defeated the French.

My lord, you will never by such special pleading, I know of no other term by which I can properly designate your argument, you will never, I say, by such special pleading, hide your bad generalship at Campo Mayor. The proofs of your errors there are too many and too clear; the errors themselves too glaring, too gross, to leave you the least hope; the same confusion of head which prevented you from seizing the advantages then offered to you seems to prevail in your writing; and yet, while impeaching every person's credit where their statements militate against your object, you demand the most implicit confidence in your own contradictory assertions and preposterous arguments. My lord, you only fatigue yourself and your readers by your unwieldy floundering, you are heavy and throw much mud about; like one of those fine Andalusian horses so much admired in the Peninsula, you prance and curvet and foam, and labour in your paces, but you never get on. At Campo Mayor you had an enormous superiority of troops, the enemy were taken by surprise, they were in a plain, their cavalry were beaten, their artillery-drivers cut down, their infantry, hemmed in by your horsemen and under the play of your guns, were ready to surrender; yet you suffered them to escape and to carry off their captured artillery, and then you blamed your gallant troops. The enemy escaped from you, my lord, but you cannot escape from the opinion of the world by denying the truth of all statements which militate against you.

The March by Merida.—If you had said at once that the Duke of Wellington forbade you to go by Merida, there would have been an end of all my arguments against your skill; yet it by no means follows that these arguments would be futile in themselves, though not applicable to you personally. New combinations were presented, and the Duke of Wellington might very probably have changed his instructions had he been present on the spot. But, why was this your justification withheld until now? why was so plain, so clear, so decisive a defence of yourself never thought of before? and why is it now smothered with such a heap of arguments as you have added, to prove that you ought not to have gone by Merida? Have you found out that I am not such a bad reasoner upon military affairs as you were pleased to style me in your former publication? Have you found out that pleading high rank is not a sufficient answer to plain and well supported statements? It is good, however, that you have at last condescended to adopt a different mode of proceeding. I applaud you for it, and with the exception of two points I will leave you in the full enjoyment of any triumph which the force of your arguments may procure you; always, however, retaining my right to assume that your lordship's memory with respect to the Duke of Wellington's negative, may have been as treacherous as it was about your own letter to the junta of Badajoz.

I have therefore nothing to add to the arguments I have already used in my Justification,

and in my History, in favour of the march to Merida; if I am wrong the world will so judge me. But the two points I have reserved are, 1st. That you assert now, in direct contradiction to your former avowal, that the march to Merida would have been one of *four* days instead of *two*; and that the road by Albuquerque was the only one which you could use. In answer to this last part I observe, that the French before, and the Spaniards then, marched by the road of Montigo; and that a year after, when Lord Hill's expedition against Almaraz took place, the whole of his battering and pontoon train, with all the ammunition belonging to it, moved with great facility in three days from Elvas, by this very road of Montigo, to Merida; and Elvas as your lordship knows is rather further than Campo Mayor from Merida.

The second point is that mode of conducting a controversy which I have so often had occasion to expose in your former publications, viz., misstating my arguments to suit your own reasoning. I never said that you should have attempted, or could have succeeded in a "*coup de main*" against Badajos; I never even said you should have commenced the siege immediately. What I did say was, that by the march through Merida you could have placed your army at once between Badajos and the French army, and so have thrown the former upon its own resources at a most inconvenient time; that in this situation you could have more readily thrown your bridge at Jerumenha, and proceeded at your convenience.

Further than this I do not think it necessary to dissect and expose your new fallacies and contradictions; it requires too much time. You have written upwards of 600 pages, 400 of them I have before demolished; but my own volumes are rather thick and to me at least much more important than yours; your lordship must therefore spare me the other 200, or at least permit me to treat them lightly. I will leave the whole siege of Badajos to you, it is matter of opinion, and I will not follow your example in overloading what is already clear by superfluity of argument. I will only expose one error into which you have been led by Colonel La Marre's work. On his authority you say the garrison on the 10th of April had three months' provisions; but the following extract from a letter of Marshal Soult's to the Prince of Wagram will prove that La Marre is wrong:—

"Seville, 18th April.

"From the 11th of this month the place was provisioned, according to the report of General Phillipon, for *two months and some days* as to subsistence; and there are 100 milliers of powder," etc., etc.

Let us now come to the *battle of Albuera*.

You still doubt that the position as I explained it is four miles long, and you rest upon the superior accuracy of Major Mitchell's plan, on which you have measured the distance with your compasses. I also am in possession of one of Major Mitchell's plans, and I find by the aid of my pair of compasses, that even from the left of the Portuguese *infantry* (without noticing Otway's squadron of cavalry) to the right of the Spanish line, as placed at the termination of the battle, is exactly four miles; and everybody knows that a line over the actual ground will from the latter's rises and falls exceed the line on paper. Wherefore as my measurement does not coincide with your lordship's, and as we are both Irishmen, I conclude that either your compasses are too short or that mine are too long.

Your grand *cheval de bataille* is, however, the numbers of the armies on each side. Thirty-eight long pages you give us, to prove what cannot be proved, namely, that my estimate is wrong and yours right; and at the end you are just where you began. All is uncertain, there are no returns, no proof! the whole matter is one of guess upon probabilities as to the allies, and until lately was so also with respect to the French.

Mine was a very plain statement. I named a certain number as the nearest approximation I could make, and when my estimate was questioned by you I explained as briefly as possible the foundation of that estimate. You give in refutation 38 pages of most confused calculations, and what is the result? why that the numbers of the allies, on your own showing, still remain uncertain; and your estimate of the French, as I will show by the bye, is quite erroneous.

I said, in my History, you had more than 2000 cavalry in the field, and in my Justification I gave reasons for believing you had nearly 3000; you now acknowledge 2000; my History then is not far wrong. But your lordship does not seem to know the composition of your own divisions. General Long's morning states, now before me, do not include General Madden's cavalry. That officer's regiments were the 5th and 8th, and, if I mistake not, the 6th and 9th also were under him; those in General Long's division are the 1st and 7th. I find from General Madden's own account of his services, given in the "*Military Calendar*," that a part of his brigade, namely, the 8th regiment, under Colonel Windham, was in the battle of Albuera. Now taking the 8th to be between 270 and 281 troopers, which were the respective strengths of the 1st and 7th regiments in Long's division on the 29th of May, I have above 1800 troopers, namely, 1587 in Long's division, and 275 in the 8th regiment, and to these I add about 250 officers and sergeants, making in all more than 2000 sabres. In General Long's states of the 8th of May, those two Portuguese regiments had indeed fewer under arms than on the 29th, but then 689 men and 44 sergeants and trumpeters were on command, of which more than 400 belonged to those two Portuguese regiments. Many of these men must surely have joined before the battle, because such an unusual number on command could only be temporary. Again, I find in the state of the 29th of May, 115 sergeants, trumpeters, and troopers returned as prisoners of war; and when the killed and wounded in the battle are

added, we may fairly call the British and Portuguese cavalry above 2000. Your lordship admits the Spaniards to have had 750; but I will, for clearness, place this in a tabular form:—

GENERAL LONG'S STATES.

8th of May.

Sergeants, trumpeters, and troopers.

Present under arms	1576
On command	733
Prisoners of war	115
	<hr/>
	2424

29th of May.

Present	1739
Command	522
Prisoners of war	127
	<hr/>
	2388

Medium estimate for the 16th of May.

Present 8th May	1576
Ditto 29th May	1739
	<hr/>
	2)3315
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	1657½
	270 8th Portuguese regt.
	<hr/>
	1927
	127 Prisoners of war.
	<hr/>
	2054
	750 Spaniards.
	<hr/>
	2804
Deduct prisoners on the 8th	115
	<hr/>
Total	2689

To which are to be added the killed and wounded of the Anglo-Portuguese, and the men rejoined from command.

Thus, the statements in my History and in my Justification are both borne out; for the numbers are above 2000 as set down in the first, and nearly 3000 as stated in the last. Moreover, a general historian is not blameable for small inaccuracies. If he has reasonably good authority for any fact he cannot be justly censured for stating that fact, and you should make a distinction between that which is stated in my History and that which is stated in my controversial writings. All mistakes in the latter, however trifling, are fair; but to cavil at trifles in the former rather hurts yourself. Now with respect to the artillery there is an example of this cavilling, and also an illustration of your lordship's mode of raising a very confused argument on a very plain fact. I said there were so many guns in the field, and that so many were 9-pounders; you accused me of arbitrarily deciding upon their calibre. In reply I showed you that I took the *number* on the report of Colonel Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery, the *calibre* upon the authority of your own witness and quarter-master-general, Sir Benjamin D'Urban. The latter was wrong, and there the matter should have ended. Your lordship, however, requires me, as a mark of ingenuousness, to acknowledge as my mistake that which is the mistake of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and you give a grand table, with the gross number of pounds of iron as if the affair had been between two ships. You set down in your columns the statements of the writer of a note upon your Strictures, the statement of the Strictures themselves, and my statement; and then come on with your own observations as if there were three witnesses on your side. But the author of the note is again your witness D'Urban, who thus shows himself incorrect both as to number and weight; and the author of the Strictures is yourself. This is not an *ingenuous*, though it is an *ingenious* mode of multiplying testimony. In your Further Strictures also you first called in Sir B. D'Urban in person, you then used his original memoir, you also caused him to write anonymously a running commentary upon yours and his own statements, and now you comment in your own name upon your own anonymous statements, thus making five testimonies out of two.

The answer is simple and plain. When I took Sir Benjamin D'Urban as a guide he led me wrong; and you, instead of visiting his error upon his own head, visit it upon mine, and

require me and your readers to follow him implicitly upon all points while to do so avails for your defence, but not when they contradict it. From Sir B. D'Urban I took the *calibre* of the allies' guns employed in the battle of Albuera, and he was wrong! From him, if I had not possessed Sir A. Dickson's official return, I should also have taken the *number* of guns, and I should have been wrong, because he calls then 34 instead of 38. He also (see page 26 of the Appendix to your Further Strictures) says that the Spaniards had six guns, whereas Dickson says, they had but four; and if his six guns were reckoned there would have been forty pieces of artillery, which he however reduced to 34 by another error, namely, leaving out a whole brigade of German artillery. On Sir Benjamin's authority I called Major Dickson the commander of the artillery, and this also was wrong. From Sir Benjamin D'Urban's "Memoir," I took the statement that the fourth division arrived on the field of battle *at six o'clock in the morning*, and yet I am assured that they did not arrive until nine o'clock, and after the action had commenced. And this last is a very serious error, because it gives the appearance of skill to your lordship's combinations for battle and to Sir Benjamin's arrangements for the execution, which they do not merit, if, as I now believe, that division arrived at nine o'clock. But the latter hour would be quite in keeping with the story of the cavalry going to forage, and both together would confirm another report very current, namely that your lordship did not anticipate any battle on the 16th of May. Setting this however aside, I know not why, in the face of all these glaring errors and a multitude of smaller ones, I am to take Sir Benjamin D'Urban's authority upon any disputed point.

I will now, my lord, admit one complete triumph which you have attained in your dissertation upon the numbers of the troops. I did say that from the 20th of March to the 16th of May, was only 20 days, and though the oversight is so palpably one that could not be meant to deceive, I will not deny your right to ridicule and to laugh at it. I have laughed at so many of your lordship's oversights that it would be unfair to deny you this opportunity for retaliation, which I also admit you have used moderately.

I have, since I wrote my Justification, procured some proofs about the French numbers, you will find them in the following extracts from the Duke of Dalmatia's correspondence of that time. They are worth your attention. They throw some light upon the numbers of the allies, and one of them shows unquestionably that my estimate of the French numbers was, as I have before said, too high instead of too low. I give the translations, to avoid the trouble and expense of printing in two languages, and I beg your lordship to observe that these extracts are not liable to the praise of that generous patriotism which you alluded to in speaking of French authors, because they were written before the action and for the Emperor's information, and because it was the then interest of the writer rather to exaggerate than to lessen his own numbers, in order to give his sovereign an idea of his activity and zeal.

Extract of a letter from MARSHAL SOULT to the PRINCE OF WAGRAM.

"Seville, 22nd April, 1811.

"General Latour Maubourg announces to me that General Beresford, commanding the Anglo-Portuguese army, and the Spanish generals Castaños and Ballesteros, with the remains of the corps of their nation, are united at Zafra, and I am assured that the whole of their forces is 25,000 men, of which 3000 are cavalry."

"Colonel Quennot of the 9th regiment of dragoons, who commands upon the line of the Tinto and observes the movements on that side as far as Ayamonte, informs me that on the 18th and 19th General Blake disembarked 10,000 infantry and 700 cavalry between the mouths of the Piedra and the Guadiana. These troops come from Cadiz, they have cannon, and Blake can unite in that part 15,000 men."

DITTO to DITTO.

"May 4th, 1811.

"Cordova is menaced by a corps of English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, many troops are concentrated in Estremadura, Badajos is invested, Blake *has* united on the Odiel an army of 15,000 to 16,000 men."—"I depart in four days with *twenty thousand men, three thousand horses and thirty pieces of cannon* to drive across the Guadiana the enemy's corps which are spread in Estremadura, to disengage Badajos, and to facilitate the arrival of Count D'Erlon. If the troops which that general brings can unite with mine, and if the troops coming from the armies of the north and centre, and which I have already in part arranged, arrive in time, I shall have in Estremadura, 35,000 men, 5000 horses, and 40 pieces of artillery."

Now, my lord, I find by the imperial returns that Count D'Erlon marched towards Andalusia with 12,000 men present under arms, and that he did not arrive until the 14th of June. There remain 3000 men, as coming from the armies of the north and centre, to make up the 35,000 men mentioned by Soult, and I find the following passage in his letter to the Prince of Wagram, dated the 9th of May.

"The 12th, I shall be at Fuente Cantos, General Bron commands there, he brings with him the first reinforcement coming from the armies of the north and centre, and I shall employ him in the expedition."

Hence, if we take the first reinforcement at half of the whole number expected, we add 1500 men and five guns to the 20,000, making a total for the battle of Albuera of 21,500 men of all

arms, and 35 guns. From these must be deducted the detachments left at Villalba, stragglers on the march, and some hussars sent to scout on the flanks, for I find in General Madden's narrative of his services, that he was watched by part of the enemy's cavalry on the day of the battle.

I have now, my lord, given you positive and undeniable testimony that the French numbers were overrated instead of being underrated by me, and I have given you corroborative evidence, that the number of the allies was as great as I have stated it to be; for we find in the above extracts Soult giving Blake 15,000 men, of which, at least, 700 are cavalry, *before the battle*, and 25,000, of which 3000 are cavalry, to your lordship, Cantañón, etc. We find the French general's information, taking into consideration the troops which joined Blake in the Niebla, not differing essentially from Mr. Henry Wellesley's report of the numbers of Blake's army, namely 12,000, of which 1100 were cavalry; and we find both in some manner confirmed by Lord Wellington's repeated statements of the forces of Blake's army after the battle, that is to say, making a reasonable allowance for the numbers lost in the action. Soult and Mr. Wellesley also agree in making out the Spanish cavalry more numerous than your lordship will admit of. Blake alone had from 700 to 1100 cavalry, following the statement of these persons, and there was in addition the corps of Penne Villemur, which, as I have said in my Justification, was not less than 500.

In closing your calculation of numbers you exultingly observe that it is the first time you ever heard of a general's being censured for keeping one-third of his force in reserve and *beating the enemy with the other two*. Aye—but this involves the very pith of the question. At Albuera the general did not beat the enemy. My lord, you have bestowed great pains on your argument about the battle of Albuera, and far be it from me to endeavour to deprive you of any addition to your reputation which you may thus obtain. I have no desire to rob you of any well-earned laurels, my observations were directed against what appeared to me your bad generalship; if I have not succeeded in pointing that out to the satisfaction of the public I have nothing further to offer in fairness and certainly will not by any vile sophistry endeavour to damage your fame. But do not think that I acknowledge the force of your present arguments. If I do not take the trouble to dissect them, for reasons before mentioned, be assured it is not from any want of points to fasten upon; indeed, my lord, your book is very weak, there are many failures in it, and a few more I will touch upon that you may estimate my forbearance at its proper value. I will begin with your observations on Captain Gregory's testimony, not in defence of that gentleman's credit, for in truth, as his and the other officers' evidence is given to facts of which they were personally cognizant I cannot pay the slightest regard to your confused arguments in opposition to their honour. I am aware that you do not mean to impeach anything but their memory; but if I were to attempt to defend them from your observations it would appear as if I thought otherwise. My lord, you have missed Captain Gregory, but you have hit yourself very hard.

Behold the proof.

At page 167 you say, "I will now point out the gross and palpable errors of Captain Gregory's narrative. He says, 'that on receiving the intelligence from an orderly of the 13th dragoons who came in from a picket on the right with intelligence that the enemy was crossing the river, General Long galloped off.' I conclude to the right, 'and found half the army across,' and to the right. *Why, every other authority has stated that the enemy's first movement was from the wood along the right bank of the Albuera upon our left*; and that we were not at all aware of their intention to cross above our right and there make an attack, till after their first movement was considerably advanced and the action had actually commenced with Godinot's corps on the opposite side of the river to our left. It is quite surprising that Colonel Napier should have overlooked a blunder so gross as to destroy the value of the whole of his friend's testimony."

Now, my lord, compare the passage marked by italics (pardon me the italics) in the above, with the following extract from your own despatch.

"The enemy on the 16th did not long delay his attack: at eight o'clock" (the very time mentioned by Captain Gregory), "he was observed to be in movement, and his cavalry were seen passing the rivulet of Albuera considerably *above our right, and shortly after*, he marched, out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry and two heavy columns of infantry, posting them to our front, *as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera*. During this time he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river *beyond our right*, and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank." Your lordship has, indeed in another part discarded the authority of your despatch, as appears most necessary in treating of this battle, but is rather hard measure to attack me so fiercely for having had some faith in it.

With respect to Sir William Lumley's letter I cannot but admire his remembrance of the exact numbers of the British cavalry. A recollection of 23 years, founded on a few hasty words spoken on a field of battle, is certainly a rare thing; yet I was not quite unprepared for such precision, for if I do not greatly mistake, Sir William was the general, who at Santarem edified the head-quarters by a report, that "*the enemy were certainly going to move either to their right or to their left, to their front or to their rear*." One would suppose that so exact a person could never be in error; and yet the following extract from General Harvey's journal

would lead me to suppose that his memory was not quite so clear and powerful as he imagines. Sir William Lumley says, that to the best of his recollection he was not aware of the advance of the fusileers and Harvey's brigade until they had passed his left flank; that they then came under his eye; that as the rain and smoke cleared away he saw them as one body moving to engage, and although they had become so oblique, relative to the point where he stood, that he could not well speak as to their actual distance from one another, there did not appear any improper interval between them.

Now hear General Harvey!

"The 23rd and one battalion of the 7th fusileers were in line. The other battalion at quarter distance, forming square at every halt to cover the right, which the cavalry continued to menace. *Major-General Lumley, with the British cavalry, was also in column of half squadrons in rear of our right and moved with us, being too weak to advance against the enemy's cavalry.*

There, my lord, you see that generals as well as doctors differ. Sir W. Lumley, 23 years after the event, recollects seeing the fusileers and Harvey's brigade at such a distance, and so obliquely, that he could not speak to their actual distance from one another. General Harvey writing the day after the event, says, Sir William Lumley had his cavalry in half squadrons close in rear of these very brigades, and was moving with them! This should convince your lordship that it is not wise to cry out and cavil at every step in the detail of a battle.

As to the term *gap*, I used the word without the mark of quotation, because it was my own and it expressed mine and your meaning very well. You feared that the cavalry of the French would overpower ours, and break in on your rear and flank when the support of the fusileers was taken away. I told you that General Cole had placed Harvey's brigade in the *gap*, that is, in such a situation that the French could not break in. I knew very well that Harvey's brigade followed in support of the attack of the fusileers, because he says so in his journal; but he also says, that both ours and the enemy's cavalry made a corresponding movement. Thus the fear of the latter breaking in was chimerical, especially as during the march Harvey halted, formed, received and beat off a charge of the French horsemen.

But I have not yet done with Sir W. Lumley's numbers. How curious it is that Brigade-Major Holmes's verbal report on the field of battle, as recollected by Sir William, should give the 3rd dragoon guards and the 4th dragoons, forming the heavy brigade, the exact number of 560 men, when the same Brigade-Major Holmes, in his written morning state of the 8th of May, one week before the battle, gives to those regiments 752 troopers present under arms, and 183 on command. What became of the others in the interval? Again, on the 29th of May, 13 days after the battle, he writes down these regiments 695 troopers present under arms, 182 on command, and 32 prisoners of war. In both cases also the sergeants, trumpeters, etc., are to be added; and I mark this circumstance, because in the French returns all persons from the highest officer to the conductors of carriages are included in the strength of men. I imagine neither of the distinguished regiments alluded to will be willing to admit that their ranks were full before and after, but empty on the day of battle. It is contrary to the English custom. Your lordship, also, in a parenthesis (p. 125) says that the 13th dragoons had not 300 men at this time to produce; but this perverse Brigade-Major Holmes writes that regiment down also on the 8th of May, at 357 troopers present under arms, and 63 on command; and on the 29th of May, 341 present, 79 on command, 82 prisoners of war. Staff-officers are notoriously troublesome people.

One point more, and I have done.

You accuse me of having placed Sir A. Dickson in a position where he never was, and you give a letter from that officer to prove the fact. You also deny the correctness of Sir Julius Hartman's statement, and you observe that even were it accurate, he does not speak of an order to retreat, but an order to cover a retreat. Now to say that I place Dickson in a wrong position is scarcely fair, because I only use Sir Julius Hartman's words, and that in my justification; whereas in my History, I have placed Colonel Dickson's guns exactly in the position where he himself says they were. If your lordship refers to my work you will see that it is so; and surely it is something akin to quibbling, to deny, that artillery posted to defend a bridge was not at the bridge because its long range enabled it to effect its object from a distance.

You tell me also that I had your quarter-master-general's evidence to counteract Sir Julius Hartman's relative to this retreat. But Sir Benjamin D'Urban had already misled me more than once; and why, my lord, did you garble Sir A. Dickson's communication? I will answer for you. It contained positive evidence that *a retreat was ordered*. Your lordship may ask how I know this. I will tell you that also. Sir Alexander Dickson at my request sent me the substance of his communication to you at the same time. You are now I hope, convinced that it is not weakness which induces me to neglect a complete analysis of your work. I do assure you it is very weak in every part.

My lord, you have mentioned several other letters which you have received from different officers, Colonel Arbutnot, Colonel Colborne, etc., as confirming your statements, but you have not, as in the cases of Sir James Douglas and General M'Bean, where they were wholly on your own side, given these letters in full; wherefore, seeing the gloss you have put upon Lord Stuart's communication, and this garbling of Sir A. Dickson's letter, I have a right to

suppose that the others do not bear up your case very strongly,—probably they contradict it on some points as Sir Alexander Dickson's does. I shall now give the latter entire.

"The Portuguese artillery under my command (12 guns) attached to General Hamilton's division was posted on favourable ground about 750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and at least 700 yards S. W. of the village of Albuera, their fire bore effectually upon the bridge and the road from it to the bridge, and I received my orders to take this position from Lord Beresford when the enemy threatened their main attack at the bridge. At a certain period of the day, I should judge it to have been about the time the fourth division moved to attack, *I received a verbal order in English from Don Jose Luiz de Souza* (now Conde de Villa Real, an aide-de-camp of Lord Beresford) *to retire by the Valverde road, or upon the Valverde road, I am not sure which*; to this I strongly expressed words of doubt, and he then rode off towards Albuera; as, however, I could see no reason for falling back, and the infantry my guns belonged to being at hand, I continued in action, and though I believe I limbered up once or twice previous to the receipt of this message and moved a little to improve my position, I never did so to retire. Soon after Don Jose left me, seeing Lord Beresford and some of his staff to my right, I rode across to satisfy myself that I was acting correctly, but perceiving that the French were giving way I did not mention the order I had received, and as soon as Lord Beresford saw me, he asked what state my guns were in, and then ordered me to proceed as quickly as I could with my 9-pounders to the right, which I did in time to bring them into action against the retreating masses of the enemy. The foregoing is the substance of an explanation given to Lord Beresford which he lately requested."

Thus you have the whole of what Sir Alexander Dickson (as he tells me) wrote to you; and here therefore I might stop, my lord, to enjoy your confusion. I might harp upon this fact, as being so formidable a bar to your lordship's argument, that rather than give it publicity, you garbled your own correspondent's letter. But my object is not to gain a triumph over you, it is to establish the truth, and I will not follow your example by suppressing what may tend to serve your argument and weaken mine. It is of no consequence to me whether you gave orders for a retreat or not. I said in my History that you did not do so, thinking the weight of testimony to be on that side, and it was only when your anonymous publications called forth new evidence that I began to doubt the correctness of my first statement.* But if the following observation in Sir Alexander Dickson's letter can serve your argument, you are welcome to it, although it is not contained in the substance of what he wrote to you; and here also I beg of you to remember that this letter of Sir Alexander's was written to me *after my justification* was printed.

"I had never mentioned the matter to any one, except to Hartman, with whom I was on the greatest habits of intimacy, and indeed I was from the first induced to attribute Souza's message to some mistake, as neither in my conversation with Lord Beresford was there any allusion to it, nor did anything occur to indicate to me that he was aware of my having received such an order."

Your lordship will no doubt deny that the Count of Villa Real had any authority from you to order this retreat, so be it; but then you call upon me and others to accept this Count of Villa Real's evidence upon other points, and you attempt to discredit some of my witnesses, because their testimony is opposed to the testimony of the Count of Villa Real; if you deny him at Albuera, you cannot have him at Campo Mayor. And behold, my lord, another difficulty you thus fall into. Your publications are intended to prove your talent as a general, and yet we find you acknowledging, that in the most critical period of this great and awful battle of Albuera, your own staff had so little confidence in your ability, that Sir Henry Hardinge took upon himself to win it for you, while the Conde de Villa Real took upon himself to lose it; the one ordering an advance, which gained the day; the other ordering a retreat, which would have ruined all. My lord, be assured that such liberties are never taken by the staff of great commanders.

In ancient times it was reckoned a worthy action to hold the mirror of truth up to men placed in high stations, when the partiality of friends, the flattery of dependants, and their own human vanity had given them too exalted notions of their importance. You, my lord, are a man in a high station, and you have evidently made a false estimate of your importance, or you would not treat men of inferior rank with so much disdain as you have expressed in these your publications; wherefore it may be useful, and certainly will be just, to let you know the judgment which others have formed of your talents. The following character was sketched about two months after the battle of Albuera. The author was a man of great ability, used to public affairs, experienced in the study of mankind, opposed to you by no personal interest, and withal had excellent opportunities of observing your disposition; and surely his acuteness will not be denied by those who have read your three publications in this controversy.

"Marshal Beresford appears to possess a great deal of information upon all subjects connected with the military establishments of the kingdom, the departments attached to the army,

* Since the first publication of this Letter I have learned from excellent authority that Marshal Beresford did actually in person order General Sir Colin Halket to retreat from the bridge, and rebuked him for being slow to obey.

and the resources of the country. But nothing appears to be well arranged and digested in his head; he never fixes upon a point, but deviates from his subject, and overwhelms a very slender thread of argument by a profusion of illustrations, stories, and anecdotes, most of which relate to himself. He is captious and obstinate, and difficult to be pleased. He appears to grasp at everything for his own party, without considering what it would be fair, and reasonable, and decent to expect from the other party."

I now take leave of you, my lord, and notwithstanding all that has passed, I take leave of you with respect, because I think you to be a brave soldier, and even an able organizer of an army. I know that you have served your country long, I firmly believe to the utmost of your ability, and I admit that ability to have been very considerable; but history, my lord, deals with very great men, and you sink in the comparison. She will speak of you as a general far above mediocrity, as one who has done much and a great deal of it well, yet when she looks at Campo Mayor and Albuera she will not rank you amongst great commanders, and if she should ever cast her penetrating eyes upon this your present publication, she will not class you amongst great writers.

REPLY

TO THE THIRD ARTICLE IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW ON COL. NAPIER'S HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

"Now there are two of them; and one has been called *Crawley*, and the other is *Honest Iago*."—OLD PLAY.

THIS Article is the third of its family, and like its predecessors is only remarkable for malignant imbecility and systematic violation of truth. The malice is apparent to all; it remains to show the imbecility and falseness.

The writer complains of my ill-breeding, and with that valour which belongs to the *incognito* menaces me with his literary vengeance for my former comments. His vengeance! Bah! The ass' ears peep too far beyond the lion's hide. He shall now learn that I always adapt my manners to the level of the person I am addressing; and though his petty industry indicates a mind utterly incapable of taking an enlarged view of any subject, he shall feel that chastisement awaits his malevolence. And first with respect to the small sketches in my work which he pronounces to be the very worst *plans* possible. "It is expressly stated on the face of the each that they are only '*Explanatory Sketches*,'" his observations therefore are a mere ebullition of contemptible spleen; but I will now show my readers why they are only sketches and not accurate plans.

When I first commenced my work, amongst the many persons from whom I sought information was Sir George Murray, and this in consequence of a message from him, delivered to me by Sir John Colborne, to the effect, that if I would call upon him he would answer any question I put to him on the subject of the Peninsular War. The interview took place, but Sir George Murray, far from giving me information, seemed intent upon persuading me to abandon my design; repeating continually that it was his intention to write the History of the War himself. He appeared also desirous of learning what sources of information I had access to. I took occasion to tell him that the Duke of Wellington had desired me to ask him particularly for the "*Order of Movements*," as essentially necessary to a right understanding of the campaign and the saving of trouble; because otherwise I should have to search out the different movements through a variety of documents. Sir George replied that he knew of no such orders, that he did not understand me. To this I could only reply that I spoke as the duke had desired me, and knew no more.* I then asked his permission to have reduced plans made from Captain Mitchell's fine drawings, informing him that officer was desirous so to assist me. His reply was uncourtously vehement—"No certainly not!" I proposed to be allowed to inspect those drawings if I were at any time at a loss about ground. The answer was still "No!" And as Sir George then intimated to me that my work could only be a momentary affair for the booksellers and would not require plans, I took my leave. I afterwards discovered that he had immediately caused Captain Mitchell's drawings to be locked up and sealed.

I afterwards waited on Sir Willoughby Gordon, the quarter-master-general, who treated me with great kindness, and sent me to the chief of the plan department in his office with an order to have access to everything which might be useful. From that officer I received every attention; but he told me that Sir George Murray had been there the day before to borrow all the best plans relating to the Peninsular War, and that consequently little help could be given to me. Now Captain Mitchell's drawings were made by him after the war, by order of the government, and at the public expense. He remained in the Peninsula for more than two years with pay as a staff officer, his extra expenses were also paid;† he was attended constantly by two Spanish dragoons as a protection, and the whole mission was costly. Never was money better laid out, for I believe no topographical drawings, whether they be considered for accuracy of detail, perfection of manner, or beauty of execution, ever exceeded Mitchell's. But those drawings belong to the public and were merely placed in Sir George Murray's official keeping. I believe they are still in his possession, and it would be well if

* I have since obtained from other sources many of those orders of movements, signed, George Murray, and addressed to the generals commanding divisions. Had they been given to me, according to the Duke of Wellington's desire, when I first commenced my Work they would have saved me much time, much expense, and much labour; but I repeat, that from Sir George Murray and from him only I have met with hostility. He has not been able to hurt me, but I take the will for the deed.

† Above £5000.

some member of parliament were to ask why they are thus made the property of a private man?*

Here I cannot refrain from observing that, in the course of my labours, I have asked information of many persons of various nations, even of Spaniards, after my first volume was published, and when the unfavourable view I took of their exertions was known. And from Spaniards, Portuguese, English, French, and Germans, whether of high or low rank, I have invariably met with the greatest kindness, and found an eager desire to aid me. Sir George Murray only has thrown obstacles in my way; and if I am rightly informed of the following circumstance, his opposition has not been confined to what I have stated above. Mr. Murray, the bookseller, purchased my first volume with the right of refusal for the second volume. When the latter was nearly ready a friend informed me that he did not think Murray would purchase, because he had heard him say that Sir George Murray had declared it was not "*The Book*." He did not point out any particular error; but it was not "*The Book*;" meaning doubtless that his own production, when it appeared, would be "*The Book*." My friend's prognostic was good. I was offered just half of the sum given for the first volume. I declined it, and published on my own account; and certainly I have had no reason to regret that Mr. Murray waited for "*The Book*:" indeed he has since told me very frankly that he had mistaken his own interest. Now whether three articles in *The Quarterly*, and a promise of more,† be a tribute paid to the importance of "*My Book*," or whether they be the puff preliminary to "*The Book*," I know not; but I am equally bound to Mr. Editor Lockhart for the distinction, and only wish he had not hired such a stumbling sore-backed hackney for the work. Quitting this digression, I return to the *Review*.

My topographical ignorance is a favourite point with the writer, and he mentions three remarkable examples on the present occasion:—1. That I have said Oporto is built in a hollow; 2. That I have placed the Barca de Avintas only three miles from the Serra Convent, instead of nine miles; 3. That I have described a ridge of land near Medellin where no such ridge exists.

These assertions are all hazarded in the hope that they will pass current with those who know no better, and will be unnoticed by those who do. But first, a town may be *on* a hill and yet *in* a hollow. If the reader will look at Lieutenant Godwin's Atlas,‡ or at Gage's Plan of Oporto, or at Avlis' Plan of that city—all three published by Mr. Wylde, of Charing Cross, —he will find that Oporto, which by the way is situated very much like the hot-wells at Bristol, is built partly on the slopes of certain heights partly on the banks of the river; that it is surrounded on every side by superior heights; and that consequently my description of it, having relation to the Bishop's lines of defence and the attack of the French army, is militarily correct. Again, if the reader will take his compasses and any or all of the three maps above mentioned, he will find that the Barca de Avintas is, as I have said, just three miles from the Serra Convent, and not nine miles as the reviewer asserts. Lord Wellington's despatch called it four miles *from Oporto*, but there is a bend in the river which makes the distance greater on that side.

Such being the accuracy of this very correct topographical critic upon two of three examples, let us see how he stands with respect to the third.

Extracts from MARSHAL VICTOR'S Official Report and Register of the Battle of Medellin.

"Medellin is situated upon the left bank of the Guadiana. To arrive there, a handsome stone bridge is passed. On the left of the town is a very high hill (*anamelon tres élevé*), which commands all the plain; on the right is a ridge or steppe (*rideau*), which forms the basin of the Guadiana. Two roads or openings (*débouchés*) present themselves on quitting Medellin; the one conducts to Mingrabil, the other to Don Benito. They traverse a vast plain, bounded by a ridge (*rideau*), which, from the right of the Ortigosa, is prolonged in the direction of Don Benito, and Villa Neuva de la Serena."—"The ridge which confines the plain of Medellin has many rises and falls (*mouvements de terrain*) more or less apparent. It completely commands (*domine parfaitement*) the valley of the Guadiana; and it was at the foot of this ridge the enemy's cavalry was posted. Not an infantry-man was to be seen; but the presence of the cavalry made us believe that the enemy's army was *masked behind this ridge* of Don Benito."—"Favoured by this ridge, he could *manœuvrer* his troops, and carry them upon any point of the line he pleased *without being seen by us*."

Now "*rideau*" can only be rendered, with respect to ground, a *steppe* or a *ridge*; but, in this case, it could not mean a *steppe*, since the Spanish army was hidden *behind it*, and on a *steppe* it would have been seen. Again, it must have been a *high ridge*, because it not only

* Since this was written Mr. Leader did put the question in the House when Sir George Murray's conduct was strongly animadverted upon by Lord Howick and his lordship's observations were loudly cheered. Sir George is now publishing these maps, but they belong to the public.

† Another has appeared since, but I have not read it, being informed that it was precisely like its predecessors.

‡ This work has been since discontinued by Lieutenant Godwin in consequence as he told me of foul play in a high quarter where he least expected it.

perfectly commanded the basin of the Guadiana, overlooking the *steppe* which formed that basin, but was itself not overlooked by the very high hill on the left of Medellín. What is my description of the ground?—"The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a *high ridge of land*," mark, reader, not a mountain ridge, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry and guns in advance. Here then we have another measure of value for the reviewer's topographical pretensions.

The reference to French military reports and registers has not been, so far, much to the advantage of the reviewer; and yet he rests the main part of his criticisms upon such documents. Thus, having got hold of the divisional register of general Heudelet, which register was taken, very much mutilated, in the pursuit of Soult from Oporto, he is so elated with his acquisition that he hisses and cackles over it like a goose with a single gosling. But I have in my possession the general report and register of Soult's army, which enables me to show what a very little callow bird his treasure is. And first, as he accuses *me* of painting the wretched state of Soult's army at St. Jago, previous to the invasion of Portugal, for the sole purpose of giving a false colouring to the campaign, I will extract Soult's own account, and the account of *Le Noble* historian of the campaign, and *ordonnateur en chef* or comptroller of the civil administration of the army.

Extract from SOULT'S Official Journal of the Expedition to Portugal, dated Lugo, 30th of May, 1809.

"Under these circumstances the enterprise was one of the most difficult, considering the nature of the obstacles to be surmounted, the *shattered and exhausted state* ("délablement et épuisement") of the "*corps d'armée*," and the insufficiency of the means of which it could dispose. But the order was positive; it was necessary to obey."—"The march was directed upon St. Jago, where the troops took the first repose it had been possible to give them since they quitted the Carion river in Castile."—"Marshal Soult rested six days at St. Jago, during which he distributed some shoes, had the artillery carriages repaired and the horses shod; the park, which since the Carion had not been seen, now came up, and with it some ammunition (which had been prepared at Coruña), together with various detachments that the previous hardships and the exhaustion of the men had caused to remain behind. He would have prolonged his stay until the end of February because he could not hide from himself that his troops had the most urgent need of it; but his operations were connected with the Duke of Belluno's, etc., etc., and he thought it his duty to go on without regard to time or difficulties."

Extract from LE NOBLE'S History.

"The army was without money, without provision, without clothing, without equipages, and the men (personnel) belonging to the latter, not even ordinarily complete, when they should have been doubled to profit from the feeble resources of the country."

Who now is the false colourist? But what can be expected from a writer so shameless in his statements as this reviewer? Let the reader look to the effrontery with which he asserts that I have *celebrated Marshal Soult* for the reduction of two fortresses, Ferrol and Coruña, which were not even defended, whereas my whole passage is a censure upon the Spaniards for not defending them, and without one word of praise towards the French marshal.

To return to General Heudelet's register. The first notable discovery from this document is, that it makes no mention of an action described by me as happening on the 17th of February, at Ribadavia; and therefore the reviewer says no such action happened, though I have been so particular as to mention the strength of the Spaniards' position, their probable numbers, and the curious fact that 20 priests were killed, with many other circumstances, all of which he contradicts. Now this is only the old story of "*the big book which contains all that Sir George does not know*." For, first, Heudelet's register, being only divisional, would not, as a matter of course, take notice of an action in which other troops were also engaged, and where the commander-in-chief was present. But that the action did take place, as I have described it, and on the 17th of February, the following extracts will prove, and also the futility of the reviewer's other objections. And I request the reader, both now and always, to look at the passages quoted from my work, in the work itself, and not trust the garbled extracts of the reviewer, or he will have a very false notion of my meaning.

Extract from SOULT'S General Report.

"The French army found each day greater difficulty to subsist, and the Spanish insurrection feeling itself sustained by the approach of La Romana's corps, organized itself in the province of Orense.

"The insurrection of the province of Orense, directed by the monks and by officers, became each day more enterprising, and extended itself to the quarters of General La Houssaye at Salvaterra. *It was said the corps of Romana was at Orense* (on disait le corps de Romana à Orense), and his advanced guard at Ribadavia.

"The 16th of February the troops commenced their march upon Ribadavia.

"The left column, under General Heudelet, found the route intercepted by barricades on the bridges between Franquiera and Canizar; and defended besides by a party of insurgents

800 strong. The brigade Graindorge, arriving in the night, overthrew them *in the morning of the 17th*, and pursued them to the heights of Ribadavia, where they united themselves with a body *far more numerous*. General Heudelet having come up with the rest of his division, and being sustained by Maransin's brigade of dragoons, overthrew the enemy and killed many. *Twenty monks at the least perished, and the town was entered fighting.*

"The 18th, General Heudelet scoured all the valley of the Avia, where *three or four thousand insurgents had thrown themselves*, Maransin followed the route of Rosamunde chasing all that was before him."

The reviewer further says that, with my habitual inaccuracy as to dates, I have concentrated all Soult's division at Orense on the 20th. But Soult himself says, "The 19th, Franceschi and Heudelet marched upon Orense, and seized the bridge. *The 20th, the other divisions followed the movement upon Orense.*" Here then, besides increasing the bulk of the book, containing what Sir George *does not know*, the reviewer has only proved his own habitual want of truth.

In the above extract nothing is said of the "*eight or ten thousand Spaniards*;" nothing of the "*strong rugged hill*" on which they were posted; nothing of "*Soult's presence in the action.*" But the reader will find all these particulars in the Appendix to the "*Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*," and in Le Noble's "*History of Soult's Campaign.*" The writers in each work were present, and the latter notwithstanding the reviewer's sneers, and what is of more consequence, notwithstanding many serious errors as to the projects and numbers of his enemies, is highly esteemed by his countrymen, and therefore good authority for those operations on his own side which he witnessed. Well, Le Noble says there were 15,000 or 20,000 insurgents and some regular troops in position, and he describes that position as very rugged and strong, which I can confirm, having marched over it only a few weeks before. Nevertheless, as this estimate was not borne out by Soult's report, I set the Spaniards down at 8000 or 10,000 grounding my estimate on the following data: 1st. Soult says that 800 men fell back on a body *far more numerous*. 2nd. It required a considerable body of troops and several combinations to dislodge them from an extensive position. 3rd. *Three or four thousand fugitives went off by one road only.*" Finally, the expression *eight or ten thousand* showed that I had doubts.

Let us proceed with Heudelet's register. In my History it is said that Soult softened the people's feelings by kindness and by enforcing strict discipline. To disprove this the reviewer quotes, from Heudelet's register, statements of certain excesses, committed principally by the light cavalry, and while in actual pursuit of the enemy—excesses, however, which he admits that Count Heudelet blamed and rigorously repressed, thus proving the truth of my statement instead of his own, for verily the slow-worm is strong within him. Yet I will not rely upon this curious stupidity of the reviewer. I will give absolute authority for the fact that Soult succeeded in soothing the people's feelings, begging the reader to observe that both Heudelet and my history speak of Soult's stay at Orense immediately after the action at Ribadavia.

Extract from SOULT'S General Report.

"At this period the *prisoners of Romana's corps*" (note, the reviewer says none of Romana's corps were there) "*had all demanded to take the oath of fidelity, and to serve King Joseph. The Spanish general himself was far off (fort éloigné).*" The inhabitants of the province of Orense were returning to their houses, breaking their arms, and cursing the excitement and the revolt which Romana had fomented. The priests even encouraged their submission, and offered themselves as sureties. These circumstances appeared favourable for the invasion of Portugal."

Animated by a disgraceful anxiety which has always distinguished the *Quarterly Review* to pander to the bad feelings of mankind by making the vituperation of an enemy the test of patriotism, this critic accuses me of an unnatural bias, and an inclination to do injustice to the Spaniards, because I have not made the report of some outrages, committed by Soult's cavalry, the ground of a false and infamous charge against the whole French army and French nation. Those outrages he admits himself were vigorously repressed, and they were committed by troops in a country where all the inhabitants were in arms, where no soldier could straggle without meeting death by torture and mutilation, and, finally, where the army lived from day to day on what they could take in the country. I shall now put this sort of logic to a severe test, and leave the reviewer's patriots to settle the matter as they can. That is, I shall give from Lord Wellington's despatches, through a series of years, extracts touching the conduct of British officers and soldiers in this same Peninsula, where they were dealt with, not as enemies, not mutilated, tortured, and assassinated, but well provided and kindly treated.

SIR A. WELLESLEY to MR. VILLIERS.

Extract, May 1, 1809.—"I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly."—"They have plundered the people of bullocks, amongst other property, for what reason I am sure I do not know, except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, May 31, 1809.

"The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success, more than Sir John Moore's army could bear failure. I am endeavouring to tame them, but if I should not succeed I shall make an official complaint of them and send one or two corps home in disgrace; they plunder in all directions."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to MR. VILLIERS, June 13, 1809.

"It is obvious that one of the private soldiers has been wounded; it is probable that all three have been put to death by the peasantry of Martede; I am sorry to say that from the conduct of the soldiers of the army in general, I apprehend that the peasants may have had some provocation for their animosity against the soldiers; but it must be obvious to you and the general, that these effects of their animosity must be discouraged and even punished, otherwise it may lead to consequences fatal to the peasantry of the country in general as well as to the army."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to COLONEL DONKIN, June, 1809.

"I trouble you now upon a subject which has given me the greatest pain, I mean the accounts which I receive from all quarters of the disorders committed by, and the general irregularity of the — and — regiments."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, June, 1809.

"It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their officers, I may almost say never out of the sight of the commanding officers of the regiments and the general officers of the army, that outrages are not committed."—"Not a post or a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march. *There is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation.*"—"It is most difficult to convict any prisoner before a regimental court-martial, for I am sorry to say that soldiers have little regard to the oath administered to them; and the officers who are sworn, 'well and truly to try and determine according to evidence, the matter before them,' have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered to them."—"There ought to be in the British army a regular provost establishment."—"All the foreign armies have such an establishment. The French *gendarmerie nationale* to the amount of 40 or 50 with each corps. The Spaniards have their police militia to a still larger amount. *While we who require such an aid more, I am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe, have nothing of the kind.*"

"We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must depend upon the diligence of regimental officers, particularly subalterns. I may order what I please, but if they do not execute what I order, or if they execute with negligence, I cannot expect that British soldiers will be orderly or regular."—"I believe I should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence."—"We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, *but we are worse than an enemy in a country, and take my word for it that either defeat or success would dissolve us.*"

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to MR. VILLIERS, July, 1809.

"We must have some general rule of proceeding in cases of criminal outrages of British officers and soldiers."—"As matters are now conducted, the Government and myself stand complimenting each other while no notice is taken of the murderer."

SIR ARTHUR to LORD WELLESLEY, August, 1809.

"But a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers lose their discipline and spirit; they plunder even in the presence of their officers. The officers are discontented and are almost as bad as the men."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to MR. VILLIERS, September, 1809.

"In respect to the complaints you have sent me of the conduct of detachments, they are only a repetition of others which I receive every day from all quarters of Spain and Portugal and I can only lament my inability to apply any remedy. In the first place, our law is not what it ought to be and I cannot prevail upon Government even to look at a remedy; secondly, our military courts having been established solely for the purpose of maintaining military discipline, and with the same wisdom which has marked all our proceedings of late years we have obliged the officers to swear to decide according to the evidence brought before them, and we have obliged the witnesses to give their evidence upon oath, the witnesses being in almost every instance common soldiers whose conduct this tribunal was constituted to control; *the consequence is, that perjury is almost as common an offence as drunkenness and plunder.*"

LORD WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, *January, 1810.*

"I am concerned to tell you, that notwithstanding the pains taken by the general and other officers of the army the conduct of the soldiers is infamous."—"At this moment there are three general courts-martial sitting in Portugal for the trial of soldiers guilty of wanton murders, (no less than four people have been killed by them since we returned to Portugal), robberies, thefts, robbing convoys under their charge, etc., etc. Perjury is as common as robbery and murder."

LORD WELLINGTON to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE FORCES, 1810.

"It is proper I should inform the commander-in-chief that desertion is not the only crime of which the soldiers of the army have been guilty to an extraordinary degree. A detachment seldom marches, particularly if under the command of a non-commissioned officer (which rarely happens), that a murder or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage, is not committed by the British soldiers composing it: they have killed eight people since the army returned to Portugal."

LORD WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, 1810.

"Several soldiers have lately been convicted before a general court-martial and have been executed."—"I am still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice operation before the enemy, for they really forget everything when plunder or wine is within reach."

LORD WELLINGTON to SIR S. COTTON, 1810.

"I have read complaints from different quarters of the conduct of the hussars towards the inhabitants of the country."—"It has gone so far, that they (the people) have inquired whether they might kill the Germans in our service as well as in the service of the French."

LORD WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, *May, 1812.*

"The outrages committed by the British soldiers have been so *enormous*, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so injurious to the army itself, that I request your lordship's early attention to the subject."

Many more extracts I could give, but let us now see what was the conduct of the French towards men who did not murder and mutilate prisoners:—

LORD WELLINGTON to SIR H. WELLESLEY, *August, 1810.*

"Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives. The only motive which I have had for this conduct has been, that they might treat our officers and soldiers well who might fall into their hands: and I must do the French the justice to say that they have been universally well treated, and in recent instances the *wounded prisoners of the British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the French army.*"

LORD WELLINGTON to ADMIRAL BERKELEY, *October, 1810.*

"I confess, however, that as the French treat well the prisoners whom they take from us, and the Portuguese treat their prisoners exceedingly ill, particularly in point of food, I should prefer an arrangement, by which prisoners who have once come into the hands of the provost marshal of the British army should avoid falling under the care of any officer of the Portuguese government."

Having thus displayed the conduct of the British army, as described by its own general through a series of years; and having also from the same authority, shown the humane treatment English officers and soldiers, when they happened to be made prisoners, experienced from the French, I demand of any man with a particle of honour, truth, or conscience in his composition,—of any man, in fine, who is not at once knave and fool, whether these outrages perpetrated by British troops upon a friendly people can be suppressed, and the outrages of French soldiers against implacable enemies enlarged upon with justice? Whether it is right and decent to impute relentless ferocity, atrocious villainy, to the whole French army, and stigmatize the whole French nation for the excesses of some bad soldiers, prating at the same time of the virtue of England and the excellent conduct of her troops; and this too in the face of Wellington's testimony to the kindness with which they treated our men, and in the face also of his express declaration (see letter to Lord Wellesley, 26th January, 1811), that the majority of the French soldiers were "*sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.*" But what intolerable injustice it would be to stigmatize either nation for military excesses which are common to all armies and to all wars; and when I know that the general characteristic of the British and French troops alike, is generosity, bravery, humanity, and honour.

And am I to be accused of an unnatural bias against the Spaniards because I do not laud them for running away in battle; because I do not express my admiration of their honour in assassinating men whom they dared not face in fight; because I do not commend their

humanity for mutilating, torturing, and murdering their prisoners. I have indeed heard of a British staff-officer, high in rank, who, after the battle of Talavera, looked on with apparent satisfaction at a Spaniard beating a wounded Frenchman's brains out with a stone, and even sneered at the indignant emotion and instant interference of my informant. Such an adventure I have heard of, yet there are few such cold-blooded men in the British army. But what have I said to the disparagement of the Spaniards in my History without sustaining it by irrefragable testimony? Nothing, absolutely nothing! I have quoted the deliberate judgment of every person of note, French and English, who had to deal with them; nay, I have in some instances supported my opinion by the declaration even of Spanish generals. I have brought forward the testimony of Sir Hew Dalrymple, of Sir John Moore, of Sir John Craddock, of Mr. Stuart, of Mr. Frere, of General Graham, of Lord William Bentinck, of Sir Edward Pellew, of Lord Collingwood, of Sir Edward Codrington, and of Mr. Sydenham, and a crowd of officers of inferior rank. Lastly, I have produced the testimony of the Duke of Wellington; and I will now add more proofs that his opinion of the Spanish character coincides with that expressed in my History.

Extracts from LORD WELLINGTON'S correspondence, 1809.

"I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration."—"That is the frequent, I ought to say constant and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy: we in England never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have heard of Spanish officers telling of 19 and 20 actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo."—"In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very trifling exceptions was not engaged, whole corps threw away their arms and ran off *in my presence* when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own fire."—"I have found, upon inquiry, and from experience, the instances of the misbehaviour of the Spanish troops to be so numerous and those of their good behaviour to be so few, that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be depended upon."

"The Spanish cavalry are I believe nearly entirely without discipline; they are in general well clothed, armed, and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition; but I never heard anybody pretend that in one instance they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an enemy."—"In respect to that great body of all armies—I mean the infantry—it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards is."—"It is said that sometimes they behave well; though I acknowledge I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill."—"Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army; and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual."—"I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away and assembling again in a state of nature."

"The Spaniards have neither numbers, efficiency, discipline, bravery or arrangement to carry on the contest."

Extracts, 1810.

"The misfortune throughout the war has been that the Spaniards are of a disposition too sanguine; they have invariably expected only success in objects for the attainment of which they had adopted no measures; they have never looked to or prepared for a lengthened contest; and all those, or nearly all who have had anything to do with them, have imbibed the same spirit and the same sentiments."

"Those who see the difficulties attending all communications with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are aware how little dependence can be placed upon them, and that they depend entirely upon us for everything, will be astonished that with so small a force as I have I should have been able to maintain myself so long in this country."

"The character of the Spaniards has been the same throughout the war; they have never been equal to the adoption of any solid plan, or to the execution of any system of steady resistance to the enemy by which their situation might be gradually improved. The leading people amongst them have invariably deceived the lower orders; and instead of making them acquainted with their real situation, and calling upon them to make the exertions and sacrifices which were necessary even for their defence, they have amused them with idle stories of imaginary successes, with visionary plans of offensive operations which those who offer them for consideration know that they have not the means of executing, and with hopes of driving the French out of the Peninsula by some unlooked-for good. The consequence is, that no event is provided for in time, every misfortune is doubly felt, and the people will at last become fatigued with the succession of their disasters which common prudence and foresight in their leaders would have prevented."

WELLINGTON to SIR H. WELLESLEY, 1810.

"In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I enclose you a report which Sir William Beresford has received from General Madden, the officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word in this

letter that is not true. *Yet these are the soldiers who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!!*

"There is no remedy for these evils excepting a vigorous system of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in which discipline can be established. *It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French, or of carrying on the war in any other manner.* Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the guerillas and by the Spanish armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies, are calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field.

"But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period. *Their courage and even their activity is of a passive nature, it must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances, and is never a matter of choice nor of foresight.*"

WELLINGTON to LORD WELLESLEY, 1810.

"There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army, either amongst officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has, in my opinion, been the cause of the *dastardly conduct* which we have so frequently witnessed in Spanish troops, and *they have become odious to the country. The peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph's government to be protected from the outrages of their own troops.*

WELLINGTON to SIR H. WELLESLEY, December, 1810.

"I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of the war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocana, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz—the seat of their government—upon having one or two, more or less, British regiments; and that after having been shut in for 10 months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them.

"The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities—that is, *boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.*"

WELLINGTON to GENERAL GRAHAM, 1811.

"The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition (Barosa) *is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be.* They march the troops night and day without provisions or rest, and abuse everybody who proposes a moment's delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed; and thus, when the moment of action arrives they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal."*

So much for Wellington's opinion of the Spanish soldiers and statesmen; let us now hear him as to the Spanish generals:—

1809. "Although the Duque de Albuquerque is *proné* by many, amongst others by Whittingham and Frere, you will find him out. I think the Marquis de la Romana the best I have seen of the Spaniards. I doubt his talents at the head of an army, but he is certainly a sensible man, and has seen much of the world."

Now reader, the following is the character given to Romana in my History; compare it with the above:—

"Romana was a man of talent, quickness, and information, but disqualified by nature for military command." And again, speaking of his death, I say, "He was a worthy man, and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss." If the expressions are more positive than Wellington's, it is because this was the duke's first notion of the marquis; he was more positive afterwards, and previous circumstances unknown to him, and after circumstances known to him, gave me a right to be more decided. The following additional proofs, joined to those already given in my former reply, must suffice for the present. Sir John Moore, in one of his letters, says, "*I am sorry to find that Romana is a shuffler.*" And Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, writing about the same period to General Doyle to urge the advance of Palafox and Infantado, says, "*I know that Romana has not supported the British as he ought to have done, and has left our army to act alone when he might have supported it with a tolerably efficient force.*"

In 1812, during the siege of Burgos, Mr. Sydenham, expressing Lord Wellington's

* That very successful Spanish general and very temperate English politician, Sir de Lacy Evans, pronounces all such animadversions upon the Spanish armies to be "*a most deplorable defect in a historian, and the result of violent partialities.*" I dare to say the Spaniards will agree with him.

opinions, after saying that Wellington declared he had never met with a really able man in Spain, while in Portugal he had found several, proceeds thus—

"It is indeed clear to any person who is acquainted with the present state of Spain, that the Spaniards are incapable of forming either a good government or a good army."—"With respect to the army there are certainly in Spain abundant materials for good common soldiers. But where is one general of even moderate skill and talents? I know nothing of Lacy and Sarzfield, but assuredly a good general is not to be found amongst Castanos, Ballesteros, Palacios, Mendizabal, Santocildes, Abadia, Duque del Parque, La Pena, Elio, Mahy, or Joseph O'Donnell."—"You cannot make good officers in Spain."

If to this the reader will add what I have set forth in my History about Vives, Imas, Contreras, Campo Verde, Cuesta, and Areyasaga, and that he is not yet satisfied, I can still administer to his craving. In 1809 Wellington speaks with dread of "*Romana's cormorants flying into Portugal*," and says, "that foolish fellow the Duque del Parque has been endeavouring to get his corps destroyed on the frontier." Again—

"The Duque del Parque has advanced, because, whatever may be the consequences, the Spaniards always think it necessary to advance when their front is clear of an enemy."

"There never was anything like the *madness*, the *imprudence*, and the *presumption* of the Spanish officers in the way they risk their corps, knowing that the national vanity will prevent them from withdrawing them from a situation of danger, and that if attacked they must be totally destroyed. A retreat is the only chance of safety for the Duque del Parque's corps; but instead of making it he calls upon you for cavalry."—"I have ordered magazines to be prepared on the Douro and Mondego to assist in providing these vagabonds if they should retire into Portugal, which I hope they will do as their only chance of salvation."

Again in 1811, defending himself from an accusation, made by the Spaniards, that he had caused the loss of Valencia, he says, "the misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to Blake's ignorance of his profession and to Mahy's cowardice and treachery."

Now if any passage in my History can be pointed out more disparaging to the Spaniards than the expressions of Lord Wellington and the other persons quoted above, I am content to be charged with an "unnatural bias" against that people. But if this cannot be done, it is clear that the reviewer has proved, not my unnatural bias to the French but his own natural bias to calumny. He has indeed a wonderful aversion to truth, for close under his eye, in my second volume, which he was then reviewing, was the following passage, and there are many of a like tendency in my work relative to the Spaniards, which he leaves unnoticed:

"Under such a system it was impossible that the peasantry could be rendered energetic soldiers, and they certainly were not active supporters of their country's cause; and with a wonderful constancy they suffered for it, enduring fatigue and sickness, nakedness and famine with patience, and displaying in all their actions and in all their sentiments a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy and the iniquity of the usurpation, hallowed their efforts in despite of their ferocity and merits respect, though the vices and folly of the juntas and the leading men rendered the effects nugatory."—*History*, vol. ii., chap. 1.

I would stop here, but the interests of truth and justice, and the interests of society require that I should thoroughly expose this reviewer. Let the reader therefore mark his reasoning upon Soult's government of Oporto and the intrigue of the *Anti-Braganza* party. Let him, however, look first at the whole statement of these matters in my book, and not trust the garbled extracts made by the reviewer. Let him observe how Heudelet's expedition to Tuy is by this shameless writer, at one time made to appear as if it took place after Soult had received the deputations and addresses calling for a change of dynasty; and this to show that no beneficial effect had been produced in the temper of the people, as I had asserted, and of which I shall presently give ample proof. How at another time this same expedition of Heudelet is used as happening before the arrival of the addresses and deputations, with a view to show that Soult had laboured to procure those addresses, a fact which, far from denying, I had carefully noticed. Let him mark how an expression in my History, namely, that Soult was *unprepared* for one effect of his own vigorous conduct, has been perverted, for the purpose of deceit; and all this with a spirit at once so malignant and stupid, that the reviewer is unable to see that the garbled extracts he gives from Heudelet's and Riccard's Registers, not only do not contradict but absolutely confirm the essential point of my statement.

Certainly Soult was not unprepared for the submission of the Portuguese to the French arms, because it was the object and bent of his invasion to make them so submit. But there is a great difference between that submission of which Heudelet and Riccard speak, and the proposal coming from the Portuguese for the establishment of a *new and independent dynasty*; a still greater difference between that and *offering the crown to Soult himself*; and it was this last which the word *unprepared* referred to in my History. So far from thinking or saying that Soult was unprepared for the deputations and addresses, I have expressly said, that he "*encouraged the design*," that he "*acted with great dexterity*," and I called the whole affair an "*intrigue*." But if I had said that he was unprepared for the whole affair it would have been correct in one sense. He was unprepared to accede to the extent of the *Anti-Braganza* party's views. He had only received authority from his sovereign to conquer Portugal, not to establish a new and independent dynasty, placing a French prince upon the throne; still less

to accept that throne for himself. These were dangerous matters to meddle with under such a monarch as Napoleon; but the weakness of Soult's military position made it absolutely necessary to catch at every aid, and it would have been a proof that the Duke of Dalmatia was only a common man and unsuited for the great affairs confided to his charge if he had rejected such a powerful auxiliary to his military operations: wisely, therefore, and even magnanimously did he encourage the *Anti-Braganza* party, drawing all the military benefit possible from it, and trusting to Napoleon's sagacity and grandeur of soul for his justification. Nor was he mistaken in either. Yet I am ready to admit that all this must appear very strange to Quarterly Reviewers and parasites, whose knowledge of the human mind is confined to an accurate measure of the sentiments of patrons, rich and powerful, but equally with themselves incapable of true greatness and therefore always ready to ridicule it.

The facts then stand thus. Heudelet's expedition through the *Entre Minho e Douro* took place between the 5th of April and the 27th of that month, and the country people being then in a state of exasperation opposed him vehemently; in my History the combats he sustained are mentioned, and it is said that previous to the *Anti-Braganza* intrigue the horrible warfare of assassinations had been carried on with infinite activity. But the intrigue of the malcontents was not completed until the end of April, and the good effect of it on the military operations was not apparent until May, consequently could not have been felt by Heudelet in the beginning of April. In my History the difference of time in these two affairs is expressly marked, inasmuch as I say that in treating of the intrigue I have anticipated the chronological order of events. Truly if Mr. Lockhart has paid for this part of the Review as criticism Mr. Murray should disallow the unfair charge in his accounts.

I shall now give two extracts from Soult's general report, before quoted, in confirmation of my statements:—

"Marshal Soult was led by necessity to favour the party of the malcontents, which he found already formed in Portugal when he arrived. He encouraged them, and soon that party thought itself strong enough in the province of *Entre Minho e Douro*, to propose to the marshal to approve of the people declaring for the deposition of the house of Braganza, and that the Emperor of the French should be asked to name a prince of his family to reign in Portugal. In a political view, Marshal Soult could not without express authority permit such a proceeding, and he could not ask for such authority having lost his own communication with France, and being without news of the operations of any of the other corps which were to aid him; but considered in a military point of view the proposition took another character. Marshal Soult there saw the means of escaping from his embarrassments, and he seized them eagerly, certain that whatever irregularity there was in his proceedings ultimate justice would be done to him."

"These dispositions produced a remarkable change, tranquillity was re-established, and the confidence was such, that in the province (*Entre Minho e Douro*) all the inhabitants returned to their labours, supplied the markets and familiarized themselves with the idea of an approaching change."—"Marshal Soult received numerous deputations of the clergy to thank him for the attentions he paid them, and for the order which he had restored. Before this no Frenchman could straggle without being mutilated and killed. The Portuguese, believing that it was glorious and grateful to God to do all the mischief possible to the army, had perpetrated the most dreadful horrors on the wretched soldiers who fell into their hands."

It would be too tedious and unprofitable to the reader to continue thus following the reviewer step by step. Wherefore, neglecting his farrago about the principles of war, and his application of them to show how I am wrong in my statement, that, in a *strategic point of view it was better to attack Victor, but that especial circumstances* led Sir Arthur to fall upon Soult, I hold it sufficient to place Sir Arthur's own statement before the reader and leave him to compare it with mine.

"Lisbon, April 24, 1809.

"I intend to move towards Soult and attack him, if I should be able to make any arrangement in the neighbourhood of Abrantes which can give me any security for the safety of this place during my absence to the northward."

"I am not quite certain, however, that I should not do more good to the general cause by combining with General Cuesta in an operation against Victor; and I believe I should prefer the last if Soult was not in possession of a part of this country very fertile in resources, and of the town of Oporto, and if to concert the operations with Cuesta would not take time which might be profitably employed in operations against Soult. I think it probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego. If he does I shall attack him. *If he should retire, I am convinced that it would be most advantageous for the common cause that we should remain upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and act vigorously in co-operation with Cuesta against Victor.*

"An operation against Victor is attended by these advantages—if successful it effectually relieves Seville and Lisbon, and in case affairs should take such a turn as to enable the king's ministers to make another great effort for the relief of Spain, the corps under my command in Portugal will not be removed to such a distance from the scene of operation as to render its co-operation impossible; and we may hope to see the effect of a great effort made by a combined and concentrated force."

The assertion of the reviewer that I have underrated Cuesta's force, inasmuch as it was only 19,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, instead of 30,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry as I have stated it to be, and that consequently the greatest numbers could not be brought to bear on Victor, is one of those curious examples of elaborate misrepresentation in which this writer abounds. For first, admitting that Cuesta had only 20,000 men, Sir Arthur would have brought 24,000 to aid him, and Victor had only 30,000. The allies would then have had double the number opposed to Soult. But the pith of the misrepresentation lies in this, that the reviewer has taken Cuesta's account of his actual force on the 23rd of April, and suppresses the facts, that reinforcements were continually pouring in to him at that time, and that he actually did advance against Victor with rather greater numbers than those stated by me.

PROOFS.

SIR ARTHUR to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *April 24, 1809.*

"Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which it is said will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry."

To GENERAL MACKENZIE, *May 1, 1809.*

"They (Victor's troops) have in their front a Spanish army with General Cuesta at Llerena, which army was defeated in the month of March, and has since been reinforced to the amount of *twenty thousand men*."—"They will be attacked by Cuesta, who is *receiving reinforcements*."

MR. FRERE to SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, *Seville, May 4.*

"We have here 3000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of Estremadura (under Cuesta). Cuesta has with him 4000 cavalry."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, *June 17, 1809.*

"We had every reason to believe that the French army consisted of about 27,000, of which 7000 were cavalry; and the combined British and Portuguese force which I was in hopes I should have enabled to march upon this expedition would have amounted to about 24,000 men."

To LORD WELLESLEY, *August 8, 1809.*

"The army of Cuesta, which crossed the Tagus *thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand strong*, does not now consist of 30,000."

Extract from a Memoir by SIR A. WELLESLEY, 1809.

"The Spanish army under General Cuesta had been *reinforced with cavalry and infantry, and had been refitted with extraordinary celerity after the action of Medellin*."

All the reviewer's remarks about Cuesta's numbers, and about the unfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction of misrepresentations and objections before exposed and refuted by me in my controversy with Marshal Beresford; but as it is now attempted to support them by garbled extracts from better authorities, I will again and completely expose and crush them. This will however be more conveniently done farther on. Meanwhile I repeat, that the Tagus is only unfordable during the winter, and not then if there is a few days dry weather; that six months of the year it is always fordable in many places, and as low down as Salvaterra, near Lisbon; finally, that my expression, "*a river fordable at almost every season*," is strictly correct, and is in jeed not mine but Lord Wellington's expression. To proceed with the rest:—

Without offering any proof beyond his own assertion, the reviewer charges me with having *exaggerated the importance of D'Argenton's conspiracy for the sole purpose of excusing Soult's remissness in guarding the Douro*. But my account of that conspiracy was compiled from the Duke of Wellington's letters—some public, some private addressed to me; and from a narrative of the conspiracy written expressly for my guidance by Major-General Sir James Douglas, who was the officer employed to meet and conduct D'Argenton to and from the English army;—from Soult's own official report; from Le Noble's "*History*," and from secret information which I received from a French officer who was himself one of the principal movers—not of that particular conspiracy—but of a general one of which the one at Oporto was but a branch.

Again, the reviewer denies that I am correct in saying, that Soult thought Hill's division had been disembarked from the ocean; that he expected the vessels would come to the mouth of the Douro; and that considering that river secure above the town his personal attention was directed to the line below Oporto. Let Soult and Le Noble answer this.

Extract from SOULT's General Report.

"In the night of the 9th and 10th the enemy made a *considerable disembarkation at Aveiro, and another at Ovar*. The 10th, at daybreak, they attacked the right flank of General Franceschi, while the *column coming from Lisbon by Coimbra* attacked him in front."

Extract from LE NOBLE.

"The house occupied by the general-in-chief was situated beyond the town on the road to the sea. The site was very high, and from thence he could observe the left bank of the Douro from the convent to the sea. His orders, given on the 8th, to scour the left bank of the river, those which he had expedited in the morning, and the position of his troops, rendered him confident that no passage would take place above Oporto; *he believed that the enemy, master of the sea, would try a disembarkation near the mouth of the Douro.*"

Such is the value of this carping disingenuous critic's observations on this point; and I shall now demolish his other misstatements about the passage of the Douro.

1st. The poor barber's share in the transaction is quite true; my authority is Major-General Sir John Waters who was the companion of the barber in the daring exploit of bringing over the boats. And if Waters had recollected his name, it is not the despicable aristocratic sneer of the reviewer about the "*Plebeian*" that would have prevented me from giving it. 2nd. *The Barca de Avintas*, where Sir John Murray crossed, has already been shown by a reference to the maps and to Lord Wellington's despatch, to be not nine miles from the Serra Convent, as the reviewer says, but three miles as I have stated: moreover, two Portuguese leagues would not make nine English miles. But to quit these minor points, the reviewer asks, "*Why Colonel Napier departed from the account of the events given in the despatch of Sir Arthur Wellesley?*" This is the only decent passage in the whole review, and it shall have a satisfactory answer.

Public despatches, written in the hurry of the moment, immediately after the events and before accurate information can be obtained, are very subject to errors of detail, and are certainly not what a judicious historian would rely upon for details without endeavouring to obtain other information. In this case I discovered several discrepancies between the despatch and the accounts of eye-witnesses and actors written long afterwards and deliberately. I knew also that the passage of the Douro, though apparently a very rash action and little considered in England, was a very remarkable exploit, prudent, skilful, and daring. Anxious to know the true secret of the success, I wrote to the Duke of Wellington, putting a variety of questions relative to the whole expeditions. In return I received from him distinct answers, with a small diagram of the seminary and ground about it to render the explanation clear. Being thus put in possession of all the leading points relative to the passage of the Douro by the commanders on each side, for I had before got Soult's, I turned to the written and printed statement of several officers engaged in the action for those details which the generals had not touched upon.

Now the principal objections of the reviewer to my statement are,—1st. That I have given too many troops to Sir John Murray. 2nd. That I have unjustly accused him of want of military hardihood. 3rd. That I have erroneously described the cause of the loss sustained by the 14th dragoons in retiring from their charge. In reply I quote my authorities; and first, as to the numbers with Murray.

Extract from LORD WELLINGTON'S answers to COLONEL NAPIER'S questions.

"*The right of the troops which passed over to the seminary, which in fact made an admirable tête de pont, was protected by the passage of the Douro higher up by Lieut.-General Sir John Murray and the king's German legion, supported by other troops.*"

Armed with this authority, I did set aside the despatch, because though it said that Murray was sent with a battalion and a squadron, it did not say that he was not followed by others. And in Lord Londonderry's narrative I found the following passage:—

"General Murray, too, who had been detached with *his division* to a ferry higher up, was fortunate enough to gain possession of as many boats as enabled him to pass over with *two battalions of Germans and two squadrons of the 14th dragoons.*"

And his lordship, further on, says, that he himself charged several times and with advantage at the head of those squadrons. His expression is "*the dragoons from Murray's corps.*"

With respect to the loss of the dragoons sustained by having to fight their way back again, I find the following account in the narrative of Sir James Douglas, written, as I have before said, expressly for my guidance:—

"Young soldiers like young greyhounds run headlong on their prey; while experience makes old dogs of all sorts run cunning. Here *two squadrons* actually rode over the *whole rear French guard*, which laid down upon the road; and was, to use their own terms, *passé sur le ventre*: but no support to the dragoons being at hand no great execution was done; and the *two squadrons themselves suffered severely in getting back again through the infantry.*"

Thus, even in this small matter, the reviewer is not right. And now, with the above facts fixed, I shall proceed to rebut the charge of having calumniated Sir John Murray.

First, the reviewer's assertion, that Murray's troops were never within several miles of the seminary, and that they would have been crushed by Soult if they had attacked the enemy, is evidently false from the following facts. Lord Wellington expressly says, in his answer to my questions quoted before,—That *the right of the troops in the seminary was protected by the troops under Murray*; which could not be if the latter were several miles off. Again, if the

dragoons of Murray's corps could charge repeatedly with advantage, the infantry and guns of that corps might have followed up the attack without danger upon a confused, flying, panic-stricken body of men who had been surprised, and were at the same time taken both in flank and rear. But if Murray dared not with any prudence even approach the enemy,—if it were absolutely necessary for him to retire as he did,—what brought him there at all? Is the Duke of Wellington a general to throw his troops wantonly into such a situation,—and on ground which his elevated post at the Serra Convent enabled him to command perfectly, and where the men and movements of both sides were as much beneath his eye as the men and movements on a chess-board? Bah!

But the fact is that a part of the Germans under Murray, aye!—a very small part! did actually engage the enemy with success. Major Beamish, in his "History of the German Legion," on the authority of one of the German officers' journals, writes thus:—

"The skirmishers of the first line under Lieutenant Von Hölle, and two companies of the same regiment under Ensign Hodenberg, were alone brought into fire. The skirmishers made several prisoners, and one rifleman (Henry Hauer) was lucky enough to capture a French lieutenant-colonel. Seven of the legion were wounded."

Murray wanted hardihood. And it is no answer to say Lord Wellington did not take notice of his conduct. A commander-in-chief is guided by many circumstances distinct from the mere military facts, and it might be, that, on this occasion he did not choose to judge rashly or harshly a man, who had other good qualities, for an error into which, perhaps, a very bold and able man might have fallen by accident. And neither would I have thus judged Sir John Murray from this fact alone, although the whole army were disgusted at the time by his want of daring, and openly expressed an unfavourable opinion of his military vigour. But when I find that the same want of hardihood was again apparent in him at Castalla, as I have shown in my fifth volume, and still more glaringly displayed by him at Taragona, as I shall show in my sixth volume, the matter became quite different, and the duty of the historian is to speak the truth, even of a general, strange as that may and I have no doubt does appear to this reviewer.

Having disposed of this matter, I shall now set down some passages evincing the babbling shallowness and self-conceit of the critic, and beneath them my authorities, whereby it will appear that the big book containing all Sir George does not know is increasing in bulk:—

"Sir Arthur Wellesley was detained at Oporto neither by the instructions of the English cabinet nor by his own want of generalship, but simply by the want of provisions."—*Review*.

Indeed! Reader, mark the following question to, and answer from the Duke of Wellington.

Question to the Duke of Wellington by Colonel Napier:

Why did the duke halt the next day after the passage of the Douro?

Answer.—"The halt was made next day,—First, because the whole army had not crossed the Douro, and none of its supplies and baggage had crossed. Secondly, on account of the great exertion and fatigue of the preceding days, particularly the last. Thirdly, because we had no account of Lord Beresford being in possession of Amarante, or even across the Douro; we having, in fact, out-marched everything. Fourthly, the horses and animals required a day's rest as well as the men."

And, in answer to another question, the following observation occurs:—"The relative numbers and the nature of the troops must be considered in all these things; and this fact, moreover, that excepting to attain a very great object we could not risk the loss of a corps."

I pass over the reviewer's comments upon my description of Soult's retreat, because a simple reference to my work will at once show their folly and falseness; but I beg to inform this acute and profound historical critic that the first field-marshal captured by an English general was Marshal Tallard, and that the English general who captured him was called John, Duke of Marlborough. And, with respect to his sneers about the "*little river of Ruivæns*;" "*Soult's theatrical speech*;" "*the use of the twenty-five horsemen*;" "*the non-repairs of the Ponte Nova*;" and the "*Romançe composed by Colonel Napier and Le Noble*;" I shall, in answer, only offer the following authorities, none of which, the reader will observe, are taken from Le Noble.

Extract from SOULT'S General Report.

"The 15th, in the morning, the enemy appeared one league from Braga; our column was entangled in the defile; the rain came down in torrents; and the wind was frightful. On reaching Salamanca we learned that *the bridge of Ruivæns, over the little river (ruisseau) of that name was cut, and the passage guarded by 1200 men with cannon*. It was known also that the *Ponte Nova on the route of Montelegre*, which they had begun to destroy, was feebly guarded; and the marshal gave to Major Dulong the command of 100 brave men, of his own choice, to carry it. The valiant Dulong, under cover of the night, reached the bridge, passed it notwithstanding the cuts in it, surprised the guard, and put to the sword those who could not escape. *In four hours the bridge was repaired*; General Loison passed it, and marched upon the bridge of Misserella, near Villa da Ponte, where 800 Portuguese, well retrenched, defended the passage. *A battalion and some brave men, again led by the intrepid Dulong, forced the abatis, entered the entrenchments and seized the bridge.*"

Extract from the "Victoires et Conquêtes des Français."

"The marshal held a council, at the end of which he called Major Dulong. It was nine o'clock in the evening. 'I have selected you from the army,' he said to that brave officer, 'to seize the bridge of Ponte Nova, which the enemy are now cutting: you must endeavour to surprise them. The time is favourable. Attack vigorously with the bayonet, you will succeed or you will die. I want no news save that of your success, send me no other report, your silence will be sufficient in a contrary case. Take a hundred men at your choice; they will be sufficient; add *twenty-five dragoons, and kill their horses to make a rampart, if it be necessary, on the middle of the bridge to sustain yourself and remain master of the passage.*'"

The major departed with determined soldiers and a Portuguese guide, who was tied with the leather slings of the muskets. Arrived within pistol-shot of the bridge he saw the enemy *cutting the last beam*. It was then one o'clock, the rain fell heavily, and the enemy's labourers being fatigued thought they might take some repose before they finished their work. The torrents descending from the mountains and the cavado itself made such a noise that the march of the French was not heard; the sentinel at the bridge was killed without giving any alarm, and Dulong, *with twenty-five grenadiers passed crawling on the beam, one of them fell into the cavado, but happily his fall produced no effect*. The enemy's advanced post of 24 men was destroyed, etc., etc. The marshal informed of this happy event, came up in haste with the first troops he could find to defend the bridge and accelerate the passage of the army; *but the repairing was neither sufficiently prompt or solid to prevent many brave soldiers perishing*. The marshal embraced Major Dulong, saying to him, 'I thank you, in the name of France, brave major; you have saved the army.'"

Then follows a detailed account of the Misserella bridge, or Saltador, and its abattis and other obstacles; of Dulong's attack; of his being twice repulsed; and of his carrying of the bridge—the Leaper as it was called—at the third assault, falling dreadfully wounded at the moment of victory; finally, of the care and devotion with which his soldiers carried him on their shoulders during the rest of the retreat. And the reader will observe that this account is not a mere description in the body of the work, but a separate paper in the Appendix, written by some officer evidently well acquainted with all the facts, perhaps Dulong himself, and for the express purpose of correcting the errors of detail in the body of that work. Theatrical to the critic, and even ridiculous it may likely enough appear. The noble courage and self-devotion of such a soldier as Dulong is a subject which no person will ever expect a Quarterly reviewer to understand.

In the foregoing comments I have followed the stream of my own thoughts, rather than the order of the reviewer's criticisms; I must therefore retrace my steps to notice some points which have been passed over. His observations about Zaragoza have been already disposed of, in my reply to his first articles published in my fifth volume, but his comments upon Catalan affairs shall now be noticed.

The assertion that Lord Collingwood was incapable of judging of the efforts of the Catalans, although he was in daily intercourse with their chiefs, co-operating with their armies, and supplying them with arms and stores, *because he was a seaman*, is certainly ingenious. It has just so much of pertness in it as an admiralty clerk of the Melville School might be supposed to acquire by a long habit of official insolence to naval officers, whose want of parliamentary interest exposed them to the mortification of having intercourse with him. And it has just so much of cunning wisdom as to place it upon a par with that which dictated the inquiry which we have heard was sent out to Sir John Warren during the late American war, namely, "whether *light—very light* frigates, could not sail up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario?" And with that surprising providence, which did send out birch-brooms and tanks to hold *fresh water* for the use of the ships on the said lake of Ontario. But quitting these matters, the reviewer insinuates what is absolutely untrue, namely, that I have only quoted Lord Collingwood as authority for my statements about Catalonia. The readers of my work know that I have adduced in testimony the Spanish generals themselves, namely, Contreas, Lacy, and Rovira; the testimony of Sir Edward Codrington, of Sir Edward Pellew, of Colonel Doyle, and of other Englishmen. That I have referred to St. Cyr, Suchet, Lafaille, and other French writers; that I have quoted Vacani and Cabane's "Histories," the first an Italian serving with the French army in Catalonia, the last a Spaniard and chief of the staff to the Catalan army: and now, to complete the reviewer's discomfiture, I will add the Duke of Wellington, who is a landsman and therefore, according to this reviewer's doctrine, entitled to judge:—

Letter to LORD LIVERPOOL, 19th December, 1809.

"In Catalonia the resistance is more general and regular; but still the people are of a description with which your armies could not co-operate with any prospect of success, or even of safety. You see what Burghersh says of the Somatenes; and it is *notorious that the Catalans have at all times been the most irregular, and the least to be depended upon of any of the Spaniards.*"

So much for light frigates, birch-brooms, fresh-water tanks, and Collingwood's incapacity to judge of the Catalans, *because he was a seaman*; and as for Reding's complaints of the Spaniards when dying, they must go to Sir George's big book with this marginal note, that

St. Cyr is not the authority. But for the grand flourish, the threat to prove at another time, "*from Wellington's despatches*," that the Spaniards gave excellent intelligence, and made *no false reports*, let the reader take the following testimony in anticipation:—

Extracts from LORD WELLINGTON'S Correspondence, 1809.

"At present I have no intelligence whatever, excepting the nonsense I receive occasionally from —; *as the Spaniards have defeated all my attempts to obtain any by stopping those whom I sent out to make inquiries.*"

"I do not doubt that the force left in Estremadura does not exceed 8000 infantry and 900 cavalry; and you have been made acquainted with the exact extent of it, *because*, the Duque del Albuquerque, who is appointed to command it, *is interested in making known the truth*; but they have *lied* about the cavalry ordered to the Duque del Parque."

"It might be advisable, however, to frighten the gentlemen at Seville *with their own false intelligence.*"

"It is most difficult to obtain any information respecting roads, or any local circumstances, which must be considered in the decisions to be formed respecting the march of troops."

1810. "We are sadly deficient in good information, and all the efforts which I have made to obtain it have failed; and all that we know is the movement of troops at the moment, or probably after it is made."

"I have had accounts from the Marquis de la Romana: he tells me that the siege of Cadix was raised on the 23rd, *which cannot be true.*"

"I believe there was no truth in the stories of the insurrection at Madrid."

"There is so far a foundation for the report of O'Donnel's action, as that it appears that Suchet's advanced guard was at Lerida on the 11th of April. It is doubtful, however, *according to my experience of Spanish reports*, whether O'Donnel was beaten or gained a victory."

"I recommend to you, however, to proceed with great caution in respect to intelligence transmitted to you by the Marquis de la Romana, *and all the Spanish officers.* It is obvious there is nothing they wish for so much as to involve our troops in their operations. This is evident both from the letters of the marquis himself, and from the *false reports* made to Lieutenant Heathcote of the firing heard from Badajoz at Albuquerque."

WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, 1810. *Cartaxo.*

"The circumstances which I have related above will show your lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with a corps so ill-organized, *in possession of so little intelligence*, and upon whose actions no reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that *the first intelligence which General Mendizabal received of the assembling of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence.*"

WELLINGTON to SIR H. WELLESLEY, 1810.

"Mendizabal, etc., etc., have sent us so many *false reports* that I cannot make out what the French are doing."

"This is a part of the system on which *all the Spanish authorities have been acting*, to induce us to take a part in the desultory operations which they are carrying on. *False reports and deceptions of every description are tried*, and then popular insults, to show us what the general opinion is of our conduct."

"The Spaniards take such bad care of their posts, and have so little intelligence, that it is difficult to say by what troops the blow has been struck."

"It is strange that the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo should have no intelligence of the enemy's movements near his garrison, of which we have received so many accounts."

"We hear also a great deal of Blake's army in the Alpujarras, and of a corps from Valencia operating upon the enemy's communications with Madrid; but I conclude that there is as little foundation for this intelligence as for that relating to the insurrection of Ronda."

"I enclose a letter from General Carrera, in which I have requested him to communicate with you. I beg you to observe, however, that very little reliance can be placed on the report made to you *by any Spanish general at the head of a body of troops.* They generally exaggerate on one side or the other; and *make no scruple of communicating supposed intelligence, in order to induce those to whom they communicate it to adopt a certain line of conduct.*"

The reader must be now somewhat tired of quotations; let us therefore turn for relaxation to the reviewer's observations about light troops,—of which he seems indeed to know as much as the wise gentleman of the Admiralty did about the facility of sailing up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; but though that wise gentleman did not know much about sailing-craft, the reviewer knows something of another kind of craft, namely misrepresentation. Thus he quotes a passage from Captain Kincaid's amusing and clever work as if it told in his favour; whereas it in no manner supports his foolish insinuation—namely, that the 43rd and 52nd regiments of the light division were not light troops, never acted as such, and never skirmished! Were he to say as much to the lowest bugler of these corps, he would give him the fittest answer for his folly—that is to say, laugh in his face.

"There are but two kinds of soldiers in the world," said Napoleon, "the good and the bad."

Now, the light division were not only good but, I will say it fearlessly, the best soldiers in the world. The three British regiments composing it had been formed by Sir John Moore precisely upon the same system. There was no difference save in the colour of the riflemen's jackets and the weapons which they carried. Captain Kincaid's observation, quoted by the reviewer, merely says, what is quite true, that the riflemen fought in skirmishing order more frequently than the 43rd and 52nd did. Certainly they did, and for this very sufficient reason—their arms, the rifle and sword, did not suit any other formation; it is a defect in the weapon, which is inferior to the musket and bayonet, fitted alike for close or open order. Napoleon knew this so well that he had no riflemen in his army, strange as it may appear to those persons who have read so much about French riflemen. The riflemen of the light division could form line, columns, and squares—could move as a heavy body—could do, and did do everything that the best soldiers in the world ought to do; and in like manner the 52nd and 43rd regiments skirmished and performed all the duties of light troops with the same facility as the riflemen; but the difference of the weapon made it advisable to use the latter nearly always in open order: I do not, indeed, remember ever to have seen them act against the enemy either in line or square. Captain Kincaid is too sensible and too good a soldier, and far too honest a man, to serve the purpose of this snarling blockhead, who dogmatizes in defiance of facts and with a plenitude of pompous absurdity that would raise the bile of an alderman. Thus, after quoting from my work the numbers of the French army, he thus proceeds:—

"Notwithstanding that this enormous force was *pressing* upon the *now unaided* Spanish people with *all its weight*, and acting against them with its *utmost energy*, it proved wholly unable to put down resistance."—*Review*, page 497.

Now this relates to the period following Sir John Moore's death, which was on the 16th of January. That general's fine movement upon Sahagun, and his subsequent retreat, had drawn the great bulk of the French forces towards Galicia, and had paralyzed many corps. The war with Austria had drawn Napoleon himself and the imperial guards away from the Peninsula. Joseph was establishing his court at Madrid; Victor remained very inactive in Estremadura; Soult marched into Portugal;—in fine, this was precisely the period of the whole war in which the French army were most inert. Napoleon has fixed upon the four months of February, March, April, and May, 1809, as the period in which the King let the Peninsula slip from his feeble hands.

Let us see then what the Spaniards did during that time. And, first, it is false to say that they were unaided. They were aided against Victor by the vicinity of Sir John Craddock's troops; they were aided on the Gallician coast by an English squadron; they were aided on the Beira frontier, against Lapisse, by the Portuguese troops under Sir Robert Wilson; they were aided on the Catalonian coast by Lord Collingwood's fleet; they were aided at Cadiz by the presence of General M'Kenzie's troops, sent from Lisbon; and they were aided everywhere by enormous supplies of money, arms, and ammunition sent from England. Finally, they were aided, and most powerfully so, by Sir John Moore's generalship, which had enabled them to rally and keep several considerable armies on foot in the southern parts of the country. What did these armies—these invincible Spaniards—do? They lost Zaragoza, Monzon, and Jaca, in the east; the fortresses of Ferrol and Coruña, and their fleet in the north; they lost Estremadura, La Mancha, Aragon, the Asturias, and Galicia; they lost the battles of Ucles and of Valls; the battle of Monterrey, that of Ciudad Real, and the battle of Medellin. They won nothing! they did not save themselves, it was the *British army and the indolence and errors of the French that saved them*.

Extract from NAPOLEON'S "Memoirs."

"After the embarkation of the English army, the king of Spain did nothing; *he lost four months*; he ought to have marched upon Cadiz, upon Valencia, upon Lisbon; political means would have done the rest."

Extracts from LORD WELLINGTON'S Correspondence, 1809.

"It is obvious that the longer, and the more intimately we become acquainted with the affairs of Spain, the less prospect do they hold out of anything like a glorious result. The great extent of the country, the natural difficulties which it opposes to an enemy, and the enmity of the people towards the French may spin out the war into length, and at last the French may find it impossible to establish a government in the country; but there is no prospect of a glorious termination to the contest."

"After the perusal of these details, and of Soult's letters, can any one doubt that the evacuation of Galicia was occasioned by the operations of the British troops in Portugal?"

"The fact is, that the British army *has saved Spain and Portugal* during this year."

The reviewer is not only a great critic, he is a great general also. He has discovered that there are no positions in the mountains of Portugal; nay, he will scarcely allow that there are mountains at all; and he insists that they offer no defence against an invader, but that the rivers do—that the Douro defends the *eastern* frontier of Beira, and that the frontier of Portugal generally is very compact and strong for defence, and well suited for a weak army to fight superior numbers;—that the weak army cannot be turned and cut off from Lisbon, and the strong army must invade in mass and by one line.

Now, first, it so happened, unluckily for this lucid military notion of Portugal, that in Massena's invasion Lord Wellington stopped to fight on the mountain of Busaco, and stopped Massena altogether at the mountains of Alhandra, Aruda, Sobral, and Torres Vedras—in other words at the lines, and that he did not once stop him or attempt to stop him by defending a river. That Massena, in his retreat, stopped Lord Wellington on the mountain of Santarem, attempted to stop him on the mountains of Casal Nova, Moita, and Guarda, but never attempted to stop him by defending a river, save at Sabugal, and then he was instantly beaten. Oh, certainly, tis a most noble general, and a very acute critic! Nevertheless, I must support my own opinions about the frontier of Portugal, the non-necessity of invading this country in one mass, and the unfordable nature of the Tagus, by the testimony of two generals as distinguished as honest Iago.

Extract of a letter from SIR JOHN MOORE.

"I am not prepared at this moment to answer minutely your lordship's question respecting the defence of Portugal; but I can say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, but all equally to be penetrated.

Extracts from LORD WELLINGTON'S Correspondence.

"In whatever season the enemy may enter Portugal, he will probably make his attack by two distinct lines, the one north the other south of the Tagus; and the system of defence must be founded upon this general basis. In the summer season, however, the *Tagus being fordable*, etc., etc., care must be taken that the enemy does not by his attack directed from the south of the Tagus and by the passage of that river, *cut off from Lisbon the British army engaged in operations to the north of the Tagus.*"

"The line of frontier to Portugal is so long in proportion to the extent and means of the country, and the Tagus and the mountains separate the parts of it so effectually from each other, and it is so open in many parts, that it would be *impossible for an army acting upon the defensive to carry on its operations upon the frontier without being cut off from the capital.*"

"In the summer it is probable, as I have before stated, that the enemy will make his attacks in two principal corps, and that he will also push on through the mountains between Castello Branco and Abrantes. His object will be, by means of his corps *south of the Tagus*, to turn the positions which might be taken in his front on the north of that river; *to cut off from Lisbon the corps opposed to him*; and to destroy it by an attack in front and rear at the same time. This can be avoided only by the retreat of the right centre and left of the allies, and their junction at a point, at which from the state of the river they cannot be turned by the passage of the Tagus by the enemy's left. The first point of defence which presents itself below that at which the Tagus ceases to be fordable, is the river Castenheira, close to the lines."

In the above extracts, the fordable nature of the Tagus has been pretty clearly shown, but I will continue my proofs upon that fact to satiety.

LORD WELLINGTON to CHARLES STUART, Esq.

"The line of operations which we are obliged to adopt for the defence of Lisbon and for our own embarkation necessarily throws us back as far as below Salvaterra on the Tagus, to which place, and I believe lower, *the Tagus is fordable during the summer*; and we should be liable to be turned or cut off from Lisbon and the Tagus, if we were to take our line of defence higher upon the river."

LORD WELLINGTON to GENERAL HILL, August.

"I had already considered the possibility that Regnier might move across the fords of the Tagus at Vilha Velha and thus turn your right."

LORD WELLINGTON to GENERAL HILL, October.

"If there are no boats, send them (the sick and encumbrances) across the Tagus by the ford (at Santarem)."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to GENERAL HILL.

"I have desired Murray to send you the copy of a plan we have, with some of the fords of the Tagus marked upon it, but I believe the whole river from Barquina to Santarem is fordable."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to MARSHAL BIERESFORD.

"I enclose a letter which Colonel Fletcher has given me, which affords but a bad prospect of a defence for the Tagus. I think that if Captain Chapman's facts are true his arguments are unanswerable, and that it is very doubtful whether any heavy ordnance should be placed in the batteries on the upper Tagus."

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY to ADMIRAL BERKELEY.

"But if the invasion should be made in summer, when the Tagus is fordable in many places." "In the event of the attack being made between the months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable, at least as low down as Salvaterra (near the lines)."

SIR JOHN CRADDOCK to LORD CASTLEREAGH, April.

"There is a ferry at Salvaterra, near Alcantara, and another up the left bank of the Tagus in the Alemtajo, where there is also a ford, and the river may be easily passed."

Extract from a Memoir by SIR B. D'URBAN, quarter-master-general to BERESFORD'S army.

"The Tagus, between Golegao and Rio Moinhos was known to offer several fords after a few days' dry weather."

Thus we see that, in nearly every month in the year, this unfordable Tagus of the reviewer is fordable in many places, and that in fact it is no barrier except in very heavy rains. But to render this still clearer I will here give one more and conclusive proof. In an elaborate manuscript memoir upon the defence of Portugal, drawn up by the celebrated General Dumourier for the Duke of Wellington, that officer argues like this reviewer, that the Tagus is unfordable and a strong barrier. But a marginal note in Wellington's hand-writing runs thus—"He (Dumourier) does not seem to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season."

What can I say more? Nothing upon this head, but much upon others. I can call upon the reader to trace the deceitful mode in which the reviewer perverts or falsifies my expressions throughout. How he represents the Spaniards at one moment so formidable as to resist successfully the utmost efforts of more than 300,000 soldiers, the next breath calls them a poor, unarmed horde of peasants incapable of making any resistance at all. How he quotes me as stating that the ministers had unbounded confidence in the success of the struggle in Spain; whereas my words are, that the ministers *professed* unbounded confidence. How he represents me as saying, the *Cabinet* were too much dazzled to analyze the real causes of the Spanish Revolution; whereas it was the *nation* not the *Cabinet* of which I spoke. And this could not be mistaken, because I had described the ministers as only anxious to pursue a warlike system necessary to their own existence, and that they were actuated by a personal hatred of Napoleon. Again, how he misrepresents me as wishing the British to *seize* Cadiz, and speaks of a *mob* in that city, when I have spoken only of the *people* (oh, true Tory!), and never proposed to seize Cadiz at all, and have also given the unexceptionable authority of Mr. Stuart, General M'Kenzie, and Sir George Smith, for my statement. And here I will notice a fine specimen of this reviewer's mode of getting up a case. Having undertaken to prove that every river in Portugal is a barrier, except the *Zezere* which I had fixed upon as being an important line, he gives an extract of a letter from Lord Wellington to a General *Smith*, to the effect that, as the *Zezere* might be *turned* at *that season* in so many ways, he did not wish to construct works to defend it then. Now, first, it is necessary to inform the reader that there is no letter to General Smith. The letter in question was to General Leith, and the *mistake* was not without its object, namely, to prevent any curious person from discovering that the very next sentence is as follows:—"If, however, this work can be performed, either by the peasantry or by the troops, without any great inconvenience, *the line of the Zezere may, hereafter, become of very great importance.*"

All this is very pitiful, and looks like extreme soreness in the reviewer; but the effrontery with which he perverts my statements about the Austrian war surpasses all his other efforts in that line, and deserves a more elaborate exposure.

In my History it is stated, that some obscure intrigues of the Princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies on the continent, emanating from patrician sources, excited the sympathy and nourished certain *distempered feelings* in the English ministers, *which feeling* made them see only weakness and disaffection in France. This, I stated, because I knew that those intrigues were, in fact, a conspiracy concocted with Talleyrand's connivance, for the dethronement of Napoleon; and the English ministers neglected Spain and every other part of their foreign affairs for the moment, so intent were they upon this foolish scheme and so sanguine of success. These facts are not known to many, but they are true.

In the same paragraph of my History it is said, *the warlike preparations of Austria*, and the reputation of the Archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed Napoleon's, *had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions*; meaning, as would be evident to any persons not wilfully blind, had awakened that dormant spirit in the English ministers.

Now reader, mark the candour and simplicity of the reviewer. He says that I condemned these ministers, "for nourishing their distempered feelings by combining the efforts of a German monarch in favour of national independence." As if it were the *Austrian war*, and not the *obscure intrigues for dethroning Napoleon* that the expression of *distempered feelings* applied to. As if the awakening the *dormant spirit of coalitions*, instead of being a reference to the sentiments of the English ministers, meant the exciting the Austrians and other nations to war, and the forming of a vast plan of action by those ministers! And for fear any mistake on that head should arise, it is so asserted in another part of the *review* in the following terms:—

"To have '*awakened the dormant spirit*' of coalitions, is another of the crimes which the British ministers are charged with, as if it would have been a proof of wisdom to have abstained from forming a combination of those states of Europe which still retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist a conqueror," etc., etc.—*Review*.

* This was in February.

The *Quarterly's* attention to Spanish affairs seems to have rendered it very intimate with the works of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto. But since it has thus claimed the Austrian war as the work of its former patrons, the ministers of 1809, I will throw some new light upon the history of that period, which, though they should prove little satisfactory to the *Quarterly*, may, as the details are really curious, in some measure repay the reader for his patience in wading through the tedious exposition of this silly and unscrupulous writer's misrepresentations.

After the conference of Erfurth, the Austrian, Count Stadion, a man of ability and energy, either believing, or affecting to believe, that Napoleon was determined to destroy Austria and only waited until Spain was conquered, resolved to employ the whole force of the German empire against the French monarch in a war of destruction for one or other of the contending states. With this view his first efforts were directed to change the opinions of the Archduke Charles and those immediately about him who were averse to a war; and though he was long and vigorously resisted by General Grün, an able man and the archduke's confidant, he finally succeeded. Some time before this, France had insisted upon a reduction of the Austrian forces, and being asked if she would do the same for the sake of peace, replied that she would maintain no more troops in Germany than should be found necessary; but the army of the Confederation must be kept up as a constitutional force, and it was impossible during the war with England to reduce the French troops in other quarters. To this succeeded an attempt at a triple treaty, by which the territories of Austria, Russia, and France, were to be mutually guaranteed. Champagny and Romanzow suggested this plan, but the Austrian minister did not conceive Russia strong enough to guarantee Austria against France. Stadion's project was more agreeable, and a note of a declaration of war was sent to Metternich, then at Paris, to deliver to the French government. The Archduke Charles set off for the army, and was followed by the emperor.

When the war was thus resolved upon, it remained to settle whether it should be carried on for the sole benefit of Austria, or in such a manner as to interest other nations. Contrary to her usual policy Austria decided for the latter, and contrary to her usual parsimony she was extremely liberal to her general officers and spies. It was determined that the war should be one of restitution, and in that view secret agents had gone to Italy, and were said to have made great progress in exciting the people; officers had been also sent to Sicily and Sardinia to urge those courts to attempt their own restoration to the continental thrones. The complete restoration of Naples, of Tuscany, and the Pope's dominions, and large additions to the old kingdom of Piedmont were proposed, and Austria herself only demanded a secure frontier, namely, the Tyrol, the river Po, and the Chiusa, which was not much more than the peace of Campo Formio had left her.

Such were her views in the south where kings were to be her coadjutors, but in the north she was intent upon a different plan. There she expected help from the people, who were discontented at being parcelled out by Napoleon. Treaties were entered into with the Elector of Hesse, the Dukes of Brunswick and Oels, and it was understood that the people there and in the provinces taken from Prussia, were ready to rise on the first appearance of an Austrian soldier. Hanover was to be restored to England; but Austria was so discontented with the Prussian king, that the restoration of the Prussian provinces, especially the Duchy of Warsaw, was to depend upon his conduct in the war.

The means of effecting this mighty project were the great resources which Stadion had found or created: they were greater than Austria had ever before produced, and the enthusiasm of her people was in proportion. The landwehr levy had been calculated at only 150 battalions; it produced 300 battalions, besides the Hungarian insurrection. The regular army was complete in everything, and the cavalry good, though not equal to what it had been in former wars. There were nine "*corps d'armée*." The Archduke Ferdinand with one was to strike a blow in the Duchy of Warsaw. The Archduke Charles commanded in chief. Marching with six corps, containing 160,000 regular troops besides the landwehr attached to them, he was to cross the frontier and fall on the French army, supposed to be only 40,000. That is to say, the first corps, under Belgarde and Klenau, were to march by Peterwalde and Dresden against Bernadotte, who was in that quarter. The second corps, under Kollowrath and Brady, were to march by Eger upon Bareith and Wurzburg, to prevent the union of Davoust and Bernadotte. The third corps, under Prince Rosenberg, was to move by Waldmunchen, in the Upper Palatinate, and after beating Wrede at Straubingen, to join the Archduke Charles near Munich. The archduke himself was to proceed against that city with the reserves of Prince John of Lichtenstein, Hiller's corps, Stipchitz, and those of Hohenzollern's, and the Archduke Louis'. The Archduke John was to attack Italy; and the different corps, exclusive of landwehr, amounted to not less than 260,000 men.

The project was gigantic, the force prodigious, and though the quarter-master-general, Meyer, seeing the vice of the military plan, resigned his situation, and that Meerfelt quarrelled with the Archduke Charles, the general feeling was high and sanguine; and the princes of the empire were, with the exception of Wirtemberg and Westphalia, thought to be rather favourable towards the Austrians. But all the contributions were in kind; Austria had only a depreciated paper currency which would not serve her beyond her own frontiers; wherefore England, at that time the paymaster of all Europe, was looked to. England, however, had no ambassador, no regular accredited agent at Vienna; all this mighty armament and plan

were carried on without her aid, almost without her knowledge; and a despatch from the Foreign Office, dated the 8th of December, but which only arrived the 10th of March, *refused all aid whatsoever! and even endeavoured to prove that Austria could not want, and England was not in a situation to grant.* Yet this was the period in which such lavish grants had been made to Spain without any condition—so lavish, that, in Cadiz, nearly £400,000, received from England, was lying untouched by the Spaniards. They were absolutely glutted with specie, for they had, at that moment, of their own money, and lying idle in their treasury *fourteen millions of dollars, and ten millions more were on the way from Vera Cruz and Buenos Ayres.* Such was the wisdom, such the providence of the English ministers! heaping money upon money at Cadiz, where it was not wanted, and if it had been wanted, ill-bestowed; but refusing it to Austria to forward the explosion of the enormous mine prepared against Napoleon in Germany and Italy. Their agent, Mr. Frere, absolutely refused even to ask for a loan of some of this money from the Spaniards. This is what the reviewer, wilfully perverting my expression, namely, "*awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions,*" calls "*the forming a combination of the states of Europe?*" The English ministers were treated as mere purse-bearers, to be bullied or cajoled as the case might be; and in these two instances, not without reason, for they neither know how to give nor how to refuse in the right time or place. Nor were their military dispositions better arranged, as we shall presently see.

To proceed with our narrative. Stadion, to prevent the mischief which this despatch from England might have produced, by encouraging the peace party at the court, and discouraging the others, only imparted it to the emperor and his secret council, but hid it from those members of the cabinet who were wavering. Even this was like to have cost him his place; and some members of the council actually proposed to reduce one-third of the army. In fine, a cry was arising against the war, but the emperor declared himself on Stadion's side, and the cabinet awaited the result of Count Walmoden's mission to London. That nobleman had been despatched with full powers to conclude a treaty of alliance and subsidy with England, and to learn the feeling of the English cabinet upon an extraordinary measure which Austria had resorted to; for being utterly unable to pay her way at the outset, and trusting to the importance of the crisis, and not a little to the known facility with which the English ministers lavished their subsidies, she had resolved to raise, through the principal bankers in Vienna, £150,000 a month, by making drafts through Holland upon their correspondents in London, *to be repaid from the subsidy to be granted by England!* Prince Staremberg was sent at the same time with a special mission to London, to arrange a definite treaty for money, and a convention regulating the future object and conduct of the war—a very curious proceeding—because Staremberg had been recalled before for conduct offensive to the English cabinet; but he was well acquainted with London, and the emperor wished to get him away lest he should put himself at the head of the peace-party in Vienna. Thus the English ministers continued so to conduct their affairs, that, while they gave their money to Spain and their advice to Austria, and both unprofitably, they only excited the contempt of both countries.

From the conference of Erfurth, France had been earnest with Russia to take an active part, according to treaty, against Austria; and Romanzow, who was an enemy of England, increased Alexander's asperity toward that country, but nothing was done against Austria; and when Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at Petersburg, became clamorous, Alexander pretended to take the Austrian ambassador Swartzenberg to task for the measures of his court, but really gave him encouragement, by repairing immediately afterwards to Finland without inviting Caulaincourt. A contemporaneous official note, from Romanzow to Austria, was indeed couched in terms to render the intention of Alexander apparently doubtful, but this was only a blind for Napoleon. There was no doubt of the favourable wishes and feelings of the court, the Russian troops in Poland did not stir, and Stadion, far from having any dread of them, calculated upon their assistance in case of any marked success in the outset. The Emperor Alexander was, however, far from inattentive to his own interests, for he sent General Hitroff at this time to Turkey to demand Moldavia and Wallachia as the price of a treaty, hoping thus to snatch these countries, during the general commotion. He was foiled by the Austrian cabinet, which secretly directed the Turks sent to meet Hitroff, to assume a high tone and agree to no negotiation in which England was not a party: hence, when the Russians demanded the dismissal of Mr. Adair from Constantinople Hitroff was himself sent away.

While the affairs with Russia were in this state, the present king of Holland arrived, incognito, at Vienna, to offer his services either as heir to the stadtholdership, as a prince of the German empire, or as a near and confidential connection of the house of Brandenburg; but it was only in the latter view he could be useful, and it was evident he expected the Austrian court would make their policy in the north coincide with that of the Prussian court. He said the secret voyage of the royal family to Petersburg had exposed them to mortifications and slights which had changed the sentiments of both the king and queen towards France, and the queen, bowed down by misfortune, dreaded new reverses and depressed the spirit of the king. They stood alone in their court, ministers and officers alike openly maintained opinions diametrically opposed to the sovereign, and at a grand council held in Konigsberg every minister had voted for war with Napoleon. The king assented, but the next day the queen induced him to retract. However, the voice of the people and of the army was for war, and any order

to join the troops to those of the Rhenish confederation was sure to produce an explosion. There were between 30,000 and 40,000 regular troops under arms, and Austria was assured that if any Austrian force approached the frontier, the Prussian soldiers would, bag and baggage, join it, despite of king or queen.

In this state of affairs, and when a quarrel had arisen between Bernadotte and the Saxon king (for the people of that country were ill-disposed towards the French), it is evident that a large English army appearing in the north of Germany would have gathered around it all the people and armies of the north, and accordingly Stadion proposed a landing in the Weser and the Elbe. Now England had at that time the great armament which went to Walcheren, the army under Wellington in the Peninsula, and that under Sir John Stuart in Sicily, that is to say, she had about 80,000 or 90,000 men disposable; and yet, so contriving were the ministers, that they kept Wellington too weak in Spain, Stuart too strong in Sicily; and instead of acting in the north of Germany where such a great combination awaited them, they sent their most powerful force to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, where the only diversion they caused was the bringing together a few thousand national guards from the nearest French departments. And this the reviewer calls "*the forming a combination of those states in Europe which still retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist the ambition of a conqueror.*" What a profound, modest, and, to use a *Morning Post* compound, not-at-all-a-flagitious writer this reviewer is.

Well, notwithstanding this grand "*combination,*" things did not turn out well. The Austrians changed their first plan of campaign in several particulars. Napoleon suddenly and unexpectedly appeared at the head of his army, which, greatly inferior in number, and composed principally of German contingents, was not very well disposed towards him; and yet, such was the stupendous power of this man's genius and bravery, he in a few days by a series of movements unequalled in skill by any movement known in military records, broke through the Austrian power, separated her armies, drove them in disorder before him, and seized Vienna; and but for an accident, one of those minor accidents so frequent in war, which enabled the Archduke Charles to escape over the Danube at Ratisbon, he would have terminated this gigantic contest in 10 days. The failure there led to the battle of Esling, where the sudden swell of the Danube again baffled him and produced another crisis, which might have been turned to his hurt if the English army had been in the north of Germany; but it was then perishing amongst the stagnant ditches of Walcheren, and the only combination of the English ministers to be discovered was a combination of folly, arrogance, and conceit. I have now done with the *Review*. Had all the objections contained in it been true, it would have evinced the petty industry of a malicious mind more than any just or generous interest in the cause of truth; but being, as I have demonstrated, false even in the minutest particular, I justly stigmatize it as remarkable only for malignant imbecility and systematic violation of truth.

The reviewers having asserted that I picked out of Foy's history the charge against Lord Melville of saying "the worst men made the best soldiers," I replied that I drew for it on my own clear recollection of the fact.

Since then a friend has sent me the report of Lord Melville's speech, extracted from the "Annual Register" (Baldwin's) 1808, p. 112, and the following passage extracted from his lordship's speech bears out my assertion and proves the effrontery with which the reviewers deny facts.

"What was meant by a better sort of men? Was it that they should be taller or shorter, broader or thinner? This might be intelligible, but it was not the fact. The men that had hitherto formed the British armies were men of stout hearts and habits; men of spirit and courage; lovers of bold enterprise. These were the materials of which an army must be composed. Give him such men though not of the better description. *The worse men were the fittest for soldiers.* Keep the better sort at home."

HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER I.

GREAT and surprising as the winter campaign had been, its importance was not understood, and therefore not duly appreciated by the English ministers. But the French generals saw with anxiety that Lord Wellington, having snapped the heavy links of the chain which bound him to Lisbon, had acquired new bases of operation on the Guadiana, the Agueda, and the Douro, that he could now choose his own field of battle, and Spain would feel the tread of his conquering soldiers. Those soldiers, with the confidence inspired by repeated successes, only demanded to be led forward, but their general had still to encounter political obstacles, raised by the governments he served.

In Spain, the leading men, neglecting the war at hand, were entirely occupied with intrigues, with the pernicious project of reducing their revolted colonies, or with their new constitution. In Portugal, and in the Brazils, a jealous opposition to the general on the part of the native authorities had kept pace with the military successes. In England the cabinet, swayed by Mr. Perceval's narrow policy, was still vacillating between its desire to conquer and its fear of the expense. There also the Whigs, greedy of office and dexterous in parliamentary politics, deafened the country with their clamours, while the people, deceived by both parties as to the nature of the war, and wondering how the French should keep the field at all, were, in common with the ministers, still doubtful, if their commander was truly a great man or an impostor.

The struggle in the British cabinet having ended with the resignation of Lord Wellesley, the consequent predominance of the Perceval faction left small hopes of a successful termination to the contest in the Peninsula. Wellington had, however, carefully abstained from political intrigues, and his brother's retirement, although a subject of regret, did not affect his own personal position; he was the General of England, untrammelled, undegraded by factious ties, and responsible to his country only for his actions. The ministers might, he said, relinquish or continue the war, they might supply his wants, or defraud the hopes of the nation by their timorous economy, his efforts must be proportioned to his means; if the latter were great, so would be his actions, under any circumstances he would do his best, yet he was well assured the people of England would not endure to forego triumph at the call of a niggard parsimony. It was in this temper that he had undertaken the siege of Badajos, in this temper he had stormed it, and meanwhile political affairs in England were brought to a crisis.

Lord Wellesley had made no secret of Mr. Perceval's mismanagement of the war, and the public mind being unsettled, the Whigs were invited by the Prince Regent, his year of restrictions having now expired, to join a new administration. But the heads of that faction would not share with Mr. Perceval, and he, master of the secrets relating to the detestable persecution of the Princess of Wales, was too

powerful to be removed. However, on the 11th of May, Perceval was killed in the House of Commons, and this act, which was a horrible crime, but politically no misfortune either to England or the Peninsula, produced other negotiations, upon a more enlarged scheme with regard both to parties and to the system of government. Personal feelings again prevailed. Lord Liverpool would not unite with Lord Wellesley, the Grey and Grenville faction would not serve their country without having the disposal of all the household offices, and Lord Moira, judging a discourtesy to the Prince Regent too high a price to pay for their adhesion, refused that condition. The materials of a new cabinet were therefore drawn from the dregs of the Tory faction, and Lord Liverpool became Prime Minister.

It was unfortunate that a man of Lord Wellesley's vigorous talent should have been rejected for Lord Liverpool, but this remnant of a party being too weak to domineer, proved less mischievous with respect to the Peninsula than any of the preceding governments. There was no direct personal interest opposed to Lord Wellington's wishes, and the military policy of the cabinet, yielding by degrees to the attraction of his ascending genius, was finally absorbed in its meridian splendour. Many practical improvements had also been growing up in the official departments, especially in that of war and colonies, where Colonel Bunbury, the under-secretary, a man experienced in the wants of an army on service, had reformed the incredible disorders which pervaded that department during the first years of the contest. The result of the political crisis was therefore comparatively favourable to the war in the Peninsula, the story of which shall now be resumed.

It has been shown how the danger of Galicia, and the negligence of the Portuguese and Spanish authorities with reference to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, stopped the invasion of Andalusia, and brought the allies back to Beira. But if Wellington, pursuing his first plan, had overthrown Soult on the banks of the Guadalquivir and destroyed the French arsenal at Seville, his campaign would have ranked amongst the most hardy and glorious that ever graced a general; and it is no slight proof of the uncertainty of war, that combinations, so extensive and judicious, should have been marred by the negligence of a few secondary authorities, at points distant from the immediate scenes of action. The English general had, indeed, under-estimated the force opposed to him, both in the north and south; but the bravery of the allied troops, aided by the moral power of their recent successes, would have borne that error, and in all other particulars his profound military judgment was manifest.

Yet to obtain a true notion of his views, the various operations which he had foreseen and provided against must be considered, inasmuch as they show the actual resources of the allies, the difficulty of bringing them to bear with due concert, and the propriety of looking to the general state of the war, previous to each of Wellington's great movements. For his calculations were constantly dependent upon the ill-judged operations of men, over whom he had little influence, and his successes, sudden, accidental, snatched from the midst of conflicting political circumstances, were as gems brought up from the turbulence of a whirlpool.

Castañas was captain-general of Galicia, as well as of Estremadura, and when Ciudad Rodrigo fell, Lord Wellesley, expecting from his friendly feeling some efficient aid, had counselled him upon all the probable movements of the enemy during the siege of Badajos.

First. He supposed Marmont might march into Estremadura, either with or without the divisions of Souham and Bonnet. In either case, he advised that Abadia should enter Leon, and, according to his means, attack Astorga, Benavente, Zamora, and the other posts fortified by the enemy in that kingdom; and that Carlos d'España, Sanches, Saornil, in fine all the Partidas in Castile and the Asturias, and even Mendizabel, who was then in the Montaña St. Ander, should come to Abadia's assistance. He promised also that the regular Portuguese cavalry, under Silveira and Bacellar, should pass the Spanish frontier. Thus a force of not less than 25,000 men would have been put in motion on the rear of Marmont, and a most powerful diversion effected in aid of the siege of Badajos and the invasion of Andalusia.

The next operation considered, was that of an invasion of Galicia, by five

divisions of the army of Portugal, the three other divisions, and the cavalry, then in the valley of the Tagus and about Bejar, being left to contend, in concert with Soult, for Badajos. To help Abadia to meet such an attack, Bacella and Silveira had orders to harass the left flank and rear of the French, with both infantry and cavalry, as much as the nature of the case would admit, regard being had to the safety of their raw militia, and to their connection with the right flank of the Gallician army, whose retreat was to be by Orense.

Thirdly. The French might invade Portugal north of the Douro. Abadia was then to harass their right flank and rear, while the Portuguese opposed them in front; and whether they fell on Galicia or Portugal, or Estremadura, Carlos d'España, and the Partidas, and Mendizabel, would have an open field in Leon and Castile.

Lastly, the operation which really happened was considered, and to meet it Lord Wellington's arrangements were, as we have seen, calculated to cover the magazines on the Douro, and the Mondego, and to force the enemy to take the barren difficult line of country, through Lower Beira, towards Castelo Branco, while Abadia and the Guerilla chiefs entered Castile and Leon on his rear, Carlos d'España had also been ordered to break down the bridges on the Yeltes, and the Huebra, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, and that of Barba de Puerco on the Agueda to the left of that fortress. Marmont would thus have been delayed two days, and the magazines both at Castelo Branco and Celorico saved by the near approach of the allied army.

España did none of these things, neither did Abadia nor Mendizabel operate in a manner to be felt by the enemy, and their remissness, added to the other faults noticed in former observations, entirely marred Wellington's defensive plan in the north, and brought him back to fight Marmont. And when that general had passed the Agueda in retreat, the allied army wanting the provisions which had been so foolishly sacrificed at Castelo Branco, was unable to follow; the distant magazines on the Douro and the Mondego were its only resource; then also it was found that Ciudad and Almeida were in want, and before those places could be furnished, and the intermediate magazines on the lines of communication restored, it was too late to march against Andalusia. For the harvest, which ripens the beginning of June in that province, and a fortnight later in Estremadura, would have enabled the army of Portugal to follow the allies march by march.

Now Marmont, as Napoleon repeatedly told him, had only to watch Lord Wellington's movements, and a temporary absence from Castile would have cost him nothing of any consequence, because the army of the north would have protected the great communication with France. The advantages of greater means, and better arrangements for supply, on which Wellington had calculated, would thus have been lost, and moreover, the discontented state of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the approach of a new battering train from France, rendered it dangerous to move far from that fortress. The invasion of Andalusia, judicious in April, would in the latter end of May have been a false movement; and the more so that Castaños having, like his predecessors, failed to bring forward the Gallician army, it was again made painfully evident, that in critical circumstances no aid could be obtained from that quarter.

Such being the impediments to an invasion of Andalusia, it behoved the English general to adopt some other scheme of offence more suitable to the altered state of affairs. He considered that as the harvest in Leon and Castile, that is to say, in the districts north of the Gredos and Gata mountains, was much later than in Estremadura and Andalusia, he should be enabled to preserve his commissariat advantages over the French in the field for a longer period in the north than in the south. And if he could strike a decisive blow against Marmont, he would relieve Andalusia as securely as by a direct attack, because Madrid would then fall, and Soult, being thus cut off from his communications with France, would fear to be hemmed in on all sides. Wherefore to make the Duke of Ragusa fight a great battle, to calculate the chances, and prepare the means of success, became the immediate objects of Lord Wellington's thoughts.

The French general might be forced to fight by a vigorous advance into Castile,


but a happy result depended upon the relative skill of the generals, the number and goodness of the troops. Marmont's reputation was great, yet hitherto the essays had been in favour of the Englishman's talents. The British infantry was excellent, the cavalry well horsed, and more numerous than it had ever been. The French cavalry had been greatly reduced by drafts made for the Russian contest, by the separation of the army of the north from that of Portugal, and by frequent and harassing marches. Marmont could indeed be reinforced with horsemen from the army of the centre, and from the army of the north, but his own cavalry was weak, and his artillery badly horsed, whereas the allies' guns were well and powerfully equipped. Every man in the British army expected victory, and this was the time to seek it, because, without pitched battles the French could never be dispossessed of Spain, and they were now comparatively weaker than they had yet been, or were expected to be; for such was the influence of Napoleon's stupendous genius, that his complete success in Russia, and return to the Peninsula with overwhelming forces, was not doubted even by the British commander. The time, therefore, being propitious, and the chances favourable, it remained only to combine the primary and secondary operations in such a manner, that the French army of Portugal, should find itself isolated for so long as would enable the allies to force it singly into a general action. If the combinations failed to obtain that great result, the march of the French succouring corps, would nevertheless relieve various parts of Spain, giving fresh opportunities to the Spaniards to raise new obstacles, and it is never to be lost sight of, that this principle was always the base of Wellington's plans. Ever, while he could secure his final retreat into the strongholds of Portugal without a defeat, offensive operations, beyond the frontiers, could not fail to hurt the French.

To effect the isolating of Marmont's army, the first condition was to be as early in the field as the rainy season would permit, and before the coming harvest enabled the other French armies to move in large bodies. But Marmont could avail himself, successively, of the lines of the Tormes and the Douro to protract the campaign until the ripening of the harvest enabled reinforcements to join him, and hence the security of the allies' flanks and rear during the operations, and of their retreat, if overpowered, was to be previously looked to. Soult, burning to revenge the loss of Badajos, might attack Hill with superior numbers, or detach a force across the Tagus, which, in conjunction with the army of the centre, now directed by Jourdan, could advance upon Portugal by the valley of the Tagus, and so turn the right flank of the allied army in Castile. Boats and magazines, supplied from Toledo and Madrid, were already being collected at the fort of Lugar Nueva, near Almaraz, and from hence, as from a place of arms, the French could move upon Coria, Placencia, and Castelo Branco, menacing Abrantes, Celorico, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida, while detachments from the army of the north reinforced the army of Portugal. But to obviate this last danger Wellington had planned one of those enterprises, which as they are successful, principally because of their exceeding boldness, are beheld with astonishment when achieved, and are attributed to madness when they fail.

SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ.

For a clear understanding of this event, the reader must call to mind, 1st, that the left bank of the Tagus, from Toledo to Almaraz, is lined with rugged mountains, the ways through which, impracticable for an army, are difficult even for small divisions; 2nd, that from Almaraz to the frontier of Portugal, the banks, although more open, were still difficult, and the Tagus was only to be crossed at certain points, to which bad roads leading through the mountains descended. But from Almaraz to Alcantara, all the bridges had been long ruined, and those of Arzobispo and Talavera, situated between Almaraz and Toledo, were of little value, because of the ruggedness of the mountains above spoken of. Soult's pontoon equipage had been captured in Badajos, and the only means of crossing the Tagus, possessed by the French, from Toledo to the frontier of Portugal, was a boat-bridge laid down at Almaraz by Marmont, and to secure which he had constructed three strong forts and a bridge-head.

The first of these forts, called Ragusa, was a magazine, containing many stores



Explanatory Sketch
of the
SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ,
May, 1812:
The Scene of Action Enlarged.

and provisions, and it was, although not finished, exceedingly strong, having a loopholed stone tower, 25 feet high within, and being flanked without by a field-work near the bridge.

On the left bank of the Tagus the bridge had a fortified head of masonry, which was again flanked by a redoubt, called Fort Napoleon, placed on a height a little in advance. This redoubt, though imperfectly constructed, inasmuch as a wide berm, in the middle of the scarp, offered a landing place to troops escalading the rampart, was yet strong because it contained a second interior defence or retrenchment, with a loopholed stone tower, a ditch, drawbridge, and palisades.

These two forts, and the bridge-head, were armed with 18 guns, and they were garrisoned by above a thousand men, which seemed sufficient to insure the command of the river; but the mountains on the left bank still precluded the passage of an army towards Lower Estremadura, save by the royal road to Truxillo, which road, at the distance of five miles from the river, passed over the rugged Mirabete ridge, and to secure the summit of the mountain the French had drawn another line of works, across the throat of the pass. This line consisted of a large fortified house, connected by smaller posts, with the ancient watch-tower of Mirabete, which itself contained eight guns, and was surrounded by a rampart 12 feet high.

If all these works and a road, which Marmont, following the traces of an ancient Roman way, was now opening across the Gredos mountains had been finished, the communication of the French, although circuitous, would have been very good and secure. Indeed, Wellington fearing the accomplishment, intended to have surprised the French at Almaraz previous to the siege of Badajos, when the redoubts were far from complete, but the Portuguese government neglected to furnish the means of transporting the artillery from Lisbon, and he was baffled. General Hill was now ordered to attempt it with a force of 6000 men, including 400 cavalry, two field brigades of artillery, a pontoon equipage, and a battering train of six iron 24-pound howitzers.

The enterprise, at all times difficult, was become one of extreme delicacy. When the army was near Badajos, only the resistance of the forts themselves was to be looked for; now Foy's division of the army of Portugal had returned to the valley of the Tagus, and was in no manner fettered, and d'Armagnac, with troops from the army of the centre, occupied Talavera. Drouet also was, with 8000 or 9000 men of the army of the south, at Hinojosa de Cordoba, his cavalry was on the road to Medellin, he was nearer to Merida than Hill was to Almaraz, he might intercept the latter's retreat, and the king's orders were imperative that he should hang upon the English army in Estremadura. Soult could also detach a corps from Seville by St. Ollaia to fall upon Sir William Erskine, who was posted with the cavalry and the remainder of Hill's infantry, near Almendralejo. However, Lord Wellington placed General Graham near Portalegre, with the 1st and 6th divisions, and Cotton's cavalry, all of which had crossed the Tagus for the occasion, and thus, including Erskine's corps, above 20,000 men were ready to protect Hill's enterprise.

Drouet by a rapid march might still interpose between Hill and Erskine, and beat them in detail before Graham could support them, wherefore the English general made many other arrangements to deceive the enemy. First, he chose the moment of action when Soult, having sent detachments in various directions, to restore his communications in Andalusia, had marched himself with a division to Cadiz, and was consequently unfavourably placed for a sudden movement. Secondly, by rumours adroitly spread, and by demonstrations with the Portuguese militia of the Alentejo, he caused the French to believe that 10,000 men were moving down the Guadiana, towards the Niebla, preparatory to the invasion of Andalusia, a notion upheld by the assembling of so many troops under Graham, by the pushing of cavalry parties towards the Morena, and by restoring the bridge at Merida, with the avowed intention of sending Hill's battering and pontoon train, which had been formed at Elvas, to Almendralejo. Finally, many exploring officers, taking the roads leading to the province of Cordoba, made ostentatious inquiries about the French posts at Belalcazar and other places, and thus everything seemed to point at Andalusia.

The restoration of the bridge at Merida proving unexpectedly difficult, cost a fortnight's labour, for two arches having been destroyed, the opening was above 60 feet wide, and large timber was scarce. Hill's march was thus dangerously delayed, but on the 12th of May, the repairs being effected and all else being ready, he quitted Almendralejo, passed the Guadiana, at Merida, with near 6000 men and 12 field-pieces, and joined his pontoons and battering-train. These last had come by the way of Montijo, and formed a considerable convoy, nearly 50 country carts, besides the guns and limber carriages, being employed to convey the pontoons, the ladders, and the ammunition for the howitzers.

The 13th the armament reached the Burdalo river on the road to Truxillo ; the 14th it was at Villa Mesias ; the 15th at Truxillo. Meanwhile, to mislead the enemy on the right bank of the Tagus, the guerillas of the Guadalupe mountains made demonstrations at different points between Almaraz and Arzobispo, as if they were seeking a place to cast a bridge that Hill might join Lord Wellington. General Foy was deceived by these operations, and though his spies at Truxillo had early informed him of the passage of the Guadiana by the allies, they led him to believe that Hill had 15,000 men, and that two brigades of cavalry were following in his rear ; one report even stated that 30,000 men had entered Truxillo, whereas there were less than 6000 of all arms.

Hill having reached Jaraicejo early on the 16th, formed his troops in three columns, and made a night march, intending to attack by surprise and at the same moment, the tower of Mirabete, the fortified house in the pass, and the forts at the bridge of Almaraz. The left column, directed against the tower, was commanded by General Chowne. The centre column, with the dragoons and the artillery, moved by the royal road, under the command of General Long. The right column, composed of the 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments, under the direction of Hill in person, was intended to penetrate by the narrow and difficult way of La Cueva and Roman Gordo, against the forts at the bridge. But the day broke, before any of the columns reached their destination, and all hopes of a surprise were extinguished. This untoward beginning was unavoidable on the part of the right and centre column, because of the bad roads ; but it would appear that some negligence had retarded General Chowne's column, and that the castle of Mirabete might have been carried by assault before daylight.

The difficulty, great before, was now much increased. An attentive examination of the French defences convinced Hill that to reduce the works in the pass, he must incur more loss than was justifiable, and finish in such plight that he could not afterwards carry the forts at the bridge, which were the chief objects of his expedition. Yet it was only through the pass of Mirabete that the artillery could move against the bridge. In this dilemma, after losing the 17th and part of the 18th in fruitless attempts to discover some opening through which to reach the valley of Almaraz with his guns, he resolved to leave them on the Sierra with the centre column, and to make a false attack upon the tower with General Chowne's troops, while he himself, with the right column, secretly penetrated by the scarcely practicable line of La Cueva and Roman Gordo to the bridge, intent, with infantry alone, to storm works which were defended by 18 pieces of artillery and powerful garrisons.

This resolution was even more hardy and bold than it appears, without a reference to the general state of affairs. Hill's march had been one of secrecy, amidst various divisions of the enemy ; he was four days' journey distant from Merida, which was his first point of retreat ; he expected that Drouet would be reinforced, and advance towards Medellin, and hence, whether defeated or victorious at Almaraz, that his own retreat would be very dangerous ; exceedingly so if defeated, because his fine British troops could not be repulsed with a small loss, and he should have to fall back through a difficult country, with his best soldiers dispirited by failure, and burthened with numbers of wounded men. Then, harassed on one side by Drouet, pursued by Foy and D'Armagnac on the other, he would have been exposed to the greatest misfortunes, every slanderous tongue would have been let loose on the rashness of attacking impregnable forts, and a military career, hitherto so glorious, might have terminated in shame. But General Hill, being totally devoid of interested ambition, was necessarily unshaken by such fears.

The troops remained concealed in their position until the evening of the 18th, and then the general, reinforcing his own column with the 6th Portuguese regiment, a company of the 60th rifles, and the artillerymen of the centre column, commenced the descent of the valley. His design was to storm Fort Napoleon before daylight, and the march was less than six miles, but his utmost efforts could only bring the head of the troops to the fort a little before daylight; the rear was still distant, and it was doubtful if the scaling-ladders, which had been cut in halves to thread the short narrow turns in the precipitous descent, would serve for an assault. Fortunately some small hills concealed the head of the column from the enemy, and at that moment General Chowne commenced the false attack on the castle of Mirabete. Pillows of white smoke rose on the lofty brow of the Sierra, the heavy sound of artillery came rolling over the valley, and the garrison of Fort Napoleon, crowding on the ramparts, were anxiously gazing at these portentous signs of war, when, quick and loud, a British shout broke on their ears, and the gallant 50th regiment, aided by a wing of the 71st, came bounding over the nearest hills.

The French were surprised to see an enemy so close while the Mirabete was still defended, yet they were not unprepared, for a patrol of English cavalry had been seen from the fort on the 17th in the pass of Roman Gordo; and in the evening of the 18th a woman of that village had carried very exact information of Hill's numbers and intentions to Lugar Nueva. This intelligence had caused the commandant, Aubert, to march in the night with reinforcements to Fort Napoleon, which was therefore defended by six companies, including the 39th French and the voltigeurs of a foreign regiment. These troops were ready to fight, and when the first shout was heard, turning their heads, they, with a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, smote the assailants in front, while the guns of Fort Ragusa took them in flank from the opposite side of the river; in a few moments, however, a rise of ground, at the distance of only 20 yards from the ramparts, covered the British from the front fire, and General Howard, in person, leading the foremost troops into the ditch, commenced the escalade. The great breadth of the berm kept off the ends of the shortened ladders from the parapet, but the soldiers who first ascended, jumped on to the berm itself, and drawing up the ladders planted them there, and thus, with a second escalade, forced their way over the rampart; then, closely fighting, friends and enemies went together into the retrenchment round the stone tower. Colonel Aubert was wounded and taken; the tower was not defended, and the garrison fled towards the bridge-head; but the victorious troops would not be shaken off, and entered that work also in one confused mass with the fugitives, who continued their fight over the bridge itself. Still the British soldiers pushed their headlong charge, slaying the hindmost, and they would have passed the river if some of the boats had not been destroyed by stray shots from the forts, which were now sharply cannonading each other, for the artillerymen had turned the guns of Fort Napoleon on Fort Ragusa.

Many of the French leaped into the water and were drowned, but the greatest part were made prisoners, and to the amazement of the conquerors, the panic spread to the other side of the river; the garrison of Fort Ragusa, although perfectly safe, abandoned that fort also and fled with the others along the road to Naval Moral. Some grenadiers of the 92nd immediately swam over and brought back several boats, with which the bridge was restored, and Fort Ragusa was gained. The towers and other works were then destroyed, the stores, ammunition, provisions, and boats were burned in the course of the day, and in the night the troops returned to the Sierra above, carrying with them the colours of the foreign regiment, and more than 250 prisoners, including a commandant and 16 other officers. The whole loss on the part of the British was about 180 men, and one officer of artillery was killed by his own mine, placed for the destruction of the tower; but the only officer slain in the actual assault was Captain Candler, a brave man, who fell while leading the grenadiers of the 50th on to the rampart of Fort Napoleon.

This daring attack was executed with a decision similar to that with which it had been planned. The first intention of General Hill was, to have directed a part of his column against the bridge-head, and so to have assailed both works together, but when the difficulties of the road marred this project, he attacked the nearest

work with the leading troops, leaving the rear to follow as it could. This rapidity was an essential cause of the success, for Foy hearing on the 17th that the allies were at Truxillo, had ordered D'Armagnac to reinforce Lugar Nueva with a battalion, which being at Naval Moral the 18th, might have entered Fort Ragusa early in the morning of the 19th; but instead of marching before daybreak, this battalion did not move until eleven o'clock, and meeting the fugitives on the road, caught the panic and returned.

The works at Mirabete being now cut off from the right bank of the Tagus, General Hill was preparing to reduce them with his heavy artillery, when a report from Sir William Erskine, caused him, in conformity with his instructions, to commence a retreat on Merida, leaving Mirabete blockaded by the guerillas of the neighbourhood. It appeared that Soult, being at Chiclana, heard of the allies' march the 19th, and then only desired Drouet to make a diversion in Estremadura without losing his communication with Andalusia; for he did not perceive the true object of the enterprise, and thinking he had to check a movement, which the king told him was made for the purpose of reinforcing Wellington in the north, resolved to enforce Hill's stay in Estremadura. In this view he recalled his own detachments from the Niebla, where they had just dispersed a body of Spaniards at Castillejos, and then forming a large division at Seville, he purposed to strengthen Drouet and enable him to fight a battle. But that general, anticipating his orders, had pushed an advanced guard of 4000 men to Dom Benito the 17th, and his cavalry patrols passing the Guadiana on the 18th had scoured the roads to Majadas and Merida, while Lallemand's dragoons drove back the British outposts from Ribera, on the side of Zafra.

Confused by these demonstrations, Sir William Erskine immediately reported to Graham, and to Hill, that Soult himself was in Estremadura with his whole army, whereupon Graham came up to Badajos, and Hill, fearful of being cut off, retired, as I have said, from Mirabete on the 21st, and on the 26th reached Merida unmolested. Drouet then withdrew his advanced guards, and Graham returned to Castello de Vide. Notwithstanding this error Wellington's precautions succeeded, for if Drouet had been aware of Hill's real object, instead of making demonstrations with a part of his force, he would with the whole of his troops, more than 10,000, have marched rapidly from Medellin to fall on the allies as they issued out of the passes of Truxillo, and before Erskine or Graham could come to their aid; whereas, acting on the supposition that the intention was to cross the Tagus, his demonstrations merely hastened the retreat, and saved Mirabete. To meet Hill in the right place would, however, have required very nice arrangements and great activity, as he could have made his retreat by the road of Caceres as well as by that of Merida.

Lord Wellington was greatly displeased that this false alarm, given by Erskine, should have rendered the success incomplete; yet he avoided any public expression of discontent, lest the enemy, who had no apparent interest in preserving the post of Mirabete, should be led to keep it, and so embarrass the allies when their operations required a restoration of the bridge of Almaraz. To the ministers however, he complained, that his generals, stout in action, personally, as the poorest soldiers, were commonly so overwhelmed with the fear of responsibility when left to themselves, that the slightest movement of the enemy deprived them of their judgment, and they spread unnecessary alarm far and wide. But instead of expressing his surprise, he should rather have reflected on the cause of this weakness. Every British officer of rank knew, that without powerful interest, his future prospects, and his reputation for past services, would have withered together under the first blight of misfortune; that a selfish government would instantly offer him up, a victim to a misjudging public and a ribald press with whom success is the only criterion of merit. English generals are and must be prodigal of their blood to gain a reputation, but they are necessarily timid in command, when a single failure, even without a fault, consigns them to an old age of shame and misery. It is, however, undeniable that Sir William Erskine was not an able officer.

On the other side the king was equally discontented with Soult, whose refusal to reinforce Drouet, he thought had caused the loss of Almaraz, and he affirmed that

if Hill had been more enterprising, the arsenal of Madrid might have fallen as well as the depôt of Almaraz, for he thought that general had brought up his whole corps instead of a division only 6000 strong.

CHAPTER II.

WHILE the Anglo-British army was thus cleansing and strengthening its position on the frontier of Portugal, the progress of the war in other parts had not been so favourable to the common cause. It has already been shown that Galicia, in the latter part of 1811, suffered from discord, poverty, and ill success in the field; that an extraordinary contribution imposed upon the province, had been resisted by all classes, and especially at Coruña, the seat of Government; finally that the army, torn by faction, was become hateful to the people. In this state of affairs Castaños having, at the desire of Lord Wellington, assumed the command, removed the seat of government to St. Jago, leaving the troops in the Bierzo under the Marquis of Portazgo.

Prudent conduct and the personal influence of the new captain-general soothed the bitterness of faction, and stopped, or at least checked for the moment, many of the growing evils in Galicia, and the regency at Cadiz assigned an army of 60,000 men for that province. But the revenues were insufficient even to put the few troops already under arms in motion, and Castaños, although desirous to menace Astorga while Marmont was on the Agueda, could not, out of 22,000 men, bring even one division into the field. Nevertheless, so strange a people are the Spaniards, that a second expedition against the colonies, having with it all the field artillery just supplied by England, would have sailed from Vigo but for the prompt interference of Sir Howard Douglas.

When Castaños saw the penury of his army, he as usual looked to England for succour, at the same time, however, both he and the Junta made unusual exertions to equip their troops, and the condition of the soldiers was generally ameliorated. But it was upon the efforts of the *Partidas* that the British agent chiefly relied. His system, with respect to those bodies, has been before described, and it is certain that under it, greater activity, more perfect combination, more useful and better timed exertions, had marked their conduct, and their efforts, directed to the proper objects, were kept in some subordination to the operations of the allies. This was, however, so distasteful to the regular officers, and to the predominant faction, always fearful of the priestly influence over the allies, that Sir Howard was offered the command of 6000 troops to detach him from the Guerilla system; and the *Partidas* of the northern provinces would now have been entirely suppressed, from mere jealousy, by the general government, if Lord Wellington and Sir H. Wellesley had not strenuously supported the views of Douglas which were based on the following state of affairs.

The French line of communication extending from Salamanca to Irun, was never safe while the Gallician and Asturian forces, the English squadrons, and the *Partidas* in the Montaña, in Biscay, in the Rioja, and in the mountains of Burgos and Leon, menaced it from both sides. The occupation of the Asturias, the constant presence of a division in the Montaña, the employment of a corps to threaten Galicia, and the great strength of the army of the north, were all necessary consequences of this weakness. But though the line of communication was thus laboriously maintained, the lines of correspondence, in this peculiar war of paramount importance, were, in despite of numerous fortified posts, very insecure, and Napoleon was always stimulating his generals to take advantage of each period of inactivity, on the part of the British army, to put down the *Partidas*. He observed, that without English succours they could not remain in arms, that the secret of their strength was to be found on the coast, and that all the points, which favoured any intercourse with vessels, should be fortified. And at this time so anxious was he for the security of his correspondence, that he desired, if necessary, the whole army of the north should be employed merely to scour the lines of communication.

In accordance with these views, Santona, the most important point on the coast, had been rendered a strong post in the summer of 1811, and then Castro, Porta-

galete at the mouth of the Bilbao river, Bermeo, Lesquito, and Guetaria, were by degrees fortified. This completed the line eastward from Santander to St. Sebastian, and all churches, convents, and strong houses, situated near the mouths of the creeks and rivers between those places were entrenched. The Partidas being thus constantly intercepted, while attempting to reach the coast, were nearly effaced in the latter end of 1811, and a considerable part of the army of the north was, in consequence, rendered disposable for the aid of the army of Portugal. But when Bonet, because of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, evacuated the Asturias, the French troops in the Montaña were again exposed to the enterprises of the seventh army, which had been immediately succoured by Douglas, and which, including guerillas, was said to be 23,000 strong. Wherefore Napoleon had so early as March directed that the Asturias should be re-occupied, and one of Bonet's brigades, attached to the army of the north, rejoined him in consequence; but the pass of Pajares being choked with snow, Bonet, who was then on the Orbijo, neglected this order until the approach of finer weather.

In May, Marmont having returned from Portugal, the emperor's order was reiterated, and the French troops on the Orbijo, being augmented to 15,000, drew the attention of the Gallicians to that quarter, while Bonet passing the mountains of Leon, with 8000 men, re-occupied Oviedo, Grado, and Gihon, and established small posts communicating through the town of Leon, with the army of Portugal. Thus a new military line was established which interrupted the Gallicians communications with the Partidas, the chain of seaport defences was continued to Gihon, a constant intercourse with France was maintained, and those convoys came safely by water, which otherwise would have had to travel by land escorted by many troops and in constant danger.

Meanwhile Marmont, having distributed his division in various parts of Leon, was harassed by the Partidas, especially Porlier's, yet he proceeded diligently with the fortifying of Toro and Zamora, on the Douro, and converted three large convents at Salamanca into so many forts capable of sustaining a regular siege; the works of Astorga and Leon were likewise improved, and strong posts were established at Benavente, La Baneza, Castro-Contrigo, and intermediate points. The defensive lines of the Tormes and the Douro were thus strengthened against the British general, and as 4000 men sufficed to keep the Gallician forces of the Bierzo and Puebla Senabria in check, the vast and fertile plains of Leon, called the *Tierras de Campos*, were secured for the French, and their detachments chased the bands from the open country.

Sir Howard Douglas observing the success of the enemy in cutting off the Partidas from the coast, and the advantage they derived from the water communication; considering also that, if Lord Wellington should make any progress in the coming campaign, new lines of communication with the sea would be desirable, proposed, that a powerful squadron with a battalion of marines and a battery of artillery, should be secretly prepared for a littoral warfare on the Biscay coast. This suggestion was approved of, and Sir Home Popham was sent from England, in May, with an armament, well provided with scaling ladders, arms, clothing, and ammunition for the Partidas, and all means to effect sudden disembarkations. But the ministers were never able to see the war in its true point of view, they were always desponding, or elated, and sanguine, beyond what reason warranted in either case. Popham was ordered not only to infest the coast, but if possible, to seize some point, and hold it permanently as an entrance into Biscay, by which the French positions might be turned, if, as in 1808, they were forced to adopt the line of the Ebro! Now at this period 300,000 French soldiers were in the Peninsula, 120,000 were in the northern provinces, and, without reckoning the army of the centre, which could also be turned in that direction, nearly 50,000 were expressly appropriated to the protection of this very line of communication, on which 1000 marines were to be permanently established, in expectation of the enemy being driven over the Ebro by a campaign which was not yet commenced!

While Marmont was in Beira, the activity of the seventh army, and of the Partidas, in the Montana, was revived by the supplies which Sir Howard Douglas, taking the opportunity of Bonet's absence, had transmitted to them through the

Asturian ports. The ferocity of the leaders was remarkable. Mina's conduct was said to be very revolting; and on the 16th of April the Curate Merino, coming from the mountains of Espinosa to the forests between Aranda de Duero and Hontoria Valdearados, took several hundred prisoners, and hanged 60 of them, in retaliation for three members of the local junta, who had been put to death by the French; he executed the others also in the proportion of 10 for each of his own soldiers who had been shot by the enemy. The ignorance and the excited passions of the guerilla chiefs, may be pleaded in mitigation of their proceedings; but to the disgrace of England, these infamous executions by Merino were recorded with complacency in the newspapers, and met with no public disapprobation.

There are occasions when retaliation, applied to men of rank, may stop the progress of barbarity, yet the necessity should be clearly shown, and the exercise restricted to such narrow limits, that no reasonable ground should be laid for counter retaliation. Here, 60 innocent persons were deliberately butchered to revenge the death of three, and no proof offered that even those three were slain contrary to the laws of war; and though it is not to be doubted that the French committed many atrocities, some in wantonness, some in revenge, such savage deeds as the curate's are inexcusable. What would have been said if Washington had hanged 20 English gentlemen of family, in return for the death of Captain Handy; or if Sir Henry Clinton had caused 20 American officers to die for the execution of André? Like atrocities are, however, the inevitable consequence of a guerilla system not subordinate to the regular government of armies, and ultimately they recoil upon the helpless people of the country, who cannot fly from their enemies. When the French occupied a district, famine often ensued, because to avoid distant forages they collected large stores of provisions from a small extent of country, and thus the guerilla system, while it harassed the French, without starving them, both harassed and starved the people. And many of the chiefs of bands, besides their robberies, when they dared not otherwise revenge affronts or private feuds, would slay some prisoners, or stragglers, so as to draw down the vengeance of the French on an obnoxious village, or district. This in return produced associations of the people for self defence in many places, by which the enemy profited.

Soon after this exploit a large convoy having marched from Burgos towards France, Merino endeavoured to intercept it, and Mendizabel, who, notwithstanding his defeat by Bonet, had again gathered 1200 cavalry, came from the Liebana, and occupied the heights above Burgos. The French immediately placed their baggage and followers in the castle, and recalled the convoy, whereupon the Spaniards, dispersing in bands, destroyed the fortified posts of correspondence, at Sasamon, and Gamonal, and then returned to the Liebana. But Bonet had now re-occupied the Asturias, the remnant of the Spanish force, in that quarter, fled to Mendizabel, and the whole shifted as they could in the hills. Meanwhile Mina displayed great energy. In February he repulsed an attack near Lodosa, and having conveyed the prisoners taken at Huesca to the coast, returned to Aragon and maintained a distant blockade of Zaragoza itself. In March he advanced, with a detachment, to Pina, and captured one of Suchet's convoys going to Mequinenza; but having retired with his booty to Robres, a village on the eastern slopes of the Sierra de Alcubierre, he was there betrayed to General Pannetier, who with a brigade of the army of the Ebro, came so suddenly upon him that he escaped death with great difficulty.

He reappeared in the Rioja, and although hotly chased by troops from the army of the north, escaped without much loss, and, having 5000 men, secretly gained the defiles of Navas Tolosa, behind Vittoria, where on the 7th of April, he defeated with great loss a Polish regiment, which was escorting the enormous convoy that had escaped the curate and Mendizabel at Burgos. The booty consisted of treasure, Spanish prisoners, baggage, followers of the army, and officers retiring to France. All the Spanish prisoners, 400 in number, were released and joined Mina, and, it is said, that one million of francs fell into his hands, besides the equipages, arms, stores, and a quantity of church plate.

On the 28th he captured another convoy going from Valencia to France, but General Abbé, who had been recently made governor of Navarre, now directed

combined movements from Pampeluna, Jacca, and Sangüesa, against him. And so vigorously did this general, who I have heard Mina declare to be the most formidable of all his opponents, urge on the operations, that after a series of actions, on the 25th, 26th, and 28th of May, the Spanish chief, in bad plight, and with the utmost difficulty, escaped by Los Arcos to Guardia, in the Rioja. Marshal Victor seized this opportunity to pass into France, with the remains of the convoy shattered on the 7th, and all the bands in the north were discouraged. However, Wellington's successes, and the confusion attending upon the departure of so many French troops for the Russian war, gave a powerful stimulus to the partisan chiefs in other directions. The Empecinado, ranging the mountains of Cuenca and Guadalaxara, pushed his parties close to Madrid; Duran entered Soria, and raised a contribution in the lower town; Villa Campa, Bassecour, and Montijo, coming from the mountains of Albarracin, occupied Molino and Orejuela, and invested Daroca; the Catalanian Gayan, taking post in the vicinity of Belchite, made excursions to the very gates of Zaragoza; the Frayle, haunting the mountains of Alcañiz and the Sierra de Gudar, interrupted Suchet's lines of communication by Morella and Teruel, and along the right bank of the Ebro towards Tortosa. Finally, Gay and Miralles infested the Garriga on the left bank.

It was to repress these bands that the army of the Ebro, containing 20,000 men, of whom more than 16,000 were under arms, was formed by drafts from Suchet's army, and given to General Reille. That commander immediately repaired to Lerida, occupied Upper Aragon with his own division, placed Severoli's division between Lerida and Zaragoza, and General Frere's between Lerida, Barcelona, and Taragona; but his fourth division, under Palombini, marched direct from Valencia towards the districts of Soria and Calatayud, to form the link of communication between Suchet and Caffarelli. The latter now commanded the army of the north, but the imperial guards, with the exception of one division, had quitted Spain, and hence, including the government's and the reserve of Monthion, this army was reduced to 48,000 under arms. The reserve at Bayonne was therefore increased to 5000 men, and Palombini was destined finally to reinforce Caffarelli, and even to march, if required, to the aid of Marmont in Leon. However, the events of the war soon caused Reille to repair to Navarre, and broke up the army of the Ebro, wherefore it will be clearer to trace the operations of these divisions successively and separately, and in the order of the provinces towards which they were first directed.

Palombini having left a brigade at the entrenched bridge of Teruel, relieved Daroca on the 23rd of February, and then deceiving Villa Campa, Montijo, and Bassecour, who were waiting about the passes of Toralva to fall on his rear-guard, turned them by the Xiloca, and reached Calatayud. This effected, he fortified the convent of La Peña, which, as its name signifies, was a rocky eminence, commanding that city and forming a part of it. But on the 4th of March, having placed his baggage and artillery in this post, under a guard of 300 men, he dispersed his troops to scour the country and to collect provisions, and the Partidas, seeing this, recommenced operations. Villa Campa cut off two companies at Campillo on the 8th, and made a fruitless attempt to destroy the Italian colonel, Pisa, at Ateca. Five hundred men were sent against him, but he drew them towards the mountains of Albarracin, and destroyed them at Pozonhonda on the 28th; then marching another way, he drove the Italians from their posts of communication as far as the town of Albarracin on the road to Teruel, nor did he regain the mountains until Palombini came up on his rear and killed some of his men. The Italian general then changing his plan, concentrated his division on the plains of Hused, where he suffered some privations, but remained unmolested until the 14th of April, when he again marched to co-operate with Suchet in a combined attempt to destroy Villa Campa. The Spanish chief evaded both by passing over to the southern slopes of the Albarracin mountains, and before the Italians could return to Hused, Gayan, in concert with the alcalde of Calatayud, had exploded a plot against the convent of La Peña.

Some of the Italian officers, including the commandant, having rashly accepted

an invitation to a feast, were sitting at table, when Gayan appeared on a neighbouring height; the guests were immediately seized, and many armed citizens ran up to surprise the convent, and 60 soldiers were made prisoners, or killed in the tumult below; but the historian, Vacani, who had declined to attend the feast, made a vigorous defence, and on the 1st of May General St. Pol and Colonel Schiazzetti, coming from Hused, and Daroca, raised the siege. Schiazzetti marched in pursuit, and as his advanced guard was surprised at Mochales by a deceit of the alcalde, he slew the latter, whereupon the Spaniards killed the officers taken at the feast of Calatayud.

Gayan soon baffled his pursuers, and then moved by Medina Celi and Soria to Navarre, thinking to surprise a money convoy going to Burgos for the army of Portugal, but being followed on one side by a detachment from Hused, and met on the other by Caffarelli, he was driven again to the hills above Daroca. Here he renewed his operations in concert with Villa Campa and the Empecinado, who came up to Medina Celi, while Duran descended from the Moncayo hills, and this menacing union of bands induced Reille, in May, to detach General Paris, with a French regiment and a troop of hussars, to the aid of Palombini. Paris moved by Calatayud, while Palombini, briskly interposing between Duran and Villa Campa, drove the one towards Albarracin and the other towards Soria; and in June, after various marches, the two French generals uniting, dislodged the Empecinado from Sigüenza, chasing him so sharply that his band dispersed and fled to the Sotosierra.

During these operations, Mina was pressed by Abbé, but Duran entering Tudela by surprise, destroyed the artillery park, and carried off a battering train of six guns. Palombini was only a few marches from Madrid, and the king, alarmed by Lord Wellington's preparations for opening the campaign, ordered him to join the army of the centre, but these orders were intercepted, and the Italian general retraced his steps, to pursue Duran. He soon recovered the guns taken at Tudela, and drove the Spanish chief through the Rioja into the mountains beyond the sources of the Duero; then collecting boats, he would have passed the Ebro, for Caffarelli was on the Arga, with a division of the army of the north, and a brigade had been sent by Reille to the Aragon river with the view of destroying Mina. This chief, already defeated by Abbé, was in great danger, when a duplicate of the king's orders having reached Palombini, he immediately recommenced his march for the capital, which saved Mina. Caffarelli returned to Vittoria, and the Italians reaching Madrid the 21st of July, became a part of the army of the centre, having marched 150 miles in seven days without a halt. Returning now to the other divisions of the army of the Ebro, it is to be observed, that their movements being chiefly directed against the Catalans, belong to the relation of that warfare.

OPERATIONS IN ARAGON AND CATALONIA.

After the battle of Altafulla, the fall of Peniscola, and the arrival of Reille's first division on the Ebro, Decaen, who had succeeded Macdonald in Upper Catalonia, spread his troops along the coast, with a view to cut off the communication between the British navy and the interior, where the Catalan army still held certain positions.

Lamarque, with a division of 5000 men, first seized and fortified Mataro, and then driving Milans from Blanes, occupied the intermediate space, while detachments from Barcelona fortified Moncada, Mongat, and Molino del Rey, thus securing the plain of Barcelona on every side.

The line from Blanes to Cadagués, including Canets, St. Filieu, Palamos, and other ports, was strengthened, and placed under General Bearman.

General Clement was posted in the vicinity of Girona, to guard the interior French line of march from Hostalrich to Figueras.

Tortosa, Mequinenza, and Taragona were garrisoned by detachments from Severoli's division, which was quartered between Zaragoza and Lerida, and in communication with Bourke's and Pannetier's brigades of the first division of the army of reserve.

General Frere's division was on the communication between Aragon and

Catalonia, and there was a division under General Quesnel, composed partly of national guards, in the Cerdaña. Finally there was a moveable reserve, of 6000 or 8000 men, with which Decaen himself marched from place to place as occasion required; but the supreme command of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia was with Suchet.

The Catalans still possessed the strongholds of Cardona, Busa, Sceu d'Urgèl, and the Medas islands, and they had 10,000 men in the field. Lacy was at Cardona with Sarzfield's division, and some irregular forces; Colonel Green was organizing an experimental corps at Montserrat, near which place Erolles was also quartered; Rovira continued about the mountains of Olot; Juan Claros, who occupied Arenis de Mar when the French were not there, was now about the mountains of Hostalrich; Milans, Manso, and the Brigand Gros, being driven from the coast line, kept the hills near Manreza; Gay and Miralles were on the Ebro. But the communication with the coast being cut off, all these chiefs were in want of provisions and stores, and the French were forming new roads along the sea line, beyond the reach of the English ship guns.

Lacy, thus debarred of all access to the coast, feeding his troops with difficulty, and having a great number of prisoners and deserters to maintain in Cardona and Busa, because Coupigny refused to receive them in the Balearic isles, Lacy, I say, disputing with the Junta and the generals, and abhorred by the people, in his spleen desired Captain Codrington to cannonade all the sea-coast towns in the possession of the French, saying he would give the inhabitants timely notice; but he did not do so, and when Codrington reluctantly opened his broadsides upon Mataro, many of the people were slain. The Catalans complained loudly of this cruel, injudicious operation, and hating Lacy, affected Erolles more than ever, and the former sent him with a few men to his native district of Talam, ostensibly to raise recruits, and make a diversion in Aragon, but really to deprive him of his division and reduce his power.

The distress in the Catalan army now became so great, that Sarzfield was about to force his way to the coast, and embark his division to commence a littoral warfare, when Erolles having quickly raised and armed a new division entered Aragon, whereupon Sarzfield followed him. The baron having entered the valley of Venasque, advanced to Graus, menacing all the district between Fraga and Huesca; but those places were occupied by detachments from Bourke's brigade of the army of the Ebro, and at this moment Severoli arrived from Valencia, whereupon the Spaniards, instead of falling back upon Venasque, retired up the valley of the Isabena, to some heights above Roda, a village on the confines of Aragon.

Erolles had not more than 1000 regular infantry, three guns, and 200 cavalry, for he had left 500 in the valley of Venasque, and Bourke knowing this, and encouraged by the vicinity of Severoli, followed hastily from Benavarre, with about 2000 men of all arms, thinking Erolles would not stand before him. But the latter's position, besides being very steep and rough in front, was secured on both flanks by precipices, beyond which, on the hills, all the Partidas of the vicinity were gathered; he expected aid also from Sarzfield, and was obliged to abide a battle or loose the detachment left in the valley of Venasque. Bourke, keeping two battalions in reserve, attacked with the third, but he met with a stubborn opposition, and after a long skirmish, in which he lost 150 men, and Erolles 200, was beaten, and being wounded himself, retreated to Monza, in great confusion. This combat was very honourable to Erolles, but it was exposed to doubt and ridicule, at the time, by the extravagance of his public despatch; for he affirmed that his soldiers, finding their muskets too hot, had made use of stones, and in this mixed mode of action had destroyed 1000 of the enemy!

Severoli now advanced, and Erolles being still unsupported by Sarzfield, retired to Talam, whereupon the Italian general returned to Aragon. Meanwhile Lacy, who had increased his forces, approached Cervera, while Sarzfield, accused by Erolles of having treacherously abandoned him, joined with Gay and Miralles, occupying the hills about Taragona, and straitening that place for provisions. Milans and Manso also uniting, captured a convoy at Arenis de Mar, and the English squadron intercepted several vessels going to Barcelona.

Decaen observing this fresh commotion came down from Gerona with his reserve. He relieved Taragona on the 28th of April, and then marched with 3000 men upon Lerida, but on the way, hearing that Sarzfield was at Fuentes Rubino, near Villa Franca, he took the road of Braffin and Santa Coloma instead of Momblanch, and suddenly turning to his right defeated the Spanish general, and then continued his march by Cervera towards Lerida. Lacy, in great alarm, immediately abandoned Lower Catalonia, and concentrated Manso's, Milans', Green's, and Sarzfield's divisions in the mountains of Olot, and as they were reduced in numbers he reinforced them with select Somatenes, called the Companies of Preferencia. After a time, however, seeing that Decaen remained near Lerida, he marched rapidly against the convent of Mataro, with 5000 men and with good hope, for the garrison consisted of only 500, the works were not strong, and Captain Codrington, who had anchored off Mataro at Lacy's desire, lent some ship guns; but his sailors were forced to drag them to the point of attack, because Lacy and Green had, in breach of their promise, neglected to provide means of transport.

The wall of the convent gave way in a few hours, but on the 5th, Lacy, hearing that Decaen was coming to succour the place, broke up the siege and buried the English guns without having any communication with Captain Codrington. The French found these guns and carried them into the convent, yet Lacy, to cover his misconduct, said in the official gazette, that they were safely re-embarked.

After this disreputable transaction, Manso, who alone had behaved well, retired with Milans to Vich. Lacy went to Cardona, the French sent a large convoy into Barcelona, and the men of Erolles' ancient division were, to his great discontent, turned over to Sarzfield, who took post near Molina del Rey, and remained there until the 5th of June, when a detachment from Barcelona drove him to the Campo de Taragona. On the 14th of the same month, Milans was defeated near Vich by a detachment from the 'Ampurdan, and being chased for several days suffered considerably. Lamarque followed Sarzfield into the Campo, and defeated him again on the 24th, near Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and this time the Spanish general was wounded, yet made his way by Santa Coloma de Querault and Calaf to Cardona, where he rejoined Lacy. Lamarque then joined Decaen in the plains of Lerida, where all the French moveable forces were now assembled, with a view to gather the harvest; a vital object to both parties, but it was attained by the French.

This with Lacy's flight from Mattaro, the several defeats of Milans and Sarzfield, and the discontent of Erolles, disturbed the whole principality; and the general disquietude was augmented by the increase of all the frauds and oppressions, which both the civil and military authorities, under Lacy, practised with impunity. Everywhere there was a disinclination to serve in the regular army. The Somatene argued, that while he should be an ill-used soldier, under a bad general, his family would either become the victims of French revenge or starve, because the pay of the regular troops was too scanty, were it even fairly issued, for his own subsistence; whereas, remaining at home, and keeping his arms, he could nourish his family by his labour, defend it from straggling plunderers, and at the same time always be ready to join the troops on great occasions. In some districts the people, seeing that the army could not protect them, refused to supply the Partidas with food, unless upon contract not to molest the French in their vicinity. The spirit of resistance would have entirely failed, if Lord Wellington's successes at Ciudad and Badajos, and the rumour that an English army was coming to Catalonia, had not sustained the hopes of the people.

Meanwhile the Partidas in the north, being aided by Popham's expedition, obliged Reille to remove to Navarre, that Caffarelli might turn his whole attention to the side of Biscay and the Montaña. Decaen then received charge of the Lower as well as of the Upper Catalonia, which weakened his position; and at the same time some confusion was produced, by the arrival of French prefects and councillors of state, to organize a civil administration. This measure, ostensibly to restrain military licentiousness, had probably the ultimate object of preparing Catalonia for a union with France, because the Catalans, who have peculiar

customs and a dialect of their own, scarcely call themselves Spaniards. Although these events embarrassed the French army, the progress of the invasion was visible in the altered feelings of the people, whose enthusiasm was stifled by the folly and corruption with which their leaders aided the active hostility of the French.

The troops were reduced in number, distressed for provisions, and the soldiers deserted to the enemy, a thing till then unheard of in Catalonia, nay, the junta having come down to the coast, were like to have been delivered up to the French, as a peace offering. The latter passed, even singly, from one part to the other, and the people of sea-coast towns readily trafficked with the garrison of Barcelona, when neither money nor threats could prevail on them to supply the British squadron. Claros and Milans were charged with conniving at this traffic, and of exacting money for the landing of corn, when their own people and soldiers were starving. But to such a degree was patriotism overlaid by the love of gain, that the colonial produce, seized in Barcelona and other parts, was sold, by the enemy, to French Merchants, and the latter undertook both to carry it off, and pay with provisions on the spot, which they successfully executed by means of Spanish vessels, corruptly licensed for the occasion by Catalan authorities.

Meanwhile the people generally accused the junta of extreme indolence, and Lacy, of treachery; and tyranny because of his arbitrary conduct in all things, but especially that, after proclaiming a general rising, he had disarmed the Somatenes, and suppressed the independent bands. He had quarrelled with the British naval officers, was the avowed enemy of Erolles, the secret calumniator of Sarzfield, and withal a man of no courage or enterprise in the field. Nor was the story of his previous life calculated to check the bad opinion generally entertained of him. It was said that, being originally a Spanish officer, he was banished, for an intrigue, to the Canaries, from whence he deserted to the French, and again deserted to his own countrymen, when the war of independence broke out.

Under this man, the frauds, which characterize the civil departments of all armies in the field, became destructive, and the extent of the mischief may be gathered from a single fact. Notwithstanding the enormous supplies granted by England, the Catalans paid nearly three millions sterling, for the expense of the war, besides contributions in kind, and yet their soldiers were always distressed for clothing, food, arms, and ammunition.

This amount of specie might excite doubt, were it not that here, as in Portugal, the quantity of coin accumulated from the expenditure of the armies and navies was immense. But gold is not always the synonyme of power in war, or of happiness in peace. Nothing could be more wretched than Catalonia. Individually the people were exposed to all the licentiousness of war, collectively to the robberies, and revenge, of both friends and enemies. When they attempted to supply the the British vessels, the French menaced them with death; when they yielded to such threats, the English ships menaced them with bombardment, and plunder. All the roads were infested with brigands, and in the hills large bands of people, whose families and property had been destroyed, watched for straggling Frenchmen and small escorts, not to make war but to live on the booty; when this resource failed they plundered their own countrymen. While the land was thus harassed, the sea swarmed with privateers of all nations, differing from pirates only in name; and that no link in the chain of infamy might be wanting, the merchants of Gibraltar, forced their smuggling trade at the ports, with a shameless disregard for the rights of the Spanish Government. Catalonia seemed like some huge carcass, on which all manner of ravenous beasts, all obscene birds, and all reptiles had gathered to feed.

CHAPTER III.

OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

SUCHET having recovered his health was again at the head of the troops, but the king's military authority was so irksome to him, that he despatched an officer to represent the inconvenience of it to the emperor, previous to that monarch's departure for Russia. The answer in some degree restored his independence; he

was desired to hold his troops concentrated, and move them in the manner most conducive to the interests of his own command. Hence, when Joseph, designing to act against Lord Wellington in Estremadura, demanded the aid of one division, Suchet replied that he must then evacuate Valencia ; and as the natural line of retreat for the French armies would, during the contemplated operations, be by the eastern provinces, it would be better to abandon Andalusia first ! An answer calculated to convince Joseph that his authority in the field was still but a name.

Suchet, from a natural disposition towards order, and because his revenue from the fishery of the Albufera depended upon the tranquillity of the province, took infinite pains to confirm his power ; and his mode of proceeding, at once prudent and firm, was wonderfully successful. Valencia, although one of the smallest provinces in Spain, and not naturally fertile, was from the industry of the inhabitants, one of the richest. Combining manufactures with agriculture, it possessed great resources, but they had been injured by the war, without having been applied to its exigencies ; and the people expected that a bloody vengeance would be taken for Calvo's murder of the French residents at the commencement of the contest. Their fears were soon allayed ; discipline was strictly preserved, and Suchet, having suppressed the taxes imposed by the Spanish government, substituted others, which, being more equal, were less onerous. To protect the people from oppression in the collection, he published in every corner his demands, authorizing resistance to contributions which were not named in his list and demanded by the proper officers ; and he employed the native authorities, as he had done in Aragon. Thus, all impolitic restrictions upon the industry and traffic of the country being removed, the people found the government of the invaders less oppressive than their own.

Napoleon, in expectation of Suchet's conquest, had however imposed a war contribution, as a punishment for the death of the French residents, so heavy, that his lieutenant imagined Valencia would be quite unable to raise the sum ; yet the emperor, who had calculated the Valencians' means by a comparison with those of Aragon, would not rescind the order. And so exact was his judgment, that Suchet, by accepting part payment in kind, and giving a discount for prompt liquidation, satisfied this impost in one year, without much difficulty, and the current expenses of the army were provided for besides ; yet neither did the people suffer as in other provinces, nor was their industry so cramped, nor their property so injured, as under their own government. Valencia therefore remained tranquil, and, by contrast, the mischief of negligence and disorder was made manifest.

The advantages derived from the conquest were even extended to the province of Aragon, and to the court of Joseph, for the contributions were diminished in the former, and large sums were remitted to the latter to meet Napoleon's grant of one-fifth of the war contributions in favour of the intrusive government. This prosperous state of French affairs in Valencia was established also in the face of an enemy daily increasing in strength. For the regent, Abispa, had given Blake's command to his own brother Joseph O'Donel, who collecting the remains of the armies of Murcia and Valencia, had raised new levies, and during Suchet's illness formed a fresh army of 12,000 or 14,000 men in the neighbourhood of Alicante. In the Balearic Isles also Roche and Whittingham's divisions were declared ready to take the field, and 1500 British troops, commanded by General Ross, arrived at Carthage. To avoid the fever there, these last remained on shipboard, and were thus more menacing to the enemy than on shore, because they seemed to be only awaiting the arrival of a new army, which the French knew to be coming from Sicily to the eastern coast of Spain. And as the descent of this army was the commencement of a remarkable episode in the history of the Peninsular War, it is proper to give an exact account of its origin and progress.

Sir John Stuart had been succeeded, in Sicily, by Lord William Bentinck, a man of resolution, capacity, and spirit, just in his actions, and abhorring oppression, but of a sanguine, impetuous disposition. Being resolved to ameliorate the condition of the Sicilian people, after surmounting many difficulties, he removed the queen from power, vested the direction of affairs in the crown prince, obtained

from the barons a renunciation of their feudal privileges, and caused a representative constitution to be proclaimed. Believing then that the court was submissive because it was silent ; that the barons would adhere to his system, because it gave them the useful power of legislation, in lieu of feudal privileges alloyed by ruinous expenses and the degradation of courtiers ; because it gave them the dignity of independence at the cost only of maintaining the rights of the people and restoring the honour of their country :—believing thus, he judged that the large British force hitherto kept in Sicily, as much to overawe the court as to oppose the enemy, might be dispensed with ; and that the expected improvement of the Sicilian army, and the attachment of the people to the new political system, would permit 10,000 men to be employed in aid of Lord Wellington, or in Italy. In January, therefore, he wrote of these projects to the English ministers, and sent his brother to Lord Wellington to consult upon the best mode of acting.

Such an opportune offer to create a diversion on the left flank of the French armies was eagerly accepted by Wellington, who immediately sent engineers, artificers, and a battering train complete, to aid the expected expedition. But Lord William Bentinck was soon made sensible that in large communities working constitutions are the offspring, and not the generators, of national feelings and habits. They cannot be built like cities in the desert, nor cast, as breakwaters, into the sea of public corruption, but gradually, and as the insect rocks come up from the depths of the ocean, they must arise, if they are to bear the storms of human passions.

The Sicilian court opposed Lord William with falsehood and intrigue, the constitution was secretly thwarted by the barons, the Neapolitan army, a body composed of foreigners of all nations, was diligently augmented, with a view to overawe both the English and the people ; the revenues and the subsidy were alike misapplied, and the native Sicilian army, despised and neglected, was incapable of service. Finally, instead of going to Spain himself, with 10,000 good troops, Lord William could only send a subordinate general with 6000—British, Germans, Calabrese, Swiss, and Sicilians; the British and Germans only being either morally or militarily well organized. To these, however, Roche's and Whittingham's levies, represented to be 12,000 or 14,000 strong, were added, the Spanish government having placed them at the disposition of General Maitland, the commander of the expedition. Thus, in May, 20,000 men were supposed ready for a descent on Catalonia, to which quarter Lord Wellington recommended they should proceed.

But now other objects were presented to Lord William Bentinck's sanguine mind. The Austrian government, while treating with Napoleon, was secretly encouraging insurrections in Italy, Croatia, Dalmatia, the Venetian states, the Tyrol, and Switzerland. English, as well as Austrian agents, were active to organize a vast conspiracy against the French emperor, and there was a desire, especially on the part of England, to create a kingdom for one of the Austrian archdukes. Murat was discontented with France, the Montenegrins were in arms on the Adriatic coast, and the prospect of a descent upon Italy, in unison with the wishes of the people, appeared so promising to Lord William Bentinck, that supposing himself to have a discretionary power, he stopped the expedition to Catalonia, reasoning thus :

"In Spain, only 6000 middling troops can be employed on a secondary operation, and for a limited period, whereas, 12,000 British soldiers, and 6000 men composing the Neapolitan army of Sicily, can land in Italy, a grand theatre, where success will most efficaciously assist Spain. The obnoxious Neapolitan force being thus removed, the native Sicilian army can be organized, and the new constitution established with more certainty." The time, also, he thought critical for Italy, not so for Spain, which would suffer but a temporary deprivation, seeing that failure in Italy would not preclude after aid to Spain.

Impressed with these notions, which, it must be confessed, were both plausible and grand, he permitted the expedition, already embarked, to sail for Palma in Sardinia, and Mahon in Minorca, yet merely as a blind, because, from those places, he could easily direct the troops against Italy, and meanwhile they menaced the French in Spain. But the conception of vast and daring enterprises, even the

execution of them up to a certain point, is not very uncommon, they fail only by a little ! that little is, however, the essence of genius, the phial of wit, which, held to Orlando's nostril, changed him from a frantic giant to a perfect commander.

It was in the consideration of such nice points of military policy that Lord Wellington's solid judgment was always advantageously displayed. Neither the greatness of this project nor the apparent facility of execution weighed with him. He thought the recovery of Italy by the power of the British arms would be a glorious, and might be a feasible exploit, but it was only in prospect, Spain was the better field, the war in the Peninsula existed ; years had been devoted to the establishment of a solid base there, and experience had proved that the chance of victory was not imaginary. England could not support two armies. The principle of concentration of power on an important point was as applicable here as on a field of battle, and although Italy might be the more vital point, it would be advisable to continue the war already established in Spain : nay, it would be better to give up Spain, and direct the whole power of England against Italy, rather than undertake double operations, on such an extensive scale, at a moment when the means necessary to sustain one were so scanty.

The ministers, apparently convinced by this reasoning, forbade Lord William Bentinck to proceed, and they expressed their discontent at his conduct. Nevertheless their former instructions had unquestionably conferred on him a discretionary power to act in Italy, and so completely had he been misled by their previous despatches, that besides delaying the expedition to Spain, he had placed 1200 men under Admiral Fremantle, to assist the Montenegrins. And he was actually entangled in a negotiation with the Russian Admiral, Greig, relative to the march of a Russian army ; a march planned, as it would appear, without the knowledge of the Russian court, and which, from the wildness of its conception and the mischief it would probably have effected, deserves notice.

While the Russian war was still uncertain, Admiral Tchitchagoff, who commanded 60,000 men on the Danube, proposed to march with them, through Bosnia and the ancient Epirus, to the mouths of the Cattaro, and, there embarking, to commence the impending contest with France in Italy. He was, however, without resources, and expecting to arrive in a starving and miserable condition on the Adriatic, demanded, through Admiral Greig, then commanding a squadron in the Mediterranean, that Lord William Bentinck should be ready to supply him with fresh arms, ammunition, and provisions, and to aid him with an auxiliary force. That nobleman saw at a glance the absurdity of this scheme, but he was falsely informed that Tchitchagoff, trusting to his good will, had already commenced the march ; and thus he had only to choose between aiding an ally, whose force, if it arrived at all, and was supplied by England, would help his own project, or permit it, to avoid perishing, to ravage Italy, and so change the people of that country from secret friends into deadly enemies. It would be foreign to this history to consider what effect the absence of Tchitchagoff's army during the Russian campaign would have had upon Napoleon's operations, but this was the very force whose march to the Beresina afterwards obliged the emperor to abandon Smolensko, and continue the retreat to Warsaw.

It was in the midst of these affairs, that the English minister's imperative orders to look only to the coast of Spain arrived. The negotiation with the Russians was immediately stopped, the project of landing in Italy was relinquished, and the expedition, already sent to the Adriatic, was recalled. Meanwhile, the descent on Catalonia had been delayed, and as a knowledge of its destination had reached Suchet through the French minister of war, and through the rumours rife amongst the Spaniards, all his preparations to meet it were matured. Nor was this the only mischief produced by the English minister's want of clear views and decided system of policy. Lord William Bentinck had been empowered to raise money on bills for his own exigencies, and being desirous to form a military chest for his project in Italy, he had invaded Lord Wellington's money markets. With infinite trouble and difficulty that general had just opened a source of supply at the rate of five shillings and four-pence, to five shillings and eight-pence the dollar, when Lord

William Bentinck's agents offering six shillings and eight-pence, swept four millions from the markets, and thus, as shall be hereafter shown, seriously embarrassed Lord Wellington's operations in the field.

This unhappy commencement of the Sicilian expedition led to other errors, and its arrival on the coast of Spain did not take place until after the campaign in Castile had commenced ; but as its proceedings connected the warfare of Valencia immediately with that of Catalonia, and the whole with Lord Wellington's operations, they cannot be properly treated of in this place. It is, however, worthy of observation, how an illiberal and factious policy inevitably recoils upon its authors.

In 1807 Sir John Moore, with that sagacity and manliness which distinguished his career through life, had informed the ministers that no hope of a successful attack on the French in Italy could be entertained while the British army upheld the tyrannical system of the dissolute and treacherous Neapolitan court in Sicily. And as no change for the better could be expected while the queen was allowed to govern, he proposed, that the British cabinet should either relinquish Sicily, or, assuming the entire control of the island, seize the queen and send her to her native Austria. This he judged to be the first step necessary to render the large British army in Sicily available for the field, because the Sicilian people could then be justly governed, and thus only could the organization of an effective native force attached to England, and fitted to offer freedom to Italy, be effected.

He spoke not of constitutions but of justice to the people, and hence his proposal was rejected as a matter of Jacobinism. Mr. Drummond, the English plenipotentiary, even betrayed it to the queen, a woman not without magnanimity, yet so capable of bloody deeds, that, in 1810, she secretly proposed to Napoleon the perpetration of a second Sicilian vespers upon the English. The emperor, detesting such guilt, only answered by throwing her agent into prison, yet the traces of the conspiracy were detected by the British authorities in 1811 ; and in 1812 Lord William Bentinck was forced to seize the government, in the manner before recommended by Moore, and did finally expel the queen by force. But because these measures were not resorted to in time, he was now, with an army of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, 16,000 of which were British, only able to detach a mixed force of 6000 to aid Lord Wellington. And at the same time the oppression of Ireland required that 60,000 fine soldiers should remain idle at home, while France, with a Russian war on hand, was able to overmatch the allies in Spain. Bad government is a scourge with a double thong !

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.

A SHORT time previous to Hill's enterprise against Almaraz, Soult, after driving Ballesteros from the Ronda, and restoring the communication with Grenada, sent 3000 men into the Niebla ; partly to interrupt the march of some Spaniards coming from Cadiz to garrison Badajos, partly to menace Penne Villemur and Morillo, who still lingered on the Odiel against the wishes of Wellington. The French arguments were more effectual. Those generals immediately filed along the frontier of Portugal towards Estremadura, they were hastily followed by the Spanish troops sent from Cadiz, and the militia of the Algarves were called out, to defend the Portuguese frontier. Soult then remained on the defensive, for he expected the advance of Lord Wellington, which the approach of so many troops, the seeming reluctance of the Spaniards to quit the Niebla, the landing of fresh men from Cadiz at Ayamonte, and the false rumours purposely set afloat by the British general seemed to render certain. Nor did the surprise of Almaraz, which he thought to be aimed at the army of the south and not against the army of Portugal, alter his views.

The great advantage which Lord Wellington had gained by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos was now very clearly illustrated ; for, as he could at will advance either against the north or the south, or the centre, the French generals in each quarter expected him, and they were anxious that the others should regulate their movements accordingly. None would help the other, and the secret plans

of all were paralyzed until it was seen on which side the thunderbolt would fall. This was of most consequence in the south, for Soult's plans were vast, dangerous, and ripe for execution.

After the fall of Badajos he judged it unwise to persevere in pushing a head of troops into Estremadura, while his rear and flanks were exposed to attacks from Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Murcia ; but it was essential, he thought, to crush Ballesteros before his forces should be increased, and this was not to be effected while that general could flee to Gibraltar on the one side, and Tarifa on the other. Whereupon Soult had resolved first to reduce Tarifa, with a view to the ruin of Ballesteros, and then to lay siege to Carthagená and Alicant, and he only awaited the development of Wellington's menacing demonstrations against Andalusia to commence his own operations. Great and difficult his plan was, yet profoundly calculated to effect his main object, which was to establish his base so firmly in Andalusia that, maugre the forces in Cadiz and the Isla, he might safely enter upon and follow up regular offensive operations in Estremadura and against Portugal, instead of the partial uncertain expeditions hitherto adopted. In fine, he designed to make Lord Wellington feel that there was a powerful army within a few marches of Lisbon.

Thinking that Carthagená and Tarifa, and even Alicant must fall, with the aid of Suchet, which he expected, or that the siege of the first would bring down Hill's corps, and all the disposable Spanish troops to save it, he desired that the army of Portugal, and the army of the centre, should operate so as to keep Lord Wellington employed north of the Tagus. He could then by himself carry on the sieges he contemplated, and yet leave a force under Drouet, on the edge of Estremadura, strong enough to oblige Hill to operate in the direction of Carthagená instead of Seville. And if this should happen as he expected, he proposed suddenly to concentrate all his finely organized and experienced troops, force on a general battle, and, if victorious, the preparations being made before hand, to follow up the blow by a rapid march upon Portugal, and so enter Lisbon ; or by bringing Wellington in all haste to the defence of that capital, confine the war, while Napoleon was in Russia, to a corner of the Peninsula.

This great project was strictly in the spirit of the emperor's instructions. For that consummate commander had desired his lieutenants to make Lord Wellington feel that his enemies were not passively defensive. He had urged them to press the allies close on each flank, and he had endeavoured to make Marmont understand that, although there was no object to be attained by entering the north-east of Portugal, and fighting a general battle on ground favourable to Lord Wellington, it was contrary to all military principles, to withdraw several days' march from the allies' outposts, and by such a timid defensive system, to give the English general the power of choosing when and where to strike. Now the loss of Badajos, and the difficulty of maintaining a defensive war against the increasing forces of the allies in the south of Andalusia, rendered it extremely onerous for Soult to press Wellington's flank in Estremadura ; and it was therefore a profound modification of the emperor's views, to urge the king and Marmont to active operation in the north, while he besieged Tarifa and Carthagená, keeping his army in mass ready for a sudden stroke in the field, if fortune brought the occasion, and if otherwise, sure of fixing a solid base for future operations against Portugal.

The Duke of Dalmatia wished to have commenced his operations by the siege of Tarifa in May, when Wellington's return to Beira had relieved him from the fear of an immediate invasion of Andalusia ; but the failure of the harvest in 1811, and the continual movements during the winter, had so reduced his magazines, both of provisions and ammunition, that he could not undertake the operation until the new harvest was ripe, and fresh convoys had replenished his exhausted stores. His soldiers were already on short allowance, and famine raged amongst the people of the country. Meanwhile his agents in Morocco had so firmly re-established the French interests there, that the emperor refused all supplies to the British, and even fitted out a squadron to insure obedience to his orders. To counteract this mischief, the Gibraltar merchant, Viali, who had been employed in the early part of the war by Sir Hew Dalrymple, was sent by Sir Henry Wellesley with a mission to the

court of Fez, which failed, and it was said from the intrigues of the notorious Charmilly who was then at Tangier, and being connected by marriage with the English consul there, unsuspected ; indeed, from a mean hatred to Sir John Moore, there were not wanting persons in power who endeavoured still to uphold this man.

So far everything promised well for Soult's plans, and he earnestly demanded that all his detachments, and sufficient reinforcements, together with artillery, officers, money, and convoys of ammunition should be sent to him for the siege of Carthagera. Pending their arrival, to divert the attention of the allies, he repaired to Port St. Mary, where the French had, from the circumstances of the war in Estremadura, been a long time inactive. He brought down with him a number of the Villantroy mortars, and having collected about 30 gunboats in the Trocadero canal, commenced a serious bombardment of Cadiz on the 16th of May. While thus engaged, a sudden landing from the English vessels was effected on the Grenada coast, Almeria was abandoned by the French, the people rose along the sea line, and General Frere, advancing from Murcia, entrenched himself in the position of Venta de Bahul, on the eastern frontier of Grenada. He was, indeed, surprised and beaten with loss, and the insurrection on the coast was soon quelled, but these things delayed the march of the reinforcements intended for Drouet ; meanwhile, Hill surprised Almaraz, and Ballesteros, whose forces had subsisted during the winter and spring upon the stores of Gibraltar, advanced against Conroux's division, then in observation at Bornos on the Guadalete.

This Spanish general caused equal anxiety to Soult and to Wellington, because his proceedings involved one of those intricate knots by which the important parts of both their operations were fastened. Lord Wellington judged that, while a large and increasing corps which could be aided by a disembarkation of 5000 or 6000 men from the Isla de Leon, menaced the blockade of Cadiz and the communications between Seville and Grenada, Soult must keep a considerable body in observation, and consequently, Hill would be a match for the French in Estremadura. But the efficacy of this diversion depended upon avoiding battles, seeing that if Ballesteros' army was crushed, the French, reinforced in Estremadura, could drive Hill over the Tagus, which would inevitably bring Wellington himself to his succour. Soult was for the same reason as earnest to bring the Spanish general to action, as Wellington was to prevent a battle, and Ballesteros, a man of infinite arrogance, despised both. Having obtained money and supplies from Gibraltar to replace the expenditure of his former excursion against Seville, he marched with 8000 men against Conroux, and that Frenchman, aware of his intention, induced him, by an appearance of fear, to attack an entrenched camp in a disorderly manner. On the 1st of June the battle took place, and Conroux issuing forth unexpectedly killed or took 1500 Spaniards, and drove the rest to the hills, from whence they retreated to San Roque. How this victory was felt in Estremadura shall now be shown.

The loss of Almaraz had put all the French corps in movement. A division of Marmont's army crossed the Gredos mountains, to replace Foy in the valley of the Tagus, and the latter general, passing that river by the bridge of Arzobispo, moved through the mountains of Guadalupe, and succoured the garrison of Mirabete on the 26th of May. When he retired, the Partidas of the Guadalupe renewed the blockade, and Hill, now strongly reinforced by Lord Wellington, advanced to Zafra, whereupon Drouet, unable to meet him, fell back to Azagua. Hill, wishing to protect the gathering of the harvest, then detached Penne Villemur's horsemen, from Llerena on the right flank, and General Slade, with the third dragoon guards and the royals, from Llera on the left flank ; General Lallemande, having a like object, came forward with two regiments of French dragoons, on the side of Valentia de las Torres, whereupon Hill, hoping to cut him off, placed Slade's dragoons in a wood, with directions to await further orders. Slade hearing that Lallemande was so near, and nowise superior to himself in numbers, forgot his orders, advanced and drove the French cavalry with loss beyond the defile of Maquilla, a distance of eight miles ; and through the pass also the British rashly galloped in pursuit, the general riding in the foremost ranks, and the supports joining tumultuously in the charge.

But in the plain beyond stood Lallemande with his reserves well in hand. He broke the disorderly English mass thus rushing on him, killed or wounded 48 men, pursued the rest for six miles, recovered all his own prisoners, and took more than 100, including two officers, from his adversary; and the like bitter results will generally attend what is called "*dashing*" in war, which in other words means courage without prudence. Two days after this event the Austrian Strenowitz, whose exploits have been before noticed, marched with 50 men of the same regiments, to fetch off some of the English prisoners who had been left, by the French, under a slender guard in the village of Maquilla. Eighty of the enemy met him on the march, yet by fine management he overthrew them, and losing only one man himself, killed many French, executed his mission, and returned with an officer and 20 other prisoners,

Such was the state of affairs, when the defeat of Ballesteros at Bornoz, enabled Soult to reinforce Drouet, with Barois's division of infantry and two divisions of cavalry; they marched across the Morena, but for reasons, to be hereafter mentioned, by the royal road of St. Ollala, a line of direction which obliged Drouet to make a flank march by his left towards Llerena to form his junction with them. It was effected on the 18th, and the allies then fell back gradually towards Albuera, where, being joined by four Portuguese regiments from Badajos, and by the fifth Spanish army, Hill formed a line of battle furnishing 20,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 24 guns.

Drouet had only 21,000 men, of which 3000 were cavalry, with 18 pieces of artillery; the allies were therefore the most numerous, but the French army was better composed, and battle seemed inevitable, for both generals had discretionary orders. However, the French cavalry did not advance further than Almendralejo; and Hill, who had shown himself so daring at Aroyo Molino and Almaraz, now, with an uncommon mastery of ambition, refrained from an action which promised him unbounded fame, simply because he was uncertain whether the state of Lord Wellington's operations in Castile, then in full progress, would warrant one. His recent exploits had been so splendid that a great battle gained at this time would, with the assistance of envious malice, have placed his reputation on a level with Wellington's. Yet he was habituated to command, and his adversary's talents were moderate, his forbearance must therefore be taken as a proof of the purest patriotism.

Early in July the French cavalry entered Almendralejo and Santa Marta, cut off 200 Spanish horsemen, and surprised a small British cavalry post; Hill, who had then received fresh instructions, and was eager to fight, quickly drove them with loss from both places. Drouet immediately concentrated his forces and retired to La Granja, and was followed by the allies; but the account of the transactions in Andalusia and Estremadura must be here closed, because those which followed belong to the general combinations. And as the causes of these last movements, and their effects upon the general campaign, are of an intricate nature, to avoid confusion the explanation of them is reserved for another place; meanwhile I will endeavour to describe that political chaos, amidst which Wellington's army appeared as the ark amongst the meeting clouds and rising waters of the deluge.

CHAPTER V.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.

THE unmatched power of Napoleon's genius was now being displayed in a wonderful manner. His interest, his inclination, and his expectation were alike opposed to a war with Russia, but Alexander and himself, each hoping that a menacing display of strength would reduce the other to negotiation, advanced, step by step, until blows could no longer be avoided. Napoleon, a man capable of sincere friendship, had relied too much and too long on the existence of a like feeling in the Russian emperor; and misled, perhaps, by the sentiment of his own energy, did not sufficiently allow for the daring intrigues of a court, where secret combinations of the nobles formed the real governing power.

That the cabinet of Petersburg should be more than ordinarily subject to such

combinations at this period, was the necessary consequence of the greatness of the interests involved in the treaties of Tilsit and Erfurth; the continental system had so deeply injured the fortunes of the Russian noblemen, that their sovereign's authority in support of it was as nothing. During the Austrian war of 1809, when Alexander was yet warm from Napoleon's society at Erfurth, the aid given to France was a mockery, and a desire to join a northern confederation against Napoleon was even then scarcely concealed at St. Petersburg, where the French ambassador was coldly treated. The royal family of Prussia were, it is true, at the same time, mortified by a reception which inclined them to side with France, against the wishes of their people and their ministers, but in Russia, Romanzow alone was averse to choose that moment to declare against Napoleon. And this was so certain that Austria, anticipating the explosion, was only undecided whether the King of Prussia should be punished or the people rewarded, whether she herself should befriend or plunder the Prussian monarchy.

At that time also, the Russian naval commander in the Adriatic, being ordered to sail to Ancona for the purpose of convoying Marmont's troops from Dalmatia to Italy, refused, on the plea that his ships were not sea-worthy; yet secretly he informed the governor of Trieste that they would be in excellent order to assist an Austrian corps against the French! Admiral Tchitchagoff's strange project of marching upon Italy from Bucharest has been already noticed, and it is remarkable that this expedition was to be conducted upon popular principles, the interests of the Sicilian court being to be made subservient to the wishes of the people. At a later period, in 1812, Admiral Greig proposed to place an auxiliary Russian army under either Wellington or Lord William Bentinck, and it was accepted; but when the Russian ambassador in London was applied to upon the subject, he unequivocally declared that the emperor knew nothing of the matter!

With a court so situated, angry negotiations once commenced rendered war inevitable, and the more especially that the Russian cabinet, which had long determined on hostilities, though undecided as to the time of drawing the sword, was well aware of the secret designs and proceedings of Austria in Italy, and of Murat's discontent. The Hollanders were known to desire independence, and the deep hatred which the people of Prussia bore to the French was a matter of notoriety. Bernadotte, who very early had resolved to cast down the ladder by which he rose, was the secret adviser of these practices against Napoleon's power in Italy, and he was also in communication with the Spaniards. Thus Napoleon, having a war in Spain which required 300,000 men to keep in a balanced state, was forced, by resistless circumstances, into another and more formidable contest in the distant north, when the whole of Europe was prepared to rise upon his lines of communication, and when his extensive sea-frontier was exposed to the all-powerful navy of Great Britain.

A conqueror's march to Moscow, amidst such dangers, was a design more vast, more hardy, more astounding than ever before entered the imagination of man; yet it was achieved, and solely by the force of his genius. For having organized 200,000 French soldiers, as a pretorian guard, he stepped resolutely into the heart of Germany, and monarchs and nations bent submissively before him; secret hostility ceased, and, with the exception of Bernadotte, the crowned and anointed plotters quitted their work to follow his chariot-wheels. Dresden saw the ancient story of the King of Kings renewed in his person; and the 200,000 French soldiers arrived on the Niemen in company with 200,000 allies. On that river 400,000 troops—I have seen the imperial returns—were assembled by this wonderful man, all disciplined warriors, and, notwithstanding their different national feelings, all proud of the unmatched genius of their leader. Yet, even in that hour of dizzy elevation, Napoleon, deeply sensible of the inherent weakness of a throne unhallowed by time, described by one emphatic phrase the delicacy of his political situation. During the passage of the Niemen, 12,000 cuirassiers, whose burnished armour flashed in the sun while their cries of salutation pealed in unison with the thunder of the horses' feet, were passing like a foaming torrent towards the river, when Napoleon turned and thus addressed Gouvion St. Cyr, whose republican principles were well known:

"No monarch ever had such an army?"

"No, sire."

"The French are a fine people; they deserve more liberty, and they shall have it; but, St. Cyr, no liberty of the press! That army, mighty as it is, could not resist the songs of Paris!"

Such, then, was the nature of Napoleon's power that success alone could sustain it; success which depended as much upon others' exertions as upon his own stupendous genius, for Russia was far distant from Spain. It is said, I know not upon what authority, that he at one moment had resolved to concentrate all the French troops in the Peninsula behind the Ebro during this expedition to Russia, but the capture of Blake's force at Valencia changed his views. Of this design there are no traces in the movements of his armies, nor in the captured papers of the king, and there are some indications of a contrary design; for at that period several foreign agents were detected examining the lines of Torres Vedras, and on a Frenchman, who killed himself when arrested in the Brazils, were found papers proving a mission for the same object. Neither is it easy to discern the advantage of thus crowding 300,000 men on a narrow slip of ground, where they must have been fed from France, already overburthened with the expenses of the Russian war; and this when they were numerous enough, if rightly handled, to have maintained themselves on the resources of Spain, and near the Portuguese frontier, for a year at least.

To have given up all the Peninsula, west of the Ebro, would have been productive of no benefit, save what might have accrued from the jealousy which the Spaniards already displayed towards their allies; but if that jealousy, as was probable, had forced the British general away, he could have carried his army to Italy, or have formed in Germany the nucleus of a great northern confederation on the emperor's rear. Portugal was therefore, in truth, the point of all Europe in which the British strength was least dangerous to Napoleon during the invasion of Russia; moreover, an immediate war with that empire was not a certain event previous to the capture of Valencia. Napoleon was undoubtedly anxious to avoid it while the Spanish contest continued; yet, with a far-reaching European policy, in which his English adversaries were deficient, he foresaw and desired to check the growing strength of that fearful and wicked power which now menaces the civilized world.

The proposal for peace which he made to England before his departure for the Niemen is another circumstance where his object seems to have been misrepresented. It was called a device to reconcile the French to the Russian war; but they were as eager for that war as he could wish them to be, and it is more probable that it sprang from a secret misgiving, a prophetic sentiment of the consequent power of Russia, lifted as she then would be towards universal tyranny, by the very arm which he had raised to restrain her. The ostensible ground of his quarrel with the Emperor Alexander was the continental system; yet, in this proposal for peace, he offered to acknowledge the house of Braganza in Portugal, the house of Bourbon in Sicily, and to withdraw his army from the Peninsula, if England would join him in guaranteeing the crown of Spain to Joseph, together with a constitution to be arranged by a national Cortes. This was a virtual renunciation of the continental system for the sake of peace with England; and a proposal which obviated the charge of aiming at universal dominion, seeing that Austria, Spain, Portugal, and England would have retained their full strength, and the limits of his empire would have been fixed. The offer was made also at a time when the emperor was certainly more powerful than he had ever yet been, when Portugal was, by the avowal of Wellington himself, far from secure, and Spain quite exhausted. At peace with England, Napoleon could easily have restored the Polish nation, and Russia would have been repressed. Now, Poland has fallen, and Russia stalks in the plenitude of her barbarous tyranny.

Political state of England.—The new administration, despised by the country, was not the less powerful in parliament; its domestic proceedings were therefore characterized by all the corruption and tyranny of Mr. Pitt's system, without his redeeming genius. The press was persecuted with malignant ferocity, and the

government sought to corrupt all that it could not trample upon. Repeated successes had rendered the particular contest in the Peninsula popular with the ardent spirits of the nation, and war-prices passed for glory with the merchants, land-owners, and tradesmen ; but as the price of food augmented faster than the price of labour, the poorer people suffered ; they rejoiced, indeed, at their country's triumphs, because the sound of victory is always pleasing to warlike ears, but they were discontented. Meanwhile all thinking men who were not biased by factions, or dazzled by military splendour, perceived in the enormous expenses incurred to repress the democratic principle, and in the consequent transfer of property, the sure foundation of future reaction and revolution. The distresses of the working classes had already produced partial insurrections, and the nation at large was beginning to perceive that the governing powers, whether representative or executive, were rapacious usurpers of the people's rights ; a perception quickened by malignant prosecutions, by the insolent extravagance with which the public money was lavished on the family of Mr. Perceval, and by the general profusion at home, while Lord Wellesley declared that the war languished for want of sustenance abroad.

Napoleon's continental system, although in the nature of a sumptuary law, which the desires of men will never suffer to exist long in vigour, was yet so efficient, that the British government was forced to encourage, and protect illicit trading, to the great detriment of mercantile morality. The island of Heligoland was the chief point of deposit for this commerce, and either by trading energy, or by the connivance of continental governments, the emperor's system was continually baffled ; nevertheless its effects will not quickly pass away ; it pressed sorely upon the manufacturers at the time, and by giving rise to rival establishments on the continent, has awakened in Germany a commercial spirit by no means favourable to England's manufacturing superiority.

But ultimate consequences were never considered by the British ministers ; the immediate object was to procure money, and by virtually making bank-notes a legal tender, they secured unlimited means at home, through the medium of loans and taxes, which the corruption of the parliament insured to them, and which, by a reaction, insured the corruption of the parliament. This resource failed abroad. They could, and did, send to all the allies of England, enormous supplies in kind, because to do so was, in the way of contracts, an essential part of the system of corruption at home ; a system aptly described, as bribing one-half of the nation with the money of the other half, in order to misgovern both. Specie was however only to be had in comparatively small quantities, and at a premium so exorbitant, that even the most reckless politician trembled for the ultimate consequences.

The foreign policy of the government was very simple, namely, to bribe all powers to war down France. Hence to Russia, everything, save specie, was granted ; and hence, also, amicable relations with Sweden were immediately re-established, and the more readily that this power had lent herself to the violation of the continental system by permitting the entry of British goods at Stralsund ; but wherever wisdom, or skill, was required, the English minister's resources failed altogether. With respect to Sicily, Spain, and Portugal, this truth was notorious ; and to preserve the political support of the trading interests at home, a degrading and deceitful policy, quite opposed to the spirit of Lord Wellington's counsels, was followed in regard to the revolted Spanish colonies.

The short-sighted injustice of the system was however most glaring with regard to the United States of America. Mutual complaints, the dregs of the war of independence, had long characterized the intercourse between the British and American governments, and these discontents were turned into extreme hatred by the progress of the war with France. The British government in 1806 proclaimed, contrary to the law of nations, a blockade of the French coast, which could not be enforced. Napoleon, in return, issued the celebrated decrees of Berlin and Milan, which produced the no less celebrated orders in council. The commerce of all neutrals was thus extinguished by the arrogance of the belligerents ; but the latter, very soon finding that their mutual convenience required some relaxation of mutual

violence, granted licences to each other's ships, and by this scandalous evasion of their own policy, caused the whole of the evil to fall upon the neutral, who was yet called the friend of both parties.

The Americans, unwilling to go to war with two such powerful states, were yet resolved not to submit to the tyranny of either; but the injustice of the English government was the most direct and extended in its operations, and it was rendered infinitely more bitter by the violence used towards the seamen of the United States; not less than 6000 sailors, it was said, were taken from merchant vessels on the high seas, and forced to serve in the British men-of-war. Wherefore, after first passing retaliatory, or rather warning acts, called the non-intercourse, non-importation, and embargo acts, the Americans finally declared war, at the moment when the British government, alarmed at the consequences of their own injustice, had just rescinded the orders in council.

The immediate effects of these proceedings on the contest in the Peninsula, shall be noticed in another place, but the ultimate effects on England's prosperity have not yet been unfolded. The struggle prematurely told the secret of American strength, and it has drawn the attention of the world to a people, who, notwithstanding the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the most horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous, do in their general government uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe.

Political state of Spain.—Bad government is more hurtful than direct war; the ravages of the last are soon repaired, and the public mind is often purified and advanced by the trial of adversity; but the evils, springing from the former, seem interminable. In the Isla de Leon the unseemly currents of folly, although less raging than before, continued to break open new channels and yet abandoned none of the old. The intrigues of the Princess Carlotta were unremitting, and though the danger of provoking the populace of Cadiz restrained and frightened her advocates in the Cortes, she opposed the English diplomacy, with reiterated and not quite unfounded accusations, that the revolt or the colonies was being perfidiously fostered by Great Britain:—a charge well calculated to lower the influence of England, especially in regard to the scheme of mediation, which being revived in April by Lord Castlereagh, was received by the Spaniards with outward coldness, and a secret resolution to reject it altogether; nor were they in any want of reasons to justify their proceedings.

This mediation had been commenced by Lord Wellesley, when the quarrel between the mother country and the colonies was yet capable of adjustment; it was now renewed when it could not succeed. English commissioners were appointed to carry it into execution, the Duke of Infantado was to join them on the part of Spain, and at first Mr. Stuart was to have formed part of the commission, Mr. Sydenham being to succeed him at Lisbon; but finally he remained in Portugal, and Mr. Sydenham was attached to the commission, whose composition he thus described:—

"I do not understand a word of the Spanish language, I am unacquainted with the Spanish character, I know very little of Old Spain, and I am quite ignorant of the state of the colonies; yet I am part of a commission composed of men of different professions, views, habits, feelings, and opinions. The mediation proposed is, at least, a year too late, it has been forced upon the government of Old Spain, I have no confidence in the ministers who employ me, and I am fully persuaded that they have not the slightest confidence in me."

The first essential object was to have Bardaxi's secret article, which required England to join Old Spain if the mediation failed, withdrawn; but as this could not be done without the consent of the Cortes, the publicity thus given would have ruined the credit of the mediation with the colonists. Nor would the distrust of the latter have been unfounded, for though Lord Wellesley had offered the guarantee of Great Britain to any arrangement made under her mediation, his successors would not do so!

"They empower us," said Mr. Sydenham, "to negotiate, and sign a treaty, but will not guarantee the execution of it! My opinion is, that the formal signature of

a treaty by plenipotentiaries is in itself a solemn guarantee, if there is good faith and fair dealing in the transaction; and I believe that this opinion will be confirmed by the authority of every writer on the law of nations. But this is certainly not the doctrine of our present ministers, they make a broad distinction between the ratification of a treaty and the intention of seeing it duly observed."

The failure of such a scheme was inevitable. The Spaniards wanted the commissioners to go first to the Caraccas, where the revolt being full blown, nothing could be effected; the British government insisted that they should go to Mexico, where the dispute had not yet been pushed to extremities. After much useless diplomacy, which continued until the end of the year, the negotiation, as Mr. Sydenham had predicted, proved abortive.

In March the new constitution of Spain had been solemnly adopted; and a decree settling the succession of the crown was promulgated. The Infant Francisco de Paula, the Queen of Etruria, and their respective descendants were excluded from the succession, which was to fall first to the Princess Carlotta if the Infant don Carlos failed of heirs, then to the hereditary princess of the Two Sicilies, and so on; the Empress of France and her descendants being especially excluded. This exhibition of popular power, under the pretext of baffling Napoleon's schemes, struck at the principle of legitimacy. And when the extraordinary Cortes decided that the ordinary Cortes, which ought to assemble every year, should not be convoked until October, 1813, and thus secured to itself a tenure of power for two years instead of one, the discontent increased both at Cadiz and in the provinces, and a close connection was kept up between the malcontents and the Portuguese government, which was then the stronghold of arbitrary power in the Peninsula.

The local junta of Estremadura adopted Carlotta's claims, in their whole extent, and communicated on the subject, at first secretly with the Portuguese regency, and then more openly with Mr. Stuart. Their scheme was to remove all the acting provincial authorities, and to replace them with persons acknowledging Carlotta's sovereignty; they even declared that they would abide by the new constitution, only so far as it acknowledged what they called legitimate power, in other words, the princess was to be sole regent. Nevertheless this party was not influenced by Carlotta's intrigues, for they would not join her agents in any outcry against the British; they acted upon the simple principle of opposing the encroachments of democracy, and they desired to know how England would view their proceedings. The other provinces received the new constitution coldly, and the Biscayens angrily rejected it as opposed to their ancient privileges. In this state of public feeling, the abolition of the Inquisition, a design now openly agitated, offered a point around which all the clergy, and all that the clergy could influence, gathered against the Cortes, which was also weakened by its own factions; yet the republicans gained strength, and they were encouraged by the new constitution established in Sicily, which also alarmed their opponents, and the fear and distrust extended to the government of Portugal.

However, amidst all the varying subjects of interest, the insane project of reducing the colonies by force remained a favourite with all parties; nor was it in relation to the colonies only that these men, who were demanding aid from other nations, in the names of freedom, justice, and humanity, proved themselves to be devoid of those attributes themselves. "The humane object of the abolition of the slave-trade has been frustrated," said Lord Castlereagh, "because not only Spanish subjects but Spanish public officers and governors, in various parts of the Spanish colonies, are instrumental to, and accomplices in the crimes of the contraband slave-traders of Great Britain and America, furnishing them with flags, papers, and solemn documents to entitle them to the privileges of Spanish cruisers, and to represent their property as Spanish."

With respect to the war in Spain itself, all manner of mischief was abroad. The regular cavalry had been entirely destroyed, and when, with the secret permission of their own government, some distinguished Austrian officers, proffered their services to the regency, to restore that arm, they were repelled. Nearly all the field artillery had been lost in action, the arsenals at Cadiz were quite exhausted, and most of the heavy guns on the works of the Isla were rendered unserviceable

by constant and useless firing; the stores of shot were diminished in an alarming manner, no sums were appropriated to the support of the foundries, and when the British artillery officers made formal representations of this dangerous state of affairs, it only produced a demand of money from England to put the foundries into activity. To crown the whole, Abadia, recalled from Galicia at the express desire of Sir Henry Wellesley, because of his bad conduct, was now made minister of war.

In Ceuta, notwithstanding the presence of a small British force, the Spanish garrison, the galley slaves, and the prisoners of war who were allowed to range at large, joined in a plan for delivering that place to the Moors; not from a treacherous disposition in the two first, but to save themselves from starving, a catastrophe which was only staved off by frequent assistance from the magazines of Gibraltar. Ceuta might have been easily acquired by England at this period, in exchange for the debt due by Spain, and General Campbell urged it to Lord Liverpool, but he rejected the proposal, fearing to awaken popular jealousy. The notion, however, came originally from the people themselves; and that jealousy which Lord Liverpool feared, was already in full activity, being only another name for the democratic spirit rising in opposition to the aristocratic principle upon which England afforded her assistance to the Peninsula.

The foreign policy of Spain was not less absurd than their home policy, but it was necessarily contracted. Castro, the envoy at Lisbon, who was agreeable both to the Portuguese and British authorities, was removed, and Bardaxi, who was opposed to both, substituted. This Bardaxi had been just before sent on a special mission to Stockholm, to arrange a treaty with that court, and he was referred to Russia for his answer, so completely subservient was Bernadotte to the Czar. One point, however, was characteristically discussed by the Swedish prince and the Spanish envoy. Bardaxi demanded assistance in troops, and Bernadotte in reply asked for a subsidy, which was promised without hesitation, but security for the payment being desired, the negotiation instantly dropped! A treaty of alliance was however concluded between Spain and Russia, in July, and while Bardaxi was thus pretending to subsidize Sweden, the unceasing solicitations of his own government had extorted from England a grant of one million of money, together with arms and clothing for 100,000 men, in return for which 5000 Spaniards were to be enlisted for the British ranks.

To raise Spanish corps had long been a favourite project with many English officers, General Graham had deigned to offer his services, and great advantages were anticipated by those who still believed in Spanish heroism. Joseph was even disquieted, for the Catalans had formally demanded such assistance, and a like feeling was now expressed in other places; yet when it came to the proof only 200 or 300 starving Spaniards of the poorest condition enlisted; they were recruited principally by the light division, were taught with care, and placed with English comrades, yet the experiment failed, they did not make good soldiers. Meanwhile the regency demanded and obtained from England, arms, clothing, and equipments for 10,000 cavalry, though they had scarce 500 regular horsemen to arm at the time, and had just rejected the aid of the Austrian officers in the organization of new corps. Thus the supplies granted by Great Britain continued to be embezzled or wasted; and with the exception of a trifling amelioration in the state of Carlos d'Españas' corps, effected by the direct interposition of Wellington, no public benefit seemed likely at first to accrue from the subsidy, for every branch of administration in Spain, whether civil or military, foreign or domestic, was cankered to the core. The public mischief was become portentous.

Ferdinand, living in tranquillity at Valençay, was so averse to encounter any dangers for the recovery of his throne, that he rejected all offers of assistance to escape. Kolli and the brothers Sagas had been alike disregarded. The councillor Sobral, who while in secret correspondence with the allies, had so long lived at Victor's head-quarters, and had travelled with that marshal to France, now proposed to carry the prince off, and he also was baffled as his predecessors had been. Ferdinand would listen to no proposal save through Escoiquez, who lived at some distance, and Sobral, who judged this man one not to be trusted,

immediately made his way to Lisbon, fearful of being betrayed by the prince to whose succour he had come.

Meanwhile Joseph was advancing towards the political conquest of the country, and spoke with ostentation of assembling a Cortes in his own interests ; but this was to cover a secret intercourse with the Cortes in the Isla de Leon where his partisans called *Afrancesados* were increasing : for many of the democratic party, seeing that the gulf which separated them from the clergy, and from England, could never be closed, and that the bad system of government deprived them of the people's support, were willing to treat with the intrusive monarch as one whose principles were more in unison with their own. Joseph secretly offered to adopt the new constitution, with some modifications, and as many of the Cortes were inclined to accept his terms, the British policy was on the eve of suffering a signal defeat, when Wellington's iron arm again fixed the destiny of the Peninsula.

CHAPTER VI.

POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.

THE internal condition of this country was not improved. The government, composed of civilians, was unable, as well as unwilling, to stimulate the branches of administration connected with military affairs, and the complaints of the army, reaching the Brazils, drew reprimands from the prince ; but instead of meeting the evil with suitable laws, he only increased Beresford's authority, which was already sufficiently great. Thus while the foreigner's power augmented, the native authorities were degraded in the eyes of the people ; and as their influence to do good dwindled, their ill-will increased, and their power of mischief was not lessened, because they still formed the intermediate link between the military commander and the subordinate authorities. Hence, what with the passive patriotism of the people, the abuses of the government, and the double dealing at the Brazils, the extraordinary energy of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart was counterbalanced.

The latter had foreseen that the regent's concessions at the time of Borel's arrest would produce but a momentary effect in Portugal, and all the intrigues at Rio Janeiro revived when Lord Wellesley, disgusted with Perceval's incapacity, had quitted the British cabinet. But previous to that event, Mr. Sydenham, whose mission to Portugal has been noticed, had so strongly represented the evil effects of Lord Strangford's conduct, that Lord Wellesley would have immediately dismissed him, if Mr. Sydenham, who was offered the situation, had not refused to profit from the effects of his own report. It was then judged proper to send Lord Louvaine with the rank of ambassador, and he was to touch at Lisbon and consult with Lord Wellington whether to press the prince's return to Portugal, or insist upon a change in the regency ; meanwhile a confidential agent, despatched direct to Rio Janeiro, was to keep Lord Strangford in the strict line of his instructions until the ambassador arrived.

But Lord Louvaine was on bad terms with his uncle, the Duke of Northumberland, a zealous friend to Lord Strangford ; and for a government conducted on the principle of corruption, the discontent of a nobleman, possessing powerful parliamentary influence, was necessarily of more consequence than the success of the war in the Peninsula. Ere a fit successor to Lord Strangford could be found, the prince regent of Portugal acceded to Lord Wellington's demands, and it was then judged expedient to await the effect of this change of policy. Meanwhile the dissensions, which led to the change of ministry arose, and occupied the attention of the English cabinet to the exclusion of all other affairs. Thus Lord Strangford's career was for some time uncontrolled, yet after several severe rebukes from Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, it was at last arrested, by a conviction that his tenure of place depended upon their will.

However, prior to this salutary check on the Brazilian intrigues, Lord Wellesley had so far intimidated the prince regent of Portugal, that besides assenting to the reforms, he despatched Mr. De Lemos from Rio Janeiro, furnished with authority for Beresford to act despotically in all things connected with the administration of the army. Moreover, Lord Wellington was empowered to dismiss Principal Souza from the regency ; and Lord Castlereagh, following up his predecessor's policy on

this head, insisted that all the obnoxious members of the regency should be set aside and others appointed. And these blows at the power of the Souza faction, were accompanied by the death of Linhares, the head of the family, an event which paralyzed the court of Rio Janeiro for a considerable time; nevertheless the Souzas were still so strong, that Domingo Souza, now Count of Funchal, was appointed prime minister, although he retained his situation as ambassador to the English court, and continued to reside in London.

Lord Wellington, whose long experience of Indian intrigues rendered him the fittest person possible to deal with the exactions and political cunning of a people who so much resemble Asiatics, now opposed the removal of the obnoxious members from the regency. He would not even dismiss the Principal Souza; for with a refined policy he argued, that the opposition to his measures arose, as much from the national, as from the individual character of the Portuguese authorities, several of whom were under the displeasure of their own court, and consequently dependent upon the British power for support against their enemies. There were amongst them also persons of great ability, and hence no beneficial change could be expected, because the influence already gained would be lost with new men. The latter would have the same faults, with less talent, and less dependence on the British power, and the dismissed ministers would become active enemies. The patriarch would go to Oporto, where his power to do mischief would be greatly increased, and Principal Souza would then be made patriarch. It was indeed very desirable to drive this man, whose absurdity was so great as to create a suspicion of insanity, from the regency; but he could neither be persuaded, nor forced, to quit Portugal. His dismissal had been extorted from the prince by the power of the British government, he would therefore maintain his secret influence over the civil administration, he would be considered a martyr to foreign influence, which would increase his popularity, and his power would be augmented by the sanctity of his character as patriarch. Very little advantage could then be derived from a change, and any reform would be attributed to the English influence, against which the numerous interests involved in the preservation of abuses would instantly combine with active enmity.

On the other hand, the government of Portugal had never yet laid the real nature of the war fairly before the people. The latter had been deceived, flattered, cajoled; their prowess in the field extolled beyond reason, and the enemy spoken of contemptuously; but the resources of the nation, which essentially consisted neither in its armies, nor in its revenue, nor in its boasting, but in the sacrificing of all interests to the prosecution of the contest, had never been vigorously used to meet the emergencies of the war. The regency had neither appealed to the patriotism of the population nor yet enforced sacrifices by measures which were absolutely necessary, because, as the English general honestly observed, no people would ever voluntarily bear such enormous, though necessary burthens; strong laws and heavy penalties could alone insure obedience. The Portuguese government relied upon England and her subsidies, and resisted all measures which could render their natural resources more available. Their subordinates, on the same principle, executed corruptly and vexatiously, or evaded the military regulations, and the chief supporters of all this mischief were the Principal and his faction.

Thus dragged by opposing forces, and environed with difficulties, Wellington took a middle course. That is, he strove by reproaches and by redoubled activity to stimulate the patriotism of the authorities; he desired the British ministers at Lisbon, and at Rio Janeiro, to paint the dangerous state of Portugal in vivid colours, and to urge the prince regent, in the strongest manner, to enforce the reform of those gross abuses which, in the taxes, in the customs, in the general expenditure, and in the execution of orders by the inferior magistrates, were withering the strength of the nation. At the same time, amidst the turmoil of his duties in the field, sometimes actually from the field of battle itself, he transmitted memoirs upon the nature of these different evils, and the remedies for them—memoirs which will attest to the latest posterity the greatness and vigour of his capacity.

These efforts, aided by the suspension of the subsidy, produced partial reforms, yet the natural weakness of character and obstinacy of the prince regent were

insurmountable obstacles to any general or permanent cure; the first defect rendered him the tool of the court intriguers, and the second was to be warily dealt with, lest some dogged conduct should oblige Wellington to put his often repeated threat of abandoning the country into execution. The success of the contest was in fact of more importance to England than to Portugal, and this occult knot could neither be untied nor cut; the difficulty could with appliances be lessened, but might not be swept away; hence the British general, involved in ceaseless disputes and suffering hourly mortifications, the least of which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary man, had to struggle as he could to victory.

Viewing the contest as one of life or death to Portugal, he desired to make the whole political economy of the state a simple provision for the war, and when thwarted, his reproaches were as bitter as they were just; nevertheless, the men to whom they were addressed were not devoid of merit. In after times, while complaining that he could find no persons of talent in Spain, he admitted that amongst the Portuguese, Redonda possessed both probity and ability, that Nogueira was a statesman of capacity equal to the discussion of great questions, and that no sovereign in Europe had a better public servant than Forjas. Even the restless Principal disinterestedly prosecuted measures for forcing the clergy to pay their just share of the imposts. But greatness of mind, on great occasions, is a rare quality. Most of the Portuguese considered the sacrifices demanded a sharper ill than submission, and it was impossible to unite entire obedience to the will of the British authorities, with an energetic, original spirit in the native government. The Souza faction was always violent and foolish; the milder opposition of three gentlemen, above mentioned, was excusable. Lord Wellington, a foreigner, was serving his own country, pleasing his own government, and forwarding his own fortune; final success was sure to send him to England, resplendent with glory, and beyond the reach of Portuguese ill-will. The native authorities had no such prospects. Their exertions brought little of personal fame, they were disliked by their own prince, hated by his favourites, and they feared to excite the enmity of the people by a vigour which, being displeasing to their sovereign, would inevitably draw evil upon themselves: from the French if the invasion succeeded, from their own court if the independence of the country should be ultimately obtained.

But thus much conceded for the sake of justice, it is yet to be affirmed, with truth, that the conduct of the Portuguese and Brazilian governments was always unwise, often base. Notwithstanding the prince's concessions, it was scarcely possible to remedy any abuses. The Lisbon government, substituting evasive for active opposition, baffled Wellington and Stuart by proposing inadequate laws, or by suffering the execution of effectual measures to be neglected with impunity; and the treaty of commerce with England always supplied them a source of dispute, partly from its natural difficulties, partly from their own bad faith. The general's labours were thus multiplied, not abated, by his new powers; and in measuring these labours it is to be noted, so entirely did Portugal depend upon England, that Wellington, instead of drawing provisions for his army from the country, in a manner fed the whole nation, and was often forced to keep the army magazines low, that the people might live. This is proved by the importation of rice, flour, beef, and pork from America, which increased each year of the war in a surprising manner, the price keeping pace with the quantity, while the importation of dried fish, the ordinary food of the Portuguese, decreased.

In 1808, the supply of flour and wheat from New York was 60,000 barrels. In 1811, 600,000; in 1813, between 700,000 and 800,000. Ireland, England, Egypt, Barbary, Sicily, the Brazils, parts of Spain, and even France, also contributed to the consumption, which greatly exceeded the natural means of Portugal; English treasure therefore, either directly or indirectly, furnished the nation as well as the armies.

The peace revenue of Portugal, including the Brazils, the colonies, and the islands, even in the most flourishing periods, had never exceeded 36,000,000 of cruzada novas; but in 1811, although Portugal alone raised 25,000,000, this sum, added to the British subsidy, fell very short of the actual expenditure; yet

economy was opposed by the local government, the prince was continually creating useless offices for his favourites, and encouraging law-suits and appeals to Rio Janeiro. The troops and fortresses were neglected, although the military branches of expense amounted to more than three-fourths of the whole receipts; and though Mr. Stuart engaged that England, either by treaty or tribute, would keep the Algerines quiet, he could not obtain the suppression of the Portuguese navy, which always fled from the barbarians. It was not until the middle of the year 1812, when Admiral Berkeley, whose proceedings had at times produced considerable inconvenience, was recalled, that Mr. Stuart, with the aid of Admiral Martin, who succeeded Berkeley, without a seat in the regency, effected this naval reform.

The government, rather than adopt the measures suggested by Wellington, such as keeping up the credit of the paper-money, by regular payments of the interest, the fair and general collection of the *Decima*, and the repression of abuses in the custom-house, in the arsenal, and in the militia, always more costly than the line, projected the issuing of fresh paper, and endeavoured, by unworthy stock-jobbing schemes, to evade instead of meeting the difficulties of the times. To check their folly the general withheld the subsidy, and refused to receive their depreciated paper into the military chest; but neither did this vigorous proceeding produce more than a momentary return to honesty, and meanwhile, the working people were so cruelly oppressed that they would not labour for the public, except under the direction of British officers. Force alone could overcome their repugnance, and force was employed, not to forward the defence of the country, but to meet particular interests and to support abuses. Such also was the general baseness of the Fidalgos, that even the charitable aid of money, received from England, was shamefully and greedily claimed by the rich, who insisted that it was a donation to all, and to be equally divided.

Confusion and injustice prevailed everywhere, and Wellington's energies were squandered on vexatious details; at one time he was remonstrating against the oppression of the working people, and devising remedies for local abuses; at another superintending the application of the English charities, and arranging the measures necessary to revive agriculture in the devastated districts; at all times endeavouring to reform the general administration, and in no case was he supported. Never during the war did he find an appeal to the patriotism of the Portuguese government answered frankly; never did he propose a measure which was accepted without difficulties. This opposition was at times carried to such a ridiculous extent, that when some Portuguese nobles in the French service took refuge with the Curate Merino, and desired from their own government a promise of safety, to which they were really entitled, the regency refused to give that assurance; nor would they publish an amnesty, which the English general desired for the sake of justice and from policy also, because valuable information as to the French army, could have been thus obtained. The authorities would neither say yes nor no. And when General Pamplona applied to Wellington personally for some assurance, the latter could only answer that in like cases Mascarheñas had been hanged, and Sabugal rewarded!

To force a change in the whole spirit and action of the government seemed to some the only remedy for the distemperature of the time; but this might have produced anarchy, and would have given countenance to the democratic spirit, contrary to the general policy of the British government. Wellington therefore desired rather to have the prince regent at Lisbon or the Azores, whence his authority might, under the influence of England, be more directly used to enforce salutary regulations; he however considered it essential that Carlotta, whose intrigues were incessant, should not be with him, and she, on the other hand, laboured to come back without the prince, who was prevented from moving by continued disturbances in the Brazils. Mr. Stuart, then despairing of good, proposed the establishment of a military government at once, but Wellington would not agree, although the mischief afloat clogged every wheel of the military machine.

A law of King Sebastian, which obliged all gentlemen holding land to take arms, was now revived, but desertion, which had commenced with the first

appointment of British officers, increased ; and so many persons sailed away in British vessels of war, to evade military service in their own country, that an edict was published to prevent the practice. Beresford checked the desertion for a moment, by condemning deserters to hard labour, and offering rewards to the country people to deliver them up ; yet griping want renewed the evil at the commencement of the campaign, and the terrible severity of condemning 19 at once to death, did not repress it. The cavalry, which had been at all times very inefficient, was now nearly ruined ; the men were become faint-hearted, the breed of horses almost extinct, and shameful speculations amongst the officers increased the mischief ; one guilty colonel was broke, and his uniform stripped from his shoulders in the public square at Lisbon. However, these examples produced fear and astonishment rather than correction ; the misery of the troops continued, and the army, although by the care of Beresford it was again augmented to more than 30,000 men under arms, declined in moral character and spirit.

To govern armies in the field is at all times a great and difficult matter ; and in this contest the operations were so intimately connected with the civil administration of Portugal, Spain, and the Brazils, and the contest, being one of principles, so affected the policy of every nation of the civilized world, that unprecedented difficulties sprung up in the way of the general, and the ordinary frauds and embarrassments of war were greatly augmented. Napoleon's continental system, joined to his financial measures, which were quite opposed to debt and paper-money, increased the pernicious effects of the English bank restriction ; specie was abundant in France, but had nearly disappeared from England ; it was only to be obtained from abroad, and at an incredible expense. The few markets left for British manufactures and colonial produce did not always make returns in the articles necessary for the war ; and gold, absolutely indispensable in certain quantities, was only supplied, and this entirely from the incapacity of the English ministers, in the proportion of one-sixth of what was required by an army which professed to pay for everything. Hence continual efforts on the part of the government to force markets, hence a depreciation of value both in goods and bills ; hence, also, a continual struggle on the part of the general to sustain a contest dependent on the fluctuation of such a precarious system. Dependent also it was upon the prudence of three governments, one of which had just pushed its colonies to rebellion, when the French armies were in possession of four-fifths of the mother country ; another was hourly raising up obstacles to its own defence, though the enemy had just been driven from the capital ; and the third was forcing a war with America, its greatest and surest market, when by commerce alone it could hope to sustain the struggle in the Peninsula.

The failure of the preceding year's harvest all over Europe had rendered the supply of Portugal very difficult. Little grain was to be obtained in any country of the north of Europe accessible to the British, and the necessity of paying in hard money rendered even that slight resource null. Sicily and Malta were thrown for subsistence upon Africa, where colonial produce was indeed available for commerce, yet the quantity of grain to be had there was small, and the capricious nature of the barbarians rendered the intercourse precarious. In December 1811 there was only two months' consumption of corn in Portugal for the population, although the magazines of the army contained more than three. To America, therefore, it was necessary to look. Now in 1810 Mr. Stuart had given treasury bills to the house of Sampaio for the purchase of American corn ; but the disputes between England and the United States, the depreciation of English bills, from the quantity in the market, together with the expiration of the American bank charter, had prevented Sampaio from completing his commission, nevertheless, although the increasing bitterness of the disputes with America discouraged a renewal of this plan, some more bills were now given to the English minister at Washington, with directions to purchase corn, and consign it to Sampaio, to resell in Portugal as before, for the benefit of the military chest. Other bills were also sent to the Brazils, to purchase rice, and all the consuls in the Mediterranean were desired to encourage the exportation of grain and the importation of colonial produce. In this manner, despite of the English ministers' incapacity, Lord Wellington found resources to

feed the population, to recover some of the specie expended by the army, and to maintain the war. But as the year advanced, the Non-intercourse Act of Congress, which had caused a serious drain of specie from Portugal, was followed by an embargo for ninety days, and then famine, which already afflicted parts of Spain, menaced Portugal.

Mr. Stewart knew of this embargo before the speculators did, and sent his agents orders to buy up with hard cash, at a certain price, a quantity of grain which had lately arrived at Gibraltar. He could only forestall the speculators by a few days, the cost soon rose beyond his means in specie, yet the new harvest being nearly ripe, this prompt effort sufficed for the occasion, and happily so, for the American declaration of war followed, and American privateers were to take the place of American flour-ships. But as ruin seemed to approach, Stuart's energy redoubled. His agents, seeking for grain in all parts of the world, discovered that in the Brazils a sufficient quantity might be obtained, in exchange for English manufactures, to secure Portugal from absolute famine; and to protect this traffic, and preserve that with the United States, he persuaded the regency to declare the neutrality of Portugal, and to interdict the sale of prizes within its waters. He also, at Wellington's desire, besought the English admiralty to reinforce the squadron in the Tagus, and to keep cruisers at particular stations. Finally he pressed the financial reforms in Portugal with the utmost vigour and with some success. His efforts were, however, strangely counteracted from quarters least expected. The English consul, in the Western Isles, with incredible presumption, publicly excited the islanders to war with America, when Mr. Stuart's efforts were directed to prevent such a calamity; the admiralty neglecting to station cruisers in the proper places, left the American privateers free to range along the Portuguese and African coast; and the cupidity of English merchants broke down the credit of the English commissariat paper-money, which was the chief medium of exchange on the immediate theatre of war.

This paper had arisen from a simple military regulation. Lord Wellington, on first assuming the command in 1809, found that all persons gave their own vouchers in payment for provisions, whereupon he proclaimed that none save commissaries should thus act; and that all local accounts should be paid within one month, in ready money, if it was in the chest, if not, with bills on the commissary-general. These bills soon became numerous, because of the scarcity of specie, yet their value did not sink, because they enabled those who had really furnished supplies, to prove their debts without the trouble of following the head-quarters; and they had an advantage over receipts, inasmuch as they distinctly pointed out the person who was to pay; they were also in accord with the customs of the country, for the people were used to receive government bills. The possessors were paid in rotation, whenever there was money; the small holders, who were the real furnishers of the army, first, the speculators last, a regulation by which justice and the credit of the paper were alike consulted.

In 1812, this paper sunk 20 per cent., from the sordid practices of English mercantile houses, whose agents secretly depreciated its credit and then purchased it; and in this dishonesty they were aided by some of the commissariat, notwithstanding the vigilant probity of the chief commissary. Sums, as low as tenpence, payable in Lisbon, I have myself seen in the hands of poor country people on the frontiers. By these infamous proceedings the poorer dealers were ruined or forced to raise their prices, which hurt their sales and contracted the markets to the detriment of the soldiers; and there was much danger that the people generally would thus discover the mode of getting cash for bills, by submitting to high discounts, which would soon have rendered the contest too costly to continue. But the resources of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were not exhausted. They contrived to preserve the neutrality of Portugal, and by means of licenses continued to have importations of American flour, until the end of the war; a very fine stroke of policy, for this flour was paid for with English goods, and resold at a considerable profit for specie which went to the military chest. They were less successful in supporting the credit of the Portuguese government paper; bad faith, and the necessities of the native commissariat, which now caused an extraordinary issue, combined to lower its credit.

The Conde de Funchal, Mr. Villiers, and Mr. Vansittart proposed a bank, and other schemes, such as a loan of one million and a half from the English treasury, which shall be treated more at length in another place. But Lord Wellington ridiculing the fallacy of a government, with revenues unequal to its expenditure, borrowing from a government which was unable to find specie sufficient to sustain the war, remarked, that the money could not be realized in the Portuguese treasury, or it must be realized at the expense of a military chest, whose hollow sound already mocked the soldiers' shout of victory. Again, therefore, he demanded the reform of abuses, and offered to take all the responsibility and odium upon himself, certain that the exigencies of the war could be thus met, and the most vexatious imposts upon the poor abolished; neither did he fail to point out in detail the grounds of this conviction. His reasoning made as little impression upon Funchal, as it had done upon Linhares; money was nowhere to be had, and the general, after being forced to become a trader himself, now tolerated, for the sake of the resources it furnished, a contraband commerce, which he discovered Soult to have established with English merchants at Lisbon, exchanging the quicksilver of Almaden for colonial produce; and he was still to find in his own personal resources the means of beating the enemy, in despite of the matchless follies of the governments he served. He did so, but complained that it was a hard task.

BOOK XVIII.

CHAPTER I.

In the foregoing book, the political state of the belligerents, and those great chains which bound the war in the Peninsula to the policy of the American as well as to the European nations, have been shown ; the minor events of the war have also been narrated, and the point where the decisive struggle was to be made has been indicated ; thus naught remains to tell, save the particular preparations of each adverse general ere the noble armies were dashed together in the shock of battle.

Nearly 300,000 French still trampled upon Spain, above 240,000 were with the eagles, and so successful had the plan of raising native soldiers proved, that 40,000 Spaniards well organized marched under the king's banners.

In May the distribution of this immense army, which, however, according to the French custom, included officers and persons of all kinds attached to the forces, was as follows :—

Seventy-six thousand, of which 60,000 were with the eagles, composed the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, under Suchet, and they occupied Valencia, and the provinces whose name they bore.*

Forty-nine thousand men, of which 38,000 were with the eagles, composed the army of the north, under Caffarelli, and were distributed on the grand line of communication from St. Sebastian to Burgos ; but of this army two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, were destined to reinforce Marmont.

Nineteen thousand, of which 17,000 were with the eagles, composed the army of the centre, occupying a variety of posts in a circle round the capital, and having a division in La Mancha.

Sixty-three thousand, of which 56,000 were with the eagles, composed the army of the south, under Soult, occupying Andalusia and a part of Estremadura ; but some of these troops were detained in distant governments by other generals.

The army of Portugal, under Marmont, consisted of 70,000 men, 52,000 being with the eagles, and a reinforcement of 12,000 men were in march to join this army from France. Marmont occupied Leon, part of Old Castile, and the Asturias, having his front upon the Tormes, and a division watching Galicia.

The numerous Spanish *juramentados* were principally employed in Andalusia and with the army of the centre, and the experience of Ocaña, of Badajos, and many other places, proved that for the intrusive monarch they fought with more vigour than their countrymen did against him.

In March Joseph had been appointed commander-in-chief of all the French armies, but the generals, as usual, resisted his authority. Dorsenne denied it altogether, Caffarelli, who succeeded Dorsenne, disputed even his civil power in the governments of the north, Suchet evaded his orders, Marmont neglected them, and Soult firmly opposed his injudicious military plans. The king was distressed for money, and he complained that Marmont's army had consumed or plundered in three months, the whole resources of the province of Toledo and the district of Talavera, whereby Madrid and the army of the centre were famished. Marmont retorted by complaints of the wasteful extravagance of the king's military administration in the capital. Thus dissensions were generated when the most absolute union was required.

After the fall of Badajos, Joseph judged that the allies would soon move, either against Marmont in Castile, against himself by the valley of the Tagus, or against

* Appendix No. 1, section 1.

Soult in Andalusia. In the first case he designed to aid Marmont, with the divisions of the north, with the army of the centre, and with 15,000 men to be drawn from the army of the south. In the second case to draw the army of Portugal and a portion of the army of the south into the valley of the Tagus, while the divisions from the army of the north entered Leon. In the third case the half of Marmont's army, reinforced by a division of the army of the centre, was to pass the Tagus at Arzobispo and follow the allies. But the army of the centre was not ready to take the field, and Wellington knew it; Marmont's complaint was just; waste and confusion prevailed at Madrid, and there was so little military vigour that the Empecinado, with other Partida chiefs, pushed their excursions to the very gates of that capital.

Joseph finally ordered Suchet to reinforce the army of the centre, and then calling up the Italian division of Palombini from the army of the Ebro, directed Soult to keep Drouet, with one-third of the army of the south, so far advanced in Estremadura as to have direct communication with General Trielhard in the valley of the Tagus; and he especially ordered that Drouet should pass that river if Hill passed it. It was necessary, he said, to follow the English army, and fight it with advantage of numbers, to do which required a strict co-operation of the three armies, Drouet's corps being the pivot. Meanwhile Marmont and Soult, being each convinced that the English general would invade their separate provinces, desired that the king would so view the coming contest, and oblige the other to regulate his movements thereby. The former complained that, having to observe the Gallicians and occupy the Asturias, his forces were disseminated, and he asked for reinforcements to chase the Partidas, who impeded the gathering of provisions in Castile and Leon. But the king, who overrated the importance of Madrid, designed rather to draw more troops round the capital; and he entirely disapproved of Soult besieging Tarifa and Carthagen, arguing that if Drouet was not ready to pass the Tagus, the whole of the allies could unite on the right bank, and penetrate without opposition to the capital, or that Lord Wellington would concentrate to overwhelm Marmont.

The Duke of Dalmatia would not suffer Drouet to stir, and Joseph, whose jealousy had been excited by the marshal's power in Andalusia, threatened to deprive him of his command. The inflexible duke replied that the king had already virtually done so by sending orders direct to Drouet, that he was ready to resign, but he would not commit a gross military error. Drouet could scarcely arrive in time to help Marmont, and would be too weak for the protection of Madrid, but his absence would ruin Andalusia, because the allies, whose force in Estremadura was very considerable, could in five marches reach Seville and take it on the sixth; then communicating with the fleets at Cadiz they would change their line of operation without loss, and unite with 30,000 other troops, British and Spanish, who were at Gibraltar, in the Isla, in the Niebla, on the side of Murcia, and under Ballesteros in the Ronda. A new army might also come from the ocean, and Drouet, once beyond the Tagus, could not return to Andalusia in less than twelve days; Marmont could scarcely come there in a month; the force under his own immediate command was spread all over Andalusia, if collected it would not furnish 30,000 sabres and bayonets, exclusive of Drouet, and the evacuation of the province would be unavoidable.

The French misfortunes, he said, had invariably arisen from not acting in large masses, and the army of Portugal, by spreading too much to its right, would ruin this campaign as it had ruined the preceding one. "Marmont should leave one or two divisions on the Tormes, and place the rest of his army in position, on both sides of the pass of Baños, the left near Placentia, and the right, extending towards Somosierra, which could be occupied by a detachment. Lord Wellington could not then advance by the valley of the Tagus without lending his left flank; nor to the Tormes without lending his right flank. Neither could he attack Marmont with effect, because the latter could easily concentrate, and according to the nature of the attack secure his retreat by the valley of the Tagus, or by the province of Avila, while the two divisions of the Tormes reinforced by two others from the army of the north would act on the allies' flank." For these reasons Soult would not

permit Drouet to quit Estremadura, yet he promised to reinforce him and so to press Hill that Graham, whom he supposed still at Portalegre, should be obliged to bring up the first and sixth divisions. In fine he promised that a powerful body of the allies should be forced to remain in Estremadura, or Hill would be defeated and Badajos invested. This dispute raged during May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile the English general, well acquainted from the intercepted letters with these dissensions, made his arrangements so as to confirm each general in his own peculiar views.

Soult was the more easily deceived, because he had obtained a Gibraltar newspaper, in which, so negligent was the Portuguese government, Lord Wellington's secret despatches to Forjas, containing an account of his army and of his first designs against the south, were printed; and it must be remembered that the plan of invading Andalusia was only relinquished about the middle of May. Hill's exploit at Almaraz menaced the north and south alike, but that general had adroitly spread a report that his object was to gain time for the invasion of Andalusia, and all Wellington's demonstrations were calculated to aid this artifice and impose upon Soult. Graham indeed returned to Beira with the first and sixth divisions and Cotton's cavalry; but as Hill was at the same time reinforced, and Graham's march sudden and secret, the enemy were again deceived in all quarters. For Marmont and the king, reckoning the number of divisions, thought the bulk of the allies was in the north, and did not discover that Hill's corps had been nearly doubled in numbers, though his division seemed the same; while Soult, not immediately aware of Graham's departure, found Hill more than a match for Drouet, and still expected the allies in Andalusia.

Drouet, willing rather to obey the king than Soult, drew towards Medellin in June, but Soult, as we have seen, sent the reinforcements from Seville, by the road of Monasterio, and thus obliged him to come back. Then followed those movements and counter-movements in Estremadura, which have been already related, each side being desirous of keeping a great number of their adversaries in that province. Soult's judgment was thus made manifest, for Drouet could only have crossed the Tagus with peril to Andalusia, whereas, without endangering that province, he now made such a powerful diversion for Marmont, that Wellington's army in the north was reduced below the army of Portugal, and much below what the latter could be raised to, by detachments from the armies of the north, and of the centre. However, in the beginning of June, while the French generals were still disputing, Lord Wellington's dispositions were completed, he had established at last an extensive system of gaining intelligence all over Spain, and as his campaign was one which posterity will delight to study, it is fitting to show very exactly the foundation on which the operations rested.

His political and military reasons for seeking a battle have been before shown, but this design was always conditional; he would fight on advantage, but he would risk nothing beyond the usual chances of combat. While Portugal was his, every movement which obliged the enemy to concentrate was an advantage, and his operations were ever in subservience to this vital condition. His whole force amounted to nearly 90,000 men, of which about 6000 were in Cadiz; but the Walcheren expedition was still to be atoned for: the sick were so numerous amongst the regiments which had served there, that only 32,000, or a little more than half of the British soldiers, were under arms. This number, with 24,000 Portuguese, made 56,000 sabres and bayonets in the field; and it is to be remembered that now and at all times the Portuguese infantry were mixed with the British either by brigades or regiments; wherefore in speaking of English divisions in battle the Portuguese battalions are always included, and it is to their praise that their fighting was such as to justify the use of the general term.

The troops were organized in the following manner:—

Two thousand cavalry and 15,000 infantry, with 24 guns, were under Hill, who had also the aid of four garrison Portuguese regiments, and of the fifth Spanish army. Twelve hundred Portuguese cavalry were in the *Tras Os Montes*, under General D'Urban, and about 3500 British cavalry and 36,000 infantry, with 54 guns, were under Wellington's immediate command, which was now enlarged

by 3500 Spaniards, infantry and cavalry, under Carlos D'España and Julian Sanchez.

The bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed to lengthen the French lateral communications, and Wellington now ordered the bridge of Alcantara to be repaired to shorten his own. The breach in that stupendous structure was 90 feet wide, and 150 feet above the water line. Yet the fertile genius of Colonel Sturgeon furnished the means of passing this chasm with heavy artillery, and without the enemy being aware of the preparations made until the moment of execution. In the arsenal of Elvas he secretly prepared a network of strong ropes, after a fashion which permitted it to be carried in parts, and with the beams, planking, and other materials it was transported to Alcantara on 17 carriages. Straining beams were then fixed in the masonry on each side of the broken arch, cables were stretched across the chasm, the net-work was drawn over, tarpaulin blinds were placed at each side, and the heaviest guns passed in safety. This remarkable feat procured a new and short internal line of communication along good roads, while the enemy, by the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, was thrown upon a long external line and very bad roads.

Hill's corps was thus suddenly brought a fortnight's march nearer to Wellington, than Drouet was to Marmont, if both marched as armies with artillery ; but there was still a heavy drag upon the English general's operations. He had drawn so largely upon Portugal for means of transport, that agriculture was seriously embarrassed, and yet his subsistence was not secured for more than a few marches beyond the Agueda. To remedy this he set sailors and workmen to remove obstructions in the Douro and the Tagus ; the latter, which in Philip the Second's time had been navigable from Toledo to Lisbon, was opened to Malpica, not far from Alcantara, and the Douro was opened as high as Barca de Alba, below which it ceases to be a Spanish river. The whole land transport of the interior of Portugal was thus relieved ; the magazines were brought up the Tagus, close to the new line of communication by Alcantara, on one side ; on the other, the country vessels conveyed provisions to the mouth of the Douro, and that river then served to within a short distance of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca. Still danger was to be apprehended from the American privateers along the coast, which the admiralty neglected ; and the navigation of the Douro was suddenly suspended by the overheated zeal of a commissary, who being thwarted by the delays of the boatmen, issued, of his own authority, an edict, establishing regulations, and pronouncing pains and penalties upon all those who did not conform to them. The river was immediately abandoned by the craft, and the government endeavoured by a formal protest to give political importance to this affair, which was peculiarly vexatious, inasmuch as the boatmen were already so averse to passing the old points of navigation, that very severe measures were necessary to oblige them to do so.

When this matter was arranged, Wellington had still to dread that if his operations led him far into Spain, the subsistence of his army would be insecure ; for there were many objects of absolute necessity, especially meat, which could not be procured except with ready money, and not only was he unfurnished of specie, but his hopes of obtaining it were nearly extinguished by the sweep Lord William Bentinck had made in the Mediterranean money market : moreover the English ministers chose this period of difficulty to interfere, and in an ignorant and injurious manner, with his mode of issuing bills to supply his necessities. His resolution to advance could not be shaken, yet before crossing the Agueda, having described his plan of campaign to Lord Liverpool, he finished in these remarkable words :

"I am not insensible to losses and risks, nor am I blind to the disadvantages under which I undertake this operation. My friends in Castile, and I believe no officer ever had better, assure me that we shall not want provisions even before the harvest will be reaped ; that there exist concealed granaries which shall be opened to us, and that if we can pay for a part, credit will be given to us for the remainder, and they have long given me hopes that we should be able to borrow money in Castile upon British securities. In case we should be able to maintain ourselves in Castile, the general action and its results being delayed by the enemy's manœuvres,

which I think not improbable, I have in contemplation other resources for drawing supplies from the country, and I shall have at all events our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. *But with all these prospects I cannot reflect without shuddering upon the probability that we shall be distressed; nor upon the consequences which may result from our wanting money in the interior of Spain.*"

In the contemplated operations Lord Wellington did not fail to look both to his own and to his enemy's flanks. His right was secured by the destruction of the forts, the stores, and boats at Almaraz; for the valley of the Tagus was exhausted of provisions, and full of cross rivers which required a pontoon train to pass if the French should menace Portugal seriously in that line: moreover, he caused the fortress of Monte Santos, which covered the Portuguese frontier between the Tagus and Ciudad Rodrigo to be put into a state of defence, and the restoration of Alcantara gave Hill the power of quickly interfering. On the other side, if Marmont, strengthened by Caffarelli's division, should operate strongly against the allies' left, a retreat was open either upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or across the mountains into the valley of the Tagus. Such were his arrangements for his own interior line of operations, and to menace his enemy's flanks his measures embraced the whole Peninsula.

1. He directed Silveira and D'Urban, who were on the frontier of Tras Os Montes, to file along the Douro, menace the enemy's right flank and rear, and form a link of connection with the Gallician army, with which Castaños promised to besiege Astorga, as soon as the Anglo-Portuguese should appear on the Tormes. Meanwhile Sir Home Popham's expedition was to commence its operations, in concert with the seventh Spanish army, on the coast of Biscay, and so draw Caffarelli's divisions from the succour of Marmont.

2. To hinder Suchet from reinforcing the king, or making a movement towards Andalusia, the Sicilian expedition was to menace Catalonia and Valencia, in concert with the Murcian army.

3. To prevent Soult overwhelming Hill, Wellington trusted, 1st, to the garrison of Gibraltar, and to the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish troops in the Isla de Leon; 2nd, to insurrections in the kingdom of Cordoba, where Echevaria, going from Cadiz by the way of Ayamonte, with 300 officers, was to organize the Partidas of that district, as Mendizabel had done those of the northern parts; 3rd, to Ballesteros's army, but he ever dreaded the rashness of this general, who might be crushed in a moment, which would have endangered Hill and rendered any success in the north nugatory.

It was this fear of Ballesteros's rashness that caused Wellington to keep so strong a corps in Estremadura, and hence Soult's resolution to prevent Drouet from quitting Estremadura, even though Hill should cross the Tagus, was wise and military. For though Drouet would undoubtedly have given the king and Marmont a vast superiority in Castile, the general advantage would have remained with Wellington. Hill could at any time have misled Drouet by crossing the bridge of Alcantara, and returning again, when Drouet had passed the bridge of Toledo or Arzobispo. The French general's march would then have led to nothing, for either Hill could have joined Wellington by a shorter line, and Soult, wanting numbers, could not have taken advantage of his absence from Estremadura; or Wellington could have retired within the Portuguese frontier, rendering Drouet's movement to Castile a pure loss; or reinforcing Hill by the bridge of Alcantara, he could have gained a fortnight's march, and overwhelmed Soult in Andalusia. The great error of the king's plan was that it depended upon exact co-operation amongst persons who, jealous of each other, were far from obedient to himself, and whose marches it was scarcely possible to time justly; because the armies were separated by a great extent of country, and their lines of communication were external, long, and difficult, while their enemy was acting on internal short and easy lines. Moreover, the French correspondence, continually intercepted by the Partidas, was brought to Wellington, and the knowledge thus gained by one side and lost by the other, caused the timely reinforcing of Hill in Estremadura, and the keeping of Palombini's Italian division from Madrid for

three weeks ; an event which in the sequel proved of vital consequence, inasmuch as it prevented the army of the centre moving until after the crisis of the campaign had passed.

Hill's exploit at Almaraz, and the disorderly state of the army of the centre, having in a manner isolated the army of Portugal, the importance of Galicia and the Asturias, with the respect to the projected operations of Lord Wellington, was greatly increased. For the Gallicians could either act in Castile upon the rear of Marmont, and so weaken the line of defence on the Douro ; or, marching through the Asturias, spread insurrection along the coast to the Montaña de Santander and there join the seventh army. Hence the necessity of keeping Bonet in the Asturias, and watching the Gallician passes was become imperative, and Marmont, following Napoleon's instructions, had fortified the different posts in Castile, but his army was too widely spread, and, as Soult observed, was extended to its right instead of concentrating on the left near Baños.

The Duke of Ragusa had resolved to adopt the Tormes and Douro as his lines of defence, and never doubting that he was the object of attack, watched the augmentation of Wellington's forces and magazines with the utmost anxiety. He had collected considerable magazines himself, and the king had formed others for him at Talavera and Segovia, yet he did not approach the Agueda, but continued to occupy a vast extent of country for the convenience of feeding them until June. When he heard of the restoration of the bridge of Alcantara, and of magazines being formed at Caceres, he observed that the latter would be on the left of the Guadiana if Andalusia were the object ; and although not well placed for an army acting against himself, were admirably placed for an army which, having fought in Castile, should afterwards operate against Madrid, because they could be transported at once to the right of the Tagus by Alcantara, and could be secured by removing the temporary restorations. Wherefore, judging that Hill would immediately rejoin Wellington, to aid in the battle that, with a prophetic feeling he observed, would be fought near the Tormes, he desired Caffarelli to put the divisions of the army of the north in movement ; and he prayed the king to have guns, and a pontoon train sent from Madrid that Drouet might pass at Almaraz and join him by the Puerto Pico.

Joseph immediately renewed his orders to Soult, and to Caffarelli, but he only sent two small boats to Almaraz ; and Marmont, seeing the allied army suddenly concentrated on the Agueda, recalled Foy from the valley of the Tagus, and Bonet from the Asturias. His first design was to assemble the army at Medina del Campo, Valladolid, Valdesillas, Toro, Zamora, and Salamanca, leaving two battalions and a brigade of dragoons at Benavente to observe the Gallicians. Thus the bulk of the troops would line the Duero, while two divisions formed an advance guard on the Tormes, and the whole could be concentrated in five days. His ultimate object was to hold the Tormes until Wellington's whole army was on that river, then to assemble his own troops on the Duero, and act so as to favour the defence of the forts at Salamanca until reinforcements from the north should enable him to drive the allies again within the Portuguese frontier ; and he warned Caffarelli that the forts could not hold out more than 15 days after they should be abandoned by the French army.

Marmont was a man to be feared. He possessed quickness of apprehension and courage, moral and physical, scientific acquirements, experience of war, and great facility in the moving of troops ; he was strong of body, in the flower of life, eager for glory, and although neither a great nor a fortunate commander, such a one as might bear the test of fire. His army was weak in cavalry but admirably organized, for he had laboured with successful diligence to restore that discipline which had been so much shaken by the misfortunes of Massena's campaign, and by the unceasing operations from the battle of Fuentes Onoro to the last retreat from Beira. Upon this subject a digression must be allowed, because it has been often affirmed, that the bad conduct of the French in the Peninsula was encouraged by their leaders, was unmatched in wickedness, and peculiar to the nation. Such assertions springing from morbid national antipathies it is the duty of the historian to correct. All troops will behave ill, when ill-governed, but the best commanders

cannot at times prevent the perpetration of the most frightful mischief; and this truth, so important to the welfare of nations, may be proved with respect to the Peninsular war, by the avowal of the generals on either side, and by their endeavours to arrest the evils which they deplored. When Dorsenne returned from his expedition against Galicia, in the latter end of 1811, he reproached his soldiers in the following terms:—"The fields have been devastated and houses have been burned; these excesses are unworthy of the French soldier, they pierce the hearts of the most devoted and friendly of the Spaniards, they are revolting to honest men, and embarrass the provisioning of the army. The general-in-chief sees them with sorrow, and orders, that besides a permanent court-martial, there shall be at the head-quarters of each division, of every arm, a military commission which shall try the following crimes, and on conviction, sentence to death, without appeal; execution to be done on the spot, in presence of the troops.

"1. Quitting a post to pillage. 2. Desertion of all kinds. 3. Disobedience in face of the enemy. 4. Insubordination of all kinds. 5. Marauding of all kinds. 6. Pillage of all kinds.

"*All persons, military or others, shall be considered as pillagers, who quit their post or their ranks to enter houses, etc., or who use violence to obtain from the inhabitants more than they are legally entitled to.*

"*All persons shall be considered deserters who shall be found without a passport beyond the advanced posts, and frequent patrols, day and night, shall be sent to arrest all persons beyond the outposts.*

"*Before the enemy, when in camp or cantonments, roll-calls shall take place every hour, and all persons absent without leave twice running shall be counted deserters and judged as such. The servants and sutlers of the camp are amenable to this as well as the soldier."*

This order Marmont, after reproaching his troops for like excesses, renewed with the following additions:

"*Considering that the disorders of the army have arrived at the highest degree, and require the most vigorous measures of repression, it is ordered—*

"1. *All non-commissioned officers and soldiers found a quarter of a league from their quarters, camp, or post without leave, shall be judged pillagers and tried by the military commission.*

"2. *The gens-d'armes shall examine the baggage of all sutlers and followers and shall seize all effects that appear to be pillaged, and shall burn what will burn, and bring the gold and silver to the paymaster-general under a 'procès verbal,' and all persons whose effects have been seized as pillage to the amount of 100 livres shall be sent to the military commission, and on conviction suffer death.*

"3. *All officers who shall not take proper measures to repress disorders under their command shall be sent in arrest to head-quarters, there to be judged."*

Then appointing the number of baggage animals to each company, upon a scale which coincides in a remarkable manner with the allowances in the British army, Marmont directed the overplus to be seized and delivered, under a legal process, to the nearest villages, ordering the provost-general to look to the execution each day, and report thereon. Finally, he clothed the provost-general with all the powers of the military commissions; and proof was soon given that his orders were not mere threats, for two captains were arrested for trial, and a soldier of the 26th regiment was condemned to death by one of the provisional commissions for stealing church vessels.

Such was the conduct of the French; and touching the conduct of the English, Lord Wellington, in the same month, wrote thus to Lord Liverpool:

"*The outrages committed by the British soldiers belonging to this army have become so enormous, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request your Lordship's early attention to the subject. I am sensible that the best measures to be adopted on this subject are those of prevention, and I believe there are few officers who have paid more attention to the subject than I have done, and I have been so far successful, as that few outrages are committed by the soldiers who are with their regiments, after the regiments have been a short time in this country.*

"But in the extended system on which we are acting, small detachments of soldiers must be marched long distances, through the country, either as escorts, or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or coming from hospitals, etc., and notwithstanding that these detachments are never allowed to march, excepting under the command of an officer or more, in proportion to its size, and that every precaution is taken to provide for the regularity of their subsistence, there is no instance of the march of one of these detachments that outrages of every description are not committed, and I am sorry to say with impunity."

"The guard-rooms are therefore crowded with prisoners, and the offences of which they have been guilty remain unpunished, to the destruction of the discipline of the army, and to the injury of the reputation of the country for justice. I have thought it proper to lay these circumstances before your lordship. I am about to move the army further forward into Spain, and I assure your lordship, that I have not a friend in that country, who has not written to me in dread of the consequences, which must result to the army and to the cause, from a continuance of these disgraceful irregularities, which I declare I have it not in my power to prevent."

To this should have been added, the insubordination, and the evil passions, awakened by the unchecked plunder of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos. But long had the English general complained of the bad discipline of his army, and the following extracts, from a letter dated a few months later, show that his distrust at the present time was not ill-founded. After observing that the constitutions of the soldiers were so much shaken from disorders acquired by their service at Walcheren, or by their own irregularities, that a British army was almost a moving hospital, more than one-third or about 20,000 men being sick, or attending upon the sick, he thus describes their conduct.

"The disorders which these soldiers have, are of a very trifling description, they are considered to render them incapable of serving with their regiments, but they certainly do not incapacitate them from committing outrages of all descriptions on their passage through the country, and in the last movements of the hospitals the soldiers have not only plundered the inhabitants of their property, but the hospital stores which moved with the hospitals, and have sold the plunder. And all these outrages are committed with impunity, no proof can be brought on oath before a court-martial that any individual has committed an outrage, and the soldiers of the army are becoming little better than a band of robbers." "I have carried the establishment and authority of the provost-marshal as far as either will go; there are at this moment not less than one provost-marshal and 19 assistant provost-marshals attached to the several divisions of cavalry and infantry and to the hospital stations, to preserve order, but this establishment is not sufficient, and I have not the means of increasing it."

The principal remedies he proposed, were the admitting less rigorous proof of guilt, before courts-martial; the forming a military police, *such as the French and other armies possessed*; the enforcing more attention on the part of the officers to their duties; the increasing the pay and responsibility of the non-commissioned officers, and the throwing upon them the chief care of the discipline. But in treating this part of the subject he broached an opinion which can scarcely be sustained even by his authority. Assuming, somewhat unjustly, that the officers of his army were, from consciousness of like demerit, generally too lenient in their sentences on each other for neglect of duty, he says, "I am inclined to entertain the opinion that in the British army duties of inspection and control over the conduct and habits of the soldiers, the performance of which by somebody is the only effectual check to disorder and all its consequences, are imposed upon the subaltern officers of regiments, which duties British officers, being of the class of gentlemen in society, and being required to appear as such, have never performed *and which they will never perform*. It is very necessary, however, that the duties should be performed by somebody, and for this reason, and having observed the advantage derived in the guards, from the respectable body of non-commissioned officers in those regiments, who perform all the duties required from subalterns in the marching regiments, I had suggested to your lordship the expediency of increasing the pay of the non-commissioned officers in the army."

Now it is a strange assumption, that a gentleman necessarily neglects his duty to his country. When well taught, which was not always the case, gentlemen by birth generally performed their duties in the Peninsula more conscientiously than others, and the experience of every commanding officer will bear out the assertion. If the non-commissioned officers could do all the duties of subaltern officers, why should the country bear the useless expense of the latter? But in truth the system of the guards produced rather a medium goodness, than a superior excellence; the system of Sir John Moore, founded upon the principle that the officers should thoroughly know and be responsible for the discipline of their soldiers, better bore the test of experience. All the British regiments of the light division were formed in the camps of Shorn-Cliff by that most accomplished commander; very many of the other acknowledged good regiments of the army had been instructed by him in Sicily; and wherever an officer formed under Moore obtained a regiment, whether British or Portuguese, that regiment was distinguished in this war for its discipline and enduring qualities; courage was common to all.

CHAPTER II.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

ON the 13th of June, the periodic rains having ceased, and the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda and marched towards the Tormes in four columns, one of which was composed of the Spanish troops. The 16th he reached the Valmusa stream, within six miles of Salamanca, and drove a French detachment across the Tormes. All the bridges save that of Salamanca, which was defended by the forts, had been destroyed, and there was a garrison in the castle of Alba de Tormes, but the 17th the allies passed the river above and below the town, by the deep fords of Santa Marta and Los Cantos, and General Henry Clinton invested the forts the same day with the sixth division. Marmont, with two divisions, and some cavalry, retired to Fuente el Saucó, on the road of Toro, followed by an advanced guard of the allies; Salamanca instantly became a scene of rejoicing, the houses were illuminated, and the people shouting, singing, and weeping for joy, gave Wellington their welcome while his army took a position on the mountain of San Christoval about five miles in advance.

SIEGE OF THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA.

Four 18-pounders had followed the army from Almeida, three 24-pound howitzers were furnished by the field artillery, and the battering train used by Hill at Almaraz, had passed the bridge of Alcantara the 11th. These were the means of offence, but the strength of the forts had been underrated; they contained 800 men, and it was said that 13 convents and 22 colleges had been destroyed in their construction. San Vincente, so called from the large convent it enclosed, was the key-fort. Situated on a perpendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes, and irregular in form, but well flanked, it was separated by a deep ravine from the other forts, which were called St. Cajetano and La Merced. These were also on high ground, smaller than San Vincente, and of a square form, but with bomb proofs, and deep ditches, having perpendicular scarps and counterscarps.

In the night of the 17th, Colonel Burgoyne, the engineer directing the siege, commenced a battery for eight guns, at the distance of 250 yards from the main wall of Vincente, and as the ruins of the destroyed convents rendered it impossible to excavate, earth was brought from a distance; but the moon was up, the night short, the enemy's fire of musketry heavy, the workmen of the sixth division were inexperienced, and at daybreak the battery was still imperfect. Meanwhile an attempt had been made to attach the miner secretly to the counterscarp, and when the vigilance of a trained dog baffled this design, the enemy's picquet was driven in, and the attempt openly made, yet it was rendered vain by a plunging fire from the top of the convent.

On the 18th, 800 Germans, placed in the ruins, mastered all the enemy's fire save that from loopholes, and Colonel May, who directed the artillery service, then placed two field-pieces on a neighbouring convent, called San Bernardo, overlooking the fort; however, these guns could not silence the French artillery.

In the night the first battery was armed; covering for two field-pieces as

a counter-battery was raised a little to its right, and a second breaching battery for two howitzers was constructed on the Cajetano side of the ravine.

At daybreak on the 19th, seven guns opened, and at nine o'clock the wall of the convent was cut away to the level of the counterscarp. The second breaching battery, which was lower down the scarp, then commenced its fire; but the iron howitzers proved unequal to battering ordnance, and the enemy's musketry being entirely directed on this point, because the first battery, to save ammunition, had ceased firing, brought down a captain and more than 20 gunners. The howitzers did not injure the wall, ammunition was scarce, and as the enemy could easily cut off the breach in the night, the fire ceased.

The 20th at mid-day, Colonel Dickson arrived with the iron howitzers from Elvas, and the second battery being then reinforced with additional pieces, revived its fire against a re-entering angle of the convent a little beyond the former breach. The wall here was soon broken through, and in an instant a huge cantle of the convent, with its roof, went to the ground, crushing many of the garrison and laying bare the inside of the building: carcasses were immediately thrown into the opening, to burn the convent, but the enemy undauntedly maintained their ground and extinguished the flames. A lieutenant and 15 gunners were lost this day, on the side of the besiegers, and the ammunition being nearly gone, the attack was suspended until fresh stores could come up from Almeida.

During the progress of this siege, the general aspect of affairs had materially changed on both sides. Lord Wellington had been deceived as to the strength of the forts, and intercepted returns of the armies of the south and of Portugal now showed to him that they also were far stronger than he had expected; at the same time he heard of Ballesteros's defeat at Bornos, and of Slade's unfortunate cavalry action of Llera. He had calculated that Bonet would not quit the Asturias, and that general was in full march for Leon, Caffarelli also was preparing to reinforce Marmont, and thus the brilliant prospect of the campaign was suddenly clouded. But on the other hand Bonet had unexpectedly relinquished the Asturias after six days' occupation; 3000 Galicians were in that province and in communication with the seventh army, and the maritime expedition under Popham had sailed for the coast of Biscay.

Neither was the king's situation agreeable. The Partidas intercepted his despatches so surely, that it was the 19th ere Marmont's letter announcing Wellington's advance, and saying that Hill also was in march for the north, reached Madrid. Soult detained Drouet, Suchet refused to send more than one brigade towards Madrid, and Caffarelli, disturbed that Palombini should march upon the capital instead of Burgos, kept back the divisions promised to Marmont. Something was however gained in vigour, for the king, no longer depending upon the assistance of the distant armies, gave orders to blow up Mirabete and abandon La Mancha on one side, and the forts of Somosierra and Buitrago on the other, with a view to unite the army of the centre.

A detachment of 800 men under Colonel Noizet, employed to destroy Buitrago, was attacked on his return by the Empecinado with 3000, but Noizet, an able officer, defeated him and reached Madrid with little loss. Palombini's march was then hastened, and imperative orders directed Soult to send 10,000 men to Toledo. The garrison of Segovia was reinforced to preserve one of the communications with Marmont, that marshal was informed of Hill's true position, and the king advised him to give battle to Wellington, for he supposed the latter to have only 18,000 English troops; but he had 24,000, and had yet left Hill so strong that he desired him to fight Drouet if occasion required.

Meanwhile Marmont, who had remained in person at Fuente el Saucó, united there on the 20th, four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, furnishing about 25,000 men of all arms, with which he marched to the succour of the forts. His approach over an open country was descried at a considerable distance, and a brigade of the fifth division was immediately called off from the siege, the battering train was sent across the Tormes, and the army, which was in bivouac on the Salamanca side of St. Christoval, formed in order of battle on the top. This position of Christoval was about four miles long, and rather concave, the ascent in

front steep and tangled with hollow roads and stone enclosures belonging to the villages, but the summit was broad, even, and covered with ripe corn; the right was flanked by the Upper Tormes, and the left dipped into the country bordering the Lower Tormes for in passing Salamanca that river makes a sweep round the back of the position. The infantry, the heavy cavalry, and the guns crowned the summit of the mountain, but the light cavalry fell back from the front to the low country on the left, where there was a small stream and a marshy flat. The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind the left of the position; the village of Cabrerizos marked the extreme right, though the hill still trended up the river. The villages of Christoval, Castellanos, and Moresco, were nearly in a line along the foot of the heights in front, the last was somewhat within the allies' ground, and nothing could be stronger than the position, which completely commanded all the country for many miles; but the heat was excessive, and there was neither shade nor fuel to cook with, nor water nearer than the Tormes.

About five o'clock in the evening the enemy's horsemen approached, pointing towards the left of the position, as if to turn it by the Lower Tormes, whereupon the British light cavalry made a short forward movement and a partial charge took place; but the French opened six guns, and the British retired to their own ground near Monte Rubio and Villares. The light division, which was held in reserve, immediately closed towards the left of the position until the French cavalry halted, and then returned to the centre. Meanwhile, the main body of the enemy bore in one dark volume against the right, and halting at the very foot of the position, sent a flight of shells on to the lofty summit; nor did this fire cease until after dark, when the French general, after driving back all the outposts, obtained possession of Moresco, and established himself behind that village and Castellanos within gunshot of the allies.

The English general slept that night on the ground, amongst the troops, and at the first streak of light the armies were again under arms. Nevertheless, though some signals were interchanged between Marmont and the forts, both sides were quiet until towards evening, when Wellington detached the 68th regiment from the line to drive the French from Moresco. This attack, made with vigour, succeeded; but the troops being recalled just as day-light failed, a body of French, coming unperceived through the standing corn, broke into the village as the British were collecting their posts from the different avenues, and did considerable execution. In the skirmish an officer of the 68th, named Mackay, being suddenly surrounded, refused to surrender, and singly fighting against a multitude, received more wounds than the human frame was thought capable of sustaining, yet he still lives to show his honourable scars.

On the 22nd, three divisions and a brigade of cavalry joined Marmont, who having now nearly 40,000 men in hand, extended his left and seized a part of the height in advance of the allies' right wing, from whence he could discern the whole of their order of battle, and attack their right on even terms. However, General Graham, advancing with the seventh division, dislodged this French detachment with a sharp skirmish before it could be formidably reinforced, and that night Marmont withdrew from his dangerous position to some heights about six miles in his rear.

It was thought that the French general's tempestuous advance to Moresco with such an inferior force, on the evening of the 20th, should have been his ruin. Lord Wellington saw clearly enough the false position of his enemy, but he argued that if Marmont came up to fight, it was better to defend a very strong position than to descend and combat in the plain, seeing that the inferiority of force was not such as to insure the result of the battle being decisive of the campaign; and in case of failure, a retreat across the Tormes would have been very difficult. To this may be added, that during the first evening there was some confusion amongst the allies, before the troops of the different nations could form their order of battle. Moreover, as the descent of the mountain towards the enemy was by no means easy, because of the walls and avenues and the two villages, which covered the French front, it is probable that Marmont, who had plenty of guns and whose troops were in perfect order and extremely ready of movement, could have evaded the action until night. This reasoning, however, will not hold good on the 21st.

The allies, whose infantry was a third more and their cavalry three times as numerous and much better mounted than the French, might have been poured down by all the roads passing over the position at daybreak; then Marmont, turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, could never have made his retreat to the Douro through the open country; but on the 22nd, when the French general had received his other divisions, the chances were no longer the same.



Marmont's new position was skilfully chosen; one flank rested on Cabeza Velloso, the other at Huerta, the centre was at Aldea Rubia. He thus refused his right and abandoned the road of Toro to the allies, but he covered the road of Tordesillas, and commanded the fort of Huerta with his left; and he could in a moment pass the Tormes, and operate by the left bank to communicate with the forts. Wellington made corresponding dispositions, closing up his left towards Moresco, and pushing the light division along the salient part of his position to Aldea Lengua, where it overhung a ford, which was however scarcely practicable at this period. General Graham with two divisions was placed at the fords of Santa Marta, and the heavy German cavalry under General Bock crossed the Tormes to watch the ford of Huerta. By this disposition the allies covered Salamanca, and could operate on either side of the Tormes on a shorter line than the French could operate.

The 23rd the two armies again remained tranquil, but at break of day on the 24th some dropping pistol-shots, and now and then a shout, came faintly from the mist which covered the lower ground beyond the river; the heavy sound of artillery succeeded, and the hissing of the bullets as they cut through the thickened atmosphere plainly told that the French were over the Tormes. After a time the fog cleared up, and the German horsemen were seen in close and beautiful order, retiring before 12,000 French infantry, who in battle array were marching steadily onwards. At intervals, twenty guns ranged in front, would start forwards and send their bullets whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, while scattered parties of light cavalry, scouting out, capped all the hills in succession, and peering abroad, gave signals to the main body. Wellington immediately sent Graham across the river by the fords of Santa Marta with the first and seventh divisions and Le Marchant's brigade of English cavalry; then concentrating the rest of the army between Cabrerizos and Moresco, he awaited the progress of Marmont's operation.

Bock continued his retreat in the same fine and equable order, regardless alike of the cannonade and of the light horsemen on his flanks, until the enemy's scouts had gained a height above Calvarisa Abaxo, from whence, at the distance of three miles, they for the first time perceived Graham's 12,000 men and 18 guns, ranged on an order of battle, perpendicular to the Tormes. From the same point also Wellington's heavy columns were to be seen, clustering on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the light division was descried at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance against the French troops left on the position of Aldea Rubia, or to pass the river to the aid of Graham. This apparition made the French general aware of his error, whereupon, hastily facing about and repassing the Tormes, he resumed his former ground.

Wellington's defensive dispositions on this occasion were very skilful, but it would appear that, unwilling to stir before the forts fell, he had again refused the advantage of the moment; for it is not to be supposed that he misjudged the occasion, since the whole theatre of operation was distinctly seen from St. Christoval, and he had passed many hours in earnest observation; his faculties were indeed so fresh and vigorous, that after the day's work he wrote a detailed memoir upon the proposal for establishing a bank in Portugal, treating that and other financial schemes in all their bearings with a master hand. Against the weight of his authority, therefore, any criticism must be advanced.

Marmont had the easiest passage over the Tormes, namely, that by the ford of Huerta; the allies had the greatest number of passages and the shortest line of operations. Hence, if Graham had been ordered vigorously to attack the French troops on the left bank, they must have been driven upon the single ford of Huerta, if not reinforced from the heights of Aldea Rubia. But the allies could also have



Explanatory
Sketch
of the
Sieges of the Forts
and Operations, fought
at SALAMANCA
1812

been reinforced by the fords of Santa Marta and those of Cabrerizos, and even by that of Aldea Lengua, although it was not good at this early season. A partial victory would then have been achieved, or a general battle would have been brought on, when the French troops would have been disadvantageously cooped up in the loop of the Tormes and without means of escaping if defeated. Again, it is not easy to see how the French general could have avoided a serious defeat if Wellington had moved with all the troops on the right bank, against the divisions left on the hill of Aldea Rubia; for the French army would then have been separated, one part on the hither, one on the further bank of the Tormes. It was said at the time that Marmont hoped to draw the whole of the allies across the river, when he would have seized the position of Christoval, raised the siege, and maintained the line of the Tormes. It may, however, be doubted that he expected Wellington to commit so gross an error. It is more likely that holding his own army to be the quickest of movement, his object was to separate the allies' force in the hopes of gaining some partial advantage to enable him to communicate with his forts, which were now in great danger.

When the French retired to the heights at Aldea Rubia on the night of the 23rd, the heavy guns had been already brought to the right of the Tormes, and a third battery, to breach San Cajetano, was armed with four pieces, but the line of fire being oblique, the practice, at 450 yards, only beat down the parapet and knocked away the palisades. Time was however of vital importance, the escalade of that fort and La Merced was ordered, and the attack commenced at 10 o'clock, but in half an hour failed with a loss of 120 men and officers. The wounded were brought off the next day under truce and the enemy had all the credit of the fight, yet the death of General Bowes must ever be admired. That gallant man, whose rank might have excused his leading so small a force, being wounded early, was having his hurt dressed when he heard that the troops were yielding, and returning to the combat fell.

The siege was now perforce suspended for want of ammunition, and the guns were sent across the river, but were immediately brought back in consequence of Marmont having crossed to the left bank. Certain works were meanwhile pushed forward to cut off the communication between the forts and otherwise to straiten them, and the miner was attached to the cliff on which La Merced stood. The final success was not however influenced by these operations, and they need no further notice.

The 26th, ammunition arrived from Almeida, the second and third batteries were re-armed, the field-pieces were again placed in the convent of San Bernardo, and the iron howitzers, throwing hot shot, set the convent of San Vincente on fire in several places. The garrison again extinguished the flames, and this balanced combat continued during the night, but on the morning of the 27th the fire of both batteries being redoubled, the convent of San Vincente was in a blaze, the breach of San Cajetano was improved, a fresh storming party assembled, and the white flag waved from Cajetano. A negotiation ensued, but Lord Wellington, judging it an artifice to gain time, gave orders for the assault; then the forts fell, for San Cajetano scarcely fired a shot, and the flames raged so violently at San Vincente that no opposition could be made.

Seven hundred prisoners, 30 pieces of artillery, provisions, arms, and clothing, and a secure passage over the Tormes, were the immediate fruits of this capture, which was not the less prized that the breaches were found to be more formidable than those at Ciudad Rodrigo. The success of a storm would have been very doubtful if the garrison could have gained time to extinguish the flames in the convent of San Vincente, and as it was the allies had 90 killed; their whole loss since the passage of the Tormes was nearly 500 men and officers, of which 160 men, with 50 horses, fell outside Salamanca, the rest in the siege.

Marmont had allotted 15 days as the term of resistance for these forts, but from the facility with which San Vincente caught fire, five would have been too many if ammunition had not failed. His calculation was therefore false. He would however have fought on the 23rd, when his force was united, had he not on the 22nd received intelligence from Caffarelli, that a powerful body of infantry, with

22 guns and all the cavalry of the north, were actually in march to join him. It was this which induced him to occupy the heights of Villa Rubia on that day, to avoid a premature action; but on the evening of the 26th, the signals from the forts having indicated that they could still hold out three days, Marmont, from fresh intelligence, no longer expected Caffarelli's troops, and resolved to give battle on the 28th. The fall of the forts, which was made known to him on the evening of the 27th, changed this determination, the reasons for fighting on such disadvantageous ground no longer existed, and hence, withdrawing his garrison from the castle of Alba de Tormes, he retreated during the night towards the Duero, by the roads of Tordesillas and Toro.

Wellington ordered the works both at Alba and the forts of Salamanca to be destroyed, and following the enemy by easy marches, encamped on the Guarena the 30th. The next day he reached the Trabancos, his advanced guard being at Nava del Rey. On the 2nd he passed the Zapardiel in two columns, the right marching by Medina del Campo, the left following the advanced guard towards Rueda. From this place the French rear-guard was cannonaded and driven upon the main body, which was filing over the bridge of Tordesillas. Some were killed and some made prisoners, not many, but there was great confusion, and a heavy disaster would have befallen the French if the English general had not been deceived by false information that they had broken the bridge the night before. For as he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont intended to take a position near Tordesillas, this report made him suppose the enemy was already over the Duero, and hence he had spread his troops, and was not in sufficient force to attack during the passage of the river.

Marmont, who had fortified posts at Zamora and Toro, and had broken the bridges at those places and at Puente Duero and Tudela, preserving only that of Tordesillas, now took a position on the right of the Duero. His left was at Simancas on the Pisuerga, which was unfordable, and the bridges at that place and Valladolid were commanded by fortified posts. His centre was at Tordesillas, and very numerous, and his right was on some heights opposite to Pollos. Wellington indeed caused the third division to seize the ford at the last place, which gave him a command of the river, because there was a plain between it and the enemy's heights, but the ford itself was difficult and insufficient for passing the whole army. Head-quarters were therefore fixed at Rueda, and the forces were disposed in a compact form, the head placed in opposition to the ford of Pollos and the bridge of Tordesillas, the rear occupying Medina del Campo and other points on the Zapardiel and Trabancos rivers, ready to oppose the enemy if he should break out from the Valladolid side. Marmont's line of defence, measured from Valladolid to Zamora, was 60 miles; from Simancas to Toro above 30, but the actual line of occupation was not above 12; the bend of the river gave him the chord, the allies the arc, and the fords were few and difficult. The advantage was therefore on the side of the enemy, but to understand the true position of the contending generals it is necessary to know the secondary coincident operations.

While the armies were in presence at Salamanca, Silveira had filed up the Duero, to the Esla river, menacing the French communications with Benavente. D'Urban's horsemen had passed the Duero below Zamora on the 25th, and cut off all intercourse between the French army and that place; but when Marmont fell back from Aldea Rubia, D'Urban recrossed the Duero at Fresno de la Ribera to avoid being crushed, yet immediately afterwards advanced beyond Toro to Castro-monte, behind the right wing of the enemy's new position. It was part of Wellington's plan that Castaños, after establishing the siege of Astorga, should come down by Benavente with the remainder of his army, and place himself in communication with Silveira. This operation, without disarranging the siege of Astorga, would have placed 12,000 or 15,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, behind the Esla, and with secure lines of retreat; consequently able to check all the enemy's foraging parties, and reduce him to live upon his fixed magazines, which were scanty. The usual Spanish procrastination defeated this plan.

Castaños, by the help of the succours received from England, had assembled 15,000 men at Ponteferada, under the command of Santocildes, but he pretended

that he had no battering guns until Sir Howard Douglas actually pointed them out in the arsenal of Ferrol, and showed him how to convey them to the frontier. Then Santocildes moved, though slowly, and when Bonet's retreat from the Asturias was known, 11,000 men invested Astorga, and 4000 others marched to Benavente, but not until Marmont had called his detachment in from that place. The Spanish battering train only reached Villa Franca del Bierzo on the 1st of July. However, the guerilla chief, Marquinez, appeared about Palencia, and the other Partidas of Castile acting on a line from Leon to Segovia, intercepted Marmont's correspondence with the king. Thus the immense tract called the *Campo de Tierras* was secured for the subsistence of the Gallician army; and to the surprise of the allies, who had so often heard of the enemy's terrible devastations that they expected to find Castile a desert, those vast plains and undulating hills were covered with ripe corn or fruitful vines, and the villages bore few marks of the ravages of war.

While the main body of the Gallicians was still at Ponte Ferrada, a separate division had passed along the coast road into the Asturias, and in concert with part of the seventh army had harassed Bonet's retreat from that kingdom; the French general indeed forced his way by the eastern passes, and taking post the 30th of June at Reynosa and Aguilar del Campo, chased the neighbouring bands away, but this movement was one of the great errors of the campaign. Napoleon and Wellington felt alike the importance of holding the Asturias at this period. The one had ordered that they should be retained, the other had calculated that such would be the case, and the judgment of both was quickly made manifest. For the Gallicians, who would not have dared to quit the Bierzo if Bonet had menaced their province by Lugo, or by the shore line, invested Astorga the moment he quitted the Asturias. And the Partidas of the north, who had been completely depressed by Mina's defeat, recovering courage, now moved towards the coast, where Popham's expedition, which had sailed on the 18th of June from Coruña, soon appeared, a formidable spectacle, for there were five sail of the line, with many frigates and brigs, in all 20 ships of war.

The port of Lesquito was immediately attacked on the sea-board by this squadron, on the land side by the Pastor, and when Captain Bouverie got a gun up to breach the convent, the Spanish chief assaulted but was repulsed; however the garrison, 250 strong, surrendered to the squadron the 22nd, and on the two following days Bermeo and Plencia fell. The Partidas failed to appear at Guetaria, but Castro and Portagalete, in the Bilbao river, were attacked the 6th of July, in concert with Longa, and though the latter was rebuffed at Bilbao the squadron took Castro. The enemy recovered some of their posts on the 10th, and on the 19th the attempt on Guetaria being renewed, Mina and Pastor came down to co-operate, but a French column beat those chiefs, and drove the British seamen to their vessels, with the loss of 30 men and two guns.

It was the opinion of General Carrol who accompanied this expedition, that the plan of operations was ill-arranged, but the local successes merit no attention, the great object of distracting the enemy was obtained. Caffarelli heard at one and the same time that Palombini's division had been called to Madrid; that Bonet had abandoned the Asturias; that a Gallician division had entered that province; that a powerful English fleet containing troops was on the coast, and acting in concert with all the Partidas of the north; that the seventh army was menacing Burgos, and that the whole country was in commotion. Trembling for his own districts he instantly arrested the march of the divisions destined for Marmont; and although the king, who saw very clearly the real object of the maritime expedition, reiterated the orders to march upon Segovia or Cuellar, with a view to reinforce either the army of the centre or the army of Portugal, Caffarelli delayed obedience until the 13th of July, and then sent but 1800 cavalry, with 20 guns,

Thus Bonet's movement, which only brought a reinforcement of 6000 infantry to Marmont, kept away Caffarelli's reserves, which were 12,000 of all arms, uncovered the whole of the great French line of communication, and caused the siege of Astorga to be commenced. And while Bonet was in march by Palencia and Valladolid to the position of Tordesillas, the king heard of Marmont's retreat from the Tormes, and that an English column menaced Arevalo; wherefore not being

ready to move with the army of the centre, and fearing for Avila, he withdrew the garrison from that place, and thus lost his direct line of correspondence with the army of Portugal, because Segovia was environed by the *Partidas*. In this state of affairs neither Wellington nor Marmont had reason to fight upon the Duero. The latter because his position was so strong he could safely wait for Bonet's and Caffarelli's troops, and meanwhile the king could operate against the allies' communications. The former because he could not attack the French, except at great disadvantage; for the fords of the Duero were little known, and that of Pollos was very deep. To pass the river there, and form within gun-shot of the enemy's left, without other combinations, promised nothing but defeat, and the staff-officers, sent to examine the course of the river, reported that the advantage of ground was entirely on the enemy's side, except at Gastro Nuño, half-way between Pollos and Toro.

While the enemy commanded the bridge at Tordesillas, no attempt to force the passage of the river could be safe, seeing that Marmont might fall on the allies' front and rear if the operation was within his reach; and if beyond his reach, that is to say, near Zamora, he could cut their communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, and yet preserve his own with Caffarelli and with the king. Wellington therefore resolved to wait until the fords should become lower, or the combined operations of the Gallicians and *Partidas* should oblige the enemy either to detach men or to dislodge altogether for want of provisions. In this view he urged Santocildes to press the siege of Astorga vigorously, and to send every man he could spare down the Esla; and an intercepted letter gave hopes that Astorga would surrender on the 7th, yet this seems to have been a device to keep the Gallicians in that quarter, for it was in no danger. Santocildes, expecting its fall, would not detach men, but the vicinity of D'Urban's cavalry, which remained at Castromonte, so incommoded the French right, that Foy marched to drive them beyond the Esla. General Pakenham, however, crossed the ford of Pollos with some of the third division, which quickly brought Foy back, and Marmont then endeavoured to augment the number and efficiency of his cavalry, by taking 1000 horses from the infantry officers and the sutlers.

On the 8th Bonet arrived, and the French marshal, immediately extending his right to Toro, commenced repairing the bridge there. Wellington, in like manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, yet kept his centre still on the Trabancos, and his right at Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas and the ford of Pollos. In this situation the armies remained for some days. Generals Graham and Picton went to England in bad health, and the principal powder magazine at Salamanca exploded with hurt to many, but no other events worth recording occurred. The weather, was very fine, the country rich, and the troops received their rations regularly; wine was so plentiful, that it was hard to keep the soldiers sober; the caves of Rueda, either natural, or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were so immense and so well stocked, that the drunkards of two armies failed to make any very sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men of both sides perished in that labyrinth; and on both sides, also, the soldiers, passing the Duero in groups, held amicable intercourse, conversing of the battles that were yet to be fought; the camps on the banks of the Duero seemed at times to belong to one army, so difficult is it to make brave men hate each other.

To the officers of the allies all looked prosperous; their only anxiety was to receive the signal of battle; their only discontent that it was delayed; and many amongst them murmured that the French had been permitted to retreat from Christoval. Had Wellington been finally forced back to Portugal his reputation would have been grievously assailed by his own people, for the majority, peering through their misty politics, saw Paris in dim perspective, and overlooked the enormous French armies that were close at hand. Meanwhile their general's mind was filled with care and mortification, and all cross and evil circumstances seemed to combine against him.

The mediation for the Spanish colonies had just failed at Cadiz, under such circumstances as left no doubt that the English influence was powerless, and the French influence visibly increasing in the Cortes. Soult had 27 gun-boats in

the Trocadero canal, shells were cast day and night into the city, and the people were alarmed; 2000 French had marched from Santa Mary to Seville, apparently to reinforce Drouet in Estremadura; Echevaria had effected nothing in the kingdom of Cordoba, and a French division was assembling at Bornos to attack Ballesteros, whose rashness, inviting destruction, might alone put an end to the campaign in Leon and bring Wellington back to the Tagus. In the north of Spain, also, affairs appeared equally gloomy; Mina's defeats, and their influence upon the other Partidas, were positively known, but the effect of Popham's operations was unknown, or at least doubtful. Bonet's division had certainly arrived, and the Gallicians, who had done nothing at Astorga, were already in want of ammunition. In Castile the activity of the Partidas instead of increasing had diminished, after Wellington crossed the Tormes, and the chiefs seemed inclined to leave the burthen of the war entirely to their allies. Nor was this feeling confined to them. It had been arranged that new corps, especially of cavalry, should be raised, as the enemy receded in this campaign, and the necessary clothing and equipments, supplied by England, were placed at the disposal of Lord Wellington, who, to avoid the burthen of carriage, had directed them to Coruña; yet now, when Leon and the Asturias were in a manner recovered, no man would serve voluntarily. There was great enthusiasm in words, there had always been so, but the fighting men were not increased, and even the *juramentados*, many of whom deserted at this time from the king, well clothed and soldier-like men, refused to enter the English ranks.

Now, also, came the news that Lord William Bentinck's plans were altered, and the intercepted despatches showed that the king had again ordered Drouet to pass the Tagus, but Soult's resistance to this order was not known. Wellington, therefore, at the same moment, saw Marmont's army increase, heard that the king's army, reinforced by Drouet, was on the point of taking the field; that the troops from Sicily, upon whose operations he depended to keep all the army of Aragon in the eastern part of Spain, and even to turn the king's attention that way, were to be sent to Italy; and that two millions of dollars, which he hoped to have obtained at Gibraltar, had been swept off by Lord William Bentinck for this Italian expedition, which thus at once deprived him of men and money! The latter was the most serious blow; the promised remittances from England had not arrived, and as the insufficiency of land-carriage rendered it nearly impossible to feed the army even on the Duero, to venture further into Spain without money would be akin to madness. From Galicia, where no credit was given, came the supply of meat, a stoppage there would have made the war itself stop, and no greater error had been committed by the enemy, than delaying to conquer Galicia, which could many times have been done.

To meet the increasing exigencies for money, the English general had, for one resource, obtained a credit of half a million from the Treasury to answer certain certificates, or notes of hand, which his Spanish correspondents promised to get cashed; but of this resource he was now suddenly deprived by the English ministers, who objected to the irregular form of the certificates, because he, with his usual sagacity, had adapted them to the habits of the people he was to deal with. Meanwhile his troops were four, his staff six, his muleteers nearly twelve months in arrears of pay, and he was in debt everywhere, and for everything. The Portuguese government had become very clamorous for the subsidy; Mr. Stuart acknowledging that their distress was very great, and the desertion from the Portuguese army, which augmented in an alarming manner, and seemed rather to be increased than repressed by severity, sufficiently proved their misery. The personal resources of Wellington alone enabled the army to maintain its forward position, for he had, to a certain extent, carried his commercial speculations into Galicia, as well as Portugal; and he had persuaded the Spanish authorities in Castile to give up a part of their revenue in kind to the army, receiving bills on the British embassy at Cadiz in return. But the situation of affairs may be best learned from the mouths of the generals.

"The arrears of the army are certainly getting to an alarming pitch, and if it is suffered to increase, we cannot go on; we have only here two brigades of infantry,

fed by our own commissariat, and we are now reduced to one of them having barely bread for this day, and the commissary has not a farthing of money. I know not how we shall get on !”

Such were Beresford's words on the 8th of July, and on the 15th Wellington wrote even more forcibly.

“I have never,” said he, “been in such distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen if the government do not attend seriously to the subject, and supply us regularly with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese government are a joke to ours, and if our credit was not better than theirs, we should certainly starve. As it is, if we don't find means to pay our bills for butcher's meat, there will be an end to the war at once.”

Thus stript as it were to the skin, the English general thought once more to hide his nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont, proud of his own unripened skill, and perhaps, from the experience of San Christoval, undervaluing his adversary's tactics, desirous also, it was said, to gain a victory without the presence of a king, Marmont, pushed on by fate, madly broke the chain which restrained his enemy's strength.

CHAPTER III.

WHEN Wellington found, by the intercepted letters, that the king's orders for Drouet to cross the Tagus were reiterated and imperative, he directed Hill to detach troops, in the same proportion. And as this reinforcement, coming by the way of Alcantara, could reach the Duero as soon as Drouet could reach Madrid, he hoped still to maintain the Tormes, if not the Duero, notwithstanding the king's power ; for some money, long expected from England, had at last arrived in Oporto, and he thought the Gallicians, maugre their inertness, must soon be felt by the enemy. Moreover the harvest on the ground, however abundant, could not long feed the French multitudes, if Drouet and the king should together join Marmont. Nevertheless, fearing the action of Joseph's cavalry, he ordered D'Urban's horsemen to join the army on the Duero. But to understand the remarkable movements which were now about to commence, the reader must bear in mind, that the French army, from its peculiar organization, could, while the ground harvest lasted, operate without any regard to lines of communication ; it had supports on all sides and procured its food everywhere, for the troops were taught to reap the standing corn and grind it themselves, if their cavalry could not seize flour in the villages. This organization, approaching the ancient Roman military perfection, gave them great advantages ; in the field it baffled the irregular, and threw the regular force of the allies entirely upon the defensive ; because when the flanks were turned, a retreat only could save the communications, and the French offered no point, for retaliation in kind. Wherefore, with a force composed of four different nations, Wellington was to execute the most difficult evolutions in an open country, his chances of success being to arise only from the casual errors of his adversary, who was an able general, who knew the country perfectly, and was at the head of an army, brave, excellently disciplined, and of one nation. The game would have been quite unequal if the English general had not been so strong in cavalry.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE DUERO.

In the course of the 15th and 16th Marmont, who had previously made several deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant army between Toro and the Hornija river ; and intercepted letters, the reports of deserters, and the talk of the peasants had for several days assigned the former place as his point of passage. On the morning of the 16th the English exploring officers, passing the Duero near Tordesillas, found only the garrison there, and in the evening the reports stated that two French divisions had already passed the repaired bridge of Toro. Wellington united his centre and left at Canizal on the Guarena during the night, intending to attack those who had passed at Toro ; but as he had still some doubts of the enemy's real object, he caused Sir Stapleton Cotton to halt on the Trabancos with the right wing, composed of the fourth and light divisions and Anson's cavalry. Meanwhile Marmont, recalling his troops from the left bank of

the Duero, returned to Tordesillas and Pollos, passed that river at those points and occupied Nava del Rey, where his whole army was concentrated in the evening of the 17th, some of his divisions having marched above 40 miles, and some above 50 miles, without a halt. The English cavalry posts being thus driven over the Trabancos, advice of the enemy's movement was sent to Lord Wellington, but he was then near Toro, it was midnight ere it reached him, and the troops, under Cotton, remained near Castrejon behind the Trabancos during the night of the 17th without orders, exposed, in a bad position, to the attack of the whole French army. Wellington hastened to their aid in person, and he ordered Bock's, Le Marchant's, and Alten's brigades of cavalry to follow him to Alaejos, and the fifth division to take post at Torrecilla de la Orden, six miles in rear of Castrejon.

At daybreak Cotton's outposts were again driven in by the enemy, and the bulk of his cavalry with a troop of horse artillery immediately formed in front of the two infantry divisions, which were drawn up, the fourth division on the left, the light division on the right, but at a considerable distance from each other and separated by a wide ravine. The country was open and hilly, like the downs of England, with here and there water-gulleys, dry hollows, and bold naked heads of land, and behind the most prominent of these last, on the other side of the Trabancos, lay the whole French army. Cotton, however, seeing only horsemen, pushed his cavalry again towards the river, advancing cautiously by his right along some high table-land, and his troops were soon lost to the view of the infantry, for the morning fog was thick on the stream, and at first nothing could be descried beyond. But very soon the deep tones of artillery shook the ground, the sharp ring of musketry was heard in the mist, and the 43rd regiment was hastily brought through Castrejon to support the advancing cavalry; for besides the ravine which separated the fourth from the light division, there was another ravine with a marshy bottom, between the cavalry and infantry, and the village of Castrejon was the only good point of passage.

The cannonade now became heavy, and the spectacle surprisingly beautiful, for the lighter smoke and mist, curling up in fantastic pillars, formed a huge and glittering dome tinged of many colours by the rising sun; and through the grosser vapour below, the restless horsemen were seen or lost as the fume thickened from the rapid play of the artillery, while the bluff head of land beyond the Trabancos, covered with French troops, appeared, by an optical deception close at hand, dilated to the size of a mountain, and crowned with gigantic soldiers, who were continually breaking off and sliding down into the fight. Suddenly a dismounted cavalry officer stalked from the midst of the smoke towards the line of infantry; his gait was peculiarly rigid, and he appeared to hold a bloody handkerchief to his heart, but that which seemed a cloth, was a broad and dreadful wound; a bullet had entirely effaced the flesh from his left shoulder and from his breast, and had carried away part of his ribs, his heart was bared, and its movement plainly discerned. It was a piteous and yet a noble sight, for his countenance though ghastly was firm, his step scarcely indicated weakness, and his voice never faltered. This unyielding man's name was Williams; he died a short distance from the field of battle, and it was said, in the arms of his son, a youth of 14, who had followed his father to the Peninsula in hopes of obtaining a commission, for they were not in affluent circumstances.

General Cotton maintained this exposed position with skill and resolution, from daylight until seven o'clock, at which time Wellington arrived, in company with Beresford, and proceeded to examine the enemy's movements. The time was critical, and the two English generals were like to have been slain together by a body of French cavalry, not very numerous, which breaking away from the multitude on the head of land beyond the Trabancos, came galloping at full speed across the valley. It was for a moment thought they were deserting, but with headlong course they mounted the table-land on which Cotton's left wing was posted, and drove a whole line of British cavalry skirmishers back in confusion. The reserves indeed soon came up from Alaejos, and these furious swordsmen being scattered in all directions were in turn driven away or cut down, but meanwhile 30 or 40, led by a noble officer, had brought up their right shoulders, and

came over the edge of the table-land above the hollow which separated the British wings at the instant when Wellington and Beresford arrived on the same slope. There were some infantry picquets in the bottom, and higher up, near the French, were two guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry which was disposed in perfect order. When the French officer saw this squadron, he reined in his horse with difficulty, and his troopers gathered in a confused body round him as if to retreat. They seemed lost men, for the British instantly charged, but with a shout the gallant fellows soused down upon the squadron, and the latter turning, galloped through the guns; then the whole mass, friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind to the bottom, carrying away Lord Wellington, and the other generals, who with drawn swords and some difficulty, got clear of the tumult. The French horsemen were now quite exhausted, and a reserve squadron of heavy dragoons coming in cut most of them to pieces; yet their invincible leader, assaulted by three enemies at once, struck one dead from his horse, and with surprising exertions saved himself from the others, though they rode hewing at him on each side for a quarter of a mile.

While this charge was being executed, Marmont, who had ascertained that a part only of Wellington's army was before him, crossed the Trabancos in two columns, and passing by Alaejos, turned the left of the allies, marching straight upon the Guarena. The British retired by Torrecilla de la Orden, the fifth division being in one column on the left, the fourth division on the right as they retreated, and the light division on an intermediate line and nearer to the enemy. The cavalry were on the flanks and rear, the air was extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds, and the close order of the troops rendered it very oppressive, but the military spectacle was exceedingly strange and grand. For then were seen the hostile columns of infantry, only half musket-shot from each other, marching impetuously towards a common goal, the officers on each side pointing forwards with their swords, or touching their caps, and waving their hands in courtesy, while the German cavalry, huge men, on huge horses, rode between in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision. At times the loud tones of command, to hasten the march, were heard passing from the front to the rear, and now and then the rushing sound of bullets came sweeping over the columns whose violent pace was continually accelerated.

Thus moving for 10 miles, yet keeping the most perfect order, both parties approached the Guarena, and the enemy seeing that the light division, although more in their power than the others, were yet outstripping them in the march, increased the fire of their guns and menaced an attack with infantry. But the German cavalry instantly drew close round, the column plunged suddenly into a hollow dip of ground on the left which offered the means of baffling the enemy's aim, and 10 minutes after the head of the division was in the stream of the Guarena between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth division entered the river at the same time but higher up on the left, and the fourth division passed it on the right. The soldiers of the light division, tormented with thirst, yet long used to their enemy's mode of warfare, drunk as they marched, and the soldiers of the fifth division stopped in the river for only a few moments, but on the instant 40 French guns gathered on the heights above sent a tempest of bullets amongst them. So nicely timed was the operation.

The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources which are united below Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence, and Marmont, hoping to carry it in the first confusion of the passage and so seize the table-land of Vallesa, had brought up all his artillery to the front; and to distract the allies' attention he had directed Clausel to push the head of the right column over the river at Castrillo, at the same time. But Wellington expecting him at Vallesa from the first, had ordered the other divisions of his army, originally assembled at Canizal, to cross one of the upper branches of the river; and they reached the table-land of Vallesa, before Marmont's infantry, oppressed by the extreme heat and rapidity of the march, could muster in strength to attempt the passage of the other branch. Clausel, however, sent Carrier's brigade of cavalry across the Guarena at Castrillo and supported it with a column of infantry; and the fourth division had just gained

the heights above Canizal, after passing the stream, when Carier's horsemen entered the valley on their left, and the infantry in one column menaced their front. The sedgy banks of the river would have been difficult to force in face of an enemy, but Victor Alten, though a very bold man in action, was slow to seize an advantage, and suffered the French cavalry to cross and form in considerable numbers without opposition; he assailed them too late and by successive squadrons instead of by regiments, and the result was unfavourable at first. The 14th and the German hussars were hard pressed, the 3rd dragoons came up in support, but they were immediately driven back again by the fire of some French infantry; the fight waxed hot with the others, and many fell, but finally General Carier was wounded and taken, and the French retired. During this cavalry action the 27th and 40th regiments coming down the hill, broke the enemy's infantry with an impetuous bayonet charge, and Alten's horsemen being thus disengaged sabred some of the fugitives.

This combat cost the French, who had advanced too far without support, a general and 500 soldiers; but Marmont, though baffled at Vallesa, and beaten at Castrillo, concentrated his army at the latter place in such a manner as to hold both banks of the Guarena. Whereupon Wellington recalled his troops from Vallesa; and as the whole loss of the allies during the previous operations was not more than 600, nor that of the French more than 800, and that both sides were highly excited, the day still young, and the positions although strong, open, and within cannon-shot, a battle was expected. Marmont's troops had however been marching for two days and nights incessantly, and Wellington's plan did not admit of fighting unless forced to it in defence, or under such circumstances as would enable him to crush his opponent, and yet keep the field afterwards against the king.

By this series of signal operations, the French general had passed a great river, taken the initiatory movement, surprised the right wing of the allies, and pushed it back above 10 miles. Yet these advantages are to be traced to the peculiarities of the English general's situation which have been already noticed, and Wellington's tactical skill was manifested by the extricating of his troops from their dangerous position at Castrejon without loss, and without being forced to fight a battle. He however appears to have erred in extending his troops to the right when he first reached the Duero, for seeing that Marmont could at pleasure pass that river and turn his flanks, he should have remained concentrated on the Guarena, and only pushed cavalry posts to the line of the Duero above Toro. Neither should he have risked his right wing so far from his main body from the evening of the 16th to the morning of the 18th. He could scarcely have brought it off without severe loss, if Marmont had been stronger in cavalry, and instead of pushing forwards at once to the Guarena had attacked him on the march. On the other hand the security of the French general's movements, from the Trabancos to the Guarena, depended entirely on their rapidity; for as his columns crossed the open country on a line parallel to the march of the allies, a simple wheel by companies to the right would have formed the latter in order of battle on his flank, while the four divisions already on the Guarena could have met them in front.

But it was on the 16th that the French general failed in the most glaring manner. His intent was, by menacing the communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the allies back, and strike some decisive blow during their retreat. Now on the evening of the 16th he had passed the Duero at Toro, gained a day's march, and was then actually nearer to Salamanca than the allies were; and had he persisted in his movement, Wellington must have fought him to disadvantage or have given up Salamanca, and passed the Tormes at Huerta to regain the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This advantage Marmont relinquished to make a forced march of 80 miles in 48 hours, and to risk the execution of a variety of nice and difficult evolutions, in which he lost above a thousand men by the sword or by fatigue, and finally found his adversary on the 18th still facing him in the very position which he had turned on the evening of the 16th!

On the 19th the armies maintained their respective ground in quiet until the evening, when Marmont concentrated his troops in one mass on his left near the

village of Tarazona, and Wellington, fearing for his right, again passed the second branch of the Guarena, at Vallesa and El Olmo, and took post on the table-land above those villages. The light division, being in front, advanced to the edge of the table-land, overlooking the enemy's main body which was at rest round the bivouac fires; yet the picquets would have been quietly posted if Sir Stapleton Cotton coming up at the moment, had not ordered Captain Ross to turn his battery of 6-pounders upon a group of French officers. At the first shot the enemy seemed surprised, at the second their gunners ran to their pieces, and in a few moments a reply from 12 8-pounders showed the folly of provoking a useless combat. An artillery officer was wounded in the head, several of the British soldiers fell in different parts of the line, one shot swept away a whole section of Portuguese, and finally the division was obliged to withdraw several hundred yards in a mortifying manner to avoid a great and unnecessary effusion of blood.

The allies being now formed in two lines on the table-land of Vallesa, offered a fair though not an easy field to the enemy; Wellington expected a battle the next day, because the range of heights which he occupied trended backwards to the Tormes on the shortest line; and as he had thrown a Spanish garrison into the castle of Alba de Tormes, he thought Marmont could not turn his right, or if he attempted it, that he would be shouldered off the Tormes at the ford of Huerta. He was mistaken. The French general was more perfectly acquainted with the ground and proved that he could move an army with wonderful facility.

On the 20th at daybreak, instead of crossing the Guarena to dispute the high land of Vallesa, Marmont marched rapidly in several columns, covered by a powerful rear-guard, up the river to Santa la Piedra, and crossed the stream there, though the banks were difficult, before any disposition could be made to oppose him. He thus turned the right flank of the allies and gained a new range of hills trending towards the Tormes, and parallel to those leading from Vallesa. Wellington immediately made a corresponding movement. Then commenced an evolution similar to that of the 18th, but on a greater scale both as to numbers and length of way. The allies, moving in two lines of battle, within musket-shot of the French, endeavoured to gain upon and cross their march at Cantalpino; the guns on both sides again exchanged their rough salutations as the accidents of ground favoured their play; and again the officers, like gallant gentlemen who bore no malice and knew no fear, made their military recognitions, while the horsemen on each side watched with eager eyes for an opening to charge; but the French general, moving his army as one man along the crest of the heights, preserved the lead he had taken, and made no mistake.

At Cantalpino it became evident that the allies were outflanked, and all this time Marmont had so skilfully managed his troops that he furnished no opportunity even for a partial attack. Wellington therefore fell off a little and made towards the heights of Cabeça Velloso and Aldea Rubia, intending to halt there while the sixth division and Alten's cavalry, forcing their march, seized Aldea Lengua and secured the position of Christoval. But he made no effort to seize the ford of Huerta, for his own march had been long, and the French had passed over nearly twice as much ground, wherefore he thought they would not attempt to reach the Tormes that day. However when night approached, although his second line had got possession of the heights of Velloso, his first line was heaped up without much order in the low ground between that place and Hornillos; the French army crowned all the summit of the opposite hills, and their fires, stretching in a half circle from Villarueta to Babila Fuente, showed that they commanded the fort of Huerta. They could even have attacked the allies with great advantage had there been light for the battle. The English general immediately ordered the bivouac fires to be made, but filed the troops off in succession with the greatest celerity towards Velloso and Aldea Rubia, and during the movement the Portuguese cavalry, coming in from the front, were mistaken for French and lost some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognized.

Wellington was deeply disquieted at the unexpected result of this day's operations, which had been entirely to the advantage of the French general. Marmont had shown himself perfectly acquainted with the country, had outflanked and out-

marched the allies, had gained the command of the Tormes, and as his junction with the king's army was thus secured, he might fight or wait for reinforcements or continue his operations as it seemed good to himself. But the scope of Wellington's campaign was hourly being more restricted. His reasons for avoiding a battle except at advantage, were stronger than before, because Caffarelli's cavalry was known to be in march, and the army of the centre was on the point of taking the field; hence, though he should fight and gain a victory, unless it was decisive, his object would not be advanced. That object was to deliver the Peninsula, which could only be done by a long course of solid operations incompatible with sudden and rash strokes unauthorized by anything but hope; wherefore yielding to the force of circumstances, he prepared to return to Portugal and abide his time; yet with a bitter spirit, which was not soothed by the recollection that he had refused the opportunity of fighting to advantage, exactly one month before, and upon the very hills he now occupied. Nevertheless that steadfast temper, which then prevented him from seizing an adventitious chance, would not now let him yield to fortune more than she could ravish from him: he still hoped to give the lion's stroke, and resolved to cover Salamanca and the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment. A letter stating his inability to hold his ground was however sent to Castaños, but it was intercepted by Marmont, who exultingly pushed forwards without regard to the king's movements; and it is curious that Joseph afterwards imagined this to have been a subtlety of Wellington's to draw the French general into a premature battle.

On the 21st, while the allies occupied the old position of Christoval, the French threw a garrison into Alba de Tormes, from whence the Spaniards had been withdrawn by Carlos D'España, without the knowledge of the English general. Marmont then passed the Tormes, by the fords between Alba and Huerta, and moving up the valley of Machechouco encamped behind Calvariza Ariba, at the edge of a forest which extended from the river to that place. Wellington also passed the Tormes in the course of the evening by the bridges, and by the fords of Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua; but the third division and D'Urban's cavalry remained on the right bank, and entrenched themselves at Cabrerizos, lest the French, who had left a division on the heights of Babila Fuente, should recross the Tormes in the night and overwhelm them.

It was late when the light division descended the rough side of the Aldea Lengua mountain to cross the river, and the night came suddenly down with more than common darkness, for a storm, that common precursor of a battle in the Peninsula, was at hand. Torrents of rain deepened the ford, the water foamed and dashed with increasing violence, the thunder was frequent and deafening, and the lightning passed in sheets of fire close over the column, or played upon the points of the bayonets. One flash, falling amongst the 5th dragoon guards near Santa Marta, killed many men and horses, while hundreds of frightened animals breaking loose from their picquet ropes, and galloping wildly about, were supposed to be the enemy's cavalry charging in the darkness, and indeed some of their patrols were at hand; but to a military eye there was nothing more imposing than the close and beautiful order in which the soldiers of that noble light division, were seen by the fiery gleams to step from the river to the bank and pursue their march amidst this astounding turmoil, defying alike the storm and the enemy.

The position now taken by the allies was nearly the same as that occupied by General Graham a month before, when the forts of Salamanca were invested. The left wing rested in the low ground on the Tormes, near Santa Marta, having a cavalry post in front towards Calvariza de Abaxo. The right wing extended along a range of heights, which ended also in low ground, near the village of Arapiles, and this line being perpendicular to the course of the Tormes from Huerta to Salamanca, and parallel to its course from Alba to Huerta, covered Salamanca. But the enemy extending his left along the edge of the forest, still menaced the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and in the night advice came that General Chauvel, with near 2000 of Caffarelli's horsemen and 20 guns, had actually reached Pollos on the 20th, and would join Marmont the 22nd or 23rd. Hence, Wellington, feeling that he must now perforce retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and fear-

ing that the French cavalry thus reinforced would hamper his movements, determined, unless the enemy attacked him, or committed some flagrant fault, to retire before Chauvel's horsemen could arrive.

At daybreak on the 22nd, Marmont, who had called the troops at Babila Fuente over the Tormes, by the ford of Encina, brought Bonet's and Maucune's divisions up from the forest and took possession of the ridge of Calvariza de Ariba; he also occupied in advance of it a wooded height on which was an old chapel called Nuestra Señora de la Pena. But at a little distance from his left, and from the English right, stood a pair of solitary hills, called the *Two Arapiles*, about half cannon-shot from each other; steep and savagely rugged they were, and the possession of them would have enabled the French general to form his army across Wellington's right, and thus bring on a battle with every disadvantage to the allies, confined, as the latter would have been, between the French army and the Tormes. These hills were neglected by the English general until a staff officer, who had observed the enemy's detachments stealing towards them, first informed Beresford, and afterwards Wellington, of the fact. The former thought it was of no consequence, but the latter immediately sent the 7th Caçadores to seize the most distant of the rocks, and then a combat occurred similar to that which happened between Cæsar and Afranius at Lerida; for the French seeing the allies' detachment approaching, broke their own ranks, and running without order to the encounter gained the first Arapiles and kept it, but were repulsed in an endeavour to seize the second. This skirmish was followed by one at Nuestra Señora de la Pena, which was also assailed by a detachment of the seventh division, and so far successfully, that half that height was gained; yet the enemy kept the other half, and Victor Alten, flanking the attack with a squadron of German hussars, lost some men and was himself wounded by a musket-shot.

The result of the dispute for the Arapiles rendered a retreat difficult to the allies during daylight; for though the rock gained by the English was a fortress in the way of the French army, Marmont, by extending his left, and by gathering a force behind his own Arapiles, could still frame a dangerous battle and pounce upon the allies during their movement. Wherefore Wellington immediately extended his right into the low ground, placing the light companies of the guards in the village of Arapiles, and the fourth division, with exception of the 27th regiment, which remained at the rock, on a gentle ridge behind them. The fifth and sixth divisions he gathered in one mass upon the internal slope of the English Arapiles, where from the hollow nature of the ground they were quite hidden from the enemy; and during these movements a sharp cannonade was exchanged from the tops of those frowning hills, on whose crowning rocks the two generals sat like ravenous vultures watching for their quarry.

Marmont's project was not yet developed; his troops coming from Babila Fuente were still in the forest, and some miles off; he had only two divisions close up, and the occupation of Calvariza Ariba, and Nuestra Señora de la Pena, was a daring defensive measure to cover the formation of his army. The occupation of the Arapiles was however a start forward, for an advantage to be afterwards turned to profit, and seemed to fix the operations on the left of the Tormes. Wellington, therefore, brought up the first and the light divisions to confront the enemy's troops on the height of Calvariza Ariba; and then calling the third division and D'Urban's cavalry over the river, by the fords of Santa Marta, he posted them in a wood near Aldea Tejada, entirely refused to the enemy and unseen by him, yet in a situation to secure the main road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Thus the position of the allies was suddenly reversed; the left rested on the English Arapiles, the right on Aldea Tejada; that which was the rear became the front, and the interval between the third and the fourth division was occupied by Bradford's Portuguese infantry, by the Spaniards, and by the British cavalry.

This ground had several breaks and hollows, so that few of these troops could be viewed by the enemy, and those which were, seemed, both from their movement and from their position, to be pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road as in retreat. The commissariat and baggage had also been ordered to the rear, the dust of their march was plainly to be seen many miles off, and hence

there was nothing in the relative position of the armies, save their proximity, to indicate an approaching battle. Such a state of affairs could not last long. About twelve o'clock Marmont, fearing that the important bearing of the French Arapiles on Wellington's retreat would induce the latter to drive him thence, hastily brought up Foy's and Ferey's divisions in support, placing the first, with some guns, on a wooded height between the Arapiles and Nuestra Señora de la Pena, the second, and Boyer's dragoons, behind Foy on the ridge of Calvariza de Ariba. Nor was this fear ill-founded, for the English general thinking that he could not safely retreat in daylight without possessing both Arapiles, had actually issued orders for the seventh division to attack the French, but perceiving the approach of more troops gave counter-orders lest he should bring on the battle disadvantageously. He judged it better to wait for new events, being certain that at night he could make his retreat good, and wishing rather that Marmont should attack him in his now strong position.

The French troops coming from Babila Fuente had not yet reached the edge of the forest, when Marmont, seeing that the allies would not attack, and fearing that they would retreat before his own dispositions were completed, ordered Thomieres' division, covered by fifty guns and supported by the light cavalry, to menace the Ciudad Rodrigo road. He also hastened the march of his other divisions, designing, when Wellington should move in opposition to Thomieres, to fall upon him by the village of Arapiles, with six divisions of infantry and Boyer's dragoons, which last he now put in march to take fresh ground on the left of the Arapiles rocks, leaving only one regiment of cavalry to guard Foy's right flank at Calvariza.

In these new circumstances, the positions of the two armies embraced an oval basin formed by different ranges of hills, that rose like an amphitheatre of which the Arapiles rocks might be considered the door-posts. This basin was about a mile broad from north to south, and more than two miles long from east to west. The northern and western half formed the allies' position, which extended from the English Arapiles on the left to Aldea Tejada on the right. The eastern heights were held by the French right, and their left, consisting of Thomieres' division with the artillery and light cavalry, was now moving along the southern side of the basin; but the march was wide and loose, there was a long space between Thomieres and the divisions, which, coming from the edge of the forest, were destined to form the centre, and there was a longer space between him and the divisions about the Arapiles. Nevertheless, the mass of artillery placed on his right flank was very imposing, and opened its fire grandly, taking ground to the left by guns, in succession, as the infantry moved on; and these last marched eagerly, continually contracting their distance from the allies, and bringing up their left shoulders as if to envelop Wellington's position and embrace it with fire. At this time also, Bonet's troops, one regiment of which held the French Arapiles, carried the village of that name, and although soon driven from the greatest part of it again, maintained a fierce struggle.

Marmont's first arrangements had occupied several hours, yet as they gave no positive indication of his designs, Wellington, ceasing to watch him, had retired from the Arapiles. But at three o'clock, a report reached him that the French left was in motion and pointing towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road; then starting up he repaired to the high ground, and observed their movements for some time with a stern contentment, for their left wing was entirely separated from the centre. The fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunder-bolt. A few orders issued from his lips like the incantations of a wizard, and suddenly the dark mass of troops which covered the English Arapiles, was seemingly possessed by some mighty spirit, and rushing violently down the interior slope of the mountain, entered the great basin amidst a storm of bullets which seemed to shear away the whole surface of the earth over which the soldiers moved. The fifth division instantly formed on the right of the fourth, connecting the latter with Bradford's Portuguese, who hastened forward at the same time from the right of the army, and the heavy cavalry galloping up on the right of Bradford, closed this front of battle. The sixth and seventh divisions flanked on the right by Anson's light cavalry, which had now moved from the Arapiles,

were ranged at half cannon-shot in a second line, which was prolonged by the Spaniards in the direction of the third division; and this last, reinforced by two squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and by D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, formed the extreme right of the army. Behind all, on the highest ground, the first and light divisions and Pack's Portuguese were disposed in heavy masses as a reserve.

When this grand disposition was completed, the third division and its attendant horsemen, the whole formed in four columns and flanked on the left by twelve guns, received orders to cross the enemy's line of march. The remainder of the first line, including the main body of the cavalry, was directed to advance whenever the attack of the third division should be developed; and as the fourth division must in this forward movement necessarily lend its flank to the enemy's troops stationed on the French Arapiles, Pack's brigade was commanded to assail that rock the moment the left of the British line should pass it. Thus, after long coiling and winding, the armies came together, and drawing up their huge trains like angry serpents mingled in deadly strife.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

Marmont, from the top of the French Arapiles, saw the country beneath him suddenly covered with enemies at a moment when he was in the act of making a complicated evolution, and when, by the rash advance of his left, his troops were separated into three parts, each at too great a distance to assist the other, and those nearest the enemy neither strong enough to hold their ground, nor aware of what they had to encounter. The third division was, however, still hidden from him by the western heights, and he hoped that the tempest of bullets under which the British line was moving in the basin beneath, would check it until he could bring up his reserve divisions, and by the village of Arapiles fall on what was now the left of the allies' position. But even this, his only resource for saving the battle, was weak, for on that point there were still the first and light divisions and Pack's brigade, forming the mass of 12,000 troops with 30 pieces of artillery; the village itself was well disputed, and the English Arapiles rock stood out as a strong bastion of defence. However, the French general, nothing daunted, despatched officer after officer, some to hasten up the troops from the forest, others to stop the progress of his left wing, and with a sanguine expectation still looked for the victory until he saw Pakenham with the third division shoot like a meteor across Thomieres' path; then pride and hope alike died within him, and desperately he was hurrying in person to that fatal point, when an exploding shell stretched him on the earth with a broken arm and two deep wounds in his side. Confusion ensued; and the troops, distracted by ill-judged orders and counter-orders, knew not where to move, who to fight, or who to avoid.

It was about five o'clock when Pakenham fell upon Thomieres, and it was at the instant when that general, the head of whose column had gained an open isolated hill at the extremity of the southern range of heights, expected to see the allies in full retreat towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, closely followed by Marmont from the Arapiles. The counter-stroke was terrible! Two batteries of artillery placed on the summit of the western heights suddenly took his troops in flank, and Pakenham's massive columns, supported by cavalry, were coming on full in his front, while two-thirds of his own division, lengthened out and unconnected, were still behind in a wood where they could hear, but could not see the storm which was now bursting. From the chief to the lowest soldier all felt that they were lost, and in an instant Pakenham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle.

The British columns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners standing up manfully for the honour of their country, sent showers of grape into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light troops poured in a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavoured to display a front. But bearing onwards through the skirmishers with the might of a giant, Pakenham broke the half-formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancing supports; one only officer, with unyielding spirit, remained by the artillery; standing alone he fired the last gun at the distance of a few yards, but whether

he lived or there died could not be seen for the smoke. Some squadrons of light cavalry fell on the right of the third division, but the 5th regiment repulsed them, and then D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, reinforced by two squadrons of the 14th dragoons under Felton Harvey, gained the enemy's flank. The Oporto regiment, led by the English major, Watson, instantly charged the French infantry, yet vainly, Watson fell deeply wounded, and his men retired.*

Pakenham continued his tempestuous course against the remainder of Thomieres' troops, which were now arrayed on the wooded heights behind the first hill, yet imperfectly, and offering two fronts, the one opposed to the third division and its attendant horsemen, the other to the fifth division, to Bradford's brigade and the main body of cavalry and artillery, all of which were now moving in one great line across the basin. Meanwhile Bonet's troops, having failed at the village of Arapiles, were sharply engaged with the fourth division, Maucune kept his menacing position behind the French Arapiles, and as Clausel's division had come up from the forest, the connection of the centre and left was in some measure restored; two divisions were however still in the rear, and Boyer's dragoons were in march from Calvariza Ariba. Thomieres had been killed, and Bonet, who succeeded Marmont, had been disabled, hence more confusion; but the command of the army devolved on Clausel, and he was of a capacity to sustain this terrible crisis.

The fourth and fifth divisions, and Bradford's brigade, were now hotly engaged and steadily gaining ground; the heavy cavalry, Anson's light dragoons, and Bull's troop of artillery were advancing at a trot on Pakenham's left; and on that general's right D'Urban's horsemen overlapped the enemy. Thus in less than half an hour, and before an order of battle had even been formed by the French, their commander-in-chief and two other generals had fallen, and the left of their army was turned, thrown into confusion and enveloped. Clausel's division had indeed joined Thomieres', and a front had been spread on the southern heights, but it was loose and unfit to resist; for the troops were, some in double lines, some in columns, some in squares; a powerful sun shone full in their eyes, the light soil, stirred up by the trampling of men and horses, and driven forward by a breeze which arose in the west at the moment of attack, came full upon them mingled with smoke in such stifling clouds, that scarcely able to breathe and quite unable to see, their fire was given at random.

In this situation, while Pakenham, bearing onward with a conquering violence, was closing on their flank and the fifth division advancing with a storm of fire on their front, the interval between the two attacks was suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust, which moving swiftly forward carried within its womb the trampling sound of a charging multitude. As it passed the left of the third division Le Marchant's heavy horsemen flanked by Anson's light cavalry, broke forth from it at full speed, and the next instant 1200 French infantry though formed in several lines were trampled down with a terrible clamour and disturbance. Bewildered and blinded, they cast away their arms and run through the openings of the British squadrons stooping and demanding quarter, while the dragoons, big men and on big horses, rode onwards smiting with their long glittering swords in uncontrollable power, and the third division followed at speed, shouting as the French masses fell in succession before this dreadful charge.

Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. Their own general, Le Marchant, and many officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff was at their head, and with ranks confused, and blended together in one mass, still galloping forward they sustained from a fresh column an irregular stream of fire which emptied 100 saddles; yet with fine courage and downright force, the survivors broke through this the third and strongest body of men that had encountered them, and Lord Edward Somerset, continuing his course at the head of one squadron with a happy perseverance, captured five guns. The French left was entirely broken, more than 2000 prisoners were taken, the French light horsemen abandoned that part of the field, and Thomieres' division no longer existed as a military body. Anson's cavalry, which had passed quite over the hill and had suffered little in the charge, was now joined by D'Urban's troopers, and took the place of Le Marchant's exhausted men; the heavy German dragoons followed in


* Appendix I.

reserve, and with the third and fifth divisions and the guns, formed one formidable line, two miles in advance of where Pakenham had first attacked; and that impetuous officer with unmitigated strength still pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on the enemy's left.


While these signal events, which occupied about 40 minutes, were passing on the allies' right, a terrible battle raged in the centre. For when the first shock of the third division had been observed from the Arapiles, the fourth division, moving in a line with the fifth, had passed the village of that name under a prodigious cannonade, and vigorously driving Bonet's troops backwards, step by step, to the southern and eastern heights, obliged them to mingle with Clausel's and with Thomieres' broken remains. When the combatants had passed the French Arapiles, which was about the time of Le Marchant's charge, Pack's Portuguese assailed that rock, and the front of battle was thus completely defined, because Foy's division was now exchanging a distant cannonade with the first and light divisions. However, Bonet's troops, notwithstanding Marmont's fall, and the loss of their own general, fought strongly, and Clausel made a surprising effort, beyond all men's expectations, to restore the battle. Already a great change was visible. Ferey's division, drawn off from the height of Calvaraza Ariba, arrived in the centre behind Bonet's men; the light cavalry, Boyer's dragoons, and two divisions of infantry from the forest, were also united there, and on this mass of fresh men Clausel rallied the remnants of his own and Thomieres' division. Thus by an able movement, Sarrut's, Brennier's, and Ferey's unbroken troops, supported by the whole of the cavalry, were so disposed as to cover the line of retreat to Alba de Tormes, while Maucune's division was still in mass behind the French Arapiles, and Foy's remained untouched on the right.

But Clausel, not content with having brought the separated part of his army together and in a condition to effect a retreat, attempted to stem the tide of victory in the very fullness of its strength and roughness. His hopes were founded on a misfortune which had befallen General Pack; for that officer, ascending the French Arapiles in one heavy column, had driven back the enemy's skirmishers and was within 30 yards of the summit, believing himself victorious, when suddenly the French reserves leaped forward from the rocks upon his front, and upon his left flank. The hostile masses closed, there was a thick cloud of smoke, a shout, a stream of fire, and the side of the hill was covered to the very bottom with the dead the wounded and the flying Portuguese, who were scoffed at for this failure without any justice; no troops could have withstood that crash upon such steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at all seems very questionable. The result went nigh to shake the whole battle. For the fourth division had just then reached the southern ridge of the basin, and one of the best regiments in the service was actually on the summit when 1200 fresh adversaries arrayed on the reverse slope, charged up hill; and as the British fire was straggling and ineffectual, because the soldiers were breathless and disordered by the previous fighting, the French who came up resolutely and without firing won the crest. They were even pursuing down the other side when two regiments placed in line below, checked them with a destructive volley.

This vigorous counter-blow took place at the moment when Pack's defeat permitted Maucune, who was no longer in pain for the Arapiles hill, to menace the left flank and rear of the fourth division, but the left wing of the 40th regiment immediately wheeled about and with a rough charge cleared the rear. Maucune would not engage himself more deeply at that time, but General Ferey's troops pressed vigorously against the front of the fourth division, and Brennier did the same by the first line of the fifth division, Boyer's dragoons also came on rapidly, and the allies being outflanked and over-matched lost ground. Fiercely and fast the French followed and the fight once more raged in the basin below. General Cole had before this fallen deeply wounded, and Leith had the same fortune, but Beresford promptly drew Spry's Portuguese brigade from the second line of the fifth division and thus flanked the advancing columns of the enemy; yet he also fell desperately wounded, and Boyer's dragoons then came freely into action because Anson's cavalry had been checked after Le Marchant's charge by a heavy fire of artillery.



**Battle of
SALAMANCA,**
with
SKETCH of OPERATIONS
before and after the
Action.



The crisis of the battle had now arrived, and the victory was for the general who had the strongest reserves in hand. Wellington, who was seen that day at every point of the field exactly when his presence was most required, immediately brought up from the second line the sixth division, and its charge was rough, strong, and successful. Nevertheless the struggle was no slight one. The men of General Hulse's brigade, which was on the left, went down by hundreds, and the 61st and 11th regiments won their way desperately and through such a fire as British soldiers only can sustain. Some of Boyer's dragoons also breaking in between the fifth and sixth divisions slew many men, and caused some disorder in the 53rd; but that brave regiment lost no ground, nor did Clausel's impetuous counter-attack avail at any point, after the first burst, against the steady courage of the allies. The southern ridge was regained, the French general, Menne, was severely, and General Ferey, mortally wounded, Clausel himself was hurt, and the reserve of Boyer's dragoons coming on at a canter were met and broken by the fire of Hulse's noble brigade. Then the changing current of the fight once more set for the British. The third division continued to outflank the enemy's left, Maucune abandoned the French Arapiles, Foy retired from the ridge of Calvariza, and the allied host righting itself as a gallant ship after a sudden gust, again bore onwards in blood and gloom, for though the air, purified by the storm of the night before, was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled along the basin, and within it was the battle with all its sights and sounds of terror.

When the English general had thus restored the fight in the centre, he directed the commander of the first division to push between Foy and the rest of the French army, which would have rendered it impossible for the latter to rally or escape; but this order was not executed, and Foy's and Maucune's divisions were skilfully used by Clausel to protect the retreat. The first, posted on undulating ground and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, covered the roads to the fords of Huerta and Encina; the second, reinforced with 15 guns, was placed on a steep ridge in front of the forest, covering the road to Alba de Tormes; and behind this ridge the rest of the army, then falling back in disorder before the third, fifth, and sixth divisions, took refuge. Wellington immediately sent the light division, formed in two lines and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, against Foy; and he supported them by the first division in columns, flanked on the right by two brigades of the fourth division which he had drawn off from the centre when the sixth division restored the fight. The seventh division and the Spaniards followed in reserve, the country was covered with troops, and a new army seemed to have risen out of the earth.

Foy, throwing out a cloud of skirmishers, retired slowly by wings, turning and firing heavily from every rise of ground upon the light division, which marched steadily forward without returning a shot, save by its skirmishers; for three miles the march was under this musketry, which was occasionally thickened by a cannonade, and yet very few men were lost, because the French aim was baffled, partly by the twilight, partly by the even order and rapid gliding of the lines. But the French general Desgraviere was killed, and the flanking brigades from the fourth division having now penetrated between Maucune and Foy, it seemed difficult for the latter to extricate his troops from the action; nevertheless he did it and with great dexterity. For having increased his skirmishers on the last defensible ridge, along the foot of which run a marshy stream, he redoubled his fire of musketry, and made a menacing demonstration with his horsemen just as the darkness fell; the British guns immediately opened their fire, a squadron of dragoons galloped forwards from the left, the infantry, crossing the marshy stream, with an impetuous pace hastened to the summit of the hill, and a rough shock seemed at hand, but there was no longer an enemy; the main body of the French had gone into the thick forest on their own left during the firing, and the skirmishers fled swiftly after, covered by the smoke and by the darkness.

Meanwhile Maucune maintained a noble battle. He was outflanked and outnumbered, but the safety of the French army depended on his courage; he knew it, and Pakenham, marking his bold demeanour, advised Clinton, who was immediately in his front, not to assail him until the third division should have

turned his left. Nevertheless the sixth division was soon plunged afresh into action under great disadvantage, for after being kept by its commander a long time without reason, close under Maucune's batteries, which ploughed heavily through the ranks, it was suddenly directed by a staff officer to attack the hill. Assisted by a brigade of the fourth division, the troops then rushed up, and in the darkness of the night the fire showed from afar how the battle went. On the side of the British a sheet of flame was seen, sometimes advancing with an even front, sometimes pricking forth in spear heads, now falling back in waving lines, and anon darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the apex of which often approached yet never gained the actual summit of the mountain; but the French musketry, rapid as lightning, sparkled along the brow of the height with unvarying fullness, and with what destructive effects the dark gaps and changing shapes of the adverse fire showed too plainly. Yet when Pakenham had again turned the enemy's left, and Foy's division had glided into the forest, Maucune's task was completed, the effulgent crest of the ridge became black and silent, and the whole French army vanished as it were in the darkness.

Meanwhile Wellington, who was with the leading regiment of the light division, continued to advance towards the ford of Huerta, leaving the forest to his right, for he thought the Spanish garrison was still in the castle of Alba de Tormes, and that the enemy must of necessity be found in a confused mass at the fords. It was for this final stroke that he had so skilfully strengthened his left wing, nor was he diverted from his aim by marching through standing corn where no enemy could have preceded him; nor by Foy's retreat into the forest, because it pointed towards the fords of Encina and Gonzalo, which that general might be endeavouring to gain, and the right wing of the allies would find him there. A squadron of French dragoons also burst hastily from the forest in front of the advancing troops, soon after dark, and firing their pistols passed at full gallop towards the ford of Huerta, thus indicating great confusion in the defeated army, and confirming the notion that its retreat was in that direction. Had the castle of Alba been held, the French could not have carried off a third of their army, nor would they have been in much better plight if Carlos D'España, who soon discovered his error in withdrawing the garrison, had informed Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed it and suffered the colonel, who had only obeyed his orders, to be censured; the left wing therefore continued their march to the ford without meeting any enemy, and, the night being far spent, were there halted; the right wing, exhausted by long fighting, had ceased to pursue after the action with Maucune, and thus the French gained Alba unmolested; but the action did not terminate without two remarkable accidents. While riding close behind the 43rd regiment, Wellington was struck in the thigh by a spent musket-ball, which passed through his holster; and the night picquets had just been set at Huerta, when Sir Stapleton Cotton, who had gone to the ford and returned a different road, was shot through the arm by a Portuguese sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded. These were the last events of this famous battle, in which the skill of the general was worthily seconded by troops whose ardour may be appreciated by the following anecdotes.

Captain Brotherton, of the 14th dragoons, fighting on the 18th at the Guarena, amongst the foremost, as he was always wont to do, had a sword thrust quite through his side, yet on the 22nd he was again on horseback, and being denied leave to remain in that condition with his own regiment, secretly joined Pack's Portuguese in an undress, and was again hurt in the unfortunate charge at the Arapiles. Such were the officers. A man of the 43rd, one by no means distinguished above his comrades, was shot through the middle of the thigh, and lost his shoes in passing the marshy stream; but refusing to quit the fight, he limped under fire in rear of his regiment, and with naked feet and streaming of blood from his wound, he marched for several miles over a country covered with sharp stones. Such were the soldiers; and the devotion of a woman was not wanting to the illustration of this great day.

The wife of Colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers and endured the privations of two campaigns with the patient fortitude which belongs only to her sex; and in

this battle, forgetful of everything but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling yet irresistibly impelled forwards by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death.

CHAPTER IV.

DURING the few hours of darkness, which succeeded the cessation of the battle, Clausel had with a wonderful diligence passed the Tormes by the narrow bridge of Alba and the fords below it, and at daylight was in full retreat upon Peneranda, covered by an organized rear-guard. Wellington also, having brought up the German dragoons and Anson's cavalry to the front, crossed the river with his left wing at daylight, and moving up the stream, came about ten o'clock upon the French rear, which was winding without much order along the Almar, a small stream at the foot of a height near the village of La Serna. He launched his cavalry against them, and the French squadrons, flying from Anson's troopers towards their own left, abandoned three battalions of infantry, who in separate columns were making up a hollow slope on their right, hoping to gain the crest of the heights before the cavalry could fall on. The two foremost did reach the higher ground and there formed squares, General Foy being in the one, and General Chemineau in the other; but the last regiment, when half-way up, seeing Bock's dragoons galloping hard on, faced about, and being still in column commenced a disorderly fire. The two squares already formed above also plied their muskets with far greater effect; and as the Germans, after crossing the Almar stream, had to pass a turn of narrow road, and then to clear some rough ground before they could range their squadrons on a charging front, the troopers dropped fast under the fire. By twos, by threes, by tens, by twenties they fell, but the rest keeping together, surmounted the difficulties of the ground, and hurtling on the column went clean through it; then the squares above retreated, and several hundred prisoners were made by these able and daring horsemen.

This charge had been successful even to wonder, the joyous victors, standing in the midst of their captives and of thousands of admiring friends, seemed invincible; yet those who witnessed the scene, nay, the actors themselves, remained with the conviction of this military truth, that cavalry are not able to cope with veteran infantry save by surprise. The hill of La Serna offered a frightful spectacle of the power of the musket, that queen of weapons, and the track of the Germans was marked by their huge bodies. A few minutes only had the combat lasted and above 100 had fallen; 51 were killed outright; and in several places man and horse had died simultaneously, and so suddenly, that falling together on their sides they appeared still alive, the horse's legs stretched out as in movement, the rider's feet in the stirrup, his bridle in hand, the sword raised to strike, and the large hat fastened under the chin, giving to the grim but undistorted countenance, a supernatural and terrible expression.

When the French main body found their rear-guard attacked, they turned to its succour, but seeing the light division coming up recommenced the retreat and were followed to Nava de Sotroval. Near that place Chauvel's horsemen joined them from the Duero, and covered the rear with such a resolute countenance that the allied cavalry, reduced in numbers and fatigued with continual fighting, did not choose to meddle again. Thus Clausel carried his army clear off without further loss, and with such celerity, that his head-quarters were that night at Flores de Avila, 40 miles from the field of battle. After remaining a few hours there he crossed the Zapardiel, and would have halted the 24th, but the allied cavalry entered Cisca, and the march was then continued to Arevalo. This was a wonderful retreat, and the line was chosen with judgment, for Wellington naturally expected the French army would have made for Tordesillas instead of the Adaja. The pursuit was however somewhat slack, for on the very night of the action, the British left wing being quite fresh, could have ascended the Tormes and reached the Almar before daylight, or, passing at Huerta, have marched by Ventosa to Peneranda; but the vigorous following of a beaten enemy was never a prominent characteristic of Lord Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula.

The 25th the allied army halted on the Zapardiel and Adaja rivers, to let the commissariat, which had been sent to the rear the morning of the battle, come up. Meanwhile the king, having quitted Madrid with 14,000 men on the 21st, reached the Adaja and pushed his cavalry towards Fontiveros; he was at Blasco Sancho on the 24th, within a few hours' march of Arevalo, and consequently able to effect a junction with Clausel, yet he did not hurry his march, for he knew only of the advance upon Salamanca, not of the defeat, and having sent many messengers to inform Marmont of his approach, concluded that general would await his arrival. The next day he received letters from the Duke of Ragusa and Clausel, dated Arevalo, describing the battle, and telling him that the defeated army must pass the Duero immediately to save the depôt of Valladolid, and to establish new communications with the army of the north. Those generals promised however to halt behind that river, if possible, until the king could receive reinforcements from Suchet and Soult.

Joseph by a rapid movement upon Arevalo could still have effected a junction, but he immediately made a forced march to Espinar, leaving in Blasco Sancho 2 officers and 27 troopers, who were surprised and made prisoners on the evening of the 25th by a corporal's patrol; Clausel at the same time marched upon Valladolid, by Olmedo, thus abandoning Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas, with their garrisons, to the allies. Wellington immediately brought Santocildes, who was now upon the Esla with 8000 Gallicians, to the right bank of the Duero, across which river he communicated by Castro Nuño with the left of the allies, which was then upon the Zapardiel.

The 27th the British, whose march had become more circumspect from the vicinity of the king's army, entered Olmedo. At this place General Ferey had died of his wounds, and the Spaniards tearing his body from the grave were going to mutilate it, when the soldiers of the light division who had so often fought against this brave man rescued his corpse, remade his grave, and heaped rocks upon it for more security, though with little need; for the Spaniards, with whom the sentiment of honour is always strong when not stifled by the violence of their passions, applauded the action.

On the 26th Clausel, finding the pursuit had slackened, sent Colonel Fabvier to advise the king of it, and then sending his own right wing across the Duero, by the ford near Boecillo, to cover the evacuation of Valladolid, marched with the other wing towards the bridge of Tudela; he remained, however, still on the left bank, in the hope that Fabvier's mission would bring the king back. Joseph, who had already passed the Puerta de Guadarama, immediately repassed it without delay and made a flank movement to Segovia, which he reached the 27th, and pushed his cavalry to Santa Maria de Nieva. Here he remained until the 31st, expecting Clausel would join him, for he resolved not to quit his hold of the passes over the Guadarama, nor to abandon his communication with Valencia and Andalusia. But Wellington brought Santocildes over the Duero to the Zapardiel, and crossing the Eresma and Ciga rivers himself, with the first and light divisions and the cavalry, had obliged Clausel to retire over the Duero in the night of the 29th; and the next day the French general, whose army was very much discouraged, fearing that Wellington would gain Aranda and Lerma while the Gallicians seized Dueñas and Torquemada, retreated in three columns by the valleys of the Arlanza, the Duero, and the Esquiva towards Burgos.

The English general entered Valladolid amidst the rejoicings of the people, and there captured 17 pieces of artillery, considerable stores, and 800 sick and wounded men; 300 other prisoners were taken by the Partida chief Marquinez, and a large French convoy intended for Andalusia returned to Burgos. While the left wing of the allies pursued the enemy up the Arlanza, Wellington, marching with the right wing against the king, reached Cuellar the 1st of August; on the same day the garrison of Tordesillas surrendered to the Gallicians, and Joseph, having first dismantled the castle of Segovia and raised a contribution of money and church plate, retreated through the Puerta de Guadarama, leaving a rear-guard of cavalry, which escaped by the Ildefonso pass on the approach of the allied horsemen. Thus the army of the centre was irrevocably separated from the army of Portugal, the

operations against the latter were terminated, and new combinations were made conformable to the altered state of affairs; but to understand these it is necessary to look at the transactions in other parts of the Peninsula.

In Estremadura, after Drouet's retreat to Azagua, Hill placed a strong division at Merida ready to cross the Tagus, but no military event occurred until the 24th of July, when General Lallemande, with three regiments of cavalry, pushed back some Portuguese horsemen from Ribera to Villa Franca. He was attacked in front by General Long, while General Slade menaced his left, but he succeeded in repassing the defile of Ribera; Long then turned him by both flanks, and aided by Lefebvre's horse artillery, drove him with the loss of 50 men and many horses upon Llera, a distance of 20 miles. Drouet, desirous to retaliate, immediately executed a flank march towards Merida, and Hill fearing for his detachments there, made a corresponding movement, whereupon the French general returned to the Serena; but though he received positive orders from Soult to give battle, no action followed, and the affairs of that part of the Peninsula remained balanced.

In Andalusia, Ballesteros surprised Colonel Beauvais at Ossuna, took 300 prisoners, and destroyed the French dépôt there. After this he moved against Malaga, and was opposed by General Laval in front, while General Villatte, detached from the blockade of Cadiz, cut off his retreat to San Roque. The road to Murcia was still open to him, but his rashness, though of less consequence since the battle of Salamanca, gave Wellington great disquietude, and the more so that Joseph O'Donel had just sustained a serious defeat near Alicante. This disaster, which though he described in a more fitting place, was however in some measure counterbalanced by the information that the revived expedition from Sicily had reached Majorca, where it had been reinforced by Whittingham's division, and by the stores and guns sent from Portugal to Gibraltar. It was known also, that in the northern provinces Popham's armament had drawn all Caffarelli's troops to the coast, and although the littoral warfare was not followed up, the French were in confusion and the diversion complete.

In Castile the siege of Astorga still lingered, but the division of Santocildes, 7000 strong, was in communication with Wellington, Silveira's militia were on the Duero, Clausel had retreated to Burgos, and the king, joined by 2000 men from Suchet's army, could concentrate 20,000 to dispute the passes of the Guadarama. Hence Wellington, having nothing immediate to fear from Soult, nor from the army of Portugal, nor from the army of the north, nor from Suchet, menaced as that marshal was by the Sicilian expedition, resolved to attack the king in preference to following Clausel. The latter general could not be pursued without exposing Salamanca and the Gallicians to Joseph, who was strong in cavalry; but the monarch could be assailed without risking much in other quarters, seeing that Clausel could not be very soon ready to renew the campaign, and it was expected Castaños would reduce Astorga in a few days, which would give 8000 additional men to the field army. Moreover, a strong British division could be spared to co-operate with Santocildes, Silveira, and the Partidas, in the watching of the beaten army of Portugal, while Wellington gave the king a blow in the field, or forced him to abandon Madrid; and it appeared probable that the moral effect of regaining the capital would excite the Spaniard's energy everywhere, and would prevent Soult from attacking Hill. If he did attack him the allies, by choosing this line of operations, would be at hand to give succour.

These reasons being weighed, Wellington posted General Clinton at Cuellar with the sixth division, which he increased to 8000 men by the addition of some sickly regiments, and by Anson's cavalry; Santocildes also was put in communication with him, and the Partidas of Marquinez, Saornil, and El Principe agreed to act with Anson on a prescribed plan. Thus exclusive of Silveira's militia, and of the Gallicians about Astorga, 18,000 men were left on the Duero, and the English general was still able to march against Joseph with 28,000 old troops, exclusive of Carlos D'España's Spaniards. He had also assurance from Lord Castlereagh that a considerable sum in hard money, to be followed by other remittances, had been sent from England, a circumstance of the utmost importance, because grain could be purchased in Spain at one third the cost of bringing it up from Portugal.

Meanwhile the king, who had regained Madrid, expecting to hear that 10,000 of the army of the south were at Toledo, received letters from Soult positively refusing to send that detachment; and from Clausel, saying that the army of Portugal was in full retreat to Burgos. This retreat he regarded as a breach of faith, because Clausel had promised to hold the line of the Duero if Wellington marched upon Madrid; but Joseph was unable to appreciate Wellington's military combinations; he did not perceive that, taking advantage of his central position, the English general, before he marched against Madrid, had forced Clausel to abandon the Duero to seek some safe and distant point to reorganize his army. Nor was the king's perception of his own situation much clearer. He had the choice of several lines of operations; that is, he might defend the passes of the Guadarama while his court and enormous convoys evacuated Madrid and marched either upon Zaragoza, Valencia, or Andalusia; or he might retire, army and convoy together, in one of those directions.

Rejecting the defence of the passes, lest the allies should then march by their right to the Tagus, and so intercept his communication with the south, he resolved to direct his march towards the Morena, and he had from Segovia sent Soult orders to evacuate Andalusia and meet him on the frontier of La Mancha; but to avoid the disgrace of flying before a detachment, he occupied the Escorial mountain, and placed his army across the roads leading from the passes of the Guadarama to Madrid. While in this position Wellington's advanced guard, composed of D'Urban's Portuguese, a troop of horse artillery, and a battalion of infantry, passed the Guadarama, and the rest of the whole army was over the mountains. Then the king, retaining only 8000 men in position, sent the rest of his troops to protect the march of his court, which quitted Madrid the same day with 2000 or 3000 carriages of different kinds, and nearly 20,000 persons of all ages and sexes.

The 11th D'Urban drove back Trielhard's cavalry posts, and entered Majadahonda, whilst some German infantry, Bock's heavy cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery occupied Las Rozas, about a mile in his rear. In the evening, Trielhard, reinforced by Schiazzetti's Italian dragoons and the lancers of Berg, returned; whereupon D'Urban called up the horse artillery, and would have charged the enemy's leading squadrons, but the Portuguese cavalry fled. The artillery officer, thus abandoned, made a vigorous effort to save his guns, yet three of them, being overturned on the rough ground, were taken, and the victorious cavalry passed through Majadahonda in pursuit. The German dragoons, although surprised in their quarters, mounted and stopped the leading French squadrons until Schiazzetti's Italians came up, when the fight was like to end badly; but Ponsonby's cavalry and the seventh division arrived, and Trielhard immediately abandoned Majadahonda, leaving the captured guns behind him, yet carrying away prisoners the Portuguese general, Visconde de Barbacena, the colonel of the German cavalry, and others of less rank. The whole loss of the allies was above 200, and when the infantry passed through Rozas, a few hours after the combat, the German dead were lying thickly in the streets, many of them in their shirts and trousers, and thus stretched across the sills of the doors, they furnished proof at once of the suddenness of the action and of their own bravery. Had the king been prepared to follow up this blow with his whole force the allies must have suffered severely, for Wellington, trusting to the advanced guard, had not kept his divisions very close together.

After this combat the king retired to Valdemoro where he met his convoy from Madrid, and when the troops of the three different nations forming his army thus came together, a horrible confusion arose; the convoy was plundered, and the miserable people who followed the court were made a prey by the licentious soldiers. Marshal Jourdan, a man at all times distinguished for the noblest sentiments, immediately threw himself into the midst of the disorderly troops, and aided by the other generals, with great personal risk arrested the mischief, and succeeded in making the multitude file over the bridge of Aranjues. The procession was however lugubrious and shocking, for the military line of march was broken by crowds of weeping women and children, and by despairing men, and courtiers of the highest rank were to be seen in full dress desperately struggling with savage

soldiers for the possession of even the animals on which they were endeavouring to save their families. The cavalry of the allies could have driven the whole before them into the Tagus, yet Lord Wellington did not molest them. Either from ignorance of their situation, or what is more probable compassionating their misery, and knowing that the troops by abandoning the convoy could easily escape over the river, he would not strike where the blow could only fall on helpless people without affecting the military operations. Perhaps also he thought it wise to leave Joseph the burthen of his court.

In the evening of the 13th the whole multitude was over the Tagus, the garrisons of Aranjues and Toledo joined the army, order was restored, and the king received letters from Soult and Suchet. The first-named marshal opposed the evacuation of Andalusia; the second gave notice that the Sicilian expedition had landed at Alicant, and that a considerable army was forming there. Then irritated by Soult, and alarmed for the safety of Suchet, the king relinquished his march towards the Morena and commenced his retreat to Valencia. The 15th the advanced guard moved with the sick and wounded, who were heaped on country cars, and the main body of the convoy followed under charge of the infantry, while the cavalry, spreading to the right and left, endeavoured to collect provisions. But the people, remembering the wanton devastation committed a few months before by Montbrun's troops on their return from Alicant, fled with their property; and as it was the hottest time of the year, and the deserted country was sandy and without shade, this march of 150 miles to Almanza was one of continual suffering. The Partida chief Chaleco hovered constantly on the flanks and rear, killing without mercy all persons, civil or military, who straggled or sunk from exhaustion; and while this disastrous journey was in progress, another misfortune befel the French on the side of Requena. For the hussars and infantry belonging to Suchet's army having left Madrid to succour Cuenca before the king returned from Segovia, carried off the garrison of that place in despite of the Empecinado, and made for Valencia; but Villacampa crossing their march on the 25th of August, at the passage of a river, near Utiel, took all their baggage, their guns, and 300 men. And after being driven away from Cuenca the Empecinado invested Guadalaxara, where the enemy had left a garrison of 700 men.

Wellington, seeing that the king had crossed the Tagus in retreat, entered Madrid, a very memorable event were it only from the affecting circumstances attending it. He, a foreigner and marching at the head of a foreign army, was met and welcomed to the capital of Spain by the whole remaining population. The multitude who before that hour had never seen him, came forth to hail his approach not with feigned enthusiasm, not with acclamations extorted by the fear of a conqueror's power, nor yet excited by the natural proneness of human nature to laud the successful, for there was no tumultuous exultation; famine was amongst them, and long-endured misery had subdued their spirits, but with tears, and every other sign of deep emotion, they crowded around his horse, hung upon his stirrups, touched his clothes, or throwing themselves upon the earth, blessed him aloud as the friend of Spain. His triumph was as pure and glorious as it was uncommon, and he felt it to be so.

Madrid was however still disturbed by the presence of the enemy. The Retiro contained enormous stores, 20,000 stand of arms, more than 180 pieces of artillery, and the eagles of two French regiments, and it had a garrison of 2000 fighting men, besides invalids and followers; but its inherent weakness was soon made manifest. The works consisted of an interior fort called La China, with an exterior entrenchment; but the fort was too small, the entrenchment too large, and the latter could be easily deprived of water. In the lodgings of a French officer also was found an order directing the commandant to confine his real defence to the fort, and accordingly, in the night of the 13th, being menaced, he abandoned the entrenchment, and the next day accepted honourable terms, because La China was so contracted and filled with combustible buildings, that his fine troops would with only a little firing have been smothered in the ruins; yet they were so dissatisfied that many broke their arms, and their commander was like to have fallen a victim to their wrath. They were immediately sent to Portugal, and French

writers with too much truth assert that the escort basely robbed and murdered many of the prisoners. This disgraceful action was perpetrated, either at Avila or on the frontier of Portugal, wherefore the British troops, who furnished no escorts after the first day's march from Madrid, are guiltless.

Coincident with the fall of the Retiro was that of Guadalaxara, which surrendered to the Empecinado. This mode of wasting an army, and its resources, was designated by Napoleon as the most glaring and extraordinary of all the errors committed by the king and by Marmont. And surely it was so. For including the garrisons of Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Astorga, which were now blockaded, 6000 men had been delivered, as it were bound, to the allies, and with them stores and equipments sufficient for a new army. These forts had been designed by the emperor to resist the Partidas, but his lieutenants exposed them to the British army, and thus the positive loss of men from the battle of Salamanca was doubled.

Napoleon had notice of Marmont's defeat as early as the 2nd of September, a week before the great battle of Borodino; the news was carried by Colonel Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in one course, and having fought on the 22nd of July at the Arapiles, was wounded on the heights of Moskowa the 7th of September. However, the Duke of Ragusa, suffering alike in body and in mind, had excused himself with so little strength, or clearness, that the emperor, contemptuously remarking that the despatch contained more complicate stuffing than a clock, desired his war minister to demand why Marmont had delivered battle without the orders of the king? why he had not made his operations subservient to the general plan of the campaign? why he broke from defensive into offensive operations before the army of the centre joined him? why he would not even wait two days for Chauvel's cavalry which he knew were close at hand? "From personal vanity," said the emperor, with seeming sternness, "the Duke of Ragusa has sacrificed the interests of his country, and the good of my service; he is guilty of the crime of insubordination, and is the author of all this misfortune."

But Napoleon's wrath, so just, and apparently so dangerous, could not, even in its first violence, overpower his early friendship. With a kindness, the recollection of which must now pierce Marmont's inmost soul, twice, in the same letter, he desired that these questions might not even be put to his unhappy lieutenant until his wounds were cured and his health re-established. Nor was this generous feeling shaken by the arrival of the king's agent, Colonel Désprez, who reached Moscow the 18th of October, just after Murat had lost a battle at the outposts and when all hopes of peace with Russia were at an end. Joseph's despatches, bitter against all the generals, were especially so against Marmont and Soult; the former for having lost the battle, and the latter because of his resistance to the royal plan.* The recall of the Duke of Dalmatia was demanded imperatively, because he had written a letter to the emperor extremely offensive to the king; and it was also hinted that Soult designed to make himself king of Andalusia. Idle stories of that marshal's ambition seem always to have been resorted to, when his skilful plans were beyond the military judgment of ordinary generals; but Marmont was deeply sunk in culpable misfortune, and the king's complaints against him were not unjust. Napoleon had however then seen Wellington's despatch, which was more favourable to the Duke of Ragusa than Joseph's report; for the latter was founded on a belief that the unfortunate general, knowing the army of the centre was close at hand, would not wait for it; whereas the Partidas had intercepted so many of Joseph's letters, it is doubtful if any reached Marmont previous to the battle. It was in vain, therefore, that Désprez pressed the king's discontent on the emperor; that great man, with unerring sagacity, had already disentangled the truth, and Désprez was thus roughly interrogated as to the conduct of his master.

Why was not the army of the centre in the field a month sooner to succour Marmont? Why was the emperor's example, when, in a like case, he marched from Madrid against Sir John Moore, forgotten? Why, after the battle, was not the Duero passed, and the beaten troops rallied on the army of the centre? Why were the passes of the Guadarama so early abandoned? Why was the Tagus

* Appendix, 4, 5, 6.

crossed so soon? Finally, why were the stores and gun-carriages in the Retiro not burnt, the eagles and the garrison carried off?

To these questions the king's agent could only reply by excuses which must have made the energetic emperor smile; but when, following his instructions, D  sprez harped upon Soult's demeanour, his designs in Andalusia, and still more upon the letter so personally offensive to the king, and which shall be noticed hereafter, Napoleon replied sharply that he could not enter into such pitiful disputes while he was at the head of 500,000 men and occupied with such immense operations. With respect to Soult's letter, he said he knew his brother's real feelings, but those who judged Joseph by his language could only think with Soult, whose suspicions were natural and partaken by the other generals; wherefore he would not, by recalling him, deprive the armies in Spain of the only military head they possessed. And then in ridicule of Soult's supposed treachery, he observed, that the king's fears on that head must have subsided, as the English newspapers said the Duke of Dalmatia was evacuating Andalusia, and he would of course unite with Suchet and with the army of the centre to retake the offensive.

The emperor, however, admitted all the evils arising from these disputes between the generals and the king, but said that at such a distance he could not give precise orders for their conduct. He had foreseen the mischief, he observed, and regretted more than ever that Joseph had disregarded his counsel not to return to Spain in 1811, and thus saying he closed the conversation, but this expression about Joseph not returning to Spain is very remarkable. Napoleon spoke of it as of a well known fact, yet Joseph's letters show that he not only desired but repeatedly offered to resign the crown of Spain and live a private man in France! Did the emperor mean that he wished his brother to remain a crowned guest at Paris? or had some subtle intriguer misrepresented the brothers to each other? The noblest buildings are often defiled in secret by vile and creeping things.

OBSERVATIONS.

- i. *Menace your enemy's flanks, protect your own, and be ready to concentrate on the important points :*

These maxims contain the whole spirit of Napoleon's instructions to his generals, after Badajos was succoured in 1811. At that time he ordered the army of Portugal to occupy the valley of the Tagus and the passes of the Gredos mountains, in which position it covered Madrid, and from thence it could readily march to aid either the army of the south or the army of the north. Dorsenne, who commanded the latter, could bring 26,000 men to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult could bring a like number to Badajos, but Wellington could not move against one or the other without having Marmont upon his flank; he could not move against Marmont, without having the others on both flanks, and he could not turn his opponent's flanks save from the ocean. If, notwithstanding this combination, he took Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, it was by surprise, and because the French did not concentrate on the important points, which proved indeed his superiority to the executive general opposed to him but in no manner affected the principle of Napoleon's plan.

Again, when the preparations for the Russian war had weakened the army of the north, the emperor, giving Marmont two additional divisions, ordered him to occupy Castile, not as a defensive position, but as a central offensive one from whence he could keep the Gallicians in check, and by prompt menacing movements, prevent Wellington from commencing serious operations elsewhere. This plan also had reference to the maxim respecting flanks. For Marmont was forbidden to invade Portugal while Wellington was on the frontier of Beira, that is when he could not assail him in flank; and he was directed to guard the Asturias carefully as a protection to the great line of communication with France; in May also he was rebuked for having withdrawn Bonet from Oviedo, and for delaying to re-occupy the Asturias when the incursion against Beira terminated. But neither then nor afterwards did the Duke of Ragusa comprehend the spirit of the emperor's views, and that extraordinary man, whose piercing sagacity seized every chance of war, was so disquieted by his lieutenant's want of perception, that all the pomp,

and all the vast political and military combinations of Dresden, could not put it from his thoughts.

"Twice," said he, "has the Duke of Ragusa placed an interval of 30 leagues between his army and the enemy, contrary to all the rules of war; the English general goes where he will, the French general loses the initial movements and is of no weight in the affairs of Spain. Biscay and the north are exposed by the evacuation of the Asturias; Santona and St. Sebastian are endangered, and the guerillas communicate freely with the coast. If the Duke of Ragusa has not kept some bridges on the Agueda, he cannot know what Wellington is about, and he will retire before light cavalry instead of operating so as to make the English general concentrate his whole army. The false direction already given to affairs by Marshal Marmont, makes it necessary that Caffarelli should keep a strong corps always in hand; that the commander of the reserve at Bayonne should look to the safety of St. Sebastian, holding 3000 men always ready to march; finally, that the provisional battalions, and troops from the depôts of the interior, should immediately reinforce the reserve at Bayonne, be encamped on the Pyrenees, and exercised and formed for service. *If Marmont's oversights continue, these troops will prevent the disasters from becoming extreme.*"*

Napoleon was supernaturally gifted in warlike matters. It has been recorded of Cæsar's generalship, that he foretold the cohorts mixed with his cavalry would be the cause of victory at Pharsalia. But this letter was written by the French emperor on the 28th of May, before the allies were even collected on the Agueda, and when 100,000 French troops were between the English general and Bayonne, and yet its prescience was vindicated at Burgos in October!

2. To fulfil the conditions of the emperor's design, Marmont should have adopted Soult's recommendation, that is, leaving one or two divisions on the Tormes, he should have encamped near Baños, and pushed troops towards the upper Agueda to watch the movements of the allies. Caffarelli's divisions could then have joined those on the Tormes, and thus Napoleon's plan for 1811 would have been exactly renewed; Madrid would have been covered, a junction with the king would have been secured, Wellington could scarcely have moved beyond the Agueda, and the disaster of Salamanca would have been avoided.

The Duke of Ragusa, apparently because he would not have the king in his camp, ran counter both to the emperor and to Soult. 1st. He kept no troops on the Agueda, which might be excused on the ground that the feeding of them there was beyond his means; but then he did not concentrate behind the Tormes to sustain his forts, neither did he abandon his forts, when he abandoned Salamanca, and thus 800 men were sacrificed merely to secure the power of concentrating behind the Duero. 2nd. He adopted a line of operations perpendicular to the allies' front, instead of lying on their flank; he abandoned 60 miles of country between the Tormes and the Agueda, and he suffered Wellington to take the initial movements of the campaign. 3rd. He withdrew Bonet's division from the Asturias, whereby he lost Caffarelli's support and realized the emperor's fears for the northern provinces. It is true that he regained the initial power, by passing the Duero on the 18th, and had he deferred the passage until the king was over the Guadarama, Wellington must have gone back upon Portugal with some show of dishonour if not great loss. But if Castaños, instead of remaining with 15,000 Gallicians, before Astorga, a weak place with a garrison of only 1200 men, had blockaded it with 3000 or 4000, and detached Santocildes with 11,000 or 12,000 down the Escla to co-operate with Silveira and D'Urban, 16,000 men would have been acting upon Marmont's right flank in June; and as Bonet did not join until the 8th of July the line of the Duero would scarcely have availed the French general.

3. The secret of Wellington's success is to be found in the extent of country occupied by the French armies, and the impediments to their military communication. Portugal was an impregnable central position, from whence the English general could rush out unexpectedly against any point. This strong post was however of his own making, he had chosen it, had fortified it, had defended it; he

* Appendix, No. 2.

knew its full value and possessed quickness and judgment to avail himself of all its advantages ; the battle of Salamanca was accidental in itself, but the tree was planted to bear such fruit, and Wellington's profound combinations must be estimated from the general result. He had only 60,000 disposable troops, and above 100,000 French were especially appointed to watch and control him, yet he passed the frontier, defeated 45,000 in a pitched battle, and drove 20,000 others from Madrid in the greatest confusion, without risking a single strategic point, of importance to his own operations. His campaign up to the conquest of Madrid was therefore strictly in accord with the rules of art, although his means and resources have been shown to be precarious, shifting, and uncertain. Indeed the want of money alone would have prevented him from following up his victory if he had not persuaded the Spanish authorities, in the Salamanca country, to yield him the revenues of the government in kind under a promise of repayment at Cadiz. No general was ever more entitled to the honours of victory.

4. The success of Wellington's daring advance would seem to indicate a fault in the French plan of invasion. The army of the south, numerous, of approved valour and perfectly well commanded, was yet of so little weight in this campaign as to prove that Andalusia was a point pushed beyond the true line of operations. The conquest of that province in 1811 was an enterprise of the king's, on which he prided himself, yet it seems never to have been much liked by Napoleon, although he did not absolutely condemn it. The question was indeed a very grave one. While the English general held Portugal, and while Cadiz was unsubdued, Andalusia was a burthen rather than a gain. It would have answered better, either to have established communications with France by the southern line of invasion, which would have brought the enterprise within the rules of a methodical war, or to have held the province partially by detachments, keeping the bulk of the army of the south in Estremadura, and thus have strengthened the northern line of invasion. For in Estremadura, Soult would have covered the capital, and have been more strictly connected with the army of the centre ; and his powerful co-operation with Massena in 1810 would probably have obliged the English general to quit Portugal. The same result could doubtless have been obtained by reinforcing the army of the south, with 30,000 or 40,000 men, but it is questionable if Soult could have fed such a number ; and in favour of the invasion of Andalusia it may be observed, that Seville was the great arsenal of Spain, that a formidable power might have been established there by the English without abandoning Portugal, that Cadiz would have compensated for the loss of Lisbon, and finally that the English ministers were not at that time determined to defend Portugal.

5. When the emperor declared that Soult possessed the only military head in the Peninsula he referred to a proposition made by that marshal which shall be noticed in the next chapter ; but having regard merely to the disputes between the Duke of Dalmatia, Marmont, and the king, Suchet's talents not being in question, the justice of the remark may be demonstrated. Napoleon always enforced with precept and example, the vital military principle of concentration on the important points ; but the king and the marshals, though harping continually upon this maxim, desired to follow it out, each in his own sphere. Now to concentrate on a wrong point is to hurt yourself with your own sword, and as each French general desired to be strong, the army at large was scattered instead of being concentrated.

The failure of the campaign was by the king attributed to Soult's disobedience, inasmuch as the passage of the Tagus by Drouet would have enabled the army of the centre to act before Palombini's division arrived. But it has been shown that Hill could have brought Wellington an equal, or superior reinforcement, in less time, whereby the latter could either have made head until the French dispersed for want of provisions, or by a rapid counter-movement, he could have fallen upon Andalusia. And if the king had menaced Ciudad Rodrigo in return it would have been no diversion, for he had no battering train, still less could he have revenged himself by marching on Lisbon, because Wellington would have overpowered Soult and established a new base at Cadiz before such an operation could become dangerous to the capital of Portugal. Oporto might indeed have been taken, yet Joseph would have hesitated to exchange Madrid for that city. But the 10,000 men

required of Soult by the king on the 19th of June, could have been at Madrid before August, and thus the passes of the Guadarama could have been defended until the army of Portugal was reorganized! Ay! but Hill could then have entered the valley of the Tagus, or being reinforced, could have invaded Andalusia while Wellington kept the king's army in check. It would appear therefore that Joseph's plan of operations, if all its combinations had been exactly executed, might have prevented Wellington's progress on some points, but to effect this the French must have been concentrated in large masses from distant places without striking any decisive blow, which was the very pith and marrow of the English general's policy. Hence it follows that Soult made the true and Joseph the false application of the principle of concentration.

6. If the king had judged his position truly he would have early merged the monarch in the general, exchanged the palace for the tent; he would have held only the Retiro and a few fortified posts in the vicinity of Madrid, he would have organized a good pontoon train and established his magazines in Segovia, Avila, Toledo, and Talavera; finally he would have kept his army constantly united in the field, and exercised his soldiers, either by opening good roads through the mountains, or in chasing the Partidas, while Wellington remained quiet. Thus acting, he would have been always ready to march north or south, to succour any menaced point. By enforcing good order and discipline in his own army he would also have given a useful example, and he could by vigilance and activity have ensured the preponderance of force in the field on whichever side he marched. He would thus have acquired the esteem of the French generals, and obtained their willing obedience, and the Spaniards would more readily have submitted to a warlike monarch. A weak man may safely wear an inherited crown, it is of gold and the people support it; but it requires the strength of a warrior to bear the weight of a usurped diadem, it is of iron.

7. If Marmont and the king were at fault in the general plan of operations, they were not less so in the particular tactics of the campaign.

On the 18th of July the army of Portugal passed the Douro in advance. On the 30th it repassed that river in retreat, having in 12 days marched 200 miles, fought three combats, and a general battle.* One field-marshal, seven generals, 12,500 men and officers had been killed, wounded, or taken; and two eagles, besides those taken in the Retiro, several standards, 12 guns, and eight carriages, exclusive of the artillery and stores captured at Valladolid, fell into the victors' hands. In the same period, the allies marched 160 miles, and had one field-marshal, four generals, and somewhat less than 6000 officers and soldiers killed or wounded.

This comparison furnishes the proof of Wellington's sagacity, when he determined not to fight except at great advantage. The French army, although surprised in the midst of an evolution and instantly swept from the field, killed and wounded 6000 of the allies; the 11th and 61st regiments of the sixth division had not together more than 160 men and officers left standing at the end of the battle; twice 6000 then would have fallen in a more equal contest, the blow would have been less decisive, and as Chauvel's cavalry and the king's army were both at hand, a retreat into Portugal would probably have followed a less perfect victory. Wherefore this battle ought not, and would not have been fought, but for Marmont's false movement on the 22nd. Yet it is certain that if Wellington had retired without fighting, the murmurs of his army, already louder than was seemly, would have been heard in England, and if an accidental shot had terminated his career all would have terminated. The Cortes, ripe for a change, would have accepted the intrusive king, and the American war, just declared against England, would have rendered the complicated affairs of Portugal so extremely embarrassed that no new man could have continued the contest. Then the cries of disappointed politicians would have been raised. Wellington, it would have been said, Wellington, desponding, and distrusting his brave troops, dared not venture a battle on even terms, hence these misfortunes! His name would have been made, as Sir John Moore's was, a butt for the malice and falsehood of faction, and his military genius would have been measured by the ignorance of his detractors.

* Appendix, Nos. 19, 20.

8. In the battle, Marmont had about 42,000 sabres and bayonets; Wellington, who had received some detachments on the 19th, had above 46,000, but the excess was principally Spanish.* The French had 74 guns, the allies, including a Spanish battery, had only 60 pieces. Thus, Marmont, overmatched in cavalry and infantry, was superior in artillery, and the fight would have been most bloody, if the generals had been equal, for courage and strength were in even balance until Wellington's genius struck the beam. Scarcely can a fault be detected in his conduct. It might indeed be asked why the cavalry reserves were not, after Le Marchant's charge, brought up closer to sustain the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions and to keep off Boyer's dragoons, but it would seem ill to cavil at an action which was described at the time by a French officer, as the "*beating of 40,000 men in 40 minutes.*"

9. The battle of Salamanca, remarkable in many points of view, was not least so in this that it was the first decided victory gained by the allies in the Peninsula. In former actions the French had been repulsed, here they were driven headlong as it were before a mighty wind, without help or stay, and the results were proportionate. Joseph's secret negotiations with the Cortes were crushed, his partisans in every part of the Peninsula were abashed, and the sinking spirit of the Catalans was revived; the clamours of the opposition in England were checked, the provisional government of France was dismayed, the secret plots against the French in Germany were resuscitated, and the shock, reaching even to Moscow, heaved and shook the colossal structure of Napoleon's power to its very base.

Nevertheless Salamanca was, as most great battles are, an accident; an accident seized upon with astonishing vigour and quickness, but still an accident. Even its results were accidental, for the French could never have repassed the Tormes as an army, if Carlos D'España had not withdrawn the garrison from Alba, and hidden the fact from Wellington; and this circumstance alone would probably have led to the ruin of the whole campaign, but for another of those chances, which recurring so frequently in war, render bad generals timid, and make great generals trust their fortune under the most adverse circumstances. This is easily shown. Joseph was at Blasco Sancho on the 24th, and notwithstanding his numerous cavalry, the army of Portugal passed in retreat across his front at the distance of only a few miles, without his knowledge; he thus missed one opportunity of effecting his junction with Clausel. On the 25th this junction could still have been made at Arevalo, and Wellington, as if to mock the king's generalship, halted that day behind the Zapardiel; yet Joseph retreated towards the Guadarama, wrathful that Clausel made no effort to join him, and forgetful that as a beaten and pursued army must march, it was for him to join Clausel. But the true cause of these errors was the different inclinations of the generals. The king wished to draw Clausel to Madrid, Clausel desired to have the king behind the Duero, and if he had succeeded the probable result may be thus traced.

Clausel during the first confusion wrote that only 20,000 men could be reorganized, but in this number he did not include the stragglers and marauders who always take advantage of a defeat to seek their own interest; a reference to the French loss proves that there were nearly 30,000 fighting men left, and in fact Clausel did in a fortnight reorganize 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry and 50 guns, besides gaining a knowledge of 5000 stragglers and marauders. In fine no soldiers rally quicker after a defeat than the French, and hence as Joseph brought to Blasco Sancho 30 guns and 14,000 men, of which above 2000 were horsemen, 40,000 infantry, and more than 6000 cavalry, with a powerful artillery, might then have been rallied behind the Duero, exclusive of Caffarelli's divisions. Nor would Madrid have been meanwhile exposed to an insurrection, nor to the operation of a weak detachment from Wellington's army; for the 2000 men sent by Suchet had arrived in that capital on the 30th, and there were in the several fortified points of the vicinity, 6000 or 7000 other troops who could have been united at the Retiro, to protect that dépôt and the families attached to the intrusive court.

Thus Wellington, without committing any fault, would have found a more powerful army than Marmont's again on the Duero, and capable of renewing the

* Appendix, Nos. 19, 20.

former operations with the advantage of former errors as warning beacons. But his own army would not have been so powerful as before, for the reinforcements sent from England did not even suffice to replace the current consumption of men; and neither the fresh soldiers nor the old Walcheren regiments were able to sustain the toil of the recent operations. Three thousand troops had joined since the battle, yet the general decrease, including the killed and wounded, was above 8000 men, and the number of sick was rapidly augmenting from the extreme heat. It may therefore be said that if Marmont was stricken deeply by Wellington, the king poisoned the wound. The English general had fore-calculated all these superior resources of the enemy, and it was only Marmont's flagrant fault, on the 22nd, that could have wrung the battle from him; yet he fought it as if his genius disdained such trial of its strength. I saw him late in the evening of that great day, when the advancing flashes of cannon and musketry, stretching as far as the eye could command, showed in the darkness how well the field was won; he was alone, the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and watchful, but his voice was calm, and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater warriors than Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed only to accept this glory as an earnest of greater things.

BOOK XIX.

CHAPTER I.

As Wellington's operations had now deeply affected the French affairs in the distant provinces, it is necessary again to revert to the general progress of the war, lest the true bearings of his military policy should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, by clearing all the centre of Spain, had reduced the invasion to its original lines of operation. For Palombini's division having joined the army of the centre, the army of the Ebro was broken up; Caffarelli had concentrated the scattered troops of the army of the north; and when Clausel had led back the vanquished army of Portugal to Burgos, the whole French host was divided in two distinct parts, each having a separate line of communication with France, and a circuitous, uncertain, attenuated line of correspondence with each other by Zaragoza instead of a sure and short one by Madrid. But Wellington was also forced to divide his army in two parts, and though, by the advantage of his central position, he retained the initial power both of movement and concentration, his lines of communication were become long and weak, because the enemy was powerful at either flank. Wherefore on his own simple strength in the centre of Spain he could not rely, and the diversions he had projected against the enemy's rear and flanks became more important than ever. To these we must now turn.

EASTERN OPERATIONS.

It will be recollected that the narrative of Catalanian affairs ceased at the moment when Decaen, after fortifying the coast line and opening new roads beyond the reach of shot from the English ships, was gathering the harvest of the interior. Lacy, inefficient in the field and universally hated, was thus confined to the mountain chain which separates the coast territory from the plains of Lerida, and from the Cerdaña. The insurrectionary spirit of the Catalonians was indeed only upheld by Wellington's successes, and by the hope of English succour from Sicily; for Lacy, devoted to the republican party in Spain, had now been made captain-general as well as commander-in-chief, and sought to keep down the people, who were generally of the priestly and royal faction. He publicly spoke of exciting a general insurrection, yet, in his intercourse with the English naval officers, avowed his wish to repress the patriotism of the Somatenes; he was not ashamed to boast of his assassination plots, and received with honour a man who had murdered the aide-de-camp of Maurice Mathieu; he sowed dissensions among his generals, intrigued against all of them in turn, and when Eroles and Manso, who were the people's favourites, raised any soldiers, he transferred the latter as soon as they were organized to Sarzfield's division, at the same time calumniating that general to depress his influence. He quarrelled incessantly with Captain Codrington, and had no desire to see an English force in Catalonia lest a general insurrection should take place, for he feared that the multitude once gathered and armed would drive him from the province and declare for the opponents of the Cortes. And in this view the constitution itself, although emanating from the Cortes, was long withheld from the Catalans, lest the newly declared popular rights should interfere with the arbitrary power of the chief.

Such was the state of the province when intelligence that the Anglo-Sicilian expedition had arrived at Mahon excited the hopes of the Spaniards and the fears of the French. The coast then became the great object of interest to both, and the Catalans again opened a communication with the English fleet by Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and endeavoured to collect the grain of the Campo de Taragona. Decaen, coming to meet Suchet, who had arrived at Reus with 2000 men, drove the

Catalans to the hills again; yet the Lerida district was thus opened to the enterprises of Lacy, because it was at this period that Reille had detached General Paris from Zaragoza to the aid of Palombini; and that Severoli's division was broken up to reinforce the garrisons of Lerida, Taragona, Barcelona, and Zaragoza. But the army of the Ebro being dissolved, Lacy resolved to march upon Lerida, where he had engaged certain Spaniards in the French service to explode the powder magazine when he should approach; and this odious scheme which necessarily involved the destruction of hundreds of his own countrymen, was vainly opposed by Eroles and Sarzfield.

On the 12th of July Eroles's division, that general being absent, was incorporated with Sarzfield's and other troops at Guisona, and the whole journeying day and night reached Tremp on the 13th. Lacy having thus turned Lerida, would have resumed the march at mid-day, intending to attack the next morning at dawn, but the men were without food and exhausted by fatigue, and 1500 had fallen behind. A council of war being then held, Sarzfield, who thought the plot wild, would have returned, observing that all communication with the sea was abandoned, and the harvest of the Campo de Taragona and Valls being left to be gathered by the enemy, the loss of the corn would seriously affect the whole principality. Displeased at the remonstrance, Lacy immediately sent him back to the plain of Urgel with some infantry and the cavalry, to keep the garrison of Balaguer in check; but in the night of the 16th, when Sarzfield had reached the bridge of Alentorna on the Segre, fresh orders caused him to return to Limiana on the Noguera. Meanwhile Lacy himself had advanced by Agen towards Lerida, the explosion of the magazine took place, many houses were thrown down, 200 inhabitants and 150 soldiers were destroyed; two bastions fell, and the place was laid open.

Henriod the governor, although ignorant of the vicinity of the Spaniards, immediately manned the breaches, the garrison of Balaguer, hearing the explosion, marched to his succour, and when the Catalan troops appeared, the citizens, enraged by the destruction of their habitations, aided the French; Lacy then fled back to Tremp, bearing the burthen of a crime which he had not feared to commit, but wanted courage to turn to his country's advantage. To lessen the odium thus incurred, he insidiously attributed the failure to Sarzfield's disobedience; and as that general, to punish the people of Barbastro for siding with the French and killing 20 of his men, had raised a heavy contribution of money and corn in the district, he became so hateful, that some time after, when he endeavoured to raise soldiers in those parts, the people threw boiling water at him from the windows as he passed.

Before this event Suchet had returned to Valencia, and Dacaen and Maurice Mathieu marched against Colonel Green, who was entrenched in the hermitage of St. Dimas, one of the highest of the peaked rocks overhanging the convent of Montserrat. Manso immediately raised the Somatenes to aid Green, and as the latter had provisions, the inaccessible strength of his post seemed to defy capture; yet he surrendered in 24 hours, and at a moment when the enemy, despairing of success, were going to relinquish the attack. He excused himself as being forced by his own people, but he signed the capitulation. Decaen then set fire to the convent of Montserrat, and the flames, seen for miles around, was the signal that the warfare on that holy mountain was finished. After this the French general marched to Lerida to gather corn, and Lacy again spread his troops in the mountains.

During his absence Eroles had secretly been preparing a general insurrection to break out when the British army should arrive, and it was supposed that his object was to effect a change in the government of the province; for though Lacy himself again spoke of embodying the Somatenes if arms were given to him by Sir Edward Pellow; there was really no scarcity of arms, the demand was a deceit to prevent the muskets from being given to the people, and there was no levy. Hence the discontent increased, and a general desire for the arrival of the British troops became prevalent; the miserable people turned anxiously towards any quarter for aid, and this expression of conscious helplessness was given in evidence by the Spanish chiefs, and received as proof of enthusiasm by the English naval com-

manders, who were more sanguine of success than experience would warrant. All eyes were however directed towards the ocean, the French in fear, the Catalans in hope; and the British armament did appear off Palamos, but after three days, spread its sails again and steered for Alicant, leaving the principality stupefied with grief and disappointment.

This unexpected event was the natural result of previous errors on all sides, errors which invariably attend warlike proceedings when not directed by a superior genius, and even then not always to be avoided. It has been shown how ministerial vacillation marred Lord William Bentinck's first intention of landing in person with 10,000 or 12,000 men on the Catalonian coast; and how after much delay General Maitland had sailed to Palma with a division of 6000 men, Calabrians, Sicilians, and others, troops of no likelihood save that some 3000 British and Germans were amongst them. This force was afterwards joined by the transports from Portugal, having engineers and artillery officers on board, and that honoured battering train which had shattered the gory walls of Badajos. Wellington had great hopes of this expedition; he had himself sketched the general plan of operations; and his own campaign had been conceived in the expectation that Lord William Bentinck, a general of high rank and reputation, with 10,000 good troops, aided with at least as many Spanish soldiers, disciplined under the two British officers, Whittingham and Roche, would have early fallen on Catalonia to the destruction of Suchet's plans. And when this his first hope was quashed, he still expected that a force would be disembarked of strength, sufficient, in conjunction with the Catalan army, to take Taragona.

Roche's corps was most advanced in discipline, but the Spanish government delayed to place it under General Maitland, and hence it first sailed from the islands to Murcia, then returned without orders, again repaired to Murcia, and at the moment of General Maitland's arrival off Palamos, was, under the command of Joseph O'Donel, involved in a terrible catastrophe already alluded to and hereafter to be particularly narrated. Whittingham's levy remained, but when inspected by the Quarter-Master-General Donkin, it was found in a raw state, scarcely mustering 4000 effective men, amongst which were many French deserters from the island of Cabrera. The sumptuous clothing and equipments of Whittingham's and Roche's men, their pay regularly supplied from the British subsidy, and very much exceeding that of the other Spanish corps, excited envy and dislike; there was no public inspection, no check upon the expenditure, nor upon the delivery of the stores, and Roche's proceedings on this last head, whether justly or unjustly I know not, were very generally and severely censured. Whittingham acknowledged that he could not trust his people near the enemy without the aid of British troops, and though the Captain-General Coupigny desired their departure, his opinion was against a descent in Catalonia. Maitland hesitated, but Sir Edward Pellew urged this descent so very strongly that he finally assented, and reached Palamos with 9000 men of all nations on the 31st of July, yet in some confusion as to the transport service, which the staff officers attributed to the injudicious meddling of the naval chiefs.

Maitland's first care was to open a communication with the Spanish commanders. Eroles came on board at once and vehemently and unceasingly urged an immediate disembarkation, declaring that the fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended upon it; the other generals showed less eagerness, and their accounts differed greatly with respect to the relative means of the Catalans and the French. Lacy estimated the enemy's disposable troops at 15,000, and his own at 7000 infantry and 300 cavalry; and even that number he said he could with difficulty feed or provide with ammunition. Sarzfield judged the French to be, exclusive of Suchet's movable column, 18,000 infantry and 500 cavalry; he thought it rash to invest Taragona with a less force, and that a free and constant communication with the fleet was absolutely essential in any operation. Eroles rated the enemy at 13,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, including Suchet's column; but the reports of the deserters gave 22,000 infantry, exclusive of Suchet's column and of the garrisons and Miguelettes in the enemy's service.

No insurrection of the Somatenes had yet taken place, nor was there any appearance that such an event would happen, as the French were descried con-

ducting convoys along the shore with small escorts, and concentrating their troops for battle without molestation. The engineers demanded from six to ten days to reduce Taragona after investment, and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were then near Montserrat with 7000 or 8000 good troops, which number could be doubled in a few days ; the Catalans could not so soon unite and join Maitland's force, and there was a general, although apparently, an unjust notion abroad, that Lacy was a Frenchman at heart. It was feared also that the Toulon fleet might come out and burn the transports at their anchorage during the siege, and thus Wellington's battering train and even the safety of the army would be involved in an enterprise promising little success. A full council of war was unanimous not to land, and the reluctance of the people to rise, attributed by Captain Codrington to the machinations of traitors, was visible ; Maitland also was farther swayed by the generous and just consideration, that as the Somatenes had not voluntarily taken up arms, it would be cruel to excite them to such a step, when a few days might oblige him to abandon them to the vengeance of the enemy. Wherefore, as Palamos appeared too strong for a sudden assault, the armament sailed towards Valencia with intent to attack that place, after a project, furnished by the Quarter-Master-General Donkin and in unison with Lord Wellington's plan of operations ; but Maitland, during the voyage, changed his mind and proceeded at once to Alicante.

The Catalans were not more displeased than the British naval commanders at seeing the principalty thus shaken off ; yet the judgment of the latter seems to have been swayed partly from having given stronger hopes of assistance to the former than the circumstances would rigorously warrant ; partly from that confidence which, inspired by continual success, is strength on their own element, but rashness on shore. Captain Codrington, from the great interest he took in the struggle, was peculiarly discontented ; yet his own description of the state of Catalonia at the time, shows that his hopes rested more on some vague notions of the Somatenes' enthusiasm, than upon any facts which a general ought to calculate upon. Lord Wellington indeed said, that he could see no reason why the plan he had recommended should not have been successful ; an observation made, however, when he was somewhat excited by the prospect of having Suchet on his own hands, and probably under some erroneous information. He had been deceived about the strength of the forts at Salamanca, although close to them ; and as he had only just established a sure channel of intelligence in Catalonia, it was probable that he was also deceived with respect to Taragona, which if not strong in regular works, was well provided and commanded by a very bold active governor, and offered great resources in the facility of making interior retrenchments.

The force of the Catalans Lord Wellington knew principally from Sir Edward Pellew, who had derived his information chiefly from Eroles, who very much exaggerated it, and lessened the enemy's power in proportion. And General Maitland could scarcely be called a commander-in-chief, for Lord William Bentinck forbade him to risk the loss of his division lest Sicily itself should thereby be endangered ; and to avoid mischief from the winter season, he was instructed to quit the Spanish coast in the second week of September. Lord William and Lord Wellington were therefore not agreed in the object to be attained. The first considered the diversion on the Spanish coast as secondary to the wants of Sicily, whereas Wellington looked only to the great interests at stake in the Peninsula, and thought Sicily in no danger until the French should reinforce their army in Calabria. He desired vigorous combined efforts of the military and naval forces, to give a new aspect to the war in Catalonia, and his plan was that Taragona should be attacked ; if it fell the warfare he said would be once more established on a good base in Catalonia ; if it was succoured by the concentration of the French troops, Valencia would necessarily be weak, and the armament could then proceed to attack that place, and if unsuccessful, return to assail Taragona again.

This was an excellent plan no doubt, but Napoleon never lost sight of that great principle of war, as concisely expressed by Sertorius when he told Pompey that a good general should look behind him rather than before. The emperor acting on the proverb that fortune favours the brave, often urged his lieutenants to da e desperately with a few men in the front, but he invariably covered their

communications with heavy masses, and there is no instance of his plan of invasion being shaken by a flank or rear attack, except where his instructions were neglected. His armies made what are called points, in war, such as Massena's invasion of Portugal, Moncey's attack on Valencia, Dupont's on Andalusia; but the general plan of operation was invariably supported by heavy masses protecting the communications. Had his instructions sent from Dresden been strictly obeyed, the walls of Lerida and Taragona would have been destroyed, and only the citadels of each occupied with small garrisons easily provisioned for a long time. The field army would thus have been increased by at least 3000 men, the movable columns spared many harassing marches, and Catalonia would have offered little temptation for a descent.

But notwithstanding this error of Suchet, Maitland's troops were too few, and too ill-composed to venture the investment of Taragona. The imperial muster-rolls gave more than 80,000 men, including Reille's divisions at Zaragoza, for the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, and 27,000 of the first and 37,000 of the second, were actually under arms with the eagles; wherefore to say that Decaen could have brought at once 10,000 men to the succour of Taragona, and by weakening his garrisons, as many more in a very short time, is not to overrate his power; and this without counting Paris's brigade, 3000 strong, which belonged to Reille's division and was disposable. Suchet had just before come to Reus with 2000 select men of all arms, and as O'Donel's army had since been defeated near Alicant, he could have returned with a still greater force to oppose Maitland.

Now the English fleet was descried by the French off Palamos on the evening of the 31st of July, although it did not anchor before the 1st of August; Decaen and Maurice Mathieu with some 8000 disposable men were then between Montserrat and Barcelona, that is to say, only two marches from Taragona; Lamarque, with from 4000 to 5000, was between Palamos and Mataro, five marches from Taragona; Quesnel with a like number was in the Cerdafia, being about seven marches off; Suchet and Paris could have arrived in less than eight days, and from the garrisons and minor posts smaller succours might have been drawn; Tortosa alone could have furnished 2000. But Lacy's division was at Vich, Sarzfield's at Villa Franca, Eroles's divided between Montserrat and Urgel, Milan's in the Grao D'Olot, and they required five days even to assemble; when united, they would not have exceeded 7000 men, and with their disputing, captious generals, would have been unfit to act vigorously; nor could they have easily joined the allies without fighting a battle in which their defeat would have been certain.

Sarzfield judged that 10 days at least were necessary to reduce Taragona, and positively affirmed that the army must be entirely fed from the fleet, as the country could scarcely supply the Catalan troops alone. Thus Maitland would have had to land his men, his battering train and stores, and to form his investment in the face of Decaen's power, or following the rules of war have defeated their general first. But Decaen's troops numerically equal, without reckoning the garrison of Taragona 2000 strong, were in composition vastly superior to the allies, seeing that only 3000 British and German troops in Maitland's army were to be at all depended upon in battle; neither does it appear that the platforms, sand-bags, fascines, and other materials necessary for a siege, were at this period prepared and on board the vessels.

It is true Maitland would, if he had been able to resist Decaen at first, which seems doubtful, have effected a great diversion, and Wellington's object would have been gained if a re-embarkation had been secure; but the naval officers, having reference to the nature of the coast, declared that a safe re-embarkation could not be depended upon. The soundness of this opinion has indeed been disputed by many seamen well acquainted with the coast, who maintain that even in winter the Catalan shore is remarkably safe and tranquil; and that Cape Salou, a place in other respects admirably adapted for a camp, affords a certain retreat and facility of re-embarking on one or other of its sides in all weather. However, to Maitland the coast of Catalonia was represented as unsafe, and this view of the question is also supported by very able seamen likewise acquainted with that sea.

OPERATIONS IN MURCIA.

The Anglo-Sicilian armament arrived at Alicante at a critical moment ; the Spanish cause was there going to ruin. Joseph O'Donel, brother to the regent, had with great difficulty organized a new Murcian army after Blake's surrender at Valencia and, this army, based upon Alicante and Carthagena, was independent of a division under General Frere, which always hung about Baza and Lorca, on the frontier of Grenada, and communicated through the Alpuxaras with the sea-coast. Both Suchet and Soult were paralyzed in some degree by the neighbourhood of these armies, which holding a central position were supported by fortresses, supplied by sea from Gibraltar to Cadiz, and had their existence guaranteed by Wellington's march into Spain, by his victory of Salamanca, and by his general combinations. For the two French commanders were forced to watch his movements, and to support at the same time, the one a blockade of the Isla de Leon, the other the fortresses in Catalonia ; hence they were in no condition to follow up the prolonged operations necessary to destroy these Murcian armies, which were moreover supported by the arrival of General Ross with British troop at Carthagena.

O'Donel had been joined by Roche in July, and Suchet, after detaching Maupoint's brigade towards Madrid, departed himself with 2000 men for Catalonia, leaving General Harispe with not more than 4000 men beyond the Xucar. General Ross immediately advised O'Donel to attack him, and to distract his attention a large fleet, with troops on board, which had originally sailed from Cadiz to succour Ballesteros at Malaga, now appeared off the Valencian coast. At the same time Bassecour and Villa Campa, being free to act in consequence of Palombini's and Maupoint's departure for Madrid, came down from their haunts in the mountains of Albaracyn upon the right flank and rear of the French positions. Villa Campa penetrated to Liria, and Bassecour to Cofrentes on the Xucar ; but ere this attack could take place, Suchet, with his usual celerity, returned from Reus. At first he detached men against Villa Campa, but when he saw the fleet, fearing it was the Sicilian armament, he recalled them again, and sent for Paris's brigade from Zaragoza, to act by Teruel against Bassecour and Villa Campa. Then he concentrated his own forces at Valencia, but a storm drove the fleet off the coast, and meanwhile O'Donel's operations brought on the

FIRST BATTLE OF CASTALLA.

Harispe's posts were established at Biar, Castalla, and Onil on the right ; at Ibi and Alcoy on the left. This line was not more than one march from Alicante. Colonel Mesclop, with a regiment of infantry and some cuirassiers held Ibi, and was supported by Harispe himself with a reserve at Alcoy. General Delort, with another regiment of infantry, was at Castalla, having some cuirassiers at Onil on his left, and a regiment of dragoons with three companies of foot at Biar on his right. In this exposed situation the French awaited O'Donel, who directed his principal force, consisting of 6000 infantry, 700 cavalry, and eight guns, against Delort ; meanwhile Roche, with 3000 men, was to move through the mountains of Xixona, so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with the attack at Castalla. O'Donel hoped thus to cut the French line, and during these operations, Bassecour, with 2000 men, was to come down from Cofrentes to Villena, on the right flank of Delort.

Roche, who marched in the night of the 19th, remained during the 20th in the mountains, but the next night he threaded a difficult pass, eight miles long, reached Ibi at daybreak on the 21st, and sent notice of his arrival to O'Donel ; and when that general appeared in front of Delort, the latter abandoned Castalla, which was situated in the same valley as Ibi, and about five miles distant from it. But he only retired skirmishing to a strong ridge behind that town, which also extended behind Ibi ; this secured his communication with Mesclop, of whom he demanded succour, and at the same time he called in his own cavalry and infantry from Onil and Biar. Mesclop, leaving some infantry, two guns, and his cuirassiers to defend Ibi and a small fort on the hill behind it, marched at once towards Delort, and thus Roche, finding only a few men before him, got possession of the town after a sharp skirmish, yet he could not take the fort.

At first, O'Donel, who had advanced beyond Castalla, only skirmished with and cannonaded the French in his front, for he had detached the Spanish cavalry to

operate by the plains of Villena, to turn the enemy's right and communicate with Bassacour. While expecting the effects of this movement he was astonished to see the French dragoons come trotting through the pass of Biar, on his left flank; they were followed by some companies of infantry, and only separated from him by a stream over which was a narrow bridge without parapets, and at the same moment the cuirassiers appeared on the other side coming from Onil. The Spanish cavalry had made no effort to interrupt this march from Biar, nor to follow the French through the defile, nor any effort whatever.* In this difficulty O'Donel turned two guns against the bridge and supported them with a battalion of infantry; but the French dragoons observing this battalion to be unsteady, braved the fire of the guns, and riding furiously over the bridge seized the battery, and then dashed against and broke the infantry. Delort's line advanced at the same moment, the cuirassiers charged into the town of Castalla, and the whole Spanish army fled outright. Several hundred sought refuge in an old castle and there surrendered, and of the others 3000 were killed, wounded, or taken, and yet the victors had scarcely 1500 men engaged, and did not lose 200. O'Donel attributed his defeat to the disobedience and inactivity of St. Estevan, who commanded his cavalry, but the great fault was the placing that cavalry beyond the defile of Biar instead of keeping it in hand for the battle.

This part of the action being over, Mesclop, who had not taken any share in it, was reinforced and returned to succour Ibi, to which place also Harispe was now approaching from Alcoy; but Roche favoured by the strength of the passes escaped, and reached Alicant with little hurt, while the remains of O'Donel's divisions, pursued by the cavalry on the road of Jumilla, fled to the city of Murcia. Bassacour who had advanced to Almanza was then driven back to his mountain-haunts, where Villa Campa rejoined him. It was at this moment that Maitland's armament disembarked, and the remnants of the Spanish force rallied. The king, then flying from Madrid, immediately changed the direction of his march from the Morena to Valencia, and one more proof was given that it was England and not Spain which resisted the French; for Alicant would have fallen, if not as an immediate consequence of this defeat, yet surely when the king's army had joined Suchet.

That general, who had heard of the battle of Salamanca, the evacuation of Madrid, and the approach of Joseph, and now saw a fresh army springing up in his front, hastened to concentrate his disposable force in the positions of San Felipe de Xativa and Moxente which he entrenched, as well as the road to Almanza, with a view to secure his junction with the king. At the same time he established a new bridge and bridge-head at Alberique in addition to that at Alcira on the Xucar; and having called up Paris from Teruel, and Maupoint from Cuenca, resolved to abide a battle, which the slowness and vacillation of his adversaries gave him full time to prepare for.

Maitland arrived the 7th, and though his force was not all landed before the 11th, the French were still scattered on various points, and a vigorous commander would have found the means to drive them over the Xucar, and perhaps from Valencia itself. However, the British general had scarcely set his foot on shore when the usual Spanish vexations overwhelmed him. Three principal roads led towards the enemy; one on the left, passed through Yecla and Fuente La Higuera, and by it the remnant of O'Donel's army was coming up from Murcia; another passed through Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera, and the third through Xixona, Alcoy, and Albayda. Now O'Donel, whose existence as a general was redeemed by the appearance of Maitland, instantly demanded from the latter a pledge, that he would draw nothing either by purchase or requisition, save wine and straw, from any of these lines, nor from the country between them. The English general assented, and instantly sunk under the difficulties thus created. For his intention was to have attacked Harispe at Alcoy and Ibi on the 13th or 14th, but he was only able to get one march from Alicant as late as the 16th, he could not attack before the 18th, and it was on that day, that Suchet concentrated his army at Xativa. The delay had been a necessary consequence of the agreement with O'Donel.

* Appendix, No. 15.

Maitland was without any habitude of command, his commissariat was utterly inefficient, and his field-artillery had been so shamefully ill-prepared in Sicily that it was nearly useless. He had hired mules at a great expense for the transport of his guns, and of provisions, from Alicante, but the owners of the mules soon declared they could not fulfil their contract unless they were fed by the British, and this O'Donel's restrictions as to the roads prevented. Many of the muleteers also, after receiving their money, deserted with both mules and provisions; and on the first day's march a convoy, with six days' supply, was attacked by an armed banditti, called a guerilla, and the convoy was plundered or dispersed and lost.

Maitland, suffering severely from illness, was disgusted at these things, and fearing for the safety of his troops, would have retired at once, and perhaps have re-embarked, if Suchet had not gone back to Xativa; then, however, he advanced to Elda, while Roche entered Alcoy; yet both apparently without an object, for there was no intention of fighting, and the next day Roche retired to Xixona and Maitland retreated to Alicante. To cover this retreat General Donkin pushed forward, with a detachment of Spanish and English cavalry, through Sax, Ibi, and Alcoy, and giving out that an advanced guard of 5000 British was close behind him, coasted all the French line, captured a convoy at Olleria, and then returned through Alcoy. Suchet kept close himself, in the camp of Xativa, but sent Harispe to meet the king, who was now near Almanza, and on the 25th the junction of the two armies was effected; at the same time Maupoint, escaping Villa Campa's assault, arrived from Cuenca with the remnant of his brigade.

When the king's troops arrived, Suchet pushed his outposts again to Villena and Alcoy, but apparently occupied in providing for Joseph's army and court, he neglected to press the allies, which he might have done to their serious detriment. Meanwhile O'Donel, who had drawn off Frere's division from Lorca, came up to Yecla with 5000 or 6000 men, and Maitland, reinforced with some detachments from Sicily, commenced fortifying a camp outside Alicante; but his health was quite broken, and he earnestly desired to resign, being filled with anxiety at the near approach of Soult. That marshal had abandoned Andalusia, and his manner of doing so shall be set forth in the next chapter; for it was a great event, leading to great results, and worthy of deep consideration by those who desire to know upon what the fate of kingdoms may depend.

CHAPTER II.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

SUCHET found resources in Valencia to support the king's court and army, without augmenting the pressure on the inhabitants, and a counter-stroke could have been made against the allies, if the French commanders had been of one mind and had looked well to the state of affairs; but Joseph, exasperated by the previous opposition of the generals, and troubled by the distresses of the numerous families attached to his court, was only intent upon recovering Madrid as soon as he could collect troops enough to give Wellington battle. He had demanded from the French minister of war, money, stores, and a reinforcement of 40,000 men, and he had imperatively commanded Soult to abandon Andalusia; * that clear-sighted commander could not, however, understand why the king, who had given him no accurate details of Marmont's misfortunes, or of his own operations, should yet order him to abandon at once all the results and all the interests springing from three years' possession of the south of Spain. He thought it a great question, not to be treated lightly, and as his vast capacity enabled him to embrace the whole field of operations, he concluded that rumour had exaggerated the catastrophe at Salamanca and that the abandoning of Andalusia would be the ruin of the French cause.

"To march on Madrid," he said, "would probably produce another pitched battle, which should be carefully avoided, seeing that the whole framework of the French invasion was disjointed, and no resource would remain after a defeat. On the other hand, Andalusia, which had hitherto been such a burthen to the invasion,

* Appendix, No. 3.

now offered means to remedy the present disasters, and to sacrifice that province with all its resources, for the sake of regaining the capital of Spain, appeared a folly. It was purchasing a town at the price of a kingdom. Madrid was nothing in the emperor's policy, though it might be something for a King of Spain; yet Philip the Fifth had thrice lost it and preserved his throne. Why then should Joseph set such a value upon that city? The battle of the Arapiles was merely a grand duel which might be fought again with a different result; but to abandon Andalusia with all its stores and establishments; to raise the blockade of Cadiz; to sacrifice the guns, the equipments, the hospitals, and the magazines, and thus render null the labours of three years, would be to make the battle of the Arapiles a prodigious historical event, the effect of which would be felt all over Europe and even in the new world. And how was this flight from Andalusia to be safely effected? The army of the south had been able to hold in check 60,000 enemies disposed on a circuit round it, but the moment it commenced its retreat towards Toledo those 60,000 men would unite to follow, and Wellington himself would be found on the Tagus in its front. On that line then the army of the south could not march, and a retreat through Murcia would be long and difficult. But why retreat at all? Where," exclaimed this able warrior, "where is the harm, though the allies should possess the centre of Spain?"

"Your majesty," he continued, "should collect the army of the centre, the army of Aragon, and if possible, the army of Portugal, and you should march upon Andalusia, even though to do so should involve the abandonment of Valencia. If the army of Portugal comes with you, 120,000 men will be close to Portugal; if it cannot or will not come, let it remain, because while Burgos defends itself, that army can keep on the right of the Ebro and the emperor will take measures for its succour. Let Wellington then occupy Spain from Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care to provide magazines, stores, and places of arms in Andalusia; and the moment 80,000 French are assembled in that province the theatre of war is changed! The English general must fall back to save Lisbon, the army of Portugal may follow him to the Tagus, the line of communication with France will be established by the eastern coast, the final result of the campaign turns in our favour, and a decisive battle may be delivered without fear at the gates of Lisbon. March, then, with the army of the centre upon the Despenas Perros, unite all our forces in Andalusia, and all will be well! Abandon that province and you lose Spain! you will retire behind the Ebro, and famine will drive you thence before the emperor can, from the distant Russia, provide a remedy; his affairs even in that country will suffer by the blow, and America, dismayed by our misfortunes, will perhaps make peace with England."

Neither the king's genius, nor his passions, would permit him to understand the grandeur and vigour of this conception. To change even simple lines of operation suddenly, is at all times a nice affair, but thus to change the whole theatre of operations and regain the initial movements after a defeat, belongs only to master spirits in war. Now the emperor had recommended a concentration of force, and Joseph would not understand this save as applied to the recovery of Madrid; he was uneasy for the frontiers of France; as if Wellington could possibly have invaded that country while a great army menaced Lisbon; in fine he could see nothing but his lost capital on one side, and a disobedient lieutenant on the other, and peremptorily repeated his orders. Then Soult, knowing that his plan could only be effected by union and rapidity, and dreading the responsibility of further delay, took immediate steps to abandon Andalusia; but mortified by this blighting of his fruitful genius, and stung with anger at such a termination to all his political and military labours, his feelings overmastered his judgment. Instead of tracing the king's rigid counteraction of his scheme to the narrowness of the monarch's military genius, he judged it part of a design to secure his own fortune at the expense of his brother, an action quite foreign to Joseph's honest and passionate nature. Wherefore, making known this opinion to six generals, who were sworn to secrecy, unless interrogated by the emperor, he wrote to the French minister of war expressing his doubts of the king's loyalty towards the emperor, and founding them on the following facts.*

* Appendix, No. 4.

1. That the extent of Marmont's defeat had been made known to him only by the reports of the enemy, and the king, after remaining for 23 days without sending any detailed information of the operations in the north of Spain, although the armies were actively engaged, had peremptorily ordered him to abandon Andalusia, saying it was the only resource remaining for the French. To this opinion Soult said he could not subscribe, yet being unable absolutely to disobey the monarch, he was going to make a movement which must finally lead to the loss of all the French conquests in Spain, seeing that it would then be impossible to remain permanently on the Tagus, or even in the Castiles.

2. This operation, ruinous in itself, was insisted upon at a time when the newspapers of Cadiz affirmed that Joseph's ambassador at the court of Petersburg had joined the Prussian army in the field; that Joseph himself had made secret overtures to the government in the Isla de Leon; that Bernadotte, his brother-in-law, had made a treaty with England and had demanded of the Cortes a guard of Spaniards, a fact confirmed by information obtained through an officer sent with a flag of truce to the English admiral; finally, that Moreau and Blücher were at Stockholm, and the aide-de-camp of the former was in London.

Reflecting upon all these circumstances he feared that the object of the king's false movements, might be to force the French army over the Ebro, in the view of making an arrangement for Spain, separate from France; fears, said the Duke of Dalmatia, which may be chimerical, but it is better in such a crisis to be too fearful than too confident. This letter was sent by sea, and the vessel having touched at Valencia at the moment of Joseph's arrival there, the despatch was opened, and it was then, in the first burst of his anger, that the king despatched D'Éprez on that mission to Moscow, the result of which has been already related.

Soult's proceedings, though most offensive to the king and founded in error, because Joseph's letters, containing the information required, were intercepted, not withheld, were prompted by zeal for his master's service and cannot be justly condemned, yet Joseph's indignation was natural and becoming. But the admiration of reflecting men must ever be excited by the greatness of mind, and the calm sagacity, with which Napoleon treated this thorny affair. Neither the complaints of his brother, nor the hints of his minister of war (for the Duke of Feltre, a man of mean capacity and of an intriguing disposition, countenanced Joseph's expressed suspicions that the Duke of Dalmatia designed to make himself king of Andalusia) could disturb the temper or judgment of the emperor; and it was then, struck with the vigour of the plan for concentrating the army in Andalusia, he called Soult the only military head in Spain.* Nor was Wellington inattentive of that general's movements, he knew his talents, and could foresee and appreciate the importance of the project he had proposed. Anxiously he watched his reluctant motions, and while apparently enjoying his own triumph amidst the feasts and rejoicings of Madrid, his eye was fixed on Seville; the balls and bull-fights of the capital cloaked both the skill and the apprehensions of the consummate general.

Before the allies had crossed the Guadarama, Hill had been directed to hold his army in hand, close to Drouet, and ready to move into the valley of the Tagus if that general should hasten to the succour of the king. But when Joseph's retreat upon Valencia was known, Hill received orders to fight Drouet, and even to follow him into Andalusia; at the same time General Cooke was directed to prepare an attack, even though it should be an open assault on the French lines before Cadiz, while Ballesteros operated on the flank from Gibraltar. By these means Wellington hoped to keep Soult from sending any succour to the king, and even to force him out of Andalusia without the necessity of marching there himself; yet if these measures failed, he was resolved to take 20,000 men from Madrid and uniting with Hill drive the French from that province.

Previous to the sending of these instructions, Laval and Villatte had pursued Ballesteros to Malaga, which place, after a skirmish at Coin, he entered, and was in such danger of capture, that the maritime expedition already noticed was detached from Cadiz, by sea, to carry him off. However the news of the battle of Salamanca

* Appendix, No. 5.

having arrested the French movements, the Spanish general regained San Roque, and the fleet went on to Valencia. Meanwhile Soult, hoping the king would transfer the seat of war to Andalusia, had caused Drouet to show a bold front against Hill, extending from the Serena to Monasterio, and to send scouting parties towards Merida; and large magazines were formed at Cordoba, a central point, equally suited for an advance by Estremadura, a march to La Mancha, or a retreat by Grenada. Wherefore Hill, who had not then received his orders to advance, remained on the defensive; nor would Wellington stir from Madrid, although his presence was urgently called for on the Duero, until he was satisfied that the Duke of Dalmatia meant to abandon Andalusia. The king, as we have seen, finally forced this measure upon the marshal; but the execution required very extensive arrangements, for the quarters were distant, the convoys immense, the enemies numerous, the line of march wild, and the journey long. And it was most important to present the imposing appearance of a great and regular military movement and not the disgraceful scene of a confused flight.

The distant minor posts, in the Condado de Niebla and other places, were first called in, and then the lines before the Isla were abandoned; for Soult, in obedience to the king's first order, designed to move upon La Mancha, and it was only by accident, and indirectly, that he heard of Joseph's retreat to Valencia. At the same time he discovered that Drouet, who had received direct orders from the king, was going to Toledo, and it was not without difficulty, and only through the medium of his brother, who commanded Drouet's cavalry, that he could prevent that destructive isolated movement. Murcia then became the line of retreat, but everything was hurried, because the works before the Isla were already broken up in the view of retreating towards La Mancha, and the troops were in march for Seville, although the safe assembling of the army at Grenada required another arrangement.

On the 25th of August 1000 guns, stores in proportion, and all the immense works of Chiclana, St. Maria, and the Trocadero, were destroyed. Thus the long blockade of the Isla de Leon was broken up at the moment when the bombardment of Cadiz had become very serious, when the opposition to English influence was taking a dangerous direction, when the French intrigues were nearly ripe, the Cortes becoming alienated from the cause of Ferdinand and the Church; finally when the executive government was weaker than ever, because the Count of Abispa, the only active person in the regency, had resigned, disgusted that his brother had been superseded by Elio and censured in the Cortes for the defeat at Castalla. This siege or rather defence of Cadiz, for it was never, strictly speaking, besieged, was a curious episode in the war. Whether the Spaniards would or would not have effectually defended it without the aid of British troops is a matter of speculation; but it is certain that notwithstanding Graham's glorious action at Barrosa, Cadiz was always a heavy burthen upon Lord Wellington; the forces there employed would have done better service under his immediate command, and many severe financial difficulties to say nothing of political crosses would have been spared.

In the night of the 26th, Soult, quitting Seville, commenced his march by Ossuna and Antequera towards Grenada; but now Wellington's orders had set all the allied troops of Andalusia and Estremadura in motion. Hill advanced against Drouet; Ballesteros moved by the Ronda mountains to hang on the retiring enemy's flanks; the expedition sent by sea to succour him returned from Valencia; Colonel Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon disembarked with 4000 English and Spanish troops at Huelva, and marching upon St. Lucar Mayor, drove the enemy from thence on the 24th. The 27th they fell upon the French rear-guard at Seville, and the suburb of Triana, the bridge, and the streets beyond, were soon carried by the English guards and Downie's legion. Two hundred prisoners, several guns, and many stores were taken, but Downie himself was wounded and made prisoner, and treated very harshly, because the populace rising in aid of the allies had mutilated the French soldiers who fell into their hands. Scarcely was Seville taken, when 7000 French infantry came up from Chiclana, but thinking all Hill's troops were before them, instead of attacking Skerrit hastily followed their own army,

leaving the allies masters of the city. But this attack, though successful, was isolated and contrary to Lord Wellington's desire. A direct and vigorous assault upon the lines of Chiclana by the whole of the Anglo-Spanish garrison was his plan, and such an assault, when the French were abandoning their works there, would have been a far heavier blow to Soult.

That commander was now too strong to be meddled with. He issued eight days' bread to his army, marched very leisurely, picked up on his route the garrisons and troops who came into him at Antequera from the Ronda and from the coast; and at Grenada he halted 11 days to give Drouet time to join him, for the latter quitting Estremadura the 25th by the Cordova passes, was marching by Jaen to Huescar. Ballesteros had harassed the march, but the French general had, with an insignificant loss, united 72 guns and 45,000 soldiers under arms, of which 6000 were cavalry. He was however still in the midst of enemies. On his left flank was Hill; on his right flank was Ballesteros; Wellington himself might come down by the Despenas Perros; the Murcians were in his front, Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon behind him, and he was clogged with enormous convoys; his sick and maimed men alone amounted to nearly 9000; his Spanish soldiers were deserting daily, and it was necessary to provide for several hundreds of Spanish families who were attached to the French interests. To march upon the city of Murcia was the direct and the best route for Valencia; but the yellow fever raged there and at Carthagena; moreover, Don S. Bracco, the English consul at Murcia, a resolute man, declared his resolution to inundate the country if the French advanced. Wherefore, again issuing eight days' bread, Soult marched by the mountain ways leading from Huescar to Cehejin and Calasparra, and then moving by Hellin, gained Almanza on the great road to Madrid, his flank being covered by a detachment from Suchet's army which skirmished with Maitland's advanced posts at San Vicente close to Alicante. At Hellin he met the advanced guard of the army of Aragon, and on the 3rd of October the military junction of all the French forces was effected.

The task was thus completed, and in a manner worthy of so great a commander. For it must be recollected that besides the drawing together of the different divisions, the march itself was 300 miles, great part through mountain roads, and the population was everywhere hostile. General Hill had menaced him with 25,000 men, including Morillo and Penne Villemur's forces; Ballesteros, reinforced from Cadiz and by the deserters, had nearly 20,000; there were 14,000 soldiers still in the Isla; Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon had 4000, and the Partidas were in all parts numerous: yet from the midst of these multitudes the Duke of Dalmatia carried off his army, his convoys, and his sick without any disaster. In this manner Andalusia, which had once been saved by the indirect influence of a single march, made by Moore from Salamanca, was, such is the complexity of war, after three years' subjection, recovered by the indirect effect of a single battle delivered by Wellington close to the same city.

During these transactions Maitland's proceedings had been anxiously watched by Wellington; for though the recovery of Andalusia was both politically and militarily a great gain, the result, he saw, must necessarily be hurtful to the ultimate success of his campaign by bringing together such powerful forces. He still thought that regular operations would not so effectually occupy Suchet, as a littoral warfare, yet he was contented that Maitland should try his own plan, and he advised that general to march by the coast, and have constant communication with the fleet, referring to his own campaign against Junot, in 1808, as an example to be followed. But the coast roads were difficult, the access for the fleet uncertain; and though the same obstacles, and the latter perhaps in a greater degree, had occurred in Portugal, the different constitution of the armies, and still more of the generals, was an insuperable bar to a like proceeding in Valencia.

General Maitland only desired to quit his command, and the more so that the time appointed by Lord William Bentinck for the return of the troops to Sicily was approaching. The moment was critical, but Wellington, without hesitation, forbade their departure, and even asked the ministers to place them under his

own command. Meanwhile, with the utmost gentleness and delicacy, he showed to Maitland, who was a man of high honour, courage, and feeling, although inexperienced in command, and now heavily oppressed with illness, that his situation was by no means dangerous ;—that the entrenched camp of Alicant might be safely defended,—that he was comparatively better off than Wellington himself had been when in the lines of Torres Vedras, and that it was even desirable that the enemy should attack him on such strong ground, because the Spaniards when joined with English soldiers in a secure position would certainly fight. He also desired that Carthagena should be well looked to by General Ross lest Soult should turn aside to surprise it. Then taking advantage of Elio's fear of Soult he drew him with the army that had been O'Donel's towards Madrid and so got some control over his operations.

If the English general had been well furnished with money at this time, and if the yellow fever had not raged in Murcia, it is probable he would have followed Joseph rapidly, and rallying all the scattered Spanish forces and the Sicilian armament on his own army, have endeavoured to crush the king and Suchet before Soult could arrive ; or he might have formed a junction with Hill at Despenas Perros and so have fallen on Soult himself, during his march, although such an operation would have endangered his line of communication on the Duero. But these obstacles induced him to avoid operations in the south, which would have involved him in new and immense combinations, until he had secured his northern line of operations by the capture of Burgos, meaning then with his whole army united to attack the enemy in the south.

However, he could not stir from Madrid until he was certain that Soult would relinquish Andalusia, and this was not made clear before Cordorba was abandoned. Then Hill was ordered to advance on Zalamea de la Serena, where he commanded equally, the passes leading to Cordorba in front, those leading to La Mancha on the left, and those leading by Truxillo to the Tagus in the rear ; so that he could at pleasure either join Wellington, follow Drouet towards Grenada, or interpose between Soult and Madrid, if he should turn towards the Despenas Perros : meanwhile Skerrit's troops were marching to join him, and the rest of the Anglo-Portuguese garrison of Cadiz sailed to Lisbon, with intent to join Wellington by the regular line of operations.

During these transactions the affairs in Old Castile had become greatly deranged, for where Wellington was not, the French warfare generally assumed a severe and menacing aspect. Castaños had, in person, conducted the siege of Astorga, after the battle of Salamanca, yet with so little vigour, that it appeared rather a blockade than a siege. The forts at Toro and Zamora had also been invested, the first by the Partidas, the second by Silveira's militia, who with great spirit had passed their own frontier, although well aware that they could not be legally compelled to do so. Thus all the French garrisons abandoned by Clausel's retreat were endangered, and though the slow progress of the Spaniards before Astorga was infinitely disgraceful to their military prowess, final success seemed certain.

General H. Clinton was at Cuellar, Santocildes occupied Valladolid, Anson's cavalry was in the valley of the Esqueva, and the front looked fair enough. But in the rear the line of communication, as far as the frontier of Portugal, was in great disorder ; the discipline of the army was deteriorating rapidly, and excesses were committed on all the routes. A detachment of Portuguese, not more than 1000 strong, either instigated by want or by their hatred of the Spaniards, had perpetrated such enormities on their march from Pinhel to Salamanca, that as an example, five were executed and many others severely punished by stripes, yet even this did not check the growing evil, the origin of which may be partly traced to the license at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, but principally to the sufferings of the soldiers.

All the hospitals in the rear were crowded, and Salamanca itself, in which there were 6000 sick and wounded, besides French prisoners, was the very abode of misery. The soldiers endured much during the first two or three days after the battle, and the inferior officers' sufferings were still more heavy and protracted.

They had no money, and many sold their horses and other property to sustain life ; some actually died of want, and though Wellington, hearing of this, gave orders that they should be supplied from the purveyor's stores in the same manner as the soldiers, the relief came late. It is a common, yet erroneous notion, that the English system of hospitals in the Peninsula was admirable, and that the French hospitals were neglected. Strenuous and unceasing exertions were made by Lord Wellington and the chiefs of the medical staff to form good hospital establishments, but the want of money, and still more the want of previous institutions, foiled their utmost efforts. Now there was no point of warfare which more engaged Napoleon's attention than the care of his sick and wounded ; and he being monarch as well as general, furnished his hospitals with all things requisite, even with luxuries. Under his fostering care also, Baron Larrey, justly celebrated, were it for this alone, organized the establishment called the hospital *Ambulance* ; that is to say, waggons of a peculiar construction, well horsed, served by men trained and incorporated as soldiers, and subject to a strict discipline. Rewarded for their courage and devotion like other soldiers, they were always at hand, and whether in action or on a march, ready to pick up, to salve, and to carry off wounded men ; and the astonishing rapidity with which the fallen French soldiers disappeared from a field of battle attested the excellence of the institution.

But in the British army, the carrying off the wounded depended partly upon the casual assistance of a weak waggon train, very badly disciplined, furnishing only three waggons to a division, and not originally appropriated to that service ; partly upon the spare commissariat animals, but principally upon the resources of the country, whether of bullock carts, mules, or donkeys, and hence the most doleful scenes after a battle, or when an hospital was to be evacuated. The increasing numbers of the sick and wounded as the war enlarged, also pressed on the limited number of regular medical officers, and Wellington complained, that when he demanded more, the military medical board in London neglected his demands, and thwarted his arrangements. Shoals of hospital mates and students were indeed sent out, and they arrived for the most part ignorant alike of war and their own profession ; while a heterogeneous mass of purveyors and their subordinates, acting without any military organization or effectual superintendence, continually bade defiance to the exertions of those medical officers, and they were many, whose experience, zeal, and talents would, with a good institution to work upon, have rendered this branch of the service most distinguished. Nay, many even of the well-educated surgeons sent out were for some time of little use, for superior professional skill is of little value in comparison of experience in military arrangement ; where one soldier dies from the want of a delicate operation, hundreds perish from the absence of military arrangement. War tries the strength of the military frame-work ; it is in peace that the frame-work itself must be formed, otherwise barbarians would be the leading soldiers of the world ; a perfect army can only be made by civil institutions, and those, rightly considered, would tend to confine the horrors of war to the field of battle, which would be the next best thing to the perfection of civilization that would prevent war altogether.

Such was the state of affairs on the allies' line of communication, when, on the 14th of August, Clausel suddenly came down the Pisuergra. Anson's cavalry immediately recrossed the Duero at Tudela, Santocildes, following Wellington's instructions, fell back to Torrelobaton, and on the 18th the French assembled at Valladolid to the number of 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 50 guns well provided with ammunition. Five thousand stragglers, who in the confusion of defeat had fled to Burgos and Vittoria, were also collected and in march to join. Clausel's design was to be at hand when Joseph, reinforced from the south, should drive Wellington from Madrid, for he thought the latter must then retire by Avila, and the Valle de Ambles, and he purposed to gain the mountains of Avila himself, and harass the English general's flank. Meanwhile Foy proposed, with two divisions of infantry and 1600 cavalry, to succour the garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Astorga, and Clausel consented, though he appears to have been somewhat fearful of this dangerous experiment, and did not believe Astorga was so near its fall.

Foy wished to march on the 15th by Placentia, yet he was not dispatched until

the evening of the 17th, and then by the line of Toro, the garrison of which place he carried off in passing. The 19th he sabred some of the Spanish rear-guard at Castro Gonzalo, on the Esla; the 20th, at three o'clock in the evening, he reached La Baneza, but was mortified to learn, that Castaños, by an artful negotiation had, the day before, persuaded the garrison of Astorga, 1200 good troops, to surrender, although there was no breach, and the siege was actually being raised at the time. The Gallicians being safe in their mountains, the French general turned to the left, and marched upon Carvajales, hoping to enclose Silveira's militia, between the Duero and the Esla, and sweep them off in his course; then relieving Zamora, he purposed to penetrate to Salamanca, and seize the trophies of the Arapiles. And this would infallibly have happened, but for the judicious activity of Sir Howard Douglas, who, divining Foy's object, sent Silveira with timely notice into Portugal; yet so critical was the movement that Foy's cavalry skirmished with the Portuguese rear-guard near Constantín at day-break on the 24th. The 25th the French entered Zamora, but Wellington was now in movement upon Arevalo, and Clausel recalled Foy at the moment when his infantry were actually in march upon Salamanca to seize the trophies, and his cavalry was moving by Ledesma, to break up the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

That Foy was thus able to disturb the line of communication was certainly Clinton's error. Wellington left 18,000 men, exclusive of the troops besieging Astorga, to protect his flank and rear, and he had a right to think it enough, because he momentarily expected Astorga to fall, and the French army, a beaten one, was then in full retreat. It is true none of the French garrisons yielded before Clausel returned, but Clinton alone had 8000 good troops, and might with the aid of Santocildes and the Partidas, have baffled the French; he might even have menaced Valladolid, after Foy's departure, which would have certainly brought that general back. And if he dared not venture so much, he should, following his instructions, have regulated his movements along the left of the Duero, so as to be always in a condition to protect Salamanca; that is, he should have gone to Olmedo when Clausel first occupied Valladolid, but he retired to Arevalo, which enabled Foy to advance.

The mere escape of the garrisons from Toro and Zamora, was by the English general thought no misfortune. It would have cost him a long march and two sieges in the hottest season to have reduced them, which, in the actual state of affairs, was more than they were worth; yet, to use his own words, "*it was not very encouraging to find that the best Spanish army was unable to stand before the remains of Marmont's beaten troops; that in more than two months, it had been unable even to breach Astorga, and that all important operations must still be performed by the British troops.*" The Spaniards, now in the fifth year of the war, were still in the state described by Sir John Moore, "*without an army, without a government, without a general!*"

While these events were passing in Castile, Popham's armament remained on the Biscay coast, and the Partidas thus encouraged became so active, that with exception of Santana and Guetaria, all the littoral posts were abandoned by Caffarelli; Porlier, Renvalles, and Mendizabel, the nominal commanders of all the bands, immediately took possession of Castro, Santander, and even of Bilbao, and though General Rouget came from Vittoria to recover the last, he was after some sharp fighting obliged to retire again to Durango. Meanwhile Reille, deluded by a rumour that Wellington was marching through the centre of Spain upon Zaragoza, abandoned several important outposts; Aragon, hitherto so tranquil, became unquiet, and all the northern provinces were ripe for insurrection.

CHAPTER III.

WHILE the various military combinations described in the foregoing chapter were thickening, Wellington, as we have seen, remained in Madrid, apparently inactive, but really watching the fitting moment to push his operations, and consolidate his success in the north, preparatory to the execution of his designs in the south. The result was involved in a mixed question, of time, and of combinations dependent upon his central position, and upon the activity of the Partidas in

cutting off all correspondence between the French armies. His mode of paralyzing Suchet's and Caffarelli's armies, by the Sicilian armament in the east and Popham's armament in the north, has been already described, but his internal combinations, to oppose the united forces of Soult and the king, were still more important and extensive.

When it was certain that Soult had actually abandoned Andalusia, Hill was directed upon Toledo, by the bridge of Almaraz, and Colonel Sturgeon's genius had rendered that stupendous ruin, although more lofty than Alcantara, passable for artillery. Elio also was induced to bring the army of Murcia to the same quarter, and Ballesteros was desired to take post on the mountain of Alcaraz, and look to the fortress of Chinchilla, which, situated at the confines of Murcia and La Mancha, and perched on a rugged isolated hill in a vast plain, was peculiarly strong both from construction and site, and it was the knot of all the great lines of communication. The partizan corps of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, were desired to enter La Mancha, and thus, as Hill could bring up above 20,000 men, and as the third, fourth, and light divisions, two brigades of cavalry, and Carlos D'Espana's troops were to remain near Madrid, whilst the rest of the army marched into Old Castile, above 60,000 men, 30,000 being excellent troops and well commanded, would have been assembled, with the fortified post of Chinchilla in front, before Soult could unite with the king.

The British troops at Carthagea were directed, when Soult should have passed that city, to leave only small garrisons in the forts there, and join the army at Alicante, which with the reinforcements from Sicily, would then be 16,000 strong, 7000 being British troops. While this force was at Alicante, Wellington judged that the French could not bring more than 50,000 against Madrid without risking the loss of Valencia itself. Not that he expected the heterogeneous mass he had collected could resist on a fair field the veteran and powerfully constituted army which would finally be opposed to them; but he calculated that ere the French generals could act seriously the rivers would be full, and Hill could then hold his ground sufficiently long to enable the army to come back from Burgos. Indeed, he had little doubt of reducing that place, and being again on the Tagus in time to take the initial movements himself.

Meanwhile the allies had several lines of operation.

Ballesteros, from the mountains of Alcaraz, could harass the flanks of the advancing French, and when they passed, could unite with Maitland to overpower Suchet.

Hill could retire if pressed, by Madrid, or by Toledo, and could either gain the passes of the Guadarama or the valley of the Tagus.

Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecour, and the Empecinado could act by Cuenca and Requeña against Suchet, or against Madrid, if the French followed Hill obstinately; or they could join Ballesteros. And besides all these forces, there were 10,000 or 12,000 new Spanish levies in the Isla waiting for clothing and arms which under the recent treaty were to come from England.

To Lord Wellington, the English ministers had nominally confided the distribution of these succours, but following their usual vicious manner of doing business, they also gave Mr. Stuart a control over it without Wellington's knowledge, and hence the stores, expected by the latter at Libson or Cadiz, were by Stuart unwittingly directed to Coruña, with which place the English general had no secure communication; moreover, there were very few Spanish levies there, and no confidential person to superintend the delivery of them. Other political crosses, which shall be noticed in due time, he also met with, but it will suffice here to say that the want of money was an evil now become intolerable. The army was many months in arrears; those officers who went to the rear sick suffered the most cruel privations, and those who remained in Madrid, tempted by the pleasures of the capital, obtained some dollars at an exorbitant premium from a money-broker, and it was previously suspected that his means resulted from the nefarious proceedings of an under-commissary; but the soldiers, equally tempted, having no such resource, plundered the stores of the Retiro. In fine, discipline became relaxed throughout the army, and the troops kept in the field were gloomy, envying those who remained at Madrid.

That city exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and desolation. When it was first entered a violent, cruel, and unjust persecution of those who were called *Afrancesados*, was commenced, and continued until the English general interfered, and as an example made no distinction in his invitations to the palace feasts. Truly it was not necessary to increase the sufferings of the miserable people, for though the markets were full of provisions, there was no money wherewith to buy; and though the houses were full of rich furniture, there were neither purchasers nor lenders; even noble families secretly sought charity that they might live. At night the groans and stifled cries of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead bodies, cast into the streets, showed why those cries had ceased. The calm resignation with which these terrible sufferings were borne was a distinctive mark of the national character; not many begged, none complained; there was no violence, no reproaches, very few thefts; the allies lost a few animals, nothing more, and these were generally thought to be taken by robbers from the country. But with this patient endurance of calamity the *Madridenses* discovered a deep and unaffected gratitude for kindness received at the hands of the British officers who contributed not much, for they had it not, but enough of money to form soup charities by which hundreds were succoured. It was the third division, and I believe the 45th regiment which set the example, and surely this is not the least of the many honourable distinctions those brave men have earned.

Wellington, desirous of obtaining shelter from the extreme heat for his troops, had early sent four divisions and the cavalry to the Escorial and St. Ildefonso, from whence they could join Hill by the valley of the Tagus, or Clinton by Arevalo; but when he knew that the king's retreat upon Valencia was decided, that Soult had abandoned Cordoba, and that Clinton was falling back before Clausel, he ordered the first, fifth, and seventh divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, Ponsonby's light horsemen, and the heavy German cavalry, to move rapidly upon Arevalo, and on the 1st of September quitted Madrid himself to take the command. Yet his army had been so diminished by sickness that only 21,000 men, including 3000 cavalry, were assembled in that town, and he had great difficulty to feed the Portuguese soldiers, who were also very ill equipped.

The regency, instead of transmitting money and stores to supply their troops, endeavoured to throw off the burthen entirely by an ingenious device; for having always had a running account with the Spanish government, they now made a treaty, by which the Spaniards were to feed the Portuguese troops, and check off the expense on the national account which was then in favour of the Portuguese; that is, the soldiers were to starve under the sanction of this treaty, because the Spaniards could not feed their own men, and would not, if they could, have fed the Portuguese. Neither could the latter take provisions from the country, because Wellington demanded the resources of the valleys of the Duero and Pisuergra for the English soldiers, as a set-off against the money advanced by Sir Henry Wellesley to the Spanish regency at Cadiz. Wherefore, to force the Portuguese regency from this shameful expedient, he stopped the payments of their subsidy from the chest of aids. Then the old contents and disputes revived and acquired new force; the regency became more intractable than ever, and the whole military system of Portugal was like to fall to pieces.

On the 4th the allies quitted Arevalo, the 6th they passed the Duero by the ford above Puente de Duero, the 7th they entered Valladolid, and meanwhile the Galicians, who had returned to the Esla, when Foy retreated, were ordered to join the Anglo-Portuguese army. Clausel abandoned Valladolid in the night of the 6th, and though closely followed by Ponsonby's cavalry, crossed the Pisuergra and destroyed the bridge of Bercial on that river. The 8th the allies halted for rest, and to await the arrival of Castaños; but seldom during this war did a Spanish general deviate into activity; and Wellington observed that in his whole intercourse with that people, from the beginning of the revolution to that moment, he had not met with an able Spaniard, while amongst the Portuguese he had found several. The Galicians came not, and the French retreated slowly up the beautiful Pisuergra and Arlanzan valleys, which, in denial of the stories about French devastation, were carefully cultivated and filled to repletion with corn, wine, and oil.


Nor were they deficient in military strength. Off the high road, on both sides, ditches and rivulets impeded the troops, while cross ridges continually furnished strong parallel positions flanked by the lofty hills on either side. In these valleys Clausel baffled his great adversary in the most surprising manner. Each day he offered battle, but on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, but chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day darkness fell ere they were completed, and the morning's sun always saw Clausel again in position. At Cigales and Dueñas, in the Pisuerga valley; at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega, in the valley of the Arlanzan, the French general thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th, by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino.

But 11,000 Spanish infantry, 300 cavalry, and eight guns had now joined the allies, and Wellington would have attacked frankly on the 17th, had not Clausel, alike wary and skilful, observed the increased numbers and retired in the night to Frandovine; his rear-guard was however next day pushed sharply back to the heights of Burgos, and in the following night he passed through that town leaving behind him large stores of grain. Caffarelli who had come down to place the castle of Burgos in a state of defence, now joined him, and the two generals retreated upon Briviesca, where they were immediately reinforced by that reserve which, with such an extraordinary foresight, the emperor had directed to be assembled and exercised on the Pyrennees, in anticipation of Marmont's disaster. The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion, for the garrison of the castle had set fire to some houses impeding the defence of the fortress, the conflagration spread widely, and the Partidas, who were already gathered like wolves round a carcass, entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness, and not unused to scenes of war, thus describes their proceedings, "What with the flames and the plundering of the guerillas, who are as bad as Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay hordes, I was afraid Burgos would be entirely destroyed, but order was at length restored by the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava."

The series of beautiful movements executed by Clausel merit every praise, but it may be questioned if the English general's marches were in the true direction, or made in good time; for though Clinton's retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not absolutely dictate the line of operations. Wellington had expected Clausel's advance to Valladolid; it was therefore no surprise, and on the 26th of August Foy was still at Zamora. At that period the English general might have had his army, Clinton's troops excepted, at Segovia; and as the distance from thence to Valladolid is rather less than from Valladolid to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former, Clinton advancing at the same time might have separated Clausel from Foy. Again, Wellington might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de Duero and Lerma, that road being as short as by Valladolid; he might also have brought forward the third or the light division, by the Somosierra, from Madrid; and directed Clinton and the Spaniards to close upon the French rear. He would thus have turned the valleys of the Pisuerga and the Arlanzan, and could, from Aranda or Lerma, have fallen upon Clausel while in march. That general, having Clinton and the Gallicians on his rear, and Wellington, reinforced by the divisions from Madrid, on his front or flank, would then have had to fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. In fine the object was to crush Clausel, and this should have been effected, though Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is however probable that want of money and means of transport decided the line of operations, for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid was from hand to mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal.

SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.

Caffarelli had placed 1800 infantry, besides artillerymen, in this place, and General Dubreton, the governor, was of such courage and skill that he surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine and warlike countryman. The castle and its works



enclosed a rugged hill, between which and the river the city of Burgos was situated. An old wall, with a new parapet and flanks constructed by the French, offered the first line of defence; the second line, which was within the other, was earthen, of the nature of a field retrenchment and well palisaded; the third line was similarly constructed, and contained the two most elevated points of the hill, on one of which was an entrenched building called the White Church, and on the other the ancient keep of the castle; this last was the highest point, and was not only entrenched but surmounted with a heavy casemated work called the Napoleon battery. Thus there were five separate enclosures.

The Napoleon battery commanded everything around it, save to the north, where at the distance of 300 yards there was a second height, scarcely less elevated than that of the fortress. It was called the hill of San Michael, and was defended by a large hornwork with a hard sloping scarp 25, and a counterscarp 10 feet high. This outwork was unfinished, and only closed by strong palisades, but it was under the fire of the Napoleon battery, was well flanked by the castle defences, and covered in front by slight entrenchments for the out picquets. The French had already mounted nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, and six mortars or howitzers in the fortress, and as the reserve artillery and stores of the army of Portugal were also deposited there, they could increase their armament.

FIRST ASSAULT.

The batteries so completely commanded all the bridges and fords over the Arlanzan that two days elapsed ere the allies could cross; but on the 19th, the passage of the river being effected above the town by the first division, Major Somers Cocks, supported by Pack's Portuguese, drove in the French outposts on the hill of San Michael. In the night the same troops, reinforced with the 42nd regiment, stormed the hornwork. The conflict was murderous. For though the ladders were fairly placed by the bearers of them, the storming column, which, covered by a firing party, marched against the front, was beaten with great loss, and the attack would have failed if the gallant leader of the 79th had not meanwhile forced an entrance by the gorge. The garrison was thus actually cut off, but Cocks, though followed by the second battalion of the 42nd regiment, was not closely supported, and the French being still 500 strong, broke through his men and escaped. This assault gave room for censure, the troops complained of each other, and the loss was above 400, while that of the enemy was less than 150.

Wellington was now enabled to examine the defences of the castle. He found them feeble and incomplete, and yet his means were so scant that he had slender hopes of success, and relied more upon the enemy's weakness than upon his own power. It was however said that water was scarce with the garrison, and that their provision magazines could be burned, wherefore encouraged by this information he adopted the following plan of attack.

Twelve thousand men, composing the first and sixth divisions, and the two Portuguese brigades, were to undertake the works; the rest of the troops, about 20,000, exclusive of the Partidas, were to form the covering army.

The trenches were to be opened from the suburb of San Pedro, and a parallel formed in the direction of the hill of San Michael.

A battery for five guns was to be established close to the right of the captured hornwork.

A sap was to be pushed from the parallel as near the first wall as possible, without being seen into from the upper works, and from thence the engineer was to proceed by gallery and mine.

When the first mine should be completed, the battery on the hill of San Michael was to open against the second line of defence, and the assault was to be given on the first line. If a lodgment was formed, the approaches were to be continued against the second line, and the battery on San Michael was to be turned against the third line in front of the White Church, because the defences there were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile a trench for musketry was to be dug along the brow of San Michael, and a concealed battery was to be prepared within the horn-work itself, with a view to the final attack of the Napoleon battery.

The head-quarters were fixed at Villa Toro, Colonel Burgoyne conducted the

operations of the engineers, Colonel Robe and Colonel Dickson those of the artillery, which consisted of three 18-pounders, and the five iron 24-pound howitzers used at the siege of the Salamanca forts ; and it was with regard to these slender means, rather than the defects of the fortress, that the line of attack was chosen.

When the hornwork fell a lodgment had been immediately commenced in the interior, and it was continued vigorously, although under a destructive fire from the Napoleon battery, because the besiegers feared the enemy would at daylight endeavour to retake the work by the gorge ; good cover was, however, obtained in the night, and the first battery was also begun.

The 21st the garrison mounted several fresh field-guns, and at night kept up a heavy fire of grape and shells on the workmen, who were digging the musketry trench in front of the first battery.

The 22nd the fire of the besieged was redoubled, but the besiegers worked with little loss, and their musketeers galled the enemy. In the night the first battery was armed with two 18-pounders and three howitzers, and the secret battery within the hornwork was commenced ; but Lord Wellington, deviating from his first plan, now resolved to try an escalade against the first line of defence. He selected a point half-way between the suburb of San Pedro and the hornwork, and at midnight 400 men provided with ladders were secretly posted in a hollow road, 50 yards from the wall, which was from 23 to 25 feet high, but had no flanks ; this was the main column, and a Portuguese battalion was also assembled in the town of Burgos to make a combined flank attack on that side.

SECOND ASSAULT.

The storm was commenced by the Portuguese, but they were repelled by the fire of the common guard alone, and the principal escalading party, which was composed of detachments from different regiments under Major Lawrie, 79th regiment, though acting with more courage, had as little success. The ladders were indeed placed, and the troops entered the ditch, yet all together, and confusedly ; Lawrie was killed, and the bravest soldiers who first mounted the ladders were bayoneted ; combustible missiles were then thrown down in great abundance, and after a quarter of an hour's resistance the men gave way, leaving half their number behind. The wounded were brought off the next day under a truce. It is said that on the body of one of the officers killed the French found a complete plan of the siege, and it is certain that this disastrous attempt, which delayed the regular progress of the siege for two days, increased the enemy's courage, and produced a bad effect upon the allied troops, some of whom were already dispirited by the attack on the hornwork.

The original plan being now resumed, the hollow way from whence the escaladers had advanced, and which at only 50 yards' distance run along the front of defence, was converted into a parallel, and connected with the suburb of San Pedro. The trenches were made deep and narrow to secure them from the plunging shot of the castle, and musketeers were also planted to keep down the enemy's fire ; but heavy rains incommoded the troops, and though the allied marksmen got the mastery over those of the French immediately in their front, the latter, having a raised and palisaded work on their own right which in some measure flanked the approaches, killed so many of the besiegers that the latter were finally withdrawn.

In the night a flying sap was commenced, from the right of the parallel, and was pushed within 20 yards of the enemy's first line of defence ; but the directing engineer was killed, and with him many men, for the French plied their musketry sharply, and rolled large shells down the steep side of the hill. The head of the sap was indeed so commanded as it approached the wall, that a six-feet trench, added to the height of the gabion above, scarcely protected the workmen, wherefore the gallery of the mine was opened, and worked as rapidly as the inexperience of the miners, who were merely volunteers from the line, would permit.

The concealed battery within the hornwork of San Michael being now completed, two 18-pounders were removed from the first battery to arm it, and they were replaced by two iron howitzers, which opened upon the advanced palisade below, to drive the French marksmen from that point ; but after firing 140 rounds without success, this project was relinquished, and ammunition was so scarce that the soldiers were paid to collect the enemy's bullets.

This day also a zigzag was commenced in front of the first battery and down the face of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry trench to overlook the enemy's defences below ; and though the workmen were exposed to the whole fire of the castle, at a distance of 200 yards, and were knocked down fast, the work went steadily on.

On the 26th the gallery of the mine was advanced 18 feet, and the soil was found favourable, but the men in passing the sap, were hit fast by the French marksmen, and an assistant engineer was killed. In the night the parallel was prolonged on the right, within 20 yards of the enemy's ramparts, with a view to a second gallery and mine, and musketeers were planted there to oppose the enemy's marksmen and to protect the sap ; at the same time the zigzag on the hill of San Michael was continued, and the musket trench there was completed under cover of gabions, and with little loss, although the whole fire of the castle was concentrated on the spot.

The 27th the French were seen strengthening their second line, and they had already cut a step along the edge of the counterscarp, for a covered way, and had palisaded the communication. Meanwhile the besiegers finished the musketry trench on the right of their parallel, and opened the gallery for the second mine ; but the first mine went on slowly, the men in the sap were galled and disturbed, by stones, grenades, and small shells, which the French threw into the trenches by hand ; and the artillery fire also knocked over the gabions of the musketry trench on San Michael so fast, that the troops were withdrawn during the day.

In the night a trench of communication forming a second parallel behind the first was begun and nearly completed from the hill of San Michael towards the suburb of San Pedro, and the musketry trench on the hill was deepened.

The 28th an attempt was made to perfect this new parallel of communication, but the French fire was heavy, and the shells, which passed over, came rolling down the hill again into the trench, so the work was deferred until night and was then perfected. The back roll of the shells continued indeed to gall the troops, but the whole of this trench, that in front of the hornwork above, and that on the right of the parallel below, were filled with men whose fire was incessant. Moreover, the first mine was now completed and loaded with more than a thousand weight of powder, the gallery was strongly tamped for 15 feet with bags of clay, and all being ready for the explosion Wellington ordered the

THIRD ASSAULT.

At midnight the hollow road, 50 yards from the mine, was lined with troops to fire on the defences, and 300 men, composing the storming party, were assembled there, attended by others who carried tools and materials to secure the lodgment when the breach should be carried. The mine was then exploded, the wall fell, and an officer with 20 men rushed forward to the assault. The effect of the explosion was not so great as it ought to have been, yet it brought the wall down, the enemy was stupefied, and the forlorn hope, consisting of a sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the breach, and there stood until the French, recovering, drove them down pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile the officer and the 20 men, who were to have been followed by a party of 50, and these by the remainder of the stormers, missed the breach in the dark, and finding the wall unbroken, returned, and reported that there was no breach. The main body immediately regained the trenches, and before the sergeant and his men returned with streaming wounds to tell their tale, the enemy was reinforced ; and such was the scarcity of ammunition, that no artillery practice could be directed against the breach during the night ; hence the French were enabled to raise a parapet behind it and to place obstacles on the ascent which deterred the besiegers from renewing the assault at daylight.

This failure arose from the darkness of the night, and the want of a conducting engineer, for out of four regular officers of that branch engaged in the siege, one had been killed, one badly wounded, and one was sick, wherefore the remaining one was necessarily reserved for the conducting of the works. The aspect of affairs was gloomy. Twelve days had elapsed since the siege commenced, one assault had succeeded, two had failed, 1200 men had been killed or wounded, little progress had been made, and the troops generally showed symptoms of despon-

dency, especially the Portuguese, who seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was relaxed, the soldiers wasted ammunition, and the work in the trenches was avoided or neglected both by officers and men; insubordination was gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued, the guards only being noticed as presenting an honourable exception.

In this state it was essential to make some change in the operations, and as the French marksmen, in the advanced palisadoed work below, were now become so expert that everything which could be seen from thence was hit, the howitzer battery on San Michael was reinforced with a French 8-pounder, by the aid of which this mischievous post was at last demolished. At the same time the gallery of the second mine was pushed forward, and a new breaching battery for three guns was constructed behind it, so close to the enemy's defences that the latter screened the work from the artillery fire of their upper fortress; but the parapet of the battery was only made musket-proof because the besieged had no guns on the lower line of this front.

In the night the three 18-pounders were brought from the hill of San Michael without being discovered, and at daylight, though a very galling fire of muskets thinned the workmen, they persevered until nine o'clock, when the battery was finished and armed. But at that moment the watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down from the upper works, and with a low charge threw shells into the battery; then making a hole through a flank wall, he thrust out a light gun which sent its bullets whizzing through the thin parapet at every round, and at the same time his marksmen plied their shot so sharply that the allies were driven from their pieces without firing a shot. More French cannon were now brought from the upper works, the defences of the battery were quite demolished, two of the gun-carriages were disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the 18-pounders, and the muzzle of another was split. And it was in vain that the besiegers' marksmen, aided by some officers who considered themselves good shots, endeavoured to quell the enemy's fire, the French being on a height were too well covered, and remained masters of the fight.

In the night a second and more solid battery was formed at a point a little to the left of the ruined one, but at daylight the French observed it; and their fire plunging from above made the parapet fly off so rapidly, that the English general relinquished his intention and returned to his galleries and mines, and to his breaching battery on the hill of San Michael. The two guns still serviceable were therefore removed towards the upper battery to beat down a retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach. It was intended to have placed them on this new position in the night of the 3rd, but the weather was very wet and stormy, and the workmen, those of the guards only excepted, abandoned the trenches; hence at daylight the guns were still short of their destination, and nothing more could be done until the following night.

On the 4th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the two 18-pounders, and three iron howitzers, again opened from San Michael's, and at four o'clock in the evening, the old breach being cleared of all incumbrances, and the second mine being strongly tamped for explosion, a double assault was ordered. The second battalion of the 24th British regiment, commanded by Captain Hedderwick, was selected for this operation, and was formed in the hollow way, having one advanced party, under Mr. Holmes, pushed forward as close to the new mine as it was safe to be, and a second party under Mr. Fraser in like manner pushed towards the old breach.

FOURTH ASSAULT.

At five o'clock the mine was exploded with a terrific effect, sending many of the French up into the air and breaking down 100 feet of the wall, the next instant Holmes and his brave men went rushing through the smoke and crumbling ruins, and Fraser, as quick and brave as his brother officer, was already fighting with the defenders on the summit of the old breach. The supports followed closely, and in a few minutes both points were carried with a loss to the assailants of 37 killed and 200 wounded, seven of the latter being officers and amongst them the conducting engineer. During the night lodgments were formed, in advance of the old and

on the ruins of the new breach, yet very imperfectly, and under a heavy destructive fire from the upper defences. But this happy attack revived the spirits of the army ; vessels with powder were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by land from Ciudad Rodrigo, and as a supply of ammunition sent by Sir Home Popham had already reached the camp from Santander, the howitzers continued to knock away the palisades in the ditch, and the battery on San Michael's was directed to open a third breach at a point where the first French line of defence was joined to the second line.

This promising state of affairs was of short duration.

On the 5th, at five o'clock in the evening, while the working parties were extending the lodgments, 300 French came swiftly down the hill, and sweeping away the labourers and guards from the trenches, killed or wounded 150 men, got possession of the old breach, destroyed the works, and carried off all the tools. However, in the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed saps from each flank to meet in the centre near the second French line, and to serve as a parallel to check future sallies. Meanwhile the howitzers on the San Michael continued their fire, yet ineffectually, against the palisades ; the breaching battery in the horn-work also opened, but it was badly constructed, and the guns being unable to see the wall sufficiently low, soon ceased to speak, the embrasures were therefore masked. On the other hand the besieged were unable, from the steepness of the castle-hill, to depress their guns sufficiently to bear on the lodgment at the breaches in the first line, but their musketry was destructive, and they rolled down large shells to retard the approaches towards the second line.

On the 7th the besiegers had got so close to the wall below that the howitzers above could no longer play without danger to the workmen, wherefore two French field-pieces, taken in the horn-work, were substituted and did good service. The breaching battery on San Michael's being altered, also renewed its fire, and at five o'clock had beaten down 50 feet from the parapet of the second line ; but the enemy's return was heavy, and another 18-pounder lost a trunnion. However in the night block-carriages with supports for the broken trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns were enabled to recommence their fire yet with low charges. But a constant rain had now filled the trenches, the communications were injured, the workmen were negligent, the approaches to the second line went on slowly, and again Dubreton came thundering down from the upper ground, driving the guards and workmen from the new parallel at the lodgments, levelling all the works, carrying off all the tools, and killing or wounding 200 men. Colonel Cocks, promoted for his gallant conduct at the storming of San Michael, restored the fight, and repulsed the French, but he fell dead on the ground he had recovered. He was a young man of a modest demeanour, brave, thoughtful, and enterprising, and he lived and died a good soldier.

After this severe check the approaches to the second line were abandoned, and the trenches were extended so as to embrace the whole of the fronts attacked ; the battery on San Michael had meantime formed a practicable breach 25 feet wide, and the parallel, at the old breach of the first line, was prolonged by zigzags on the left towards this new breach, while a trench was opened to enable marksmen to fire upon the latter at 30 yards distance. Nevertheless, another assault could not be risked because the great expenditure of powder had again exhausted the magazines, and without a new supply, the troops might have found themselves without ammunition in front of the French army which was now gathering head near Briviesca. Heated shot were however thrown at the White Church with a view to burn the magazines ; and the miners were directed to drive a gallery, on the other side of the castle, against the church of San Roman, a building pushed out a little beyond the French external line of defence on the side of the city.

On the 10th, when the besiegers' ammunition was nearly all gone, a fresh supply arrived from Santander, but no effect had been produced upon the White Church, and Dubreton had strengthened his works to meet the assault ; he had also isolated the new breach on one flank by a strong stockade extending at right angles from the second to the third line of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery had obliged the besiegers again to withdraw their battering guns within the

hornwork, and the attempt to burn the White Church was relinquished, but the gallery against San Roman was continued. In this state things remained for several days with little change, save that the French, maugre the musketry from the nearest zigzag trench, had scarped eight feet at the top of the new breach and formed a small trench at the back.

On the 15th the battery in the hornwork was again armed, and the guns pointed to breach the wall of the Napoleon battery; they were however overmatched and silenced in three-quarters of an hour, and the embrasures were once more altered, that the guns might bear on the breach in the second line. Some slight works and counter-works were also made on different points, but the besiegers were principally occupied repairing the mischief done by the rain, and in pushing the gallery under San Roman, where the French were now distinctly heard talking in the church, wherefore the mine there was formed and loaded with 900 pounds of powder.

On the 17th the battery of the horn-work being renewed, the fire of the 18-pounders cleared away the enemy's temporary defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged the rampart on each side, and a small mine was sprung on the extreme right of the lower parallel, with a view to take possession of a cavalier or mound which the French had raised there, and from which they had killed many men in the trenches; it was successful, and a lodgment was effected, but the enemy soon returned in force and obliged the besiegers to abandon it again. However, on the 18th the new breach was rendered practicable, and Wellington ordered it to be stormed. The explosion of the mine under San Roman was to be the signal; that church was also to be assaulted; and at the same time a third detachment was to escalate the works in front of the ancient breach and thus connect the attacks.

FIFTH ASSAULT.

At half-past four o'clock the springing of the mine at San Roman broke down a terrace in front of that building, yet with little injury to the church itself; the latter was, however, resolutely attacked by Colonel Browne, at the head of some Spanish and Portuguese troops, and though the enemy sprung a countermine which brought the building down, the assailants lodged themselves in the ruins. Meanwhile 200 of the foot-guards, with strong supports, poured through the old breach in the first line, and escalated the second line, beyond which in the open ground between the second and third lines, they were encountered by the French, and a sharp musketry fight commenced. At the same time a like number of the German legion, under Major Wurmb, similarly supported, stormed the new breach on the left of the guards so vigorously, that it was carried in a moment, and some men, mounting the hill above, actually gained the third line. Unhappily, at neither of these assaults did the supports follow closely, and the Germans being cramped on their left by the enemy's stockade, extended by their right towards the guards, and at that critical moment Dubreton, who held his reserves well in hand, came dashing like a torrent from the upper ground, and in an instant cleared the breaches. Wurmb and many other brave men fell, and then the French, gathering round the guards, who were still unsupported, forced them beyond the outer line. More than 200 men and officers were killed or wounded in this combat, and the next night the enemy recovered San Roman by a sally.

The siege was thus virtually terminated, for though the French were beaten out of San Roman again, and a gallery was opened from that church against the second line; and though two 24-pounders, sent from Santander by Sir Home Popham had passed Reynosa on their way to Burgos these were mere demonstrations. It is now time to narrate the different contemporary events which obliged the English general, with a victorious army, to abandon the siege of a third-rate fortress, strong in nothing but the skill and bravery of the governor and his gallant soldiers.

CHAPTER IV.

WHEN King Joseph retreated to Valencia, he earnestly demanded a reinforcement of 40,000 men from France, and, more earnestly, money. Three millions of francs he obtained from Suchet, yet his distress was greater even than that of the allies, and Wellington at one time supposed that this alone would drive the French from

the Peninsula. The Anglo-Portuguese soldiers had not received pay for six months, but the French armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal, were a whole year behindhand; and the salaries of the ministers and civil servants of the court were two years in arrears. Suchet's army, the only one which depended entirely on the country, was by that marshal's excellent management regularly paid, and the effect on its discipline was conformable; his troops refrained from plunder themselves, and repressed some excesses of Joseph's and Soult's soldiers so vigorously, as to come to blows in defence of the inhabitants. And thus it will ever be, since paid soldiers only may be kept under discipline. Soldiers without money must become robbers. Napoleon knew the king's necessity to be extreme, but the war with Russia had so absorbed the resources of France, that little money, and only 20,000 men, principally conscripts, could be sent to Spain.

The army of Portugal, at the moment when the siege of the castle commenced, had been quartered between Vittoria and Burgos; that is to say, at Pancorbo and along the Ebro as far as Logroña, an advanced guard only remaining at Briviesca; on this line they were recruited and reorganized, and Massena was appointed with full powers to command in the northern provinces. A fine opportunity to revenge his own retreat from Torres Vedras was thus furnished to the old warrior; but whether he doubted the issue of affairs, or was really tamed by age, he pleaded illness, and sent General Souham to the army of Portugal. Then arose contentions, for Marmont had designated Clausel as the fittest to lead, Massena insisted that Souham was the abler general, and the king desired to appoint Drouet. Clausel's abilities were certainly not inferior to those of any French general, and to more perfect acquaintance with the theatre of war, he added a better knowledge of the enemy he had to contend with; he was also more known to his own soldiers, and had gained their confidence by his recent operations, no mean considerations in such a matter. However, Souham was appointed.

Caffarelli, anxious to succour the castle of Burgos, which belonged to his command, had united at Vittoria 1000 cavalry, 16 guns, and 8000 infantry, of which 3000 were of the young guard. The army of Portugal, reinforced from France with 12,000 men, had 35,000 present under arms, reorganized in six divisions, and by Clausel's care its former excellent discipline had been restored. Thus 44,000 good troops were, in the beginning of October, ready to succour the castle of Burgos; but the generals, although anxious to effect that object, awaited, first the arrival of Souham, and then news from the king, with whose operations it was essential to combine their own. They had no direct tidings from him, because the lines of correspondence were so circuitous, and so beset by the *Partidas* that the most speedy as well as certain mode of communication, was through the minister of war at Paris; and that functionary found the information best suited to his purpose in the English newspapers. For the latter, while deceiving the British public by accounts of battles which were never fought, victories which were never gained, enthusiasm and vigour which never existed, did, with most accurate assiduity, enlighten the enemy upon the numbers, situation, movements, and reinforcements of the allies.

Souham arrived the 3rd of October with the last of the reinforcements from France, but he imagined that Lord Wellington had 60,000 troops around Burgos, exclusive of the *Partidas*, and that three divisions were marching from Madrid to his aid; whereas none were coming from that capital, and little more than 30,000 were present under arms round Burgos, 11,000 being Gallicians, scarcely so good as the *Partidas*. Wellington's real strength was in his Anglo-Portuguese, then not 20,000, for besides those killed or wounded at the siege, the sick had gone to the rear faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached regiments and escorts were, indeed, about Segovia, and other points north of the Guadarama, and a reinforcement of 5000 men had been sent from England in September; but the former belonged to Hill's army, and of the latter, the life-guards and blues had gone to Lisbon. Hence a regiment of foot guards, and some detachments for the line, in all about 3000, were the only available force in the rear.

During the first part of the siege, the English general seeing the French scattered along the Ebro, and only reinforced by conscripts, did not fear any

interruption, and the less so; that Sir Home Popham was again menacing the coast line. Even now, when the French were beginning to concentrate their troops, he cared little for them, and was resolved to give battle; for he thought that Popham and the guerillas would keep Caffarelli employed, and he felt himself a match for the army of Portugal. Nor were the Partidas inactive on any point, and their successes though small in themselves, were exceedingly harassing to the enemy.

Mina, having obtained 2000 or 3000 stand of English arms, had re-entered Aragon and domineered on the left bank of the Ebro, while Duran, with 4000 men, operated uncontrolled on the right bank. The Empecinado, Villa Campa, and Bassecour descended from Cuenca, the first against Requeña, the others against Albacete. The Frayle interrupted the communications between Valencia and Tortosa. Saornil, Cuesta, Firmin, and others, were in La Mancha and Estremadura, Juan Palarea, called the Medico, was near Segovia, and though Marquez had been murdered by one of his own men, his Partida and that of Julian Sanchez acted as regular troops with Wellington's army. Meanwhile Sir Home Popham, in conjunction with Mendizabel, Porlier, and Renovales, who had gathered all the minor Partidas under their banners, assailed Gueteria, but unsuccessfully; for on the 30th of September the Spanish chiefs were driven away, and Popham lost some guns which had been landed. About the same time the Empecinado being defeated at Requeña, retired to Cuenca, yet he failed not from thence to infest the French quarters.

Duran, when Soria was abandoned, fell upon Calatayud, but was defeated by Severoli, who withdrew the garrison. Then the Spanish chief attacked the castle of Almunia, which was only one march from Zaragoza, and when Severoli succoured this place also, and dismantled the castle, Duran attacked Borja between Tudela and Zaragoza, and took it before Severoli could come up. Thus Zaragoza was gradually deprived of its outposts on the right of the Ebro; on the left, Mina hovered close to the gates, and his lieutenant, Chaplangara, meeting near Ayerbe with 300 Italians, killed 40, and would have destroyed the whole but for the timely succour of some mounted gens-d'armes. At last Reille being undeceived as to Wellington's march, restored the smaller posts which he had abandoned, and Suchet ordered the castle of Almunia to be refitted, but during these events, Bassecour and Villa Campa united to infest Joseph's quarters about Albacete.

Soult's march from Andalusia and his junction with the king has been described; but while he was yet at Grenada, Hill, leaving three Portuguese regiments of infantry and one of cavalry at Almendralejo and Truxillo, to protect his line of supply, had marched to cross the Tagus at Almaraz and Arzobispo. He entered Toledo the 28th of September, and the same day Elio took a small French garrison left in Consuegra. Hill soon after occupied a line from Toledo to Aranjuez, where he was joined by the fourth division, Victor Alten's cavalry, and the detachments quartered about Ildefonsos and Segovia. On the 8th, hearing of Soult's arrival at Hellin, he pushed his cavalry to Belmonte on the San Clemente road, and here in La Mancha as in Old Castile the stories of French devastation were belied by the abundance of provisions.

Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado now united on the road leading from Cuenca to Valencia, while the Medico and other chiefs gathered in the Toledo mountains. In this manner the allies extended from Toledo on the right, by Belmonte, Cuenca, and Calatayud to near Jacca on the left, and were in military communication with the coast; for Caffarelli's disposable force was now concentrated to relieve Burgos, and Mina had free intercourse with Mendizabal and Renovales, and with Popham's fleet. But the French line of correspondence between the armies in the eastern and northern provinces was so interrupted that the English newspapers became their surest, quickest, and most accurate channels of intelligence.*

Souham, who overrated the force of his adversary, and feared a defeat as being himself the only barrier left between Wellington and France, was at first so far from meditating an advance, that he expected and dreaded an attack from the

* Appendix, No. 8. B.

allies; and as the want of provisions would not let him concentrate his army permanently near Monasterio, his dispositions were made to fight on the Ebro. The minister of war had even desired him to detach a division against the Partidas. But when, by the English newspapers and other information sent from Paris, he learned that Soult was in march from Grenada, that the king intended to move upon Madrid, that no English troops had left that capital to join Wellington, that the army of the latter was not very numerous, and that the castle of Burgos was sorely pressed, he called up Caffarelli's troops from Vittoria, concentrated his own at Briviesca and resolved to raise the siege.

On the 13th a skirmish took place on the stream beyond Monasterio, where Captain Perse of the 16th dragoons was twice forced from the bridge and twice recovered it in the most gallant manner, maintaining his post until Colonel F. Ponsonby, who commanded the reserves, arrived. Ponsonby and Perse were both wounded, and this demonstration was followed by various others until the evening of the 18th, when the whole French army was united, and the advanced guard captured a picquet of the Brunswickers which contrary to orders had remained in St. Olalla. This sudden movement apparently prevented Wellington from occupying the position of Monasterio, his outposts fell back on the 19th to Quintanapala and Olmos, and on the ridges behind those places he drew up his army in order of battle. The right was at Ibeas on the Arlanzan; the centre at Riobena and Majarradas on the main road behind Olmos; the left was thrown back near Soto Palaccio, and rested on a small river,

The 20th, Maucune, with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, drove the allies from Quintanapala, but Olmos was successfully defended by the chasseurs Britanniques, and Maucune, having no supports, was immediately outflanked on the right and forced back to Monasterio by two divisions under Sir Edward Paget. There were now in position, including Pack's Portuguese, which blockaded the castle, about 33,000 men under arms, namely, 21,000 Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, 11,000 Gallicians, and the horsemen of Marquinez and Julian Sanchez. Thus, there were 4000 troopers, but only 2600 of these were British and German, and the Spanish horsemen, regular or irregular, could scarcely be counted in the line of battle. The number of guns and howitzers was only 42, including 12 Spanish pieces, extremely ill equipped and scant of ammunition.

Lord Wellington had long felt the want of artillery, and had sent a memoir upon the subject to the British government in the beginning of the year; yet his ordnance establishment had not been augmented, hence his difficulties during the siege; and in the field, instead of 90 British and Portuguese cannon, which was just the complement for his army, he had now only 50 serviceable pieces, of which 24 were with General Hill; and all were British, for the Portuguese artillery had from the abuses and the poverty of their government entirely melted away. Now the French had, as I have before stated, 44,000 men, of which nearly 5000 were cavalry, and they had more than 60 guns, a matter of no small importance; for besides the actual power of artillery in an action, soldiers are excited when the noise is greatest on their side. Wellington stood, therefore, at disadvantage in numbers, composition, and real strength. In his rear was the castle and the river Arlanzan, the fords and bridges of which were commanded by the guns of the fortress; his generals of division, Paget excepted, were not of any marked ability, his troops were somewhat desponding, and deteriorated in discipline. His situation was therefore dangerous and critical; a victory could scarcely be expected, and a defeat would have been destructive; he should not have provoked a battle, nor would he have done so had he known that Caffarelli's troops were united to Souham's.

On the other hand, Souham should by all means have forced on an action, because his ground was strong, his retreat open, his army powerful and compact, his soldiers full of confidence, his lieutenants Clausel, Maucune, and Foy, men of distinguished talents, able to second, and able to succeed him in the chief command. The chances of victory and the profit to be derived were great, the chances of defeat, and the dangers to be incurred comparatively small. And it was thus indeed that he judged the matter himself, for Maucune's advance was intended to be the prelude to a great battle, and the English general, as we have seen, was willing

to stand the trial.* But generals are not absolute masters of events, and as the extraneous influence which restrained both sides on this occasion came from afar, it was fitting to show how, in war, movements, distant, and apparently unconnected with those immediately under a general's eye, will break his measures, and make him appear undecided or foolish when in truth he is both wise and firm.

While Wellington was still engaged with the siege, the Cortes made him commander of all the Spanish armies. He had before refused this responsible situation, but the circumstances were now changed, for the Spaniards, having lost nearly all their cavalry and guns in the course of the war, could not safely act, except in connection with the Anglo-Portuguese forces, and it was absolutely necessary that one head should direct. The English general therefore demanded leave of his own government to accept the offer, although he observed that the Spanish troops were not at all improved in their discipline, their equipments, or their military spirit; but he thought that conjoined with the British they might behave well, and so escape any more of those terrible disasters which had heretofore overwhelmed the country and nearly brought the war to a conclusion. He was willing to save the dignity of the Spanish government, by leaving it a certain body of men wherewith to operate after its own plans; but that he might exercise his own power efficiently, and to the profit of the troops under himself, he desired that the English government would vigorously insist upon the strict application of the subsidy to the payment of the Spanish soldiers acting with the British army, otherwise the care of the Spanish troops, he said, would only cramp his own operations.

In his reply to the Cortes, his acceptance of the offer was rendered dependent upon the assent of his own government; and he was careful to guard himself from a danger, not unlikely to arise, namely, that the Cortez, when he should finally accept the offer, would in virtue of that acceptance assume the right of directing the whole operations of the war. The intermediate want of power to move the Spanish armies he judged of little consequence, because hitherto his suggestions having been cheerfully attended to by the Spanish chiefs, he had no reason to expect any change in that particular, but there he was grievously mistaken.

Previous to this offer the Spanish government had, at his desire, directed Ballesteros to cross the Morena and place himself at Alcaraz and in support of the Chinchilla fort, where joined by Cruz Murgeon, by Elio, and by the Partidas, he would have had a corps of 30,000 men, would have been supported by Hill's army, and, having the mountains behind him for a retreat, could have safely menaced the enemy's flank and delayed the march against Madrid, or at least have obliged the king to leave a strong corps of observation to watch him. But Ballesteros, swelling with arrogant folly, never moved from Grenada; and when he found that Wellington was created generalissimo, he published a manifesto appealing to the Spanish pride against the degradation of serving under a foreigner; he thus sacrificed to his own spleen the welfare of his country, and with a result he little expected; for while he judged himself a man to sway the destinies of Spain, he suddenly found himself a criminal and nothing more. The Cortes caused him to be arrested in the midst of his soldiers, who, indifferent to his fate, suffered him to be sent a prisoner to Ceuta. The Count of Abispa! was then declared captain-general of Andalusia, and the Duke del Parque was appointed to command Ballesteros's army, which General Verues immediately led by Jaen towards La Mancha; but Soult was then on the Tormes.

That marshal united with the king on the 3rd of October. His troops required rest, his numerous sick were to be sent to the Valencian hospitals, and his first interview with Joseph was of a warm nature, for each had his griefs and passions to declare. Finally the monarch yielded to the superior mental power of his opponent and resolved to profit from his great military capacity, yet reluctantly and more from prudence than liking; for the Duke of Feltre, minister of war at Paris, although secretly an enemy of Soult, and either believing, or pretending to believe in the foolish charges of disorderly ambition made against that commander, opposed any decided exercise of the king's authority until the emperor's will was

* Appendix, No. 8. A.

known: yet this would not have restrained the king if the marshals Jourdan and Suchet had not each declined accepting the Duke of Dalmatia's command when Joseph offered it to them.*

Soult's first operation was to reduce Chinchilla, a well-constructed fort, which, being in the midst of his quarters, commanded the great roads so as to oblige his army to move under its fire or avoid it by circuitous routes. A vigorous defence was expected, but on the 6th it fell, after a few hours' attack; for a thunder-storm suddenly arising in a clear sky had discharged itself upon the fort, and killed the governor and many other persons, whereupon the garrison, influenced, it is said, by a superstitious fear, surrendered. This was the first bitter fruit of Ballesteros' disobedience, for neither could Soult have taken Chinchilla, nor scattered his troops, as he did, at Albacete, Almanza, Yecla, and Hellin, if 30,000 Spaniards had been posted between Alcaraz and Chinchilla, and supported by 30,000 Anglo-Portuguese at Toledo under Hill. These extended quarters were however essential for the feeding of the French general's numbers, and now, covered by the fort of Chinchilla, his troops were well lodged, his great convoys of sick and maimed men, his Spanish families, and other impediments safely and leisurely sent to Valencia, while his cavalry, scouring the country of La Mancha in advance, obliged Bassecour and Villa Campa to fall back upon Cuenca.

The detail of the operations which followed, belongs to another place. It will suffice to say here, that the king, being at the head of more than 70,000 men, was enabled without risking Valencia to advance towards the Tagus, having previously sent Souham a specific order to combine his movements in co-operation, but strictly to avoid fighting. General Hill, also finding himself threatened by such powerful forces, and reduced by Ballesteros's defection to a simple defence of the Tagus, at a moment when that river was becoming fordable in all places, gave notice of his situation to Lord Wellington. Joseph's letter was dispatched on the 1st, and six others followed in succession day by day; yet the last, carried by Colonel Lucotte, an officer of the royal staff, first reached Souham; the advantages derived from the allies' central position, and from the Partidas, were here made manifest; for Hill's letter, though only dispatched the 17th, reached Wellington at the same moment that Joseph's reached Souham.† The latter general was thus forced to relinquish his design of fighting on the 20th; nevertheless having but four days' provisions left, he designed when those should be consumed, to attack notwithstanding the king's prohibition, if Wellington should still confront him. But the English general, considering that his own army, already in a very critical situation, would be quite isolated if the king should, as was most probable, force the allies from the Tagus, now resolved, though with a bitter pang, to raise the siege and retreat so far as would enable him to secure his junction with Hill.

While the armies were in presence some fighting had place at Burgos, Dubreton had again obtained possession of the ruins of the church of San Roman and was driven away next morning; and now in pursuance of Wellington's determination to retreat, mines of destruction were formed in the hornwork by the besiegers, and the guns and stores were removed from the batteries to the park at Villa Toro. But the greatest part of the draught animals had been sent to Reynosa, to meet the powder and artillery coming from Santander, and hence, the 18-pounders could not be carried off, nor, from some error, were the mines of destruction exploded. The rest of the stores and the howitzers were put in march by the road of Villaton and Frandovinez for Celada de Camino. Thus the siege was raised, after five assaults, several sallies, and 33 days of investment, during which the besiegers lost more than 2000 men and the besieged 600 in killed or wounded; the latter had also suffered severely from continual labour, want of water, and bad weather, for the fortress was too small to afford shelter for the garrison, and the greater part bivouacked between the lines of defence.

RETREAT FROM BURGOS.

This operation was commenced on the night of the 21st by a measure of great

* Appendix, No. 6, A.

† Appendix, No. 8, A.


nicety and boldness, for the road, divaricating at Gamonal, led by Villatoro to the bridge of Villaton on the one hand, and the bridge of Burgos on the other, and Wellington chose the latter, which was the shortest, though it passed the Arlanzan river close under the guns of the castle. The army quitted the position after dark without being observed, and having the artillery-wheels muffled with straw, defiled over the bridge of Burgos with such silence and celerity, that Dubreton, watchful and suspicious as he was, knew nothing of their march until the Partidas, failing in nerve, commenced galloping; then he poured a destructive fire down, but soon lost the range. By this delicate operation the infantry gained Cellada del Camino and Hormillas that night, but the light cavalry halted at Estepar and the bridge of Villa Baniel. Souham, who did not discover the retreat until late in the evening of the 22nd, was therefore fain to follow, and by a forced march, to overtake the allies, whereas, if Wellington to avoid the fire of the castle had gone by Villaton and Frandovinez, the French might have forestalled him at Cellada del Camino.

The 23rd the infantry renewing their march crossed the Pisuerga, at Cordovillas and Torquemada, a little above and below its junction with the Arlanzan; but while the main body made this long march, the French having passed Burgos in the night of the 22nd, vigorously attacked the allies' rear-guard. This was composed of cavalry and some horse-artillery, commanded by Norman Ramsay and Major Downman; of two battalions of Germans under Colin Halket; and of the Partidas of Marquez and Sanchez, the latter being on the left of the Arlanzan and the whole under the command of Sir Stapleton Cotton. The picquets of light cavalry were vigorously driven from the bridge of Baniel as early as seven o'clock in the morning; but they rallied upon their reserves and gained the Hormaza stream, which was disputed for some time, and a charge made by Captain Perse of the 16th dragoons, was of distinguished bravery. However, the French cavalry finally forced the passage, and the British retiring behind Cellada Camino took post in a large plain. On their left was a range of hills the summit of which was occupied by the Partida of Marquez, and on their right was the Arlanzan, beyond which Julian Sanchez was posted. Across the middle of the plain ran a marshy rivulet cutting the main road, and only passable by a little bridge near a house called the Venta de Pozo, and half way between this stream and Cellada there was a broad ditch with a second bridge in front of a small village. Cotton immediately retired over the marshy stream, leaving Anson's horsemen and Halket's infantry as a rear-guard beyond the ditch; and Anson to cover his own passage, of that obstacle, left the 11th dragoons and the guns at Cellada Camino, which was situated on a gentle eminence.

COMBAT OF VENTA DE POZO.

When the French approached Cellada, Major Money of the 11th, who was in advance, galloping out from the left of the village at the head of two squadrons, overturned their leading horsemen, and the artillery plied them briskly with shot, but the main body advancing at a trot along the road soon outflanked the British, and obliged Money's squadrons to rejoin the rest of the regiment while the guns went on beyond the bridge of Venta de Pozo. Meanwhile the French general, Curto, with a brigade of hussars ascended the hills on the left, and being followed by Boyer's dragoons, put Marquez' Partida to flight; but a deep ravine run along the foot of these hills, next the plain, it could only be passed at certain places, and towards the first of these the Partidas galloped, closely chased by the hussars, at the moment when the leading French squadrons on the plain were forming in front of Cellada to attack the 11th regiment. The latter charged and drove the first line upon the second, but then both lines coming forward together, the British were pushed precipitately to the ditch, and got over by the bridge with some difficulty, though with little loss, being covered by the fire of Halket's infantry which was in the little village behind the bridge.

The left flank of this new line was already turned by the hussars on the hills, wherefore Anson fell back, covered by the 16th dragoons, and in good order, with design to cross the second bridge at Venta de Pozo; during this movement Marquez' Partida came pouring down from the hills in full flight, closely pursued by the French hussars, who mixed with the fugitives, and the whole mass fell upon



the flank of the 16th dragoons; and at the same moment, these last were also charged by the enemy's dragoons, who had followed them over the ditch. The commander of the Partida was wounded, Colonel Pelly with another officer, and 30 men of the 16th, fell into the enemy's hands, and all were driven in confusion upon the reserves. But while the French were reforming their scattered squadrons after this charge, Anson got his people over the bridge of Venta de Pozo and drew up beyond the rivulet and to the left of the road, on which Halket's battalions and the guns had already taken post, and the heavy German cavalry, an imposing mass, stood in line on the right, and farther in the rear than the artillery.

Hitherto the action had been sustained by the cavalry of the army of Portugal, but now Caffarelli's horsemen, consisting of the lancers of Berg, the 15th dragoons, and some squadrons of gens d'armes, all fresh men, came down in line to the rivulet, and finding it impassable, with a quick and daring decision wheeled to their right, and despite of the heavy pounding of the artillery, trotted over the bridge, and again formed line, in opposition to the German dragoons, having the stream in their rear. The position was dangerous, but they were full of mettle, and though the Germans, who had let too many come over, charged with a rough shock and broke the right, the French left had the advantage and the others rallied; then a close and furious sword contest had place, but the gens d'armes fought so fiercely, that the Germans, mauling their size and courage, lost ground and finally gave way in disorder. The French followed on the spur with shrill and eager cries, and Anson's brigade, which was thus outflanked and threatened on both sides, fell back also, but not happily, for Boyer's dragoons having continued their march by the hills to the village of Balbaces there crossed the ravine and came thundering in on the left. Then the British ranks were broken, the regiments got intermixed, and all went to the rear in confusion; finally however the Germans, having extricated themselves from their pursuers turned and formed a fresh line on the left of the road, and the others rallied upon them.

The gens d'armes and lancers, who had suffered severely from the artillery, as well as in the sword-fight, now halted, but Boyer's dragoons forming, 10 squadrons again came to the charge, and with the more confidence that the allies' ranks appeared still confused and wavering. When within 100 yards, the German officers rode gallantly out to fight, and their men followed a short way, but the enemy was too powerful, disorder and tumult again ensued, the swiftness of the English horses alone prevented a terrible catastrophe, and though some favourable ground enabled the line to reform once more, it was only to be again broken. However, Wellington, who was present, had placed Halket's infantry and the guns in a position to cover the cavalry, and they remained tranquil until the enemy, in full pursuit after the last charge, came galloping down and lent their left flank to the infantry; then the power of this arm was made manifest; a tempest of bullets emptied the French saddles by scores, and their hitherto victorious horsemen, after three fruitless attempts to charge, each weaker than the other, reined up and drew off to the hills, the British cavalry covered by the infantry made good their retreat to Quintana la Puente near the Pisuergra, and the bivouacs of the enemy were established at Villadriga. The loss in this combat was very considerable on both sides, the French suffered most, but they took a colonel and 70 other prisoners, and they had before the fight also captured a small commissariat store near Burgos.

While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness and insubordination, the usual concomitants of an English retreat, were exhibited at Torquemada, where the well-stored wine vaults became the prey of the soldiery; it is said that 12,000 men were to be seen at one time in a state of helpless inebriety. This commencement was bad, and the English general, who had now retreated some 50 miles, seeing the enemy so hot and menacing in pursuit, judged it fitting to check his course; for though the arrangements were surprisingly well combined, the means of transport were so scanty and the weather so bad, that the convoys of sick and wounded were still on the wrong side of the Duero. Wherefore, having with a short march crossed the Carion river on the 24th, at its confluence with the Pisuergra, he turned and halted behind it.

Here he was joined by a regiment of the guards, and by detachments coming

from Coruña, and his position extending from Villa Muriel to Dueñas below the meeting of the waters, was strong. The troops occupied a range of hills, lofty, yet descending with an easy sweep to the Carion; that river covered the front, and the Pisuerga did the same by the right wing. A detachment had been left to destroy the bridge of Baños on the Pisuerga; Colonel Campbell, with a battalion of the royals, was sent to aid the Spaniards in destroying the bridges at Palencia; and in Wellington's immediate front some houses and convents beyond the rivers furnished good posts to cover the destruction of the bridges of Muriel and San Isidro on the Carion, and that of Dueñas on the Pisuerga.

Souham, excited by his success on the 23rd, followed from Villadriga early on the 24th, and having cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada passed the Pisuerga. He immediately directed Foy's division upon Palencia, and ordered Maucune with the advanced guard to pursue the allies to the bridges of Baños, Isidro, and Muriel; but he halted himself at Magoz, and, if fame does not lie, because the number of French drunkards at Torquemada were even more numerous than those of the British army.

COMBAT ON THE CARION.

Before the enemy appeared, the summits of the hills were crowned by the allies, all the bridges were mined and that of San Isidro was strongly protected by a convent which was filled with troops. The left of the position was equally strong, yet General Oswald, who had just arrived from England and taken the command of the fifth division on the instant, overlooked the advantages to be derived from the dry bed of a canal with high banks which, on his side, run parallel with the Carion, and he had not occupied the village of Muriel in sufficient strength. In this state of affairs Foy reached Palencia, where, according to some French writers, a treacherous attempt was made, under cover of a parley, to kill him; he however drove the allies with some loss from the town and in such haste that all the bridges were abandoned in a perfect condition, and the French cavalry crossing the river and spreading abroad gathered up both baggage and prisoners.

This untoward event obliged Wellington to throw back his left, composed of the fifth division and the Spaniards at Muriel, thus offering two fronts, the one facing Palencia, the other the Carion. Oswald's error then became manifest; for Maucune having dispersed the 8th cazadores who were defending a ford between Muriel and San Isidro, fell with a strong body of infantry and guns upon the allies at Muriel, and this at the moment when the mine having been exploded, the party covering the bridge were passing the broken arch by means of ladders. The play of the mine, which was effectual, checked the advance of the French for an instant, but suddenly a horseman darting out at full speed from the column, rode down under a flight of bullets to the bridge, calling out that he was a deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm made by the explosion, and then violently checking his foaming horse, held up his hands, exclaiming that he was a lost man, and with hurried accents asked if there was no ford near. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one a little way off, and the gallant fellow having looked earnestly for a few moments as if to fix the exact point, wheeled his horse round, kissed his hand in derision, and bending over his saddle-bow dashed back to his own comrades, amidst showers of shot and shouts of laughter from both sides. The next moment Maucune's column, covered by a concentrated fire of guns, passed the river at the ford thus discovered, made some prisoners in the village, and lined the dry bed of the canal.

Lord Wellington, who came up at this instant, immediately turned some guns upon the enemy and desired that the village and canal might be retaken; Oswald thought that they could not be held, yet Wellington, whose retreat was endangered by the presence of the enemy on that side of the river, was peremptory; he ordered one brigade under General Barnes to attack the main body, while another brigade under General Pringle cleared the canal, and he strengthened the left with the Spanish troops and Brunswickers. A very sharp fire of artillery and musketry ensued, and the allies suffered some loss, especially by cannon-shot, which from the other side of the river plumped into the reserves. The Spaniards, unequal to any regular movement, got into confusion, and were falling back, when their fiery

countryman Miguel Alava, running to their head, with exhortation and example, for though wounded he would not retire, urged them forward to the fight; finally the enemy was driven over the river, the village was reoccupied in force, and the canal was lined by the allied troops. During these events at Villa Muriel, other troops attempted without success to seize the bridge of San Isidro, and the mine was exploded; but they were more fortunate at the bridge of Baños on the Pisuergra, for the mine there failed, and the French cavalry galloping over, made both the working and covering party prisoners.

The strength of the position was now sapped, for Souham could assemble his army on the allies' left, by Palencia, and force them to an action with their back upon the Pisuergra, or he could pass that river on his own left, and forestall them on the Duero at Tudela. If Wellington pushed his army over the Pisuergra by the bridge of Duenas, Souham, having the initial movement, might be first on the ground, and could attack the heads of the allied columns while Foy's division came down on the rear. If Wellington, by a rapid movement along the right bank of the Pisuergra, endeavoured to cross at Cabezon, which was the next bridge in his rear, and so gain the Duero, Souham by moving along the left bank, might fall upon him while in march to the Duero, and hampered between that river the Pisuergra and the Esquevilla. An action under such circumstances would have been formidable, and the English general once cut off from the Duero must have retired through Valladolid and Simancas to Tordesillas, or Toro, giving up his communications with Hill. In this critical state of affairs Wellington made no delay. He kept good watch upon the left of the Pisuergra, and knowing that the ground there was rugged, and the roads narrow and bad, while on the right bank they were good and wide, sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, and withdrawing the troops before day-break on the 26th, made a clean march of 16 miles to Cabezon, where he passed to the left of the Pisuergra, and barricaded and mined the bridge. Then sending a detachment to hold the bridge of Tudela on the Duero behind him, he caused the seventh division, under Lord Dalhousie, to secure the bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. His retreat behind the Duero, which river was now in full water, being thus assured, he again halted, partly because the ground was favourable, partly to give the commissary-general, Kennedy, time for some indispensable arrangements.

This functionary, who had gone to England sick in the latter end of 1811, and had returned to the army only the day before the siege of Burgos was raised, in passing from Lisbon by Badajoz to Madrid, and thence to Burgos, discovered that the inexperience of the gentleman who conducted the department during his absence had been productive of some serious errors. The magazines established between Lisbon and Badajos, and from thence by Almaraz to the valley of the Tagus, for the supply of the army in Madrid, had not been removed again when the retreat commenced, and Soult would have found them full, if his march had been made rapidly on that side; on the other hand the magazines on the line of operations, between Lisbon and Salamanca, were nearly empty. Kennedy had therefore the double task on hand to remove the magazines from the south side of the Tagus, and to bring up stores upon the line of the present retreat; and his dispositions were not yet completed when Wellington desired him to take measures for the removal of the sick and wounded, and every other incumbrance, from Salamanca, promising to hold his actual position on the Pisuergra until the operation was effected. Now there was sufficient means of transport for the occasion, but the negligence of many medical and escorting officers, conducting the convoys of sick to the rear, and the consequent bad conduct of the soldiers, for where the officers are careless the soldiers will be licentious, produced the worst effects. Such outrages were perpetrated on the inhabitants along the whole line of march that terror was everywhere predominant, and the ill-used drivers and muleteers deserted, some with, some without their cattle, by hundreds. Hence Kennedy's operation in some measure failed, the greatest distress was incurred, and the commissariat lost nearly the whole of the animals and carriages employed; the villages were abandoned, and the under-commissaries were bewildered, or paralyzed, by the terrible disorder thus spread along the line of communication.

Souham having repaired the bridges on the Carion, resumed the pursuit on the 26th, by the right of the Pisuerga, being deterred probably from moving to the left bank, by the rugged nature of the ground, and by the king's orders not to risk a serious action. In the morning of the 27th his whole army was collected in front of Cabezon, but he contented himself with a cannonade and a display of his force; the former cost the allies Colonel Robe of the artillery, a practised officer and a worthy man; the latter enabled the English general, for the first time, to discover the numbers he had to contend with, and they convinced him that he could hold neither the Pisuerga nor the Duero permanently. However, his object being to gain time, he held his position, and when the French, leaving a division in front of Cabezon, extended their right, by Cigales and Valladolid to Simancas, he caused the bridges at the two latter places to be destroyed in succession.

Congratulating himself that he had not fought in front of Burgos with so powerful an army, Wellington now resolved to retire behind the Duero and finally, if pressed, behind the Tormes. But as the troops on the Tagus would then be exposed to a flank attack, similar to that which the siege of Burgos had been raised to avoid on his own part; and as this would be more certain if any ill fortune befell the troops on the Duero, he ordered Hill to relinquish the defence of the Tagus at once and retreat, giving him a discretion as to the line, but desiring him, if possible, to come by the Guadarama passes; for he designed, if all went well, to unite on the Adaja river in a central position, intending to keep Souham in check with a part of his army, and with the remainder to fall upon Soult.

On the 28th Souham, still extending his right, with a view to dislodge the allies by turning their left, endeavoured to force the bridges at Valladolid and Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas on the Duero. The first was easily defended by the main body of the seventh division, but Halket, an able officer, finding the French strong and eager at the second, destroyed it, and detached the regiment of Brunswick Oels to ruin that of Tordesillas. It was done in time, and a tower behind the ruins was occupied by a detachment, while the remainder of the Brunswickers took post in a pine-wood at some distance. The French arrived and seemed for some time at a loss, but very soon 60 French officers and non-commissioned officers, headed by Captain Guingret, a daring man, formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, and then plunged into the water, holding their swords with their teeth, and swimming and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a cannonade, they thus crossed this great river, though it was in full and strong water, and the weather very cold, and having reached the other side, naked as they were, stormed the tower. The Brunswick regiment then abandoned its position, and these gallant soldiers remained masters of the bridge.

Wellington having heard of the attack at Simancas, and having seen the whole French army in march to its right along the hill beyond the Pisuerga on the evening of the 28th, destroyed the bridges at Valladolid and Cabezon, and crossed the Duero at Tudela and Puente de Duero on the 29th, but scarcely had he effected this operation when intelligence of Guingret's splendid action at Tordesillas reached him. With the instant decision of a great captain he marched by his left, and having reached the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas on the 30th, fronted the enemy and forbade further progress on that point; the bridge was indeed already repaired by the French, but Souham's main body had not yet arrived, and Wellington's menacing position was too significant to be misunderstood. The bridges of Toro and Zamora were now destroyed by detachments, and though the French, spreading along the river bank, commenced repairing the former, the junction with Hill's army was insured; and the English general, judging that the bridge of Toro could not be restored for several days, even hoped to maintain the line of the Duero permanently, because he expected that Hill, of whose operations it is now time to speak, would be on the Adaja by the 3rd of November.

CHAPTER V.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS—RETREAT FROM MADRID.

KING JOSEPH's first intention was to unite a great part of Suchet's forces as well as Soult's with his own, and Soult, probably influenced by a false report that Ballesteros

had actually reached La Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted, observing that Valencia must be defended against the increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies at Alicante, and the more so that, until the French army could cross the Tagus and open a new line of communication with Zaragoza, Valencia would be the only base for the king's operations. Joseph then resolved to incorporate a portion of the army of the south with the army of the centre, giving the command to Drouet, who was to move by the road of Cuenca and Tarancon towards the Tagus; but this arrangement, which seems to have been dictated by a desire to advance Drouet's authority, was displeasing to Soult. He urged that his army, so powerfully constituted, physically and morally, as to be the best in the Peninsula, owed its excellence to its peculiar organization, and it would be dangerous to break that up. Nor was there any good reason for this change; for if Joseph only wished to have a strong body of troops on the Cuenca road, the army of the centre could be reinforced with one or two divisions, and the whole could unite again on the Tagus without injury to the army of the south. It would however be better, he said, to incorporate the army of the centre with the army of the south, and march altogether by the road of San Clemente, leaving only a few troops on the Cuenca road, who might be reinforced by Suchet. But if the king's plan arose from a desire to march in person with a large body, he could do so with greater dignity by joining the army of the south, which was to act on the main line of operations. Joseph's reply was a peremptory order to obey or retire to France, and Drouet marched to Cuenca.

Soult's army furnished 35,000 infantry, 6000 excellent cavalry under arms, with 72 guns, making with the artillerymen a total of 46,000 veteran combatants. The army of the centre, including the king's guards, furnished about 12,000, of which 2000 were good cavalry with 12 guns. Thus 58,000 fighting men, 8000 being cavalry, with 84 pieces of artillery, were put in motion to drive Hill from the Tagus. Joseph's project was to pass that river and operate against Wellington's rear, if he should continue the siege of Burgos; but if he concentrated on the Tagus, Souham was in like manner to operate on his rear by Aranda de Duero and the Somosierra, sending detachments towards Guadalajara to be met by other detachments coming from the king through Sacedon. Finally, if Wellington, as indeed happened, should abandon both Burgos and Madrid, the united French forces were to drive him into Portugal. The conveying of Soult's convoys of sick men to Valencia and other difficulties retarded the commencement of operations, to the king's great discontent, and meanwhile he became very uneasy for his supplies, because the people of La Mancha, still remembering Montbrun's devastations, were flying with their beasts and grain, and from frequent repetition were become exceedingly expert in evading the researches of the foragers. Such however is the advantage of discipline and order, that while La Mancha was thus desolated from fear, confidence and tranquillity reigned in Valencia.

However, on the 18th of October, Joseph marched from Requena upon Cuenca, where he found Drouet with a division of Soult's infantry and some cavalry. He then proceeded to Tarancon, which was the only artillery road on that side leading to the Tagus, and during this time Soult marched by San Clemente upon Ocaña and Aranjuez. General Hill immediately sent that notice to Lord Wellington, which caused the retreat from Burgos, but he was in no fear of the enemy, for he had withdrawn all his outposts and united his whole force behind the Tagus. His right was at Toledo, his left at Fuente Dueñas, and there were Spanish and Portuguese troops in the valley of the Tagus extending as far as Talavera. The Tagus was however fordable, from its junction with Jarama near Aranjuez upwards; and moreover this part of the line, weak from its extent, could not easily be supported, and the troops guarding it would have been too distant from the point of action if the French should operate against Toledo. Hill therefore drew his left behind the Tajuna, which is a branch of the Jarama and running nearly parallel to the Tagus. His right occupied very strong ground from Añover to Toledo, he destroyed the bridges at Aranjuez, and securing that below the confluence of the Jarama and Henares, called the Puente Larga, threw one of boats over the former river a little above Bayona. The light division and Elío's

troops, forming the extreme left, were directed to march upon Arganda, and the head-quarters were fixed at Cienpозuelos.

The bulk of the troops were thus held in hand, ready to move to any menaced point, and as Skerri's brigade had just arrived from Cadiz, there was, including the Spanish regulars, 40,000 men in line, and a multitude of Partidas were hovering about. The lateral communications were easy, and the scouts passing over the bridge of Toledo covered all the country beyond the Tagus. In this state of affairs the Bridges at each end of the line furnished the means of sallying upon the flanks of any force attacking the front; the French must have made several marches to force the right, and on the left, the Jarama, with its marshy banks and its many confluent, offered several positions to interpose between the enemy and Madrid.

Drouet passed the Tagus the 29th at the abandoned fords of Fuente Dueñas and Villa Maurique, and the king, with his guards, repaired to Zarza de la Cruz. Meanwhile Soult, whose divisions were coming fast up to Ocaña, restored the bridge of Aranjuez, and passed the Tagus also with his advanced guard. On the 30th he attacked General Cole, who commanded at the Puente Larga with several regiments and some guns; but though the mines failed, and the French attempted to carry the bridge with the bayonet, they were vigorously repulsed by the 47th under Colonel Skerri. After a heavy cannonade and a sharp musketry which cost the allies 60 men, Soult relinquished the attempt and awaited the arrival of his main body. Had the Puente Larga been forced, the fourth division, which was at Añover would have been cut off from Madrid, but the weather being thick and rainy, Soult could not discover what supporting force was on the high land of Valdemoro behind the bridge, and was afraid to push forward too fast.

The king, discontented with this cautious mode of proceeding, now designed to operate by Toledo, but during the night the Puente Larga was abandoned, and Soult, being still in doubt of Hill's real object, advised Joseph to unite the army of the centre at Arganda and Chinchon, throwing bridges for retreat at Villa Maurique and Fuente Dueñas, as a precaution in case a battle should take place. Hill's movement was however a decided retreat, which would have commenced 24 hours sooner but for the failure of the mines and the combat at the Puente Larga. Wellington's orders had reached him at the moment when Soult first appeared on the Tagus, and the affair was so sudden, that the light division, which had just come from Alcala to Arganda to close the left of the position, was obliged, without halting, to return again in the night, the total journey being nearly 40 miles.

Wellington, foreseeing that it might be difficult for Hill to obey his instructions, had given him a discretionary power to retire either by the valley of the Tagus, or by the Guadarama; and a position taken up in the former, on the flank of the enemy, would have prevented the king from passing the Guadarama, and at the same time have covered Lisbon; whereas a retreat by the Guadarama exposed Lisbon. Hill, thinking the valley of the Tagus, in that advanced season, would not support the French army, and knowing Wellington to be pressed by superior forces in the north, chose the Guadarama. Wherefore, burning his pontoons, and causing La China and the stores remaining there to be destroyed in the night of the 30th, he retreated by different roads, and united his army on the 31st of October near Majadahonda. Meanwhile the magazines along the line of communication to Badajos were, as I have already noticed, in danger, if the enemy had detached troops to seize them, neither were the removal and destruction of the stores in Madrid effected without disorders of a singular nature.

The Municipality had demanded all the provision remaining there as if they wanted them for the enemy, and when this was refused, they excited a mob to attack the magazines; some firing even took place, and the assistance of the fourth division was required to restore order; a portion of wheat was finally given to the poorest of the people, and Madrid was abandoned. It was affecting to see the earnest and true friendship of the population. Men, and women, and children, crowded around the troops bewailing their departure. They moved with them in one vast mass for more than two miles, and left their houses empty at the very instant when the French cavalry scouts were at the gates on the other side. This emotion was distinct from political feeling, because there was a very strong French

party in Madrid ; and amongst the causes of wailing the return of the plundering and cruel Partidas, unchecked by the presence of the British, was very loudly proclaimed. The " Madrileños " have been stigmatized as a savage and faithless people, the British army found them patient, gentle, generous, and loyal ; nor is this fact to be disputed because of the riot which occurred in the destruction of the magazines, for the provisions had been obtained by requisition from the country around Madrid, under an agreement with the Spanish government to pay at the end of the war ; and it was natural for the people, excited as they were by the authorities, to endeavour to get their own flour back, rather than have it destroyed when they were starving,

With the Anglo-Portuguese troops marched Penne Villemur, Morillo, and Carlos D'España, and it was Wellington's wish that Elio, Bassecour, and Villa Campa should now throw themselves into the valley of the Tagus, and crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, join Ballesteros's army, now under Virues. A great body of men, including the Portuguese regiments left by Hill in Estremadura, would thus have been placed on the flank of any French army marching upon Lisbon, and if the enemy neglected this line, the Spaniards could operate against Madrid or against Suchet at pleasure. Elio, however, being cut off from Hill by the French advance, remained at the bridge of Auñón, near Sacedon, and was there joined by Villa Campa and the Empecinado.

Soult now brought up his army as quickly as possible to Valdemoro, and his information, as to Hill's real force, was becoming more distinct ; but there was also a rumour that Wellington was close at hand with three British divisions, and the French General's movements were consequently cautious, lest he should find himself suddenly engaged in battle before his whole force was collected, for his rear was still at Ocaña, and the army of the centre had not yet passed the Tajuña. This disposition of his troops was probably intentional, to prevent the king from fighting, for Soult did not think this a fitting time for a great battle unless upon great advantage. In the disjointed state of their affairs, a defeat would have been more injurious to the French than a victory would have been beneficial ; the former would have lost Spain, the latter would not have gained Portugal.

On the 1st of November, the bulk of Soult's army being assembled at Getafé, he sent scouting parties in all directions to feel for the allies, and to ascertain the direction of their march ; the next day the army of the centre and that of the south were reunited not far from Madrid, but Hill was then in full retreat for the Guadarama, covered by a powerful rear-guard under General Cole.

The 3rd Soult pursued the allies, and the king entering Madrid, placed a garrison in the Retiro for the protection of his court and of the Spanish families attached to his cause ; this was a sensible relief, for hitherto, in one great convoy, they had impeded the movements of the army of the centre. On the 4th Joseph rejoined Soult at the Guadarama with his guards, which always moved as a separate body ; but he had left Palombini beyond the Tagus near Tarancon to scour the roads on the side of Cuenca, and some dragoons being sent towards Huete were surprised by the Partidas, and lost 40 men, whereupon Palombini rejoined the army.

General Hill was moving upon Arevalo, slowly followed by the French, when fresh orders from Wellington, founded on new combinations, changed the direction of his march. Souham had repaired the bridge of Toro on the 4th, several days sooner than the English general had expected, and thus when he was keenly watching for the arrival of Hill on the Adaja, that he might suddenly join him and attack Soult, his designs were again baffled ; for he dared not make such a movement lest Souham, possessing both Toro and Tordesillas, should fall upon his rear ; neither could he bring up Hill to the Duero and attack Souham, because he had no means to pass that river, and meanwhile Soult, moving by Fontiveros, would reach the Tormes. Seeing then that his combinations had failed, and his central position no longer available, either for offence or defence, he directed Hill to gain Alba de Tormes at once by the road of Fontiveros, and on the 6th he fell back himself, from his position in front of Tordesillas, by Naval del Rey and Pituega to the heights of San Christoval.

Joseph, thinking to prevent Hill's junction with Wellington, had gained Arevalo by the Segovia road on the 5th and 6th; the 8th Souham's scouts were met with at Medina del Campo, and for the first time, since he had quitted Valencia, the king obtained news of the army of Portugal. One hundred thousand combatants, of which above 12,000 were cavalry, with 130 pieces of artillery, were thus assembled on those plains over which, three months before, Marmont had marched with so much confidence to his own destruction. Soult then expelled from Andalusia by Marmont's defeat, was now, after having made half the circuit of the Peninsula, come to drive into Portugal that very army whose victory had driven him from the south; and thus, as Wellington had foreseen and foretold, the acquisition of Andalusia, politically important and useful to the cause, proved injurious to himself at the moment, inasmuch as the French had concentrated a mighty power, from which it required both skill and fortune to escape. Meanwhile the Spanish armies let loose by this union of all the French troops, kept aloof, or coming to aid, were found a burthen, rather than a help.

On the 7th Hill's main body passed the Tormes at Alba, and the bridge there was mined; the light division and Long's cavalry remained on the right bank during the night, but the next day the former also crossed the river. Wellington himself was in the position of San Christoval, and it is curious, that the king, even at this late period, was doubtful if Ballesteros's troops had or had not joined the allied army at Avila. Wellington also was still uncertain of the real numbers of the enemy, but he was desirous to maintain the line of the Tormes permanently, and to give his troops repose. He had made a retreat of 200 miles; Hill had made one of the same distance besides his march from Estremadura; Skerrit's people had come from Cadiz, and the whole army required rest, for the soldiers, especially those who besieged Burgos, had been in the field, with scarcely an interval of repose, since January; they were bare-footed, and their equipments were spoiled, the cavalry were becoming weak, their horses were out of condition, and the discipline of all was failing.

The excesses committed on the retreat from Burgos have already been touched upon, and during the first day's march from the Tagus to Madrid, some of General Hill's men had not behaved better. Five hundred of the rear-guard under Cole, chiefly of one regiment, finding the inhabitants had fled according to their custom whichever side was approaching, broke open the houses, plundered, and got drunk. A multitude were left in the cellars of Valdemoro, and 250 fell into the hands of the enemy. The rest of the retreat being unmolested, was made with more regularity, but the excesses still committed by some of the soldiers were glaring and furnished proof that the moral conduct of a general cannot be fairly judged by following in the wake of a retreating army. On this occasion there was no want of provisions, no hardships to exasperate the men, and yet I, the author of this history, counted on the first day's march from Madrid, 17 bodies of murdered peasants; by whom killed, or for what, whether by English, or Germans, by Spaniards, or Portuguese, whether in dispute, in robbery, or in wanton villany, I know not, but their bodies were in the ditches, and a shallow observer might thence have drawn the most foul and false conclusions against the English general and nation.

Another notable thing was the discontent of the veteran troops with the arrangements of the staff officers. For the assembling of the sick men, at the place and time prescribed to form the convoys, was punctually attended to by the regimental officers; not so by the others, nor by the commissaries who had charge to provide the means of transport; hence delay and great suffering to the sick, and the wearing out of the healthy man's strength by waiting with their packs on for the negligent. And when the light division was left on the right bank of the Tormes to cover the passage at Alba, a prudent order that all baggage or other impediments should pass rapidly over the narrow bridge at that place without halting at all on the enemy's side, was, by those charged with the execution, so rigorously interpreted, as to deprive the light division of their ration bullocks and flour mules, at the very moment of distribution; and the tired soldiers, thus absurdly denied their food, had the farther mortification to see a string of commissariat carts deliberately passing their post many hours afterwards. All regimental officers know that the anger and dis-

content thus created is one of the surest means of ruining the discipline of an army, and it is in these particulars that the value of a good and experienced staff is found.

Lord Wellington's position extended from Christoval to Aldea Lengua on the right bank of the Tormes, and on the left of that river, to the bridge of Alba, where the castle which was on the right bank was garrisoned by Howard's brigade of the second division. Hamilton's Portuguese were on the left bank as a reserve for Howard; the remainder of the second division watched the fords of Huerta and Enciña, and behind them in second line the third and fourth divisions occupied the heights of Calvariza de Ariba. The light division and the Spanish infantry entered Salamanca, the cavalry were disposed beyond the Tormes, covering all the front, and thus posted, the English general desired to bring affairs to the decision of a battle. For the heights of Christoval were strong and compact, the position of the Arapiles on the other side of the Tormes was glorious as well as strong, and the bridge of Salamanca and the fords furnished the power of concentrating on either side of that river by a shorter line than the enemy could move upon.

But while Wellington prepared for a battle, he also looked to a retreat. His sick were sent to the rear, small convoys of provisions were ordered up from Ciudad Rodrigo to certain halting places between that place and Salamanca; the overplus of ammunition in the latter town was destroyed daily by small explosions, and large stores of clothing, of arms and accoutrements, were delivered to the Spanish troops, who were thus completely furnished; one hour after the English general had the mortification to see them selling their equipments, even under his own windows. Indeed Salamanca presented an extraordinary scene, and the Spaniards, civil and military, began to evince hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt or perpetrate murder, and one act of peculiar atrocity merits notice. A horse led by an English soldier, being frightened, backed against a Spanish officer commanding at a gate, he caused the soldier to be dragged into his guard-house and there bayoneted him in cold blood, and no redress could be had for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence, which was not long withheld. A Spanish officer while wantonly stabbing at a rifleman was shot dead by the latter; and a British volunteer slew a Spanish officer at the head of his own regiment in a sword fight, the troops of both nations looking on, but here there was nothing dishonourable on either side.

The civil authorities, not less savage, were more insolent than the military, treating every English person with an intolerable arrogance. Even the Prince of Orange was like to have lost his life; for upon remonstrating about quarters with the sitting junta, they ordered one of their guards to kill him; and he would have been killed had not Mr. Steele of the 43rd, a bold athletic person, felled the man before he could stab; yet both the prince and his defender were obliged to fly instantly to avoid the soldier's comrades. The exasperation caused by these things was leading to serious mischief when the enemy's movements gave another direction to the soldiers' passions.

On the 9th Long's cavalry had been driven in upon Alba, and on the 10th Soult opened a concentrated fire of 18 guns against that place. The castle, which crowned a bare and rocky knoll, had been hastily entrenched, and furnished scarcely any shelter from this tempest; for two hours the garrison could only reply with musketry, but finally it was aided by the fire of four pieces from the left bank of the river and the post was defended until dark, with such vigour that the enemy dared not venture on an assault. During the night General Hamilton reinforced the garrison, repaired the damaged walls, and formed barricades, but the next morning after a short cannonade and some musketry firing the enemy withdrew. This combat cost the allies above 100 men.

On the 11th the king coming up from Medina del Campo reorganized his army. That is, he united the army of the centre with the army of the south, placing the whole under Soult, and he removed Souham from the command of the army of Portugal to make way for Drouet. Caffarelli had before this returned to Burgos, with his divisions and guns, and as Souham, besides his losses and stragglers, had placed garrisons in Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Valladolid; and as the king also had left a garrison in the Retiro, scarcely 90,000 combatants of all arms were assembled on the Tormes; but 12,000 were cavalry, nearly all were veteran troops,

and they had at least 120 pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power could not remain idle, for the country was exhausted of provisions, the soldiers were already wanting bread, and the king, eager enough for battle, for he was of a brave spirit and had something of his brother's greatness of soul, sought counsel how to deliver it with most advantage.

Jourdan, with a martial fire unquenched by age, was for bringing affairs to a crisis by the boldest and shortest mode. He had observed that Wellington's position was composed of three parts, namely, the right at Alba; the centre at Calvariza Ariba; the left, separated from the centre by the Tormes, at San Christoval; the whole distance being about 15 miles.* Now the Tormes was still fordable in many places above Salamanca, and hence he proposed to assemble the French army in the night, pass the river at day-break, by the fords between Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and so make a concentrated attack upon Calvariza de Ariba, which would force Wellington to a decisive battle.

Soult opposed this project, he objected to attacking Wellington in a position which he was so well acquainted with, which he might have fortified, and where the army must fight its way, even from the fords, to gain room for an order of battle. He proposed instead, to move by the left to certain fords, three in number, between Exême Galisancho, some seven or eight miles above Alba de Tormes. They were easy in themselves, he said, and well suited from the conformation of the banks for forcing a passage, if it should be disputed; and by making a slight circuit the troops in march could not be seen by the enemy. Passing there, the French army would gain two marches upon the allies, would be placed upon their flank and rear, and could fight on ground chosen by its own generals, instead of delivering battle on ground chosen by the enemy; or it could force on an action in a new position whence the allies could with difficulty retire in the event of disaster. Wellington must then fight to disadvantage, or retire hastily, sacrificing part of his army to save the rest; and the effect, whether military or politically, would be the same as if he was beaten by a front attack. Jourdan replied, that this was prudent and might be successful if Wellington accepted battle, but that general could not thereby be forced to fight, which was the great object; he would have time to retreat before the French could reach the line of his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, and it was even supposed by some generals that he would retreat to Almeida at once by San Felices and Barba de Puerco.

Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of the Arapiles in detail, and the former, though he urged his own plan, offered to yield if the king was so inclined. Jourdan's proposition was supported by all the generals of the army of Portugal, except Clausel, who leaned to Soult's opinion; but as that marshal commanded two-thirds of the army, while Jourdan had no ostensible command, the question was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor is it easy to determine which was right, for though Jourdan's reasons were very strong, and the result did not bear out Soult's views, we shall find the failure was only in the execution. Nevertheless it would seem so great an army and so confident, for the French soldiers eagerly demanded a battle, should have grappled in the shortest way; a just and rapid development of Jourdan's plan would probably have cut off Hamilton's Portuguese and the brigade in the castle of Alba from Calvariza Ariba.

On the other hand, Wellington, who was so well acquainted with his ground, desired a battle on either side of the Tormes; his hope was indeed to prevent the passage of that river until the rains rendered it unfordable, and thus force the French to retire from want of provisions, or engage him on the position of Christoval; yet he also courted a fight on the Arapiles, those rocky monuments of his former victory. He had 68,000 combatants under arms, 52,000 of which, including 4000 British cavalry, were Anglo-Portuguese, and he had nearly 70 guns. This force he had so disposed, that besides Hamilton's Portuguese, three divisions guarded the fords, which were moreover defended by entrenchments, and the whole army might have been united in good time upon the strong ridges of Calvariza Ariba and on the two Arapiles, where the superiority of 15,000 men would scarcely have availed the French. A defeat would only have sent the allies to

Portugal, whereas a victory would have taken them once more to Madrid. To draw in Hamilton's Portuguese, and the troops from Alba, in time, would have been the vital point; but as the French, if they did not surprise the allies, must have fought their way up from the river, this danger might have proved less than could have been supposed at first view. In fine the general was Wellington, and he knew his ground.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TORMES.—RETREAT TO CIUDAD RODRIGO.

Soult's plan being adopted, the troops in the distant quarters were brought up; the army of Portugal was directed to make frequent demonstrations against Christoval, Aldea Lengua, and the fords between Huerta and Alba; the road over the hills to the Galisancho fords was repaired, and two trestle-bridges were constructed for the passage of the artillery. The design was to push over the united armies of the centre and the south by these fords; and if this operation should oblige the allies to withdraw from Alba de Tormes, the army of Portugal was to pass by the bridge at that place and by the fords, and assail Wellington's rear; but if the allies maintained Alba, Drouet was to follow Soult at Galisancho.

At daybreak on the 14th the bridges were thrown, the cavalry and infantry passed by the fords, the allies' outposts were driven back, and Soult took a position at Mozarbes, having the road from Alba to Tamames, under his left flank. Meanwhile Wellington remained too confidently in Salamanca, and when the first report informed him that the enemy were over the Tormes, made the caustic observation, that he would not recommend it to some of them. Soon, however, the concurrent testimony of many reports convinced him of his mistake, he galloped to the Arapiles, and having ascertained the direction of Soult's march drew off the second division, the cavalry, and some guns to attack the head of the French column. The fourth division and Hamilton's Portuguese remained at Alba, to protect this movement; the third division secured the Arapiles rocks until the troops from San Christoval should arrive; and Wellington was still so confident to drive the French back over the Tormes, that the bulk of the troops did not quit San Christoval that day. Nevertheless, when he reached Mozarbes, he found the French, already assembled there, too strong to be seriously meddled with. However, under cover of a cannonade, which kept off their cavalry, he examined their position, which extended from Mozarbes to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Utiero, and it was so good that the evil was without remedy; wherefore drawing off the troops from Alba, and destroying the bridge, he left 300 Spaniards in the castle, with orders, if the army retired the next day, to abandon the place and save themselves as they best could.

During the night and the following morning the allied army was united in the position of the Arapiles, and Wellington still hoped the French would give battle there; yet he placed the first division at Aldea Tejada, on the Junguen stream, to secure that passage in case Soult should finally oblige him to choose between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. Meantime the army of Portugal finding the bridge of Alba broken, and the castle occupied, crossed the Tormes at Galisancho, and moved up to the ridge of Señora de Utiara; Soult, who had commenced fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left at the same time to the height of Señora de la Buena, near the Ciudad Rodrigo road, yet slowly, because the ground was heavy, deep, and the many sources of the Junguen and the Valmusa streams were fast filling from the rain and impeding his march. This evolution was nearly the same as that practised by the Duke of Ragusa at the battle of Salamanca; but it was made on a wider circle, by a second range of heights enclosing as it were those by which the Duke of Ragusa moved on that day, and consequently, beyond the reach of such a sudden attack and catastrophe. The result in each case was remarkable. Marmont closing with a short quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, received a buffet that broke his pinions, and spoiled his flight. Soult, a wary kite, sailing slowly and with a wide wheel to seize a helpless prey, lost it altogether.

About two o'clock Lord Wellington, feeling himself too weak to attack, and seeing the French cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, judged the king's design was to establish a fortified head of cantonments at Mozarbes, and then operate against the allies' communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; wherefore sud-

denly casting his army into three columns, he crossed the Junguen, and then covering his left flank with his cavalry and guns, defiled, in order of battle, before the enemy at little more than cannon-shot. With a wonderful boldness and facility, and good fortune also, for there was a thick fog and a heavy rain which rendered the bye-ways and fields, by which the enemy moved, nearly impassable, while the allies had the use of the high roads, he carried his whole army in one mass quite round the French left : thus he gained the Valmusa river, where he halted for the night, in the rear of those who had been threatening him in front only a few hours before. This exploit was certainly surprising, but it was not creditable to the generalship on either side ; for first it may be asked why the English commander, having somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his position, waited so long on the Arapiles as to render this dangerous movement necessary, a movement which a combination of bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigour on the other side, rendered possible and no more.

It has been said, that the only drawback to the Duke of Dalmatia's genius is his want of promptness to strike at the decisive moment. It is certainly a great thing to fight a great battle ; and against such a general as Wellington, and such troops as the British, a man may well be excused, if he thinks twice, ere he puts his life and fame, and the lives and fame of thousands of his countrymen, the weal or woe of nations upon the hazard of an event which may be decided by the existence of a ditch five feet wide, or the single blunder of a single fool, or the confusion of a coward, or by any other circumstance however trivial. To make such a throw for such a stake is no light matter. It is no mean consideration, that the praise or the hatred of nations, universal glory or universal, perhaps eternal contempt, waits on an action, the object of which may be more safely gained by other means, for in war there is infinite variety. But in this case it is impossible not to perceive that the French general vacillated after the passage of the river, purposely perhaps to avoid an action, since, as I have before shown, he thought it unwise, in the disjointed state of the French affairs, and without any fixed base or reserves in case of defeat, to fight a decisive battle. Nor do I blame this prudence, for though it be certain that he who would be great in war must be daring, to set all upon one throw belongs only to an irresponsible chief, not to a lieutenant whose task is but a portion of the general plan ; neither is it wise, in monarch or general, to fight when all may be lost by defeat, unless all may be won by victory. However, the king, more unfettered than Soult, desired a battle, and with an army so good and numerous, the latter's prudence seems misplaced ; he should have grappled with his enemy, and, once engaged at any point, Wellington could not have continued his retreat, especially with the Spaniards, who were incapable of dexterous movements.

On the 16th the allies retired by the three roads which lead across the Matilla stream, through Tamames, San Munos, and Martin del Rio, to Ciudad Rodrigo ; the light division and the cavalry closed the rear, and the country was a forest, penetrable in all directions. The army bivouacked in the evening behind the Matilla stream ; but though this march was not more than 12 miles, the stragglers were numerous, for the soldiers meeting with vast herds of swine, quitted their colours by hundreds to shoot them, and such a rolling musketry echoed through the forest, that Wellington at first thought the enemy was upon him. It was in vain that the staff officers rode about to stop this disgraceful practice, which had indeed commenced the evening before ; it was in vain that Wellington himself caused two offenders to be hanged, the hungry soldiers still broke from the columns, the property of whole districts was swept away in a few hours, and the army was in some degree placed at the mercy of the enemy. The latter however were contented to glean the stragglers, of whom they captured 2000, and did not press the rear until evening near Matilla where their lancers fell on, but were soon checked by the light companies of the 28th, and afterwards charged by the 14th dragoons.

The 17th presented a different yet a not less curious scene. During the night the cavalry immediately in front of the light division, had, for some unknown reason, filed off by the flanks to the rear without giving any intimation to the

infantry, who, trusting to the horsemen, had thrown out their picquets at a very short distance in front. At daybreak, while the soldiers were rolling their blankets and putting on their accoutrements, some strange horsemen were seen in the rear of the bivouac and were at first taken for Spaniards, but very soon their cautious movements and vivacity of gestures showed them to be French; the troops stood to arms, and in good time, for 500 yards in front the wood opened on to a large plain on which, in place of the British cavalry, 8000 French horsemen were discovered advancing in one solid mass, yet carelessly and without suspecting the vicinity of the British. The division was immediately formed in columns, a squadron of the 14th dragoons and one of the German hussars came hastily up from the rear, Julian Sanchez' cavalry appeared in small parties on the right flank, and every precaution was taken to secure the retreat. This checked the enemy, but as the infantry fell back, the French, though fearing to approach their heavy masses in the wood, sent many squadrons to the right and left, some of which rode on the flanks near enough to bandy wit, in the Spanish tongue, with the British soldiers, who marched without firing. Very soon however the signs of mischief became visible, the road was strewn with baggage, and the *bât-men* came running in for protection, some wounded, some without arms, and all breathless as just escaped from a surprise. The thickness of the forest had enabled the French horsemen to pass along unperceived on the flanks of the line of march, and, as opportunity offered, they galloped from side to side, sweeping away the baggage and sabring the conductors and guards; they had even menaced one of the columns, but were checked by the fire of the artillery. In one of these charges General Paget was carried off, as it were from the midst of his own men, and it might have been Wellington's fortune, for he also was continually riding between the columns and without an escort. However, the main body of the army soon passed the Huebra river, and took post behind it, the right at Tamames, the left near Boadilla, the centre at San Munoz, Buena Barba, and Gallego de Huebra.

When the light division arrived at the edge of the table-land which overhangs the fords at the last-named place, the French cavalry suddenly thickened, and the sharp whistle of musket-bullets with the splintering of branches on the left showed that their infantry were also up. Soult, in the hope of forestalling the allies at Tamames, had pushed his columns towards that place, by a road leading from Salamanca through Vecinos, but finding Hill's troops in his front, turned short to his right in hopes to cut off the rear-guard, which led to the

COMBAT OF THE HUEBRA.

The English and German cavalry, warned by the musketry, crossed the fords in time, and the light division should have followed without delay, because the forest ended on the edge of the table-land, and the descent from thence to the river, about 800 yards, was open and smooth, and the fords of the Huebra were deep. Instead of taking the troops down quickly, an order, more respectful to the enemy's cavalry than to his infantry, was given to form squares. The officers looked at each other in amazement, but at that moment Wellington fortunately appeared, and under his directions the battalions instantly glided off to the fords, leaving four companies of the 43rd and one of the riflemen to cover the passage. These companies, spreading as skirmishers, were immediately assailed in front and on both flanks, and with such a fire that it was evident a large force was before them; moreover a driving rain and mist prevented them from seeing their adversaries, and being pressed closer each moment, they gathered by degrees at the edge of the wood, where they maintained their ground for a quarter of an hour, then seeing the division was beyond the river, they swiftly cleared the open slope of the hill, and passed the fords under a very sharp musketry. Only 27 soldiers fell, for the tempest, beating in the Frenchmen's faces, baffled their aim, and Ross's guns, playing from the low ground with grape, checked the pursuit, but the deep bellowing of thirty pieces of heavy French artillery showed how critically timed was the passage.

The banks of the Huebra were steep and broken, but the enemy spread his infantry to the right and left along the edge of the forest, making demonstrations on every side, and there were several fords to be guarded; the 52nd and the

Portuguese defended those below, Ross's guns, supported by the riflemen and the 43rd, defended those above, and behind the right of the light division, on higher ground, was the seventh division. The second division, Hamilton's Portuguese, and a brigade of cavalry, were in front of Tamames, and thus the bulk of the army was massed on the right, hugging the Pena de Francia, and covering the roads leading to Ciudad, as well as those leading to the passes of the Gata hills.

In this situation one brisk attempt made to force the fords guarded by the 52nd was vigorously repulsed by that regiment, but the skirmishing and the cannonade, which never slackened, continued until dark; and heavily the French artillery played upon the light and seventh divisions. The former, forced to keep near the fords and in column, lest a sudden rush of cavalry should carry off the guns on the flat ground, were plunged into, at every round, yet suffered little loss, because the clayey soil, saturated with rain, swallowed the shot and smothered the shells; but it was a matter of astonishment to see the seventh division kept on open and harder ground by its commander, and in one huge mass tempting the havoc of this fire for hours, when a hundred yards in its rear the rise of the hill and the thick forest would have entirely covered it without in any manner weakening the position.

On the 18th the army was to have drawn off before daylight, and the English General was anxious about the result, because the position of the Huebra, though good for defence, was difficult to remove from at this season; the roads were hollow and narrow, and led up a steep bank to a table-land, which was open, flat, marshy, and scored with water gullies; and from the overflowing of one of the streams the principal road was impassable a mile in rear of the position; hence, to bring the columns off in time without jostling, and if possible without being attacked, required a nice management. All the baggage and stores had marched in the night, with orders not to halt until they reached the high lands near Ciudad Rodrigo, but if the preceding days had produced some strange occurrences, the 18th was not less fertile in them.

In a former part of this work it has been observed, that even the confirmed reputation of Lord Wellington could not protect him from the vanity and presumption of subordinate officers. The allusion fixes here. Knowing that the most direct road was impassable, he had directed the divisions by another road, longer and apparently more difficult; this seemed such an extraordinary proceeding to some general officers that, after consulting together, they deemed their commander unfit to conduct the army, and led their troops by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! Meanwhile Wellington, who had before daylight placed himself at an important point on his own road, waited impatiently for the arrival of the leading division until dawn, and then suspecting something of what had happened, galloped to the other road and found the would-be commanders stopped by that flood which his arrangements had been made to avoid. The insubordination, and the danger to the whole army were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was so severe and well timed, the humiliation so complete and so deeply felt that, with one proud sarcastic observation, indicating contempt more than anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his forces safely. However, some confusion and great danger still attended the operation, for even on this road one water-gully was so deep, that the light division which covered the rear, could only pass it man by man over a felled tree, and it was fortunate that Soult, unable to feed his troops a day longer, stopped on the Huebra with his main body and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. Thus the allies retired unmolested, but whether from necessity, or from negligence in the subordinates, the means of transport were too scanty for the removal of the wounded men, most of whom were hurt by cannon-shot; many were left behind, and as the enemy never passed the Huebra at this point, those miserable creatures perished by a horrible and lingering death.

The marshy plains over which the army was now marching exhausted the strength of the wearied soldiers, thousands straggled, the depredations on the herds of swine were repeated, and the temper of the army generally prognosticated the greatest misfortunes if the retreat should be continued. This was however the last day of trial, for towards evening the weather cleared up, the hills near Ciudad Rodrigo afforded dry bivouacs and fuel, the distribution of good rations restored

the strength and spirits of the men, and the next day Ciudad Rodrigo and the neighbouring villages were occupied in tranquillity. The cavalry was then sent out to the forest, and being aided by Julian Sanchez' Partidas, brought in from 1000 to 1500 stragglers who must otherwise have perished. During these events Joseph occupied Salamanca, but Colonel Miranda, the Spanish officer left at Alba de Tormes, held that place until the 27th, and then carried off his garrison in the night.

Thus ended the retreat from Burgos. The French gathered a good spoil of baggage; what the loss of the allies in men was, cannot be exactly determined, because no Spanish returns were ever seen. An approximation may however be easily made. According to the muster-rolls, the Anglo-Portuguese under Wellington had about 1000 men killed, wounded, and missing between the 21st and 29th of October, which was the period of their crossing the Duero, but this only refers to loss in action; Hill's loss between the Tagus and the Tormes was, including stragglers, about 400, and the defence of the castle of Alba de Tormes cost 100. Now, if the Spanish regulars and Partidas, marching with the two armies, be reckoned to have lost 1000, which, considering their want of discipline, is not exaggerated, the whole loss, previous to the French passage of the Tormes, will amount perhaps to 3000 men. But the loss between the Tormes and the Agueda was certainly greater, for nearly 300 were killed and wounded at the Huebra, many stragglers died in the woods, and we have Marshal Jourdan's testimony, that the prisoners, Spanish, Portuguese, and English, brought into Salamanca up to the 20th November, were 3520.* The whole loss of the double retreat cannot therefore be sat down at less than 9000, including the cost of men in the siege of Burgos.

I have been the more precise on this point, because some French writers have spoken of 10,000 being taken between the Tormes and the Agueda, and General Souham estimated the previous loss, including the siege of Burgos, at 7000. But the king in his despatches called the whole loss 12,000, including therein the garrison of Chinchilla, and he observed that if the generals of cavalry, Soult and Tilley, had followed the allies vigorously from Salamanca, the loss would have been much greater. Certainly the army was so little pressed that none would have supposed the French horsemen were numerous. On the other hand English authors have most unaccountably reduced the British loss to as many hundreds.

Although the French halted on the Huebra, the English general kept his troops together behind the Agueda, because Soult retired with the troops under his immediate command to Los Santos on the Upper Tormes, thus pointing towards the pass of Baños, and it was rumoured he designed to march that way, with a view to invade Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Wellington disbelieved this rumour, but he could not disregard it, because nearly all his channels of intelligence had been suddenly dried up by a tyrannical and foolish decree of the Cortes, which obliged every man to justify himself for having remained in a district occupied by the enemy, and hence to avoid persecution, those who used to transmit information, fled from their homes. Hill's division was therefore moved to the right as far as Robledo, to cover the pass of Perales, the rest of the troops were ready to follow, and Penne Villemur, leading the fifth Spanish army over the Gata mountains, occupied Coria.

Joseph, after hesitating whether he should leave the army of the south, or the army of Portugal in Castile, finally ordered the head-quarters of the latter to be fixed at Valladolid, and of the former at Toledo; the one to maintain the country between the Tormes and the Esla, the other to occupy La Mancha with its left, the valley of the Tagus as far as the Tietar with its centre, and Avila with its right. The army of the centre went to Segovia, where the king joined it with his guards, and when these movements, which took place in December, were known, Wellington placed his army also in winter quarters.

The fifth Spanish army crossing the Tagus at Alcantara entered Estremadura.

Hill's division occupied Coria and Placentia, and held the town of Bejar by a detachment.

* Appendix, No. 9.

Two divisions were quartered on a second line behind Hill about Castello Branco, and in the Upper Beira.

The light division remained on the Agueda, and the rest of the infantry were distributed along the Duero from Lamego downwards.

The Portuguese cavalry were placed in Moncorvo, and the British cavalry, with the exception of Victor Alten's brigade, which was attached to the light division, occupied the valley of the Mondego.

Carlos D'España's troops garrisoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and the Gallicians marched through the Trás-os-Montes to their own country.

In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were easily fed, because the improved navigation of the Tagus, the Douro, and the Mondego furnished water carriage close to all their cantonments; moreover the army could be quickly collected on either frontier, for the front line of communication from Estremadura passed by the bridge of Alcantara to Coria, and from thence through the pass of Perales to the Agueda. The second line run by Penamacor and Guinaldo, and both were direct; but the post of Bejar, although necessary to secure Hill's quarters from a surprise, was itself exposed.

The French also had double and direct communications across the Gredos mountains. On their first line they restored a Roman road leading from Horcajada, on the Upper Tormes, by the Puerto de Pico to Monbeltran, and from thence to Talavera. To ease their second line they finished a road, begun the year before by Marmont, leading from Avila, by the convent of Guisando and Escalona to Toledo. But these communications though direct, were in winter so difficult, that General Laval crossing the mountains from Avila was forced to harness 40 horses to a carriage; moreover Wellington, having the interior and shorter lines, was in a more menacing position for offence, and a more easy position for defence; wherefore, though he had ordered all boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and other points where the great roads came down to the Tagus, the French, as anxious to prevent him from passing that river as he was to prevent them, sent parties to destroy what had been overlooked. Each feared that the other would move, and yet neither wished to continue the campaign, Wellington, because his troops wanted rest, more than one-third being in the hospitals; the French because they could not feed their men, and had to refix their general base of operations, broken up and deranged as it was by the guerrillas.

The English general was however most at his ease. He knew that the best French officers thought it useless to continue the contest in Spain, unless the British army was first mastered, Soult's intercepted letters showed him how that general desired to fix the war in Portugal, and there was now a most powerful force on the frontier of that kingdom. But on the other hand Badajos, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida blocked the principal entrances, and though the two former were very ill provided by the Spaniards, they were in little danger because the last campaign had deprived the French of all their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines, in Andalusia, Almaraz, Madrid, Salamanca, and Valladolid; and it was nearly impossible for them to make any impression upon Portugal until new establishments were formed. Wherefore Wellington did not fear to spread his troops in good and tranquil quarters, to receive reinforcements, restore their equipments, and recover their health and strength.

This advantage was not reciprocal. The secondary warfare which the French sustained, and which it is now time again to notice, would have been sufficient to establish the military reputation of any nation before Napoleon's exploits had raised the standard of military glory. For when disembarassed of their most formidable enemy, they were still obliged to chase the Partidas, to form sieges, to recover and restore the posts they had lost by concentrating their armies, to send movable columns by long winter marches over a vast extent of country for food, fighting for what they got, and living hard because the magazines filled from the fertile districts were of necessity reserved for the field operations against Wellington. Certainly it was a great and terrible war they had in hand, and good and formidable soldiers they were to sustain it so long and so manfully amidst the many errors of their generals.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTINUATION OF THE PARTISAN WARFARE.

IN the north, while Souham was gathering in front of Wellington, some of Mendizabel's bands blockaded Santona by land, and Popham, after his failure at Gueteria, blockaded it by sea. It was not very well provisioned, but Napoleon, always watchful, had sent an especial governor, General Lameth, and a chosen engineer, General D'Abadie, from Paris to complete the works. By their activity 120 pieces of cannon were soon mounted, and they had, including the crew of a corvette, a garrison of 1800 men. Lameth, who was obliged to fight his way into the place in September, also formed an armed flotilla, with which, when the English squadron was driven off the port by gales of wind, he made frequent captures. Meanwhile Mendizabel surprised the garrison of Briviesca, Longa captured a large convoy with its escort near Burgos, and all the bands had visibly increased in numbers and boldness.

When Caffarelli returned from the Duero, Reille took the command of the army of Portugal, Drouet assumed that of the army of the centre, and Souham being thus cast off returned to France. The army of Portugal was then widely spread over the country. Avila was occupied, Sarrut took possession of Leon, the bands of Marquinez and Salazar were beaten, and Foy marching to seize Astorga, surprised and captured 90 men employed to dismantle that fortress; but above 20 breaches had already been opened and the place ceased to be of any importance. Meanwhile Caffarelli, troubled by the care of a number of convoys, one of which under General Frimont, although strongly escorted and having two pieces of cannon, fell into Longa's hands the 30th of November, was unable to commence active operations until the 29th of December. Then his detachments chased the bands from Bilbao, while he marched himself to succour and provision Santona and Gueteria, and to re-establish his other posts along the coast; but while he was near Santona the Spaniards attacked St. Domingo in Navarre, and invested Logroña.

Sir Home Popham had suddenly quitted the Bay of Biscay with his squadron, leaving a few vessels to continue the littoral warfare, which enabled Caffarelli to succour Santona; important events followed, but the account of them must be deferred as belonging to the transactions of 1813. Meanwhile, tracing the mere chain of guerilla operations from Biscay to the other parts, we find Abbé, who commanded in Pampeluna, Severoli, who guarded the right of the Ebro, and Paris, who had returned from Valencia to Zaragoza, continually and at times successfully attacked in the latter end of 1812; for after Chaplangarra's exploit near Jacca, Mina intercepted all communication with France, and on the 22nd of November surprised and drove back to Zaragoza with loss of a very large convoy. Then he besieged the castle of Huesca, and when a considerable force, coming from Zaragoza, forced him to desist, he reappeared at Barbastro. Finally in a severe action fought on the heights of Señora del Poya, towards the end of December, his troops were dispersed by Colonel Colbert, yet the French lost 70 men, and in a few weeks Mina took the field again, with forces more numerous than he had ever before commanded.

¶ About this time Villa Campa, who had entrenched himself near Segorbé to harass Suchet's rear, was driven from thence by General Panetier, but being afterwards joined by Gayan, they invested the castle of Daroca with 3000 men. Severoli marching from Zaragoza succoured the place, yet Villa Campa reassembled his whole force near Carineña behind Severoli, who was forced to fight his way home to Zaragoza. The Spaniards reappeared at Almunia, and on the 22nd of December another battle was fought, when Villa Campa, being defeated with considerable slaughter, retired to New Castile, and there soon repaired his losses. Meanwhile, in the centre of Spain, Elio, Bassecour, and Empecinado, having waited until the great French armies passed in pursuit of Hill, came down upon Madrid. Wellington, when at Salamanca, expected that this movement would call off some troops from the Tormes, but the only effect was to cause the garrison left by Joseph to

follow the great army, which it rejoined between the Duero and the Tormes, with a great encumbrance of civil servants and families. The Partidas then entered the city and committed great excesses, treating the people as enemies.

Soult and Joseph had been earnest with Suchet to send a strong division by Cuenca as a protection for Madrid, and that marshal did move in person with a considerable body of troops as far as Requena on the 28th of November, but being in fear for his line towards Alicante soon returned to Valencia in a state of indecision, leaving only one brigade at Requena. He had been reinforced by 3000 fresh men from Catalonia, yet he would not undertake any operation until he knew something of the king's progress, and at Requena he had gained no intelligence even of the passage of the Tagus. The Spaniards being thus uncontrolled gathered in all directions.

The Duke del Parque advanced with Ballesteros's army to Villa Nueva de los Infantes, on the La Mancha side of the Sierra Morena, his cavalry entered the plains, and some new levies from Grenada came to Alcaraz on his right. Elio and Bassecour, leaving Madrid to the Partidas, marched to Albacete, without hindrance from Suchet, and reopened the communication with Alicante; hence, exclusive of the Sicilian army, nearly 30,000 regular Spanish troops were said to be assembled on the borders of Murcia, and 6000 new levies came to Cordoba as a reserve. However, on the 3rd of December, Joseph, at the head of his guards and the army of the centre, drove all the Partidas from the capital, and reoccupied Guadalaxara and the neighbouring posts; Soult entered Toledo, and his cavalry advanced towards Del Parque, who immediately recrossed the Morena, and then the French horsemen swept La Mancha to gather contributions and to fill the magazines at Toledo.

By these operations, Del Parque, now joined by the Grenadan troops from Alcaraz, was separated from Elio, and Suchet was relieved from a danger which he had dreaded too much, and by his own inaction contributed to increase. It is true he had all the sick men belonging to the King's and to Soult's army on his hands, but he had also many effective men of those armies; and though the yellow fever had shown itself in some of his hospitals, and though he was also very uneasy for the security of his base in Aragon, where the Partida warfare was reviving, yet, with a disposable force of 15,000 infantry, and a fine division of cavalry, he should not have permitted Elio to pass his flank in the manner he did. He was afraid of the Sicilian army, which had indeed a great influence on all the preceding operations, for it is certain that Suchet would otherwise have detached troops to Madrid by the Cuenca road, and then Soult would probably have sought a battle between the Tagus and the Guadarama mountains; but this influence arose entirely from the position of the Alicante army, not from its operations, which were feeble and vacillating.

Maitland had resigned in the beginning of October, and his successor, Mackenzie, immediately pushed out some troops to the front, and there was a slight descent upon Xabea by the navy, but the general remained without plan or object, the only signs of vitality being a fruitless demonstration against the castle of Denia, where General Donkin disembarked on the 4th of October with a detachment of the 81st regiment. The walls had been represented as weak, but they were found to be high and strong, and the garrison had been unexpectedly doubled that morning, hence no attack took place, and in the evening a second reinforcement arrived, whereupon the British re-embarked. However the water was so full of pointed rocks that it was only by great exertions Lieutenant Penruddocke of the *Fame* could pull in the boats, and the soldiers, wading and fighting, got on board with little loss indeed, but in confusion.

Soon after this, General William Clinton came from Sicily to take the command, and Wellington, who was then before Burgos, thinking Suchet would weaken his army to help the king, recommended an attempt upon the city of Valencia either by a coast attack or by a land operation, warning Clinton however to avoid an action in a cavalry country. This was not very difficult, because the land was generally rocky and mountainous, but Clinton would not stir without first having possession of the citadel of Alicante, and thus all things fell into disorder and weak-

ness. For the jealous Spanish governor would not suffer the British to hold even a gate of the town, nay, he sent Elio a large convoy of clothing and other stores with an escort of only 20 men, that he might retain two of that general's battalions to resist the attempt which he believed or pretended to believe Clinton would make on the citadel. Meanwhile that general, leaving Whittingham and Roche at Alcoy and Xixona, drew in his other troops from the posts previously occupied in front by Mackenzie; he feared Suchet's cavalry, but the marshal, estimating the allied armies at more than 50,000 men, would undertake no serious enterprise while ignorant of the king's progress against Lord Wellington. He however diligently strengthened his camp at St. Felipe de Xativa, threw another bridge over the Xucar, entrenched the passes in his front, covered Denia with a detachment, obliged Whittingham to abandon Alcoy, dismantled the extensive walls of Valencia, and fortified a citadel there.

It was in this state of affairs that Elio came down to Albacete, and priding himself upon the dexterity with which he had avoided the French armies, proposed to Clinton a combined attack upon Suchet. Elio greatly exaggerated his own numbers, and giving out that Del Parque's force was under his command, pretended that he could bring 40,000 men into the field, 4000 being cavalry. But the two Spanish armies if united would scarcely have produced 20,000 really effective infantry; moreover, Del Parque, a sickly unwieldy person, was extremely incapable, his soldiers were discontented and mutinous, and he had no intention of moving beyond Alcaraz.

With such allies it was undoubtedly difficult for the English general to co-operate; yet it would seem something considerable might have been effected while Suchet was at Requena, even before Elio arrived, and more surely after that general had reached Albacete. Clinton had then 12,000 men, of which 5000 were British: there was a fleet to aid his operations, and the Spanish infantry under Elio were certainly 10,000. Nothing was done, and it was because nothing was attempted, that Napoleon, who watched this quarter closely, assured Suchet, that however difficult his position was from the extent of country he had to keep in tranquillity, the enemy in his front was not really formidable. Events justified this observation. The French works were soon completed, and the British army fell into such disrepute, that the Spaniards with sarcastic malice affirmed it was to be put under Elio to make it useful.

Meanwhile Roche's and Whittingham's division continued to excite the utmost jealousy in the other Spanish troops, who asked, very reasonably, what they did to merit such advantages? England paid and clothed them, and the Spaniards were bound to feed them;* they did not do so, and Canga Arguelles, the intendant of the province, asserted that he had twice provided magazines for them in Alicante, which were twice plundered by the governor; and yet it is certain that the other Spanish troops were far worse off than these divisions. But on every side intrigues, discontent, vacillation, and weakness were visible, and again it was shown that if England was the stay of the Peninsula, it was Wellington alone who supported the war.

On the 22nd of November, the obstinacy of the governor being at last overcome, he gave up the citadel of Alicante to the British, yet no offensive operations followed, though Suchet on the 26th drove Roche's troops out of Alcoy with loss, and defeated the Spanish cavalry at Yecla. However on the 2nd of December, General Campbell arriving from Sicily, with 4000 men, principally British, assumed the command, making the fourth general-in-chief in the same number of months. His presence, the strong reinforcement he brought, and the intelligence that Lord William Bentinck was to follow with another reinforcement, again raised the public expectation, and Elio immediately proposed that the British should occupy the enemy on the Lower Xucar, while the Spaniards crossing that river attacked Requena. However, General Campbell, after making some feeble demonstrations, declared he would await Lord William Bentinck's arrival. Then the Spanish general, who had hitherto abstained from any disputes with the British, became extremely discontented, and dispersed his army for subsistence. On the other hand, the English general complained that Elio had abandoned him.

* Appendix, No. 17.

Suchet expecting Campbell to advance, had withdrawn his outposts to concentrate at Xativa, but when he found him as inactive as his predecessors, and saw the Spanish troops scattered, he surprised one Spanish post at Onteniente, another in Ibi, and reoccupied all his former offensive positions in front of Alicante. Soult's detachments were now also felt in La Mancha, wherefore Elio retired into Murcia, and Del Parque, as we have seen, went over the Morena. Thus the storm which had menaced the French disappeared entirely, for Campbell, following his instructions, refused rations to Whittingham's corps, and desired it to separate for the sake of subsistence;* and as the rest of the Spanish troops were actually starving, no danger was to be apprehended from them: nay, Habert marched up to Alicante, killed and wounded some men almost under the walls, and the Anglo-Italian soldiers deserted to him by whole companies when opportunity offered.

Suchet, did as he pleased towards his front, but he was unquiet for his rear, for besides the operations of Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran and Mina in Aragon, the Frayle and other Partida chiefs continually vexed his communications with Tortosa. Fifty men had been surprised and destroyed near Segorbé, the 22nd of November, by Villa Campa; and General Panetier, who was sent against that chief, though he took and destroyed his entrenched camp, was unable to bring him to action or to prevent him from going to Aragon and attacking Daroca, as I have before shown. Meanwhile the Frayle surprised and destroyed an ordnance convoy, took several guns and 400 horses, and killed in cold blood after the action above 100 artillerymen and officers. A movable column being immediately despatched against him, destroyed his depôts and many of his men, but the Frayle himself escaped and soon reappeared upon the communications. The loss of this convoy was the first disgrace of the kind which had befallen the army of Aragon, and to use Suchet's expression a battle would have cost him less.

Nor were the Spaniards quite inactive in Catalonia, although the departure of General Maitland had so dispirited them that the regular warfare was upon the point of ceasing altogether. The active army was indeed stated to be 20,000 strong, and the tercios of reserve 45,000; yet a column of 900 French controlled the sea-line and cut off all supplies landed for the interior. Lacy, who remained about Vich with 7000 men, affirmed that he could not feed his army on the coast, but Captain Codrington says that 19 feluccas laden with flour had in two nights only, landed their cargoes between Mattaro and Barcelona, for the supply of the latter city, and that these and many other ventures of the same kind might have been captured without difficulty; that Claros and Milans continued corruptly to connive at the passage of French convoys; that the rich merchants of Mattaro and Arens invited the enemy to protect their contraband convoys going to France, and yet accused him publicly of interrupting their lawful trade when in fact he was only disturbing a treasonable commerce, carried on so openly that he was forced to declare a blockade of the whole coast. A plot to deliver up the Medas islands was also discovered, and when Lacy was pressed to call out the Somatenes, a favourite project with the English naval officers, he objected that he could scarcely feed and provide ammunition for the regular troops. He also observed that the general efforts of that nature hitherto made, and under more favourable circumstances, had produced only a waste of life, of treasure, of provisions, of ammunition and of arms, and now the French possessed all the strong places.

At this time, so bitter were the party dissensions, that Sir Edward Pellew anticipated the ruin of the principality from that cause alone. Lacy, Sarzfield, Eroles, and Captain Codrington, continued their old disputes, and Sarzfield, who was then in Aragon, had also quarrelled with Mina; Lacy made a formal requisition to have Codrington recalled, the junta of Catalonia made a like demand to the regency respecting Lacy, and meanwhile such was the misery of the soldiers that the officers of one regiment actually begged at the doors of private houses to obtain old clothing for their men, and even this poor succour was denied. A few feeble isolated efforts by some of the partisan generals were the only signs of war, when Wellington's victory at Salamanca again raised the spirit of the province. Then also for the first time the new constitution adopted by the Cortes was proclaimed

* Appendix, No. 17, 18.

in Catalonia, the junta of that province was suppressed, Eroles, the people's favourite, obtained greater powers, and was even flattered with the hope of becoming captain-general, for the regency had agreed at last to recall Lacy. In fine the aspect of affairs changed, and many thousand English muskets and other weapons were, by Sir Edward Pellew, given to the partisans as well as to the regular troops, which enabled them to receive cartridges from the ships instead of the loose powder formerly demanded on account of the difference in the bore of the Spanish muskets. The effect of these happy coincidences was soon displayed. Eroles, who had raised a new division of 3000 men, contrived in concert with Codrington, a combined movement in September against Taragona. Marching in the night of the 27th from Reus to the mouth of the Francoli he was met by the boats of the squadron, and having repulsed a sally from the fortress, drove some Catalans in the French service from the ruins of the Olivo, while the boats swept the mole, taking five vessels. After this affair Eroles encamped on the hill separating Lerida, Taragona, and Tortoza, meaning to intercept the communication between those places, and to keep up an intercourse with the fleet, now the more necessary because Lacy had lost this advantage eastward of Barcelona. While thus posted he heard that a French detachment had come from Lerida to Arbeca, wherefore making a forced march over the mountains, he surprised and destroyed the greatest part on the 2nd of October, and then returned to his former quarters.

Meanwhile Lacy embarked scaling ladders and battering guns on board the English ships, and made a pompous movement against Mattaro with his whole force, yet at the moment of execution changed his plan and attempted to surprise Hostalrich, but he let this design be known, and as the enemy prepared to succour the place, he returned to Vich without doing anything. During these operations Manso defeated 200 French near Molino del Rey, gained some advantages over one Pelligri, a French miguelette partisan, and captured some French boats at Mattaro after Lacy's departure. However, Sarzfield's mission to raise an army in Aragon had failed, and Decaen desiring to check the reviving spirit of the Catalans made a combined movement against Vich in the latter end of October. Lacy immediately drew Eroles, Manso, and Milans towards that point, and thus the fertile country about Reus was again resigned to the French; the intercourse with the fleet totally lost, and the garrison of Taragona, which had been greatly straitened by the previous operations of Eroles, was relieved. Yet the defence of Vich was not secured, for on the 3rd of November one division of the French forced the main body of the Spaniards, under Lacy and Milans, at the passes of Puig Gracioso and Congosto, and though the other divisions were less successful against Eroles and Manso, at St. Filieu de Codenas, Decaen reached Vich the 4th. The Catalans, who had lost altogether above 500 men, then separated; Lacy went to the hills near Momblanch, Milans and Rovira towards Olot, and Manso to Montserrat.

Eroles returned to Reus, and was like to have surprised the Col de Balaguer, for he sent a detachment under Colonel Villamil, dressed in Italian uniforms, which had been taken by Rovira in Figueras, and his men were actually admitted within the palisade of the fort before the garrison perceived the deceit. A lieutenant with 16 men placed outside were taken, and this loss was magnified so much to Eroles that he ordered Villamil to make a more regular attack. To aid him Codrington brought up the *Blake*, and landed some marines, yet no impression was made on the garrison, and the allies retired on the 17th at the approach of 2000 men sent from Tortoza. Eroles and Manso then vainly united near Manresa to oppose Decaen, who, coming down from Vich, forced his way to Reus, seized a vast quantity of corn, supplied Taragona, and then marched to Barcelona.

These operations indisputably proved that there was no real power of resistance in the Catalan army, but as an absurd notion prevailed that Soult, Suchet, and Joseph were coming with their armies in one body to France, through Catalonia, Lacy endeavoured to cover his inactivity by pretending a design to raise a large force in Aragon, with which to watch this retreat, and to act as a flanking corps to Lord Wellington, who was believed to be then approaching Zaragoza. Such rumours served to amuse the Catalans for a short time, but the sense of their real weakness soon returned. In December Bertoletti, the governor of Taragona, marched upon

Reus, and defeated some hundred men who had reassembled there; and at the same time a French convoy for Barcelona, escorted by 3000 men, passed safely in the face of 6000 Catalan soldiers, who were desirous to attack but were prevented by Lacy.

The anger of the people and of the troops also, on this occasion was loudly expressed, Lacy was openly accused of treachery, and was soon after recalled. However, Eroles who had come to Cape Salou to obtain succour from the squadron for his suffering soldiers, acknowledged that the resources of Catalonia were worn out, the spirit of the people broken by Lacy's misconduct, and the army, reduced to less than 7000 men, naked and famishing. Affairs were so bad, that expecting to be made captain-general, he was reluctant to accept that office, and the regular warfare was in fact extinguished, for Sarzfield was now acting as a partisan on the Ebro. Nevertheless the French were greatly dismayed at the disasters in Russia; their force was weakened by the drafts made to fill up the ranks of Napoleon's new army; and the war of the Partidas continued, especially along the banks of the Ebro, where Sarzfield, at the head of Eroles's ancient division, which he had carried with him out of Catalonia, acted in concert with Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Frayle, Pendencia, and other chiefs, who were busy upon Suchet's communication between Tortosa and Valencia.

Aragon being now unquiet, and Navarre and Biscay in a state of insurrection, the French forces in the interior of Spain were absolutely invested. Their front was opposed by regular armies, their flanks annoyed by British squadrons, and their rear, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, plagued and stung by this chain of Partidas and insurrections. And England was the cause of all this. England was the real deliverer of the Peninsula. It was her succours thrown into Biscay that had excited the new insurrection in the northern provinces, and enabled Mina and the other chiefs to enter Aragon, while Wellington drew the great masses of the French towards Portugal. It was that insurrection, so forced on, which notwithstanding the cessation of the regular warfare in Catalonia, gave life and activity to the Partidas of the south. It was the army from Sicily which, though badly commanded, by occupying the attention of Suchet in front, obliged him to keep his forces together instead of hunting down the bands on his communications. In fine, it was the troops of England who had shocked the enemy's front of battle, the fleets of England which had menaced his flanks with disembarkations, the money and stores of England which had supported the Partidas. Every part of the Peninsula was pervaded by her influence or her warriors, and a trembling sense of insecurity was communicated to the French wherever their armies were not united in masses.

Such then were the various military events of the year 1812, and the English general, taking a view of the whole, judged that however anxious the French might be to invade Portugal, they would be content during the winter to gather provisions and wait for reinforcements from France wherewith to strike a decisive blow at his army. But those reinforcements never came. Napoleon, unconquered of man, had been vanquished by the elements. The fires and the snows of Moscow combined had shattered his strength, and in confessed madness, nations and rulers rejoiced, that an enterprise, at once the grandest, the most provident, the most beneficial, ever attempted by a warrior-statesman, had been foiled: they rejoiced that Napoleon had failed to re-establish unhappy Poland as a barrier against the most formidable and brutal, the most swinish tyranny, that has ever menaced and disgraced European civilization.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

LORD WELLINGTON, exasperated by the conduct of the army and by the many crossings he had experienced during the campaign, had no sooner taken his winter-quarters, than he gave vent to his indignation in a circular letter, addressed to the superior officers, which being ill-received by the army at the time, has been frequently referred to since with angry denunciations of its injustice. In substance it declared, "that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed or ever read of in any army, and this without any disaster, any unusual

privation or hardship save that of inclement weather ; that the officers, had from the first, lost all command over their men, and hence excesses, outrages of all kinds, and inexcusable losses had occurred : that no army had ever made shorter marches in retreat, or had longer rests ; no army had ever been so little pressed by a pursuing enemy, and that the true cause of this unhappy state of affairs was to be found in the habitual neglect of duty by the regimental officers."

These severe reproaches were generally deserved, and only partially unjust ; yet the statements on which they were founded were in some particulars unintentionally inaccurate, especially as regarded the retreat from Salamanca. The marches, though short as to distance, after quitting the Tormes, were long as to time, and it is the time an English soldier bears his burthen, for like the ancient Roman he carries the load of an ass, that crushes his strength. Some regiments had come from Cadiz without halting, and as long garrison duty had weakened their bodies, both their constitutions and their inexperience were too heavily taxed. The line of march from Salamanca was through a flooded and flat clayey country, not much easier to the allies than the marshes of the Arnus were to Hannibal's army ; and mounted officers, as that great general well knew when he placed the Carthaginian cavalry to keep up the Gallic rear, never judge correctly of a foot-soldier's exertions ; they measure his strength by their horses' powers. On this occasion the troops, stepping ankle-deep in clay, mid-leg in water, lost their shoes, and with strained sinews heavily made their way, and withal they had but two rations in five days.

Wellington thought otherwise, for he knew not that the commissariat stores, which he had ordered up, did not arrive regularly because of the extreme fatigue of the animals who carried them ; and those that did arrive were not available for the troops, because as the rear of an army, and especially a retreating army, is at once the birth-place and the recipient of false reports, the subordinate commissaries and conductors of the temporary dépôts, alarmed with rumours that the enemy's cavalry had forestalled the allies on the march, carried off or destroyed the field-stores : hence the soldiers were actually feeding on acorns when their commander supposed them to be in the receipt of good rations. The destruction of the swine may be therefore, in some measure, palliated ; but there is neither palliation nor excuse to be offered for the excesses and outrages committed on the inhabitants, nor for many officers' habitual inattention to their duty, of which the general justly complained. Certainly the most intolerable disorders had marked the retreat, and great part of the sufferings of the army arose from these and previous disorders, for it is too common with soldiers, first to break up the arrangements of their general by want of discipline, and then to complain of the misery which those arrangements were designed to obviate. Nevertheless Wellington's circular was not strictly just, because it excepted none from blame, though in conversation he admitted the reproach did not apply to the light division nor to the guards.

With respect to the former the proof of its discipline was easy, though Wellington had not said so much in its favour ; for how could those troops be upbraided who held together so closely with their colours, that, exclusive of those killed in action, they did not leave 30 men behind. Never did the extraordinary vigour and excellence of their discipline merit praise more than in this retreat. But it seems to be a drawback to the greatness of Lord Wellington's character, that while capable of repressing insubordination, either by firmness or dexterity as the case may require, capable also of magnanimously disregarding, or dangerously resenting injuries, his praises and his censures are bestowed indiscriminately, or so directed as to acquire partisans and personal friends rather than the attachment of the multitude. He did not make the hard-working military crowd feel that their honest unobtrusive exertions were appreciated. In this he differs not from many other great generals and statesmen, but he thereby fails to influence masses, and his genius falls short of that sublime flight by which Hannibal in ancient, and Napoleon in modern, times commanded the admiration of the world. Nevertheless it is only by a comparison with such great men that he can be measured, nor will any slight examination of his exploits suffice to convey a true notion of his intellectual power and resources. Let this campaign be taken as an example.

It must be evident that it in no manner bears out the character of an easy and

triumphant march, which English writers have given to it. Nothing happened according to the original plan. The general's operations were one continual struggle to overcome obstacles, occasioned by the enemy's numbers, the insubordination of his own troops, the slowness, incapacity, and unfaithful conduct of the Spanish commanders, the want of money, and the active folly of the different governments he served. For first his design was to menace the French in Spain so as to bring their forces upon him from other parts, and then to retire into Portugal, again to issue forth when want should cause them to disperse. He was not without hopes indeed to strike a decisive blow, yet he was content, if the occasion came not, to wear out the French by continual marching, and he trusted that the frequent opportunities thus given to the Spaniards would finally urge them to a general effort. But he found his enemy from the first too powerful for him, even without drawing succour from distant parts, and he would have fallen back at once were it not for Marmont's rashness. Nor would the victory of the Arapiles itself have produced any proportionate effect but for the errors of the king, and his rejection of Soult's advice. Those errors caused the evacuation of Andalusia, yet it was only to concentrate an overwhelming force with which the French finally drove the victors back to Portugal.

Again, Wellington designed to finish his campaign in the southern provinces, and circumstances obliged him to remain in the northern provinces. He would have taken Burgos, and he could not; he would have rested longer on the Carrion, and his flanks were turned by the bridges of Palencia and Baños; he would have rested behind the Douro, to profit of his central position, but the bridge at Tordesillas was ravished from him, and the sudden reparation of that at Toro, obliged him to retire. He would have united with Hill on the Adaja, and he could only unite with him behind the Tormes; and on this last river also he desired either to take his winter quarters, or to have delivered a great battle with a view to regain Madrid, and he could do neither. Finally, he endeavoured to make an orderly and an easy retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and his army was like to have dissolved altogether. And yet in all these varying circumstances, his sagacity as to the general course of the war, his promptness in taking advantage of particular opportunities, was conspicuous. These are the distinguishing characteristics of real genius.

Passing over as already sufficiently illustrated that master-stroke, the battle of Salamanca, the reader will do well to mark how this great commander did, after that event, separate the king's army from Marmont's, forcing the one to retreat upon Burgos, and driving the other from Madrid; how he thus broke up the French combinations, so that many weeks were of necessity required to reunite a power capable of disturbing him in the field; he how posted Clinton's division and the Gallicians, to repress any light excursion by the beaten army of Portugal; how, foreseeing Soult's plan to establish a new base of operations in Andalusia, he was prepared, by a sudden descent from Madrid, to drive Soult himself from that province; how promptly, when the siege of Burgos failed, and his combinations were ruined by the fault of others, now promptly, I say, he commenced his retreat, sacrificing all his high-wrought expectation of triumph in a campaign which he burned to finish, and otherwise would have finished, even with more splendour than it had commenced.

If Burgos, a mean fortress of the lowest order, had fallen early, the world would have seen a noble stroke. For the Gallicians, aided by a weak division of Wellington's army, and by the British reinforcements making up from Coruña, would, covered by Burgos, have sufficed to keep the army of Portugal in check, while Popham's armament would have fomented a general insurrection of the northern provinces. Meanwhile Wellington, gathering 45,000 Anglo-Portuguese, and 15,000 Spaniards on the Tagus, would have marched towards Murcia; Ballesteros's army, and the 16,000 men composing the Alicant army, would there have joined him, and with 100,000 soldiers he would have delivered such a battle to the united French armies, if indeed they could have united, as would have shaken all Europe with its martial clangour. To exchange this glorious vision for the cold desolate reality of a dangerous winter retreat, was for Wellington but a momentary mental struggle,

and it was simultaneous with that daring conception, the passage of the bridge of Burgos under the fire of the castle.

Let him be traced now in retreat. Pursued by a superior army, and seeing his cavalry defeated, he turned as a savage lion at the Carrion, nor would he have removed so quickly from that lair, if the bridges at Palencia and Baños had been destroyed according to his order. Neither is his cool self-possession to be overlooked; for when both his flanks were thus exposed, instead of falling back in a hurried manner to the Duero, he judged exactly the value of the rugged ground on the left bank of the Pisuerga, in opposition to the double advantage obtained by the enemy at Palencia and Baños; nor did the difficulty which Souham and Caffarelli, independent commanders, and neither of them accustomed to move large armies, would find in suddenly changing their line of operations escape him. His march to Cabeçon and his position on the left of the Pisuerga was not a retreat, it was the shift of a practised captain.

When forced to withdraw Hill from the Tagus, he, on the instant, formed a new combination to fight that great battle on the Adaja which he had intended to deliver near the Guadalaviar; and though the splendid exploit of Captain Guingret, at Tordesillas, baffled this intent, he in return, baffled Souham by that ready stroke of generalship, the posting of his whole army in front of Rueda, thus forbidding a passage by the restored bridge. Finally, if he could not maintain the line of the Duero, nor that of the Tormes, it was because rivers can never be permanently defended against superior forces, and yet he did not quit the last without a splendid tactical illustration. I mean that surprising movement from the Arapiles to the Valmusa, a movement made not in confusion and half flight, but in close order of battle, his columns ready for action, his artillery and cavalry skirmishing, passing the Junguen without disorder, filing along the front of and winding into the rear of a most powerful French army, the largest ever collected in one mass in the Peninsula, an army having twice as many guns as the allies, and 12,000 able horsemen to boot. And all these great and skilful actions were executed by Lord Wellington, with an army composed of different nations; soldiers, fierce indeed, and valiant, terrible in battle, but characterized by himself, as more deficient in good discipline than any army of which he had ever read!

Men engaged only in civil affairs and especially book-men are apt to undervalue military genius, talking as if simple bravery were the highest qualification of a general; and they have another mode of appeasing an inward sense of inferiority, namely, to attribute the successes of a great captain to the prudence of some discreet adviser, who in secret rules the general, amends his errors, and leaves him all the glory. Thus Napoleon had Berthier, Wellington has Sir George Murray! but in this, the most skilful, if not the most glorious of Wellington's campaigns, Sir George Murray was not present, and the staff of the army was governed by three young lieutenant-colonels—Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Waters, and Delancey; for though Sir Willoughby Gordon joined the army as quarter-master-general after the battle of Salamanca, he was inexperienced, and bodily suffering impeded his personal exertions.

Such then were the principal points of skill displayed by Wellington; yet so vast and intricate an art is war, that the apophthegm of Turenne will always be found applicable: "*he who has made no mistakes in war, has seldom made war.*" Some military writers, amongst them the celebrated Jomini, blame the English general, that with a conquering army, and an insurgent nation at his back, he should in three months after his victory have attempted nothing more than the unsuccessful siege of Burgos. This censure is not entirely unfounded; the king certainly escaped very easily from Madrid; yet there are many points to be argued ere the question can be decided. The want of money, a want progressively increasing, had become almost intolerable. Wellington's army was partly fed from Ciudad Rodrigo, partly from the valley of the Pisuerga, Hill's troops were fed from Lisbon; the Portuguese in their own country, and the Spaniards everywhere lived as the French did, by requisition; but the British professed to avoid that mode of subsistence, and they made it a national boast to all Europe that they did so; the movements of the army were therefore always subservient to this principle, and must be judged accordingly because want of money was with them want of motion.

Now four modes of operation were open to Wellington.

1. *After the victory of Salamanca to follow the king to Valencia, unite with the Alicant army, and, having thus separated Soult from Joseph and Suchet, to act according to events.*

To have thus moved at once, without money, into Valencia or Murcia, new countries where he had no assured connections, and which were scarcely able to feed the French armies, would have exposed him to great difficulties; and he must have made extensive arrangements with the fleet ere he could have acted vigorously, if, as was probable, the French concentrated all their forces behind the Guadalaviar. Meanwhile the distance between the main allied army and those troops necessarily left in the north, being considered, the latter must have been strengthened at the expense of those in the south, unless the army of Portugal joined the king, and then Wellington would have been quite overmatched in Valencia; that is, if Soult also joined the king, and if not he would have placed the English general between two fires. If a force was not left in the north the army of Portugal would have had open field, either to march to the king's assistance by Zaragoza, or to have relieved Astorga, seized Salamanca, recovered the prisoners and the trophies of the Arapiles, and destroyed all the great lines of magazines and depôts even to the Tagus. Moreover, the yellow fever raged in Murcia, and this would have compelled the English general to depend upon the contracted base of operations offered by Alicant, because the advance of Clausel would have rendered it impossible to keep it on the Tagus. Time, therefore, was required to arrange the means of operating in this manner, and meanwhile the army was not unwisely turned another way.

2. *To march directly against Soult in Andalusia.*

This project Wellington was prepared to execute, when the king's orders rendered it unnecessary, but if Joseph had adopted Soult's plan a grand field for the display of military art would have been opened. The king going by the Despenas Peros, and having the advantage of time in the march, could have joined Soult, with the army of the centre, before the English general could have joined Hill. The 60,000 combatants thus united could have kept the field until Suchet had also joined; but they could scarcely have maintained the blockade of Cadiz also, and hence the error of Wellington seems to have been, that he did not make an effort to overtake the king, either upon or beyond the Tagus; for the army of the centre would certainly have joined Soult by the Despenas Peros, if Maitland had not that moment landed at Alicant.

3. *To follow the army of Portugal after the victory of Salamanca.*

The reasons for moving upon Madrid instead of adopting this line of operations having been already shown in former observations, need not be here repeated, yet it may be added that the destruction of the great arsenal and depôt of the Retiro was no small object with reference to the safety of Portugal.

4. *The plan which was actually followed.*

The English general's stay in the capital was unavoidable, seeing that to observe the development of the French operations in the south was of such importance. It only remains therefore to trace him after he quitted Madrid. Now the choice of his line of march by Valladolid certainly appears commonplace, and deficient in vigour, but it was probably decided by the want of money, and of means of transport; to which may be added the desire to bring the Gallicians forward, which he could only attain by putting himself in actual military communication with them, and covering their advance. Yet this will not excuse the feeble pursuit of Clausel's retreating army up the valley of the Pisuerga. The Spaniards would not the less have come up if that general had been defeated, nor would the want of their assistance have been much felt in the action. Considerable loss would, no doubt, have been suffered by the Anglo-Portuguese, and they could ill bear it, but the result of a victory would have amply repaid the damage received; for the time gained by Clausel was employed by Caffarelli to strengthen the castle of Burgos, which contained the greatest French depôt in this part of Spain. A victory therefore would have entirely disarranged the enemy's means of defence in the north, and would have sent the twice-broken and defeated army of Portugal behind the Ebro; then neither the conscript reinforcements, nor

the junction of Caffarelli's troops, would have enabled Clausel, with all his activity and talent, to reappear in the field before Burgos would have fallen. But that fortress would most probably have fallen at once, in which case the English general might have returned to the Tagus, and perhaps in time to have met Soult as he issued forth from the mountains in his march from Andalusia.

It may be objected, that as Burgos did not yield, it would not have yielded under any circumstances without a vigorous defence. This is not so certain, the effect of a defeat would have been very different from the effect of such a splendid operation as Clausel's retreat; and it appears also, that the prolonged defence of the castle may be traced to some errors of detail in the attack, as well as to want of sufficient artillery means. In respect of the great features of the campaign, it may be assumed that Wellington's judgment on the spot, and with a full knowledge both of his own and his adversaries' situations, is of more weight than that of critics, however able and acute, who knew nothing of his difficulties. But in the details there was something of error exceedingly strange. It is said, I believe truly, that Sir Howard Douglas being consulted, objected to the proceeding by gallery and mine against an outward, a middle, and an inward line of defence, as likely to involve a succession of tedious and difficult enterprises, which even if successful, would still leave the White Church, and the upper castle or keep, to be carried;—that this castle, besides other artillery armament, was surmounted by a powerful battery of heavy guns, bearing directly upon the face of the horn-work of San Michael, the only point from which it could be breached, and until it was breached, the governor, a gallant man, would certainly not surrender. It could not however be breached without a larger battering train than the allies possessed, and would not, as he supposed, be effected by mines; wherefore, proposing to take the guns from two frigates, then lying at Santander, he proffered to bring them up in time.

In this reasoning Lord Wellington partly acquiesced, but his hopes of success were principally founded on the scarcity of water in the castle, and upon the facility of burning the provision magazines; nor was he without hope that his fortune would carry him through, even with the scanty means he possessed. Towards the end of the siege, however, he did resort, though too late, to the plan of getting guns up from Santander. But, while Sir Howard Douglas thus counselled him on the spot, Sir Edward Pakenham, then in Madrid, assured the author of this history at the time, that he also, foreseeing the artillery means were too scanty, had proposed to send by the Somosierra 12 fine Russian battering guns, then in the Retiro; and he pledged himself to procure, by an appeal to the officers in the capital, animals sufficient to transport them and their ammunition to Burgos in a few days. The offer was not accepted.

Something also may be objected to the field operations, as connected with the siege; for it is the rule, although not an absolute one, that the enemy's active army should first be beaten, or driven beyond some strong line, such as a river, or chain of mountains, before a siege is commenced. Now if Wellington had masked the castle after the hornwork was carried on the 19th, and had then followed Clausel, the French generals, opposed to him, admit that they would have gone over the Ebro, perhaps even to Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In that case all the minor depôts must have been broken up, and the reorganization of the army of Portugal retarded at least a month; before that time the guns from Santander would have arrived, and the castle of Burgos would have fallen. In Souham's secret despatches, it is said, of course on the authority of spies, that Castaños urged an advance beyond Burgos instead of a siege; of this I know nothing, but it is not unlikely, because to advance continually, and to surround an enemy, constituted, with Spanish generals, the whole art of war. Howbeit on this occasion, the advice, if given, was not unreasonable; and it needed scarcely even to delay the siege while the covering army advanced, because one division of infantry might have come up from Madrid, still leaving two of the finest in the army, and a brigade of cavalry, at that capital, which was sufficient, seeing that Hill was coming up to Toledo, that Ballesteros's disobedience was then unknown, and that the king was in no condition to advance before Soult arrived.

The last point to which it is fitting to advert, was the stopping too long on the Tormes in hopes of fighting in the position of the Arapiles. It was a stirring thought indeed for a great mind, and the error was brilliantly redeemed, but the remedy does not efface the original fault; and this subject leads to a consideration, of some speculative interest, namely, why Wellington, desirous as he was to keep the line of the Tormes, and knowing with what difficulty the French fed their large army, did not order everything in his rear to take refuge in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and entrench himself on St. Christoval and in Salamanca. Thus posted, with a bridge-head on the left bank that he might operate on either side of the Tormes, he might have waited until famine obliged the enemy to separate, which would have been in a very few days; but perhaps the answer would be that the Spaniards had left Ciudad Rodrigo in a defenceless state.

Turning now to the French side we shall find that they also committed errors.

Souham's pursuit after the cavalry combat at Vente de Pozo was feeble. Wellington, speaking of his own army, said, "no troops were ever less pressed by an enemy." The king's orders were however positive not to fight, and as the English general continually offered Souham battle in strong positions, the man had no power to do mischief. Soult's pursuit of Hill, which was also remarkably cautious, arose from other motives. He was not desirous of a battle, and until the Guadarama was passed, Hill had the larger force, for then only was the whole French army united. The Duke of Dalmatia wished to have marched in one great mass through La Mancha, leaving only a small corps, or a detachment of Suchet's army, on the Cuenca road; but the king united the whole of the army of the centre, his own guards, and 7000 men of the army of the south on the Cuenca line, and there were no good cross communications except by Tاراcon. Soult therefore advanced towards the Tagus with only 35,000 men, and from commissariat difficulties and other obstacles, he was obliged to move by divisions, which followed each other at considerable distances; when his advanced guard was at Valdemoro, his rear-guard, not having reached Ocaña, was two marches distant. The danger of this movement is evident. Hill might have turned and driven him over the Tagus; or if his orders had permitted him to act offensively at first, he might, after leaving a small corps on the Upper Tagus to watch the king, have passed that river at Toledo, and without abandoning his line of operations by the valley of the Tagus, have attacked Soult while on the march towards Ocaña. The latter, in despite of his numerous cavalry, must then have fallen back to concentrate his forces, and this would have deranged the whole campaign.

The Duke of Dalmatia, who thought Ballesteros was with Hill, naturally feared to press his adversary under such a vicious disposition of the French army, neither could that disposition be changed during the operation, because of the want of good cross roads, and because Souham had been taught that the king would meet him on the side of Guadalaxara. In fine Soult had learned to respect his adversaries, and with the prudence of a man whose mental grasp embraced the whole machinery of the war, he avoided a doubtful battle where a defeat would, from the unsettled state of the French affairs, have lost the whole Peninsula. Wellington had Portugal to fall back upon, but the French armies must have gone behind the Ebro.

These seem to be the leading points of interest in this campaign, but it will not be uninteresting to mark the close affinities between Wellington's retreat and that of Sir John Moore. This last-named general marched from Portugal into the north of Spain, with the political view of saving Andalusia, by drawing on himself the French power, having beforehand declared that he expected to be overwhelmed. In like manner Wellington moved into the same country, to deliver Andalusia, and thus drew on himself the whole power of the enemy; like Moore declaring also beforehand, that the political object being gained, his own military position would be endangered. Both succeeded, and both were, as they had foretold, overwhelmed by superior forces. Moore was to have been aided by Romana's Spanish army, but he found it a burthen; so also Wellington was impeded, not assisted by the Gallicians, and both generals were without money.

Moore having approached Soult and menaced Burgos, was forced to retreat,

because Napoleon moved from Madrid on his right flank and towards his rear. Wellington having actually besieged Burgos was obliged to raise the siege and retire, lest the king, coming through Madrid, should pass his right flank and get into his rear. Moore was only followed by Soult to the Esla, Wellington was only followed by Souham to the Duero. The one general looked to the mountains of Galicia for positions which he could maintain, but the apathy of the Spanish people in the south permitted Napoleon to bring up such an overwhelming force, that this plan could not be sustained; the other general had the same notion with respect to the Duero, and the defection of Ballesteros enabled the king to bring up such a power that further retreat became necessary.

Moore's soldiers at the commencement of the operations evinced a want of discipline, they committed great excesses at Valderas, and disgraced themselves by their inebriety at Bemibre and Villa Franca. In like manner Wellington's soldiers broke the bonds of discipline, disgraced themselves by drunkenness at Torquemada and on the retreat from the Puente Larga to Madrid; and they committed excesses everywhere. Moore stopped behind the Esla river to check the enemy, to restore order, and to enable his commissariat to remove the stores; Wellington stopped behind the Carrion for exactly the same purposes. The one general was immediately turned on his left, because the bridge of Mancilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceschi; the other general was also turned on his left, because the bridge of Palencia was abandoned unbroken to Foy.

Moore's retreat was little short of 300 miles; Wellington's was nearly as long, and both were in the winter season. The first halted at Benevente, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo; the last halted at Duenas, at Cabeçon, Tordesillas, and Salamanca. The principal loss sustained by the one was in the last marches between Lugo and Coruña; so also the principal loss sustained by the other was in the last marches between the Tormes and the Agueda. Some of Moore's generals murmured against his proceedings, some of Wellington's generals, as we have seen, went further; the first were checked by a reprimand, the second were humbled by a sarcasm. Finally both generals reproached their armies with want of discipline, both attributed it to the negligence of the officers generally, and in both cases the justice of the reproaches was proved by the exceptions. The reserve and the foot-guards in Moore's campaign, the light division and the foot-guards in Wellington's, gave signal proof that it was negligence of discipline, not hardships, though the latter were severe in both armies, that caused the losses. Not that I would be understood to say that those regiments only preserved order; it is certain that many others were eminently well conducted, but those were the troops named as exceptions at the time.

Such were the resemblances of these two retreats. The differences were, that Moore had only 23,000 men in the first part of his retreat, and only 19,000 in the latter part, whereas Wellington had 33,000 in the first part of his retreat, and 68,000 men in the latter part. Moore's army were all of one nation and young soldiers, Wellington's were of different nations but they were veterans. The first marched through mountains, where the weather was infinitely more inclement than in the plains over which the second moved, and until he reached the Esla, Moore's flank was quite exposed, whereas Wellington's flank was covered by Hill's army until he gained the Tormes. Wellington, with veteran troops, was opposed to Souham, to Soult, to the king, and to Jourdan, men not according in their views, and their whole army, when united, did not exceed the allies by more than 20,000 men. Moore, with young soldiers was at first opposed to four times, and latterly to three times his own numbers, for it is remarkable, that the French army assembled at Astorga was above 80,000, including 10,000 cavalry, which is nearly the same as the number assembled against Wellington on the Tormes; but Moore had little more than 20,000 men to oppose to this overwhelming mass, and Wellington had nearly 70,000. The Partidas abounded at the time of Wellington's retreat, they were unknown at the time of Moore's retreat, and this general was confronted by Napoleon, who, despotic in command, was also unrivalled in skill, in genius, and in vigour. Wellington's army was not pressed by the enemy, and he made short marches, yet he lost more stragglers than Moore, who was vigorously pressed, made

long marches, and could only secure an embarkation by delivering a battle, in which he died most honourably. His character was immediately vilified. Wellington was relieved from his pursuers by the operation of famine, and had therefore no occasion to deliver a battle, but he also was vilified at the time, with equal injustice ; and if he had then died it would have been with equal malice. His subsequent successes, his great name and power, have imposed silence upon his detractors, or converted censure into praise, for it is the nature of mankind, especially of the ignorant, to cling to fortune.

Moore attributed his difficulties to the apathy of the Spaniards ; [his friends charged them on the incapacity of the English government. Wellington attributed his ultimate failure to the defection of Ballesteros ; his brother, in the House of Lords, charged it on the previous contracted policy of Perceval's government, which had crippled the general's means ; and certainly Wellington's reasoning, relative to Ballesteros, was not quite sound. That general, he said, might either have forced Soult to take the circuitous route of Valencia, Requena, and Cuenca, or leave a strong corps in observation, and then Hill might have detached men to the north. He even calculated upon Ballesteros being able to stop both Soult and Souham altogether ; for as the latter's operations were prescribed by the king, and dependent upon his proceedings, Wellington judged that he would have remained tranquil if Joseph had not advanced. This was the error. Souham's despatches clearly show that the king's instructions checked instead of forwarding his movements ; * and that it was his intention to have delivered battle at the end of four days, without regard to the king's orders ; and such was his force that Wellington admitted his own inability to keep the field. Ballesteros's defection therefore cannot be pleaded in bar of all further investigation ; but whatever failures there were, and however imposing the height to which the English general's reputation has since attained, this campaign, including the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, the forts of Salamanca, and of Burgos, the assault of Almaraz, and the battle of Salamanca, will probably be considered his finest illustration of the art of war. Waterloo may be called a more glorious exploit, because of the great man who was there vanquished ; Assaye may be deemed a more wonderful action, one indeed to be compared with the victory which Lucullus gained over Tygranes, but Salamanca will always be referred to as the most skilful of Wellington's battles.

* Appendix, No. 8, A.

BOOK XX.

CHAPTER I.

WHILE the armies were striving, the political affairs had become exceedingly complicated and unsteady. Their workings were little known or observed by the public, but the evils of bad government in England, Spain, and Portugal, the incongruous alliance of bigoted aristocracy with awakened democracy, and the inevitable growth of national jealousies as external danger seemed to recede, were becoming so powerful, that if relief had not been obtained from extraneous events, even the vigour of Wellington must have sunk under the pressure. The secret causes of disturbance shall now be laid bare, and it will then be seen that the catastrophe of Napoleon's Russian campaign was absolutely necessary to the final success of the British arms in the Peninsula. I speak not of the physical power which, if his host had not withered on the snowy wastes of Muscovy, the emperor could have poured into Spain, but of those moral obstacles, which springing up on every side, corrupted the very life-blood of the war.

If Russia owed her safety in some degree to the contest in the Peninsula, it is undoubted that the fate of the Peninsula was in return decided on the plains of Russia; for had the French veterans who there perished returned victorious, the war could have been maintained for years in Spain, with all its waste of treasures and of blood, to the absolute ruin of England, even though her army might have been victorious in every battle. Yet who shall say with certainty what termination any war will ever have? Who shall prophesy of an art always varying, and of such intricacy that its secrets seem beyond the reach of human intellect? What vast preparations, what astonishing combinations were involved in the plan, what vigour and ability displayed in the execution of Napoleon's march to Moscow! And yet when the winter came, only four days sooner than he expected, the giant's scheme seemed a thing for children to laugh at!

Nevertheless the political grandeur of that expedition will not be hereafter judged from the wild triumph of his enemies, nor its military merits from the declamation which has hitherto passed as the history of the wondrous, though unfortunate enterprise. It will not be the puerilities of Labaume, of Segur, and their imitators, nor even that splendid military and political essay of General Jomini, called the "*Life of Napoleon*," which posterity will accept as the measure of a general who carried 400,000 men across the Niemen, and 160,000 men to Moscow. And with such a military providence, with such a vigilance, so disposing his reserves, so guarding his flanks, so guiding his masses, that while constantly victorious in front, no post was lost in his rear, no convoy failed, no courier was stopped, not even a letter was missing: the communication with his capital was as regular and certain as if that immense march had been but a summer excursion of pleasure! However, it failed, and its failure was the safety of the Peninsula.

In England the retreat from Burgos was viewed with the alarm and anger which always accompanies the disappointment of high-raised public expectation; the people had been taught to believe the French weak and dispirited, they saw them so strong and daring, that even victory could not enable the allies to make a permanent stand beyond the frontiers of Portugal. Hence arose murmurs, and a growing distrust as to the ultimate result, which would not have failed to overturn the war faction, if the retreat of the French from Moscow, the defection of Prussia, and the strange unlooked-for spectacle of Napoleon vanquished, had not come in happy time as a counterpoise.

When the parliament met, Lord Wellesley undertook, and did, very clearly show,

that if the successes in the early part of the year had not been by his brother pushed to the extent expected, and had been followed by important reverses, the causes were clearly to be traced to the imbecile administration of Mr. Perceval and his coadjutors, whose policy he truly characterized as having in it "*nothing regular but confusion.*" With a very accurate knowledge of facts he discussed the military question, and maintained that 12,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, added to the army in the beginning of the year, would have rendered the campaign decisive, because the Russian contest, the incapacity of Joseph, and the dissensions of the French generals in Spain, had produced the most favourable crisis for striking a vital blow at the enemy's power. The cabinet were aware of this, and in good time, but though there were abundance of soldiers idling at home, when the welfare of the state required their presence in the Peninsula, nay, although the ministers had actually sent within five thousand as many men as were necessary, they had, with the imbecility which marked all their proceedings, so contrived, that few or none should reach the theatre of war until the time for success had passed away. Then touching upon the financial question, with a rude hand he tore to pieces the minister's pitiful pretexts, that the want of specie had necessarily put bounds to their efforts, and that the general himself did not complain. "No!" exclaimed Lord Wellesley, "he does not complain because it is the sacred duty of a soldier not to complain. But he does not say that with greater means he could not do greater things, and his country will not be satisfied if these means are withheld by men, who having assumed the direction of affairs in such a crisis have only incapacity to plead in extenuation of their failures."

This stern accuser was himself fresh from the ministry, versed in state matters, and of unquestionable talents; he was well acquainted with the actual resources and difficulties of the moment; he was sincere in his opinions because he had abandoned office rather than be a party to such a miserable mismanagement of England's power; he was in fine no mean authority against his former colleagues, even though the facts did not so clearly bear him out in his views.

That England possessed the troops, and that they were wanted by Wellington, is undeniable. Even in September there were still between 50,000 and 60,000 soldiers present under arms at home, and that any additional force could have been fed in Portugal is equally beyond doubt, because the reserve magazines contained provisions for 100,000 men for nine months. The only question then was the possibility of procuring enough of specie to purchase those supplies which could not be had on credit. Lord Wellington had indeed made the campaign almost without specie, and a small additional force would certainly not have overwhelmed his resources; but setting this argument aside, what efforts, what ability, what order, what arrangements were made by the government to overcome the difficulties of the time? Was there less extravagance in the public offices, the public works, public salaries, public contracts? The very snuff-boxes and services of plate given to diplomatists, the gorgeous furniture of palaces, nay, the gaudy trappings wasted on Whittingham's, Roche's, and Downie's divisions, would almost have furnished the wants of the additional troops demanded by Wellesley. Where were all the millions lavished in subsidies to the Spaniards, where the millions which South America had transmitted to Cadiz, where those sums spent by the soldiers during the war? Real money had indeed nearly disappeared from England, and a base paper had usurped its place; but gold had not disappeared from the world, and an able ministry would have found it. These men only knew how to squander.

The subsidy granted to Portugal was paid by the commercial speculation of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, speculations which also fed the army, saved the whole population of Portugal from famine, and prevented the war from stopping in 1811; and yet so little were the ministers capable even of understanding, much less of making such arrangements, that they now rebuked their general for having adopted them and after their own imbecile manner insisted upon a new mode of providing supplies. Every movement they made proved their incapacity. They had permitted Lord William Bentinck to engage in the scheme of invading Italy, when additional troops were wanted in Portugal; and they suffered him to bid in the money-market against Lord Wellington, and thus sweep away two millions of

dollars at an exorbitant premium, for a chimera, when the war in the Peninsula was upon the point of stopping altogether in default of that very money which Wellington could have otherwise procured—nay, had actually been promised at a reasonable cost. Nor was this the full measure of their folly.

Lord Wellesley affirmed, and they were unable to deny the fact, that dollars might have been obtained from South America to any amount, if the government would have consented to pay the market-price for them; they would not do it, and yet afterwards sought to purchase the same dollars at a higher rate in the European markets. He told them, and they could not deny it, that they had empowered five different agents to purchase dollars for five different services, without any controlling head; that these independent agents were bidding against each other in every money-market, and the restrictions as to the price were exactly in the inverse proportion to the importance of the service: the agent for the troops in Malta was permitted to offer the highest price, Lord Wellington was restricted to the lowest. And besides this folly Lord Wellesley showed that they had, under their licensing system, permitted French vessels to bring French goods, silks and gloves, to England and to carry bullion away in return. Napoleon thus paid his army in Spain with the very coin which should have subsisted the English troops.

Incapable, however, as the ministers were of making the simplest arrangement; neglecting, as they did, the most obvious means of supplying the wants of the army; incapable even, as we have seen, of sending out a few bales of clothing and arms for the Spaniards without producing the utmost confusion, they were heedless of the counsels of their general, prompt to listen to every intriguing adviser, and ready to plunge into the most absurd and complicated measures, to relieve that distress which their own want of ability had produced. When the war with the United States broke out, a war provoked by themselves, they suffered the Admiralty, contrary to the wishes of Mr. Stuart, to reduce the naval force at Lisbon, and to neglect Wellington's express recommendation as to the stationing of ships for the protection of the merchantmen bringing flour and stores to Portugal. Thus the American privateers, being unmolested, run down the coast of Africa, intercepted the provision trade from the Brazils, which was one of the principal resources of the army, and then, emboldened by impunity, infested the coast of Portugal, captured 14 ships loaded with flour off the Douro, and a large vessel in the very mouth of the Tagus. These things happened also when the ministers were censuring and interfering with the general's commercial transactions, and seeking to throw the feeding of his soldiers into the hands of British speculators; as if the supply of an army was like that of a common market! never considering that they thus made it the merchant's interest to starve the troops with a view to increase profits; never considering that it was by that very commerce, which they were putting an end to, that the general had paid the Portuguese subsidy for them and had furnished his own military chest with specie, when their administrative capacity was quite unequal to their task.

Never was a government better served than the British government was by Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart. With abilities, vigilance, and industry seldom equalled, they had made themselves masters of all that related to the Portuguese policy, whether foreign or domestic, military, or civil, or judicial. They knew all the causes of mischief, they had faithfully represented them both to the Portuguese and British governments, and had moreover devised effectual remedies. But the former met them with the most vexatious opposition, and the latter, neglecting their advice, lent themselves to those foolish financial schemes which I have before touched upon as emanating from Mr. Villiers, Mr. Vansittart, and the Count of Funchal. The first had been deficient as an ambassador and statesman, the second was universally derided as a financier, and the third, from his long residence in London, knew very little of the state of Portugal, had derived that little from the information of his brother, the restless Principal Souza, and in all his schemes had reference only to his own intrigues in the Brazils. Their plans were necessarily absurd. Funchal revived the old project of an English loan, and in concert with his coadjutors desired to establish a bank after the manner of the English institution; and they likewise advanced a number of minor details and propositions, most

of which had been before suggested by Principal Souza and rejected by Lord Wellington, and all of which went to evade, not to remedy the evils. Finally they devised, and the English cabinet actually entertained the plan, of selling the crown and church property of Portugal. This spoliation of the Catholic church was to be effected by commissioners, one of whom was to be Mr. Sydenham, an Englishman and a Protestant; and as it was judged that the pope would not readily yield his consent, they resolved to apply to his nuncio, who being in their power they expected to find more pliable.

Having thus provided for the financial difficulties of Portugal, the ministers turned their attention to the supply of the British army, and in the same spirit concocted what they called a modified system of requisitions after the manner of the French armies! Their speeches, their manifestoes, their whole scheme of policy, which in the working had nearly crushed the liberties of England and had plunged the whole world into war; that policy whose aim and scope was, they said, to support established religion, the rights of monarchs, and the independence of nations, was now disregarded or forgotten. Yes, these men, to remove difficulties caused by their own incapacity and negligence, were ready to adopt all that they had before condemned and reviled in the French; they were eager to meddle, and in the most offensive manner, with the Catholic religion, by getting from the nuncio, who was in their power, what they could not get from the pope voluntarily; they were ready to interfere with the rights of the Portuguese crown by selling its property, and finally they would have adopted that system of requisitions which they had so often denounced as rendering the very name of France abhorrent to the world.

All these schemes were duly transmitted to Lord Wellington and to Mr. Stuart, and the former had, in the field, to unravel the intricacies, to detect the fallacies, and to combat the wild speculations of men, who, in profound ignorance of facts, were giving a loose to their imaginations on such complicated questions of state. It was while preparing to fight Marmont that he had to expose the futility of relying upon a loan; it was on the heights of San Christoval, on the field of battle itself, that he demonstrated the absurdity of attempting to establish a Portuguese bank; it was in the trenches of Burgos that he dissected Funchal's and Villier's schemes of finance, and exposed the folly of attempting the sale of church property; it was at the termination of the retreat that with a mixture of rebuke and reasoning he quelled the proposal to live by forced requisitions; and on each occasion he showed himself as well acquainted with these subjects as he was with the mechanism of armies.

Reform abuses, raise your actual taxes with vigour and impartiality, pay your present debt before you contract a new one, was his constant reply to the propositions for loans. And when the English ministers pressed the other plans, which, besides the bank, included a recoinage of dollars into crusados, in other words the depreciation of the silver standard, he with an unsparing hand laid their folly bare. The military and political state of Portugal he said was such that no man in his senses, whether native or foreigner, would place his capital where he could not withdraw it at a moment's notice. When Massena invaded that country unreasonable despondency had prevailed amongst the ministers, and now they seemed to have a confidence as wild as their former fear; but he who knew the real state of affairs; he who knew the persons that were expected to advance money; he who knew the relative forces of the contending armies, the advantages and disadvantages attending each; he who knew the absolute weakness of the Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, could only laugh at the notion that the capitalists would take gold out of their own chests to lodge it in the chests of the bank and eventually in those of the Portuguese treasury, a treasury deservedly without credit. The French armies opposed to him in the field (he was then on San Christoval) were, he said, just double his own strength, and a serious accident to Ballesteros, a rash general with a bad army, would oblige the Anglo-Portuguese force to retire into Portugal, and the prospects of the campaign would vanish; and this argument left out of the question any accident which might happen to himself or General Hill. Portugal would, he hoped, be saved, but its security was not such as these visionaries would represent it.

But they had proposed also a British security, in jewels, for the capital of their bank, and their reasonings on this head were equally fallacious. This security was to be supported by collecting the duties on wines exported from Portugal to England, and yet they had not even ascertained whether the existence of these duties was conformable to the treaty with England. Then came the former question. Would Great Britain guarantee the capital of the subscribers whether Portugal was lost or saved? If the country should be lost, the new possessors would understand the levying the duties upon wines as well as the old; would England make her drinkers of port pay two duties, the one for the benefit of the bank capitalists, the other for the benefit of the French conquerors? If all these difficulties could be got over, a bank would be the most efficacious mode in which England could use her credit for the benefit of Portugal; but all the other plans proposed were mere spendthrift schemes to defray the expenses of the war, and if the English government could descend to entertain them they would fail, because the real obstacle, scarcity of specie, would remain.

A nation desirous of establishing public credit should begin, he said, by acquiring a revenue equal to its fixed expenditure, and must manifest an inclination to be honest by performing its engagements with respect to public debts. This maxim he had constantly enforced to the Portuguese government, and if they had minded it, instead of trusting to the fallacious hope of getting loans in England, the deficiency of their revenue would have been made up without imposing new taxes, and even with the repeal of many which were oppressive and unjust. The fair and honest collection of taxes which ought to exist would have been sufficient. For after protracted and unsparing exertions, and by refusing to accept their paper-money on any other condition in his commissariat transactions, he had at last forced the Portuguese authorities to pay the interest of that paper and of their exchequer bills, called "*Apolocias grandes*," and the effect had been to increase the resources of the government, though the government had even in the execution evinced its corruption. Then showing in detail how this benefit had been produced, he traced the mischief created by men whom he called the *sharks* of Lisbon and other great towns, meaning speculators, principally Englishmen, whose nefarious cupidity led them to cry down the credit of the army-bills, and then purchase them, to the injury of the public and of the poor people who furnished the supplies.

A plan of recoining the Spanish dollars, and so gaining eight in the hundred of pure silver which they contained above that of the Portuguese crusado, he treated as a fraud, and a useless one. In Lisbon, where the crusado was current, some gain might perhaps be made; but it was not even there certain; and foreigners, Englishmen and Americans, from whom the great supplies were purchased, would immediately add to their prices in proportion to the deterioration of the coin. Moreover the operations and expenditure of the army were not confined to Lisbon, nor even to Portugal, and the crusado would not pass for its nominal value in Spain; thus instead of an advantage, the greatest inconvenience would result from a scheme at the best unworthy of the British government. In fine the reform of abuses, the discontinuance of useless expenses, economy, and energy were the only remedies.

Such was his reasoning, but it had little effect on his persecutors; for when his best men were falling by hundreds, his brightest visions of glory fading on the smoky walls of Burgos, he was again forced to examine and refute anew, voluminous plans of Portuguese finance, concocted by Funchal and Villiers, with notes by Vansittart. All the old schemes of the Principal Souza, which had been so often before analyzed and rejected as impracticable, were revived, with the addition of a mixed Anglo-Portuguese commission for the sale of the crown and church lands. And these projects were accompanied with complaints that frauds had been practised on the custom-house, and violence used towards the inhabitants by the British commissaries, and it was insinuated such misconduct had been the real cause of the financial distresses of Portugal. The patient industry of genius was never more severely taxed.

Wellington began by repelling the charges of exactions and frauds, as applied to the army; he showed that to reform the custom-house so as to prevent frauds,

had been his unceasing recommendation to the Portuguese government; that he had as repeatedly, and in detail, showed the government how to remedy the evils they complained of, how to increase their customs, how to levy their taxes, how in fine to arrange their whole financial system in a manner that would have rendered their revenues equal to their expenses, and without that oppression and injustice which they were in the habit of practising; for the extortions and violence complained of were not perpetrated by the English but by the Portuguese commissariat, and yet the troops of that nation were starving. Having exposed Funchal's ignorance of financial facts in detail, and challenged him to the proof of the charges against the British army, he entered deeply into the consideration of the great question of the sale of the crown and church lands, which it had been proposed to substitute for that economy and reform of abuses which he so long, so often, and so vainly had pressed upon the regency. The proposal was not quite new. "I have already," he observed, "had before me a proposition for the sale or rather transfer, to the creditors of the '*Junta de Viveres*' of crown lands; but these were the uncultivated lands in Alemtejo, and I pointed out to the government the great improbability that anybody would take such lands in payment, and the injury that would be done to the public credit by making the scheme public if not likely to be successful. My opinion is that there is nobody in Portugal possessed of capital who entertains, or who ought to entertain, such an opinion of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, as to lay out his money in the purchase of crown lands. The loss of a battle, not in the Peninsula even, but elsewhere, would expose his estate to confiscation, or at all events to ruin, by a fresh incursion of the enemy. Even if any man could believe that Portugal is secure against the invasion of the enemy, and his estate and person against the '*violence, exactions, and frauds*' (these were Funchal's words respecting the allied army) of the enemy, he is not, during the existence of the war, according to the Conde de Funchal's notion, exempt from those evils from his own countrymen and their allies. Try this experiment, offer the estates of the crown for sale, and it will be seen whether I have formed a correct judgment on this subject." Then running with a rapid hand over many minor though intricate fallacies for raising the value of the Portuguese paper-money, he thus treated the great question of the church lands.

First, as in the case of crown lands, there would be no purchasers, and as nothing could render the measure palatable to the clergy, the influence of the church would be exerted against the allies, instead of being, as hitherto, strongly exerted in their favour. It would be useless if the experiment of the crown lands succeeded, and if that failed the sale of church lands could not succeed; but the attempt would alienate the good wishes of a very powerful party in Spain, as well as in Portugal. Moreover, if it should succeed, and be honestly carried into execution, it would entail a burthen on the finances of five in the hundred, on the purchase-money, for the support of the ecclesiastical owners of the estates. The best mode of obtaining for the state eventually the benefit of the church property, would be to prevent the monasteries and nunneries from receiving novices, and thus, in the course of time, the pope might be brought to consent to the sale of the estates, or the nation might assume possession when the ecclesiastical corporations thus became extinct. He however thought that it was no disadvantage to Spain or Portugal, that large portions of land should be held by the church. The bishops and monks were the only proprietors who lived on their estates, and spent the revenues amongst the labourers by whom those revenues had been produced; and until the habits of the new landed proprietors changed, the transfer of the property in land from the clergy to the laymen would be a misfortune.

This memoir, sent from the trenches of Burgos, quashed Funchal's projects; but that intriguer's object was not so much to remove financial difficulties, as to get rid of his brother's opponents in the regency by exciting powerful interests against them; wherefore failing in this proposal, he ordered Redondo, now Marquis of Borba, the minister of finance, to repair to the Brazils, intending to supply his place with one of his own faction. Wellington and Stuart were at this time doggedly opposed by Borba, but as the credit of the Portuguese treasury was supported by his character for probity, they forbade him to obey the order, and

represented the matter so forcibly to the prince regent, that Funchal was severely reprimanded for his audacity.

It was amidst these vexations that Wellington made his retreat, and in such destitution that he declared all former distress for money had been slight in comparison of his present misery. So low were the resources, that British naval stores had been trucked for corn in Egypt; and the English ministers, finding that Russia, intent upon pushing her successes, was gathering specie from all quarters, desired Mr. Stuart to prevent the English and American captains of merchant vessels from carrying coin away from Lisbon; a remedial measure indicating their total ignorance of the nature of commerce. It was not attempted to be enforced. Then also they transmitted their plan of supplying the English army by requisitions on the country, a plan the particulars of which may be best gathered from the answers to it.

Mr. Stuart, firm in opposition, shortly observed that it was by avoiding and reprobating such a system, although pursued alike by the natives and by the enemy, that the British character and credit had been established so firmly as to be of the greatest use in the operations of the war. Wellington entered more deeply into the subject.

Nothing, he said, could be procured from the country in the mode proposed by the ministers' memoir, unless resort was also had to the French mode of enforcing their requisitions. The proceedings of the French armies were misunderstood. It was not true, as supposed in the memoir, that the French never paid for supplies. They levied contributions where money was to be had, and with this paid for provisions in other parts; and when requisitions for money or clothing were made, they were taken on account of the regular contributions due to the government. They were indeed heavier than even a usurping government was entitled to demand, still it was a regular government account, and it was obvious the British army could not have recourse to a similar plan without depriving its allies of their own legitimate resources.

The requisitions were enforced by a system of terror. A magistrate was ordered to provide for the troops, and was told that the latter would, in case of failure, take the provisions and punish the village or district in a variety of ways. Now, were it expedient to follow this mode of requisition, there must be two armies, one to fight the enemy and one to enforce the requisitions, for the Spaniards would never submit to such proceedings without the use of force. The conscription gave the French armies a more moral description of soldiers, but even if this second army was provided, the British troops could not be trusted to inflict an exact measure of punishment on a disobedient village, they would plunder it as well as the others readily enough, but their principal object would be to get at and drink as much liquor as they could, and then to destroy as much valuable property as should fall in their way; meanwhile the objects of their mission, the bringing of supplies to the army and the infliction of an exact measure of punishment on the magistrates or district would not be accomplished at all. Moreover the holders of supplies in Spain being unused to commercial habits would regard payment for these requisitions by bills of any description to be rather worse than the mode of contribution followed by the French, and would resist it as forcibly. And upon such a nice point did the war hang, that if they accepted the bills, and were once to discover the mode of procuring cash for them by discounting high, it would be the most fatal blow possible to the credit and resources of the British army in the Peninsula. The war would then soon cease.

The memoir asserted that Sir John Moore had been well furnished with money, and that nevertheless the Spaniards would not give him provisions; and this fact was urged as an argument for enforcing requisitions. But the assertion that Moore was furnished with money, which was itself the index to the ministers' incapacity, Wellington told them was not true. "Moore," he said, "had been even worse furnished than himself; that general had borrowed a little, a very little money at Salamanca, but he had no regular supply for the military chest until the army had nearly reached Coruña; and the Spaniards were not very wrong in their reluctance to meet his wants, for the debts of his army were still unpaid in the latter end of

1812." In fine there was no mode by which supplies could be procured from the country without payment on the spot, or soon after the transaction, except by prevailing on the Spanish government to give the English army a part of the government contributions, and a part of the revenues of the royal domains, to be received from the people in kind at a reasonable rate. This had been already done by himself in the province of Salamanca with success, and the same system might be extended to other provinces in proportion as the legitimate government was re-established. But this only met a part of the evil, it would indeed give some supplies, cheaper than they could otherwise be procured, yet they must afterwards be paid for at Cadiz in specie, and thus less money would come into the military chest, which, as before noticed, was only supported by the mercantile speculations of the general.

Such were the discussions forced upon Wellington when all his faculties were demanded on the field of battle, and such was the hardness of his intellect to sustain the additional labour. Such also were the men calling themselves statesmen who then wielded the vast resources of Great Britain. The expenditure of that country for the year 1812 was above £100,000,000, the ministers who controlled it were yet so ignorant of the elementary principles of finance, as to throw upon their general, even amidst the clangour and tumult of battle, the task of exposing such fallacies. And to reduce these persons from the magnitude of statesmen to their natural smallness of intriguing debaters is called political prejudice! But though power may enable men to trample upon reason for a time with impunity, they cannot escape her ultimate vengeance, she reassumes her sway, and history delivers them to the justice of posterity.

Perverse as the proceedings of the English ministers were, those of the Portuguese and Spanish governments were not less vexatious; and at this time the temper of the Spanish rulers was of infinite importance because of the misfortunes which had befallen the French emperor. The opportunity given to strike a decisive blow at his power in the Peninsula demanded an early and vigorous campaign in Spain, and the experience of 1812 had taught Wellington, that no aid could be derived from the Spaniards unless a change was made in their military system. Hence the moment he was assured that the French armies had taken winter-quarters, he resolved before all other matters, in person to urge upon the Cortes the necessity of giving him the real as well as the nominal command of their troops, seeing that without an immediate reformation the Spanish armies could not take the field in due season.

During the past campaign, and especially after the Conde de Abisbal, indignant at the censure passed in the Cortes on his brother's conduct at Castalla, had resigned, the weakness of the Spanish government had become daily more deplorable; nothing was done to ameliorate the military system; an extreme jealousy raged between the Cortes and the regency; and when the former offered Lord Wellington the command of their armies, Mr. Wellesley advised him to accept it, not so much in the hope of effecting any beneficial change, as to offer a point upon which the Spaniards, who were still true to the English alliance and to the aristocratic cause, might rally in case of reverse. The disobedience of Ballesteros had been indeed promptly punished; but the vigour of the Cortes on that occasion was more the result of offended pride than any consideration of sound policy; and the retreat of the allies into Portugal was the signal for a renewal of those dangerous intrigues which the battle of Salamanca had arrested without crushing.

Lord Wellington reached Cadiz on the 18th of December, he was received without enthusiasm, yet with due honour, and his presence seemed agreeable both to the Cortes and to the people; the passions which actuated the different parties in the state subsided for the moment, and the ascendancy of his genius was so strongly felt, that he was heard with patience, even when in private he strongly urged the leading men to turn their attention entirely to the war, to place in abeyance their factious disputes, and above all things not to put down the inquisition lest they should drive the powerful church party into the arms of the enemy. His exhortation upon this last point, had indeed no effect save to encourage the

Serviles to look more to England; yet it did not prevent the Cortes yielding to him the entire control of 50,000 men, which were to be paid from the English subsidy; they promised also that the commanders should not be removed, nor any change made in the organization or destination of such troops without his consent.

A fresh organization of the Spanish forces now had place. They were divided into four armies and two reserves.

The Catalans formed the first army.

Elio's troops, including the divisions of Duran, Bassecour, and Villa Campa, received the name of the second army.

The forces in the Morena, formerly under Ballesteros, were constituted the third army, under Del Parque.

The troops of Estremadura, Leon, Galicia, and the Asturias, including Morillo's, Penne Villemur's, Downie's, and Carlos d'Espana's separate divisions, were called the fourth army, and given to Castaños, whose appointment to Catalonia was cancelled, and his former dignity of captain-general in Estremadura and Galicia restored. The Partidas of Longa, Mina, Porlier, and the other chiefs in the northern provinces, were afterwards united to this army as separate divisions.

The Conde d'Abispa, made captain-general of Adalusia, commanded the first reserve, and Lacy recalled from Catalonia, where he was replaced by Copons, was ordered to form a second reserve in the neighbourhood of San Roque. Such were the new dispositions, but when Wellington had completed this important negotiation with the Spanish government some inactivity was for the first time discovered in his own proceedings. His stay was a little prolonged without apparent reason, and it was whispered that if he resembled Cæsar, Cadiz could produce a Cleopatra; but whether true or not, he soon returned to the army, first however visiting Lisbon, where he was greeted with extraordinary honours and the most unbounded enthusiasm, especially by the people.

His departure from Cadiz was the signal for all the political dissensions to break out with more violence than before; the dissensions of the liberals and serviles became more rancorous, and the executive was always on the side of the latter, the majority of the Cortes on the side of the former; neither enjoyed the confidence of the people nor of the allies, and the intrigues of Carlotta, which never ceased, advanced towards their completion. A strong inclination to make her sole regent was manifested, and Sir Henry Wellesley, tired of fruitless opposition, remained neuter, with the approbation of his brother. One of the principal causes of this feeling for Carlotta was the violence she had shown against the insurgents of Buenos Ayres, and another was the disgust given to the merchants of Cadiz by certain diplomatic measures which Lord Strangford had held with that revolted state. The agents of the princess represented the policy of England towards the Spanish colonies as a smuggling policy, and not without truth, for the advice of Lord Wellington upon that subject had been unheeded. Lord Castlereagh had indeed offered a new mediation scheme, whereby the old commission was to proceed under the Spanish restriction of not touching at Mexico, to which country a new mission composed of Spaniards was to proceed, accompanied by an English agent, without any ostensible character. This proposal however ended as the others had done, and the Spanish jealousy of England increased.

In the beginning of the year 1813, Carlotta's cause, ably and diligently served by Pedro Souza, had gained a number of adherents even amongst the liberals in the Cortes. She was ready to sacrifice even the rights of her posterity, and as she promised to maintain all ancient abuses, the clergy and the serviles were in no manner averse to her success. Meanwhile the decree to abolish the inquisition, which was become the great test of political party, passed on the 7th of March, and the regency were ordered to have it read in the churches. The clergy of Cadiz resisted the order, and intimated their refusal through the medium of a public letter, and the regency encouraged them by removing the governor of Cadiz, Admiral Valdez, a known liberal and opponent of the inquisition, appointing in his stead General Alos, a warm advocate for that horrid institution. But in the

vindication of official power the Spaniards are generally prompt and decided. On the 8th Augustin Arguelles moved, and it was instantly carried, that the sessions of the extraordinary Cortes should be declared permanent, with a view to measures worthy of the nation, and to prevent the evils with which the state was menaced by the opposition of the regency and the clergy to the Cortes. A decree was then proposed for suppressing the actual regency, and replacing it with a provisional government to be composed of the three eldest councillors of state. This being conformable to the constitution was carried by a majority of 86 to 58, while another proposition, that two members of the Cortes, publicly elected, should be added to the regency, was rejected as an innovation by 72 against 66. The councillors Pedro Agar, Gabriel Ciscar, and the Cardinal Bourbon, Archbishop of Toledo, were immediately installed as regents.

A committee which had been appointed to consider of the best means of improving a system of government felt by all parties to be imperfect, now recommended that the cardinal archbishop, who was of the blood royal, should be president of the regency, leaving Carlotta's claims unnoticed, and as Ciscar and Agar had been formerly removed from the regency for incapacity, it was generally supposed that the intention was to make the archbishop in fact sole regent. Very soon however Carlotta's influence was again felt, for a dispute having arisen in the Cortes between what were called the Americans and the Liberals, about the annual Acapulco-ship, the former to the number of 20 joined the party of the princess, and it was resolved that Rueiz Pedron, a distinguished opponent of the inquisition, should propose her as the head of the regency. They were almost sure of a majority when the scheme transpired, and the people, who liked her not, became so furious that her partisans were afraid to speak. Then the opposite side, fearing her power, proposed on the instant that the provisional regency should be made permanent, which was carried. Thus, chance rather than choice ruling, an old prelate and two imbecile councillors were entrusted with the government, and the intrigues and rancour of the different parties exploded more frequently as the pressure from above became slight.

More than all others the clergy were, as might be expected, violent and daring, yet the Cortes was not to be frightened. Four canons of the cathedrals were arrested in May, and orders were issued to arrest the archbishop of St. Jago and many bishops, because of a pastoral letter they had published against the abolition of the inquisition; for according to the habits of their craft of all sects, they deemed religion trampled under foot when the power of levying money and spilling blood was denied to ministers professing the faith of Christ. Nor amidst these broils did the English influence fail to suffer; the democratic spirit advanced hastily, the Cadiz press teemed with writings, intended to excite the people against the ultimate designs of the English cabinet, and every effort was made to raise a hatred of the British general and his troops. These efforts were not founded entirely on falsehoods, and were far from being unsuccessful, because the eager desire to preserve the inquisition displayed by Lord Wellington and his brother, although arising from military considerations, was too much in accord with the known tendency of the English cabinet's policy, not to excite the suspicions of the whole liberal party.

The bishops of Logroño, Mondonedo, Astorga, Lugo, and Salamanca, and the archbishop of St. Jago were arrested, but several bishops escaped into Portugal, and were there protected as martyrs to the cause of legitimacy and despotism. The bishop of Orense and the ex-regent Lardizabal had before fled, the latter to Algarve, the former to the Tras Os Montes, from whence he kept up an active intercourse with Galicia, and the Cortes were far from popular there; indeed the flight of the bishops created great irritation in every part of Spain, for the liberal party of the Cortes was stronger in the Isla than in other parts, and by a curious anomaly the officers and soldiers all over Spain were generally their partisans, while the people were generally the partisans of the clergy. Nevertheless the seeds of freedom, though carelessly sown by the French on one side, and by the Cortes on the other, took deep root, and have since sprung up into strong plants in due time to burgeon and bear fruit.

When the bishops fled from Spain, Gravina, the pope's nuncio, assumed such

a tone of hostility, that notwithstanding the good offices of Sir Henry Wellesley, which were for some time successful in screening him from the vengeance of the Cortes, the latter, encouraged by the English newspapers, finally dismissed him and sequestered his benefices. He also took refuge in Portugal, and like the rest of the expelled clergy, sought by all means to render the proceedings of the Cortes odious in Spain. He formed a strict alliance with the Portuguese nuncio, Vicente Machiechi, and working together with great activity, they interfered, not with the concerns of Spain only, but with the Catholics in the British army, and even extended their intrigues to Ireland. Hence, as just and honest government had never formed any part of the English policy towards that country, alarm pervaded the cabinet, and the nuncio, protected when opposed to the Cortes, was now considered a very troublesome and indiscreet person.

Such a state of feud could not last long without producing a crisis, and one of a most formidable and decisive nature was really at hand. Already many persons in the Cortes held secret intercourse with Joseph, in the view of acknowledging his dynasty, on condition that he would accede to the general policy of the Cortes in civil government; that monarch had as we have seen organized a large native force, and the coasts of Spain and Portugal swarmed with French privateers manned with Spanish seamen. The victory at Salamanca had withered these resources for the moment, but Wellington's failure at Burgos and retreat into Portugal again revived them, and at the same time gave a heavy shock to public confidence in the power of England, a shock which nothing but the misfortunes of Napoleon in Russia could have prevented from being fatal.

The emperor indeed, with that wonderful intellectual activity and energy which made him the foremost man of the world, had raised a fresh army and prepared once more to march into the heart of Germany; yet to do this he was forced to withdraw such numbers of old soldiers from Spain that the French army could no longer hope permanently to act on the offensive. This stayed the Peninsula cause upon the very brink of a precipice, for in that very curious, useful, and authentic work, called "*Bourrienne and his Errors*," it appears that early in 1813, the ever factious Conde de Montijo, then a general in Elío's army, had secretly made proposals to pass over, with the forces under his command, to the king; and soon afterwards the whole army of Del Parque, having advanced into La Mancha, made offers of the same nature.

They were actually in negotiation with Joseph when the emperor's orders obliged the French army to abandon Madrid and take up the line of the Duero. Then the Spaniards, advertised of the French weakness, feared to continue their negotiations; Wellington soon afterwards advanced, and as this feeling in favour of the intrusive monarch was certainly not general, the resistance to the invaders revived with the successes of the British general. But if instead of diminishing his forces Napoleon, victorious in Russia, had strengthened them, this defection would certainly have taken place, and would probably have been followed by others. The king at the head of a Spanish army would then have reconquered Andalusia, Wellington would have been confined to the defence of Portugal, and it is scarcely to be supposed that England would have purchased the independence of that country with her own permanent ruin.

This conspiracy is not related by me with entire confidence, because no trace of the transaction is to be found in the correspondence of the king taken at Vittoria. Nevertheless there are abundant proofs that the work called "*Bourrienne and his Errors*," inasmuch as it relates to Joseph's transactions in Spain, is accurately compiled from that monarch's correspondence. Many of his papers taken at Vittoria were lost or abstracted at the time, and as in a case involving so many persons' lives he would probably have destroyed the proofs of a conspiracy which had failed, there seems little reason to doubt that the general fact is correct. Napoleon also in his memoirs, speaks of secret negotiations with the Cortes about this time, and his testimony is corroborated by the correspondence of the British embassy at Cadiz, and by the continued intrigues against the British influence. The next chapter will show that the policy of Spain was not the only source of uneasiness to Lord Wellington.

CHAPTER II.

NOTHING could be more complicated than the political state of Portugal with reference to the situation of the English general. His object, as I have repeatedly shown, was to bring the whole resources of the country to bear on the war, but to effect this he had to run counter to the habits and customs, both of the people and of the government ; to detect the intrigues of the subordinate authorities as well as those of the higher powers ; to oppose the violence of factious men in the local government, and what was still more difficult, to stimulate the sluggish apathy and to combat the often honest obstinacy of those who were not factious. These things he was to effect without the power of recompensing or chastising, and even while forced to support those who merited rebuke, against the still more formidable intriguers of the court of Brazil ; for the best men of Portugal actually formed the local government, and he was not foiled so much by the men as by the sluggish system which was national, and, although dull for good purposes, vivacious enough for mischief. The dread of ultimate personal consequences attached not to neglect of the war but to any vigorous exertions in support of it.

The proceedings of the court of Rio Janeiro were not less mischievous, for there the personal intrigues fostered by the peculiar disposition of the English envoy, by the weak yet dogged habits of the prince, and by the meddling nature and violent passions of the Princess Carlotta, stifled all great national views. There also the power of the Souza's, a family deficient neither in activity nor in talent, was predominant, and the object of all was to stimulate the government in Portugal against the English general's military policy. To this he could, and had opposed, as we have seen, the power of the English government, with some effect at different times ; but that resource was a dangerous one and only to be resorted to in extreme circumstances. Hence, when to all these things is added a continual struggle with the knavery of merchants of all nations, his difficulties must be admitted, his indomitable vigour, his patience and his extraordinary mental resources admired, and the whole scene must be considered as one of the most curious and instructive lessons in the study of nations.

Wellington was not simply a general who with greater or less means was to plan his military operations, leaving to others the care of settling the political difficulties which might arise. He had, coincident with his military duties, to regenerate a whole people, to force them against the current of their prejudices and usages on a dangerous and painful course ; he had to teach at once the populace and the government, to infuse spirit and order without the aid of rewards or punishments, to excite enthusiasm through the medium of corrupt oppressive institutions, and far from making any revolutionary appeal to suppress all tendency towards that resource of great minds on the like occasions. Thus only could he maintain an army at all, and as it was beyond the power of man to continue such a struggle for any length of time, he was more than ever anxious to gather strength for a decisive blow, which the enemy's situation now rendered possible, that he might free himself from the critical and anomalous relation in which he stood towards Portugal.

It may indeed be wondered that he so long bore up against the increasing pressure of these distracting affairs, and certain it is that more than once he was like to yield, and would have yielded if fortune had not offered him certain happy military chances, and yet such as few but himself could have profited from. In 1810, on the ridge of Busaco, and in the lines, the military success was rather over the Portuguese government than the enemy. At Santarem in 1811 the glory of arms scarcely compensated for the destitution of the troops. At Fuentes Onoro and on the Caya, after the second unsuccessful siege of Badajos, the Portuguese army had nearly dissolved ; and the astonishing sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos in 1812, were necessary to save the cause from dying of inanition and despair. Even then the early deliverance of Andalusia was frustrated, and time, more valuable than gold or life in war, was lost, the enemy became the strongest in the field, and in despite of the victory of Salamanca, the bad effects of the English general's political situation were felt in the repulse from Burgos, and in the

double retreat from that place and from Madrid. Accumulated mischiefs were now to be encountered in Portugal.

It has been shown how obstinately the regency opposed Wellington's plans of financial reform, how they disputed and complained upon every circumstance, whether serious or trivial, on which a complaint could be founded; for thinking Portugal no longer in danger they were tired of their British allies, and had no desire to aid nor indeed any wish to see Spain delivered from her difficulties. They designed therefore to harass the English general, hoping either to drive him away altogether, or to force him, and through him his government, to grant them loans or new subsidies. But Wellington knew that Portugal could, and he was resolved it should find resources within itself, wherefore, after the battle of Salamanca, when they demanded a fresh subsidy he would not listen to them; and when they adopted that scheme which I have already exposed, of feeding, or rather starving their troops, through the medium of a treaty with the Spanish government, he checked the shameful and absurd plan by applying a part of the money in the chest of aids intended for the civil service to the relief of the Portuguese troops. Yet the regency did not entirely fail in their object, inasmuch as many persons dependent upon the subsidy were thus deprived of their payments, and their complaints hurt the British credit, and reduced the British influence with the people whose faithful attachment to the alliance no intrigues had hitherto been able to shake.

Into every branch of government, however minute, the regency now infused their own captious and discontented spirit. They complained falsely that General Campbell had insulted the nation by turning some Portuguese residents publicly out of Gibraltar in company with Jews and Moors; they refused the wheat which was delivered to them by Lord Wellington in lieu of their subsidy, saying it was not fit for food, notwithstanding that the English troops were then living upon parcels of the same grain, that their own troops were glad to get it, and that no other was to be had. When a wooden jetty was to be thrown in the Tagus for the convenience of landing stores, they supported one Caldas, a rich proprietor, in his refusal to permit the trees wanted for the purpose to be felled, alleging the rights of property, although he was to be paid largely, and although they had themselves then, and always, disregarded the rights of property, especially when poor men were concerned, seizing upon whatever was required either for the public service, or for the support of their own irregularities, without any payment at all and in shameful violation both of law and humanity.

The commercial treaty, and the proceedings of the Oporto wine company, an oppressive corporation unfair in all its dealings, irresponsible, established in violation of that treaty, and supported without regard either to the interests of the prince regent or his British allies, furnished them with continual subjects for disputes, and nothing was too absurd or too gross for their interference. Under the management of Mr. Stuart who had vigorously enforced Wellington's plans, their paper-money had obtained a reasonable and increasing circulation, and their custom-house resources had increased, the expenses of their navy and of their arsenal had in some degree been reduced; and it was made evident that an extensive and vigorous application of the same principles would enable them to overcome all their financial difficulties; but there were too many personal interests, too much shameful profit made under the abuses to permit such a reform. The naval establishment instead of being entirely transferred, as Wellington desired, to the Brazils, was continued in the Tagus, and with it the arsenal as its natural appendage. The infamous Junta de Viveres had been suppressed by the prince regent, yet the government, under the false pretext of paying its debts, still disbursed above £10,000 a month in salaries to men whose offices had been formally abolished.

About this time also the opening of the Spanish ports, in those provinces from whence the enemy had been driven, deprived Lisbon of a monopoly of trade enjoyed for the last three years, and the regency observing the consequent diminution of revenue, with inexpressible effrontery insisted that the grain, imported by Wellington, by which their army and their nation had been saved from famine, and by which their own subsidy had been provided, should enter the public ware-

houses under specific regulations and pay duty for so doing. So tenaciously did they hold to this point that Wellington was forced to menace a formal appeal to the English cabinet, for he knew that the subordinate officers of the government, knavish in the extreme, would have sold the secrets of the army magazines to the speculators ; and the latter, in whose hands the furnishing of the army would under the new plan of the English ministers be placed, being thus accurately instructed of its resources, would have regulated their supplies with great nicety so as to have famished the soldiers and paralyzed the operations at the greatest possible expense.

But the supply of the army under any system was now becoming extremely precarious, for besides the activity of the American privateers, English ships of war used at times to capture the vessels secretly employed in bringing provision under licenses from Mr. Stuart and Mr. Forster. Nay, the captain of a Scotch merchant vessel engaged in the same trade and having no letter of marque, had the piratical insolence to seize in the very mouth of the Tagus, and under the Portuguese batteries, an American vessel sailing under a license from Mr. Forster, and to carry her into Greenock, thus violating at once the license of the English minister, the independence of Portugal, and the general law of nations. Alarm immediately spread far and wide amongst the American traders, the indignation of the Portuguese government was strongly and justly excited, and the matter became extremely embarrassing, because no measure of punishment could be inflicted without exposing the secret of a system which had been the principal support of the army. However the congress soon passed an act forbidding neutrals to ship flour in the American ports, and this blow, chiefly aimed at the Portuguese ships, following upon the non-importation act, and being combined with the illegal violence of the English vessels, nearly dried up this source of supply, and threw the army principally upon the Brazil trade, which by the negligence of the admiralty was, as I have before noticed, exposed to the enterprise of the United States' privateers.

During Wellington's absence in Spain the military administration of Portugal was necessarily in the hands of the regency and all the ancient abuses were fast reviving. The army in the field received no succours, the field artillery had entirely disappeared, the cavalry was in the worst condition, the infantry was reduced in numbers, the equipments of those who remained were scarcely fit for service, and the spirit of the men had waned from enthusiasm to despondency. There was no money in the military chest, no recruits in the dépôts, and the transport service was neglected altogether. Beresford's severity had failed to check desertion, because want, the parent of crimes, had proved too strong for fear ; the country swarmed with robbers, and as no fault civil or military was punished by the regency, everywhere knaves triumphed over the welfare of the nation.

Meanwhile all persons whose indolence or timidity led them to fly from the active defence of their country to the Brazils, were there received and cherished as martyrs to their personal affections for the prince ; they were lauded for their opposition to the regency, and were called victims to the injustice of Beresford, and to the encroachments of the English officers. This mischief was accompanied by another of greater moment, for the prince continually permitted officers possessing family interest to retire from active service, retaining their pay and rank, thus offering a premium for bad men to enter the army with the intent of quitting it in this disgraceful manner. Multitudes did so, promotion became rapid, the nobility, whose influence over the poor classes was very great and might have been beneficially employed in keeping up the zeal of the men, disappeared rapidly from the regiments, and the foul stream of knaves and cowards thus continually pouring through the military ranks destroyed all cohesion and tainted everything as it passed.

Interests of the same nature, prevailing with the regency, polluted the civil administration. The rich and powerful inhabitants, especially those of the great cities, were suffered to evade the taxes and to disobey the regulations for drawing forth the resources of the country in the military service ; and during Wellington's absence in Spain, the English under-commissaries, and that retinue of villains which invariably gather on the rear of armies, being in some measure freed from the immediate dread of his vigilance and vigour, violated all the regulations in the

most daring manner. The poor husbandmen were cruelly oppressed, their farming animals were constantly carried off to supply food for the army, and agriculture was thus stricken at the root; the breed of horned cattle and of horses had rapidly and alarmingly decreased, and butcher's meat was scarcely to be procured even for the troops who remained in Portugal.

These irregularities, joined to the gross misconduct of the military detachments and convoys of sick men on all the lines of communication, not only produced great irritation in the country, but offered the means for malevolent and factious persons to assail the character and intentions of the English general; everywhere writings and stories were circulated against the troops, the real outrages were exaggerated, others were invented, and the drift of all was to render Wellington and the English odious to the nation at large. Nor was this scheme confined to Portugal alone, agents were also busy to the same purpose in London, and when the enthusiasm which Wellington's presence at Lisbon had created amongst the people was known at Cadiz, the press there teemed with abuse. Divers agents of the democratic party in Spain came to Lisbon to aid the Portuguese malcontents, writings were circulated accusing Wellington of an intention to subjugate the Peninsula for his own ambitious views, and, as consistency is never regarded on such occasions, it was diligently insinuated that he encouraged the excesses of his troops out of personal hatred to the Portuguese people; the old baseness of sending virulent anonymous letters to the English general was also revived. In fine the republican spirit was extending beyond the bounds of Spain, and the Portuguese regency, terrified at its approach, appealed to Mr. Stuart for the assistance of England to check its formidable progress. Neither were they wanting to themselves. They forbade the Portuguese newspapers to admit any observations on the political events in Spain, they checked the introduction of Spanish democratic publications, they ordered their diplomatists at Cadiz to encourage writings of an opposite tendency, and to support the election of deputies who were known for their love of despotism. This last measure was, however, baffled by the motion of Arguelles, already mentioned, which rendered the old Cortes permanent; and Mr. Stuart, judging the time unfavourable, advised the Portuguese government to reserve the exertion of its power against the democrats until the military success, which the state of the continent and the weakness of the French troops in Spain promised, should enable the victors to put down such doctrines with effect; advice which was not unmeaning, as I shall have occasion hereafter to show.

All these malignant efforts Wellington viewed with indifference. "Every leading man," he said, "was sure to be accused of criminal personal ambition, and, if he was conscious of the charge being false, the accusation did no harm." Nevertheless his position was thereby rendered more difficult, and these intrigues were accompanied by other mischiefs of long standing and springing from a different source, but even of a more serious character, for the spirit of captious discontent had reached the inferior magistracy, who endeavoured to excite the people against the military generally. Complaints came in from all quarters of outrages on the part of the troops, some too true, but many of them false or frivolous; and when the English general ordered courts-martial for the trial of the accused, the magistrates refused to attend as witnesses, because Portuguese custom rendered such an attendance degrading, and by Portuguese law a magistrate's written testimony was efficient in courts-martial. Wellington in vain assured them that English law would not suffer him to punish men upon such testimony; in vain he pointed out the mischief which must infallibly overwhelm the country if the soldiers discovered they might thus do evil with impunity. He offered to send in each case lists of Portuguese witnesses required, that they might be summoned by the native authorities, but nothing could overcome the obstinacy of the magistrates; they answered that his method was insolent; and with a sullen malignity they continued to accumulate charges against the troops, to refuse attendance in the courts, and to call the soldiers, their own as well as the British, "licensed spoliators of the community."

For a time the generous nature of the poor people resisted all these combining causes of discontent; neither real injuries, nor the exaggerations, nor the falsehoods

of those who attempted to stir up wrath, produced any visible effect upon the great bulk of the population; yet by degrees affection for the British cooled, and Wellington expressed his fears that a civil war would commence between the Portuguese people on the one hand, and the troops of both nations on the other. Wherefore his activity was redoubled to draw, while he could still control affairs, all the military strength to a head, and to make such an irruption into Spain as would establish a new base of operations beyond the power of such fatal dissensions.

These matters were sufficiently vexatious and alarming, but what made him tremble, was the course which the misconduct of the Portuguese government, and the incapacity of the English cabinet had forced upon the native furnishers of the supplies. Those persons, coming in the winter to Lisbon to have their bills on the military chest paid, could get no money, and in their distress had sold the bills to speculators, the Portuguese holders, at a discount of 15, the Spanish holders at a discount of 40 in the 100. The credit of the chest immediately fell, prices rose in proportion, and as no military enterprise could carry the army beyond the flight of this harpy, and no revenues could satisfy its craving, the contest must have ceased if Mr. Stuart had not found a momentary and partial remedy, by publicly guaranteeing the payment of the bills, and granting interest until they could be taken up. The expense was thus augmented, but the increase fell far short of the enhanced cost of the supplies which had already resulted even from this restricted practice of the bill-holders, and of two evils the least was chosen. It may seem strange that such transactions should belong to the history of the military operations in the Peninsula, that it should be the general's instead of the minister's task to encounter such evils, and to find the remedy. Such however was the nature of the war, and no adequate notion of Lord Wellington's vigorous capacity and Herculean labours can be formed, without an intimate knowledge of the financial and political difficulties which oppressed him, and of which this work has necessarily only given an outline.

The disorders of the Portuguese military system had brought Beresford back to Lisbon while the siege of Burgos was still in progress, and now, under Wellington's direction, he strained every nerve to restore the army to its former efficient state. To recruit the regiments of the line he disbanded all the militiamen fit for service, replacing them with fathers of families; to restore the field artillery, he embodied all the garrison artillerymen, calling out the *ordenança* gunners to man the fortresses and coast-batteries; the worst cavalry regiments he reduced to render the best more efficient, but several circumstances prevented this arm from attaining any excellence in Portugal. Meanwhile Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart strenuously grappled with the disorders of the civil administration, and their efforts produced an immediate and considerable increase of revenue. But though the regency could not deny this beneficial effect, though they could not deny the existence of the evils which they were urged to remedy, though they admitted that the reform of their custom-house system was still incomplete, that their useless navy consumed large sums which were wanted for the army, and that the taxes, especially the "*Decima*," were partially collected and unproductive, because the rich people in the great towns, who had benefited largely by the war, escaped the imposts which the poor people in the country, who had suffered most from the war, paid; though they acknowledged that while the soldiers' hire was in arrears, the transport service neglected, and all persons having just claims upon the government suffering severe privations, the tax-gatherers were allowed to keep a month's tribute in their hands even in the districts close to the enemy; though all these things were admitted, the regency would not alter their system, and Borba, the minister of finance, combated Wellington's plans in detail with such unusual obstinacy, that it became evident nothing could be obtained save by external pressure. Wherefore as the season for military operations approached, Mr. Stuart called upon Lord Castlereagh to bring the power of England to bear at once upon the court of Rio Janeiro; and Wellington, driven to extremity, sent the Portuguese prince-regent one of those clear, powerful, and nervous statements, which left those to whom they were addressed, no alternative but submission, or an acknowledgment that sense and justice were to be disregarded.

"I call your highness's attention," he said, "to the state of your troops and of all your establishments; the army of operations has been unpaid since September, the garrisons since June, the militia since February, 1812. The transport service has never been regularly paid, and has received nothing since June. To these evils I have in vain called the attention of the local government, and I am now going to open a new campaign, with troops to whom greater arrears of pay are due than when the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy from Great Britain, granted especially for the maintenance of those troops, has been regularly and exactly furnished; and although it has been proved that the revenue for the last three months has exceeded, by a third, any former quarter. The honour of your highness's arms, the cause of your allies, is thus seriously affected, and the uniform refusal of the governors of the kingdom to attend to any one of the measures which I have recommended, either for permanent or temporal relief, has at last obliged me to go as a complainant into your royal highness's presence, for here I cannot prevail against the influence of the chief of the treasury.

"I have recommended the entire reform of the customs system, but it has only been partially carried into effect. I have advised a method of actually and really collecting the taxes, and of making the rich merchants and capitalists pay the tenth of their annual profits as an extraordinary contribution for the war. I declare that no person knows better than I do the sacrifices and the sufferings of your people, for there is no one for the last four years has lived so much amongst those people; but it is a fact, sir, that the great cities, and even some of the smallest places, have gained by the war and the mercantile class has enriched itself; there are divers persons in Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. Now your government is, both from remote and recent circumstances, unable to draw resources from the capitalists by loans; it can only draw upon them by taxes. It is not denied that the regular tributes nor the extraordinary imposts on the mercantile profits are evaded; it is not denied that the measures I have proposed, vigorously carried into execution, would furnish the government with pecuniary resources, and it remains for that government to inform your highness, why they have neither enforced my plans, nor any others which the necessity of the times calls for. They fear to become unpopular, but such is the knowledge I have of the people's good sense and loyalty, such my zeal for the cause, that I have offered to become responsible for the happy issue, and to take upon myself all the odium of enforcing my own measures. I have offered in vain!

"Never was a sovereign in the world so ill served as your highness has been by the *'Junta de Viveres,'* and I zealously forwarded your interests when I obtained its abolition; and yet, under a false pretext of debt, the government still disburse 50,000,000 of reis monthly on account of that board. It has left a debt, undoubtedly, and it is of importance to pay it, although not at this moment; but let the government state in detail how these 50,000,000, granted monthly, have been applied; let them say if all the accounts have been called in and liquidated? who has enforced the operation? to what does the debt amount? has it been classified? how much is really still due to those who have received instalments? finally, have these millions been applied to the payment of salaries instead of debt? But were it convenient now to pay the debt, it cannot be denied that to pay the army which is to defend the country, to protect it from the sweeping destructive hand of the enemy, is of more pressing importance; the troops will be neither able nor willing to fight if they are not paid."

Then touching upon the abuse of permitting the tax-gatherers to hold a month's taxes in their hands, and upon the opposition he met with from the regency, he continued:—

"I assure your royal highness that I give my advice to the governor of the kingdom actuated solely by an earnest zeal for your service without any personal interest. I can have none relative to Portugal, and none with regard to individuals, for I have no private relation with, and scarcely am acquainted with those who direct, or would wish to direct your affairs. Those reforms recommended by me, and which have at last been partially effected in the custom-house, in the arsenal, in the navy, in the payment of the interest of the national debt, in the formation of

a military chest, have succeeded, and I may therefore say that the other measures I propose would have similar results. I am ready to allow that I may deceive myself on this point, but certainly they are suggested by a desire for the good of your service; hence in the most earnest and decided manner, I express my ardent wish, and it is common to all your faithful servants, that you will return to the kingdom, and take charge yourself of the government."

These vigorous measures to bring the regency to terms succeeded only partially. In May they promulgated a new system for the collection of taxes, which relieved the financial pressure on the army for the moment, but which did not at all content Wellington, because it was made to square with old habits and prejudices, and thus left the roots of all the evils alive and vigorous. Every moment furnished new proofs of the hopelessness of regenerating a nation through the medium of a corrupted government; and a variety of circumstances, more or less serious, continued to embarrass the march of public affairs.

In the Madeiras the authorities vexatiously prevented the English money agents from exporting specie, and their conduct was approved of at Rio Janeiro. At Bisao, in Africa, the troops had mutinied for want of pay, and in the Cape de Verde Islands disturbances arose from the over-exaction of taxes; for when the people were weak, the regency were vigorous; pliant only to the powerful. These commotions were trifling and soon ended of themselves, yet expeditions were sent against the offenders in both places, and the troops thus employed immediately committed far worse excesses, and did more mischief than that which they were sent to suppress. At the same time several French frigates finding the coast of Africa unguarded, cruised successfully against the Brazil trade, and aided the American privateers to contract the already too straitened resources of the army.

Amidst all these difficulties however the extraordinary exertions of the British officers had restored the numbers, discipline, and spirit of the Portuguese army. Twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers were again under arms and ready to commence the campaign, although the national discontent was daily increasing; and indeed the very feeling of security created by the appearance of such an army rendered the citizens at large less willing to bear the inconveniences of the war. Distant danger never affects the multitude, and the billeting of troops, who, from long habits of war, little regarded the rights of the citizens in comparison with their own necessities, being combined with requisitions, and with a recruiting system becoming every year more irksome, formed an aggregate of inconveniences intolerable to men who desired ease and no longer dreaded to find an enemy on their hearthstones. The powerful classes were naturally more affected than the poorer classes, because of their indolent habits; but their impatience was aggravated because they had generally been debarred of the highest situations, or supplanted by the British interference in the affairs of the country, and, unlike those of Spain, the nobles of Portugal had lost little or none of their hereditary influence. Discontent was thus extended widely, and moreover the old dread of French power was entirely gone; unlimited confidence in the strength and resources of England had succeeded; and this confidence, to use the words of Mr. Stuart, "being opposed to the irregularities which have been practised by individuals, and to the difference of manners, and of religion, placed the British in the singular position of a class whose exertions were necessary for the country, but who, for the above reasons, were in every other respect as distinct from the natives as persons with whom, from some criminal cause, it was necessary to suspend communication."—Hence he judged that the return of the prince regent would be a proper epoch for the British to retire from all situations in Portugal not strictly military, for if any thing should delay that event, the time was approaching when the success of the army and the tranquillity of the country would render it necessary to yield to the first manifestations of national feeling. In fine, notwithstanding the great benefits conferred upon the Portuguese by the British, the latter were, and it will always be so on the like occasions, regarded by the upper classes as a captain regards galley-slaves, their strength was required to speed the vessel, but they were feared and hated.

The prince regent did not return to Portugal according to Wellington's advice.

but Carlotta immediately prepared to come alone; orders were given to furnish her apartments in the different palaces, and her valuable effects had actually arrived. Ill health was the pretext for the voyage, but the real object was to be near Spain to forward her views upon the government there; for intent upon mischief, indefatigable and of a violence approaching insanity, she had sold even her plate and jewels to raise money wherewith to corrupt the leading members of the Cortes, and was resolved, if that should not promise success, to distribute the money amongst the Spanish Partidas, and so create a powerful military support for her schemes. Fortunately the prince, dreading the intriguing advisers of his wife, would not suffer her to quit Rio Janeiro until the wish of the British cabinet upon the subject was known, and that was so decidedly adverse, that it was thought better to do without the prince himself than to have him accompanied by Carlotta; so they both remained in the Brazils, and this formidable cloud passed away, yet left no sunshine on the land.

It was at this period that the offer of a Russian auxiliary force, before alluded to, being made to Wellington by Admiral Grieg, was accepted by him to the amount of 15,000 men, and yet was not fulfilled because the Russian ambassador in London declared that the emperor knew nothing of it! Alexander however proposed to mediate in the dispute between Great Britain and America, but the English ministers, while lauding him as a paragon of magnanimity and justice, in regard to the war against Napoleon, remembered the armed neutrality and quadruple alliance, and wisely declined trusting England's maritime pretensions to his faithless grasping policy. Neither would they listen to Austria, who at this time, whether with good faith or merely as a cloak I know not, desired to mediate a general peace. However, amidst this political confusion the progress of the military preparations was visible; and contemporary with the Portuguese, the Spanish troops under Wellington's influence and providence acquired more consistence than they had ever before possessed; a mighty power was in arms; but the flood of war with which the English general finally poured into Spain, and the channels by which he directed the overwhelming torrent, must be reserved for another place. It is now time to treat of the political situation of King Joseph, and to resume the narrative of that secondary warfare which occupied the French armies while Wellington was uninterruptedly, as far as the enemy were concerned, reorganizing his power.

CHAPTER III.

In war it is not so much the positive strength, as the relative situations of the hostile parties, which gives the victory. Joseph's position, thus judged, was one of great weakness, principally because he was incapable of combining the materials at his disposal, or of wielding them when combined by others. France had been suddenly thrown by her failure in Russia into a new and embarrassing attitude, more embarrassing even than it appeared to her enemies, or than her robust warlike proportions, nourished by 12 years of victory, indicated. Napoleon, the most indefatigable and active of mankind, turned his enemy's ignorance on this head to profit; for scarcely was it known that he had reached Paris by that wise, that rapid journey, from Smorghoni, which, baffling all his enemies' hopes, left them only the power of foolish abuse; scarcely, I say, was his arrival at Paris known to the world, than a new and enormous army, the constituent parts of which he had with his usual foresight created while yet in the midst of victory, was in march from all parts to unite in the heart of Germany.

On this magical rapidity he rested his hopes to support the tottering fabric of his empire; but well aware of the critical state of his affairs, his design was, while presenting a menacing front on every side, so to conduct his operations that if he failed in his first stroke, he might still contract his system gradually and without any violent concussion. And good reason for hope he had. His military power was rather broken and divided than lessened, for it is certain that the number of men employed in 1813 was infinitely greater than in 1812; in the latter 400,000, but in the former more than 700,000 men, and 1200 field-pieces were engaged on different points, exclusive of the armies in Spain. Then on the Vistula, on the

Oder, on the Elbe, he had powerful fortresses, and numerous garrisons, or rather armies, of strength and goodness to re-establish his ascendancy in Europe, if he could reunite them in one system by placing a new host victoriously in the centre of Germany. And thus also he could renew the adhesive qualities of those allies, who still clung to him though evidently feeling the attraction of his enemies' success.

But this was a gigantic contest, for his enemies, by deceiving their subjects with false promises of liberty, had brought whole nations against him. More than 800,000 men were in arms in Germany alone; secret societies were in full activity all over the continent; and in France a conspiracy was commenced by men who desired rather to see their country a prey to foreigners and degraded with a Bourbon king, than have it independent and glorious under Napoleon. Wherefore that great monarch had now to make application, on an immense scale, of the maxim which prescribes a skilful offensive as the best defence, and he had to sustain two systems of operation not always compatible; the one depending upon moral force to hold the vast fabric of his former policy together, the other to meet the actual exigencies of the war. The first was infinitely more important than the last, and as Germany and France were the proper theatres for its display, the Spanish contest sunk at once from a principal into an accessory war. Yet this delicate conjuncture of affairs made it of vital importance that Napoleon should have constant and rapid intelligence from Spain, because the ascendancy which he yet maintained over the world by his astounding genius might have been broken down in a moment if Wellington, overstepping the ordinary rules of military art, had suddenly abandoned the Peninsula, and thrown his army, or a part of it, into France. For then would have been deranged all the emperor's calculations; then would the defection of all his allies have ensued; then would he have been obliged to concentrate both his new forces and his Spanish troops for the defence of his own country, abandoning all his fortresses and his still vast though scattered veteran armies in Germany and Poland, to the unrestrained efforts of his enemies beyond the Rhine. Nothing could have been more destructive to Napoleon's moral power, than to have an insult offered and commotions raised on his own threshold at the moment when he was assuming the front of a conqueror in Germany.

To obviate this danger or to meet it, alike required that the armies in the Peninsula should adopt a new and vigorous system, under which, relinquishing all real permanent offensive movements, they should yet appear to be daring and enterprising, even while they prepared to abandon their former conquests. But the emperor wanted old officers and non-commissioned officers, and experienced soldiers, to give consistency to the young levies with which he was preparing to take the field, and he could only supply this want by drawing from the veterans of the Peninsula; wherefore he resolved to recall the division of the young guard, and with it many thousand men and officers of the line most remarkable for courage and conduct. In lieu, he sent the reserve at Bayonne into Spain, replacing it with another, which was again to be replaced in May by further levies; and besides this succour, 20,000 conscripts were appropriated for the Peninsula.

The armies thus weakened in numbers, and considerably so during the transit of the troops, were also in quality greatly deteriorated, and at a very critical time, for not only was Wellington being powerfully reinforced, but the audacity, the spirit, the organization, the discipline, and the numbers of the Partidas were greatly increased by English supplies, liberally and now usefully dealt out. And the Guerilla operations in the northern parts, being combined with the British naval squadrons, had, during the absence of the French armies employed to drive the allies back to Portugal, roused anew the spirit of insurrection in Navarre and Biscay; a spirit exacerbated by some recent gross abuses of military authority perpetrated by some of the French local commanders.

The position of the invading armies was indeed become more complicated than ever. They had only been relieved from the crushing pressure of Lord Wellington's grand operations to struggle in the meshes of the Guerilla and insurrectional warfare of the Spaniards. Nor was the importance of these now to be measured by former efforts. The Partida chiefs had become more experienced and more

docile to the suggestions of the British chief ; they had free communication with, and were constantly supplied with arms, ammunition, and money from the squadrons on the coast ; they possessed several fortified posts and harbours, their bands were swelling to the size of armies, and their military knowledge of the country and of the French system of invasion was more matured ; their own dépôts were better hidden, and they could, and at times did, bear the shock of battle on nearly equal terms. Finally, new and large bands of another and far more respectable and influential nature were formed or forming both in Navarre and Biscay, where insurrectional juntas were organized, and where men of the best families had enrolled numerous volunteers from the villages and towns.

These volunteers were well and willingly supplied by the country, and of course not obnoxious, like the *Partidas*, from their rapine and violence. In Biscay alone several battalions of this description, each mustering 1000 men, were in the field, and the communication with France was so completely interrupted, that the French minister of war only heard that Joseph had received his dispatches of the 4th of January on the 18th of March, and then through the medium of Suchet ! The contributions could no longer be collected, the magazines could not be filled, the fortresses were endangered, the armies had no base of operations, the insurrection was spreading to Aragon, and the bands of the interior were also increasing in numbers and activity. The French armies, sorely pressed for provisions, were widely disseminated, and everywhere occupied, and each general was averse either to concentrate his own forces or to aid his neighbour. In fine the problem of the operations was become extremely complicated, and Napoleon only seems to have seized the true solution.

When informed by Caffarelli of the state of affairs in the north, he thus wrote to the king, " Hold Madrid only as a point of observation ; fix your quarters not as monarch, but as general of the French forces at Valladolid ; concentrate the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal around you ; the allies will not and indeed cannot make any serious offensive movement for several months ; wherefore it is your business to profit from their forced inactivity, to put down the insurrection in the northern provinces, to free the communication with France, and to re-establish a good base of operations before the commencement of another campaign, that the French army may be in condition to fight the allies if the latter advance towards France." Very important indeed did Napoleon deem this object, and so earnest was he to have constant and rapid intelligence from his armies in the Peninsula, that the couriers and their escorts were directed to be despatched twice a week, travelling day and night at the rate of a league an hour. He commanded also that the army of the north should be reinforced even by the whole army of Portugal, if it was necessary to effect the immediate pacification of Biscay and Navarre ; and while this pacification was in progress, Joseph was to hold the rest of his forces in a position offensive towards Portugal, making Wellington feel that his whole power was required on the frontier, and that neither his main body nor even any considerable detachment could safely embark to disturb France. In short that he must cover Lisbon strongly, and on the frontier, or expect to see the French army menacing that capital. These instructions well understood, and vigorously executed, would certainly have put down the insurrection in the rear of the king's position, and the spring would have seen that monarch at the head of 90,000 men, having their retreat upon France clear of all impediments, and consequently free to fight the allies on the Tormes, the Duero, the Pisuerga, and the Ebro ; and with several supporting fortresses in a good state.

Joseph was quite unable to view the matter in this common-sense point of view. He could not make his kingly notions subservient to military science, nor his military movements subservient to an enlarged policy. Neither did he perceive that his beneficent notions of government were misplaced amidst the din of arms. Napoleon's orders were imperative, but the principle of them Joseph could not previously conceive himself nor execute the details after his brother's conception. He was not even acquainted with the true state of the northern provinces, nor would he at first credit it when told to him. Hence, while his thoughts were intent upon his Spanish political projects, and the secret negotiations with Del Parque's army, the northern


Partidas and insurgents became masters of all his lines of communication in the north ; the Emperor's orders dispatched early in January, and reiterated week after week, only reached the king in the end of February ; their execution did not take place until the end of March, and then imperfectly. The time thus lost was irreparable ; and yet, as the emperor reproachfully observed, the bulletin which revealed the extent of his disasters in Russia might alone have taught the king what to do.

Joseph was nearly as immovable in his resolutions as his brother, the firmness of the one being, however, founded upon extraordinary sagacity, and of the other upon the want of that quality. Regarding opposition to his views as the result of a disloyal malevolence, he judged the refractory generals to be enemies to the emperor, as well as to himself. Reille, Caffarelli, Suchet, alike incurred his displeasure, and the Duke of Feltre, French minister of war, also, because of a letter in which, evidently by the orders of the emperor, he rebuked the king for having removed Souham from the command of the army of Portugal.

Feltre's style, addressed to a monarch was very offensive, and Joseph attributed it to the influence of Soult, for his hatred of the latter was violent and implacable even to absurdity. "The Duke of Dalmatia or himself," he wrote to the emperor, "must quit Spain. At Valencia he had forgotten his own injuries, he had suppressed his just indignation, and instead of sending Marshal Soult to France had given him the direction of the operations against the allies, but it was in the hope that shame for the past combined with his avidity for glory, would urge him to extraordinary exertions ; nothing of the kind had happened ; Soult was a man not to be trusted. Restless, intriguing, ambitious, he would sacrifice everything to his own advancement, and possessed just that sort of talent which would lead him to mount a scaffold when he thought he was ascending the steps of a throne, because he would want the courage to strike when the crisis arrived. He acquitted him," he said, with a coarse sarcasm, "of treachery at the passage of the Tormes, because there fear alone operated to prevent him from bringing the allies to a decisive action, but he was nevertheless treacherous to the emperor, and his proceedings in Spain were probably connected with the conspiracy of Malet at Paris."

Such was the language with which Joseph in his anger assailed one of the greatest commanders and most faithful servants of his brother ; and such the greetings which awaited Napoleon on his arrival at Paris after the disasters of Russia. In the most calm and prosperous state of affairs, coming from this source, the charges might well have excited the jealous wrath of the strongest mind ; but in the actual crisis, when the emperor had just lost his great army, and found the smoking embers of a suppressed conspiracy at his very palace-gates, when his friends were failing, and his enemies accumulating, it seemed scarcely possible that these accusations should not have proved the ruin of Soult. Yet they did not even ruffle the temper of Napoleon. Magnanimous as he was sagacious, he smiled at the weakness of Joseph, and though he removed Soult from Spain, because the feud between him and the king would not permit them to serve beneficially together, it was only to make him the commander of the imperial guard ; and that no mark of his confidence might be wanting, he afterwards chose him, from amongst all his generals, to retrieve the affairs of the Peninsula when Joseph was driven from that country, an event the immediate causes of which were now being laid.

It has been already shown, that when Wellington took his winter-quarters, the French armies occupied a line stretching from the sea-coast at Valencia to the foot of the Gallician mountains. In these positions Suchet on the extreme left was opposed by the allies at Alicante. Soult, commanding the centre, had his headquarters at Toledo, with one detachment at the foot of the Sierra Morena to watch the army of Del Parque, and two others in the valley of the Tagus. Of these last, one was at Talavera, and one on the Tietar. The first observed Morillo and Penne Villemur, who from Estremadura were constantly advancing towards the bridges on the Tagus, and menacing the rear of the French detachment which was on the Tietar in observation of General Hill then at Coria. Soult's advanced post in the valley of the Tagus communicated by the Gredos mountains with Avila, where Foy's division of the army of Portugal was posted partly for the sake of food, partly to watch Bejar and the Upper Tormes, because the allies, possessing the pass



Explanatory Sketch

of the

POSITION OF THE PARTISANS

And of Lord Wellington's March from the

AGUEDA to the PYRENEES.

1813.

of Bejar, might have suddenly united north of the mountains, and breaking the French line have fallen on Madrid.

On the right of Foy, the remainder of the army of Portugal occupied Salamanca, Ledesma, and Alba on the Lower Tormes; Valladolid, Toro, and Tordesillas on the Duero; Benevente, Leon, and other points on the Esla, Astorga being, as I have before observed, dismantled by the Spaniards. Behind the right of this great line, the army of the north had retaken its old positions, and the army of the centre was fixed as before in and around Madrid, its operations being bounded on the right bank of the Tagus by the mountains which invest that capital, and on the left bank of the Tagus by the districts of Aranjuez, Tarancon, and Cuenca.

Joseph, while disposing his troops in this manner, issued a royal regulation marking the extent of country which each army was to forage, requiring at the same time a certain and considerable revenue to be collected by his Spanish civil authorities for the support of his court. The subsistence of the French armies was thus made secondary to the revenue of the crown, and he would have had the soldiers in a time of war, of insurrectional war, yield to the authority of the Spanish civilians; an absurdity heightened by the peculiarly active, vigorous, and prompt military method of the French, as contrasted with the dilatory, improvident, promise-breaking and visionary system of the Spaniards. Hence scarcely was the royal regulation issued when the generals broke through it in a variety of ways, and the king was, as usual, involved in the most acrimonious disputes with all the emperor's lieutenants. If he ordered one commander to detach troops to the assistance of another commander, he was told that he should rather send additional troops to to the first. If he reprimanded a general for raising contributions contrary to the regulations, he was answered that the soldiers were starving and must be fed. At all times also the authority of the prefects and intendants was disregarded by all the generals; and this was in pursuance of Napoleon's order; for that monarch continually reminded his brother that as the war was carried on by the French armies their interests were paramount; that the king of Spain could have no authority over them, and must never use his military authority as lieutenant of the empire in aid of his kingly views, for with those the French soldiers could have nothing to do; their welfare could not be confided to Spanish ministers whose capacity was by no means apparent and of whose fidelity the emperor had no security.

Nothing could be clearer or wiser than these instructions, but Joseph would not see this distinction between his military and his monarchical duties, and continually defended his conduct by reference to what he owed his subjects as king of Spain. His sentiments, explained with great force of feeling, and great beneficence of design, were worthy of all praise if viewed abstractedly, but totally inapplicable to the real state of affairs, because the Spaniards were not his faithful and attached subjects, they were his inveterate enemies; and it was quite impossible to unite the vigour of a war of conquest with the soft and benevolent government of a paternal monarch. Thus one constant error vitiated all the king's political proceedings, an error apparently arising from an inability to view his situation as a whole instead of by parts, for his military operations were vitiated in the same manner.

As a man of state and of war he seems to have been acute, courageous, and industrious, with respect to any single feature presented for his consideration, but always unable to look steadily on the whole and consequently always working in the dark. Men of his character being conscious of the merit of labour and good intentions, are commonly obstinate; and those qualities, which render them so useful under the direction of an able chief, lead only to mischief when they become chiefs themselves. For in matters of great moment, and in war especially, it is not the actual importance but the comparative importance of the operations which should determine the choice of measures; and when all are very important this choice demands judgment of the highest kind, judgment which no man ever possessed more largely than Napoleon, and which Joseph did not possess at all.

He was never able to comprehend the instructions of his brother, and never would accept the advice of those commanders whose capacity approached in some degree to that of the emperor. When he found that every general complained of insufficient means, instead of combining their forces so as to press with the principal

mass against the most important point, he disputed with each, and turned to demand from the emperor additional succours for all; at the same time unwisely repeating and urging his own schemes upon a man so infinitely his superior in intellect. The insurrection in the northern provinces he treated not as a military but a political question, attributing it to the anger of the people at seeing the ancient supreme council of Navarre unceremoniously dismissed and some of the members imprisoned by a French general, a cause very inadequate to the effect. Neither was his judgment truer with respect to the fitness of time. He proposed, if a continuation of the Russian war should prevent the emperor from sending more men to Spain, to make Burgos the royal residence, to transport there the archives, and all that constituted a capital; then to have all the provinces behind the Ebro, Catalonia excepted, governed by himself through the medium of his Spanish ministers and as a country at peace, while those beyond the Ebro should be given up to the generals as a country at war.

In this state his civil administration would, he said, remedy the evils inflicted by the armies, would conciliate the people by keeping all the Spanish families and authorities in safety and comfort, would draw all those who favoured his cause from all parts of Spain, and would encourage the display of that attachment to his person which he believed so many Spaniards to entertain. And while he declared the violence and injustice of the French armies to be the sole cause of the protracted resistance of the Spaniards, a declaration false in fact, that violence being only one of many causes, he was continually urging the propriety of beating the English first and then pacifying the people by just and benevolent measures. As if it were possible, off-hand, to beat Wellington and his veterans, embedded as they were in the strong country of Portugal, and having British fleets with troops and succours of all kinds, hovering on the flanks of the French, and feeding and sustaining the insurrection of the Spaniards in their rear.

Napoleon was quite as willing and anxious as Joseph could be to drive the English from the Peninsula, and to tranquillize the people by a regular government; but with a more profound knowledge of war, of politics, and of human nature, he judged that the first could only be done by a methodical combination, in unison with that rule of art which prescribes the establishment and security of the base of operations, security which could not be obtained if the benevolent but weak and visionary schemes of the king were to supersede military vigour in the field. The emperor laughed in scorn when his brother assured him that the Peninsulars, with all their fiery passions, their fanaticism and their ignorance, would receive an equable government as a benefit from the hands of an intrusive monarch before they had lost all hope of resistance by arms.

Yet it is not to be concluded that Joseph was totally devoid of grounds for his opinions; he was surrounded by difficulties and deeply affected by the misery which he witnessed, his Spanish ministers were earnest and importunate, and many of the French generals gave him but too much reason to complain of their violence. The length and mutations of the war had certainly created a large party willing enough to obtain tranquillity at the price of submission, while others were, as we have seen, not indisposed, if he would hold the crown on their terms, to accept his dynasty, as one essentially springing from democracy, in preference to the despotic, base, and superstitious family which the nation was called upon to uphold. It was not unnatural therefore for Joseph to desire to retain his capital while the negotiations with Del Parque's army were still in existence, it was not strange that he should be displeased with Soult after reading that marshal's honest but offensive letter, and certainly it was highly creditable to his character as a man and as a king that he would not silently suffer his subjects to be oppressed by the generals.

"I am in distress for money," he often exclaimed to Napoleon, "such distress as no king ever endured before, my plate is sold, and on state occasions the appearance of magnificence is supported by false metal. My ministers and household are actually starving, misery is on every face, and men, otherwise willing, are thus deterred from joining a king so little able to support them. My revenue is seized by the generals for the supply of their troops, and I cannot as a king of Spain without dishonour partake of the resources thus torn by rapine from my subjects

whom I have sworn to protect; I cannot in fine be at once King of Spain and general of the French; let me resign both and live peaceably in France. Your majesty does not know what scenes are enacted, you will shudder to hear that men formerly rich and devoted to our cause have been driven out of Zaragoza and denied even a ration of food. The Marquis Cavallero, a councillor of state, minister of justice, and known personally to your majesty, has been thus used. He has been seen actually begging for a piece of bread!"

If this Cavallero was the old minister to Charles the IV., no misery was too great a punishment for his tyrannical rule under that monarch, yet it was not from the hands of the French it should have come; and Joseph's distress for money must certainly have been great, since that brave and honest man Jourdan, a marshal of France, major-general of the armies, and a personal favourite of the king's, complained that the non-payment of his appointments had reduced him to absolute penury, and after borrowing until his credit was exhausted he could with difficulty procure subsistence. It is now time to describe the secondary operations of the war, but as these were spread over two-thirds of Spain, and were simultaneous, to avoid complexity it will be necessary to class them under two great heads, namely those which took place north and those which took place south of the Tagus.

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE TAGUS.

In December, 1812, General Copons had been appointed captain-general of Catalonia instead of Eroles, but his arrival was delayed and the province was not relieved from Lacy's mischievous sway until February, 1813, when Eroles, taking the temporary command, re-established the head-quarters at Vich. The French, being then unmolested, save by the English ships, passed an enormous convoy to France, but Eroles was not long idle. Through the medium of a double spy, he sent a forged letter to the governor of Taragona, desiring him to detach men to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, with carts to transport some stores; at the same time he gave out that he was himself going to the Cerdaña, which brought the French movable column to that quarter, and then, Eroles, Manso, and Villamil, making forced marches from different points, reached Torre dem barra where they met the British squadron. The intention was to cut off the French detachment on its march to Villa Nueva and then to attack Taragona, but fortune rules in war; the governor received a letter from Maurice Mathieu of a different tenor from the forged letter, and with all haste regaining his fortress balked this well-contrived plan.

Sarzfield, at enmity with Eroles, was now combining his operations with Villa Campa, and they menaced Alcanitz in Aragon; but General Pannetier, who had remained at Teruel to watch Villa Campa, and to protect Suchet's communications, immediately marched to Daroca, Severoli came from Zaragoza to the same point, and the Spaniards, alarmed by their junction, dispersed. Sarzfield returned to Catalonia, Bassecour and the Empecinado remained near Cuenca, and Villa Campa as usual hung upon the southern skirts of the Albaracyn mountain, ready to pounce down on the Ebro or on the Guadalquivir side as advantage might offer. Meanwhile Suchet was by no means at ease. The successes in Catalonia did not enable him to draw reinforcements from thence, because Napoleon, true to his principle of securing the base of operations, forbade him to weaken the army there, and Montmarie's brigade was detached from Valencia to preserve the communication between Saguntum and Tortosa. But Aragon, which was Suchet's place of arms and principal magazine, being infested by Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and Sarzfield, was becoming daily more unquiet, wherefore Pannetier's brigade remained between Segorbé and Daroca to aid Severoli. Thus although the two armies of Aragon and Catalonia mustered more than 70,000 men, that of Aragon alone having 40,000, with 50 field-pieces, Suchet could not fight with more than 16,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and perhaps 30 guns beyond the Xucar. His right flank was always liable to be turned by Requeña, his left by the sea which was entirely at his adversary's command, and his front was menaced by 50,000 men, of which 3000 might be cavalry, with 50 pieces of artillery.

The component parts of the allied force were the Anglo-Sicilians which, includ-

ing Whittingham's and Roche's divisions, furnished 18,000 soldiers. Elio's army furnishing 12,000 exclusive of the divisions of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, which, though detached, belonged to him. Del Parque's army reinforced by new levies from Andalusia, and on paper 20,000. Numerically this was a formidable power if it had been directed in mass against Suchet; but on his right the Duke of Dalmatia, whose head-quarters were at Toledo, sent forward detachments which occupied the army of Del Parque; moreover the secret negotiations for the defection of the latter were now in full activity, and from the army of the centre a column was sent towards Cuenca to draw Bassecour and the Empecinado from Suchet's right flank; but those chiefs had 5000 men, and in return continually harassed the army of the centre.

On the side of the Morena and Murcia, Soult's operations were confined to skirmishes and foraging parties. Early in January his brother, seeking to open a communication with Suchet by Albacete, defeated some of Elio's cavalry with the loss of 50 men, and pursued them until they rallied on their main body, under Freyre; the latter offered battle with 900 horsemen in front of the defile leading to Albacete; but Soult, disliking his appearance turned off to the right, and passing through Villa Nueva de los Infantes joined a French post established in Valdepeña at the foot of the Morena, where some skirmishes had also taken place with Del Parque's cavalry. The elder Soult thus learned that Freyre, with 2500 horsemen, covered all the roads leading from La Mancha to Valencia and Murcia; that Elio's infantry was at Tobarra and Hellin, Del Parque's head-quarters at Jaen; that the passes of the Morena were guarded, and magazines formed at Andujar, Linares, and Cordoba, while on the other side of La Mancha, the Empecinado had come to Hinojoso with 1500 horsemen, and the column sent from the army of the centre was afraid to encounter him.

These dispositions, and the strength of the Spaniards, not only prevented the younger Soult from penetrating into Murcia, but delayed the march of a column, under General Daricau, destined to communicate with Suchet, and bring up the detachments baggage and stores, which the armies of the south and centre had left at Valencia. The scouting parties of both sides now met at different points, and on the 27th of January, a sharp cavalry fight happened at El Corral, in which the French commander was killed, and the Spaniards, though far the most numerous, defeated. Meanwhile Daricau, whose column had been reinforced, reached Utiel, opened the communication with Suchet by Requena, cut off some small parties of the enemy, and then continuing his march received a great convoy consisting of 2000 fighting men, 600 travellers, and the stores and baggage belonging to Soult's and the king's armies. This convoy had marched for Madrid by the way of Zaragoza, but was recalled when Daricau arrived, and under his escort, aided by a detachment of Suchet's army placed at Yniesta, it reached Todelo in the latter end of February safely, though Villa Campa came down to the Cabriel river to trouble the march.

During these different operations numerous absurd and contradictory reports, principally originating in the Spanish and English newspapers, obtained credit in the French armies, such as that Sir Henry Wellesley and Infantado had seized the government at Cadiz; that Clinton, by an intrigue, had got possession of Alicante; that Ballesteros had shown Wellington secret orders from the Cortes not to acknowledge him as generalissimo, or even as a grandee; that the Cortes had removed the regency because the latter permitted Wellington to appoint intendants and other officers to the Spanish provinces; that Hill had devastated the frontier and retired to Lisbon though forcibly opposed by Morillo; that a nephew of Ballesteros had raised the standard of revolt; that Wellington was advancing, and that troops had been embarked at Lisbon for a maritime expedition, with other stories of a like nature, which seem to have disturbed all the French generals save Soult, whose information as to the real state of affairs continued to be sure and accurate. He also at this time detected four or five of Wellington's emissaries, amongst them was a Portuguese officer on his own staff; a man called Piloti, who served and betrayed both sides; and an amazon called Francisca de la Fuente, who, though only 22 years old, had already commanded a partida of 60 men with

some success, and was now a spy. But in the latter end of February the Duke of Dalmatia was recalled, and the command of his army fell to Gazan, whose movements belong rather to the operations north of the Tagus. Wherefore turning to Suchet, I shall proceed to give an exact notion of his resources and of the nature of the country where his operations were conducted.

The city of Valencia, though nominally the seat of his power, was not so. He had razed all the defences constructed by the Spaniards, confining his hold to the old walls and to a small fortified post within the town sufficient to resist a sudden attack, and capable of keeping the population in awe; his real place of arms was Saguntum, and between that and Tortosa he had two fortresses, namely, Oropesa and Peniscola; he had also another line of communication, but for infantry only, through Morella, a fortified post, to Mequinenza. Besides these lines there were roads both from Valencia and Saguntum, leading through Segorbé to Teruel, a fortified post, and from thence to Zaragoza by Daroca, another fortified post. These roads were eastward of the Guadalaviar, and westward of that river Suchet had a line of retreat from Valencia to Madrid by Requena, which was also a fortified post. Now if the whole of the French general's command be looked to, his forces were very numerous, but that command was wide, and in the field his army was, as I have before shown, not very numerous. Valencia was in fact a point made on hostile ground which, now that the French were generally on the defensive, was only maintained with a view of imposing upon the allies and drawing forth the resources of the country as long as circumstances would permit. The proper line for covering Valencia and the rich country immediately around it was on the Xucar, or rather beyond it, at San Felipe de Xativa and Moxente, where a double range of mountains afforded strong defensive positions, barring the principal roads leading to Valencia. On this position Suchet had formed his entrenched camp, much talked of at the time, but slighter than fame represented it; the real strength was in the natural formation of the ground.

Beyond his left flank the coast road was blocked by the castle of Denia, but his right could be turned from Yecla and Almanza, through Cofrentes and Requena, and he was forced to keep strict watch and strong detachments always towards the defile of Almanza, lest Elio's army and Del Parque's should march that way. This entrenched camp was Suchet's permanent position of defence, but there were reasons why he should endeavour to keep his troops generally more advanced; the country in his front was full of fertile plains, or rather coves within the hills, which run in nearly parallel ranges, and are remarkably rocky and precipitous, enclosing the plains like walls, and it was of great importance who should command their resources. Hence as the principal point in Suchet's front was the large and flourishing town of Alcoy, he occupied it, and from thence threw off smaller bodies to Biar, Castalla, Ibi, and Onil, which were on the same strong ridge as the position covering the cove of Alcoy. On his right there was another plain in which Fuente La Higuera, Villena, and Yecla were delineated at opposite points of a triangle, and as this plain and the smaller valleys ministered to Suchet's wants because of his superior cavalry, the subsistence of the French troops was eased, while the cantonments and foraging districts of the Sicilian army were contracted: the outposts of the allied army were in fact confined to a fourth and fifth parallel range of mountains covering the towns of Elda, Tibi, Xixona, and Villa Joyosa which was on the sea-coast.

Suchet thus assumed an insulting superiority over an army more numerous than his own, but outward appearances are deceitful in war; the French general was really the strongest, because want, ignorance, dissension, and even treachery were in his adversary's camps. Del Parque's army remained behind the Morena, Elio's was at Tobarra and Hellin, and of the Anglo-Sicilian army, the British only were available in the hour of danger, and they were few. When General Campbell quarrelled with Elio the latter retired for a time towards Murcia, but after Wellington's journey to Cadiz he again came forward, and his cavalry entering La Mancha skirmished with General Soult's and, communicating with Bassecour and the Empecinado, delayed the progress of Daricau towards Valencia. Meanwhile General Campbell remained quiet, in expectation that Lord William Bentinck would

come with more troops to Alicante, but in February fresh troubles broke out in Sicily, and in the latter end of that month Sir John Murray arriving, assumed the command. Thus in a few months five chiefs with different views and prejudices successively came to the command, and the army was still unorganized and unequipped for vigorous service. The Sicilians, Calabrese, and French belonging to it were eager to desert, one Italian regiment had been broken for misconduct by General Maitland, the British and Germans were humiliated in spirit by the part they were made to enact, and the Spaniards under Whittingham and Roche were starving; * for Wellington knowing by experience how the Spanish government, though receiving a subsidy, would, if permitted, throw the feeding of their troops entirely upon the British, forbade their being supplied from the British stores, and the Spanish intendants neglected them.

Murray's first care was to improve the equipment of his troops, and with the aid of Elio he soon put them in better condition. The two armies together furnished 30,000 effective men, of which about 3000 were cavalry, and they had 37 guns, yet very inadequately horsed, and Whittingham's and Elio's cavalry were from want of forage nearly unfit for duty. The transport mules were hired at an enormous price, the expense being at the rate of £130,000 annually, and yet the supply was bad, for here as in all other parts of Spain, corruption and misuse of authority prevailed. The rich sent their fine animals to Alicante for sanctuary and bribed the Alcaldes, the mules of the poor alone were pressed, the army was ill provided, and yet the country was harassed. In this state it was necessary to do something, and as the distress of Whittingham and Roche's troops could not be removed save by enlarging their cantonments, Murray after some hesitation resolved to drive the French from the mountains in his front, and he designed, as the first step, to surprise 1500 men which they had placed in Alcoy. Now five roads led towards the French positions. 1st. On the left the great road from Alicante passing through Monforte, Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera, where it joins the great road from Valencia to Madrid, which runs through Almanza. This way turned both the ridges occupied by the armies. 2nd. A good road leading by Tibi to Castalla, from whence it sent off two branches, on the left hand, one leading to Sax, the other through the pass of Biar to Villena; two other branches on the right hand went, the one through Ibi to Alcoy, the other through Onil to the same place. 3rd. The road from Alicante to Xixona, a bad road, leading over the very steep rugged ridge of that name to Alcoy. At Xixona also there was a narrow way on the right hand, through the mountains to Alcoy, which was followed by Roche when he attacked that place in the first battle of Castalla. 4th. A carriage-road running along the sea-coast as far as Villa Joyosa, from whence a narrow mountain-way leads to the village of Consentayna, situated in the cove of Alcoy and behind that town.

On the 6th of March the allied troops moved in four columns, one on the left by Elda, to watch the great Madrid road; one on the right composed of Spanish troops under Colonel Campbell, from Villa Joyosa, to get to Consentayna behind Alcoy; a third under Lord Frederick Bentinck, issuing by Ibi, was to turn the French right; the fourth was to march from Xixona straight against Alcoy, and to pursue the remainder of Habert's division which was behind that town. Lord Frederick Bentinck attacked in due time, but as Colonel Campbell did not appear the surprise failed, and when the French saw the main body winding down the Sierra in front of Alcoy, they retired, pursued by General Donkin with the second battalion of the 27th regiment. The head of Lord Frederick Bentinck's column was already engaged, but the rear had not arrived, and the whole of Habert's division was soon concentrated a mile beyond Alcoy, and there offered battle; yet Sir John Murray, instead of pushing briskly forward, halted, and it was not until several demands for support had reached him that he detached the 58th to the assistance of the troops engaged, who had lost about 40 men, chiefly of the 27th. Habert, fearing to be cut off by Consentayna, and seeing the 58th coming on, retreated, and the allies occupied Alcoy, which greatly relieved their quarters; but the want of vigour displayed by Sir John Murray when he had gained Alcoy did not escape the notice of the troops.

* Appendix No. 16, 17.

After this affair the armies remained quiet until the 15th, when Whittingham forced the French posts with some loss from Albayda, and General Donkin, taking two battalions and some dragoons from Ibi, drove back their outposts from Rocayrente and Alsafara, villages situated beyond the range bounding the plain of Alcoy. He repassed the hills higher up with the dragoons and a company of the grenadiers of 27th, under Captain Waldron, and returned by the main road to Alcoy, having in his course met a French battalion, through which the gallant Waldron broke with his grenadiers. Meanwhile Sir John Murray, after much vacillation, at one time resolving to advance, at another to retreat, thinking it impossible first to force Suchet's entrenched camp, and then his second line behind the Xucar, a difficult river with muddy banks, believing also that the French general had his principal magazines at Valencia, conceived the idea of seizing the latter by a maritime expedition. He judged that the garrison, which he estimated at 800 infantry and 1000 cavalry, would be unable to resist, and that the town once taken the inhabitants would rise; Suchet could not then detach men enough to quell them without exposing himself to defeat on the Xucar, and if he moved with all his force he could be closely followed by the allies and driven upon Requeña. In this view he made fresh dispositions.

On the 18th, Roche's division, reinforced by some troops from Elio's army and by a British grenadier battalion, was selected for the maritime attack, and the rest of the army was concentrated on the left at Castalla with the exception of Whittingham's troops which remained at Alcoy, for Suchet was said to be advancing, and Murray resolved to fight him. But to form a plan and to execute it vigorously were with Sir John Murray very different things. Although far from an incapable officer in the cabinet, he showed none of the qualities of a commander in the field. His indecision was remarkable. On the morning of the 18th he resolved to fight in front of Castalla, and in the evening he assumed a weaker position behind that town, abandoning the command of a road, running from Ibi in rear of Alcoy, by which Whittingham might have been cut off. And when the strong remonstrances of his quarter-master-general induced him to relinquish this ground, he adopted a third position, neither so strong as the first nor so defective as the last.

In this manner, affairs were on until the 26th, when Roche's division and the grenadier battalion marched to Alicant to embark, with orders, if they failed at Valencia, to seize and fortify Cullera at the mouth of the Xucar; and if this also failed, to besiege Denia. But now the foolish ministerial arrangements about the Sicilian army worked out their natural result. Lord Wellington, though he was permitted to retain the Anglo-Sicilian army in Spain beyond the period Lord William Bentinck had assigned for its stay, had not the full command given to him; he was clogged with reference to the state of Sicily until the middle of March, and this new arrangement was still unknown to Lord William Bentinck and to Sir John Murray. Thus there were at this time, in fact, three commanding officers; Wellington for the general operations, Murray for the particular operations, and Lord William Bentinck still empowered to increase or diminish the troops, and even upon emergency to withdraw the whole. And now in consequence of the continued dissensions in Sicily, the king of that country having suddenly resumed the government, Lord William did recal 2000 of Murray's best troops, and amongst them the grenadier battalion intended to attack Valencia. That enterprise instantly fell to the ground.

Upon this event Sir John Murray, or some person writing under his authority, makes the following observations. "The most careful combination could not have selected a moment when the danger of such authority was more clearly demonstrated, more severely felt. Had these orders been received a very short time before, the allied army would not have been committed in active operations; had they reached Sir John Murray a week later, there is every reason to believe that the whole country from Alicant to Valencia would have passed under the authority of the allied army, and that Marshal Suchet, cut off from his magazines in that province, and in Aragon, would have been compelled to retire through a mountainous and barren country on Madrid. But the order of Lord William Bentinck

was peremptory, and the allied army which even before was scarcely balanced, was now so inferior to the enemy that it became an indispensable necessity to adopt a system strongly defensive, and all hope of a brilliant commencement of the campaign vanished."

Upon this curious passage it is necessary to remark, 1st, that Suchet's great magazines were not at Valencia but at Saguntum; 2nd, that from the castle of Denia the fleet would have been descried, and the strong garrison of Saguntum could have reinforced the troops in Valencia; Montmarie's brigade also would soon have come up from Oropesa. These were doubtless contingencies not much to be regarded in bar of such an enterprise, but Suchet would by no means have been forced to retire by Requena upon Madrid, he would have retired to Liria, the road to which steered more than five miles clear of Valencia. He could have kept that city in check while passing, in despite of Sir John Murray, and at Liria he would have been again in his natural position, that is to say, in full command of his principal lines of communication. Moreover, however disagreeable to Suchet personally it might have been to be forced back upon Madrid, that event would have been extremely detrimental to the general cause, as tending to reinforce the king against Wellington. But the singular part of the passage quoted, is the assertion that the delay of a week in Lord William Bentinck's order would have ensured such a noble stroke against the French army. Now Lord William Bentinck only required the troops to proceed in the first instance to Mahon; what a dull flagging spirit then was his, who dared not delay obedience to such an order even for a week!

The recalled troops embarked for Sicily on the 5th of April, and Suchet alarmed at the offensive position of the allies, which he attributed to the general state of affairs, because the king's march to Castile permitted all the Spanish armies of Andalusia to reinforce Elio, resolved to strike first, and with the greater avidity because Elio had pushed General Mijares with an advanced guard of 3000 or 4000 men to Yecla where they were quite unsupported. This movement had been concerted in March with Murray, who was to occupy Villena and be prepared to fall upon the French left, if the Spaniards were attacked at Yecla; and in return the Spaniards were to fall on the French right if Murray was attacked. Elio however neglected to strengthen his division at Yecla with cavalry, which he had promised to do, nor did Murray occupy Villena in force; nevertheless Mijares remained at Yecla, Elio with the main body occupied Hellin, and the cavalry were posted on the side of Albacete until the departure of the troops for Sicily. Roche then joined the army at Castalla, and Elio's main body occupied Elda and Sax to cover the main road from Madrid to Alicante.

On the night of the 11th Suchet, having by a forced march assembled 16 battalions of infantry, 10 squadrons of cavalry, and 12 pieces of artillery at Fuente la Higuera, marched straight upon Caudete, while Harispe's division by a cross road endeavoured to surprise the Spaniards at Yecla. The latter retired fighting towards Jumilla by the hills, but the French artillery and skirmishers followed close, and at last the Spaniards being pierced in the centre, one part broke and fled, and the other part after some farther resistance surrendered. Two hundred were killed, and 1500 prisoners, including wounded, fell into the hands of the victors, who lost about 80 men and officers.

Suchet's movement on Fuente la Higuera was known in the night of the 10th at Castalla, where all the Anglo-Sicilian army was in position, because Whittingham had come from Alcoy, leaving only a detachment on that side. Hence, while Harispe was defeating Mijares at Yecla, Suchet in person remained at Caudete with two divisions and the heavy cavalry in order of battle, lest Murray should advance by Biar and Villena. The latter town, possessing an old wall and a castle, was occupied by the regiment of Velez-Malaga, 1000 strong, and in the course of the day Murray also came up with the allied cavalry and a brigade of infantry. Here he was joined by Elio, without troops, and when towards evening Harispe's fight being over and the prisoners secured, Suchet advanced, Murray retired with the cavalry through the pass of Biar, leaving his infantry under Colonel Adam in front of that defile. He wished also to draw the Spanish garrison from

Villena, but Elio would not suffer it, and yet during the night, repenting of his obstinacy, came to Castalla entreating Murray to carry off that battalion. It was too late, Suchet had broken the gates of the town the evening before, and the castle, with the best equipped and finest regiment in the Spanish army, had already surrendered.

Murray's final position was about three miles from the pass of Biar. His left, composed of Whittingham's Spaniards, was entrenched on a rugged sierra ending abruptly above Castalla, which, with its old castle crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, closed the right of that wing, and was occupied in strength by Mackenzie's division.

A space between Whittingham's troops and the town was left on the sierra for the advanced guard, then in the pass of Biar; Castalla itself, covered by the castle, was prepared for defence, and the principal approaches were commanded by strong batteries, for Murray had concentrated nearly all his guns at this point. The cavalry was partly behind partly in front of the town on an extensive plain which was interspersed with olive plantations.

The right wing, composed of Clinton's division and Roche's Spaniards, was on comparatively low ground, and extended to the rear at right angles with the centre, but well covered by a *barranco* or bed of a torrent, the precipitous sides of which were, in some places, 100 feet deep.

Suchet could approach this position either through the pass of Biar, or turning that defile, by the way of Sax; but the last road was supposed to be occupied by Elio's army, and as troops coming by it must make a flank march along the front of the position, it was not a favourable line of attack; moreover the allies, being in possession of the defiles of Biar and of Alcoy, might have gained the Xucar, either by Fuentes de la Higuera or by Alcoy, seeing that Alicante, which was their base, was safe, and the remnants of Elio's army could easily have got away. Murray's army was however scarcely active enough for such an operation, and Suchet advanced very cautiously, as it behoved him to do, for the ground between Castalla and Biar was just such as a prompt opponent would desire for a decisive blow.

The advanced guard in the pass of Biar, about 2500 men, was composed of two Italian regiments and a battalion of the 27th British; two companies of German riflemen, a troop of foreign hussars and six guns, four of which were mountain-pieces. The ground was very strong and difficult, but at two o'clock in the afternoon the French, having concentrated in front of the pass, their skirmishers swarmed up the steep rocks on either flank with a surprising vigour and agility, and when they had gained the summit, the supporting columns advanced. Then the allies, who had fought with resolution for about two hours, abandoned the pass with the loss of two guns and about 30 prisoners, retreating however in good order to the main position, for they were not followed beyond the mouth of the defile. The next day, that is the 13th about one o'clock, the French cavalry, issuing cautiously from the pass, extended to the left in the plain as far as Onil, and they were followed by the infantry, who immediately occupied a low ridge about a mile in front of the allies' left; the cavalry then gained ground to the front, and closing towards the right of the allies menaced the road to Ibi and Alcoy.

Murray had only occupied his ground the night before, but he had studied it and entrenched it in parts. His right wing was quite refused, and so well covered by the *barranco*, that nearly all the troops could have been employed as a reserve to the left wing, which was also very strongly posted and presented a front about two miles in extent. But notwithstanding the impregnable strength of the ground the English general shrunk from the contest, and while the head of the French column was advancing from the defile of Biar, thrice he gave his quarter-master-general orders to put the army in retreat, and the last time so peremptorily, that obedience must have ensued if at that moment the firing between the picquets and the French light troops had not begun.

BATTLE OF CASTALLA.



Suchet's dispositions were made slowly and as if he also had not made up his mind to fight, but a crooked jut of the sierra, springing from about the middle of the ridge, hid from him all the British troops, and two-thirds of the whole army,

hence his first movement was to send a column towards Castalla, to turn this jut of the sierra and discover the conditions of the position. Meanwhile he formed two strong columns immediately opposite the left wing, and his cavalry, displaying a formidable line in the plain, closed gradually towards the barranco. The French general however soon discovered that the right of the allies was unattackable. Wherefore retaining his reserve on the low ridge in front of the left wing, and still holding the exploring column of infantry near Castalla, to protect his flank against any sally from that point, he opened his artillery against the centre and right wing of the allies, and forming several columns of attack, commenced the action against the allies' left on both sides of the jut before spoken of.

The ascent in front of Whittingham's post being very rugged and steep, and the upper parts entrenched, the battle there resolved itself at once into a fight of light troops, in which the Spaniards maintained their ground with resolution; but on the other side of the jut the French mounted the heights, slowly indeed and with many skirmishers, yet so firmly, that it was evident nothing but good fighting would send them down again. Their light troops spread over the whole face of the sierra, and here and there attaining the summit were partially driven down again by the Anglo-Italian troops; but where the main body came upon the second battalion of the 27th there was a terrible crash. For the ground having an abrupt declivity near the top enabled the French to form a line under cover, close to the British, who were lying down waiting for orders to charge; and while the former were unfolding their masses a grenadier, officer, advancing alone, challenged the captain of the 27th grenadiers to single combat. Waldron, an agile vigorous Irishman, and of boiling courage, instantly sprung forward, the hostile lines looked on without firing a shot, the swords of the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman's head was cleft in twain, and the next instant the 27th jumping up with a deafening shout, fired a deadly volley at half pistol-shot distance, and then charged with such a shock that, maugre their bravery and numbers, the enemy's soldiers were overthrown, and the side of the sierra was covered with the killed and wounded. In Murray's despatch this exploit was erroneously attributed to Colonel Adam, but it was ordered and conducted by Colonel Reeves alone.

The French general seeing his principal column thus overthrown, and at every other point having the worst of the fight, made two secondary attacks to cover the rallying of the defeated columns, but these also failing, his army was separated in three parts, namely the beaten troops, which were in great confusion, the reserve on the minor heights from whence the attacking columns had advanced, and the cavalry, which being far on the left in the plain, was also separated from the point of action by the bed of the torrent, a bridge over which was commanded by the allies. A vigorous sally from Castalla and a general advance, would have obliged the French reserves to fall back upon Biar in confusion before the cavalry could come to their assistance, and the victory might have been thus completed; but Murray, who had remained during the whole action behind Castalla, gave the French full time to rally all their forces and retire in order towards the pass of Biar. Then gradually passing out by the right of the town, with a tedious pedantic movement, he changed his front, forming two lines across the valley, keeping his left at the foot of the heights, and extending his right, covered by the cavalry, towards the sierra of Onil. Meanwhile Mackenzie, moving out by the left of Castalla with three British, and one German battalion, and eight guns, followed the enemy more rapidly.

Suchet had by this time plunged into the pass with his infantry, cavalry, and tumbrils in one mass, leaving a rear-guard of three battalions with eight guns to cover the passage; but these being pressed by Mackenzie, and heavily cannonaded, were soon forced to form lines and offer battle, answering gun for gun. The French soldiers were heavily crushed by the English shot, the clatter of musketry was beginning, and one well-directed vigorous charge would have overturned and driven the French in a confused mass upon the other troops, then wedged in the narrow defile; but Mackenzie's movement had been made by the order of the Quarter-master-general Donkin, without Murray's knowledge, and the latter instead of supporting it strongly, sent repeated orders to withdraw the troops already



engaged, and in despite of all remonstrance, caused them to fall back on the main body when victory was in their grasp. Suchet thus relieved at a most critical moment, immediately occupied a position across the defile with his flanks on the heights, and though Murray finally sent some light companies to attack his left, the effort was feeble and produced no result ; he retained his position, and in the night retired to Fuente de la Higuera.

On the 14th Murray marched to Alcoy, where a small part of Whittingham's forces had remained in observation of a French detachment left to hold the pass of Albayda, and through this pass he proposed to intercept the retreat of Suchet, but his movements were slow, his arrangements bad, and the army became so disordered, that he halted the 15th at Alcoy. A feeble demonstration on the following days towards Albayda terminated his operations.

In this battle of Castalla the allies had, including Roche's division, about 17,000 of all arms, and the French about 15,000. Suchet says that the action was brought on against his wish, by the impetuosity of his light troops, and that he lost only 800 men; his statement is confirmed by Vacani the Italian historian. Sir John Murray affirms that it was a pitched battle and that the French lost above 3000 men. The reader may choose between these accounts. In favour of Suchet's version it may be remarked that neither the place, nor the time, nor the mode of attack, was such as might be expected from his talents and experience in war, if he had really intended a pitched battle; and though the action was strongly contested on the principal point, it is scarcely possible that so many as 3000 men could have been killed and wounded. And yet 800 seems too few, because the loss of the victorious troops, with all advantages of ground, was more than 600. One thing is however certain, that if Suchet lost 3000 men, which would have been at least a fourth of his infantry, he must have been so disabled, so crippled, that what with the narrow defile of Biar in the rear, and the distance of his cavalry in the plain, to have escaped at all was extremely discreditable to Murray's generalship. An able commander having a superior force, and the allies were certainly the most numerous, would never have suffered the pass of Biar to be forced on the 12th, or if it were forced, he would have had his army well in hand behind it, ready to fall upon the head of the French column as it issued into the low ground.

Suchet violated several of the most important maxims of art. For without an adequate object he fought a battle, having a defile in his rear, and on ground where his cavalry, in which he was superior, could not act. Neither the general state of the French affairs nor the particular circumstances invited a decisive offensive movement at the time, wherefore the French general should have been contented with his first successes against the Spaniards, and against Colonel Adam, unless some palpable advantage had been offered to him by Murray. But the latter's position was very strong indeed, and the French army was in imminent danger, cooped up between the pass of Biar and the allied troops; and this danger would have been increased if Elío had executed a movement which Murray had proposed to him in the night of the 12th, namely, to push troops into the mountains from Sax, which would have strengthened Whittingham's left and menaced the right flank of the enemy. Elío disregarded this request, and during the whole of the operations the two armies were unconnected and acting without concert, although only a few miles distant from each other. This might have been avoided if they had previously put the castle and town of Villena in a good state of defence, and occupied the pass of Biar in force behind it. The two armies would then have been secure of a junction in advance, and the plain of Villena would have been commanded. To the courage of the troops belongs all the merit of the success obtained, there was no generalship, and hence though much blood was spilt no profit was derived from victory.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE TAGUS.

ON this side as in the south, one part of the French fronted Lord Wellington's forces, while the rest warred with the Partidas, watched the English fleets on the coast, and endeavoured to maintain a free intercourse with France; but the extent

of country was greater, the lines of communication longer, the war altogether more difficult, and the various operations more dissevered.

Four distinct bodies acted north of the Tagus.

1. The army of Portugal, composed of six divisions under Reille, observing the allies from behind the Tormes; the Gallicians from behind the Esla.

2. That part of the Army of the south which, posted in the valley of the Tagus, observed Hill from behind the Tietar, and the Spaniards of Estremadura from behind the Tagus.

3. The army of the north, under Caffarelli, whose business was to watch the English squadrons in the Bay of Biscay, to scour the great line of communication with France, and to protect the fortresses of Navarre and Biscay.

4. The army of the centre, under Count D'Erlon, whose task was to fight the *Partidas* in the central part of Spain, to cover Madrid, and to connect the other armies by means of movable columns radiating from that capital. Now if the reader will follow the operations of these armies in the order of their importance and will mark their bearing on the main action of the campaign, he will be led gradually to understand how it was, that in 1813 the French, although apparently in their full strength, were suddenly, irremediably and as it were by a whirlwind, swept from the Peninsula.

The army of the centre was composed of Darmagnac's and Barrois's French divisions, of Palombini's Italians, Casa Palacio's Spaniards, Trielhard's cavalry, and the king's French guards. It has been already shown how, marching from the Tormes, it drove the Empecinado and Bassecour from the capital; but in passing the Guadarama 150 men were frozen to death, a catastrophe produced by the rash use of ardent spirits. Palombini immediately occupied Alcala, and, having foraged the country towards Guadalaxara, brought in a large convoy of provisions to the capital. He would then have gone to Zaragoza to receive the recruits and stores which had arrived from Italy for his division, but Caffarelli was at this time so pressed that the Italian division finally marched to his succour, not by the direct road, such was the state of the northern provinces, but by the circuitous route of Valladolid and Burgos. The king's guards then replaced the Italians at Alcala, and excursions were commenced on every side against the *Partidas*, which being now recruited and taught by French deserters were become exceedingly wary and fought obstinately.

On the 8th of January, Espert, governor of Segovia, beat Saornil not far from Cuellar.

On the 3rd of February, General Vichery, marching upon Medina Celi, routed a regiment of horse called the volunteers of Madrid, and took 600 prisoners. The Empecinado with 2000 infantry and 1000 cavalry intercepted him on his return, but Vichery beat him with considerable slaughter, and made the retreat good with a loss of only 70 men. However the guerilla chief being reinforced by Saornil and Abril, still kept the hills about Guadalaxara, and when D'Erlon sent fresh troops against him, he attacked a detachment under Colonel Prieur, killed 20 men, took the baggage and recovered a heavy contribution.

During these operations the troops in the valley of the Tagus were continually harassed, especially by a chief called Cuesta, who was sometimes in the Guadalupe mountains, sometimes on the Tietar, sometimes in the Vera de Placentia, and he was supported at times on the side of the Guadalupe by Morillo and Penne Villemur. The French were however most troubled by Hill's vicinity, for that general's successful enterprises had made a profound impression, and the slightest change of his quarters, or even the appearance of an English uniform beyond the line of cantonments caused a concentration of French troops as expecting one of his sudden blows.

Nor was the army of Portugal tranquil. The Gallicians menaced it from Puebla Senabria and the gorges of the Bierzo; Silveira from the *Tras Os Montes*; the mountains separating Leon from the Asturias were full of bands; Wellington was on the Aguada; and Hill, moving from Coria by the pass of Bejar might make a sudden incursion towards Avila. Finally the communication with the army of the north was to be kept up, and on every side the *Partidas* were enterprising,

especially the horsemen in the plains of Leon. Reille however did not fail to war down these last.

Early in January, Foy, returning from Astorga to relieve General Leval, then at Avila, killed some of Marquinez' cavalry in San Pedro, and more of them at Mota la Toro; and on the 15th of that month the French captain, Mathis, killed or took 400 of the same Partida at Valderas. A convoy of guerilla stores coming from the Asturias was intercepted by General Boyer's detachments, and one Florian, a celebrated Spanish partisan in the French service, destroyed the band of Garido, in the Avila district. The same Florian on the 1st of February defeated the Medico and another inferior chief, and soon after passing the Tormes, captured some Spanish dragoons who had come out of Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 1st of March he crushed the band of Tonto and at the same time Captain Mathis, acting on the side of the Carrion river, again surprised Marquinez' band at Melgar Abaxo, and that Partida, reduced to 200 men under two inferior chiefs called Tobar and Larcos, ceased to be formidable.

Previous to this some Gallician troops, having advanced to Castro Gonzalo on the Esla, were attacked by Boyer, who beat them through Benevente with the loss of 150 men, and then driving the Spanish garrison from Puebla Senabria, raised contributions with a rigour and ferocity said to be habitual to him. His detachments afterwards penetrating into the Asturias, menaced Oviedo, and vexed the country in despite of Porlier and Barceña who were in that province. General Foy also having fixed his quarters at Avila, feeling uneasy as to Hill's intentions, had endeavoured on the 20th of February to surprise Bejar, with the view of ascertaining if any large body was collected behind it, but he was vigorously repulsed by the 50th regiment and 6th caçadores under the command of Colonel Harrison. However, this attack and the movements of Florian beyond the Tormes, induced Lord Wellington to bring up another division to the Agueda, which, by a reaction, caused the French to believe the allies were ready to advance.

During these events Caffarelli vainly urged Reille to send him reinforcements, the insurrection in the north gained strength, and the communications were entirely intercepted until Palombini, driving away Mendizabel and Longa from Burgos, enabled the great convoy and all Napoleon's despatches, which had been long accumulating there, to reach Madrid in the latter end of February. Joseph then reluctantly prepared to abandon his capital and concentrate the armies in Castile, but he neglected those essential ingredients of the emperor's plan, rapidity and boldness. By the first Napoleon proposed to gain time for the suppression of the insurrection in the northern provinces. By the second to impose upon Lord Wellington and keep him on the defensive. Joseph did neither, he was slow, and assumed the defensive himself, and he and the other French generals expected to be attacked, for they had not fathomed the English general's political difficulties; and French writers since, misconceiving the character of his warfare, have attributed to slowness in the man what was really the long-reaching policy of a great commander. The allied army was not so lithe as the French army; the latter carried on occasion ten days' provisions on the soldiers' backs, or it lived upon the country, and was in respect of its organization and customs a superior military machine; the former never carried more than three days' provisions, never lived upon the country, avoided the principle of making the war support the war, paid or promised to pay for everything, and often carried in its marches even the corn for its cavalry. The difference of this organization resulting from the difference of policy between the two nations, was a complete bar to any great and sudden excursion on the part of the British general and must always be considered in judging his operations.

It is true that if Wellington had then passed the Upper Tormes with a considerable force, drawing Hill to him through Bejar, and moving rapidly by Avila, he might have broken in upon the defensive system of the king and beat his armies in detail, and much the French feared such a blow, which would have been quite in the manner of Napoleon. But Wellington's views were directed by other than mere military principles. Thus striking, he was not certain that his blow would be decisive, his Portuguese forces would have been ruined, his British soldiers

seriously injured by the attempt, and the resources of France would have repaired the loss of the enemy sooner than he could have recovered the weakness which must necessarily have followed such an unseasonable exertion. His plan was to bring a great and enduring power early into the field, for like Phocion he desired to have an army fitted for a long race and would not start on the short course.

Joseph, though he conceived the probability and dreaded the effect of such a sudden attack, could by no means conceive the spirit of his brother's plans. It was in vain that Napoleon, while admitting the bad moral effect of abandoning the capital, pointed out the difference between flying from it and making a forward movement at the head of an army; the king even maintained that Madrid was a better military centre of operations than Valladolid, because it had lines of communication by Segovia, Aranda de Duero, and Zaragoza; nothing could be more unmilitary, unless he was prepared to march direct upon Lisbon if the allies marched upon the Duero. His extreme reluctance to quit Madrid induced slowness, but the actual position of his troops at the moment likewise presented obstacles to the immediate execution of the emperor's orders; for as Darciau's division had not returned from Valencia, the French outposts towards the Morena could not be withdrawn, nor could the army of the centre march upon Valladolid until the army of the south relieved it at Madrid. Moreover Soult's counsels had troubled the king's judgment; for that marshal agreeing that to abandon Madrid at that time was to abandon Spain, offered a project for reconciling the possession of the capital with the emperor's views. This was to place the army of Portugal, and the army of the south, in position along the slopes of the Avila mountains, and on the Upper Tormes menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, while the king with the army of the centre remained at Madrid in reserve. In this situation he said they would be an over-match for any force the allies could bring into the field, and the latter could not move either by the valley of the Tagus or upon the Duero without exposing themselves to a flank attack.

The king objected that such a force could only be fed in that country by the utter ruin of the people, which he would not consent to; but he was deceived by his ministers; the comfortable state of the houses, the immense plains of standing corn seen by the allies in their march from the Esla to the Carrion proved that the people were not much impoverished. Soult, well acquainted with the resources of the country and a better and more practised master of such operations, looked to the military question rather than to the king's conciliatory policy, and positively affirmed that the armies could be subsisted; yet it does not appear that he had taken into his consideration how the insurrection in the northern provinces was to be suppressed, which was the principle object of Napoleon's plan. He no doubt expected that the emperor would from France send troops for that purpose, but Napoleon knowing the true state of his affairs foresaw that all the resources of France would be required in another quarter.

Hatred and suspicion would have made Joseph reject any plan suggested by Soult, and the more so that the latter now declared the armies could exist without assistance in money from France; yet his mind was evidently unsettled by that marshal's proposal, and by the coincidence of his ideas as to holding Madrid, for even when the armies were in movement towards the northern parts he vacillated in his resolutions, at one time thinking to stay at Madrid, at another to march with the army of the centre to Burgos, instead of Valladolid. However, upon the 18th of March he quitted the capital, leaving the Spanish ministers Angulo and Almenara to govern there in conjunction with Gazan. The army of the south then moved in two columns, one under Couroux across the Gredos mountains to Avila, the other under Gazan upon Madrid to relieve the army of the centre, which immediately marched to Aranda de Duero and Lerma, with orders to settle at Burgos. Meanwhile Villatte's division and all the outposts withdrawn from La Mancha remained on the Alberche, and the army of the south was thus concentrated between that river, Madrid, and Avila.

North of the Tagus the troops were unmolested, save by the bands, during these movements, which were not completed before April, but in La Mancha the retiring French posts had been followed by Del Parque's advanced guard, under Cruz

Murgeon, as far as Yebeles, and at the bridge of Algotar the French cavalry checked the Spanish horsemen so roughly, that Cruz Murgeon retired again towards the Morena. At the same time on the Cuenca side, the Empecinado having attempted to cut off a party of French cavalry, escorting the Marquis of Salices to collect his rents previous to quitting Madrid, was defeated with the loss of 70 troopers. Meanwhile the great depôt at Madrid being partly removed, General Villatte marched upon Salamanca, and Gazan fixed his head-quarters at Arevalo. The army of the south was thus cantoned between the Tormes, the Duero, and the Adaja, with exception of six chosen regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, in all about 10,000 men; these remained at Madrid under Leval, who was ordered to push advanced guards to Toledo and the Alberche, lest the allies should suddenly march that way and turn the left of the French army. But beyond the Alberche there were roads leading from the valley of the Tagus over the Gredos mountains into the rear of the advanced positions which the French had on the Upper Tormes, wherefore these last were now withdrawn from Pedrahita and Puente Congosto.

In proportion as the troops arrived in Castile Reille sent men to the army of the north, and contracting his cantonments, concentrated his remaining forces about Medina de Rio Seco with his cavalry on the Esla. But the men recalled by the emperor were now in full march, the French were in a state of great confusion, the people urged by Wellington's emissaries and expecting great events everywhere showed their dislike by withholding provisions, and the Partida warfare became as lively in the interior as on the coast, yet with worse fortune. Captain Giordano, a Spaniard of Joseph's guard, killed 150 of Saornil's people near Arevalo, and the indefatigable Florian defeated Morales' band, seized a depôt in the valley of the Tietar, beat the Medico there, and then crossing the Gredos mountains, destroyed near Segovia, on the 28th, the band of Purchas; the king's Spanish guards also crushed some smaller Partidas, and Renovales with his whole staff was captured at Carvajales and carried to Valladolid. Meanwhile the Empecinado gained the hills above Sepulveda, and joining with Merino, obliged the people of the Segovia district to abandon their houses and refuse the supplies demanded by the army of the centre. When D'Armagnac and Cassagne marched against them, Merino returned to his northern haunts, the Empecinado to the Tagus, and D'Erlon then removed his head-quarters to Cuellar.

During April Leval was very much disturbed, and gave false alarms, which extending to Valladolid caused an unseasonable concentration of the troops and D'Erlon abandoned Cuellar and Sepulveda. Del Parque and the Empecinado were said to have established the bridge of Aranjuez, Elío to be advancing in La Mancha, Hill to be in the valley of the Tagus and moving by Mombeltran with the intention of seizing the passes of the Guadarama. All of this was false. It was the Empecinado and Abuelo who were at Aranjuez, the Partidas of Firmin, Cuesta, Rivero, and El Medico who were collecting at Arzobispo, to mask the march of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, and of the reserve from Andalusia; it was the Prince of Anglona who was advancing in La Mancha to cover the movement of Del Parque upon Murcia. When disabused of his error, Leval easily drove away the Empecinado, who had advanced to Alcala; afterwards chasing Firmin from Valdemoro into the valley of the Tagus, he re-established his advanced posts in Toledo and on the Alberche, and scoured the whole country around. But Joseph himself was anxious to abandon Madrid altogether, and was only restrained by the emperor's orders and by the hope of still gathering some contributions there to support his court at Valladolid. With reluctance also he had obeyed his brother's reiterated orders to bring the army of the centre over the Duero to replace the detached divisions of the army of Portugal. He wished D'Erlon rather than Reille, to reinforce the north, and nothing could more clearly show how entirely the subtle spirit of Napoleon's instructions had escaped his perception. It was necessary that Madrid should be held, to watch the valley of the Tagus and if necessary to enable the French armies to fall back on Zaragoza, but principally to give force to the moral effect of the offensive movement towards Portugal. It was equally important and for the same reason, that the army of Portugal instead of the army of the centre should furnish reinforcements for the north.

In the contracted positions which the armies now occupied, the difficulty of subsisting was increased, and each general was dissatisfied with his district, disputes multiplied, and the court clashed with the army at every turn. Leval also inveighed against the conduct of the Spanish ministers and minor authorities left at Madrid, as being hurtful to both troops and people, and no doubt justly, since it appears to have been precisely like that of the Portuguese and Spanish authorities on the other side towards the allies. Joseph's letters to his brother became daily more bitter. Napoleon's regulations for the support of the troops were at variance with his, and when the king's budget showed a deficit of many millions, the emperor so little regarded it that he reduced the French subsidy to 2,000,000 per month, and strictly forbade the application of the money to any other purpose than the pay of the soldiers. When Joseph asked, how he was to find resources? his brother with a just sarcasm on his political and military blindness, desired him to seek what was necessary in those provinces of the north which were rich enough to nourish the *Partidas* and the insurrectional juntas. The king thus pushed to the wall, prevailed upon Gazan secretly to lend him 50,000 francs, for the support of his court, from the chest of the army of the south; but with the other generals he could by no means agree, and instead of the vigour and vigilance necessary to meet the coming campaign there was weakness, disunion, and ill blood.

All the movements and arrangements for concentrating the French forces, as made by Joseph, displeased Napoleon. The manner in which the army of the centre stole away from Madrid by the road of Lerma was, he said, only calculated to expose his real views and draw the allies upon the French before the communication with France was restored. But more than all his indignation was aroused by the conduct of the king after the concentration. The French armies were held on the defensive and the allies might without fear for Portugal embark troops to invade France, whereas, a bold and confident offensive movement sustained by the formation of a battering train at Burgos, as if to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, would have imposed upon the English general, secured France from the danger of such an insult, and would at the same time have masked the necessary measures for suppressing the insurrection in the northern provinces. To quell that insurrection was of vital importance, but from the various circumstances already noticed it had now existed for seven months, five of which the king, although at the head of 90,000 men, and uninterrupted by Wellington, had wasted unprofitably, having done no more than chase a few inferior bands of the interior while this formidable warfare was consolidating in his rear; and while his great adversary was organizing the most powerful army which had yet taken the field in his front. It is thus kingdoms are lost. I shall now trace the progress of the northern insurrection so unaccountably neglected by the king, and to the last misunderstood by him; for when Wellington was actually in movement; when the dispersed French corps were rushing and crowding to the rear to avoid the ponderous mass which the English general was pushing forward; even then, the king, who had done everything possible to render defeat certain, was urging upon Napoleon the propriety of first beating the allies and afterwards reducing the insurrection by the establishment of a Spanish civil government beyond the Ebro!

NORTHERN INSURRECTION.

It has been already shown how the old *Partidas* had been strengthened and new corps organized on a better footing in Biscay and Navarre; how in the latter end of 1812 Caffarelli marched to succour Santona, and how Longa taking advantage of his absence captured a convoy near Burgos while other bands menaced Logroño. All the littoral posts, with the exception of Santona and Gueteria, were then in the possession of the Spaniards, and Mendizabel made an attempt on Bilbao the 6th of January. Repulsed by General Rouget, he rejoined Longa, and together they captured the little fort of Salinas de Anara, near the Ebro, and that of Cuba in the Bureba, while the bands of Logroño invested Domingo Calçada in the Rioja. On the 26th of January, Caffarelli, having returned from Santona, detached Vandermaesen and Dubreton to drive the Spaniards from Santander, and they seized many stores there, but neglected to make any movement to aid Santona, which was again blockaded by the *Partidas*; meanwhile the convoy with all the emperor's despatches

was stopped at Burgos. Palombini re-opened the communications and enabled the convoy to reach Madrid, but his division did not muster more than 3000 men, and various detachments belonging to the other armies were now in march to the interior of Spain. The regiments recalled to France from all parts were also in full movement, together with many convoys and escorts for the marshals and generals quitting the Peninsula; thus the army of the north was reduced, as its duties increased, and the young French soldiers died fast of a peculiar malady which especially attacked them in small garrisons. Meanwhile the Spaniards' forces increased. In February Mendizabel and Longa were again in the Bureba intercepting the communication between Burgos and Bilbao, and they menaced Pancorbo and Briviesca. This brought Caffarelli from Vittoria and Palombini from Burgos. The latter, surprised by Longa, lost many men near Poza de Sal, and only saved himself by his courage and firmness; yet he finally drove the Spaniards away. But now Mina, returning from Aragon after his unsuccessful action near Huesca, surprised and burned the castle of Fuenterrabia in a most daring manner on the 11th of March, after which, having assembled 5000 men in Guipuscoa, he obtained guns from the English fleet at Motrico, invested Villa Real within a few leagues of Vittoria, and repulsed 600 men who came to relieve the fort. This brought Caffarelli back from Pancorbo. Mina then raised the siege, and Palombini marching into the Rioja, succoured the garrison of San Domingo Calçada and drove the Partidas towards Soria. The communication with Logroño was thus re-opened, and the Italians passing the Ebro marched by Vittoria towards Bilbao where they arrived the 21st of February; but the *gens-d'armes* and imperial guards immediately moved from Bilbao to France, Caffarelli went with them, and the Spanish chiefs remained masters of Navarre and Biscay. The people now refused war contributions both in money and kind, the harvest was not ripe, and the distress of the French increased in an alarming manner because the weather enabled the English fleets to keep upon the coast and intercept all supplies from France by sea. The communications were all broken; in front by Longa who was again at the defile of Pancorbo; in the rear by Mina who was in the hills of Arlaban; on the left by a collection of bands at Caroncal in Navarre. Abbé, governor of Pampeluna severely checked these last, but Mina soon restored affairs; for leaving the volunteers of Guipuscoa to watch the defiles of Arlaban, he assembled all the bands in Navarre, destroyed the bridges leading to Taffalla from Pampeluna and from Puente la Reyna, and though Abbé twice attacked him, he got stronger, and bringing up two English guns from the coast besieged Taffalla.

Napoleon, discontented with Caffarelli's mode of conducting the war, now gave Clausel the command in the north, with discretionary power to draw as many troops from the army of Portugal as he judged necessary. He was to correspond directly with the emperor, to avoid loss of time, but was to obey the king in all things not clashing with Napoleon's orders, which contained a complete review of what had passed and what was necessary to be done. "The Partidas," the emperor said, "were strong, organized, exercised, and seconded by the exaltation of spirit which the battle of Salamanca had produced. The insurrectional juntas had been revived, the posts on the coast abandoned by the French and seized by the Spaniards gave free intercourse with the English; the bands enjoyed all the resources of the country, and the system of warfare hitherto followed had favoured their progress. Instead of forestalling their enterprises the French had waited for their attacks, and contrived to be always behind the event; they obeyed the enemy's impulsion and the troops were fatigued without gaining their object. Clausel was to adopt a contrary system, he was to attack suddenly, pursue rapidly, and combine his movements with reference to the features of the country. A few good strokes against the Spaniard's magazines, hospitals, or depôts of arms would inevitably trouble their operations, and after one or two military successes some political measures would suffice to disperse the authorities, disorganize the insurrection, and bring the young men who had been enrolled by force back to their homes. All the generals recommended, and the emperor approved of the construction of block-houses on well-chosen points, especially where many roads met; the forests would furnish the materials cheaply, and these posts should support each other

and form chains of communication. With respect to the greater fortresses, Pampeluna and Santona were the most important, and the enemy knew it, for Mina was intent to famish the first and the English squadron to get hold of the second. To supply Pampeluna it was only necessary to clear the communications, the country around being rich and fertile. Santona required combinations. The emperor wished to supply it by sea from Bayonne and St. Sebastian, but the French marine officers would never attempt the passage, even with favourable winds and when the English squadron were away, unless all the intermediate ports were occupied by the land forces.

"Six months before, these ports had been in the hands of the French, but Caffarelli had lightly abandoned them, leaving the field open to the insurgents in his rear while he marched with Souham against Wellington. Since that period the English and Spaniards held them. For four months the emperor had unceasingly ordered the retaking of Bermeo and Castro, but whether from the difficulty of the operations or the necessity of answering more pressing calls, no effort had been made to obey, and the fine season now permitted the English ships to aid in the defence. Castro was said to be strongly fortified by the English, no wonder, Caffarelli had given them sufficient time, and they knew its value. In one month every post on the coast from the mouth of the Bidassoa to St. Ander should be again reoccupied by the French, and St. Ander itself should be garrisoned strongly. And simultaneous with the coast operations should be Clausel's attack on Mina in Navarre and the chasing of the Partidas in the interior of Biscay. The administration of the country also demanded reform, and still more the organization and discipline of the army of the north should be attended to. It was the pith and marrow of the French power in Spain, all would fail if that failed, whereas if the north was strong, its administration sound, its fortresses well provided, and its state tranquil, no irreparable misfortune could happen in any other part."

Clausel assumed the command on the 22nd of February, Abbé was then confined to Pampeluna, Mina, master of Navarre, was besieging Taffalla; Pastor, Longa, Campillo, Merino and others ranged through Biscay and Castile unmolested; and the spirit of the country was so changed that fathers now sent their sons to join Partidas which had hitherto been composed of robbers and deserters. Clausel demanded a reinforcement of 20,000 men from the army of Portugal, but Joseph was still in Madrid and proposed to send D'Erlon with the army of the centre instead, an arrangement to which Clausel would not accede. Twenty thousand troops were, he said, wanted beyond the Ebro. Two independent chiefs, himself and D'Erlon, could not act together; and if the latter was only to remain quiet at Burgos his army would devour the resources without aiding the operations of the army of the north. The king might choose another commander, but the troops required must be sent. Joseph changed his plan, yet it was the end of March before Reille's divisions moved, three upon Navarre, and one upon Burgos. Meanwhile Clausel repaired with some troops to Bilbao, where General Rouget had 800 men in garrison besides Palombini's Italians.

This place was in a manner blockaded by the Partidas. The Pastor with 3000 men was on the right of the Durango river, in the hills of Guernica and Navarnis, between Bilbao and the fort of Bermeo. Mendizabal, with from 8000 to 10,000 men, was on the left of the Durango in the mountains, menacing at once Santona and Bilbao and protecting Castro. However the French had a strong garrison in the town of Durango, the construction of new works round Bilbao was in progress, and on the 22nd of March Clausel moved with the Italians and a French regiment to assault Castro. Campillo and Mendizabel immediately appeared from different sides and the garrison made a sally; the Spaniards after some sharp fighting regained the high valleys in disorder, and the design of escalading Castro was resumed, but again interrupted by the return of Mendizabel to Trucios, only seven miles from the French camp, and by intelligence that the Pastor with the volunteers of Biscay and Guipuscoa was menacing Bilbao. Clausel immediately marched with the French regiments to the latter place, leaving Palombini to oppose Mendizabel. Finding all safe at Bilbao, he sent Rouget with two French battalions to reinforce the Italians, who then drove Mendizabel from Trucios into the hills

about Valmaceda. It being now necessary to attack Castro in form, Palombini occupied the heights of Ojeba and Ramales, from whence he communicated with the garrison of Santona, introduced a convoy of money and fresh provisions there, received ammunition in return, and directed the governor Lameth to prepare a battering train of six pieces for the siege. This done, the Italians who had lost many men returned hastily to Bilbao, for the Pastor was again menacing that city.

On the evening of the 31st Palombini marched against this new enemy, and finding him too strong retreated, but being promised a reinforcement of two regiments from Durango he returned; Pastor was then with 3000 men in position at Navarnis, Palombini gave him battle on the 3rd and was defeated with the loss of 80 men, but on the 5th, being joined by the French regiments from Durango, he beat the Spaniards. They dispersed, and while some collected in the same positions behind him, and others under Pastor gained the interior, one column retired by the coast towards the Deba on the side of St. Sebastian. Palombini eagerly pursued these last, because he expected troops from that fortress to line the Deba, and hoped thus to surround the Spaniards, but the English squadron was at Lequitio and carried them off. Pastor meanwhile descending the Deba drove the French from that river to the very walls of St. Sebastian, and Palombini was forced to make for Bergara on the road to Vittoria.

At Bergara he left his wounded men with a garrison to protect them, and returning on the 9th of April attacked the volunteers of Guipuscoa at Ascoytia; repulsed in this attempt he retired again towards Bergara, and soon after took charge of a convoy of artillery going from St. Sebastian for the siege of Castro. Meanwhile Bilbao was in great danger, for the volunteers of Biscay coming from the Arlaban, made on the 10th a false attack at a bridge two miles above the entrenched camp, while Tapia, Dos Pelos, and Campillo fell on seriously from the side of Valmaceda. Mendizabel, who commanded, did not combine his movements well and was repulsed by Rouget although with difficulty; the noise of the action reached Palombini, who hastened his march, and having deposited his convoy, followed the volunteers of Biscay to Guernica and drove them upon Bermeo where they got on board the English vessels.

During these events Clausel was at Vittoria arranging the general plan of operations. Mina had on the 1st of April defeated one of his columns near Lerin with the loss of 500 or 600 men. The four divisions sent from the army of Portugal, together with some unattached regiments furnished, according to Reille, the 20,000 men demanded, yet only 17,000 reached Clausel; and as the unattached regiments merely replaced a like number belonging to the other armies, and now recalled from the north, the French general found his expected reinforcements dwindled to 13,000. Hence, notwithstanding Palombini's activity, the insurrection was in the beginning of April more formidable than ever; the line of correspondence from Torquemada to Burgos was quite unprotected for want of troops, neither was the line from Burgos to Irun so well guarded that couriers could pass without powerful escorts, nor always then. The fortifications of the castle of Burgos were to have been improved, but there was no money to pay for the works; the French, in default of transport, could not collect provisions for the magazines ordered to be formed there by the king, and two generals, La Martiniere and Rey, were disputing for the command. Nearly 40,000 irregular Spanish troops were in the field. The garrison of Taffalla, 500 strong, had yielded to Mina, and that chief, in concert with Duran, Amor, Tabueca, the militiamen of Logroña, and some minor guerillas occupied both sides of the Ebro between Calahorra, Logroña, Santa Cruz de Campero, and Guardia. They could in one day unite 18,000 infantry and 1000 horsemen. Mendizabel, Longa, Campillo, Herrera, El Pastor, and the volunteers of Biscay, Guipuscoa, and Alava, in all about 16,000, were on the coast acting in conjunction with the English squadrons, Santander, Castro, and Bermeo were still in their hands, and maritime expeditions, were preparing at Coruña and in the Asturias.

This partisan war thus presented three distinct branches, that of Navarre, that of the coast, and that on the lines of communication. The last alone required above 15,000 men; namely 10,000 from Irun to Burgos, and the line between Tolosa and Pampeluna, which was destroyed, required 1500 to restore it, while 4000 were

necessary between Mondragon and Bilbao, comprising the garrison of the latter place; even then no post would be safe from a sudden attack. Nearly all the army of the north was appropriated to the garrisons and lines of communication, but the divisions of Abbé and Vandermoesen could be used on the side of Pampeluna, and there were besides, disposable, Palombini's Italians and the divisions sent by Reille. But one of these, Sarrut's, was still in march, and all the sick of the armies in Castile were now pouring into Navarre, when, from the loss of the contributions, there was no money to provide assistance for them. Clausel had however ameliorated both the civil and the military administrations, improved the works of Guetaria, commenced the construction of block-houses between Irun and Vittoria, and as we have seen had shaken the bands about Bilbao. Now dividing his forces he destined Palombini to besiege Castro, ordering Foy and Sarrut's divisions, when the latter should arrive, to cover the operation and to oppose any disembarkation.

The field force thus appropriated, together with the troops in Bilbao under Rouget, was about 10,000 men, and in the middle of April, Clausel, beating Mina from Taffalla and Estella, assembled the remainder of the active army, composed of Taupin and Barbout's divisions of the army of Portugal, Vandermoesen's and Abbé's divisions of the army of the north, in all about 13,000 men at Puente la Reyna in Navarre. He urged General L'Huillier, who commanded the reserve at Bayonne, to reinforce St. Sebastian and Guetaria and to push forward his troops of observation into the valley of Bastan, and he also gave the commandant of Zaragoza notice of his arrival, that he might watch Mina on that side. From Puente la Reyna he made some excursions, but he lost men uselessly, for the Spaniards would only fight at advantage, and to hunt Mina without first barring all his passages of flight was to destroy the French soldiers by fatigue. And here the king's delay was most seriously felt because the winter season, when, the tops of the mountains being covered with snow, the Partidas could only move along the ordinary roads, was most favourable for the French operations, and it had passed away. Clausel despairing to effect anything with so few troops was even going to separate his forces and march to the coast, when in May Mina who had taken post in the valley of Ronçal, furnished an occasion which did not escape the French general.

On the 13th Abbé's and Vandermoesen's divisions and the cavalry entered that valley at once by the upper and lower parts, and suddenly closing upon the guerilla chief killed and wounded 1000 of his men and dispersed the rest; one part fled by the mountains to Navarquez, on the side of Sanguessa, with the wounded whom they dropped at different places in care of the country people. Chaplangarra, Cruchaga, and Carena, Mina's lieutenants, went off, each with a column, in the opposite direction and by different routes to the valley of the Aragon, they passed that river at St. Gilla, and made their way towards the sacred mountain of La Pena near Jacca. The French cavalry following them by Villa Real, entered that town the 14th on one side, while Mina with 12 men entered it on the other, but he escaped to Martes, where another ineffectual attempt was made to surprise him. Abbé's columns then descended the smaller valleys leading towards the upper valley of the Aragon, while Vandermoesen's infantry and the cavalry entered the lower part of the same valley, and the former approaching Jacca sent his wounded men there and got fresh ammunition.

Meanwhile Mina and the insurgent junta making a push to regain Navarre by the left of the Aragon river, were like to have been taken, but again escaped towards the valley of the Gallego, whither also the greater part of their troops now sought refuge. Clausel was careful not to force them over that river, lest they should remain there and intercept the communication from Zaragoza by Jacca, which was the only free line the French now possessed and too far removed from Clausel's true theatre of operations to be watched. Abbé therefore returned to Ronçal in search of the Spanish depôts, and Vandermoesen entered Sos at one end just as Mina, who had now 150 horsemen and was always intent upon regaining Navarre, passed out at the other; the light cavalry pursuing overtook him at Sos Fuentes and he fled to Carcastillo, but there unexpectedly meeting some of his own squadrons which had wandered over the mountains after the action at Ronçal, he gave battle, was defeated with the loss of 50 men and fled once more

to Aragon, whereupon the insurrectional junta dispersed, and dissensions arose between Mina and the minor chiefs under his command. Clausel, anxious to increase this discord, sent troops into all the valleys to seek out the Spanish depôts and to attack their scattered men, and he was well served by the Aragonese, for Suchet's wise administration was still proof against the insurrectional juntas.

During these events four battalions left by Mina at Santa Cruz de Campero in the Amescoas, were chased by Taupin, who had remained at Estella when the other divisions marched up the valley of Ronçal. Mina, however, reassembled at Barbastro in Aragon a strong column, crowds of deserters from the other Spanish armies were daily increasing his power, and so completely had he organized Navarre that the presence of a single soldier of his in a village sufficed to have any courier without a strong escort stopped. Many bands also were still in the Rioja, and two French regiments rashly foraging towards Lerim were nearly all destroyed. In fine the losses were well balanced, and Clausel demanded more troops, especially cavalry, to scour the Rioja. Nevertheless the dispersion of Mina's troops lowered the reputation of that chief, and the French general taking up his quarters in Pampeluna so improved this advantage by address, that many townships withdrew from the insurrection, and recalling their young men from the bands commenced the formation of eight free Spanish companies to serve on the French side. Corps of this sort were raised with so much facility in every part of Spain, that it would seem nations, as well as individuals, have an idiosyncrasy, and in these changeable warriors we again see the Mandonius and Indibilis of ancient days.

Joseph, urged by Clausel, now sent Maucune's division and some light cavalry of the army of Portugal, to occupy Pampliega, Burgos, and Briviesca, and to protect the great communication, which the diverging direction of Clausel's double operations had again exposed to the Partidas. Meanwhile the French troops had not been less successful in Biscay than in Navarre. Foy reached Bilbao the 24th of April, and finding all things there ready for the siege of Castro marched to Santana to hasten the preparations at that place, and he attempted also to surprise the chiefs Campillo and Herrera in the hills above Santana, but was worsted in the combat. The two battering trains then endeavoured to proceed from Bilbao and Santana by sea to Castro, but the English vessels, coming to the mouth of the Durango, stopped those at Bilbao, and obliged them to proceed by land, but thus gave an opportunity for those at Santana to make the sea-run in safety.

SIEGE OF CASTRO.

This place, situated on a promontory, was garrisoned by 1200 men, under the command of Don Pedro Alvarez; three English sloops of war commanded by the captains Bloye, Bremen, and Tayler, were at hand, some gun-boats were in the harbour, and 27 guns were mounted on the works. An outward wall with towers, extended from sea to sea on the low neck which connected the promontory with the main land; this line of defence was strengthened by some fortified convents, behind it came the town, and behind the town at the extremity of the promontory stood the castle.

On the 4th of May, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, took post at different points to cover the siege; the Italian general St. Paul invested the place; the engineer Vacani conducted the works, having 12 guns at his disposal. The defence was lively and vigorous, and captain Tayler with great labour landed a heavy ship-gun on a rocky island to the right of the town, looking from the sea, which he worked with effect against the French counter-batteries. On the 11th a second gun was mounted on this island, but that day the breaching batteries opened, and in a few hours broke the wall, while the counter-batteries set fire to some houses with shells, wherefore the English guns were removed from the island. The assault was then ordered but delayed by a sudden accident, for a foraging party having been sent into the hills, came flying back, pursued by a column of Spaniards which had passed unperceived through the positions of the French; and the besiegers were for some time in confusion as thinking the covering army had been beaten; however, they soon recovered, and the assault and escalade took place in the night.

The attack was rapid and fierce, the walls were carried, and the garrison driven through the town to the castle, which was maintained by two companies, while the

flying troops got on board the English vessels ; finally the Italians stormed the castle, but every gun had been destroyed, and the two companies safely rejoined their countrymen on board the ships. The English had 10 seamen wounded, the Spaniards lost about 180, and the remainder were immediately conveyed to Bermeo from whence they marched inland to join Longa. The besiegers lost only 50 men killed and wounded, and the Italian soldiers committed great excesses, setting fire to the town in many places. Foy and Sarrut, separating after the siege, marched, the former through the district of Incartaciones to Bilbao defeating a battalion of Biscay volunteers on his route ; the latter to Orduña with the design of destroying Longa ; but that chief crossed the Ebro at Puente Lara, and finding the additional troops sent by Joseph were beginning to arrive in the vicinity of Burgos, recrossed the river, and after a long chase escaped in the mountains of Espinosa. Sarrut having captured a few gun-carriages and one of Longa's forest depôts of ammunition, returned towards Bilbao, and Foy immediately marched from that place against the two remaining battalions of Biscay volunteers, which under the chiefs Mugartegui and Artola were now at Villaro and Guernica.

These battalions, each 1000 strong, raised by conscription, and officered from the best families, were the champions of Biscay ; but though brave and well equipped, the difficulty of crushing them and the volunteers of Guipuscoa was not great, because neither would leave their own peculiar provinces. The third battalion had been already dispersed in the district of Incartaciones, and Foy having in the night of the 29th combined the march of several columns to surround Villaro, fell at daybreak upon Mugartegui's battalion and dispersed it, with the loss of all its baggage. Two hundred of the volunteers immediately returned to their homes, and the French general marched rapidly through Durango against Artola, who was at Guernica. The Italians, who were still at Bilbao, immediately turned Guernica on the west by Mungia, while a French column turned it eastward by Marquinez ; then Artola fled to Lequito, but the column from Marquinez, coming over the mountain, fell upon his right flank just as he was defiling by a narrow way along the sea-coast. Artola himself escaped, but 200 Biscayens were killed or drowned, more than 300, with 27 officers were taken, and two companies which formed his rear-guard dispersed in the mountains, and some men finding a few boats rowed to an English vessel. The perfect success of this action, which did not cost the French a man killed or wounded, was attributed to the talents and vigour of Captain Guinget, the daring officer who won the passage of the Douro at Tordesillas, in Wellington's retreat from Burgos.

When the three battalions of Biscay were thus disposed of, all their magazines, hospitals, and depôts fell into Foy's hands, the junta dispersed, the privateers quitted the coast for Santander, Pastor abandoned Guipuscoa, and the Italians recovered Bermeo, from which the garrison fled to the English ships. They also destroyed the works of the little island of Isaro, which, being situated 3000 yards from the shore, and having no access to the summit, save by a staircase cut in the rock, was deemed impregnable, and used as a depôt for the English stores ; but this was the last memorable exploit of Palombini's division in the north. That general himself had already gone to Italy to join Napoleon's reserves, and his troops being ordered to march by Aragon to join Suchet, were in movement, when new events caused them to remain in Guipuscoa, with the reputation of being brave and active but ferocious soldiers, barbarous and devastating, differing little from their Roman ancestors.

It has been already observed that, during these double operations of the French on the coast and in Navarre, the Partidas had fallen upon the line of communication with France, thus working out the third branch of the insurrectional warfare. Their success went nigh to balance all their losses on each flank. For Mendizabel settled with Longa's Partida upon the line between Burgos and Miranda de Ebro ; the volunteers of Alava and Biscay, and part of Pastor's bands concentrated on the mountains of Arlaban, above the defiles of Salinas and Descarga ; Merino and Salazar came up from the country between the Ebro and the Duero ; and the three battalions left by Mina in the Amescua, after escaping from Taupin, reassembled close to Vittoria. Every

convoy and every courier's escort was attacked at one or other of these points, without hindering Mendizabel from making sudden descents towards the coast when occasion offered. Thus, on the 11th of April, as we have seen, he attacked Bilbao. On the 25th of April Longa, who had 4000 men and several guns, was repulsed at Armiñon, between Miranda and Trevino, by some of the drafted men going to France; but on the 3rd of May, at the same place, Longa met and obliged a large convoy, coming from Castile with an escort of 800 men, to return to Miranda, and even cannonaded that place on the 5th. Thouvenot, the commandant of the government, immediately detached 1200 men and three guns from Vittoria to relieve the convoy; but then Mina's battalions endeavoured to escalate Salvatierra, and they were repulsed with difficulty. Meanwhile the volunteers of Alava gathered above the pass of Salinas to intercept the rescued convoy, and finding that the latter would not stir from Vittoria, they went on the 10th to aid in a fresh attack on Salvatierra; being again repulsed, they returned to the Arlaban, where they captured a courier with a strong escort in the pass of Descarga, near Villa Real. A French regiment, sent to succour Salvatierra, finally drove these volunteers towards Bilbao, where, as we have seen, Foy routed them, but Longa continued to infest the post of Armiñon until Sarrut arriving from the siege of Castro chased him also.

Notwithstanding these successes, Clausel, whose troops were worn out with fatigue, declared that it would require 50,000 men and three months' time to quell the insurrection entirely. And Napoleon, more discontented than ever with the king, complained that the happy enterprises of Clausel, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini had brought no safety to his couriers and convoys; that his orders about the posts and the infantry escorts had been neglected; that the reinforcements sent to the north from Castile had gone slowly and in succession, instead of at once; finally, that the cautious movement of concentration by the other armies was inexcusable, since the inaction of the allies, their distance, their want of transport, their ordinary and even timid circumspection in any operation out of the ordinary course, enabled the French to act in the most convenient manner. The growing dissensions between the English and the Spaniards, the journey of Wellington to Cadiz, and the changes in his army, were, he said, all favourable circumstances for the French, but the king had taken no advantage of them; the insurrection continued, and the object of interest was now changed. Joseph defended himself with more vehemence than reason against these charges, but Wellington soon vindicated Napoleon's judgment, and the voice of controversy was smothered by the din of battle, for the English general was again abroad in his strength, and the clang of his arms resounded through the Peninsula.

CHAPTER VI.

WHILE the French power in Spain was being disorganized by the various circumstances related in the former chapter, Lord Wellington's diligence and energy had reorganized the allied army with greater strength than before. Large reinforcements, especially of cavalry, had come out from England. The efficiency and the spirit of the Portuguese had been restored in a surprising manner, and discipline had been vindicated, in both services, with a rough but salutary hand; rank had not screened offenders; some had been arrested, some tried, some dismissed for breach of duty; the negligent were terrified, the zealous encouraged; in short every department was reformed with vigour, and it was full time. Confidential officers commissioned to detect abuses in the general hospitals and depôts, those asylums for malingers, discovered and drove so many skulkers to their duty, that the second division alone recovered 600 bayonets in one month; and this salutary scouring was rendered more efficient by the establishment of both permanent and ambulant regimental hospitals, a wise measure, and founded on a principle which cannot be too widely extended; for it is certain that as the character of a battalion depends on its fitness for service, a moral force will always be brought to bear upon the execution of orders under regimental control which it is in vain to look for elsewhere.

The Douro had been rendered navigable as high up as Castillo de Alva above the confluence of the Aguada; a pontoon train of 35 pieces had been formed; carts

of a peculiar construction had been built to repair the great loss of mules during the retreat from Burgos, and a recruit of these animals was also obtained by emissaries who purchased them with English merchandise, even at Madrid, under the beards of the enemy, and at the very time when Clausel was unable for want of transport to fill the magazines of Burgós. The ponderous iron camp-kettles of the soldiers had been laid aside for lighter vessels carried by men, the mules being destined to carry tents instead; it is, however, doubtful if these tents were really useful on a march in wet weather, because when soaked they became too heavy for the animal, and seldom arrived in time for use at the end of a march. Their greatest advantage was found when the soldiers halted for a few days. Beside these amendments many other changes and improvements had taken place, and the Anglo-Portuguese troops conscious of a superior organization, were more proudly confident than ever, while the French were again depressed by intelligence of the defection of the Prussians following on the disasters in Russia. Nor had the English general failed to amend the condition of those Spanish troops which the Cortes had placed at his disposal. By a strict and jealous watch over the application of the subsidy he had kept them clothed and fed during the winter, and now reaped the benefit by having several powerful bodies fit to act in conjunction with his own forces. Wherefore being thus prepared he was anxious to strike, anxious to forestall the effects of his Portuguese political difficulties as well as to keep pace with Napoleon's efforts in Germany, and his army was ready to take the field in April, but he could not concentrate before the green forage was fit for use, and deferred the execution of his plan until May. What that plan was and what the means for executing it shall now be shown.

The relative strength of the contending armies in the Peninsula was no longer in favour of the French. Their force, which at the termination of Wellington's retreat into Portugal was above 260,000 men and 32,000 horses, 216,000 being present with the eagles, was by the loss in subsequent operations, and by drafts for the army in Germany reduced in March, 1813, to 231,000 men and 29,000 horses.* Thirty thousand of these were in hospital, and only 197,000 men, including the reserve at Bayonne, were present with the eagles. Of this number 68,000, including sick, were in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. The remainder, with the exception of the 10,000 left at Madrid, were distributed on the northern line of communication, from the Tormes to Bayonne, and it has been already shown how scattered and how occupied.

But Wellington had so well used the five months' cessation of active operations that nearly 200,000 allied troops were ready to take the field, and on each flank there was a British fleet, now a more effective aid than before, because the French lines of retreat run parallel to, and near the sea-coast on each side of Spain, and every part opened by the advance of the allies would furnish a fresh dépôt for the subsistence of their armies. This mass of troops was composed in the following manner.

The first army, under Copons, nominally 10,000, really about 6000 strong, was in Catalonia.

The second army, under Elio, was in Murcia, about 20,000, including the divisions of Villa Campa, Bassecour, Duran, and Empecinado.

The Anglo-Sicilian army, under Murray, near Alicante, about 16,000.

The third army, under Del Parque, in the Morena, about 12,000.

The first army of reserve, under the Conde d'Abispa, in Andalusia, about 15,000.

The fourth army, under Castaños, which included the Spanish divisions in Estremadura, Julian Sanchez' Partida, and the Gallicians under Giron, the Asturians under Porlier and Barceña, together with the Partidas of Longa and Mina, likewise belonged to this army and were mustered amongst its divisions. This army was computed at 40,000 men, to which may be added the minor bands and volunteers in various parts.

Lastly there was the noble Anglo-Portuguese army, which now furnished more than 70,000 fighting men, with 90 pieces of artillery; and the real difference between the French and the allies was greater than the apparent difference. The French

* Appendix, No. 18.

returns included officers, sergeants, drummers, artillerymen, engineers, and wagoners, whereas the allies' numbers were all sabres and bayonets. Moreover this statement of the French number was on the 15th of March, and as there were drafts made by Napoleon after that period, and as Clausel and Foy's losses, and the reserves at Bayonne must be deducted, it would be probably more correct to assume that the whole number of sabres and bayonets in June was not more than 160,000, of which 110,000 were on the northern line of invasion.

The campaign of 1812 had taught the English general the strength of the French lines of defence, especially on the Duero, which they had since entrenched in different parts, and most of the bridges over it he had himself destroyed in his retreat. But for many reasons it was not advisable to operate in the central provinces of Spain. The country there was exhausted, the lines of supply would be longer and more exposed, the army further removed from the sea, the Gallicians could not be easily brought down to co-operate, the services of the northern Partidas would not be so advantageous, and the ultimate result would be less decisive than operations against the great line of communication with France; wherefore against the northern provinces he had early resolved to direct his attack and had well considered how to evade those lines which he could scarcely hope to force.

All the enemy's defences on the Lower Duero could be turned by a movement on the right, across the Upper Tormes, and from thence skirting the mountains towards the Upper Duero; but that line, although most consonant to the rules of art, because the army would thus be kept in one mass, led through a very difficult and wasted country, the direct aid of the Gallicians must have been dispensed with, and moreover it was there the French looked for the allies. Hence Wellington resolved not to operate by his right, and with great skill and dexterity he had, by the disposition of his troops in winter quarters, by false reports and false movements, masked his real intentions. For the gathering of the Partidas in the valley of the Tagus, the demonstrations made in Estremadura and La Mancha by Penne, Villemur, Morillo and Del Parque's army, together with the presence of Hill at Coria, that general's hold of the passes of Bejar, and the magazines formed there, all intimated a design of moving either by the valley of the Tagus or by the district of Avila; and the great magazines collected at Celerico, Viseu, Penamacor, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo, in no manner belied the other indications. But half the army widely cantoned in the interior of Portugal, apparently for the sake of subsistence or health, was really so placed as to be in the direction of the true line of operations, which was by the left through the *Tras os Montes*.

Wellington's plan was to pass the Duero, within the Portuguese frontier, with a part of his army; to ascend the right bank of that river towards Zamora, and then crossing the *Esla* to unite with the Gallician forces, while the remainder of the army, advancing from the *Agueda*, forced the passage of the Tormes. By this great movement, which he hoped to effect so suddenly that the king would not have time to concentrate the French armies in opposition, the front of the allies would be changed to their right, the Duero and the *Pisuerga* would be turned, and the enemy forced in confusion over the *Carion*. Then, with his powerful army well in hand, the English general could march in advance without fear, strong enough to fight and strong enough to turn the right flank of any position which the French might take up; and with this advantage also, that at each step he would gain additional help by the junction of the irregular Spanish forces until he gave his hand to the insurgents in Biscay, and every port opened would furnish him a new *dépôt* and magazines.

But in executing this movement the army would necessarily be divided into three separate divisions each too weak to beat the whole French force singly; the march of the centre division by the *Tras os Montes*, upon the nice execution of which the concentration of the whole depended, would be through an extremely difficult and mountainous country, and there were three great rivers to pass. The operation was therefore one of extreme delicacy, requiring nice and extensive arrangements; yet there was not much danger to be apprehended from failure; because as each separate corps had a strong country to retire upon, the probable extent of the mischief would only be the loss of time, and the disadvantage of pursuing other

operations when the harvest being ripe the French could easily keep in masses. The secret then was to hide the true plan as long as possible, to gain some marches for the centre corps, and by all means to keep the French so scattered and occupied by minor combinations, that they should be unable to assemble in time to profit from their central positions. Now the bridge equipage being prepared at Abrantes in the interior of Portugal was unknown, and gave no intimation of the real design, for the bullocks which drew it came with cars from Spain to Lamego and from thence went down to Abrantes; the free navigation of the Douro up to the Agueda was more conducive to a movement by the right, and it furnished abundance of large boats wherewith to pass that river without creating any suspicion from their presence; the wide cantonnements of the allies permitted various changes of quarters under the pretence of sickness, and the troops thus gradually closed upon the Douro, within the Portuguese frontier, unobserved of the enemy, who was likewise deceived by many reports purposely spread abroad. The menacing head which Hill, and the Spaniards in southern Estremadura and Andalusia, carried towards the valley of the Tagus and towards the Avila district, also contributed to draw the enemy's attention away from the true point of danger; but more than all other things the vigorous excitement of the insurrection in the north occupied the French, scattered their forces, and rendered the success of the English general's plan nearly certain.

Neither did Lord Wellington fail to give ample employment to Suchet's forces, for his wings were spread for a long flight even to the Pyrennees, and he had no desire to find that marshal's army joined with the other French forces on the Ebro. The lynx eyes of Napoleon had scanned this point of war also, and both the king and Clausel had received orders to establish the shortest and most certain line of correspondence possible with Suchet, because the emperor's plan contemplated the arrival of the army of Aragon in the north, but Wellington furnished a task for it elsewhere. Sir John Murray, as we have seen, had just repulsed the French at Castalla, and General Freire's cavalry had joined the Andalusian reserve under Abispa, but Elio, with the third army, remained near Alicante, and Wellington destined Del Parque's army to join him. This with the Anglo-Sicilian army made more than 50,000 men, including the divisions of Duran, Villa Campa, the Empeccinado, and other partisans always lying on Suchet's right flank and rear. Now with such a force, or even half this number of good troops, the simplest plan would have been to turn Suchet's right flank and bring him to action with his back to the sea; but the Spanish armies were not efficient for such work, and Wellington's instructions were adapted to the actual circumstances. To win the open part of the kingdom, to obtain a permanent footing on the coast beyond the Ebro, and to force the enemy from the lower line of that river by acting in conjunction with the Catalans, these were the three objects which Wellington proposed to reach and in the following manner. Murray was to sail against Taragona, to save it Suchet would have to weaken his army in Valencia; Elio and Del Parque might then seize that kingdom. If Taragona fell, good. If the French proved too strong, Murray could return instantly by sea, and secure possession of the country gained by the Spanish generals. These last were however to remain strictly on the defensive until Murray's operations drew Suchet away, for they were not able to fight alone, and above all things it was necessary to avoid a defeat which would leave the French general free to move to the aid of the king.

The force necessary to attack Taragona Wellington judged at 10,000, and if Murray could not embark that number there was another mode of operating. Some Spanish divisions, to go by sea, were then to reinforce Copons in Catalonia and enable him to hold the country between Taragona, Tortosa, and Lerida; meanwhile Murray and Elio were to advance against Suchet in front, and Del Parque in conjunction with the Portuguese troops to turn his right flank by Requena; and this operation was to be repeated until the allies communicated with Copons by their left, the partisans advancing in proportion and cutting off all communication with the northern parts of Spain. Thus in either case Suchet would be kept away from the Upper Ebro, and there was no reason to expect any interruption from that quarter.

But Wellington was not aware that the infantry of the army of Portugal were

beyond the Ebro; the spies, deceived by the multitude of detachments passing in and out of the Peninsula, supposed the divisions which reinforced Clausel to be fresh conscripts from France; the arrangements for the opening of the campaign were therefore made in the expectation of meeting a very powerful force in Leon. Hence Freire's cavalry, and the Andalusian reserve under the Conde de Abisbal, received orders to march upon Almaraz, to pass the Tagus there by a pontoon bridge which was established for them, and then crossing the Gredos by Bejar or Mombeltran, to march upon Valladolid while the Partidas of that quarter should harass the march of Leval from Madrid. Meanwhile the Spanish troops in Estremadura were to join those forces on the Agueda which were destined to force the passage of the Tormes. The Galicians under Giron were to come down to the Esla, and unite with the corps destined to pass that river and turn the line of the Duero. Thus 70,000 Portuguese and British, 8000 Spaniards from Estremadura, and 12,000 Galicians, that is to say, 90,000 fighting men would be suddenly placed on a new front, and marching abreast against the surprised and separated masses of the enemy, would drive them reflux to the Pyrennees. A grand design and grandly it was executed! For high in heart and strong of hand Wellington's veterans marched to the encounter, the glories of 12 victories played about their bayonets, and he the leader so proud and confident, that in passing the stream which marks the frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups and waving his hand cried out "Farewell Portugal."

But while straining every nerve, and eager to strike, as well to escape from the Portuguese politics as to keep pace with Napoleon's efforts in Germany, the English general was mortified by having again to discuss the question of a descent on Italy. Lord William Bentinck had relinquished his views upon that country with great reluctance, and now, thinking affairs more favourable than ever, again proposed to land at Naples, and put forward the Duke of Orleans or the archduke Francis. He urged in favour of this project the weak state of Murat's kingdom, the favourable disposition of the inhabitants, the offer of 15,000 auxiliary Russians made by Admiral Grieg, the shock which would be given to Napoleon's power, and the more effectual diversion in favour of Spain. He supported his opinion by an intercepted letter of the Queen of Naples to Napoleon, and by other authentic documents, and thus, at the moment of execution, Wellington's vast plans were to be disarranged to meet a new scheme of war which he had already discussed and disapproved of, and which, however promising in itself, would inevitably divide the power of England and weaken the operations in both countries.

His reply was decisive. His opinion on the state of affairs in Sicily was, he said, not changed by the intercepted letters, as Murat evidently thought himself strong enough to attack the allies. Lord William Bentinck should not land in Italy with less than 40,000 men of all arms, perfectly equipped, since that army would have to depend upon its own means and to overcome all opposition before it could expect the people to aid or even to cease to oppose it. The information stated that the people looked for protection from the French and they preferred England to Austria. There could be no doubt of this, the Austrians would demand provisions and money and would insist upon governing them in return, whereas the English would as elsewhere defray their own expenses and probably give a subsidy in addition. The south of Italy was possibly for many reasons the best place next to the Spanish Peninsula for the operations of a British army, and it remained for the government to choose whether they would adopt an attack on the former upon such a scale as he had alluded to. But of one thing they might be certain, that if it were commenced on a smaller scale, or with any other intention than to persevere to the last, and by raising, feeding, and clothing armies of the natives, the plan would fail and the troops would re-embark with loss and disgrace.

This remonstrance at last fixed the wavering judgment of the ministers, and Wellington was enabled to proceed with his own plans. He designed to open the campaign in the beginning of May, and as the green forage was well advanced on the 21st of April, he directed Murray, Del Parque, Elio, and Copons to commence their operations on the eastern coast; Abisbal and Freire were already in march and expected at Almaraz on the 24th; the Spanish divisions of Estremadura had

come up to the Coa, and the divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese force were gradually closing to the front. But heavy rains broke up the roads, and the cumbrous pontoon train being damaged on its way from the interior, did not reach Sabugal before the 13th, and was not repaired before the 15th. Thus the opening of the campaign was delayed, yet the check proved of little consequence, for on the French side nothing was prepared to meet the danger.

Napoleon had urged the king to send his heavy baggage and stores to the rear, and to fix his hospitals and dépôts at Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, Tolosa, and San Sebastian. In neglect of this the impediments remained with the armies, the sick were poured along the communications, and in disorder thrown upon Clausel at the moment when that general was scarcely able to make head against the northern insurrection.

Napoleon had early and clearly fixed the king's authority as generalissimo, and forbade him to exercise his monarchical authority towards the French armies. Joseph was at this moment in high dispute with all his generals upon those very points.

Napoleon had directed the king to enlarge and strengthen the works of Burgos castle, and to form magazines in that place, and at Santona, for the use of the armies in the field. At this time no magazines had been formed at either place, and although a commencement had been made to strengthen the castle of Burgos, it was not yet capable of sustaining four hours' bombardment, and offered no support for the armies.

Napoleon had desired that a more secure and shorter line of correspondence than that by Zaragoza should be established with Suchet; for his plan embraced though it did not prescribe the march of that general upon Zaragoza, and he had warned the king repeatedly how dangerous it would be to have Suchet isolated and unconnected with the northern operations. Nevertheless the line of correspondence remained the same, and the allies possessed the means of excising Suchet's army from the operations in the north.

Napoleon had long and earnestly urged the king to put down the northern insurrection in time to make head against the allies on the Tormes. Now when the English general was ready to act, that insurrection was in full activity, and all the army of the north and the greatest part of the army of Portugal was employed to suppress it instead of being on the Lower Duero.

Napoleon had clearly explained to the king the necessity of keeping his troops concentrated towards the Tormes in an offensive position, and he had desired that Madrid might be held in such a manner that it could be abandoned in a moment. The campaign was now being opened, the French armies were scattered, Leval was encumbered at Madrid with a part of the civil administration, with large stores and parks of artillery, and with the care of families attached to Joseph's court, while the other generals were stretching their imaginations to devise which of the several projects open to him Wellington would adopt. Would he force the passage of the Tormes and the Duero with his whole army, and thus turn the French right? Would he march straight upon Madrid either by the district of Avila or by the valley of the Tagus or by both; and would he then operate against the north, or upon Zaragoza, or towards the south in co-operation with the Anglo-Sicilians? Everything was vague, uncertain, confused.

The generals complained that the king's conduct was not military, and Napoleon told him if he would command an army he must give himself up entirely to it, thinking of nothing else; but Joseph was always demanding gold when he should have trusted to iron. His skill was unequal to the arrangements and combinations for taking an initiatory and offensive position, and he could neither discover nor force his adversary to show his real design. Hence the French armies were thrown upon a timid defensive system, and every movement of the allies necessarily produced alarm and the dislocation of troops without an object. The march of Del Parque's army towards Alcaraz, and that of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura towards the Agueda, in the latter end of April, were judged to be the commencement of a general movement against Madrid, because the first was covered by the advance of some cavalry into La Mancha, and the second by the concentration of the Par-

tidas in the valley of the Tagus. Thus the whole French army was shaken by the demonstration of a few horsemen, for when Leval took the alarm, Gazan marched towards the Guadarama with three divisions, and D'Erlon gathered the army of the centre around Segovia.

Early in May a fifth division of the army of Portugal was employed on the line of communication at Pampliega, Burgos, and Briviesca, and Reille remained at Valladolid with only one division of infantry and his guns, his cavalry being on the Esla. D'Erlon was then at Segovia and Gazan at Arevalo, Conroux's division was at Avila, and Leval still at Madrid with outposts at Toledo. The king who was at Valladolid could not therefore concentrate more than 35,000 infantry on the Duero. He had indeed 9000 excellent cavalry and 100 pieces of artillery, but with such dispositions to concentrate for a battle in advance was not to be thought of, and the first decided movement of the allies was sure to roll his scattered forces back in confusion. The lines of the Tormes and the Duero were effaced from the system of operations.

About the middle of May, D'Armagnac's division of the army of the centre came to Valladolid, Villatte's division of the army of the south, reinforced by some cavalry, occupied the line of the Tormes from Alba to Ledesma. Daricau's, Digeon's, and D'Armagnac's divisions were at Zamora, Toro, and other places on both sides of the Duero, and Reille's cavalry was still on the Esla. The front of the French was thus defined by these rivers, for the left was covered by the Tormes, the centre by the Duero, the right by the Esla. Gazan's head-quarters were at Arevalo, D'Erlon's at Segovia, and the point of concentration was at Valladolid; but Conroux was at Avila, and Leval being still at Madrid was thrown entirely out of the circle of operations. At this moment Wellington entered upon what has been in England called, not very appropriately, the march to Vittoria. That march was but one portion of the action. The concentration of the army on the banks of the Duero was the commencement, the movement towards the Ebro and the passage of that river was the middle, the battle of Vittoria was the catastrophe, and the crowning of the Pyrennees the end of the splendid drama.

CHAPTER VII.

In the latter part of April, the Spanish troops from Estremadura being assembled on the Tormes near Almada, Carlos d'España's division moved to Miranda del Castanar, and everything was ready to open the campaign when an unexpected and formidable danger menacing ruin arose. Some specie sent from England had enabled the general to pay up the British soldiers' arrears to November, 1812, but the Portuguese troops were still neglected by their government, a whole year's pay was due to them, a suspicion that a systematic difference in this respect was to be established pervaded their minds, and at the same time many regiments which had been raised for a limited period and whose term of service was now expired, murmured for their discharge, which could not be legally refused. The moment was critical, but Wellington applied suitable remedies. He immediately threatened to intercept the British subsidy for the payment of the troops which brought the Portuguese regency to its senses, and he then made an appeal to the honour and patriotism of the Portuguese soldiers whose time had expired. Such an appeal is never made in vain to the poorer classes of any nation; one and all those brave men remained in the service notwithstanding the shameful treatment they had endured from their government. This noble emotion would seem to prove that Beresford, whose system of military reform was chiefly founded upon severity, might have better attained his object in another manner; but harshness is the essence of the aristocratic principle of government, and the marshal only moved in the straight path marked out for him by the policy of the day.

When this dangerous affair was terminated Castaños returned to Galicia, and the British cavalry of the left wing, which had wintered about the Mondego, crossed the Duero, some at Oporto, some near Lamego, and entered the *Tras os Montes*. The Portuguese cavalry had been already quartered all the winter in that province, and the enemy supposed that Sylveira would as formerly advance from Braganza to connect the Gallicians with the allies. But Sylveira was then commanding an

infantry division on the Agueda, and a very different power was menacing the French on the side of Braganza. For about the middle of May the cavalry were followed by many divisions of infantry, and by the pontoon equipage, thus forming with the horsemen and artillery a mass of more than 40,000 men under General Graham. The infantry and guns being rapidly placed on the right of the Duero by means of large boats assembled between Lamego and Castello de Alva, near the mouth of the Agueda, marched in several columns towards the lower Esla; the cavalry moved down to the same point by Braganza.

On the 20th Hill came to Bejar with the second division, and on the 22nd of May, Graham being well advanced, Wellington quitted his head-quarters at Freneda, and put his right wing in motion towards the Tormes. It consisted of five divisions of Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish infantry, and five brigades of cavalry, including Julian Sanchez' horsemen, the whole forming with the artillery a mass of from 25,000 to 30,000 men. The right under General Hill moved from Bejar upon Alba de Tormes, the left under Wellington himself by Matilla upon Salamanca.

On the 24th Villatte withdrew his detachment from Ledesma, and on the 26th at ten o'clock in the morning the heads of the allied columns with admirable concert appeared on all the different routes leading to the Tormes. Morillo's and Long's cavalry menaced Alba, Hill coming from Tamames bent towards the fords above Salamanca, and Wellington coming from Matilla marched straight against that city.

Villatte, a good officer, barricaded the bridge and the streets, sent his baggage to the rear, called in his detachment from Alba, and being resolved to discover the real force of his enemy, waited for their approaching masses on the heights above the ford of Santa Marta. Too long he waited, for the ground on the left side of the river had enabled Wellington to conceal the movements, and already Fane's horsemen with six guns were passing the ford at Santa Marta in Villatte's rear, while Victor Alten's cavalry removed the barricades on the bridge, and pushed through the town to attack him in front. The French general, being thus suddenly pressed, gained the heights of Cabrerizos, marching towards Babila Fuente, before Fane got over the river; but he had still to pass the defiles of Aldea Lengua, and was overtaken by both columns of cavalry.

The guns opening upon the French squares killed 30 or 40 men, and the English horsemen charged, but horsemen are no match for such infantry whose courage and discipline nothing could quell; they fell before the round shot, and nearly 100 died in the ranks without a wound from the intolerable heat, yet the cavalry made no impression on those dauntless soldiers, and in the face of 30,000 enemies they made their way to Babila Fuente, where they were joined by General Lefol with the troops from Alba, and finally the whole disappeared from the sight of their admiring and applauding opponents. Nevertheless 200 had sunk dead in the ranks, a like number unable to keep up were made prisoners, and a leading gun having been overturned in the defile of Aldea Lengua, six others were retarded and the whole fell in the allies' hands together with their tumbrils.

The line of the Tormes being thus gained, the allied troops were on the 27th and 28th pushed forward with their left towards Miranda and Zamora, and their right towards Toro; so placed the latter covered the communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, while the former approached the point on the Duero, where it was proposed to throw the bridge for communication with Graham's corps. This done Wellington left General Hill in command, and went off suddenly, for he was uneasy about his combinations on the Esla. On the 29th he passed the Duero at Miranda, by means of a basket slung on a rope which was stretched from rock to rock, the river foaming several hundred feet below. The 30th he reached Carvajales.

Graham had met with many difficulties in his march through the rugged Tras os Montes, and though the troops were now close to the Esla, stretching from Carvajales to Tabara, and their left was in communication with the Galicians who were coming down to Benevente, the combination had been in some measure thwarted by the difficulty of crossing the Esla. The general combination required

that river to be passed on the 29th, at which time the right wing, continuing its march from the Tormes without halting, could have been close to Zamora, and the passage of the Duero would have been insured. The French armies would then have been entirely surprised and separated, and some of their divisions overtaken and beaten. They were indeed still ignorant that a whole army was on the Esla, but the opposite bank of that river was watched by picquets of cavalry and infantry, the stream was full and rapid, the banks steep, the fords hard to find, difficult and deep, with stony beds, and the alarm had spread from the Tormes through all the cantonments.

At daybreak on the 31st some squadrons of hussars, with infantry holding by their stirrups, entered the stream at the ford of Almendra, and at the same time Graham approached the right bank with all his forces. A French picquet of 30 men was surprised in the village of Villa Perdrices by the hussars, the pontoons were immediately laid down, and the columns commenced passing, but several men, even of the cavalry, had been drowned at the fords.

On the 1st of June, while the rear was still on the Esla, the head of the allies entered Zamora, which the French evacuated after destroying the bridge. They retired upon Toro, and the next day having destroyed the bridge there also, they again fell back, but their rear-guard was overtaken near the village of Morales by the hussar brigade under Colonel Grant. Their horsemen immediately passed a bridge and swamp under a cannonade, and then facing about in two lines, gave battle, whereupon Major Roberts with the 10th regiment, supported by the 15th, broke both the lines with one charge and pursued them for two miles, and they lost above 200 men, but finally rallied on the infantry reserves.

The junction of the allies' wings on the Duero was now secure, for that river was fordable, and Wellington had also, in anticipation of failure on one point, made arrangements for forming a boat bridge below the confluence of the Esla; and he could also throw his pontoons without difficulty at Toro, and even in advance, because Julian Sanchez had surprised a cavalry picquet at Castronuño on the left bank, and driven the French outposts from the fords of Pollos. But the enemy's columns were concentrating, it might be for a battle, wherefore the English general halted the 3rd, to bring the Gallicians in conjunction on his left, and to close up his own rear, which had been retarded by the difficulty of passing the Esla. The two divisions of his right wing, namely, the second and light division, passed the Duero on the morning of the 3rd, the artillery and baggage by a ford, the infantry at the bridge of Toro, which was ingeniously repaired by the lieutenant of engineers, Pringle, who dropped ladders at each side of the broken arch, and then laid planks from one to the other, just above the water level. Thus the English general mastered the line of the Duero, and those who understand war may say whether it was an effort worthy of the man and his army.

Let them trace all the combinations, follow the movement of Graham's columns, some of which marched 150, some more than 250 miles, through the wild districts of the *Tras os Montes*. Through those regions, held to be nearly impracticable even for small corps, 40,000 men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and pontoons, had been carried and placed, as if by a supernatural power, upon the Esla, before the enemy knew even that they were in movement! Was it fortune or skill that presided? Not fortune, for the difficulties were such that Graham arrived later on the Esla than Wellington intended, and yet so soon, that the enemy could make no advantage of the delay. For, had the king even concentrated his troops behind the Esla on the 31st, the Gallicians would still have been at Benevente, and reinforced by Penne Villemur's cavalry, which had marched with Graham's corps, and the Asturians, would have been at Leon on the Upper Esla, which was fordable. Then the final passage of that river could have been effected by a repetition of the same combinations on a smaller scale, because the king's army would not have been numerous enough to defend the Duero against Hill, the Lower Esla against Wellington, and the Upper Esla against the Spaniards at the same time. Wellington had also, as we have seen, prepared the means of bringing Hill's corps, or any part of it, over the Duero, below the confluence of the Esla, and all these combinations, these surprising exertions, had been made merely to gain a fair field of battle.

But if Napoleon's instructions had been ably worked out by the king during the winter, this great movement could not have succeeded, for the insurrection in the north would have been crushed in time, or, at least, so far quelled that 60,000 French infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 100 pieces of artillery would have been disposable, and such a force, held in an offensive position on the Tormes, would probably have obliged Wellington to adopt a different plan of campaign. If concentrated between the Duero and the Esla, it would have baffled him on that river, because operations which would have been effectual against 35,000 infantry, would have been powerless against 60,000. Joseph indeed complained that he could not put down the insurrection in the north; that he could not feed such large armies; that a thousand obstacles arose on every side which he could not overcome; in fine, that he could not execute his brother's instructions. They could have been executed notwithstanding. Activity, the taking time by the forelock, would have quelled the insurrection; and for the feeding of the troops, the boundless plains called the *Tierras de Campos*, where the armies were now operating, were covered with the ripening harvest; the only difficulty was to subsist that part of the French army not engaged in the northern provinces during the winter. Joseph could not find the means, though Soult told him they were at hand, because the difficulties of his situation overpowered him; they would not have overpowered Napoleon; but the difference between a common general and a great captain is immense, the one is victorious when the other is defeated.

The field was now clear for the shock of battle, but the forces on either side were unequally matched. Wellington had 90,000 men, with more than 100 pieces of artillery. Twelve thousand were cavalry, and the British and Portuguese present with the colours were, including sergeants and drummers, above 70,000 sabres and bayonets; the rest of the army was Spanish. Besides this mass there were the irregulars on the wings, Sanchez' horsemen, 1000 strong, on the right beyond the Duero; Porlier, Barcena, Salazar, and Manzo on the left, between the Upper Esla and the Carion. Saornil had moved upon Avila, the Empecinado was hovering about Leval. Finally, the reserve of Andalusia had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 30th, and numerous minor bands were swarming round as it advanced. On the other hand, though the French could collect 9000 or 10,000 horsemen, and 100 guns, their infantry was less than half the number of the allies, being only 35,000 strong, exclusive of Leval. Hence the way to victory was open, and on the 4th Wellington marched forward with a conquering violence.

The intrusive monarch was in no condition to stem or to evade a torrent of war, the depth and violence of which he was even now ignorant of, and a slight sketch of his previous operations will show that all his dispositions were made in the dark, and only calculated to bring him into trouble. Early in May he would have marched the army of the centre to the Upper Duero when Leval's reports checked the movement. On the 15th of that month a spy sent to Bejar by D'Erlon, brought intelligence that a great number of country carts had been collected there and at Placentia, to follow the troops in a march upon Talavera, but after two days were sent back to their villages; that 50 mules had been purchased at Bejar and sent to Ciudad Rodrigo; that about the same time the first and fourth divisions and the German cavalry had moved from the interior towards the frontier, saying they were going, the first to Zamora, and the last to Fuente Guinaldo; that many troops were already gathered at Ciudad Rodrigo under Wellington and Castaños; that the divisions at Coria and Placentia were expected there, the reserves of Andalusia were in movement, and the pass of Baños, which had been before retrenched and broken up, was now repaired; that the English soldiers were paid their arrears, and everybody said a grand movement would commence on the 12th. All this was extremely accurate, but with the exception of the march to Zamora, which seemed to be only a blind; the information obtained indicated the principal movement as against the Tormes, and threw no light upon the English general's real design.

On the other flank Reille's cavalry under Boyer, having made an exploring sweep round by Astorga, La Baneza and Benevente brought intelligence that a Gallician expedition was embarking for America, that another was to follow, and

that several English divisions were also embarking in Portugal. The 23rd of May a report from the same quarter gave notice that Salazar and Manzo were with 700 horsemen on the Upper Esla, that Porlier was coming from the Asturias to join them with 2500 men, and Giron with 6000 Gallicians had reached Astorga; but it was uncertain if Sylveira's cavalry would come from Braganza to connect the left of the English with the Gallicians as it had done the year before.

Thus on the 24th of May the French were still entirely in the dark with respect to Graham's movement, and although it was known the 26th at Valladolid, that Wellington had troops in the country beyond the Esla, it was not considered a decisive movement because the head-quarters were still at Freneda. However, on the 29th Reille united his cavalry at Valderas, passed the Esla, entered Benevente, and sent patrols towards Tobara and Carvajales; from their reports and other sources he understood the whole allied army was on the Esla, and as his detachments were closely followed by the British scouting parties, he recrossed the Esla and broke the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, leaving his light horsemen to watch it. But the delay in the passage of the Esla, after Graham had reached Carvajales, made Reille doubt both the strength of the allies and their inclination to cross that river. He expected the main attack on the Tormes, and proposed in conjunction with Daricau's infantry, and Digeon's dragoons, then at Toro and Zamora, to defend the Duero and the Lower Esla, leaving the Gallicians, whose force he despised, to pass the Upper Esla at their peril.

D'Armagnac's division was now at Rio Seco, and Maucune's division, which had been spread along the road to Burgos, was ordered to concentrate at Palencia on the Carion; but meanwhile Gazen, on the other flank of the French position, was equally deceived by the movements of the English general. The 7th of May he heard from the Tormes that the allies' preparations indicated a movement towards that river. Leval wrote from Madrid that he had abandoned Toledo because 15,000 English and 10,000 Spaniards were to advance by the valley of the Tagus, that rations had been ordered at Escalona for Long's English cavalry, and that magazines were formed at Bejar. At the same time from a third quarter came news that three divisions would pass the Duero to join the Gallicians and march upon Valladolid.

Gazen, rightly judging that the magazines at Bejar were to supply Hill and the Spaniards, in their movement to join Wellington, expected at first that the whole would operate by the Esla, but on the 14th fresh reports changed this opinion; he then judged Hill would advance by the Puente Congosto upon Avila, to cut Leval off from the army, while Wellington attacked Salamanca. On the 24th however his doubts vanished. Villatte told him that Wellington was over the Agueda, Graham over the Lower Douro, and at the same time Daricau, writing from Zamora, told him that Graham's cavalry had already reached Alcanizas, only one march from the Esla. Conroux was instantly directed to march from Avila to Arevalo, Tilly to move with the cavalry of the army of the south, from Madrigal towards the Trabancos, Daricau to send a brigade to Toro, and Leval to come over the Guadarama pass and join D'Erlon at Segovia.

On the 26th Gazan, thinking Wellington slow and crediting a report that he was sick and travelling in a carriage, relapsed into doubt. He now judged the passage of the Agueda a feint, thought the allies' operations would be in mass towards the Esla, and was positively assured by his emissaries that Hill would move by the Puente Congosto against Segovia. However, on the 27th he heard of the passage of the Tormes and of Villatte's retreat, whereupon evacuating Arevalo he fixed his head-quarters at Rueda, and directed Conroux who was marching upon Arevalo, and so hastily that he left a movable column behind him on the Upper Tormes, to come to the Trabancos.

Gazan at first designed to take post behind that river, but there was no good position there, and the 28th he rallied Conroux's, Rey's, and Villatte's infantry and Tilly's cavalry behind the Zapardiel. Daricau's division was meanwhile concentrated at Toro, and Digeon's at Zamora; a bridge-head was commenced at Tordesillas, which was the point of retreat, and guards were placed at Pollos where the fords of the Duero were very low though as yet impracticable. These move-

ments were made in tranquillity, for Hill had no desire by driving the French over the Duero to increase the number of their troops on the Esla. However on the 30th Gazan, hearing that Hill was advancing and that the troops on the Esla were likely to attempt the passage of that river, crossed the Duero in the night and took post at Tordesillas, intending to concentrate the whole army of the south on the right of that river; but Leval, though he had quitted Madrid on the 27th, was not yet arrived, and a large artillery convoy, the ministers and Spanish families, and the pictures from the palace of Madrid were likewise on the road from that capital by the Segovia passes.

At this time the army of Portugal and D'Armagnac's division was extended from the Esla to the Carion, the king's guards were at Valladolid, and D'Erlon was in march to the Puente Duero from Segovia and Sepulveda, yet slowly and apparently not aware of the crisis. Meanwhile the passage of the Esla had been effected, and hence if that river had been crossed at the time fore-calculated by Wellington, and a rapid push made upon Placentia and Valladolid, while Hill marched upon Rueda, the whole French army might have been caught in what Napoleon calls "*flagrante delicto*" and destroyed. And even now it would seem that Wellington could have profited more by marching than by halting at Toro on the 3rd, for though Leval's troops and part of the army of the centre were then between the Puente Duero and Valladolid, D'Erlon had left a large division at Tudela de Duero to protect the arrival of the convoy from Madrid, which had not yet crossed the Duero; another great convoy was still on the left bank of the lower Pisuergra, and the parks of the armies of Portugal and of the south were waiting on the right bank of that river until the first convoy had passed over the Carion. Nevertheless it was prudent to gather well to a head first, and the general combinations had been so profoundly made that the evil day for the French was only deferred.

On the 30th Joseph's design was to oppose Wellington's principal force with the army of the south, while the army of the centre held the rest in check, the army of Portugal to aid either as the case might be; and such was his infatuation as to his real position that even now, from the Duero, he was pressing upon his brother the immediate establishment of a civil Spanish administration for the provinces behind the Ebro, as the only remedy for the insurrection, and for the rendering of the army of the north disposable. He even demanded an order from the emperor to draw Clausel's troops away from the Ebro, that he might drive the allies back to the Coa, and take the long-urged offensive position towards Portugal. Napoleon being then at Dresden and Wellington on the Duero!

On the 2nd, when the allies had passed the Esla, the king, who expected them at Toro the 1st, became disturbed to find his front unmolested, and concluded, as he had received no letter from Reille, that Wellington had cut his communication, turned his right, and was marching towards the Carion. His alarm was considerable and with reason, but in the evening of the 2nd he heard from Reille, who had retired unmolested to Rio Seco and there rallied D'Armagnac's troops, but Maucune's division was still in march from different parts to concentrate at Palencia. The halt of the 3rd was therefore to the profit of the French, for during that time they received the Madrid convoy and insured the concentration of all their troops, recovering even Conroux's movable column, which joined Leval near Olmedo. They also destroyed the bridges of Tudela and Puente Duero on the Duero, and that of Simancas and Cabeçon on the Pisuergra, and they passed their convoys over the Carion, directing them, under escort of Casa Palacios' Spanish division, upon Burgos.

The army of the south now moved upon Torrelobaton and Penafior, the army of the centre upon Duenas, the army of Portugal upon Palencia; and the spirits of all were raised by intelligence of the emperor's victory at Lutzen, and by a report that the Toulon fleet had made a successful descent on Sicily. It would appear that Napoleon certainly contemplated an attack upon that island, and Lord William Bentinck thought it would be successful, but it was prevented by Murat's discontent, who instead of attacking fell off from Napoleon and opened a negotiation with the British.

The 4th, Wellington moved in advance, his bridge of communication was

established at Pollos, and considerable stores of ammunition were formed at Valladolid; some had also been taken at Zamora, and the cavalry flankers captured large magazines of grain at Arevalo. Towards the Carion the allies marched rapidly by parallel roads, and in compact order, the Gallicians on the extreme left, Morillo and Julian Sanchez on the extreme right, and the English general expected the enemy would make a stand behind that river, but the report of the prisoners and the hasty movement of the French columns soon convinced him that they were in full retreat for Burgos. On the 6th all the French armies were over the Carion, Reille had even reached Palencia on the 4th, and there rallied Maucune's division and a brigade of light cavalry, which had been employed on the communications.

Although the king's force was now about 55,000 fighting men, exclusive of his Spanish division, which was escorting the convoys and baggage, he did not judge the Carion a good position, and retired behind the upper Pisuerga, desiring if possible to give battle there. He sent Jourdan to examine the state of Burgos castle, and expedited fresh letters, for he had already written from Valladolid on the 27th and 30th of May, to Foy, Sarrut, and Clausel, calling them towards the plains of Burgos; and others to Suchet, directing him to march immediately upon Zaragoza and hoping he was already on his way there; but Suchet was then engaged in Catalonia, Clausel's troops were on the borders of Aragon, Foy and Palombini's Italians were on the coast of Guipuscoa, and Sarrut's division was pursuing Longa in the Montaña.

Joseph was still unacquainted with his enemy. Higher than 70,000 or 80,000 he did not estimate the allied forces, and he was desirous of fighting them on the elevated plains of Burgos. But more than 100,000 men were before and around him. For all the Partidas of the Asturias and the Montaña were drawing together on his right, Julian Sanchez and the Partidas of Castile were closing on his left, and Abispaal with the reserve and Frere's cavalry had already passed the Gredos mountains and were in full march for Valladolid. Nevertheless the king was sanguine of success if he could rally Clausel's and Foy's divisions in time, and his despatches to the former were frequent and urgent. Come with the infantry of the army of Portugal! Come with the army of the north and we shall drive the allies over the Duero! Such was his cry to Clausel, and again he urged his political schemes upon his brother; but he was not a statesman to advise Napoleon nor a general to contend with Wellington, his was not the military genius, nor were his the arrangements that could recover the initiatory movement at such a crisis and against such an adversary.

While the king was on the Pisuerga he received Jourdan's report. The castle of Burgos was untenable, there were no magazines of provisions, the new works were quite unfinished, and they commanded the old, which were unable to hold out a day; of Clausel's and Foy's divisions nothing had been heard. It was resolved to retire behind the Ebro. All the French outposts in the Bureba and Montaña were immediately withdrawn, and the great dépôt of Burgos was evacuated upon Vittoria, which was thus encumbered with the artillery dépôts of Madrid, of Valladolid, and of Burgos, and with the baggage and stores of so many armies and so many fugitive families; and at this moment also arrived from France a convoy of treasure which had long waited for escort at Bayonne.

Meanwhile the tide of war flowed onwards with terrible power. The allies had crossed the Carion on the 7th, and Joseph, quitting Torquemada, had retired by the high road to Burgos with his left wing, composed of the army of the south and centre, while Reille with that of Portugal forming the right wing moved by Castro Xerez. But Wellington following hard, and conducting his operations continually on the same principle, pushed his left wing and the Gallicians along by-roads, and passed the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th, and 10th. Having thus turned the line of the Pisuerga entirely, and outflanked Reille, he made a short journey the 11th and halted the 12th with his left wing, for he had outmarched his supplies, and had to arrange the farther feeding of his troops in a country wide of his line of communication. Nevertheless he pushed his right wing under General Hill along the main road to Burgos, resolved to make the French yield the castle or fight for the

possession, and meanwhile Julian Sanchez acting beyond the Arlanzan, cut off small posts and straggling detachments.

Reille had regained the great road to Burgos on the 9th, and was strongly posted behind the Hormaza stream, his right near Hormillas, his left on the Arlanzan, barring the way to Burgos; the other two armies were in reserve behind Estepar, and in this situation they had remained for three days and were again cheered by intelligence of Napoleon's victory at Bautzen and the consequent armistice. But on the 12th Wellington's columns came up, and the light division, preceded by Grant's hussars and Ponsonby's dragoons, immediately turned the French right, while the rest of the troops attacked the whole range of heights from Hormillas to Estepar. Reille, whose object was to make the allies show their force, seeing their horsemen in rear of his right flank while his front was so strongly menaced, made for the bridge of Baniel on the Arlanzan; then Gardiner's horse-artillery raked his columns, and Captain Milles of the 14th dragoons charging, took some prisoners and one of his guns which had been disabled. Meanwhile the right of the allies pressing forward towards the bridge of Baniel endeavoured to cut off the retreat, but the French repelled the minor attacks with the utmost firmness, bore the fire of the artillery without shrinking, and evading the serious attacks by their rapid yet orderly movement, finally passed the river with a loss of only 30 men killed and a few taken.

The three French armies, being now covered by the Urbel and Arlanzan rivers, which were swelled by the rain, could not be easily attacked, and the stores of Burgos were removed; but in the night Joseph again retreated along the high road by Briviesca to Pancorbo, into which place he threw a garrison of 600 men. The castle of Burgos was prepared also for destruction, and whether from hurry, or negligence, or want of skill, the mines exploded outwards, and at the very moment when a column of infantry was defiling under the castle. Several streets were laid in ruins, thousands of shells and other combustibles which had been left in the place were ignited and driven upwards with a horrible crash, the hills rocked above the devoted column, and a shower of iron, timber, and stony fragments falling on it, in an instant destroyed more than 300 men! Fewer deaths might have sufficed to determine the crisis of a great battle.

But such an art is war! So fearful is the consequence of error, so terrible the responsibility of a general. Strongly and wisely did Napoleon speak when he told Joseph, that if he would command, he must give himself up entirely to the business, labouring day and night, thinking of nothing else. Here was a noble army driven like sheep before prowling wolves, yet in every action the inferior generals had been prompt and skilful, the soldiers brave, ready and daring, firm and obedient in the most trying circumstances of battle. Infantry, artillery, and cavalry, all were excellent and numerous, and the country strong and favourable for defence; but that soul of armies, the mind of a great commander was wanting, and the Esla, the Tormes, the Duero, the Carion, the Pisuerga, the Arlanzan, seemed to be dried up, the rocks, the mountains, the deep ravines to be levelled. Clausel's strong positions, Dubreton's thundering castle, had disappeared like a dream, and 60,000 veteran soldiers, though willing to fight at every step, were hurried with all the tumult and confusion of defeat across the Ebro. Nor was that barrier found of more avail to mitigate the rushing violence of their formidable enemy.

Joseph having possession of the impregnable rocks, and the defile and forts of Pancorbo, now thought he could safely wait for his reinforcements, and extended his wings for the sake of subsistence. On the 16th D'Erlon marched to Aro on the left, leaving small posts of communication between that place and Miranda, and sending detachments towards Domingo Calçada to watch the road leading from Burgos to Logroño. Gazan remained in the centre with a strong advanced guard beyond Pancorbo, for as the king's hope was to retake the offensive, he retained the power of issuing beyond the defiles, and his scouting parties were pushed forward towards Briviesca in front, to Zerezo on the left, and to Poya do Sal on the right. The rest of the army of the south was cantoned by divisions as far as Armiñon behind the Ebro, and Reille, who had occupied Busto marched to Espejo, also behind the Ebro and on the great road to Bilbao. There being joined by Sarrut's division from Orduña he took post, placing Maucune at Frias, Sarrut at Osma, and

La Martiniere at Espejo; guarding also the Puente Lara, and sending strong scouting parties towards Medina de Pomar and Villarcayo on one side and towards Orduña on the other.

While these movements were in progress, all the encumbrances of the armies were assembled in the basin of Vittoria, and many small garrisons of the army of the north came in; for Clausel having received the king's first letter on the 15th of June, had stopped the pursuit of Mina, and proceeded to gather up his scattered columns, intending to move by the way of Logroño to the Ebro. He had with him Taupin's and Barbout's divisions of the army of Portugal, but after providing for his garrisons, only 5000 men of the army of the north were disposable, so that he could not bring more than 14,000 men to aid the king; nevertheless the latter confident in the strength of his front was still buoyant with the hope of assembling an army powerful enough to retake the offensive. His dream was short-lived.

The 13th, while the echoes of the explosion at Burgos were still ringing in the hills, Wellington's whole army was in motion by its left towards the country about the sources of the Ebro. The Galicians moved from Aguilar de Campo high up on the Pisuerga, Graham with the British left wing moved from Villa Diego, and in one march reaching the river, passed it on the 14th at the bridges of Rocamunde and San Martin. The centre of the army followed on the 15th, and the same day the right wing under Hill marched through the Bureba and crossed at the Puente Arenas. This general movement was masked by the cavalry and by the Spanish irregulars who infested the rear of the French on the roads to Briviesca and Domingo Calcada, and the allies being thus suddenly placed between the sources of the Ebro and the great mountains of Reynosa, cut the French entirely off from the sea-coast. All the ports except Santona and Bilbao, were immediately evacuated by the enemy; Santona was invested by Mendizabel, Porlier, Barcena, and Campillo, and the English vessels entered Sant Andero, where a dépôt and hospital station was established, because the royal road from thence through Reynosa to Burgos furnished a free communication with the army. This single blow severed the connection of the English force with Portugal. That country was cast off by the army as a heavy tender is cast from its towing rope, and all the British military establishments were broken up and transferred by sea to the coast of Biscay.

The English general had now his choice of two modes of action. The one to march bodily down the left bank of the Ebro, and fall upon the enemy wherever he could meet with them; the other to advance, still turning the king's right, and by entering Guipuscoa, to place the army on the great communication with France, while the fleet keeping pace with this movement furnished fresh dépôts at Bilbao and other ports. The first plan was a delicate and uncertain operation, because of the many narrow and dangerous defiles which were to be passed, but the second, which could scarcely be contravened, was secure even if the first should fail; both were compatible to a certain point, inasmuch as to gain the great road leading from Burgos by Orduña to Bilbao, was a good step for either, and failing in that the road leading by Valmaceda to Bilbao was still in reserve. Wherefore with an eagle's sweep Wellington brought his left wing round, and pouring his numerous columns through all the deep narrow valleys and rugged defiles descended towards the great road of Bilbao between Frias and Orduña. At Modina de Pomar, a central point, he left the sixth division to guard his stores and supplies, but the march of the other divisions was unmitigated; neither the winter gullies, nor the ravines, nor the precipitate passes amongst the rocks, retarded the march even of the artillery; where horses could not draw men hauled, and when the wheels would not roll the guns were let down or lifted up with ropes; and strongly did the rough veteran infantry work their way through those wild but beautiful regions; six days they toiled unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by the junction of Longa's division and all the smaller bands which came trickling from the mountains, they burst like raging streams from every defile, and went foaming into the basin of Vittoria.

During this time many reports reached the French, some absurdly exaggerated, as that Wellington had 190,000 men, but all indicating more or less distinctly the true line and direction of his march. As early as the 15th Jourdan had warned Joseph that the allies would probably turn his right, and as the reports of Matcune's

scouts told of the presence of English troops that day on the side of Puente Arenas, he pressed the king to send the army of Portugal to Valmaceda, and to close the other armies towards the same quarter. Joseph yielded so far, that Reille was ordered to concentrate his troops at Osma on the morning of the 18th, with the view of gaining Valmaceda by Orduña, if it was still possible; if not he was to descend rapidly from Lodio upon Bilbao, and to rally Foy's division and the garrisons of Biscay, upon the army of Portugal. At the same time Gazan was directed to send a division of infantry and a regiment of dragoons from the army of the south, to relieve Reille's troops at Puente Lara and Espejo, but no general and decided dispositions were made.

Reille immediately ordered Maucune to quit Frias, and join him at Osma with his division, yet having some fears for his safety gave him the choice of coming by the direct road across the hills, or by the circuitous route of Puente Lara. Maucune started late in the night of the 17th by the direct road, and when Reille himself reached Osma, with La Martiniere's and Sarrut's divisions, on the morning of the 18th, he found a strong English column issuing from the defiles in his front, and the head of it was already at Barbarena in possession of the high road to Orduña. This was General Graham with the first, third, and fifth divisions, and a considerable body of cavalry. The French general, who had about 8000 infantry and 14 guns, at first made a demonstration with Sarrut's division in the view of forcing the British to show their whole force, and a sharp skirmish and heavy cannonade ensued, wherein 50 men fell on the side of the allies, above 100 on that of the enemy. But at half past two o'clock, Maucune had not arrived, and beyond the mountains on the left of the French, the sound of a battle arose which seemed to advance along the valley of Boveda into the rear of Osma; Reille, suspecting what had happened, instantly retired fighting towards Espejo, where the mouths of the valleys opened on each other, and from that of Boveda, and the hills on the left, Maucune's troops rushed forth begrimed with dust and powder, breathless, and broken into confused masses.

That general, proverbially daring, marched over the Aracena ridge instead of going by the Puente Lara, and his leading brigade, after clearing the defiles, had halted on the bank of a rivulet near the village of San Millan in the valley of Boveda. In this situation, without planting picquets, they were waiting for their other brigade and the baggage, when suddenly the light division which had been moving by a line parallel with Graham's march, appeared on some rising ground in their front; the surprise was equal on both sides, but the British riflemen instantly dashed down the hill with loud cries and a bickering fire, the 52nd followed in support, and the French retreated fighting as they best could. The rest of the English regiments having remained in reserve, were watching this combat and thinking all their enemies were before them, when the second French brigade, followed by the baggage, came hastily out from a narrow cleft in some perpendicular rocks on the right hand. A very confused action now commenced, for the reserve scrambled over some rough intervening ground to attack this new enemy, and the French to avoid them made for a hill a little way in their front, whereupon the 52nd, whose rear was thus menaced, wheeled round and running at full speed up the hill met them on the summit. However, the French soldiers, without losing their presence of mind, threw off their packs, and half flying, half fighting, escaped along the side of the mountains towards Miranda, while the first brigade still retreating on the road towards Espejo were pursued by the riflemen. Meanwhile the sumpter animals being affrighted, run wildly about the rocks with a wonderful clamour, and though the escort huddled together fought desperately, all the baggage became the spoil of the victors, and 400 of the French fell or were taken; the rest, thanks to their unyielding resolution and activity, escaped, though pursued through the mountains by some Spanish irregulars, and Reille being still pressed by Graham then retreated behind Salinas de Afara.

A knowledge of these events reached the king that night, yet neither Reille nor the few prisoners he had made could account for more than six Anglo-Portuguese divisions at the defiles; hence as no troops had been felt on the great road from Burgos, it was judged that Hill was marching with the others by Valmaceda into

Guipuscoa, to menace the great communication with France. However, it was clear that six divisions were concentrated on the right and rear of the French armies, and no time was to be lost in extricating the latter from its critical situation; wherefore Gazan and D'Erlon marched in the night to unite at Armiñon, a central point behind the Zadora river, up the left bank of which it was necessary to file in order to gain the basin of Vittoria. But the latter could only be entered at that side, through the pass of Puebla de Arganzan, which was two miles long, and so narrow as scarcely to furnish room for the great road; Reille therefore, to cover this dangerous movement, fell back during the night to Subijana Morillas, on the Bayas river. His orders were to dispute the ground vigorously, for by that route Wellington could enter the basin before Gazan and D'Erlon could thread the pass of Puebla; he could also send a corps from Frias to attack their rear on the Miranda side, while they were engaged in the defile. One of these things by all means he should have endeavoured to accomplish, but the troops had made very long marches on the 18th, and it was dark before the fourth division had reached Espejo. D'Erlon and Gazan, therefore, united at Armiñon without difficulty about ten o'clock in the morning of the 19th, and immediately commenced the passage of the defile of Puebla, and the head of their column appeared on the other side at the moment when Wellington was driving Reille back upon the Zadora.

The allies had reached Bayas before midday of the 19th, and if they could have forced the passage at once, the armies of the centre and of the south would have been cut off from Vittoria and destroyed; but the army of Portugal was strongly posted, the front covered by the river, the right by the village of Subijana de Morillas, which was occupied as a bridge-head, and the left secured by some very rugged heights opposite the village of Pobes. This position was turned by the light division while the fourth division attacked it in front, and after a skirmish in which about 80 of the French fell, Reille was forced over the Zadora; but the army of the centre had then passed the defile of Puebla and was in position behind that river, the army of the south was coming rapidly into second line, the crisis had passed, the combat ceased, and the allies pitched their tents on the Bayas. The French armies now formed three lines behind the Zadora, and the king hearing that Clausel was at Logroño, 11 leagues distant, expedited orders to him to march upon Vittoria; General Foy also, who was in march for Bilbao, was directed to halt at Durango, to rally all the garrisons of Biscay and Guipuscoa there, and then to come down on Vittoria. These orders were received too late.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE basin into which the king had now poured all his troops, his parks, convoys, and encumbrances of every kind, was about eight miles broad by ten in length, Vittoria being at the further end. The river Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after passing very near that town, runs towards the Ebro with many windings and divides the basin unequally, the largest portion being on the right bank. A traveller coming from Miranda by the royal Madrid road, would enter the basin by the pass of Puebla, through which the Zadora flows between two very high and rough mountain ridges, the one on his right hand being called the heights of Puebla, that on his left hand the heights of Morillas. The road leads up the left bank of the river, and on emerging from the pass, on the left hand at the distance of about six miles would be seen the village of Subijana de Morillas, furnishing that opening into the basin which Reille defended while the other armies passed the defile of Puebla. The spires of Vittoria would appear about eight miles distant, and from that town the road to Logroño goes off on the right hand, the road to Bilbao by Murgia and Orduña on the left hand, crossing the Zadora at a bridge near the village of Ariaga; further on, the roads to Estella and to Pampeluna branch off on the right, a road to Durango on the left, and between them the royal causeway leads over the great Arlaban ridge into the mountains of Guipuscoa by the formidable defiles of Salinas. But of all these roads, though several were practicable for guns, especially that to Pampeluna, the royal causeway alone could suffice for the retreat of such an encumbered army. And as the allies were behind the hills forming the basin on the right bank of the Zadora, their line being parallel to the great cause-

way, it followed that by prolonging their left they would infallibly cut off the French from that route.

Joseph felt the danger and his first thought was to march by Salinas to Durango, with a view to cover his communications with France, and to rally Foy's troops and the garrisons of Guipuscoa and Biscay. But in that rough country, neither his artillery nor his cavalry, on which he greatly depended, though the cavalry and artillery of the allies were scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist, and he would have to send them into France; and if pressed by Wellington in front and surrounded by all the bands in a mountainous region, favourable for those irregulars, he could not long remain in Spain. It was then proposed, if forced from the basin of Vittoria, to retire by Salvatierra to Pampeluna and bring Suchet's army up to Zaragoza; but Joseph feared thus to lose the great communication with France, because the Spanish regular army, aided by all the bands, could seize Tolosa while Wellington operated against him on the side of Navarre. It was replied that troops detached from the army of the north and from that of Portugal might oppose them; still the king hesitated, for though the road to Pampeluna was called practicable for wheels, it required something more for the enormous mass of guns and carriages of all kinds now heaped around Vittoria.

One large convoy had already marched on the 19th by the royal causeway for France, another, still larger was to move on the 21st under escort of Maucune's division; the fighting men in front of the enemy were thus diminished, and yet the plain was still covered with artillery parks and equipages of all kinds, and Joseph shut up in the basin of Vittoria, vacillating and infirm of purpose, continued to waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary's movements. Hence on the 19th nothing was done, but the 20th some infantry and cavalry of the army of Portugal passed the Zadora to feel for the allies towards Murguia, and being encountered by Longa's Spaniards at the distance of six miles, after some successful skirmishing recrossed the Zadora with the loss of 20 men. On the 21st at three o'clock in the morning Maucune's division, more than 3000 good soldiers, marched with the second convoy, and the king took up a new line of battle.

Reille's army, reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry, and by Digeon's division of dragoons from the army of the south, now formed the extreme right, having to defend the passage of the Zadora, where the Bilbao and Durango roads crossed it by the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga. The French division defended the bridge; the Franco-Spanish brigade was pushed forward to Durana on the royal road, and was supported by a French battalion and a brigade of light horsemen; Digeon's dragoons and a second brigade of light cavalry were in reserve behind the Zadora, near Zuazo de Alava and Hermandad. The centre of the king's army, distant six or eight miles from Gamara, following the course of the Zadora, was on another front, because the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the heights of Margarita descends to the defile of Puebla, nearly at right angles with its previous course. Here, covered by the river and on an easy open range of heights, for the basin of Vittoria is broken by a variety of ground, Gazan's right extended from the royal road to an isolated hill in front of the village of Margarita. His centre was astride the royal road, in front of the village of Arinez; his left occupied more rugged ground, being placed behind Subijana de Alava on the roots of the Puebla mountain facing the defile of that name, and to cover this wing a brigade under General Maransin was posted on the Puebla mountain. D'Erlon's army was in second line. The principal mass of the cavalry, with many guns, and the king's guards, formed a reserve, behind the centre, about the village of Gomecha, and 50 pieces of artillery were massed in the front, pointing to the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and Nanclares.

While the king was making conjectures, Wellington was making various dispositions for the different operations which might occur. He knew that the Andalusian reserve would be at Burgos in a few days, and thinking that Joseph would not fight on the Zadora, detached Giron with the Galicians on the 19th to sieze Orduña. Graham's corps was at first destined to follow Giron but finally penetrated through difficult mountain ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from Bilbao and menacing his communications with France. However, the rear of the army had

been so much scattered in the previous marches that Wellington halted on the 20th to rally his columns, and taking that opportunity to examine the position of the French armies, observed that they seemed steadfast to fight ; whereupon immediately changing his own dispositions, he gave Graham fresh orders and hastily recalled Giron from Orduña.

The long expected battle was now at hand, and on neither side were the numbers and courage of the troops of mean account. The allies had lost about 200 killed and wounded in the previous operations, and the sixth division, 6500 strong, was left at Medina de Pomar ; hence only 60,000 Anglo-Portuguese sabres and bayonets, with 90 pieces of cannon, were actually in the field, but the Spanish auxiliaries were above 20,000, and the whole army, including serjeants and artillerymen, exceeded 80,000 combatants. For the French side, as the regular muster-roll of their troops was lost with the battle, an approximation to their strength must suffice. The number killed and taken in different combats, from the Escla and Tormes to the Zadora, was about 2000 men, and some 5000 had marched to France with the two convoys. On the other hand Sarrut's division, the garrison of Vittoria, and the many smaller posts relinquished by the army of the north, had increased the king's forces, and hence, by a comparison with former returns, it would appear, that in the gross, about 70,000 men were present. Wherefore deducting the officers, the artillerymen, sappers, miners, and non-combatants, which are always borne on the French muster-rolls, the sabres and bayonets would scarcely reach 60,000, but in the number and size of their guns the French had the advantage.

The defects of the king's position were apparent both in the general arrangement and in the details. His best line of retreat was on the prolongation of his right flank, which being at Gamara Mayor, close to Vittoria, was too distant to be supported by the main body of the army ; and yet the safety of the latter depended upon the preservation of Reille's position. Instead of having the rear clear, and the field of battle free, many thousand carriages and impediments of all kinds were heaped about Vittoria, blocking all the roads, and creating confusion amongst the artillery parks. Maransin's brigade placed on the heights above Puebla, was isolated and too weak to hold that ground. The centre indeed occupied an easy range of hills, its front was open, with a slope to the river, and powerful batteries seemed to bar all access by the bridges ; nevertheless many of the guns being pushed with an advanced post into a deep loop of the Zadora, were within musket-shot of a wood on the right bank, which was steep and rugged, so that the allies found good cover close to the river.

There were seven bridges within the scheme of the operations, namely, the bridge of La Puebla on the French left beyond the defile ; the bridge of Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava and the French end of the defile of Puebla ; then three bridges which, placed around the deep loop of the river before mentioned, opened altogether upon the right of the French centre, that of Mendoza being highest up the stream, that of Vellodas lowest down the stream, and that of Tres Puentes in the centre ; lastly the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga on the Upper Zadora, opposite Vittoria, which were guarded by Reille, completed the number, and none of the seven were either broken or entrenched.

Wellington having well observed these things formed his army for three distinct battles.

Sir Thomas Graham, moving from Murguia by the Bilbao road, was to fall on Reille, and if possible to force the passage of the river at Gamara Mayor and Ariaga ; by this movement the French would be completely turned and the greatest part of their forces shut up between the Puebla mountains on one side and the Zadora on the other. The first and fifth Anglo-Portuguese divisions, Bradford's and Pack's independent Portuguese brigades, Longa's Spanish division, and Anson's and Bock's cavalry, in all near 20,000 men with 18 pieces of cannon, were destined for this attack, and Giron's Gallicians, recalled from Orduña, came up by a forced march in support.

Sir Rowland Hill was to attack the enemy's left, and his corps, also about 20,000 strong, was composed of Morillo's Spaniards, Sylveira's Portuguese, and the second British division together with some cavalry and guns. It was collected on the

southern slope of the ridge of Morillas, between the Bayas and the Lower Zadora, pointing to the village of Puebla, and was destined to force the passage of the river at that point, to assail the French troops on the heights beyond, to thread the defile of La Puebla and to enter the basin of Vittoria, thus turning and menacing all the French left and securing the passage of the Zadora at the bridge of Nanclares.


The centre attack, directed by Wellington in person, consisted of the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry, the great mass of the artillery, the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, in all nearly 30,000 combatants. They were encamped along the Bayas from Subijana Morillas to Ulivarre, and had only to march across the ridges which formed the basin of Vittoria on that side, to come down to their different points of attack on the Zadora, that is to say, the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas and Nanclares. But so rugged was the country and the communications between the different columns so difficult, that no exact concert could be expected and each general of division was in some degree master of his movements.

BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

At day-break on the 21st, the weather being rainy, with a thick vapour, the troops moved from their camps on the Bayas, and the centre of the army, advancing by columns from the right and left of the line, passed the ridges in front, and entering the basin of Vittoria slowly approached the Zadora. The left-hand column pointed to Mendoza, the right-hand column skirted the ridge of Morillas on the other side of which Hill was marching, and that general, having seized the village of Puebla about 10 o'clock, commenced passing the river there. Morillo's Spaniards led and their first brigade moving on a by-way assailed the mountain to the right of the great road; the ascent was so steep that the soldiers appeared to climb rather than to walk up, and the second Spanish brigade, being to connect the first with the British troops below, ascended only half way; little or no opposition was made until the first brigade was near the summit when a sharp skirmishing commenced, and Morillo was wounded but would not quit the field; his second brigade joined him, and the French, feeling the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin with a fresh regiment. Then Hill succoured Morillo with the 71st regiment, and a battalion of light infantry, both under Colonel Cadogan, yet the fight was doubtful, for though the British secured the summit, and gained ground along the side of the mountain, Cadogan, a brave officer and of high promise, fell, and Gazan calling Villatte's division from behind Ariñez, sent it to the succour of his side; and so strongly did these troops fight that the battle remained stationary, the allies being scarcely able to hold their ground. Hill, however, again sent fresh troops to their assistance, and with the remainder of his corps passing the Zadora, threaded the long defile of Puebla and fiercely issuing forth on the other side won the village of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan's line; he thus connected his own right with the troops on the mountain, and maintained this forward position in despite of the enemy's vigorous efforts to dislodge him.

Meanwhile Wellington had brought the fourth and light divisions, the heavy cavalry, the hussars and D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, from Subijana Morillas and Montevite, down by Olabarre to the Zadora. The fourth division was placed opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the light division opposite the bridge of Villodas, both well covered by rugged ground and woods; and the light division was so close to the water, that their skirmishers could with ease have killed the French gunners of the advanced post in the loop of the river at Villodas. The weather had cleared up, and when Hill's battle began, the riflemen of the light division, spreading along the bank, exchanged a biting fire with the enemy's skirmishers, but no serious effort was made, because the third and seventh divisions, meeting with rough ground, had not reached their point of attack; and it would have been imprudent to push the fourth division and the cavalry over the bridge of Nanclares, and thus crowd a great body of troops in front of the Puebla defile before the other divisions were ready to attack the right and centre of the enemy.

While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington that the bridge of Tres Puentes, on the left of the light division, was unguarded, and offered to guide the troops over it. Kempt's brigade of the light division was instantly directed towards



this point, and being concealed by some rocks from the French, and well led by the brave peasant, they passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a steep curving rise of ground, and halted close under the crest on the enemy's side of the river, being then actually behind the king's advanced post, and within a few hundred yards of his line of battle. Some French cavalry immediately approached, and two round shots were fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted; but as no movement of attack was made, Kempt called the 15th hussars over the river, and they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge one by one, horseman after horseman, and still the French remained torpid, showing that there was an army there but no general.

It was now one o'clock, Hill's assault on the village of Subijana de Alava was developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up the Zadora on the enemy's extreme right, being followed by the dull sound of distant guns showed that Graham's attack had also commenced. Then the king, finding both his flanks in danger, caused his reserve about Gomecha to file off towards Vittoria, and gave Gazan orders to retire by successive masses with the army of the south. But at that moment the third and seventh divisions having reached their ground were seen moving rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza, the enemy's artillery opened upon them, a body of cavalry drew near the bridge, and the French light troops which were very strong there commenced a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the French cannon from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt's forward position was instantly made manifest; for Colonel Andrew Barnard springing forward, led the riflemen of the light division, in the most daring manner, between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely that the English artillerymen, thinking his darkly clothed troops were enemies, played upon both alike.

This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass the bridge of Mendoza without opposition; the other brigade forded the river higher up, and the seventh division and Vandeleur's brigade of the light division followed. The French advanced post immediately abandoned the ground in front of Villodas, and the battle which had before somewhat slackened revived with extreme violence. Hill pressed the enemy harder, the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, the smoke and sound of Graham's attack became more distinct, and the banks of the Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. However the French, weakened in the centre by the draft made of Villatte's division, and having their confidence shaken by the king's order to retreat, were in evident perplexity, and no regular retrograde movement could be made, the allies were too close.

The seventh division, and Colville's brigade of the third division which had forded the river, formed the left of the British, and they were immediately engaged with the French right in front of Margarita and Hermandad. Almost at the same time Lord Wellington, seeing the hill in front of Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal of Villatte's troops, carried Picton and the rest of the third division in close columns of regiments at a running pace diagonally across the front of both armies towards that central point; this attack was headed by Barnard's riflemen, and followed by the remainder of Kempt's brigade and the hussars, but the other brigade of the light division acted in support of the seventh division. At the same time General Cole advanced with the fourth division from the bridge of Nanclares, and the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, also passing the river, galloped up, squadron after squadron, into the plain ground between Cole's right and Hill's left.

The French thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for retreat, threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, and 50 pieces of artillery played with astonishing activity. To answer this fire Wellington brought over several brigades of British guns, and both sides were shrouded by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under cover of which the French retired by degrees to the second range of heights, in front of Gomecha, on which their reserve had been posted, but they still held the village of Arinez on the main road. Picton's troops headed by the riflemen, plunged into that village amidst a heavy fire of muskets and artillery, and in an instant three guns

were captured; but the post was important, fresh French troops came down, and for some time the smoke and dust and clamour, the flashing of the fire-arms, and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed with the thundering of the guns, were terrible, yet finally the British troops issued forth victorious on the other side. During this conflict the seventh division, reinforced by Vandeleur's brigade of the light division, was heavily raked by a battery at the village of Margarita, until the 52nd regiment, led by Colonel Gibbs, with an impetuous charge drove the French guns away and carried the village, and at the same time the 8th under Colonel Gough won the village of Hermandad. Then the whole advanced fighting on the left of Picton's attack, and on the right hand of that general the fourth division also made way, though more slowly because of the rugged ground.

When Picton and Kempt's brigades had carried the village of Arinez and gained the main road, the French troops near Subijana de Alava were turned, and being hard-pressed on their front and on their left flank by the troops on the summit of the mountain, fell back for two miles in a disordered mass, striving to regain the great line of retreat to Vittoria. It was thought that some cavalry launched against them at the moment would have totally disorganized the whole French battle and secured several thousand prisoners, but this was not done, the confused multitude shooting ahead of the advancing British lines recovered order, and as the ground was exceedingly diversified, being in some places wooded, in others open, here covered with high corn, there broken by ditches, vineyards, and hamlets, the action for six miles resolved itself into a running fight and cannonade, the dust and smoke and tumult of which filled all the basin, passing onwards towards Vittoria.

Many guns were taken as the army advanced, and at six o'clock the French reached the last defensible height, one mile in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the city stood, and beyond the city thousands of carriages and animals and non-combatants, men, women, and children, were crowding together, in all the madness of terror, and as the English shot went booming overhead, the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay for army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation. However, the courage of the French soldier was not yet quelled. Reille, on whom everything now depended, maintained his post on the Upper Zadora, and the armies of the south and centre drawing up on their last heights, between the villages of Ali and Armentia, made their muskets flash like lightning, while more than 80 pieces of artillery massed together pealed with such a horrid uproar that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen bounding with a frantic energy.

This terrible cannonade and musketry kept the allies in check, and scarcely could the third division, which was still the foremost and bore the brunt of this storm, maintain its advanced position. Again the battle became stationary, and the French generals had commenced drawing off their infantry in succession from the right wing, when suddenly the fourth division rushing forward carried the hill on the French left, and the heights were at once abandoned. It was at this very moment that Joseph, finding the royal road so completely blocked by carriages that the artillery could not pass, indicated the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat, and the army went off in a confused yet compact body on that side, leaving Vittoria on its left. The British infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped through the town to intercept the new line of retreat, which was through a marsh, but this road also was choked with carriages and fugitive people, while on each side there were deep drains. Thus all became disorder and mischief, the guns were left on the edge of the marsh, the artillerymen and drivers fled with the horses, and, breaking through the miserable multitude, the vanquished troops went off by Metauco towards Salvatierra; however, their cavalry still covered the retreat with some vigour, and many of those generous horsemen were seen taking up children and women to carry off from the dreadful scene.

The result of the last attack had placed Reille, of whose battle it is now time to treat, in great danger. His advanced troops under Sarret had been placed at the village of Aranguis, and they also occupied some heights on their right, which

covered both the bridges of Ariaga and Gamara Mayor, but they had been driven from both the village and the height a little after 12 o'clock by General Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham's column, consisting of the fifth division, Longa's Spaniards, and Pack's Portuguese. Longa then seized Gamara Menor, on the Durango road, while another detachment gained the royal road still further on the left, and forced the Franco-Spaniards to retire from Durana. Thus the first blow on this side had deprived the king of his best line of retreat, and confined him to the road of Pampeluna. However, Sarrut recrossed the river in good order, and a new disposition was made by Reille. One of Sarrut's brigades defended the bridge of Ariaga, and the village of Abechuco beyond it; the other was in reserve, equally supporting Sarrut and La Martiniere, who defended the bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village of that name beyond the river. Digeon's dragoons were formed behind the village of Ariaga, and Reille's own dragoons being called up from Hermandad and Zuazo, took post behind the bridge of Gamara; a brigade of light cavalry was placed on the extreme right to sustain the Franco-Spanish troops, which were now on the Upper Zadora, in front of Betonio, and the remainder of the light cavalry, under General Curto, was on the French left, extending down the Zadora between Ariaga and Govea.

Oswald commenced the attack at Gamara with some guns and Robinson's brigade of the fifth division. Longa's Spaniards were to have led, and at an early hour when Gamara was feebly occupied, but they did not stir, and the village was meanwhile reinforced. However, Robinson's brigade being formed in three columns made the assault at a running pace. At first the fire of the artillery and musketry was so heavy that the British troops stopped and commenced firing also, and the three columns got intermixed; yet, encouraged by their officers, and especially by the example of General Robinson, an inexperienced man but of a high and daring spirit, they renewed the charge, broke through the village, and even crossed the bridge. One gun was captured, and the passage seemed to be won, when Reille suddenly turned 12 pieces upon the village, and La Martiniere, rallying his division under cover of this cannonade, retook the bridge. It was with difficulty the allied troops could even hold the village until they were reinforced. Then a second British brigade came down, and, the royals leading, the bridge was again carried, but again these new troops were driven back in the same manner as the others had been. Thus the bridge remained forbidden ground. Graham had meanwhile attacked the village of Abechuco, which covered the bridge of Ariaga, and it was carried at once by Colonel Halkett's Germans, who were supported by Bradford's Portuguese and by the fire of 12 guns; yet here, as at Gamara, the French maintained the bridge, and at both places the troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal fire of artillery and small arms.

Reille, though considerably inferior in numbers, continued to interdict the passage of the river, until the tumult of Wellington's battle, coming up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut's rear. Digeon's dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment, and some time before Reille, seeing the retrograde movement of the king, had formed a reserve of infantry under General Fririon at Betonia, which now proved his safety. For Sarrut was killed at the bridge of Ariaga, and General Menne, the next in command, could scarcely draw off his troops while Digeon's dragoons held the British cavalry at point; but with the aid of Fririon's reserve, Reille covered the movement, and rallied all his troops at Betonia. He had now to make head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from Ariaga, from Durana, and from Vittoria, yet he fought his way to Metauco on the Salvatierra road, covering the general retreat with some degree of order. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, and neither the resolute demeanour of the French cavalry, which was covered on the flanks by some light troops, and made several vigorous charges, nor the night, which now fell, could stop their victorious career until the flying masses of the enemy had cleared all obstacles, and passing Metauco, got beyond the reach of further injury. Thus ended the battle of Vittoria; the French escaped, indeed, with comparatively little loss of men, but, to use Gazan's words, "they lost all their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure,

all their stores, all their papers, so that no man could prove how much pay was due to him; generals and subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of them were barefooted."

Never was an army more hardly used by its commander, for the soldiers were not half beaten, and never was a victory more complete. The trophies were innumerable. The French carried off but two pieces of artillery from the battle. Jourdan's baton of command, a stand of colours, 143 brass pieces, 100 of which had been used in the fight, all the parks and dépôts from Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure, everything fell into the hands of the victors. The loss in men did not however exceed 6000, exclusive of some hundreds of prisoners; the loss of the allies was nearly as great, the gross numbers being 5176, killed wounded and missing. Of these 1049 were Portuguese and 553 were Spanish; hence the loss of the English was more than double that of the Portuguese and Spaniards together, and yet both fought well, and especially the Portuguese, but British troops are the soldiers of battle. Marshal Jourdan's baton was taken by the 87th regiment, and the spoil was immense; but to such extent was plunder carried, principally by the followers and non-combatants, for with some exceptions the fighting troops may be said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up, that of five millions and a half of dollars indicated by the French accounts to be in the money-chests, not one dollar came to the public; and Wellington sent 15 officers with power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing the Ebro and the Duero in hopes to recover the sums so shamefully carried off. Neither was this disgraceful conduct confined to ignorant and vulgar people. Some officers were seen mixed up with the mob and contending for the disgraceful gain.

On the 22nd the allies followed the retreating enemy, and Giron and Longa entered Guipuscoa, by the royal road, in pursuit of the convoy which had moved under Maucune on the morning of the battle; the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese remained at Vittoria, and General Pakenham with the sixth division came up from Medina Pomar; the remainder of the army pursued Joseph towards Pampeluna, for he had continued his retreat up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. The weather was rainy, the roads heavy, and the French rear-guard, having neither time nor materials to destroy the bridges, set fire to the villages behind them to delay the pursuit. At five o'clock in the morning of the 22nd Reille had rallied his two divisions and all his cavalry in front of Salvatierra, where he halted until he was assured that all the French had passed, and then continued his march to Huerta in the valley of Araquil, 30 miles from the field of battle. Joseph was that day at Yrursun, a town situated behind one of the sources of the Arga, and from which roads branched off to Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa and St. Esteban on the other. At this place he remained all the 23rd sending orders to different points on the French frontier to prepare provisions and succours for his suffering army, and he directed Reille to proceed rapidly by St. Esteban to the Bidassoa with the infantry, 600 select cavalry, the artillerymen and horses of the army of Portugal; meanwhile Gazan's and D'Erlon's army marched upon Pampeluna intending to cross the frontier at St. Jean Pied de Port. Joseph reached Pampeluna the 24th, but the army bivouacked on the glacis of the fortress, and in such a state of destitution and insubordination that the governor would not suffer them to enter the town. The magazines were indeed reduced very low by Mina's long blockade, and some writers assert that it was even proposed to blow up the works and abandon the place; however, by great exertions additional provisions were obtained from the vicinity, the garrison was increased to 3000 men, and the army marched towards France, leaving a rear-guard at a strong pass about two leagues off.

The 23rd Wellington having detached Graham's corps to Guipuscoa by the pass of Adrian, left the fifth division at Salvatierra, and pursued the king with the rest of the army.

On the 24th the light division and Victor Alten's cavalry came up with the French rear-guard; two battalions of the riflemen immediately pushed the infantry back through the pass, and then Ross's horse artillery galloping forward, killed several

men and dismounted one of the only two pieces of cannon carried off from Vittoria.

The 25th the enemy, covered by the fortress of Pampeluna, went up the valley of Roncesvalles. He was followed by the light division which turned the town as far as Vilalba, and he was harassed by the Spanish irregular troops now swarming on every side.

Meanwhile Foy and Clausel were placed in very difficult positions. The former had reached Bergara the 21st, and the garrison of Bilbao and the Italian division of St. Paul, formerly Palombini's, had reached Durango; the first convoy from Vittoria was that day at Bergara, and Maucune was with the second at Montdragon. The 22nd the garrison of Castro went off to Santona; the same day the fugitives from the battle spread such an alarm through the country that the forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, which commanded the passes into Guipuscoa were abandoned, and Longa and Giron penetrated them without hindrance.

Foy, who had only one battalion of his division in hand, immediately rallied the fugitive garrisons, and marching upon Montdragon, made some prisoners and acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he ordered the convoy to move day and night towards France; the troops at Durango to march upon Bergara, and the troops from all the other posts to unite at Tolosa, to which place the artillery, baggage, and sick men were now hastening from every side; and to cover their concentration Foy, reinforcing himself with Maucune's troops, gave battle to Giron and Longa, though three times his numbers, at Montdragon; the Spaniards had the advantage and the French fell back, yet slowly and fighting to Bergara, but they lost 250 men and six guns.

On the 23rd Foy marched to Villa Real de Guipuscoa, and that evening the head of Graham's column, having crossed the Mutiol mountain by the pass of Adrian, descended upon Segura. It was then as near to Tolosa as Foy was, and the latter's situation became critical; yet such were the difficulties of passing the mountain, that it was late on the 24th ere Graham, who had then only collected Anson's light cavalry, two Portuguese brigades of infantry, and Halket's Germans, could move towards Villa Franca. The Italians and Maucune's divisions, which composed the French rear, were just entering Villa Franca as Graham came in sight, and to cover that town they took post at the village of Veasaya on the right bank of the Orio river. Halket's Germans, aided by Pack's Portuguese, immediately drove Maucune's people from the village with the loss of 200 men, and Bradford's brigade having engaged the Italians on the French right, killed or wounded 80, yet the Italians claimed the advantage; and the whole position was so strong that Graham had recourse to flank operations, whereupon Foy retired to Tolosa. Giron and Longa now came up by the great road, and Mendizabel, having quitted the blockade of Santona, arrived at Aspeytia on the Deba.

The 25th Foy again offered battle in front of Tolosa, but Graham turned his left with Longa's division, and Mendizabel turned his right from Aspeytia; while they were in march, Colonel Williams, with the grenadiers of the first regiment and three companies of Pack's Portuguese, dislodged him from an advantageous hill in front, and the fight was then purposely prolonged by skirmishing until six o'clock in the evening, when the Spaniards having reached their destination on the flanks, a general attack was made on all sides. The French being cannonaded on the causeway, and strongly pushed by the infantry in front, while Longa with equal vigour drove their left from the heights, were soon forced beyond Tolosa on the flanks; but that town was strongly entrenched as a field-post and they maintained it until Graham brought up his guns and bursting one of the gates opened a passage for his troops; nevertheless Foy profiting from the darkness made his retreat good with a loss of only 400 men killed and wounded, and some prisoners who were taken by Mendizabel and Longa. These actions were very severe; the loss of the Spaniards was not known, but the Anglo-Portuguese had more than 400 killed and wounded in the two days' operations, and Graham himself was hurt.

The 26th and 27th the allies halted to hear of Lord Wellington's progress, the enemy's convoys entered France in safety, and Foy occupied a position between

Tolosa and Ernani, behind the Anezo. His force was now increased, by the successive arrival of the smaller garrisons, to 16,000 bayonets, 400 sabres, and 10 pieces of artillery, and the 28th he threw a garrison of 2600 good troops into St. Sebastian and passed the Urumia. The 29th he passed the Oyarsun, and halted the 30th, leaving a small garrison at Passages, which however surrendered the next day to Longa.

On the 1st of July the garrison of Gueteria escaped by sea to St. Sebastian, and Foy passed the Bidassoa, his rear-guard fighting with Giron's Gallicians; but Reille's troops were now at Vera and Viriatu, they had received ammunition and artillery from Bayonne, and thus 25,000 men of the army of Portugal occupied a defensive line from Vera to the bridge of Behobie, the approaches to which last were defended by a block-house. Graham immediately invested St. Sebastian, and Giron concentrating the fire of his own artillery and that of a British battery upon the block-house of Behobie obliged the French to blow it up and destroy the bridge.

While these events were passing in Guipuscoa, Clausel was in more imminent danger. On the evening of the 22nd he had approached the field of battle at the head of 14,000 men, by a way which falls into the Estella road at Aracete, and not far from Salvatierra. Pakenham with the sixth division was then at Vittoria, and the French general, learning the state of affairs, soon retired to Logroño, where he halted until the evening of the 25th. This delay was like to have proved fatal, for on that day Wellington, who before thought he was at Tudela, discovered his real position, and leaving General Hill with the second division to form the siege of Pampeluna, marched himself by Tafalla with two brigades of light cavalry and the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry. The fifth and sixth divisions and the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese marched at the same time from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon Logroño; and Mina also, who had now collected all his scattered battalions near Estella, and was there joined by Julian Sanchez' cavalry, followed hard on Clausel's rear.

The French general moving by Calahorra, reached Tudela on the evening of the 27th, and thinking that by this forced march of 60 miles in 40 hours with scarcely a halt, he had outstripped all pursuers, would have made for France by Olite and Tafalla. Wellington was already in possession of those places expecting him, but an alcalde gave Clausel notice of the danger, whereupon recrossing the Ebro he marched upon Zaragoza in all haste, and arriving the 1st of July, took post on the Gallego, gave out that he would there wait until Suchet, or the king, if the latter retook the offensive, should come up. Wellington immediately made a flank movement to his own left as far as Caseda, and could still with an exertion have intercepted Clausel by the route of Jacca, but he feared to drive him back upon Suchet and contented himself with letting Mina press the French general. That chief acted with great ability; for he took 300 prisoners, and having everywhere declared that the whole allied army were close at hand in pursuit he imposed upon Clausel, who, being thus deceived, destroyed some of his artillery and heavy baggage, and leaving the rest at Zaragoza retired to Jacca.

During this time Joseph, not being pressed, had sent the army of the south again into Spain to take possession of the valley of Bastan, which was very fertile and full of strong positions. But O'Donnel, count of Abispa, had now reduced the forts at Pancorbo, partly by capitulation, partly by force, and was marching towards Pampeluna; wherefore General Hill, without abandoning the siege of that place, moved two British and two Portuguese brigades into the valley of Bastan, and on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, vigorously driving Gazan from all his positions, cleared the valley with a loss of only 120 men. The whole line of the Spanish frontier from Ronsevalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa river was thus occupied by the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and St. Sebastian were invested. Joseph's reign was over, the crown had fallen from his head, and after years of toils and combats which had been rather admired than understood, the English general, emerging from the chaos of the Peninsula struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrennees a recognized conqueror. On those lofty pinnacles the clangour of his trumpets pealed clear and loud, and the splendour of his genuis appeared as a flaming beacon to warring nations.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. In this campaign of six weeks, Wellington, with 100,000 men, marched 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran troops from Spain. This immense result could not have been attained if Joseph had followed Napoleon's instructions; Wellington could not then have turned the line of the Duero. It could not have been attained if Joseph had acted with ordinary skill after the line of the Duero was passed. Time was to him most precious, yet when contrary to his expectations he had concentrated his scattered armies behind the Carion, he made no effort to delay his enemy on that river. He judged it an unfit position, that is, unfit for a great battle; but he could have obliged Wellington to lose a day there, perhaps two or three, and behind the Upper Pisuerga he might have saved a day or two more. Reille, who was with the army of Portugal on the right of the king's line, complained that he could find no officers of that army who knew the Pisuerga sufficiently to place the troops in position; the king then had cause to remember Napoleon's dictum, namely, that "to command an army well a general must think of nothing else." For why was the course of the Pisuerga unknown when the king's headquarters had been for several months within a day's journey of it?

2. The Carion and the Pisuerga being given up, the country about the Hormaza was occupied, and the three French armies were in mass between that stream and Burgos; yet Wellington's right wing only, that is to say, only 23,000 infantry and three brigades of cavalry, drove Reille's troops over the Arlanzan, and the castle of Burgos was abandoned. This was on the 12th, the three French armies, not less than 50,000 fighting men, had been in position since the 9th, and the king's letters prove that he desired to fight in that country, which was favourable for all arms. Nothing then could be more opportune than Wellington's advance on the 12th, because a retrograde defensive system is unsuited to French soldiers, whose impatient courage leads them always to attack, and the news of Napoleon's victory at Bautzen had just arrived to excite their ardour. Wherefore Joseph should have retaken the offensive on the 12th at the moment when Wellington approached the Hormaza, and as the left and centre of the allies were at Villa Diego and Castroxerez, the greatest part at the former, that is to say, one march distant, the 26,000 men immediately under Wellington would probably have been forced back over the Pisuerga, and the king would have gained time for Sarrut, Foy, and Clausel to join him. Did the English general then owe his success to fortune, to his adversary's fault rather than to his own skill? Not so. He had judged the king's military capacity, he had seen the haste, the confusion, the trouble of the enemy, and knowing well the moral power of rapidity and boldness in such circumstances, had acted daringly indeed, but wisely, for such daring is admirable, it is the highest part of war.

3. The manner in which Wellington turned the line of the Ebro was a fine strategic illustration. It was by no means certain of success, yet failure would have still left great advantages. He was certain of gaining Santandar and fixing a new base of operations on the coast, and he would still have had the power of continually turning the king's right by operating between him and the coast; the errors of his adversary only gave him additional advantages which he expected, and seized with promptness. But if Joseph, instead of spreading his army from Espejo on his right to the Logroño road on his left, had kept only cavalry on the latter route and on the main road in front of Pancorbo; if he had massed his army to his right pivoting upon Miranda, or Frias, and had scoured all the roads towards the sources of the Ebro with the utmost diligence, the allies could never have passed the defiles and descended upon Vittoria. They would have marched then by Valmaceda upon Bilbao, but Joseph could by the road of Orduña have met them there, and with his force increased by Foy's and Sarrut's divisions and the Italians. Meanwhile Clausel would have come down to Vittoria, and the heaped convoys could have made their way to France in safety.

4. Having finally resolved to fight at Vittoria, the king should, on the 19th and 20th, have broken some of the bridges on the Zadora, and covered others with field works to enable him to sally forth upon the attacking army; he should have entrenched the defile of Puebla, and occupied the heights above in strength; his

position on the Lower Zadora would then have been formidable. But his greatest fault was in the choice of his line of operation. His reasons for avoiding Guipuscoa were valid, his true line was on the other side, down the Ebro. Zaragoza should have been his base, since Aragon was fertile and more friendly than any other province of Spain. It is true that by taking this new line of operations he would have abandoned Foy; but that general, reinforced with the reserve from Bayonne, would have had 20,000 men and the fortress of St. Sebastian as a support, and Wellington must have left a strong corps of observation to watch him. The king's army would have been immediately increased by Clausel's troops, and ultimately by Suchet's, which would have given him 100,000 men to oppose the allied army, weakened as that would have been by the detachment left to watch Foy. And there were political reasons, to be told hereafter, for the reader must not imagine Wellington had got thus far without such trammels, which would have probably rendered this plan so efficacious as to oblige the British army to abandon Spain altogether. Then new combinations would have been made all over Europe which it is useless to speculate upon.

5. In the battle the operations of the French, with the exception of Reille's defence of the bridges of Gamara and Ariaga, were a series of errors, the most extraordinary being the suffering Kempt's brigade of the light division, and the hussars, to pass the bridge of Tres Puentes and establish themselves close to the king's line of battle, and upon the flank of his advanced posts at the bridges of Mendoza and Villodas. It is quite clear from this alone that he decided upon retreating the moment Graham's attack commenced against his right flank, and his position was therefore in his own view untenable. The fitting thing then was to have occupied the heights of Puebla strongly, but to have placed the bulk of his infantry by corps in succession, the right refused, towards Vittoria, while his cavalry and guns watched the bridges and the mouth of the Puebla defile; in this situation he could have succoured Reille, or marched to his front, according to circumstances, and his retreat would have been secure.

6. The enormous fault of heaping up the baggage and convoys and parks behind Vittoria requires no comment, but the king added another and more extraordinary error, namely the remaining to the last moment undecided as to his line of retreat. Nothing but misfortunes could attend upon such bad dispositions; and that the catastrophe was not more terrible is owing entirely to an error which Wellington and Graham seem alike to have fallen into, namely, that Reille had two divisions in reserve behind the bridges on the Upper Zadoro. They knew not that Maucune's division had marched with the convoy, and thought Clausel had only one division of the army of Portugal with him, whereas he had two, Taupin's and Barbout's. Reille's reserves were composed not of divisions but of brigades drawn from La Martiniere's and Sarrut's divisions, which were defending the bridges; and his whole force, including the French-Spaniards who were driven back from Durana, did not exceed 10,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry. Now Graham had, exclusive of Giron's Gallicians, nearly 20,000 of all arms, and it is said that the river might have been passed both above and below the points of attack; it is certain also that Longa's delay gave the French time to occupy Gamara Mayor in force, which was not the case at first. Had the passage been won in time very few of the French army could have escaped from the field; but the truth is Reille fought most vigorously.

7. As the third and seventh divisions did not come to the point of attack at the time calculated upon, the battle was probably not fought after the original conception of Lord Wellington; it is likely that his first project was to force the passage of the bridges, to break the right centre of the enemy from Arinez to Margarita, and then to envelop the left centre with the second, fourth, and light divisions and the cavalry, while the third and seventh divisions pursued the others. But notwithstanding the unavoidable delay, which gave the French time to commence their retreat, it is not easy to understand how Gazan's left escaped from Subijana de Alava, seeing that when Picton broke the centre at Arinez, he was considerably nearer to Vittoria than the French left, which was cut off from the main road and assailed in front by Hill and Cole. The having no cavalry in hand to launch at

this time and point of the battle has been already noticed ; Lord Wellington says, that the country was generally unfavourable for the action of that arm, and it is certain that neither side used it with much effect at any period of the battle ; nevertheless there are always some suitable openings, some happy moments to make a charge, and this seems to have been one which was neglected.

8. Picton's sudden rush from the bridge of Tres Puentes to the village of Arinez, with one brigade, has been much praised, and certainly nothing could be more prompt and daring, but the merit of the conception belongs to the general in chief, who directed it in person. It was suggested to him by the denuded state of the hill in front of that village, and viewed as a stroke for the occasion it is to be admired. Yet it had its disadvantages. For the brigade which thus crossed a part of the front of both armies to place itself in advance, not only drew a flank fire from the enemy, but was exposed, if the French cavalry had been prompt and daring, to a charge in flank ; it also prevented the advance of the other troops in their proper arrangement, and thus crowded the centre for the rest of the action. However these sudden movements cannot be judged by rules, they are good or bad according to the result. This was entirely successful, and the hill thus carried was called the Englishman's hill, not, as some recent writers have supposed, in commemoration of a victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of a disaster which there befel a part of his army. His battle was fought between Navarrette and Najera, many leagues from Vittoria, and beyond the Ebro ; but on this hill the two gallant knights, Sir Thomas and Sir William Felton took post with 200 companions, and being surrounded by Don Tello with 6000, all died or were taken after a long, desperate, and heroic resistance.

9. It has been observed by French writers, and the opinion has been also entertained by many English officers, that after the battle Wellington should have passed the frontier in mass, and marched upon Bayonne instead of chasing Clausel and Foy on the right and left ; and if, as the same authors assert, Bayonne was not in a state of defence and must have fallen, there can be little question that the criticism is just, because the fugitive French army having lost all its guns, and being without musket ammunition, could not have faced its pursuers for a moment. But if Bayonne had resisted, and it was impossible for Wellington to suspect its real condition, much mischief might have accrued from such a hasty advance. Foy and Clausel coming down upon the field of Vittoria would have driven away if they did not destroy the sixth division ; they would have recovered all the trophies ; the king's army returning by Jacca into Aragon, would have reorganized itself from Suchet's dépôts, and that marshal was actually coming up with his army from Valencia ; little would then have been gained by the battle. This question can however be more profitably discussed when the great events which followed the battle of Vittoria have been described.

BOOK XXI.

CHAPTER I.

THE fate of Spain was decided at Vittoria, but on the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon's genius restored the general balance, and the negotiations which followed those victories affected the war in the Peninsula.

Lord Wellington's first intention was to reduce Pampeluna by force, and the sudden fall of the Pancorbo forts, which opened the great Madrid road was a favourable event ; but Portugal being relinquished as a place of arms, a new base of operations was required, lest a change of fortune should force the allies to return to that country when all the great military establishments were broken up, when the opposition of the native government to British influence was become rancorous, and the public sentiment quite averse to English supremacy. The Western Pyrenees, in conjunction with the ocean, offered such a base, yet the harbours were few, and the English general desired to secure a convenient one near the new positions of the army ; wherefore to reduce San Sebastian was of more immediate importance than to reduce Pampeluna ; and it was essential to effect this during the fine season because the coast was iron-bound and very dangerous in winter.

Pampeluna was strong. A regular attack required three weeks for the bringing up of ordnance and stores, five or six weeks more for the attack, and from 15,000 to 20,000 of the best men, because British soldiers were wanted for the assault ; but an investment could be maintained by fewer and inferior troops, Spaniards and Portuguese, and the enemy's magazines were likely to fail under blockade sooner than his ramparts would crumble under fire. Moreover on the eastern coast misfortune and disgrace had befallen the English arms. Sir John Murray had failed at Taragona. He had lost the honoured battering-train intrusted to his charge, and his artillery equipage was supposed to be ruined. The French fortresses in Catalonia and Valencia were numerous, the Anglo-Sicilian army could neither undertake an important siege, nor seriously menace the enemy without obtaining some strong place as a base. Suchet was therefore free to march on Zaragoza, and uniting with Clausel and Paris, to operate with a powerful mass against the right flank of the allies. For these reasons Wellington finally concluded to blockade Pampeluna and besiege San Sebastian, and the troops, as they returned from the pursuit of Clausel, marched to form a covering army in the mountains. The peasantry of the vicinity were then employed on the works of the blockade which was ultimately intrusted to O'Donel's Andalusian reserve.

Confidently did the English general expect the immediate fall of San Sebastian, and he was intent to have it before the negotiations for the armistice in Germany should terminate ; but mighty pains and difficulties awaited him, and ere these can be treated of the progress of the war in other parts, during his victorious march from Portugal to the Pyrenees, must be treated of.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN COAST.

It will be remembered that the Duke del Parque was to move from the Sierra Morena, by Almanza, to join Elio, whose army had been reinforced from Minorca ; the united troops were then to act against Suchet, on the Xucar, while Sir John Murray sailed to attack Taragona. Del Parque received his orders on the 24th of April, he had long known of the project, and the march was one of 12 days, yet he did not reach his destination until the end of May. This delay resulted, partly from the bad state of his army, partly from the usual procrastination of Spaniards, partly from the conduct of Elio, whose proceedings, though probably springing from a dislike to serve under Del Parque, created doubts of his own fidelity.

It has been already shown how, contrary to his agreement with Murray, Elio withdrew his cavalry when Mijares was at Yecla, whence sprung that general's misfortune; how he placed the regiment of Velez Malaga in Villeña, a helpless prey for Suchet; how he left the Anglo-Sicilian army to fight the battle of Castalla unaided. He now persuaded Del Parque to move towards Utiel instead of Almanza, and to send a detachment under Mijares to Requena, thereby threatening Suchet's right, but exposing the Spanish army to a sudden blow, and disobeying his instructions which prescribed a march by Almanza.

This false movement Elio represented as Del Parque's own, but the latter, when Murray remonstrated, quickly approached Castalla by Jumilla, declaring his earnest desire to obey Wellington's orders. The divergence of his former march had, however, already placed him in danger; his left flank was so exposed, while coming by Jumilla, that Murray postponed his own embarkation to concert with Elio a combined operation, from Biar and Sax, against Fuente de la Higuera where Suchet's troops were lying in wait. Previous to this epoch Elio had earnestly urged the English general to disregard Del Parque altogether, and embark at once for Taragona, undertaking himself to secure the junction with his fellow-commander. And now, after agreeing to co-operate with Murray, he secretly withdrew his cavalry from Sax, sent Whittingham in a false direction, placed Roche without support at Alcoy, retired himself to the city of Murcia, and at the same time one of his regiments quartered at Alicante fired upon a British guard. Roche was attacked and lost 80 men, and Del Parque's flank was menaced from Fuente de la Higuera, but the British cavalry, assembling at Biar, secured his communication with Murray on the 25th, and the 27th the Anglo-Sicilians broke up from their quarters to embark at Alicante.

The French were now very strong. Suchet, unmolested for 40 days after the battle of Castalla, had improved his defensive works, chased the bands from his rear, called up his reinforcements, rehorsed his cavalry and artillery, and prepared for new operations, without losing the advantage of foraging the fertile districts immediately in front of the Xucar. On the other hand Lord William Bentinck, alarmed by intelligence of an intended descent upon Sicily, had recalled more British troops; and as Whittingham's cavalry and Roche's division were left at Alicante, the force actually embarked to attack Taragona, including a fresh English regiment from Carthage, scarcely exceeded 14,000 present under arms.* Of these less than 8000 were British or German, and the horsemen were only 700. Yet the armament was formidable, for the battering train was complete and powerful, the materials for gabions and fascines previously collected at Ivica, and the naval squadron, under Admiral Hallowel, consisted of several line-of-battle ships, frigates, bomb-vessels and gun-boats, besides the transports. There was, however, no cordiality between General Clinton and Murray, nor between the latter and his quarter-master-general, Donkin, nor between Donkin and the Admiral; subordinate officers also, in both services, adopting false notions, some from vanity, some from hearsay, added to the uneasy feeling which prevailed amongst the chiefs. Neither admiral nor general seem to have had sanguine hopes of success even at the moment of embarkation, and there was in no quarter a clear understanding of Lord Wellington's able plan for the operations.

While Del Parque's army was yet in march, Suchet, if he had no secret understanding with Elio or any of his officers, must have been doubtful of the allies' intentions, although the strength of the battering-train at Alicante indicated some siege of importance. He, however, recalled Pannetier's brigade from the frontier of Aragon, and placed it on the road to Tortosa; and at the same time, knowing Clausel was then warring down the Partidas in Navarre, he judged Aragon safe, and drew Severoli's Italian brigade from thence, leaving only the garrisons and a few thousand men under General Paris as a reserve at Zaragoza; and this was the reason the army of Aragon did not co-operate to crush Mina after his defeat by Clausel in the valley of Roncal. Decaen also sent some reinforcements, wherefore, after completing his garrisons, Suchet could furnish the drafts required by Napoleon, and yet bring 20,000 men into the field. He was, however, very

* Appendix, No. 28.

unquiet, and notwithstanding Clausel's operations, in fear for his troops in Aragon, where Paris had been attacked by Goyan, even in Zaragoza; moreover now, for the first time since its subjugation, an unfriendly feeling was perceptible in Valencia.

On the 31st of May, Murray sailed from Alicante. Suchet immediately ordered Pannetier's brigade to close towards Tortosa, but kept his own positions in front of Valencia until the fleet was seen to pass the Grão with a fair wind. Then feeling assured the expedition aimed at Catalonia, he prepared to aid that principality; but the column of succour being drawn principally from the camp of Xativa, 40 miles from Valencia, he could not quit the latter before the 7th of June. He took with him 9000 men of all arms, leaving Harispe on the Xucar, with 7000 infantry and cavalry, exclusive of Severoli's troops which were in full march from Teruel. Meanwhile Sir John Murray's armament, having very favourable weather, anchored on the evening of the 2nd in the bay of Taragona, whence five ships of war under Captain Adam, and two battalions of infantry, with some guns, under Colonel Prevot, were detached to attack San Felipe de Balaguer.

The strength and value of this fort arose from its peculiar position. The works, garrisoned by 100 men, were only 60 feet square, but the site was a steep isolated rock, standing in the very gorge of a pass, and blocking the only carriage-way from Tortosa to Taragona. The mountains on either hand, although commanding the fort, were nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labour was required to form the batteries.

Prevot, landing on the 3rd, was joined by a Spanish brigade of Copons' army, and in concert with the navy immediately commenced operations by placing two six-pounders on the heights, south of the pass, from whence at 600 or 700 yards distance they threw shrapnel shells; but this projectile is, when used with guns of small calibre, insignificant save as a round shot.

On the 4th two 12-pounders, and a howitzer, being brought to the same point by the sailors, opened their fire, and at night the seamen with extraordinary exertions dragged up five 24-pounders and their stores. The troops then constructed one battery for two howitzers on the slope of the grand ridge to the northward of the pass, and a second, for four heavy guns, on the rock where the fort stood at a distance of 150 yards. To form these batteries earth was carried from below, and everything else, even water, brought from the ships, though the landing place was more than a mile-and-a-half off. Hence, as time was valuable, favourable terms were offered to the garrison, but the offer was refused. The 5th the fire was continued, but with slight success, the howitzer battery on the great ridge was relinquished, and at night a very violent storm retarded the construction of the breaching batteries. Previous to this Colonel Prevot had warned Murray that his means were insufficient, and a second Spanish brigade was sent to him. Yet the breaching batteries were still incomplete on the 6th, so severe was the labour of carrying up the guns, and out of three already mounted, one was disabled by a shot from the fort.

Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortosa, had ordered the governor of that place to succour San Felipe. He tried, and would undoubtedly have succeeded, if Captain Peyton, of the *Thames* frigate, had not previously obtained from Admiral Hallowell two eight-inch mortars, which, being placed just under the fort, and worked by Mr. James of the marine artillery, commencing at daybreak on the 7th, soon exploded a small magazine in the fort, whereupon the garrison surrendered. The besiegers, who had lost about 50 men and officers, then occupied the place, and meanwhile Sir John Murray had commenced the

SECOND SIEGE OF TARAGONA.

Although the fleet cast anchor in the bay on the evening of the 2nd, the surf prevented the disembarkation of the troops until the next day. The rampart of the lower town had been destroyed by Suchet, but Fort Royal remained, and though in bad condition, served, together with the ruins of the San Carlos bastion, to cover the western front which was the weakest line of defence. The governor Bertoletti, an Italian, was supposed by Murray to be disaffected, but he proved himself a loyal and energetic officer; and his garrison, 1600 strong, 500 being privateer seamen and Franco-Spaniards, served him well.

The Olivo and Loretto heights were occupied the first day by Clinton's and Whittingham's divisions, the other troops remaining on the low ground about the Francoli river; the town was then bombarded during the night by the navy, but the fire was sharply returned and the flotilla suffered the most. The next day two batteries were commenced 600 yards from San Carlos, and 900 yards from Fort Royal. They opened the 6th, but being too distant to produce much effect, a third was commenced 600 yards from Fort Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in that outwork, yet the assault was deferred, and some pieces removed to play from the Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. The subsequent proceedings cannot be understood without an accurate knowledge of the relative positions of the French and allied armies.

Taragona, though situated on one of a cluster of heights which terminate a range descending from the northward to the sea, is, with the exception of that range, surrounded by an open country called the *Campo de Taragona*, which is again environed by very rugged mountains, through which the several roads descend into the plain.

Westward there were only two carriage ways, one direct, by the Col de Balaguer to Taragona; the other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet, Momblanch and Reus. The first was blocked by the taking of San Felipe; the second, although used by Suchet for his convoys during the French siege of Taragona, was now in bad order, and at best only available for small mountain-guns.

Northward there was a carriage way, leading from Lerida, which united with that from Falcet at Momblanch.

Eastward there was the royal causeway, coming from Barcelona, through Villa Franca, Arbos, Vendrills, and Torredembarra; this road, after passing Villa Franca, sends off two branches to the right, one passing through the Col de Cristina, the other through Masarbones and Col de Leibra, leading upon Braffin and Valis. It was by the latter branch that M'Donald passed to Reus in 1810; he had, however, no guns or carriages, and his whole army laboured to make the way practicable.

Between these various roads the mountains were too rugged to permit any direct cross communications; and troops, coming from different sides, could only unite in the Campo de Taragona, now occupied by the allies. Wherefore, as Murray had, including sergeants, above 15,000 fighting men, and Copons, reinforced with two regiments sent by sea from Coruña, was at Reus with 6000 regulars besides the irregular division of Manso, 25,000 combatants were in possession of the French point of junction.

The Catalans, after Lacy's departure, had, with the aid of Captain Adam's ship, destroyed two small forts at Perillo and Ampolla, and Eroles had blockaded San Felipe de Balaguer for 36 days, but it was then succoured by Maurice Mathieu; and the success at Perillo was more than balanced by a check which Sarzfield received on the 3rd of April from some of Pannetier's troops. The Partida warfare had, however, been more active in Upper Catalonia, and Copons claimed two considerable victories, one gained by himself on the 17th of May, at La Bisbal near the Col de Cristina, where he boasted to have beaten 6000 French with half their numbers, destroying 600, as they returned from succouring San Felipe de Balaguer. In the other, won by Colonel Lander near Olot on the 7th of May, it was said 1200 of Lamarque's men fell. These exploits are by French writers called skirmishes, and the following description of the Catalan army, given to Sir John Murray by Cabanes, the chief of Copons' staff, renders the French version the most credible.

"We do not," said that officer, "*exceed 9000 or 10,000 men, extended on different points of a line running from the neighbourhood of Reus along the high mountains to the vicinity of Olot. The soldiers are brave, but without discipline, without subordination, without clothing, without artillery, without ammunition, without magazines, without money, and without means of transport!*"

Copons himself, when he came down to the Campo, very frankly told Murray, that as his troops could only fight in position, he would not join in any operation which endangered his retreat into the high mountains. However, with the exception of 1200 men left at Vich under Eroles, all his forces, the best perhaps in Spain,

were now at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to intercept the communications of the different French corps, and to harass their marches if they should descend into the Campo. Murray could also calculate upon 700 or 800 seamen and marines to aid him in pushing on the works of the siege, or in a battle near the shore; and he expected 3000 additional troops from Sicily. Sir Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean fleet, had promised to divert the attention of the French troops by a descent eastward of Barcelona, and the armies of Del Parque and Elio were to make a like diversion westward of Tortosa. Finally, a general rising of the Somatenes might have been effected, and those mountaineers were all at Murray's disposal, to procure intelligence, to give timely notice of the enemy's approach, or to impede his march by breaking up the roads.

On the French side there was greater but more scattered power. Suchet had marched with 9000 men from Valencia, and what with Pannetier's brigade and some spare troops from Tortosa, 11,000 or 12,000 men, with artillery, might have come to the succour of Taragona from that side, if the sudden fall of San Felipe de Balaguer had not barred the only carriage way on the westward. A movement by Mora, Falset, and Momblanch, remained open, yet it would have been tedious, and the disposable troops at Lerida were few. To the eastward therefore the garrison looked for the first succour. Maurice Mathieu, reinforced with a brigade from Upper Catalonia, could bring 7000 men with artillery from Barcelona, and Decaen could move from the Ampurdan with an equal number, hence 25,000 men might finally bear upon the allied army.

But Suchet, measuring from the Xucar, had more than 160 miles to march; Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from various places and march 70 miles after Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at all until Taragona was actually besieged, lest the allies should re-embark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had in like manner to look to the security of the Ampurdan, and he was 130 miles distant. Wherefore, however active the French generals might be, the English general could calculate upon 10 days' clear operations, after investment, before even the heads of the enemy's columns, coming from different quarters, could issue from the hills bordering the Campo.

Some expectation also he might have, that Suchet would endeavour to cripple Del Parque, before he marched to the succour of Taragona; and it was in his favour, that eastward and westward, the royal causeway was in places exposed to the fire of the naval squadron. The experience of Captain Codrington during the first siege of Taragona, had proved indeed, that an army could not be stopped by this fire, yet it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation. Thus, the advantage of a central position, the possession of the enemy's point of junction, the initial movement, the good will of the people, and the aid of powerful flank diversions, belonged to Murray; superior numbers and a better army to the French, since the allies, brave, and formidable to fight in a position, were not well constituted for general operations.

Taragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, was a weak place. A simple revetment three feet and a half thick, without ditch or counter-scarp, covered it on the west; the two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, were not armed, nor even repaired until after the investment, and the garrison, too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed with labour. Here then, time being precious to both sides, ordinary rules should have been set aside and daring operations adopted. Lord Wellington had judged 10,000 men sufficient to take Taragona.* Murray brought 17,000, of which 14,000 were effective. To do this he had, he said, so reduced his equipments, stores, and means of land transport, that his army could not move from the shipping; he was yet so unready for the siege, that Fort Royal was not stormed on the 8th, because the engineer was unprepared to profit from a successful assault.

This excuse, founded on the scarcity of stores, was not however borne out by facts. The equipments left behind, were only draft animals and commissariat field-stores; the thing wanting was vigour in the general, and this was made manifest in various ways. Copons, like all regular Spanish officers, was averse to calling out the Somatenes, and Murray did not press the matter. Suchet took San Felipe de

* Appendix, No. 28.

Balaguer by escalade. Murray attacked in form, and without sufficient means; for if Captain Peyton had not brought up the mortars, which was an afterthought extraneous to the general's arrangements, the fort could not have been reduced before succour arrived from Tortosa. Indeed the surrender was scarcely creditable to the French commandant, for his works were uninjured, and only a small part of his powder destroyed. It is also said, I believe truly, that one of the officers employed to regulate the capitulation had in his pocket an order from Murray to raise the siege and embark, spiking the guns! At Taragona, the troops on the low ground did not approach so near, by 300 yards, as they might have done; and the outworks should have been stormed at once, as Wellington stormed Fort Francisco at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Francisco was a good outwork and complete. The outworks of Taragona were incomplete, ill-flanked, without palisades or casements, and their fall would have enabled the besiegers to form a parallel against the body of the place as Suchet had done in the former siege; a few hours' firing would then have brought down the wall and a general assault might have been delivered. The French had stormed a similar breach in that front, although defended by 8000 Spanish troops, and the allies, opposed by only 1600 French and Italians, soldiers and seamen, were in some measure bound by honour to follow that example, since Colonel Skerrett, at the former siege, refused to commit 1200 British troops in the place, on the special ground that it was indefensible, though so strongly garrisoned. Murray's troops were brave, they had been acting together for nearly a year; and after the fight at Castalla had become so eager, that an Italian regiment, which at Alicant, was ready to go over bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal. This confidence was not shared by their general. Even at the moment of victory, he had resolved, if Suchet advanced a second time, to relinquish the position of Castalla and retire to Alicant!

It is clear that, up to the 8th, Sir John Murray's proceedings were ill-judged, and his after operations were more injudicious.

As early as the 5th, false reports had made Suchet reach Tortosa, and had put 2000 French in movement from Lerida. Murray then openly avowed his alarm and his regret at having left Alicant; yet he proceeded to construct two heavy counter-batteries near the Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls in observation of the Lerida road, and desired Manso to watch that of Barcelona.

On the 9th his emissaries said the French were coming from the east and from the west; and would, when united, exceed 20,000. Murray immediately sought an interview with the admiral, declaring his intention to raise the siege; his views were changed during the conference, but he was discontented; and the two commanders were now evidently at variance, for Hallowel refused to join in a summons to the governor, and his flotilla again bombarded the place.

The 10th, the spies in Barcelona gave notice that 8000 or 10,000 French with 14 guns, would march from that city the next day. Copons immediately joined Manso, and Murray, as if he now disdained his enemy, continued to disembark stores, landed several mortars, armed the batteries at the Olivo, and on the 11th opened their fire, in concert with that from the ships of war.

This was the first serious attack, and the English general, professing a wish to fight the column coming from Barcelona, sent the cavalry under Lord Frederick Bentinck to Altafalla, and in person sought a position of battle to the eastward. He left orders to storm the outworks that night, but returned, before the hour appointed, extremely disturbed by intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at Villa Franca with 8000 combatants, and Suchet closing upon the Col de Balaguer. The infirmity of his mind was now apparent to the whole army. At eight o'clock he repeated his order to assault the outworks; at 10 o'clock the storming party was in the dry bed of the Francoli, awaiting the signal, when a countermand arrived; the siege was then to be raised, and the guns removed immediately from the Olivo; the commander of the artillery remonstrated, and the general then promised to hold the batteries until the next night. Meanwhile the detachment at Valls and the cavalry at Altafalla were called in, without any notice to general Copons, though he depended on their support.

The park and all the heavy guns of the batteries on the low grounds were re-

moved to the beach for embarkation on the morning of the 12th, and at 12 o'clock Lord Frederick Bentinck arrived from Altafala with the cavalry. It is said he was ordered to shoot his horses, but refused to obey, and moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The detachment from Valls arrived next, and the infantry marched to Cape Salou to embark, but the horsemen followed Lord Frederick, and were themselves followed by 14 pieces of artillery; each body moved independently, and all was confused, incoherent, afflicting, and dishonourable to the British arms.

While the seamen were embarking the guns, the quarter-master-general came down to the beach with orders to abandon that business and collect boats for the reception of troops, the enemy being supposed close at hand; and notwithstanding Murray's promise to hold the Olivo until night-fall, fresh directions were given to spike the guns there, and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose on every side, and from both services; army and navy were alike indignant, and so excited, that it is said personal insult was offered to the general. Three staff-officers remained in a body to Murray's quarters, to offer plans and opinions, and the admiral, who it would appear did not object to raising the siege but to the manner of doing it, would not suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation of artillery. He even urged an attack upon the column coming from Barcelona, and opposed the order to spike the guns at the Olivo, offering to be responsible for carrying all clear off during the night.

Thus pressed, Murray again wavered. Denying that he had ordered the battering pieces to be spiked, he sent counter-orders, and directed a part of Clinton's troops to advance towards the Gaya river. Yet a few hours afterwards he reverted to his former resolution, and peremptorily renewed the order for the artillery to spike the guns on the Olivo, and burn the carriages. Nor was even this unhappy action performed without confusion. The different orders received by Clinton in the course of the day had indicated the extraordinary vacillation of the commander-in-chief, and Clinton himself, forgetful of his own arrangements, with an obsolete courtesy took off his hat to salute an enemy's battery which had fired upon him; but this waving of his hat from that particular spot was also the conventional signal for the artillery to spike the guns, and they were thus spiked prematurely. The troops were however all embarked in the night of the 12th, and many of the stores and horses were shipped on the 13th, without the slightest interruption from the enemy; but 18 or 19 battering pieces, whose carriages had been burnt, were, with all the platforms, fascines, gabions, and small ammunition, in view of the fleet and army, triumphantly carried into the fortress. Sir J. Murray meanwhile, seemingly unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on the evening of the 12th and took his usual repose in bed.

While the English general was thus precipitately abandoning the siege, the French generals, unable to surmount the obstacles opposed to their junction, unable even to communicate by their emissaries, were despairing of the safety of Taragona. Suchet did not reach Tortosa before the 10th, but a detachment from the garrison had on the 8th attempted to succour San Felipe, and nearly captured the naval Captain Adam, Colonel Prevot, and other officers who were examining the country. On the other side Maurice Mathieu, having gathered troops from various places, reached Villa Franca early on the 10th, and deceiving even his own people as to his numbers, gave out that Decaen, who he really expected, was close behind with a powerful force. To give effect to this policy he drove Copons from Arbos on the 11th, and his scouting parties entered Vendrills, as if he was resolved singly to attack Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had however landed his marines at Rosas, which arrested Decaen's march; and Maurice Mathieu, alarmed at the cessation of fire about Taragona, knowing nothing of Suchet's movements, and too weak to fight the allies alone, fell back in the night of the 12th to the Llobregat, his main body never having passed Villa Franca.

Suchet's operations to the westward were even less decisive. His advanced guard under Panettier reached Perillo the 10th. The 11th, not hearing from his spies, he caused Panettier to pass by his left over the mountains through Valdillos to some heights which terminate abruptly on the Campo, above Monroig. The 12th that officer reached the extreme verge of the hills, being then about 25 miles

from Taragona. His patrols descending into the plains, met with Lord Frederick Bentinck's troopers, reported that Murray's whole army was at hand, wherefore he would not enter the Campo, but at night he kindled large fires to encourage the garrison of Taragona. These signals were however unobserved, the country people had disappeared, no intelligence could be procured, and Suchet could not follow him with a large force into those wild desert hills, where there was no water. Thus on both sides of Taragona the succouring armies were quite baffled at the moment chosen by Murray for flight.

Suchet now received alarming intelligence from Valencia, yet still anxious for Taragona, he pushed on the 14th along the coast-road towards San Felipe de Balaguer, thinking to find Prévôt's division alone; but the head of his column was suddenly cannonaded by the *Thames* frigate, and he was wonderfully surprised to see the whole British fleet anchored off San Felipe and disembarking troops. Murray's operations were indeed as irregular as those of a partisan, yet without partisan vigour. He had heard in the night of the 12th, from Colonel Prévôt, of Panettier's march to Monroig, and to protect the cavalry and guns under Lord Frederick Bentinck, sent Mackenzie's division by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with the whole army on the 14th. Mackenzie drove back the French posts on both sides of the pass, the embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then commenced, and Suchet, still uncertain if Taragona had fallen, moved towards Valdillos to bring off Panettier.

At this precise period Murray heard that Maurice Mathieu's column, which he always erroneously supposed to be under Decaen, had retired to the Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and that Taragona had not been reinforced. Elated by this information he revolved various projects in his mind, at one time thinking to fall upon Suchet, at another to cut off Panettier, now resolving to march upon Cambrils, and even to menace Taragona again by land; then he was for sending a detachment by sea to surprise the latter, but finally he disembarked his whole force on the 15th, and being ignorant of Suchet's last movement, decided to strike at Panettier. In this view he detached Mackenzie by a rugged valley leading from the eastward to Valdillos, and that officer reached it on the 16th, but Suchet had already carried off Panettier's brigade, and the next day the British detachment was recalled by Murray, who now only thought of re-embarking.

This determination was caused by a fresh alarm from the eastward, for Maurice Mathieu, whose whole proceedings evinced both skill and vigour, hearing that the siege of Taragona was raised, and the allies re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, retraced his steps and boldly entered Cambrils on the 17th. On that day, however, Mackenzie returned, and Murray's whole army was thus concentrated in the pass. Suchet was then behind Perillo, Copons at Reus, having come there at Murray's desire to attack Maurice Mathieu, and the latter would have suffered, if the English general had been capable of a vigorous stroke. On the other hand it was fortunate for Mackenzie, that Suchet, too anxious for Valencia, disregarded his movement upon Valdillos; but, taught by the disembarkation of the whole English army that the fate of Taragona, whether for good or evil, was decided, he had sent an emissary to Maurice Mathieu on the 16th, and then retired to Perillo and Amposta. He reached the latter place the 17th, attentive only to the movement of the fleet, and meanwhile Maurice Mathieu endeavoured to surprise the Catalans at Reus.

Copons was led into this danger by Sir John Murray, who had desired him to harass Maurice Mathieu's rear, with a view to a general attack, and then changed his plan without giving the Spanish general any notice. However, he escaped. The French moved upon Taragona, and Murray was left free to embark or to remain at the Col de Balaguer. He called a council of war, and it was concluded to re-embark, but at that moment the great Mediterranean fleet appeared in the offing, and Admiral Hallowel, observing a signal announcing Lord William Bentinck's arrival, answered with more promptitude than propriety, "*We are all delighted.*"

Sir John Murray's command having thus terminated, the general discontent rendered it impossible to avoid a public investigation, yet the difficulty of holding a

court in Spain, and some disposition at home to shield him, caused great delay. He was at last tried in England. Acquitted of two charges, on the third he was declared guilty of an error in judgment, and sentenced to be admonished ; but even that slight mortification was not inflicted.

This decision does not preclude the judgment of history, nor will it sway that of posterity. The court-martial was assembled 20 months after the event, when the war being happily terminated, men's minds were little disposed to treat past failures with severity. There were two distinct prosecutors, having different views ; the proceedings were conducted at a distance from the scene of action, defects of memory could not be remedied by references to localities, and a door was opened for contradiction and doubt upon important points. There was no indication that the members of the court were unanimous in their verdict ; they were confined to specific charges, restricted by legal rules of evidence, and deprived of the testimony of all the Spanish officers, who were certainly discontented with Murray's conduct, and whose absence caused the serious charge of abandoning Copons' army to be suppressed. Moreover the warmth of temper displayed by the principal prosecutor, Admiral Hallowel, together with his signal on Lord William Bentinck's arrival, whereby, to the detriment of discipline, he manifested his contempt for the general with whom he was acting, gave Murray an advantage which he improved skilfully, for he was a man sufficiently acute and prompt when not at the head of an army. He charged the admiral with deceit, factious dealings, and disregard of the service ; described him as a man of a passionate, overweening, busy disposition, troubled with excess of vanity, meddling with everything, and thinking himself competent to manage both troops and ships.

Nevertheless Sir John Murray had signally failed, both as an independent general, and as a lieutenant acting under superior orders. On his trial, blending these different capacities together, with expert sophistry he pleaded his instructions in excuse for his errors as a free commander, and his discretionary power in mitigation of his disobedience as a lieutenant ; but his operations were indefensible in both capacities. Lord Wellington's instructions, precise, and founded upon the advantages offered by a command of the sea, prescribed an attack upon Taragona, with a definite object, namely, to deliver Valencia.

"*You tell me,*" said he "*that the line of the Xucar, which covers Valencia, is too strong to force ; turn it then by the ocean, assail the rear of the enemy, and he will weaken his strong line to protect his communication ; or, he will give you an opportunity to establish a new base of operations behind him.*"

This plan however demanded promptness and energy, and Murray professed neither. The weather was so favourable, that a voyage which might have consumed nine or ten days was performed in two, the Spanish troops punctually effected their junction, the initial operations were secured, Fort Balaguer fell, the French moved from all sides to the succour of Taragona, the line of the Xucar was weakened, the diversion was complete. In the night of the 12th the bulk of Murray's army was again afloat, a few hours would have sufficed to embark the cavalry at the Col de Balaguer, and the whole might have sailed for the city of Valencia, while Suchet's advanced guard was still on the hills above Monroig, and he, still uncertain as to the fate of Taragona, 150 miles from the Xucar. In fine Murray had failed to attain the first object pointed out by Wellington's instructions, but the second was within his reach ; instead of grasping it he loitered about the Col de Balaguer, and gave Suchet, as we shall find, time to reach Valencia again.

Now whether the letter or the spirit of Wellington's instructions be considered, there was here a manifest dereliction on the part of Murray. What was that officer's defence ? That no specific period being named for his return to Valencia, he was entitled to exercise his discretion ! Did he then as an independent general perform any useful or brilliant action to justify his delay ? No ! his tale was one of loss and dishonour ! The improvident arrangements for the siege of San Felipe de Balaguer, and the unexpected fortune which saved him from the shame of abandoning his guns there also have been noted ; and it has been shown, that when the gain of time was the great element of success, he neither urged Copons to break up the roads, nor pushed the siege of Taragona with vigour. The feeble formality

of this latter operation has indeed been imputed to the engineer, Major Thackary, yet unjustly so. It was the part of that officer to form a plan of attack agreeable to the rules of art, it might be a bold or a cautious plan, and many persons did think Taragona was treated by him with too much respect; but it was the part of the commander-in-chief to decide if the general scheme of operations required a deviation from the regular course. The untrammelled engineer could then have displayed his genius. Sir John Murray made no sign. His instructions and his ultimate views were withheld alike, from his naval colleague, from his second in command, and from his quarter-master-general; and while the last named functionary was quite shut out from the confidence of his commander, the admiral, and many others, both of the army and navy, imagined him to be the secret author of the proceedings which were hourly exciting their indignation. Murray however declared on his trial, that he had rejected General Donkin's advice, an avowal consonant to facts, since that officer urged him to raise the siege on the 9th and had even told him where 400 draught bullocks were to be had, to transport his heavy artillery. On the 12th he opposed the spiking of the guns, and urged Murray to drag them to Cape Salou, of which place he had given, as early as the third day of the siege, a military plan, marking a position, strong in itself, covering several landing places, and capable of being flanked on both sides by the ships of war: it had no drawback save a scarcity of water, yet there were some springs, and the fleet would have supplied the deficiency.

It is true that Donkin, unacquainted with Wellington's instructions, and having at Castalla seen no reason to rely on Sir John Murray's military vigour, was averse to the enterprise against Taragona. He thought the allies should have worked Suchet out of Valencia by operating on his right flank. And so Wellington would have thought, if he had only looked at their numbers and not at their quality; he had even sketched such a plan for Murray, if the attack upon Taragona should be found impracticable. But he knew the Spaniards too well to like such combinations for an army, two-thirds of which were of that nation, and not even under one head; an army ill-equipped, and with the exception of Del Parque's troops, unused to active field operations. Wherefore, calculating their power with remarkable nicety, he preferred the sea-flank, and the aid of an English fleet.

Here it may be observed, that Napoleon's plan of invasion did not embrace the coast-lines where they could be avoided. It was an obvious disadvantage to give the British navy opportunities of acting against his communications. The French indeed, seized Santona and Santander in the Bay of Biscay, because, these being the only good ports on that coast, the English ships were thus in a manner shut out from the north of Spain. They likewise worked their invasion by the Catalanian and Valencian coast, because the only roads practicable for artillery run along that sea-line; but their general scheme was to hold, with large masses, the interior of the country, and keep their communications aloof from the danger of combined operations by sea and land. The providence of the plan was proved by Suchet's peril on this occasion.

Sir John Murray, when tried, grounded his justification on the following points. 1st. That he did not know with any certainty until the night of the 11th that Suchet was near. 2nd. That the fall of Taragona being the principal object, and the drawing of the French from Valencia the accessory, he persisted in the siege, because he expected reinforcements from Sicily, and desired to profit from the accidents of war. 3rd. That looking only to the second object, the diversion would have been incomplete if the siege had been raised sooner, or even relaxed; hence the landing of guns and stores after he despaired of success. 4th. That he dared not risk a battle to save his battering train, because Wellington would not pardon a defeat. Now had he adopted a vigorous plan, or persisted until the danger of losing his army was apparent, and then made a quick return to Valencia, this defence would have been plausible, though inconclusive. But when every order, every movement, every expression, discovered his infirmity of purpose, his pleading can only be regarded as the subtle tale of an advocate.

The fault was not so much in the raising of the siege as in the manner of doing it, and in the feebleness of the attack. For first, however numerous the chances of

war are, fortresses expecting succour do not surrender without being vigorously assailed. The arrival of reinforcements from Sicily was too uncertain for reasonable calculation, and it was scarcely possible for the governor of Taragona, while closely invested, to discover that no fresh stores or guns were being landed ; still less could he judge so timeously of Murray's final intention by that fact, as to advertise Suchet that Taragona was in no danger. Neither were the spies, if any were in the allies' camp, more capable of drawing such conclusions, seeing that sufficient artillery and stores for the siege were landed the first week. And the landing of more guns could not have deceived them, when the feeble operations of the general, and the universal discontent, furnished surer guides for their reports.

Murray designed to raise the siege as early as the 9th and only deferred it, after seeing the admiral, from his natural vacillation. It was therefore mere casuistry to say, that he first obtained certain information of Suchet's advance on the night of the 11th. On the 8th and 10th through various channels he knew the French marshal was in march for Tortosa, and that his advanced guard menaced the Col de Balaguer. The approach of Maurice Mathieu on the other side was also known; he should therefore have been prepared to raise the siege without the loss of his guns on the 12th. Why were they lost at all? They could not be saved, he said, without risking a battle in a bad position, and Wellington had declared he would not pardon a defeat! This was the after-thought of a sophister, and not warranted by Wellington's instructions, which on that head, referred only to the duke Del Parque and Elio.

But was it necessary to fight a battle in a bad position to save the guns? all persons admitted that they could have been embarked before mid-day on the 13th. Panettier was then at Monroig, Suchet still behind Perillo, Maurice Mathieu falling back from Villa Franca. The French on each side were therefore respectively 36 and 34 miles distant on the night of the 12th, and their point of junction was Reus. Yet how form that junction? The road from Villa Franca by the Col de Cristina was partially broken up by Copons, the road from Perillo to Reus was always impracticable for artillery, and from the latter place to Taragona was six miles of very rugged country. The allies were in possession of the point of junction, Maurice Mathieu was retiring, not advancing. And if the French could have marched 34 and 36 miles, through the mountains in one night, and been disposed to attack in the morning without artillery, they must still have ascertained the situation of Murray's army; they must have made arrangements to watch Copons, Manso, and Prevôt, who would have been on their rear and flanks ; they must have formed an order of battle and decided upon the mode of attack before they advanced. It is true that their junction at Reus would have forced Murray to suspend his embarkation to fight ; but not, as he said, in a bad position, with his back to the beach, where the ships' guns could not aid him, and where he might expect a dangerous surf for days. The naval officers denied the danger from surf at that season of the year; and it was not right to destroy the guns and stores when the enemy was not even in march for Reus. Coolness and consideration would have enabled Murray to see that there was no danger. In fact no emissaries escaped from the town, and the enemy had no spies in the camp, since no communication took place between the French columns until the 17th. On the 15th Suchet knew nothing of the fate of Taragona.

The above reasoning leaves out the possibility of profiting from a central position to fall with superior forces upon one of the French columns. It supposes, however, that accurate information was possessed by the French generals ; that Maurice Mathieu was as strong as he pretended to be, Suchet eager and resolute to form a junction with him. But in truth Suchet knew not what to do after the fall of Fort Balaguer, Maurice Mathieu had less than 7000 men of all arms, he was not followed by Decaen, and he imagined the allies to have 20,000 men, exclusive of the Catalans. Besides which the position at Cape Salou was only six miles distant, and Murray might, with the aid of the draft bullocks discovered by Donkin, have dragged all his heavy guns there, still maintaining the investment; he might have shipped his battery train, and when the enemy approached Reus, have marched to the Col de Balaguer, where he could, as he afterwards did, embark or disembark in the

presence of the enemy. The danger of a flank march, Suchet being at Reus, could not have deterred him, because he did send his cavalry and field artillery by that very road on the 12th, when the French advanced guard was at Monroig and actually skirmished with Lord Frederick Bentinck. Finally he could have embarked his main body, leaving a small corps with some cavalry to keep the garrison in check and bring off his guns. Such a detachment, together with the heavy guns, would have been afloat in a couple of hours and on board the ships in four hours; it could have embarked on the open beach, or, if fearful of being molested by the garrison, might have marched to Cape Salou, or to the Col de Balaguer; and if the guns had thus been lost, the necessity would have been apparent, and the dishonour lessened. It is clear therefore that there was no military need to sacrifice the battery pieces. And those were the guns that shook the bloody ramparts of Badajos!

Wellington felt their loss keenly, Sir John Murray spoke of them lightly. "*They were of small value, old iron! he attached little importance to the sacrifice of artillery, it was his principle, he had approved of Colonel Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also desired Colonel Prevôt, if pressed, to abandon his battering train before the Fort of Balaguer.*" "*Such doctrine might appear strange to a British army, but it was the rule with the continental armies, and the French owed much of their successes to the adoption of it.*"

Strange indeed! Great commanders have risked their own lives, and sacrificed their bravest men, charging desperately in person, to retrieve even a single piece of cannon in a battle. They knew the value of moral force in war, and that of all the various springs and levers on which it depends, military honour is the most powerful. No! it was not to the adoption of such a doctrine, that the French owed their great successes. It was to the care with which Napoleon fostered and cherished a contrary feeling. Sir John Murray's argument would have been more pungent, more complete, if he had lost his colours, and pleaded that they were only wooden staves, bearing old pieces of silk!

CHAPTER II.

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK arrived without troops, for, having removed the queen from Sicily, he feared internal dissension, and Napoleon had directed Murat to invade the island with 20,000 men, the Toulon squadron being to act in concert. Sir Edward Pellew admitted that the latter might easily gain 24 hours' start of his fleet, and Lord William judged that 10,000 invaders would suffice to conquer. Murat, however, opened a secret negotiation, and thus that monarch, Bernadotte, and the Emperor Francis endeavoured to destroy a hero connected with them by marriage and to whom they all owed their crowns either by gift or clemency!

This early defection of Murat is certain, and his declaration that he had instructions to invade Sicily was corroborated by a rumour, rife in the French camps before the battle of Vittoria, that the Toulon fleet had sailed and the descent actually made.* Nevertheless there is some obscurity about the matter. The negotiation was never completed, Murat left Italy to command Napoleon's cavalry, and at the battle of Dresden contributed much to the success of that day. Now it is conceivable that he should mask his plans by joining the grand army, and that his fiery spirit should in the battle forget everything except victory. But to disobey Napoleon's orders as to the invasion of Sicily and dare to face that monarch immediately after, was so unlikely as to indicate rather a paper demonstration to alarm Lord Wellington than a real attack. And it would seem, from the short observation of the latter in answer to Lord William Bentinck's detailed communication on this subject, namely, "*Sicily is in no danger,*" † that he viewed it so, or thought it put forward by Murat to give more value to his defection. However, it sufficed to hinder reinforcements going to Murray.

Lord William Bentinck on landing was informed that Suchet was at Tortosa with from 8000 to 12,000 men, Maurice Mathieu with 7000 at Cambrils. To drive the latter back and re-invest Taragona was easy, and the place would have fallen, because the garrison had exhausted all their powder in the first siege; but this Lord William did not know, and to renew the attack vigorously was impossible, because

* Appendix, No. 23.

† Appendix, No. 23.

all the howitzers and platforms and fascines had been lost, and the animals and general equipment of the army were too much deteriorated by continual embarkations, and disembarkations, to keep the field in Catalonia. Wherefore he resolved to return to Alicante, not without hope still to fulfil Wellington's instructions by landing at Valencia between Suchet and Harispe. The re-embarkation was unmolested, the fort of Balaguer was destroyed, and one regiment of Whittingham's division, destined to reinforce Copons' army, being detached to effect a landing northward of Barcelona, the fleet put to sea; but misfortune continued to pursue this unhappy armament. A violent tempest impeded the voyage, 14 sail of transports struck upon the sands off the mouth of the Ebro, and the army was not entirely disembarked at Alicante before the 27th. Meanwhile Marshal Suchet, seeing the English fleet under sail and taught by the destruction of the fort of Balaguer, that the allies had relinquished operations in Lower Catalonia, marched with such extraordinary diligence as to reach Valencia in 48 hours after quitting Tortosa, thus frustrating Lord William's project of landing at Valencia.

During his absence Harispe had again proved the weakness of the Spanish armies, and demonstrated the sagacity and prudence of Lord Wellington. That great man's warning about defeat was distinctly addressed to the Spanish generals, because the chief object of the operations was not to defeat Suchet, but to keep him from aiding the French armies in the north. Pitched battles were, therefore, to be avoided, their issue being always doubtful, and the presence of a numerous and increasing force on the front and flank of the French was more sure to obtain the end in view. But all Spanish generals desired to fight great battles, soothing their national pride by attributing defeats to want of cavalry. It was at first doubtful if Murray could transport his horsemen to Taragona, and if left behind, they would have been under Elio and Del Parque, whereby those officers would have been encouraged to fight. Hence the English general's menacing intimation. And he also considered that as the army of Del Parque had been for three years in continued activity under Ballesteros without being actually dispersed, it must be more capable than Elio's in the dodging warfare suitable for Spaniards. Moreover, Elio was best acquainted with the country between the Xucar and Alicante. Wherefore Del Parque was directed to turn the enemy's right flank by Requena, Elio to menace the front, which, adverting to the support and protection furnished by Alicante and the mountains behind Castalla, was the least dangerous operation.

But to trust Spanish generals was to trust the winds and the clouds. General Elio persuaded the Duke del Parque to adopt the front attack, took the flank line himself, and detached General Mijares to fall upon Requena. And though Suchet had weakened his line on the 2nd of June, Del Parque was not ready until the 9th, thus giving the French a week for the relief of Taragona, and for the arrival of Severoli at Liria.

At this time Harispe had about 8000 men of all arms in front of the Xucar. The Spaniards, including Roche's and Mijares' divisions and Whittingham's cavalry, were 25,000 strong; and the Empecinado, Villa Campa, and the Frayle, Nebot, waited in the Cuenca and Albaracyn mountains, to operate on the French rear. Notwithstanding this disproportion, the contest was short, and for the Spaniards, disastrous. They advanced in three columns. Elio, by the pass of Almanza; Del Parque by Villena and Fuente de la Higuera, menacing Moxente; Roche and the Prince of Anglona from Alcoy, by Onteniente and the pass of Albayda, menacing San Felipe de Xativa, and turning Moxente.

Harispe abandoned those camps on the 11th, and took the line of the Xucar, occupying the entrenchments in front of his bridges at Alcira and Barca del Rey, near Alberique; and during this retrograde movement General Mesclop, commanding the rear-guard, being pressed by the Spanish horsemen, wheeled round and drove them in great confusion upon the infantry.

On the 15th Mijares took the fort of Requena, thus turning the line of the Xucar, and securing the defiles of Cabrillas through which the Cuenca road leads to Valencia. Villa Campa immediately joined him, thereby preventing Severoli from uniting with Harispe, and meanwhile Del Parque, after razing the French works at Moxente and San Felipe, advanced towards Alcira in two columns, the one

moving by the road of Cargagente, the other by the road of Gandia. General Habert overthrew the first with one shock, took 500 prisoners, and marched to attack the other, but it was already routed by General Gudin. After this contest, Del Parque and Harispe maintained their respective positions, while Elio joined Mijares at Requena. Villa Campa then descended to Chiva, and Harispe's position was becoming critical, when on the 23rd the head of Suchet's column, coming from the Ebro, entered Valencia, and on the 24th Del Parque resumed the position of Castalla.

Thus, in despite of Wellington's precautions, everything turned contrary to his designs. Elio had operated by the flank, Del Parque by the front, and the latter was defeated because he attacked the enemy in an entrenched position. Murray had failed entirely. His precipitancy at Taragona, and his delays at Balaguer were alike hurtful, and would have caused the destruction of one or both of the Spanish armies, but for the battle of Vittoria. For Suchet, having first detached General Musnier to recover the fort of Requena, and drive back Villa Campa, had assembled the bulk of his forces in his old positions of San Felipe and Moxente, before the return of the Anglo-Sicilian troops; and as Elio, unable to subsist at Utiel, had then returned towards his former quarters, the French marshal was upon the point of striking a fatal blow against him or Del Parque, or both, when the news of Wellington's victory averted the danger.

Here the firmness, the activity, and coolness of Suchet may be contrasted with the infirmity of purpose displayed by Murray. Slow in attack, precipitate in retreat, the English commander always mistimed his movements; the French marshal doubled his force by rapidity. The latter was isolated by the operations of Lord Wellington; his communication with Aragon was interrupted, and that province placed in imminent danger; the communication between Valencia and Catalonia was exposed to the attacks of the Anglo-Sicilian army and the fleet; nearly 30,000 Spaniards menaced him on the Xucar in front; Villa Campa, the Frayle, and the Empecinado could bring 10,000 men on his right flank; yet he did not hesitate to leave Harispe with only 7000 or 8000 men to oppose the Spaniards, while with the remainder of the army he relieved Taragona, and yet returned in time to save Valencia.

Such was the state of affairs when Lord William Bentinck brought the Anglo-Sicilian troops once more to Alicante. His first care was to reorganize the means of transport for the commissariat and artillery; but this was a matter of difficulty. Sir John Murray, with a mischievous economy, and strange disregard of that part of Wellington's instructions which proscribed active field operations in Valencia, if he should be forced to return from Catalonia, had discharged 600 mules and 200 country carts, that is to say, five-sixths of the whole field equipment, before he sailed for Taragona. The army was thus crippled, while Suchet gathered strong in front, and Musnier's division, retaking Requena, forced the Spaniards to retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del Parque to advance meanwhile from Castalla, but he had not means of carrying even one day's biscuit, and at the same time Elio, pressed by famine, went off towards Cuenca. It was not until the 1st of July that the Anglo-Sicilian troops could even advance towards Alcoy.

Lord William Bentinck commanded the Spanish armies as well as his own, and letters passed between him and Lord Wellington relative to further operations. The latter, keeping to his original views, advised a renewed attack on Taragona, or on Tortosa, if the ordnance still in possession of the army would admit of such a measure; but supposing this could not be, he recommended a general advance to seize the open country of Valencia, the British keeping close to the sea, and in constant communication with the fleet.

Lord William's views were different. He found the Spanish soldiers robust and active, but their regimental officers bad, and their organization generally so deficient that they could not stand against even a small French force, as proved by their recent defeat at Alcira. The generals however pleased him at first, especially Del Parque, that is, like all Spaniards, they had fair words at command, and Lord William Bentinck, without scanning very nicely their deeds, thought he could safely undertake a grand strategic operation in conjunction with them.

To force the line of the Xucar he deemed inadvisable, inasmuch as there were only two carriage roads, both of which led to Suchet's entrenched bridges; and though the river was fordable the enemy's bank was so favourable for defence as to render the passage by force dangerous. The Anglo-Sicilians were unaccustomed to great tactical movements, the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore, relinquishing an attack in front, Lord William proposed to move the allied armies in one mass, and turn the enemy's right flank either by Utiel and Requena, or, by a wider march, to reach Cuenca, and from thence gaining the Madrid road to Zaragoza, communicate with Wellington's army and operate down the Ebro. In either case it was necessary to cross the Albaracyn mountains, and there were no carriage roads, save those of Utiel and Cuenca. But the passes near Utiel were strongly fortified by the French, and a movement on that line would necessarily lead to an attack upon Suchet, which was to be avoided. The line of Cuenca was preferable though longer, and being in the harvest season, provisions, he said, would not fail. The allies would thus force Suchet to cross the Ebro, or attack him in a chosen position where Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and in the event of a defeat they could retire for shelter upon his army.

Wellington, better acquainted with Spanish warfare, and the nature of Spanish co-operation, told him provisions would fail on the march to Cuenca, even in harvest time, and without money he would get nothing; moreover, by separating himself from the fleet, he would be unable to return suddenly to Sicily if that island should be really exposed to any imminent danger.

While these letters were being exchanged the Anglo-Sicilians marched towards Villena on Del Parque's left, and Suchet was preparing to attack when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching both parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs. The French general instantly abandoned Valencia, and Lord William entered that city.

Suchet knew that Clausel was at Zaragoza, and desirous of maintaining himself there to secure a point of junction for the army of Aragon with the king's army, if the latter should re-enter Spain. It was possible therefore, by abandoning all the fortresses in Valencia, and some of those in Catalonia, to have concentrated more than 30,000 men with which to join Clausel, and the latter, having carried off several small garrisons during his retreat, had 15,000. Lord Wellington's position would then have been critical, since 45,000 good troops, having many supporting fortresses, would have menaced his right flank at the moment when his front was assailed by a new general and a powerful army. But if this junction with Clausel invited Suchet on the one hand, on the other, with a view of influencing the general negotiations during the armistice in Germany, it was important to appear strong in Spain. On such occasions men generally endeavour to reconcile both objects and obtain neither. Suchet resolved to march upon Zaragoza and at the same time retain his grasp upon Valencia by keeping large garrisons in the fortresses. This reduced his field force, a great error, it was so proved by the result. But if the war in the north of Spain and in Germany had taken a different turn, his foresight and prudence would have been applauded.

The army of Aragon now counted 32,000 effective men. Four thousand were in Zaragoza, 2000 in Mequinenza, Venasque, Monzons, Ayerbe, Jaca, and some smaller posts. Twenty-six thousand remained. Of these 110 were left in Denia, with provisions for eight months; 1250 in Saguntum, where there were immense stores, eight months' provisions for the garrison, and two months' subsistence for the whole army; 400 with provisions for a year, were in Peniscola, and in Morella 120 with magazines for six months. Into Tortosa, where there was a large artillery park, Suchet threw a garrison of nearly 5000 men, and then destroying the bridges on the Xucar, marched from Valencia on the 5th of July, taking the coast road for Tortosa.

The inhabitants, grateful for the discipline he had maintained, were even friendly, and while the main body thus moved, Musnier retreated from Requena across the mountains towards Caspe, the point of concentration for the whole army; but ere it could reach that point, Clausel's flight to Jaca, unnecessary, for he was only pursued from Tudela by Mina, became known, and the effect was fatal.

All the Partidas immediately united and menaced Zaragoza, whereupon Suchet ordered Paris to retire upon Caspe, and pressed forward himself to Favara. Musnier, meanwhile, reached the former town, having on the march picked up Severoli's brigade and the garrisons of Teruel and Alcanitz. Thus on the 12th the whole army was in military communication but extended along the Ebro from Tortoza to Caspe. Mina had, however, seized the Monte Torrero on the 8th, and General Paris evacuated Zaragoza in the night of the 9th, leaving 500 men in the castle with much ordnance. Encumbered with a great train of carriages he got entangled in the defiles of Alcubiere, and being attacked lost many men and all his baggage and artillery. Instead of joining Suchet he fled to Huesca, where he rallied the garrison of Ayerbe and then made for Jaca, reaching it on the 14th at the moment when Clausel, after another ineffectual attempt to join the king, had returned to that place. Duran then invested the castle of Zaragoza, and the fort of Daroca. The first surrendered on the 30th, but Daroca did not fall until the 11th of August.

This sudden and total loss of Aragon made Suchet think it no longer possible to fix a base in that province, nor to rally Clausel's troops on his own. He could not remain on the right bank of the Ebro, neither could he feed his army permanently in the sterile country about Tortoza while Aragon was in possession of the enemy. Moreover the allies, having the command of the sea, might land troops, and seize the passes of the hills behind him, wherefore fixing upon the fertile country about Taragona for his position, he passed the Ebro at Tortoza, Mora, and Mequinenza, on the 14th and 15th, detaching Isidore Lamarque to fetch off the garrisons of Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, and Bujarola, and bring the whole to Lerida. Meanwhile the bulk of the army, moving on the road from Tortoza to Taragona, although cannonaded by the English fleet, reached Taragona with little hurt, and the walls were mined for destruction, but the place was still held with a view to field operations.

The general state of the war seems to have been too little considered by Suchet at this time, or he would have made a more vigorous effort to establish himself in Aragon. Had he persisted to march on Zaragoza he would have raised the siege of the castle, perchance have given a blow to Mina, whose orders were to retire upon Tudela, where Wellington designed to offer battle; but Suchet might have avoided this, and to have appeared upon Wellington's flank were it only for a fortnight, would, as shall be hereafter shown, have changed the aspect of the campaign. Suchet's previous rapidity and excellent arrangements had left the allies in Valencia far behind, they could not have gathered in force soon enough to meddle with him, and their pursuit now to be described, was not so cautiously conducted but that he might have turned and defeated them.

The 9th of July, four days after the French abandoned Valencia, Lord William Bentinck entered that city and made it his place of arms instead of Alicant. On the 16th, marching by the coast road, in communication with the fleet and masking Peniscola, a fortress now of little importance, he followed the enemy; but Suchet had on that day completed the passage of the Ebro, he might have been close to Zaragoza, and Del Parque's army was still near Alicant in a very disorderly condition. And though Elío and Roche were at Valencia, the occupation of that town, and the blockades of Denia and Murviedro, proved more than a sufficient task for them; the garrison of the latter place received provisions continually, and were so confident as to assemble in order of battle on the glacis when the allies marched past.

The 20th Lord William entered Vinaros and remained there until the 26th. Suchet might then have been at Tudela or Sanguessa, and it shall be shown that Wellington could not have met him at the former place as he designed.

During this period various reports were received. "*The French had vainly endeavoured to regain France by Zaragoza.*" "*Taragona was destroyed.*" "*The evacuation of Spain was certain.*" "*A large detachment had already quitted Catalonia.*" The English general, who had little time to spare from the pressure of Sicilian affairs, became eager to advance. He threw a flying bridge over the Ebro at Amposta, and having before embarked Clinton's division with a view

to seize the Col de Balaguer, resolved to follow Suchet with the remainder of his army, which now included Whittingham's cavalry. A detachment from Tortosa menaced his bridge on the 25th, but the troops were reinforced and the passage of the Ebro completed on the 27th. The next day Villa Campa arrived with 4000 men and meanwhile the Col de Balaguer was secured.

On the 29th the cavalry being in march was threatened by infantry from Tortosa, near the Col de Alba, but the movements generally were unopposed, and the army got possession of the mountains beyond the Ebro.

Suchet was at this time inspecting the defences of Lerida and Mequinenza, and his escort was necessarily large because Copons was hanging on his flanks in the mountains about Manresa; but his position about Villa Franca was exceedingly strong. Taragona and Tortosa, covered the front; Barcelona, the rear; the communication with Decaen was secure, and on the right flank stood Lerida, to which the small forts of Mequinenza and Monzon served as outposts.

The Anglo-Sicilian troops reinforced with Whittingham's cavalry did not exceed 10,000 effective men, of which one division was on board ship from the 22nd to the 26th. Elio and Roche were at Valencia in a destitute condition. Del Parque's army, 13,000 strong, including Whittingham's infantry, was several marches in the rear, it was paid from the British subsidy but very ill-provided and the duke himself disinclined to obedience. Villa Campa did not join until the 28th, and Copons was in the mountains above Vich. Lord William therefore remained with 10,000 men and a large train of carriages, for 10 days without any position of battle behind him nearer than the hills about Saguntum. His bridge over the Ebro was thrown within 10 miles of Tortosa where there was a garrison of 5000 men, detachments from which could approach unperceived through the rugged mountains near the fortress; and Suchet's well-organized experienced army was within two marches. That marshal however, expecting a sharp warfare, was visiting his fortresses in person, and his troops quartered for the facility of feeding were unprepared to strike a sudden blow; moreover, judging his enemy's strength in offence what it might have been rather than what it was, he awaited the arrival of Decaen's force from Upper Catalonia before he offered battle.

But Decaen was himself pressed. The great English fleet menacing Rosas and Palamos had encouraged a partial insurrection of the Somatenes, which was supported by the divisions of Eroles, Manso, and Villamiel. Several minor combats took place on the side of Besala and Olot, Eroles invested Bañolas, and though Leaten there in a sharp action by Lamarque on the 23rd of June, the insurrection spread. To quell it Decaen combined a double operation from the side of Gerona upon Vich, which was generally the Catalan head-quarters. Designing to attack by the south himself, he sent Maximilian Lamarque, with 1500 French troops and some Miguelets, by the mountain paths of San Felice de Pallarols and Amias. On the 8th of July that officer gained the heights of Salud, seized the road from Olot and descended from the north upon Roda and Manlieu, in the expectation of seeing Decaen attacking from the other side. He perceived below him a heavy body in march, and at the same time heard the sound of cannon and musketry about Vich. Concluding this was Decaen he advanced confidently against the troops in his front, although very numerous, thinking they were in retreat, but they fought him until dark without advantage on either side.

In the night an officer came with intelligence that Decaen's attack had been relinquished, in consequence of Suchet's orders to move to the Llobregat, and it then appeared that a previous despatch had been intercepted, and the whole Catalan force to the amount of 6000 or 7000 combatants was upon Lamarque's hands, and the firing heard at Vich was a rejoicing for Lord Wellington's victories in Navarre. A retreat was imperative. The Spaniards followed at daylight, and Lamarque getting entangled in difficult ground near Salud was forced to deliver battle. The fight lasted many hours, all his ammunition was expended, he lost 400 men and was upon the point of destruction, when general Beurmann came to his succour with four fresh battalions, and the Catalans were finally defeated with great loss. After this vigorous action Decaen marched to join Suchet, and the Catalans, moving by the mountains in separate divisions, approached Lord William Bentinck.

The allies having thus passed the Ebro, several officers of both nations conceived the siege of Tortosa would be the best operation. Nearly 40,000 men, that is to say, Villa Campa's, Copons', Del Parque's, Whittingham's, some of Elio's forces, and the Anglo-Sicilians, could be united for the siege, and the defiles of the mountains on the left bank of the Ebro would enable them to resist Suchet's attempts to succour the place on that side, and force him to move by the circuitous route of Lerida. Wellington also leaned towards this operation, but Lord William Bentinck resolved to push at once for Taragona, and even looked to an attack upon Barcelona; certainly a rash proceeding, inasmuch as Suchet awaited his approach with an army every way superior. It does not however follow that to besiege Tortosa would have been advisable, for though the battering train, much larger than Murray's losses gave reason at first to expect, was equal to the reduction of the place, the formal siege of such a fortress was a great undertaking. The vicinity was unhealthy, and it would have been difficult to feed the Spanish troops. They were quite inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be long, not sure to be successful, and Suchet seeing the allies engaged in such a difficult operation might have marched at once to Aragon.

It would seem Lord William Bentinck was at this time misled, partly by the reports of the Catalans, partly by Lord Wellington's great successes, into a belief that the French were going to abandon Catalonia. His mind also ran upon Italian affairs, and he did not perceive that Suchet, judiciously posted and able to draw reinforcements from Decaen, was in fact much stronger than all the allies united. The two armies of Aragon and Catalonia, numbered 67,000 men. Of these, about 27,000, including Paris's division then at Jaca, were in garrison, 5000 were sick, the remainder in the field. In Catalonia the allies were not principals, they were accessories. They were to keep Suchet from operating on the flank of the allies in Navarre and their defeat would have been a great disaster. So entirely was this Lord Wellington's view, that the Duke del Parque's army was to make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should either move himself or detach largely towards Aragon. Lord William, after passing the Ebro, could have secured the defiles of the mountains with his own and Villa Campa's troops, that is to say, with 20,000 men, including Whittingham's division. He could have insulated the garrison of Tortosa, and commenced the making of gabions and fascines, which would have placed Suchet in doubt as to his ulterior objects while he awaited the junction of Del Parque's, Copons', and the rest of Elio's troops. Thus 40,000 men, 3000 being cavalry and attended by a fleet, could have descended into the Campo, still leaving a detachment to watch Tortosa. If Suchet then came to the succour of Taragona the allies, superior in numbers, could have fought in a position chosen beforehand. Still it is very doubtful if all these corps would, or could have kept together.

Lord William Bentinck's operations were headlong. He had prepared platforms and fascines for a siege in the island of Yvica, and on the 30th quitting the mountains suddenly invested Taragona with less than 6000 men, occupying ground 300 yards nearer to the walls the first day than Murray had ever done. He thus prevented the garrison from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed, they had that intention; yet the fortress could not be besieged because of Suchet's vicinity and the dissemination of the allies. The 31st the bridge at Amposta was accidentally broken, 300 bullocks were drowned, and the head of Del Parque's army, being on the left of the Ebro, fell back a day's march. However, Whittingham's division and the cavalry came up, and on the 3rd, the bridge being restored, Del Parque also joined the investing army, Copons then promised to bring up his Catalans, Sarzfield's division, now belonging to the second army, arrived, and Elio had been ordered to reinforce it with three additional battalions while Villa Campa observed Tortosa. Meanwhile Lord William, seeing that Suchet's troops were scattered and the marshal himself at Barcelona, thought of surprising his posts and seizing the mountain line of the Llobregat; but Elio sent no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications between the English general and Eroles, was slow, the garrison of Tortosa burned the bridge at Amposta, and Suchet taking alarm suddenly returned from Barcelona and concentrated his army.

Up to this time the Spaniards, giving copious but false information to Lord

William, and no information at all to Suchet, had induced a series of faults on both sides balancing each other, a circumstance not uncommon in war, which demands all the faculties of the greatest minds. The Englishman, thinking his enemy retreating, had pressed rashly forward. The Frenchman, deeming from the other's boldness the whole of the allies were at hand, thought himself too weak, and awaited the arrival of Decaen, whose junction was retarded as we have seen by the combined operations of the Catalan army and the English fleet.

In this state of affairs Suchet heard of new and important successes gained in Navarre by Lord Wellington, one of his Italian battalions was at the same time cut off at San Sadurn by Manso, and Lord William Bentinck took a position of battle beyond the Gaya. His left, composed of Whittingham's division, occupied Braffin, the Col de Liebra, and Col de Christina, his right covered the great coast road. These were the only carriage ways by which the enemy could approach, but they were ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham thought himself too weak to defend the passes alone; hence, when Suchet, reinforced by Decaen with 8000 sabres and bayonets, finally advanced, Lord William, who had landed neither guns nor stores, decided to refuse battle. For such a resolute officer this must have been a painful decision. He had now nearly 30,000 fighting men, including 1000 marines which had been landed to join the advanced guard at Altafala; he had assumed the offensive, invested Taragona where the military honour of England had suffered twice before, in fine provoked the action which he now declined. But Suchet had equal numbers of a better quality; the banks of the Gaya were rugged to pass in retreat if the fight should be lost; much must have been left to the general officers at different points; Del Parque's was an uneasy coadjutor, and if any part was forced the whole line would have been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however manifest, for though he expected the enemy on the 9th he did not send his field artillery and baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day on which Decaen reached Villa Franca.

The French general, dreading the fire of the fleet, endeavoured by false attacks on the coast road to draw the allies from the defiles beyond Braffin, towards which he finally carried his whole army, and those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his "Memoirs" state because of these demonstrations, but because Lord William had previously determined to retreat. On the 16th finding the passes unguarded, he poured through and advanced upon Valls thus turning the allies, but he had lost time and the latter were in full retreat towards the mountains, the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrils. The march of the former was covered by Lord Frederick Bentinck who, leading the British and German cavalry, defeated the fourth French Hussars with a loss of 40 or 50 men; and it is said that either General Habert or Harispe was taken, but escaped in the confusion.

The Anglo-Sicilians and Whittingham's division now entrenched themselves near the Col de Balaguer, and Del Parque marched with his own and Sarzfield's troops to invest Tortoza, but the garrison fell upon his rear while passing the Ebro and some loss was sustained. Meanwhile Suchet, more swayed by the remembrance of Castalla than by his recent success, would not again prove the courage of the British troops on a mountain position. Contrary to the wishes of his army he returned to Taragona and destroyed the ancient walls, which from the extreme hardness of the Roman cement proved a tedious and difficult matter: then resuming his old positions about Villa Franca and on the Llobregat he sent Decaen to Upper Catalonia. This terminated Lord William Bentinck's first effort, and the general result was favourable. He had risked much on insufficient grounds, yet his enemy made no profit and lost Taragona with its fertile Campo, Tortoza was invested, and Suchet was kept away from Navarre.

It is strange that this renowned French general suffered his large force to be thus paralyzed at such a crisis. Above 27,000 of his soldiers if we include the isolated division of Paris were shut up in garrison, but 32,000 remained with which he marched to and fro in Catalonia while the war was being decided in Navarre. Had he moved to that province by Aragon, before the end of July, Lord Wellington would have been overpowered. What was to be feared? That Lord William Bentinck would follow, or attack one of his fortresses? If the French were successful

in Navarre the loss of a fortress in Catalonia would have been a trifle, it was not certain that any would have fallen, and Lord William could not abandon the coast. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned Catalonia ; but to invade France, guarded as she was by her great military reputation, and to do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, the latter barring all the carriage roads, was chimerical. Success in Navarre would have made an invasion by sea pass as a partisan descent, and moreover France, wanting Suchet's troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded by Wellington and in a far more formidable manner. This question shall, however, be treated more largely in another place, it is sufficient to observe here, that Clarke, the minister of war, a man without genius or attachment to the emperor's cause, discouraged any great combined plan of action, and Napoleon, absorbed by his own immense operations, did not interpose.

Lord William now intent upon the siege of Tortosa wished Lord Wellington to attack Mequinenza with a detachment of his army ; but this the situation of affairs in Navarre and Guipuscoa did not admit of, and he soon discovered that to assail Tortosa was an undertaking beyond his own means. Elio when desired to gather provisions and assist in the operations demanded three weeks for preparation ; all the Spanish troops were in want, Roche's division, blockading Murviedro, although so close to Valencia was on half rations ; and the siege of Tortosa was necessarily relinquished, because no great or sustained operation could be conducted in concert with such generals and such armies. Suchet's fear of them was an illustration of Napoleon's maxim, that war is an affair of discrimination. It is more essential to know the quality than the quantity of enemies.

It was difficult for Lord William Bentinck to apply his mind vigorously to the campaign he was conducting, because fresh changes injurious to the British policy in Sicily called him to that island, and his thoughts were running upon the invasion of Italy ; but as the Spaniards, deceived by the movements of escorts and convoys, reported that Suchet had marched with 12,000 men to join Soult, he once more fixed his head-quarters at Taragona, and, following Lord Wellington's instructions, detached Del Parque's troops by forced marches upon Tudela.

On the 5th of September the army entered Villa Franca, and the 12th, detachments of Calabrese, Swiss, German, and British infantry, a squadron of cavalry and one battery, in all about 1200 men under Colonel Adam, occupied the heights of Ordal. At this place, 10 miles in advance of Villa Franca, being joined by three of Sarzfield's battalions and a Spanish squadron they took a position ; but it now appeared that very few French troops had been detached ; that Suchet had concentrated his whole force on the Llobregat ; and that his army was very superior in numbers, because the allies, reduced by the loss of Del Parque's troops, had also left Whittingham's division at Reus and Valls to procure food. Sarzfield's division was feeding on the British supplies, and Lord William again looked to a retreat, yet thinking the enemy disinclined to advance desired to preserve his forward position as long as possible.

He had only two lines of operation to watch. The one menacing his front from Molino del Rey by the main road, which Colonel Adam blocked by his position at Ordal ; the other from Martorel, by San Sadurni, menacing his left ; but on this route, a difficult one, he had pushed the Catalans under Eroles and Manso reinforcing them with some Calabrese ; there was indeed a third line by Avionet on his right, but it was little better than a goat-path. He had designed to place his main body close up to the Ordal on the evening of the 12th, yet from some slight cause delayed it until the next day. Meanwhile he viewed the country in advance of that defile without discovering an enemy. His confidential emissaries assured him the French were not going to advance, and he returned, satisfied that Adam's detachment was safe, and so expressed himself to that officer. A report of a contrary tendency was indeed made by Colonel Reeves of the 27th, on the authority of a Spanish woman who had before proved her accuracy and ability as a spy ; she was now however disbelieved, and this incredulity was unfortunate. For Suchet thus braved, and his communication with Lerida threatened by Manso on the side of Martorel, was already in march to attack Ordal with the army of Aragon, while

Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, moving with the army of Catalonia from Martorel by San Sardurni, turned the left of the allies.

COMBAT OF ORDAL.

The heights occupied by Colonel Adam although rugged rose gradually from a magnificent bridge, by which the main road was carried over a very deep and impracticable ravine. The second battalion of the 27th British regiment was posted on the right, the Germans and De Roll's Swiss with the artillery, defended an old Spanish fort commanding the main road; the Spaniards were in the centre, the Calabrese on the left; and the cavalry were in reserve. A bright moonlight facilitated the movements of the French, and a little before midnight their leading column, under General Mesclap, passing the bridge without let or hindrance, mounted the heights with a rapid pace and driving back the picquets gave the first alarm. The allied troops lying on their arms in order of battle were ready instantly and the fight commenced. The first effort was against the 27th, then the Germans and the Spanish battalions were vigorously assailed in succession as the French columns got free of the bridge, but the Calabrese were too far on the left to take a share in the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate. Harispe, who commanded the French, constantly outflanked the right of the allies, and at the same time pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought gallantly.

Colonel Adam was wounded very early, the command devolved upon Colonel Reeves, and that officer seeing his flank turned and his men falling fast, in short, finding himself engaged with a whole army on a position of which Colonel Adam had lost the key by neglecting the bridge, resolved to retreat. In this view he first ordered the guns to fall back, and to cover the movement charged a column of the enemy which was pressing forward on the high road, but he was severely wounded in this attack and there was no recognized commander on the spot to succeed him. Then the affair became confused. For though the order to retreat was given the Spaniards were fighting desperately, and the 27th thought it shame to abandon them; wherefore the Germans and De Roll's regiment still held the old fort and the guns came back. The action was thus continued with great fury. Colonel Carey now brought the Calabrese into line from the left, and menaced the right flank of the French, but he was too late; the Spaniards overwhelmed in the centre were broken, the right was completely turned, the old fort was lost, the enemy's skirmishers got into the allies' rear, and at three o'clock the whole dispersed, the most part in flight; the Spanish cavalry were then overthrown on the main road by the French hussars and four guns were taken in the tumult.

Captain Waldron, with the 27th reduced to 80 men, and Captain Müller with about the same number of Germans and Swiss, breaking through several small parties of the enemy effected their retreat in good order by the hills on each side of the road. Colonel Carey endeavoured at first to gain the road of Sadurni on the left, but meeting with Decaen's people on that side he retraced his steps, and crossing the field of battle in the rear of Suchet's columns made for Villa Nueva de Sitjes. There he finally embarked without loss, save a few stragglers who fell into the hands of a flanking battalion of French infantry which had moved through the mountains by Begas and Avionet. The overthrow was complete and the prisoners were at first very numerous, but the darkness enabled many to escape, and 2000 men reached Manso and Eroles.

Suchet pursuing his march came up with Lord William about eight o'clock. The latter retired skirmishing and with excellent order beyond Villa Franca, followed by the French horsemen some of which assailed his rear-guard while others edged to their right to secure the communication with Decaen. The latter was looked for by both parties with great anxiety, but he had been delayed by the resistance of Manso and Eroles in the rugged country between Martorel and San Sadurni. Suchet's cavalry and artillery continued however to infest the rear of the retreating army until it reached a deep baranco, near the Venta de Monjos, where the passage being dangerous and the French horsemen importunate, that brave and honest soldier, Lord Frederick Bentinck, charged their right, and fighting hand to hand with the enemy's general, Myers, wounded him and overthrew his light cavalry; they rallied upon their dragoons and advanced again, endeavouring to turn the

flank, but were stopped by the fire of two guns which General Clinton opened upon them. Meanwhile the cuirassiers, on the left, pressed the Brunswick hussars and menaced the infantry, yet they were finally checked by the fire of the 10th regiment. This cavalry action was vigorous, the 20th and the Germans although few in numbers, lost more than 90 men. The baranco was however safely passed and about three o'clock the army having reached Arbos the pursuit ceased. The Catalans meanwhile had retreated towards Igualada and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to Taragona.

It was now thought Suchet would make a movement to carry off the garrisons of Lerida and Tortosa, but this did not happen, and Lord William went to Sicily, leaving the command of the army to Sir William Clinton.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Lord William Bentinck committed errors, yet he has been censured without discrimination. "*He advanced rashly.*" "*He was undecided.*" "*He exposed his advanced guard without support.*" Such were the opinions expressed at the time. Their justness may be disputed. His first object was to retain all the French force in Catalonia; his second, to profit from Suchet's weakness if he detached largely. He could do neither by remaining inactive on the barren hills behind Hospitalet, because the Spaniards would have dispersed for want of provisions and the siege of Tortosa was found to be impracticable. It was therefore the part of a bold and skilful general to menace his enemy, if he could be sure of retreating again without danger or dishonour. The position at Villa Franca fulfilled this condition. It was strong in itself and offensive; Sir Edward Pellew's fleet was in movement to create diversions in Upper Catalonia, and all the emissaries and Spanish correspondents concurred in declaring, though falsely, that the French general had detached 12,000 men.

It is indeed one of the tests of a sagacious general to detect false intelligence, yet the greatest are at times deceived, and all must act, if they act at all, upon what appears at the time to be true. Lord William's advance was founded on erroneous data, but his position in front of Villa Franca was well chosen. It enabled him to feed Whittingham's division in the fertile country about Reus and Valls, and there were short and easy communications from Villa Franca to the sea-coast. The army could only be seriously assailed on two lines. In front, by the main road, which though broad was from Molino del Rey to the heights of Ordal one continued defile. On the left, by San Sadurn, a road still more rugged and difficult than the other. And the Catalans were launched on this side as their natural line of operations, because, without losing their hold of the mountains they protected the left of the allies, menacing at the same time the right of the enemy and his communications with Lerida. Half a march to the rear would bring the army to Vendrills, beyond which the enemy could not follow without getting under the fire of the ships; neither could he forestall this movement by a march through the Liebra and Cristina defiles, because the Catalans falling back on Whittingham's division could hold him in check.

2. Ordal and San Sadurn were the keys of the position. The last was well secured, the first not so, and there was the real error of Lord William Bentinck. It was none however to push an advanced guard of 3500 men, with cavalry and artillery, to a distance of 10 miles for a few hours. He had a right to expect the commander of such a force would maintain his post until supported, or at least retreat without disaster. An officer of capacity would have done so. But whoever relies upon the capacity of Sir Frederick Adam either in peace or war will be disappointed.

In 1810, Lord Wellington detached General Robert Craufurd with 2000 or 3000 men to a much greater distance, not for one night but for many weeks. And that excellent officer, though close to Massena's immense army, the very cavalry of which was double his whole numbers; though he had the long line of the Agueda, a fordable river, to guard; though he was in an open country and continually skirmishing, never lost so much as a patrol and always remained master of his movements for his combat on the Coa was a studied and wilful error. It was no fault therefore to push Colonel Adam's detachment to Ordal, but it was a fault that

Lord William, having determined to follow with his whole force, should have delayed doing so for one night, or that delaying he did not send some supporting troops forward. It was a fault not to do so because there was good reason to do so, and to delay was to tempt fortune. There was good reason to do so as well to profit of the advantage of the position as to support Adam. Had Lord William Bentinck been at hand with his main body when the attack on Ordal commenced, the head of Suchet's force which was kept at bay for three hours by a detachment so ill commanded would have been driven into the ravine behind, and the victorious allies would still have had time to march against Decaen by the road along which Colonel Cary endeavoured to join Manso. In fine, Suchet's dispositions were vicious in principle and ought not to have succeeded. He operated on two distinct lines having no cross communications, and before an enemy in possession of a central position with good communications.

3. It was another fault that Lord William Bentinck disregarded the Spanish woman's report to Colonel Reeves ; his observations made in front of the bridge of Ordal on the evening of the 12th accorded indeed with the reports of his own emissaries, but the safe side should always be the rule of precaution. He also, although on the spot, overlooked the unmilitary dispositions of Colonel Adam on the heights of Ordal. The summit could not be defended against superior numbers with a small corps, and that officer had nevertheless extended the Calabrese so far on the left that they could take no share in the action, and yet could not retreat without great difficulty. A commander who understood his business, would have blocked up the bridge in front of the heights, and defended it by a strong detachment, supporting that detachment by others placed in succession on the heights behind, but keeping his main body always in hand, ready either to fall on the head of the enemy's column of attack, or to rally the advanced detachments and retreat in order. There were plenty of trees and stones to block the bridge, its own parapet would have supplied materials, and the ravine was so deep and rugged, that the enemy could not have crossed it on the flanks in the dark.

It is no defence to say Colonel Adam only took his ground in the evening after a march ; that he expected the main body up the next morning, and that Lord William assured him he was safe from attack. Every officer is responsible for the security of his own troops, and the precautions prescribed by the rules of war should never be dispensed with or delayed at an outpost. Now it does not appear that Colonel Adam ever placed an infantry picquet on the bridge, or sent a cavalry patrol beyond it ; and I have been informed by a French soldier, one of a party sent to explore the position, that they reached the crest of the heights without opposition and returned safely, whereupon Mesclop's brigade instantly crossed the bridge and attacked.

4. Ordal might be called a surprise with respect to the general-in-chief, yet the troops engaged were not surprised ; they were beaten and dispersed because Colonel Adam was unskilful. The French general's victory was complete ; but he has in his "Memoirs" exaggerated his difficulties and the importance of his success, his private report to the emperor was more accurate. The "Memoirs" state that the English grenadiers defended certain works which commanded the ascent of the main road, and in the accompanying atlas a perspective view of well-conditioned redoubts with colours flying is given. The reader is thus led to imagine these were regular forts of a fresh construction defended by select troops ; but in the private report they are correctly designated as ancient retrenchments,* being in fact the ruins of some old Spanish field-works and of no more advantage to the allies than any natural inequality of ground. Again in the "Memoirs" the attack of the French cavalry near Villa Franca is represented as quite successful ; but the private report only says the rear was harassed by repeated charges, which is true, and moreover those charges were vigorously repulsed. The whole French loss was about 300 men, that of the allies, heavy at Ordal, was lightened by escape of prisoners during the night, and ultimately did not exceed 1000 men, including Spaniards.

* Appendix, No. 27.

CHAPTER III.

TURNING from the war in Catalonia to the operations in Navarre and Guipuscoa, we shall find Lord Wellington's indomitable energy overcoming every difficulty. It has been already shown how, changing his first views, he disposed the Anglo-Portuguese divisions to cover the siege of San Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna, at the same time attacking with the Spanish divisions Santoña on the coast, and the castles of Daroca, Morella, Zaragoza, and the forts of Pancorbo in the interior. These operations required many men, but the early fall of Pancorbo enabled O'Donnell's reserve to blockade Pampeluna, and Don Carlos D'España's division, 4000 strong, which had remained at Miranda del Castañar to improve its organization when Lord Wellington advanced to the Ebro, was approaching to reinforce him.

The harbour of Passages was the only port near the scene of operations suited for the supply of the army. Yet it had this defect, that being situated between the covering and the besieging army, the stores and guns once landed were in danger from every movement of the enemy. The Deba river, between San Sebastian and Bilbao, was unfit for large vessels, and hence no permanent dépôt could be established nearer than Bilbao. At that port therefore, and at St. Ander and Coruña, the great dépôts of the army were fixed, the stores being transported to them from the establishments in Portugal; but the French held Santoña, and their privateers interrupted the communication along the coast of Spain while American privateers did the same between Lisbon and Coruña. On the other hand the intercourse between San Sebastian and the ports of France was scarcely molested, and the most urgent remonstrances failed to procure a sufficient naval force on the coast of Biscay. It was in these circumstances Wellington commenced

THE SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN.

This place was built on a low sandy isthmus formed by the harbour on one side and the river Urumea on the other. Behind it rose the Monte Orgullo, a rugged cone nearly 400 feet high, washed by the ocean and crowned with the small castle of La Mota. Its southern face overlooking the town, was yet cut off from it by a line of defensive works and covered with batteries; but La Mota itself was commanded, at a distance of 1300 yards, by the Monte Olia on the other side of the Urumea.

The land front of San Sebastian was 350 yards wide, stretching quite across the isthmus. It consisted of a high curtain or rampart, very solid, strengthened by a lofty casemated flat bastion or cavalier placed in the centre, and by half bastions at either end. A regular horn-work was pushed out from this front, and 600 yards beyond the horn-work the isthmus was closed by the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the foot of which stood the suburb of San Martin.

On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain sandy hills called the *Chofres*, through which the road from Passages passed to the wooden bridge over the river, and thence, by the suburb of Santa Catalina, along the top of a sea-wall which formed a *fausse braye* for the horn-work.

The flanks of the town were protected by simple ramparts. The one was washed by the water of the harbour, the other by the Urumea which at high tide covered four of the 27 feet comprised in its elevation. This was the weak side of the fortress, for though covered by the river there was only a single wall ill-flanked by two old towers, and by the half bastion of San Elmo which was situated at the extremity of the rampart close under the Monte Orgullo. There was no ditch, no counterscarp, or glacis, the wall could be seen to its base from the Chofre hills at distances varying from 500 to 1000 yards, and when the tide was out the Urumea left a dry strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo. However, the guns from the batteries at Monte Orgullo, especially that called the *Mirador*, could see this strand.

The other flank of the town was secured by the harbour, in the mouth of which was a rocky island, called Santa Clara, where the French had established a post of 25 men.

When the battle of Vittoria happened San Sebastian was nearly dismantled; many of the guns had been removed to form battering trains or to arm smaller ports on the coast, there were no bomb-proofs nor palisades nor outworks, the wells were foul and the place was supplied with water by a single aqueduct. Joseph's defeat restored its importance as a fortress. General Emanuel Rey entered it the 22nd of June, bringing with him the escort of the convoy which had quitted Vittoria the day before the battle. The town was thus filled with emigrant Spanish families, with the ministers and other persons attached to the court; the population ordinarily 8000, was increased to 16,000, and disorder and confusion were predominant. Rey, pushed by necessity, immediately forced all persons not residents to march at once to France, granting them only a guard of 100 men; the people of quality went by sea, the others by land, and fortunately all arrived safely for the Partidas would have given them no quarter.

On the 27th General Foy, while retreating before Sir Thomas Graham, threw a reinforcement into the place. The next day Mendizabal's Spaniards appeared on the hills behind the ridge of San Bartolomeo and on the Chofres, whereupon General Rey burned the wooden bridge and both the suburbs, and commenced fortifying the heights of San Bartolomeo. The 29th the Spaniards slightly attacked San Bartolomeo, and were repulsed.

The 1st of July the governor of Guetaria abandoned that place, and with detestable ferocity secretly left a lighted train which exploded the magazine and destroyed many of the inhabitants. His troops, 300 in number, entered San Sebastian, and at the same time a vessel from St. Jean de Luz arrived with 56 cannoneers and some workmen; the garrison was thus increased to 3000 men and all persons not able to provide subsistence for themselves in advance were ordered to quit the place. Meanwhile Mendizabal, having cut off the aqueduct, made some approaches towards the head of the burned bridge on the right of the Urumea and molested the workmen on the heights of Bartolomeo.

On the 3rd, the *Surveillante* frigate and a sloop with some small craft arrived to blockade the harbour, yet the French vessels from St. Jean de Luz continued to enter by night. The same day the governor made a sally with 1100 men, in three columns, to obtain news, and after some hours' skirmishing returned with a few prisoners.

The 6th some French vessels, with a detachment of troops and a considerable convoy of provisions, came from St. Jean de Luz.

The 7th Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set fire to the convent of San Bartolomeo.

On the 9th Sir Thomas Graham arrived with a corps of British and Portuguese troops, and on the 13th the Spaniards marched, some to reinforce the force blockading Santona, the remainder to rejoin the fourth army on the Bidassoa.

At this time General Reille held the entrances to the Bastan by Vera and Echallar, but Wellington drove him thence on the 15th and established the seventh and light divisions there, thus covering the passes over the Peña de Haya by which the siege might have been interrupted.

Before General Graham arrived the French had constructed a redoubt on the heights of San Bartolomeo, and connected it with the convent of that name which they also fortified. These outworks were supported by posts in the ruined houses of the suburb of San Martin behind, and by a low circular redoubt, formed of casks on the main road, half-way between the convent and the horn-work. Hence to reduce the place, working along the isthmus, it was necessary to carry in succession three lines of defence covering the town, and a fourth at the foot of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota could be assailed. Seventy-six pieces of artillery were mounted upon these works and others were afterwards obtained from France by sea.

The besieging army consisted of the fifth division under General Oswald, and the independent Portuguese brigades of J. Wilson and Bradford reinforced by detachments from the first division. Thus, including the artillerymen, some seamen commanded by Lieutenant O'Reilly of the *Surveillante* and 100 regular sappers and miners, now for the first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula, nearly 10,000 men were employed. The guns available for the attack, in the first instance, were a new

battering train originally prepared for the siege of Burgos, consisting of 14 iron 24-pounders, six 8-inch brass howitzers, four 68-pound iron carronades, and four iron 10-inch mortars. To these were added six 24-pounders lent by the ships of war, and six 18-pounders which had moved with the army from Portugal, making altogether 40 pieces, commanded by Colonel Dickson. The distance from the *dépôt* of siege at Passages to the Chofre sand-hills was one mile and a half of good road, and a pontoon bridge was laid over the Urumea river above the Chofres, but from thence to the height of Bartolomeo was more than five miles of very bad road.

Early in July the fortress had been twice closely examined by Major Smith, the engineer who had so ably defended Tarifa. He proposed a plan of siege founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofre hills to destroy the flanks, rake the principal front, and form a breach with the same batteries, the works being at the same time secured, except at low water, by the Urumea. Counter-batteries, to be constructed on the left of that river, were to rake the line of defence in which the breach was to be formed; and against the castle and its outworks he relied principally upon vertical fire, instancing the reduction of Fort Bourbon in the West Indies in proof of its efficacy. This plan would probably have reduced San Sebastian in a reasonable time without any remarkable loss of men, and Lord Wellington approving of it, though he doubted the efficacy of the vertical fire, ordered the siege to be commenced. He renewed his approval afterwards when he had examined the works in person, and all his orders were in the same spirit; but neither the plan nor his orders were followed, the siege, which should have been an ordinary event of war has obtained a mournful celebrity, and Lord Wellington has been unjustly charged with a contempt for the maxims of the great masters of the art. Anxious he was no doubt to save time, yet he did not for that urge the engineer beyond the rules. *Take the place in the quickest manner, yet do not from over speed fail to take it*, was the sense of his instructions; but Sir Thomas Graham, one of England's best soldiers, appears to have been endowed with a genius for war intuitive rather than reflective; and this joined to his natural modesty and a certain easiness of temper, caused him at times to abandon his own correct conceptions, for the less judicious counsels of those about him who advised deviations from the original plan.

Active operations were commenced on the night of the 10th by the construction of two batteries against the convent and redoubt of San Bartolomeo. And on the night of the 13th four batteries to contain 20 of the heaviest guns and four 8-inch howitzers, were marked out on the Chofre sand-hills, at distances varying from 600 to 1300 yards from the eastern rampart of the town. The river was supposed to be unfordable, wherefore no parallel of support was made, yet good trenches of communications, and subsequently regular approaches were formed. Two attacks were thus established. One on the right bank of the Urumea entrusted to the unattached Portuguese brigades; one on the left bank to the fifth division; but most of the troops were at first encamped on the right bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army in the event of a general battle.

On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour with supplies, and the batteries of the left attack, under the direction of the German major, Hartman, opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing hot shot into that building. The besieged responded with musketry from the redoubt, with heavy guns from the town, and with a field-piece which they had mounted on the belfry of the convent itself.

The 15th of July Sir Richard Fletcher took the chief command of the engineers, but Major Smith retained the direction of the attack from the Chofre hills and Lord Wellington's orders continued to pass through his hands. This day the batteries of the left attack, aided by some howitzers from the right of the Urumea, set the convent on fire, silenced the musketry of the besieged, and so damaged the defences that the Portuguese troops attached to the fifth division were ordered to feel the enemy's post. They were however repulsed with great loss, the French sallied, and the firing did not cease until nightfall.

A battery for seven additional guns to play against Bartolomeo was now commenced on the right of the Urumea, and the original batteries set fire to the convent several times, but the flames were extinguished by the garrison.

In the night of the 16th General Rey sounded the Urumea as high as Santa

Catalina, designing to pass over and storm the batteries on the Chofres ; but the fords discovered were shifting, and the difficulty of execution deterred him from this project.

The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, the assault was ordered without waiting for the effect of the new battery raised on the other side of the Urumea. The storming party was formed in two columns. Detachments from Wilson's Portuguese, supported by the light company of the 9th British regiment and three companies of the royals, composed the right, which under the direction of General Hay was destined to assail the redoubt. General Bradford directed the left which being composed of Portuguese, supported by three companies of the 9th British regiment under Colonel Cameron, was ordered to assail the convent.

ASSAULT OF SAN BARTOLOMEO.

At ten o'clock in the morning two heavy 6-pounders opened against the redoubt ; and a sharp fire of musketry in return from the French, who had been reinforced and occupied the suburb of San Martin, announced their resolution to fight. The allied troops were assembled behind the crest of the hill overlooking the convent, and the first signal was given, but the Portuguese advanced slowly at both attacks, and the supporting companies of the 9th regiment on each side, passing through them fell upon the enemy with the usual impetuosity of British soldiers. Colonel Cameron while leading his grenadiers down the face of the hill was exposed to a heavy cannonade from the horn-work, but he soon gained the cover of a wall fifty yards from the convent and there awaited the second signal. However, his rapid advance, which threatened to cut off the garrison from the suburb, joined to the fire of the two 6-pounders and that of some other field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea, caused the French to abandon the redoubt. Seeing this, Cameron jumped over the wall and assaulted both the convent and the houses of the suburb. At the latter a fierce struggle ensued and Captain Woodman of the 9th was killed in the upper room of a house after fighting his way up from below ; but the grenadiers carried the convent with such rapidity that the French, unable to explode some small mines they had prepared, hastily joined the troops in the suburb. There however the fighting continued and Colonel Cameron's force being very much reduced the affair was becoming doubtful, when the remaining companies of his regiment, which he had sent for after the attack commenced, arrived, and the suburb was with much fighting entirely won. At the right attack the company of the 9th, although retarded by a ravine, by a thick hedge, by the slowness of the Portuguese, and by a heavy fire, entered the abandoned redoubt with little loss, but the troops were then rashly led against the cask redoubt, contrary to General Oswald's orders, and were beaten back by the enemy.

The loss of the French was 240 men, that of the allies considerable ; the companies of the 9th, under Colonel Cameron, alone had seven officers and 60 men killed or wounded, and the operation although successful was an error. The battery erected on the right bank of the Urumea was not opened, wherefore, either the assault was precipitated or the battery not necessary ; but the loss justified the conception of the battery.

When the action ceased the engineers made a lodgement in the redoubt, and commenced two batteries, for eight pieces to rake the hornwork and the eastern rampart of the place. The other two batteries to contain four 68-pound carronades and four 10-inch mortars, were also commenced on the right bank of the Urumea.

The 18th the besieged threw up traverses on the land front to meet the raking fire of the besiegers, and the latter dragged four pieces up the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and other batteries on the Monte Orgullo. In the night a lodgement was made on the ruins of San Martin, the two batteries at the right attack were armed, and two additional mortars dragged up the Monte Olia.

The 19th all the batteries at both attacks were armed, and in the night two approaches being commenced from the suburb of San Martin towards the cask redoubt the French were driven from that small work.

On the 20th the whole of the batteries opened their fire, the greatest part being directed to form the breach.

Major Smith's plan was similar to that followed by Marshal Berwick a century

before. He proposed a lodgement on the hornwork before the breach should be assailed, but he had not then read the description of that siege and therefore unknowingly fixed the breaching-point precisely where the wall had been most strongly rebuilt after Berwick's attack. This was the first fault, yet a slight one because the wall did not resist the batteries very long, but it was a serious matter that Sir Thomas Graham at the suggestion of the commander of the artillery began his operations by breaching. Major Smith objected to it, and Sir R. Fletcher acquiesced reluctantly on the understanding that the ruining of the defences was only postponed, an understanding afterwards unhappily forgotten.

The result of the first day's attack was not satisfactory, the weather proved bad, the guns mounted on ship carriages failed, one 24-pounder was rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another became useless from an accident, a captain of engineers was killed, and the besiegers' shot had little effect upon the solid wall. In the night however the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages, and a parallel across the isthmus was projected; but the greatest part of the workmen, to avoid a tempest, sought shelter in the suburb of San Martin, and when day broke only one-third of the work was performed.

The 21st the besiegers' batteries ceased firing to allow of a summons, but the governor refused to receive the letter and the firing was resumed. The main wall still resisted, yet the parapets and embrasures crumbled away fast, and the batteries on Monte Olia plunged into the hornwork, although at 1600 yards distance, with such effect, that the besieged having no bomb-proofs were forced to dig trenches to protect themselves. The counter-fire directed solely against the breaching batteries was feeble, but at midnight a shell thrown from the castle into the bay gave the signal for a sally, and during the firing which ensued several French vessels with supplies entered the harbour. This night also the besieged isolated the breach by cuts in the rampart and other defences. On the other hand the besiegers' parallel across the isthmus was completed, and in its progress laid bare the mouth of a drain, four feet high and three feet wide, containing the pipe of the aqueduct cut off by the Spaniards. Through this dangerous opening Lieutenant Reid of the engineers, a young and zealous officer, crept even to the counterscarp of the hornwork, and finding the passage there closed by a door returned without an accident. Thirty barrels of powder were placed in this drain, and eight feet was stopped with sand-bags, thus forming a globe of compression designed to blow, as through a tube, so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill the narrow ditch of the hornwork.

On the 22nd the fire from the batteries, unexampled from its rapidity and accuracy, opened what appeared a practicable breach in the eastern flank wall, between the towers of Los Hornos and Las Mesquitas. The counter-fire of the besieged now slackened, but the descent into the town behind the breach was more than 12 feet perpendicular, and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently working at the interior defences to receive the assault: they added also another gun to the battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador battery, to flank the front attack. On the other hand the besiegers had placed four 68-pound carronades in battery to play on the defences of the breach, but the fire on both sides slackened because the guns were greatly enlarged at the vents with constant practice.

On the 23rd, the sea blockade being null, the French vessels returned to France with the badly wounded men. This day the besiegers judging the breach between the towers quite practicable, turned the guns, at the suggestion of General Oswald, to break the wall on the right of the main breach. Major Smith opposed this, urging that no advantage would be gained by making a second opening, to get at which the troops must first pass the great breach; that time would be thus uselessly lost to the besiegers, and that there was a manifest objection on account of the tide and depth of water at the new point attacked. His counsel was overruled, and in the course of the day, the wall being thin the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach 30 feet wide was rendered practicable.

The defensive fire of the besieged being now much diminished, the 10-inch mortars and 68-pound carronades were turned upon the defences of the great breach, and upon a stockade which separated the high curtain, on the land front, from the lower works of the flank against which the attack was conducted. The

houses near the breach were soon in flames, which spread rapidly, destroying some of the defences of the besieged and menacing the whole town with destruction. The assault was ordered for the next morning. But when the troops assembled in the trenches the burning houses appeared so formidable that the attack was deferred and the batteries again opened, partly against the second breach, partly against the defences, partly to break the wall in a third place between the half bastion of St. John on the land front and the main breach.

During the night the vigilant governor, expecting the assault, mounted two field-pieces on the cavalier, in the centre of the land front, which being 15 feet above the other defences commanded the high curtain, and they still had on the horn-work a light piece, and two casemated guns on the flank of the cavalier. Two other field-pieces were mounted on an entrenchment which crossing the ditch of the land front bore on the approaches to the main breach; a 24-pounder looked from the tower of Las Mesquitas, between the main breach and where the third opening was being made and consequently flanking both; two 4-pounders were in the tower of Hornos; two heavy guns were on the flank of St. Elmo, and two others, placed on the right of the Mirador, could play upon the breaches from within the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus 14 pieces were still available for defence, the retaining sea-wall or *fausse braye* which strengthened the flank of the horn-work, and between which and the river the storming parties must necessarily advance, was covered with live shells to roll over on the columns, and behind the flaming houses near the breach other edifices were loop-holed and filled with musketeers. However the fire extending rapidly and fiercely greatly injured the defences, the French to save their guns withdrew them until the moment of attack, and the British artillery officers were confident that in daylight they could silence the enemy's guns and keep the parapet clear of men; wherefore Sir Thomas Graham renewed the order for

THE ASSAULT.

In the night of the 24th 2000 men of the fifth division filed into the trenches on the isthmus. This force was composed of the third battalion of the royals under Major Frazer, destined to storm the great breach; the 38th regiment under Colonel Greville, designed to assail the lesser and most distant breach; the 9th regiment under Colonel Cameron, appointed to support the royals; finally a detachment, selected from the light companies of all those battalions, was placed in the centre of the royals under the command of Lieutenant Campbell of the 9th regiment. This chosen detachment, accompanied by the engineer Machel with a ladder party, was intended to sweep the high curtain after the breach should be won.

The distance from the trenches to the points of attack was more than 300 yards along the contracted space lying between the retaining wall of the horn-work and the river; the ground was strewn with rocks covered by slippery sea-weeds; the tide had left large and deep pools of water; the parapet of the horn-work was entire as well as the retaining wall; the parapets of the other works and the two towers, which closely flanked the breach, although injured were far from being ruined, and every place was thickly garnished with musketeers. The difficulties of the attack were obvious, and a detachment of Portuguese placed in a trench opened beyond the parallel on the isthmus, within 60 yards of the ramparts, was ordered to quell if possible the fire of the horn-work.

While it was still dark the storming columns moved out of the trenches, and the globe of compression in the drain was exploded with great effect against the counterscarp and glacis of the horn-work. The garrison, astonished by the unlooked-for event, abandoned the flanking parapet, and the troops rushed onwards, the stormers for the main breach leading and suffering more from the fire of their own batteries on the right of the Urumea than from the enemy. Major Frazer and the engineer Harry Jones first reached the breach. The enemy had fallen back in confusion behind the ruins of the still burning houses, and those brave officers rushed up expecting that their troops would follow, but not many followed, for it was extremely dark, the natural difficulties of the way had contracted the front and disordered the column in its whole length, and the soldiers, straggling and out of wind, arrived in small disconnected parties at the foot of the breach. The foremost

gathered near their gallant leaders, but the depth of the descent into the town and the volumes of flames and smoke which still issued from the burning houses behind awed the stoutest; and more than two-thirds of the storming column, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had broken off at the demi-bastion to commence a musketry battle with the enemy on the rampart. Meanwhile the shells from the Monte Orgullo fell rapidly, the defenders of the breach rallied and with a smashing musketry from the ruins and loopholed houses smote the head of the column, while the men in the towers smote them on the flanks; and from every quarter came showers of grape and hand-grenades tearing the ranks in a dreadful manner.

Major Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the intrepid Jones stood there awhile longer amidst a few heroic soldiers, hoping for aid, but none came and he and those with him were struck down. The engineer Machel had been killed early, and the men bearing ladders fell or were dispersed. Thus the rear of the column was in absolute confusion before the head was beaten. It was in vain that Colonel Greville of the 38th, Colonel Cameron of the 9th, Captain Archimboau of the royals, and many other regimental officers exerted themselves to rally their discomfited troops and refill the breach; it was in vain that Lieutenant Campbell, breaking through the tumultuous crowd with the survivors of his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins; twice he ascended, twice he was wounded, and all around him died. The royals endeavouring to retire got intermixed with the 38th, and with some companies of the 9th which had unsuccessfully endeavoured to pass them and get to the lesser breach. Then swayed by different impulses and pent up in the narrow way between the horn-work and the river, the mass reeling to and fro could neither advance nor go back until the shells and musketry, constantly plied both in front and flank, had thinned the concourse, and the trenches were regained in confusion. At daylight a truce was agreed to for an hour, during which the French, who had already humanely removed the gallant Jones and the other wounded men from the breach, now carried off the more distant sufferers lest they should be drowned by the rising of the tide.

Five officers of engineers including Sir Richard Fletcher, and 44 officers of the line with 520 men, had been killed, wounded, or made prisoners in this assault, the failure of which was signal, yet the causes were obvious and may be classed thus:

1. Deviation from the original project of siege and from Lord Wellington's instructions.

2. Bad arrangements of detail.

3. Want of vigour in the execution.

In respect of the first, Lord Wellington having visited the Chofre trenches on the 22nd confirmed his former approval of Smith's plan, and gave that officer final directions for the attack, finishing thus, "*Fair daylight must be taken for the assault.*" These instructions and their emphatic termination were repeated by Major Smith in the proper quarter, but they were not followed, no lodgment was made on the horn-work, the defences were nearly entire both in front and flank, and the assault was made in darkness. Major Smith had also, by calculation and by consultations with the fishermen, ascertained that the ebb of tide would serve exactly at daybreak on the 24th; but the assault was made the 25th, and then before daylight, when the water being too high contracted the ground, increased the obstacles, and forced the assaulting column to march on a narrow front and a long line, making an uneasy progress and trickling onwards instead of dashing with a broad surge against the breach. In fine, the rules of art being neglected and no extraordinary resource substituted the operation failed.

The troops filed out of the long narrow trenches in the night, a tedious operation, and were immediately exposed to a fire of grape from their own batteries on the Chofres. This fire, intended to keep down that of the enemy, should have ceased when the globe of compression was sprung in the drain, but owing to the darkness and the noise the explosion could neither be seen nor heard. The effect of it however drove the enemy from the horn-work, the Portuguese on that side advanced to the ditch, and a vigorous escalade would probably have succeeded but they had no ladders. Again, the stormers of the great breach marched first, filling up the way and rendering the second breach, as Major Smith had foretold, useless, and

the ladder-bearers never got to their destination. The attack was certainly indigested, and there was a neglect of moral influence followed by its natural consequence want of vigour in execution.

The deferring of the assault from the 24th to the 25th expressly because the breach was too difficult rendered the troops uneasy, they suspected some hidden danger, and in this mode emerging from the trenches they were struck by the fire of their own batteries; then wading through deep pools of water, or staggering in the dark over slippery rocks, and close under the enemy's flanking works whence every shot told with fatal effect, how could they manifest their natural conquering energy? It is possible that a second and more vigorous assault on the great breach might have been effected by a recognized leader, but no general or staff officer went out of the trenches with the troops, and the isolated exertions of the regimental officers were unavailing. Nor were there wanting other sinister influences. General Oswald had in the councils earnestly and justly urged the dangers arising from the irregular mode of attack, but this anticipation of ill success, in which other officers of rank joined, was freely expressed out of council, and it is said, even in the hearing of the troops, abating that daring confidence which victory loves.

Lord Wellington repaired immediately to St. Sebastian. The causes of the failure were apparent and he would have renewed the attack, but wanting ammunition, deferred it until the powder and additional ordnance, which he had written for to England as early as the 26th of June, should arrive. The next day other events caused him to resort to a blockade and the battering train was transported to Passages, two guns and two howitzers only being retained on the Chofres and the Monte Olia. This operation was completed in the night of the 26th, but at daybreak the garrison made a sally from the horn-work, surprised the trenches and swept off 200 Portuguese and 30 British soldiers. To avoid a repetition of this disaster the guards of the trenches were concentrated in the left parallel, and patrols only were sent out, yet one of those also was cut off on the 1st of August. Thus terminated the first part of the siege of San Sebastian in which the allies lost 1300 soldiers and seamen, exclusive of Spaniards during Mendizabal's blockade.

CHAPTER IV.

THE battle of Vittoria was fought on the 21st of June.

The 1st of July Marshal Soult, under a decree issued at Dresden, succeeded Joseph as lieutenant to the emperor, who thus showed how little his mind had been affected by his brother's accusations.

The 12th Soult, travelling with surprising expedition, assumed the command of the armies of the "*north*," the "*centre*," and the "*south*," now re-organized in one body, called "*the army of Spain*." And he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside if necessary, but that monarch voluntarily retired from the army.

At this period General Paris remained at Jaca, as belonging to Suchet's command, but Clausel had entered France, and the "*army of Spain*" reinforced from the interior, was composed of nine divisions of infantry, a reserve, and two regular divisions of cavalry, besides the light horsemen attached to the infantry. Following the imperial muster-rolls this army, including the garrisons and 13 German, Italian, and Spanish battalions not belonging to the organization, amounted to 114,000 men; * and as the armies of Catalonia and of Aragon numbered at the same period above 66,000, the whole force still employed against Spain exceeded 180,000 men, with 20,000 horses; and of this number 156,000 were present under arms, while in Germany and Poland above 700,000 French soldiers were in activity.

Such great forces, guided by Napoleon, seemed sufficient to defy the world, but moral power, which he has himself described as constituting three-fourths of military strength, that power which puny essayists, declaiming for their hour against the genius of warriors, are unable to comprehend, although by far the most important part of the art which they decry, was wanting. One-half of this force, organized in peace and setting forth in hope at the beginning of a war, would have enabled Napoleon to conquer; but now, near the close of a terrible struggle,

* Appendix, No. 30.

with a declining fate and the national confidence in his fortune and genius shaken, although that genius was never more surpassingly displayed, his military power was a vast but unsound machine. The public mind was bewildered by the intricacy and greatness of combinations, the full scope of which he alone could see clearly, and generals and ministers doubted and feared when they should have supported him, neglecting their duty or coldly executing his orders when their zeal should have redoubled. The unity of impulse so essential to success was thus lost, and his numerous armies carried not with them proportionate strength. To have struggled with hope under such astounding difficulties was scarcely to be expected from the greatest minds, but like the emperor, to calculate and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness and accuracy, to seize every favourable chance with unerring rapidity, to sustain every reverse with undisturbed constancy, never urged to rashness by despair, yet enterprising to the utmost verge of daring consistent with reason, was a display of intellectual greatness so surpassing, that it is not without justice Napoleon has been called, in reference as well to past ages as to the present, the foremost of mankind.

The suddenness, as well as the completeness of the destruction caused by the snows of Russia, had shattered the emperor's military and political system, and the broken parts of the former, scattered widely, were useless until he could again bind them together. To effect this he rushed with a raw army into the midst of Germany, for his hope was to obtain by celerity a rallying point for his veterans, who having survived the Russian winter and the succeeding pestilence were widely dispersed. His first effort was successful, but without good cavalry victory cannot be pushed far, and the practised horsemen of France had nearly disappeared; their successors, badly mounted and less skilful, were too few and too weak, and thus extraordinary exertion was required from soldiers whose youth and inexperience rendered them unfit even for the ordinary hardships of war.

The measure of value for Wellington's campaign is thus attained, for if Joseph had opposed him with only moderate ability and had avoided a great battle, not less than 50,000 veterans could have been drawn off to reinforce and give stability to the young soldiers in Germany. On the side of Spain those veterans were indeed still numerous, but the spirit of the French people behind them almost worn out by victory, was now abashed by defeat, and even the military men who had acquired grandeur and riches beyond their hopes, were with few exceptions averse to further toil. Napoleon's astonishing firmness of mind was understood by few in high stations, shared by fewer; and many were the traitors to him and to France and to the glories of both. However, his power was still enormous, and wherever he led in person his brave and faithful soldiers, fighting with the true instinct of patriotism, conquered. Where he was not their iron hardihood abated.

Marshal Soult was one of the few men whose indefatigable energy rendered them worthy lieutenants of the emperor; and with singular zeal, vigour, and ability he now served. His troops, nominally above 100,000 men, 97,000 being present under arms, with 86 pieces of artillery, were not all available for field operations. The garrisons of Pampeluna, San Sebastian, Santona, and Bayonne, together with the foreign battalions, absorbed 17,000; and most of the latter had orders to regain their own countries, with a view to form the new levies. The permanent "*army of Spain*" furnished therefore only 77,500 men present under arms, 7000 of which were cavalry, and its condition was not satisfactory. The people on the frontier were flying from the allies, the military administration was disorganized, and the recent disasters had discouraged the soldiers and deteriorated their discipline. Under these circumstances Soult was desirous of some delay to secure his base and restore order ere he attempted to regain the offensive, but his instructions on that point were imperative.

Napoleon's system was perfectly adapted for great efforts, civil or military; but so rapid had been Lord Wellington's advance from Portugal, so decisive his operations, that the resources of France were in a certain degree paralyzed, and the army still reeled and rocked from the blows it had received. Bayonne, a fortress of no great strength in itself, had been entirely neglected, and the arming and provisioning that and other places was indispensable. The restoration of an entrenched

camp, originally traced by Vauban to cover Bayonne, followed, and the enforcement of discipline, the removal of the immense train of Spanish families, civil administrators, and other wasteful followers of Joseph's court, the arrangement of a general system for supply of money and provisions, aided by judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities, and excite the national spirit, were amongst the first indications that a great commander was in the field. The soldiers' confidence soon revived, and some leading merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded the general; but the people of the south were generally more inclined to avoid the burthen of defending their country than to answer appeals to their patriotism.

On the 14th Soult examined the line of military positions, and ordered Reille, who then occupied the passes of Vera and Echallar, to prepare pontoons for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriattou. That general, as we have seen, was driven from those passes the next day, but he prepared his bridges; and such was Soult's activity, that on the 16th all the combinations for a gigantic offensive movement were digested, the means of executing it rapidly advancing, and orders were issued for the preliminary dispositions.

At this time the French army was divided into three corps of battle and a reserve. Clausel, commanding the left wing, was at St. Jean Pied de Port, and in communication, by the French frontier, with General Paris at Jaca. Drouet, Count D'Erlon, commanding the centre, occupied the heights near Espelette and Ainhoa, with an advance guard behind Urdax. General Reille, commanding the right wing, was in position on the mountains overlooking Vera from the side of France. The reserve under Villatte, comprising a separate body of light horsemen and the foreign battalions, guarded the banks of the Bidassoa, from the mouth upwards to Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed. The division of heavy cavalry, under Trielhard, and that of light cavalry, under Pierre Soult, the marshal's brother, were on the banks of the Nive and the Adour.

The counter-disposition of the allies was as follows :—

Byng's brigade of British infantry, detached from the second division and reinforced by Morillo's Spaniards, was on the extreme right. These troops had, early in June, driven the French from the village of Valcarlos, in the valley of that name, and had foraged the French territory, but finding no good permanent position, retreated again to the rocks in front of the passes of Roncesvalles and Ibañeta.

On the left of Byng, Campbell's brigade, detached from Hamilton's Portuguese division, was posted in the Alduides, and supported by General Cole, who was with the fourth division at Viscayret, in the valley of Urroz.

On the left of Campbell, General Hill defended the Bastan with the remainder of the second division, and with Hamilton's Portuguese, now commanded by Sylveira, Conde d'Amarante. Picton, with the third division, was stationed at Olague, as a reserve to those troops and to Cole.

On the left of Hill the seventh and light divisions occupied a chain of mountains running by Echallar to Vera, and behind them, at the town of San Estevan, was posted the sixth division.

Longa's Spaniards continued the line of defence from Vera to General Giron's position, which, extending along the mountains bordering the Bidassoa to the sea, crossed the great road of Irun. Behind Giron was the besieging army under Sir Thomas Graham.

Thirty-six pieces of field artillery, and some regiments of British and Portuguese cavalry, were with the right wing and centre, but the bulk of the horsemen and the heavy guns were behind the mountains, chiefly about Tafalla. The great hospitals were in Vittoria, the commissariat depôts were principally on the coast, and to supply the troops in the mountains was exceedingly difficult and onerous.

Henry O'Donnel, Conde de la Bispa, blockaded Pampeluna with the Andalusian army of reserve, and Carlos D'Espana's division was on the march to join him. Mina, Julian Sanchez, Duran, Empecinado, Goyan, and some smaller bands, were on the side of Zaragoza and Daroca, cutting the communication between Soult and Suchet, and the latter, thinking Aragon lost, was, as we have seen, falling back upon Catalonia.

The whole force under Lord Wellington's immediate command, that is to say

in Navarre and Guipuscoa, was certainly above 100,000 men, of which the Anglo-Portuguese furnished 57,000 present under arms, 7000 being cavalry;* but the Spanish regulars under Giron, Labispal and Carlos d'Espana, including Longa's division and some of Mendizabal's army, scarcely amounted to 25,000. According to the respective muster-rolls, the troops in line actually under arms and facing each other, were, of the allies, about 82,000, of the French about 78,000; but as the rolls of the latter include every man and officer of all arms belonging to the organization, and the British and Portuguese rolls so quoted, would furnish between 10,000 and 12,000 additional combatants, the French force must be reduced, or the allies augmented in that proportion. This surplus was however now compensated by the foreign battalions temporarily attached to Soult's army, and by the numerous national guards, all mountaineers, fierce, warlike and very useful as guides. In other respects Lord Wellington stood at a disadvantage.

The theatre of operations was a trapezoid, with sides from 40 to 60 miles in length, and having Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, all fortresses, in possession of the French at the angles. The interior, broken and tormented by dreadful mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep water-courses, precipices and forests, would at first sight appear a wilderness which no military combinations could embrace, and susceptible only of irregular and partisan operations. But the great spinal ridge of the Pyrenees furnishes a clue to the labyrinth of hills and valleys. Running diagonally across the quadrilateral, it separated Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, and San Sebastian from Pampeluna, and thus the portion of the allied army which more especially belonged to the blockade of Pampeluna, was in a manner cut off from that which belonged to the siege of San Sebastian. They were distinct armies, each having its particular object, and the only direct communication between them was the great road running behind the mountains from Tolosa, by Irurzun, to Pampeluna. The centre of the allies was indeed an army of succour and connection, but of necessity very much scattered, and with lateral communications so few, difficult and indirect as to prevent any unity of movement; nor could General Hill's corps move at all until an attack was decidedly pronounced against one of the extremities, lest the most direct gun-road to Pampeluna, which it covered, should be unwarily opened to the enemy. In short the French general, taking the offensive, could by beaten roads concentrate against any part of the English general's line, which, necessarily a passively defensive one, followed an irregular trace of more than 50 miles of mountains.

Wellington having his battering train and stores about San Sebastian, which was also nearer and more accessible to the enemy than Pampeluna, made his army lean toward, that side. His left wing, including the army of siege, was 21,000 strong with singularly strong positions of defence, and the centre, about 24,000 strong, could in two marches unite with the left wing to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of an enemy advancing by the high road of Irun; but three days or more were required by those troops to concentrate for the security of the blockade on the right. Soult however judged that no decisive result would attend a direct movement upon San Sebastian; because Guipuscoa was exhausted of provisions, and the centre of the allies could fall on his flank before he reached Ernani, which, his attack in front failing, would place him in a dangerous position. Moreover by means of his sea communication he knew that San Sebastian was not in extremity; but he had no communication with Pampeluna and feared its fall. Wherefore he resolved to operate by his left.

Profiting by the roads leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, and covering his movement by the Nivelle and Nive rivers and by the positions of his centre, he hoped to gather on Wellington's right quicker than that general could gather to oppose him, and thus compensating by numbers the disadvantage of assailing mountain positions force a way to Pampeluna. That fortress once succoured, he designed to seize the road of Irurzun, and keeping in mass either fall upon the separated divisions of the centre in detail as they descended from the hills, or operate on the rear of the force besieging San Sebastian, while a corps of observation, which he proposed to leave on the Lower Bidassoa, menaced it in front and

* Appendix, No. 29.

followed it in retreat. The siege of San Sebastian, the blockade of Pampeluna and probably that of Santona, would be thus raised, and the French army united in an abundant country, and its communication with Suchet secured, would be free either to co-operate with that marshal or to press its own attack.

In this view, and to mislead Lord Wellington by vexing his right simultaneously with the construction of the bridges against his left, Soult wrote to General Paris, desiring him to march when time suited from Jaca by the higher valleys towards Aviz or Sanguessa, to drive the partisans from that side and join the left of the army when it should have reached Pampeluna. Meanwhile Clausel was directed to repair the roads in his own front, to push the heads of his columns towards the passes of Roncesvalles, and by sending a strong detachment into the Val de Baygorry, towards the lateral pass of Yspegui, to menace Hill's flank which was at that pass, and the front of Campbell's brigade in the Alduides.

On the 20th Reille's troops on the heights above Vera and Sarres, being cautiously relieved by Villatte, marched through Cambo towards St. Jean Pied de Port. They were to reach the latter early on the 22nd, and on that day also the two divisions of cavalry and the park of artillery were to be concentrated at the same place. D'Erlon with the centre meanwhile still held his positions at Espelette, Ainhoie or Ainhoe, and Urdax, thus covering and masking the great movements taking place behind.

Villatte who including the foreign battalions had 18,000 troops on the rolls, furnishing about 15,000 sabres and bayonets, remained in observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened by superior forces he was to retire slowly and in mass upon the entrenched camp commenced at Bayonne, yet halting successively on the positions of Bordegain in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the heights of Bidart in rear of that town. He was especially directed to show only French troops at the advanced posts, and if the assailants made a point with a small corps, to drive them vigorously over the Bidassoa again. But if the allies should, in consequence of Soult's operations against their right, retire, Villatte was to relieve San Sebastian and to follow them briskly by Tolosa.


Rapidity was of vital importance to the French general, but heavy and continued rains swelled the streams, and ruined the roads in the deep country between Bayonne and the hills; the head-quarters, which should have arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port on the 20th, only reached Olhonce, a few miles short of that place, the 21st; and Reille's troops, unable to make way at all by Cambo, took the longer road of Bayonne. The cavalry was retarded in like manner, and the whole army, men and horses, were worn down by the severity of the marches. Two days were thus lost, but on the 24th more than 60,000 fighting men, including cavalry, national guards, and gens-d'armes, with 66 pieces of artillery, were assembled to force the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya. The main road leading to the former was repaired, 300 sets of bullocks were provided to draw the guns up the mountain, and the national guards of the frontier on the left were ordered to assemble in the night on the heights of Yropil, to be reinforced on the morning of the 25th by detachments of regular troops with a view to vex and turn the right of the allies which extended to the foundry of Orbaiceta.

Such were Soult's first dispositions, but as mountain warfare is complicated in the extreme, it will be well to consider more in detail the relative positions and objects of the hostile forces and the nature of the country.


It has been already stated that the great spine of the hills, trending westward, run diagonally across the theatre of operations. From this spine huge ridges shot out on either hand, and the communications between the valleys thus formed on both sides of the main chain passed over certain comparatively low places called *cols* by the French, and *puertos* by the Spaniards. The Bastan, the Val Carlos, and the Val de Baygorry, the upper part of which is divided into the Alduides and the Val de Ayra, were on the French side of the great chain; on the Spanish side were the valleys of Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, the valley of Iscua or Roncesvalles, the valley of Uroz, the Val de Zubiri, and the valley of Lanz, the two latter leading down directly upon Pampeluna which stands within two miles of the junction of their waters. Such being the relative situations of the valleys, the disposition, and

Explanatory
Sketch of
SOULT'S OPERATIONS
to relieve
PAMPELUNA
July 1813

French 
Allies 



BATTLE OF THE 23rd
Enlarged



force of the armies, shall now be traced from left to right of the French, and from right to left of the allies. But first it must be observed that the main chain, throwing as it were a shoulder forward from Roncesvalles towards St. Jean Pied de Port, placed the entrance to the Spanish valley of Ahescor or Orbaiceta, in the power of Soult, who could thus by Yropil turn the extreme right of his adversary with detachments, although not with an army.

Val Carlos.—Two issues led from this valley over the main chain, namely the Ibañeta and Mendichuri passes; and there was also the lateral pass of Atalosti leading into the Alduides, all comprised within a space of two or three miles.

The high road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Pampeluna, ascending the left-hand ridge or boundary of Val Carlos, runs along the crest until it joins the superior chain of mountains, and then along the summit of that also until it reaches the pass of Ibañeta, whence it descends to Roncesvalles. Ibañeta may therefore be called the Spanish end of the pass; but it is also a pass in itself, because a narrow road, leading through Arnegui and the village of Val Carlos, ascends directly to Ibañeta and falls into the main road behind it.

Clausel's three divisions of infantry, all the artillery, and the cavalry were formed in two columns in front of St. Jean Pied de Port. The head of one was placed on some heights above Arnegui about two miles from the village of Val Carlos; the head of the other at the Venta de Orrisson, on the main road and within two miles of the remarkable rocks of Chateau Piñon, a little beyond which one narrow way descended on the right to the village of Val Carlos, and another on the left to the foundry of Orbaiceta.

On the right-hand boundary of Val Carlos, near the rock of Ayrola, Reille's divisions were concentrated, with orders to ascend that rock at daylight, and march by the crest of the ridge towards a culminant point of the great chain called the Lindouz, which gained, Reille was to push detachments through the passes of Ibañeta and Mendichuri to the villages of Roncesvalles and Espinal. He was, at the same time, to seize the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga immediately on his right, and even approach the more distant passes of Renecabal and Bellate, thus closing the issues from the Alduides, and menacing those from the Bastan.

Val de Ayra. The Alduides. Val de Baygorry. The ridge of Ayrola, at the foot of which Reille's troops were posted, separates Val Carlos from these valleys, which must be designated by the general name of the Alduides for the upper part, and the Val de Baygorry for the lower. The issues from the Alduides over the great chain towards Spain were the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga; and there was also a road running from the village of Alduides through the Atalosti pass to Ibañeta, a distance of eight miles, by which General Campbell's brigade communicated with and could join Byng and Morillo.

Bastan. This district, including the valley of Lerins and the Cinco Villas, is separated from the Alduides and Val de Baygorry by the lofty mountain of La Houssa, on which the national guards of the Val de Baygorry and the Alduides were ordered to assemble on the night of the 24th, and to light fires so as to make it appear a great body was menacing the Bastan by that flank. The Bastan, however, does not belong to the same geographical system as the other valleys. Instead of opening to the French territory it is entirely enclosed with high mountains, and while the waters of the Val Carlos, the Alduides, and Val de Baygorry run off northward by the Nive, those of the Bastan run off westward by the Bidassoa, from which they are separated by the Mandale, Commissari, La Rhune, Santa Barbara, Ivantelly, Atchiola and other mountains.

The entrances to the Bastan with reference to the position of the French army, were by the passes of Vera and Echallar on its right; by the Col de Maya and Arietta passes in the centre; and on the left by the lateral passes of Yspegui, Lorrieta, and Berderez, which lead from the Val de Baygorry and the Alduides. The issues over the principal chain of the Pyrenees in the direct line from the Maya entrances, were the passes of Renecabal and Bellate; the first leading into the valley of Zubiri, the second into the valley of Lanz. There was also the pass of Artesiaga leading into the Val de Zubiri, but it was nearly impracticable, and all the roads through the Bastan were crossed by strong positions dangerous to assail.

The Col de Maya comprised several passages in a space of four miles, all of which were menaced by D'Erlon from Espelette and Urdax; and he had 21,000 men, furnishing about 18,000 bayonets. His communications with Soult were maintained by cavalry posts through the Val de Baygorry, and his orders were to attack the allies when the combinations in the Val Carlos and on the Houssa mountain should cause them to abandon the passes at Maya; but he was especially directed to operate by his left, so as to secure the passes leading towards Reille with a view to the concentration of the whole army. Thus if Hill retreated by the pass of Bellate, D'Erlon was to move by Berderez and the Alduides; but if Hill retired upon San Estevan, D'Erlon was to move by the pass of Bellate. Such being the dispositions of the French general, those of the allies shall now be traced.

General Byng and Morillo guarded the passes in front of Roncesvalles. Their combined force consisted of 1600 British and from 3000 to 4000 Spaniards. Byng's brigade and two Spanish battalions occupied the rocks of Altobiscar on the high road facing Chateau Piñon; one Spanish battalion was at the foundry in the valley of Orbaiceta on their right; Morillo with the remainder of the Spaniards occupied the heights of Iroulepe, on the left of the road leading to the village of Val Carlos and overlooking the nearest houses of that straggling place.

These positions, distant only four or five miles from the French columns assembled at Venta de Orrisson and Arnegui, were insecure. The ground was indeed steep and difficult of access, but too extensive; moreover, although the passes led into the Roncesvalles, that valley did not lead direct to Pampeluna; the high road, after descending a few miles, turned to the right, and crossing two ridges, and the intervening valley of Urroz, entered the valley of Zubiri, down which it was conducted to Pampeluna: wherefore after passing Ibañeta in retreat the allied troops could not avoid lending their right flank to Reille's divisions as far as Viscayret in the valley of Urroz. It was partly to obviate this danger, partly to support O'Donnell while Clausel's force was in the vicinity of Jaca, that the fourth division, about 6000 strong, occupied Viscayret, six miles from the pass of Ibañeta, 10 miles from Morillo's position, and 12 miles from Byng's position. But when Clausel retired to France, General Cole was directed to observe the roads leading over the main chain from the Alduides district, and to form a rallying point and reserve for Campbell, Byng, and Morillo, his instructions being to maintain the Roncesvalles passes against a front attack, but not to commit his troops in a desperate battle if the flanks were insecure.

On the left of Byng and Morillo, Campbell's Portuguese, about 2000 strong, were encamped above the village of Alduides on a mountain called Mizpira. They observed the national guards of the Val de Baygorry, preserved the communication between Byng and Hill, and in some measure covered the right flank of the latter. From the Alduides Campbell could retreat through the pass of Sahorgain upon Viscayret in the valley of Urroz, and through the passes of Urtiaga and Renacabal upon Eugui in the Val de Zubiri; finally by the lateral pass of Atalosti he could join Byng and the fourth division. The communication between all these posts was maintained by Long's cavalry.

Continuing the line of positions to the left, General Hill occupied the Bastan with the second British division, Sylveira's Portuguese, and some squadrons of horse, but Byng's and Campbell's brigades being detached, he had not more than 9000 sabres and bayonets. His two British brigades, under General William Stewart, guarded the Col de Maya; Sylveira's Portuguese were at Erazu, on the right of Stewart, observing the passes of Arrieta, Yspégui and Elliorita; of which the two former were occupied by Major Brotherton's cavalry and by the 6th Caçadores. The direct line of retreat and point of concentration for all these troops was Elizondo.

From Elizondo the route of Pampeluna over the great chain was by the pass of Bellate and the valley of Lanz. The latter running nearly parallel with the valley of Zubiri, is separated from it by a wooded and rugged ridge, and between them there were but three communications: the one high up, leading from Lanz to Eugui, and prolonged from thence to Viscayret in the valley of Urroz; the other two lower down, leading from Ostiz and Olague to the village of Zubiri. At Olague

the third division, furnishing 4300 bayonets, under Picton, was posted ready to support Cole or Hill as occasion required.

Continuing the front line from the left of Stewart's position at the Col de Maya, the trace run along the mountains forming the French boundary of the Bastan. It comprised the passes of Echallar and Vera, guarded by the seventh division under Lord Dalhousie, and by the light division under General Charles Alten. The former, furnishing 4700 bayonets, communicated with General Stewart by a narrow road over the Atchiola mountain, and the 82nd regiment was encamped at its junction with the Elizondo road, about three miles behind the pass of Maya. The light division, 4000 strong, was at Vera, guarding the roads which led behind the mountains through Sumbilla and San Estevan to Elizondo.

These two divisions being only observed by the left wing of Villatte's reserve were available for the succour of either wing, and behind them, at the town of San Estevan, was the sixth division of 6000 bayonets, now under General Pack. Placed at equal distances from Vera and Maya, having free communication with both, and a direct line of march to Pampeluna over the main chain of the Pyrenees by the *Puerto de Arrais*, sometimes called the pass of *Dona Maria*, this division was available for any object, and could not have been better posted.

Around Pampeluna, the point to which all the lines of march converged, the Spanish troops under O'Donnell maintained the blockade, and they were afterwards joined by Carlos D'Espana's division at a very critical moment. Thus reinforced they amounted to 11,000, of which 7000 could be brought into action without abandoning the works of blockade.

Head-quarters were at Lesaca, and the line of correspondence with the left wing was over the Peña de Haya, that with the right wing by San Estevan, Elizondo and the Alduides. The line of correspondence between Sir Thomas Graham and Pampeluna was by Goizueta and the high road of Irurzun.

As the French were almost in contact with the allies' positions at Roncesvalles, which was also the point of defence nearest to Pampeluna, it followed that on the rapidity or slowness with which Soult overcame resistance in that quarter depended his success; and a comparative estimate of numbers and distances will give the measure of his chances.

Clausel's three divisions furnished about 16,000 bayonets, besides the cavalry, the artillery, and the national guards menacing the valley of Orbaiceta. Byng and Morillo were therefore, with 5000 infantry, to sustain the assault of 16,000 until Cole could reinforce them; but Cole being 12 miles distant could not come up in fighting order under four or five hours. And as Reille's divisions, of equal strength with Clausel's, could before that time seize the Lindouz and turn the left, it was clear the allied troops, although increased to 11,000 by the junction of the fourth division, must finally abandon their ground to seek a new field of battle where the third division could join them from the valley of Lanz, and Campbell's brigade from the Alduides. Thus raised to 17,000 or 18,000 bayonets with some guns, they might on strong ground oppose Clausel and Reille's 30,000; but as Picton's position at Olague was more than a day's march from Byng's position at Altobiscar, their junction could only be made in the valley of the Zubiri and not very distant from Pampeluna. And when 7000 Spaniards from the blockade, and 2000 or 3000 cavalry from the side of the Ebro are added, we have the full measure of the allies' strength in this quarter.

General Hill, menaced by D'Erlon with a very superior force, and having the pass of Maya, half a day's march further from Pampeluna than the passes of Roncesvalles, to defend, could not give ready help. If he retreated rapidly D'Erlon could follow as rapidly, and though Picton and Cole would thus be reinforced with 10,000 men Soult would gain 18,000. Hill could not, however, move until he knew that Byng and Cole were driven from the Roncesvalles passes; in fine he could not avoid a dilemma. For if he maintained the passes at Maya and affairs went wrong near Pampeluna, his own situation would be imminently dangerous; if he maintained Irrueta, his next position, the same danger was to be dreaded; and the passes of Maya once abandoned, D'Erlon, moving by his own left towards the Alduides, could join Soult in the valley of Zubiri before Hill could join Cole and Picton by the valley

of Lanz. But if Hill did not maintain the position of Irrueta D'Erlon could follow and cut the sixth and seventh divisions off from the valley of Lanz. The extent and power of Soult's combinations are thus evinced. Hill, forced to await orders and hampered by the operations of D'Erlon, required, it might be three days to get into line near Pampeluna; but D'Erlon after gaining Maya could in one day and a half, by the passes of Berderez and Urtiaga, join Soult in the Val de Zubiri. Meanwhile Byng, Morillo, Cole, Campbell, and Picton would be exposed to the operations of double their own numbers; and, however firm and able individually those generals might be, they could not when suddenly brought together be expected to seize the whole system of operations and act with that decision and nicety of judgment which the occasion demanded. It was clear therefore that Hill's force must be in some measure paralyzed at first, and finally thrown with the sixth, seventh, and light divisions, upon an external line of operations while the French moved upon internal lines.

On the other hand it is also clear that the corps of Byng, Morillo, Campbell, Colc, Picton, and Hill were only pieces of resistance on Lord Wellington's board and that the sixth, seventh, and light divisions were those with which he meant to win his game. There was, however, a great difference in their value. The light division and the seventh, especially the former, being at the greatest distance from Pampeluna, having enemies close in front and certain points to guard, were, the seventh division a day, the light division two days, behind the sixth division, which was quite free to move at an instant's notice and was, the drag of D'Erlon's corps considered, a day nearer to Pampeluna than Hill. Wherefore, upon the rapid handling of this well-placed body the fate of the allies depended. If it arrived in time, nearly 30,000 infantry, with sufficient cavalry and artillery would be established under the immediate command of the general-in-chief, on a position of strength to check the enemy until the rest of the army arrived. Where that position was and how the troops were there gathered and fought, shall now be shown.

CHAPTER V.

BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.

Combat of Roncesvalles.—On the 23rd Soult issued an order of the day remarkable for its force and frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the leading events of the past campaign, he showed that the disasters sprung from the incapacity of the king, not from the weakness of the soldiers whose military virtue he justly extolled, and whose haughty courage he inflamed by allusions to former glories. He has been by writers who disgrace English literature with unfounded aspersions of a courageous enemy, accused of unseemly boasting as to his ultimate operations at this time, but the calumny is refuted by the following passage from his despatch to the minister at war.

"I shall move directly upon Pampeluna, and if I succeed in relieving it I will operate towards my right to embarrass the enemy's troops in Guipuscoa, Biscay, and Alava, and to enable the reserve to join me, which will relieve St. Sebastian and Santona. If this should happen I will then consider what is to be done, either to push my own attack or to help the army of Aragon, but to look so far ahead would now be temerity."

It is true that conscious of superior abilities he did not suppress the sentiment of his own worth as a commander, but he was too proud to depreciate brave adversaries on the eve of battle.

"Let us not," he said, *"defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions of the general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive, the valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy."*

Having thus stimulated the ardour of his troops, he put himself at the head of Clausel's divisions, and on the 25th at daylight led them up against the rocks of Altobiscar.

General Byng, warned the evening before that danger was near, and jealous of some hostile indications towards the village of Val Carlos, had sent the 57th regiment down there, but kept the rest of his men well in hand and gave notice to General Cole who had made a new disposition of his troops. Ross's brigade was

now at Espinal, two miles in advance of Viscayret, six miles from the pass of Ibañeta, and 11 from Byng's position, but somewhat nearer to Morillo. Anson's brigade was close behind Ross, Stubbs' Portuguese behind Anson, and the artillery was at Linzoin.

Such was the exact state of affairs when Soult, throwing out a multitude of skirmishers and pushing forward his supporting columns and guns as fast as the steepness of the road and difficult nature of the ground would permit, endeavoured to force Byng's position; but the British general, undismayed at the multitude of assailants, fought strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and their rolling musketry pealed in vain for hours along that cloudy field of battle elevated 5000 feet above the level of the plains. Their numbers however continually increased in front, and the national guards from Yropil, reinforced by Clausel's detachments, skirmished with the Spanish battalions at the foundry of Orbaiceta and threatened to turn the right. The Val Carlos was at the same time menaced from Arnegui, and Reille's divisions ascending the rock of Airola turned Morillo's left.

About mid-day General Cole arrived at Altobiscar, but his brigades were still distant, and the French renewing their attack neglected the Val Carlos to gather more thickly on the front of Byng. He resisted all their efforts, but Reille made progress along the summit of the Airola ridge. Morillo then fell back towards Ibañeta, and the French were already nearer to that pass than the troops at Altobiscar were, when Ross's brigade, coming up the pass of Mendichuri, suddenly appeared on the Lindouz, at the instant when the head of Reille's column, being close to Atalosti, was upon the point of cutting the communication with Campbell. This officer's picquets had been attacked early in the morning by the national guards of the Val de Baygorry, but he soon discovered that it was only a feint and therefore moved by his right towards Atalosti when he heard the firing on that side. His march was secured by the Val d'Ayra which separated him from the ridge of Airola along which Reille was advancing, but noting that general's strength, and at the same time seeing Ross's brigade labouring up the steep ridge of Mendichuri, Campbell judged that the latter was ignorant of what was going on above. Wherefore sending advice of the enemy's proximity and strength to Cole, he offered to pass the Atalosti and join in the battle if he could be furnished with transport for his sick, and provisions on the new line of operations.

Before this message could reach Cole, the head of Ross's column, composed of a wing of the 20th regiment and a company of Brunswickers, was on the summit of the Lindouz, where most unexpectedly it encountered Reille's advanced guard. The moment was critical, but Ross, an eager hardy soldier, called aloud to charge, and Captain Tovey of the 20th running forward with his company crossed a slight wooded hollow and full against the front of the 6th French light infantry dashed with the bayonet.* Brave men fell by that weapon on both sides, but numbers prevailing, these daring soldiers were pushed back again by the French, Ross however gained his object, the remainder of his brigade had come up and the pass of Atalosti was secured, yet with a loss of 140 men of the 20th regiment and 41 of the Brunswickers.

Previous to this vigorous action General Cole seeing the French in the Val Carlos and in the valley of Orbaiceta, that is to say on both flanks of Byng whose front was not the less pressed, had ordered Anson to reinforce the Spaniards at the foundry, and Stubbs to enter the Val Carlos in support of the 57th. He now recalled Anson to assist in defence of the Lindouz, and learning from Campbell how strong Reille was, caused Byng, with a view to a final retreat, to relinquish his advanced position at Altobiscar and take a second nearer the Ibañeta. This movement uncovered the road leading down to the foundry of Orbaiceta, but it concentrated all the troops, and at the same time General Campbell, although he could not enter the line of battle, because Cole was unable to supply his demands, made so skilful a display of his Portuguese as to impress Reille with the notion that their numbers were considerable.

During these movements the skirmishing of the light troops continued, but a thick fog coming up the valley prevented Soult from making dispositions for a

* Appendix, No. 25.

general attack with his six divisions, and when night fell General Cole still held the great chain of the mountains with a loss of only 380 men killed and wounded. His right was however turned by Orbaiceta, he had but 10,000 or 11,000 bayonets to oppose to 30,000, and his line of retreat being for four or five miles down hill and flanked all the way by the Lindouz, was uneasy and unfavourable. Wherefore putting the troops silently in march after dark, he threaded the passes and gained the valley of Urroz. His rear-guard, composed of Anson's brigade, followed in the morning, General Campbell retired from the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga to Eugui in the valley of Zubiri, and the Spanish battalion, retreating from the foundry of Orbaiceta by the narrow way of Navala, rejoined Morillo near Espinal. The great chain was thus abandoned, but the result of the day's operation was unsatisfactory to the French general; he acknowledged a loss of 400 men, he had not gained 10 miles, and from the passes now abandoned to Pampeluna the distance was not less than 22 miles, with strong defensive positions in the way where increasing numbers of intrepid enemies were to be expected.

Soult's combinations, contrived for greater success, had been thwarted, partly by fortune, partly by errors of execution the like of which all generals must expect, and the most experienced are the most resigned as knowing them to be inevitable. The interference of fortune was felt in the fog which rose at the moment when he was ready to thrust forward his heavy masses of troops entire. The failure in execution was Reille's tardy movement. His orders were to gain with all expedition the Lindouz, that is to say the knot tying the heads of the Alduides, the Val Carlos, the Roncesvalles, and the valley of Urroz. From that position he would have commanded the Mendichuri, Atalosti, Ibañeta and Sahorgain passes, and by moving along the crest of the hills could menace the Urtiaga, Renacabal, and Bellate passes, thus endangering Campbell's and Hill's lines of retreat. But when he should have ascended the rocks of Airola he halted to incorporate two newly arrived conscript battalions and to issue provisions, and the hours thus lost would have sufficed to seize the Lindouz before General Ross got through the pass of Mendichuri. The fog would still have stopped the spread of the French columns to the extent designed by Soult, but 15,000 or 16,000 men, placed on the flank and rear of Byng and Morillo, would have separated them from the fourth division, and forced the latter to retreat beyond Viscayret.

Soult however overrated the force opposed to him, supposing it to consist of two British divisions, besides Byng's brigade and Morillo's Spaniards. He was probably deceived by the wounded men, who hastily questioned on the field would declare they belonged to the second and fourth divisions, because Byng's brigade was part of the former; but that general and the Spaniards had without aid sustained Soult's first efforts, and even when the fourth division came up, less than 11,000 men, exclusive of sergeants and officers, were present in the fight. Campbell's Portuguese never entered the line at all, the remainder of the second division was in the Bastan, and the third division was at Olague in the valley of Lanz.

On the 26th the French general put Clausel's wing on the track of Cole, and ordered Reille to follow the crest of the mountains and seize the passes leading from the Bastan in Hill's rear while D'Erlon pressed him in front. That general would thus, Soult hoped, be crushed or thrown on the side of San Estevan; D'Erlon could then reach his proper place in the valley of Zubiri, while the right descended the valley of Lanz and prevented Picton quitting it to aid Cole. A retreat by those generals and on separate lines would thus be inevitable, and the French army could issue forth in a compact order of battle from the mouths of the two valleys against Pampeluna.

COMBAT OF LINZOAIN.

All the columns were in movement at day-break, but every hour brought its obstacle. The fog still hung heavy on the mountain-tops, Reille's guides, bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the crests, and at ten o'clock, having no other resource, he marched down the pass of Mendichuri upon Espinal, and fell into the rear of the cavalry and artillery following Clausel's divisions. Meanwhile Soult, although retarded also by the fog and the difficulties of the ground, overtook Cole's rear-guard in front of Viscayret. The leading troops struck hotly upon some

British light companies incorporated under the command of Colonel Wilson of the 48th, and a French squadron passing round their flank fell on the rear; but Wilson facing about, drove off these horsemen and thus fighting, Cole, about two o'clock, reached the heights of Linzoin a mile beyond Viscayret, where General Picton met him with intelligence that Campbell had reached Eugui from the Alduides, and that the third division having crossed the hills from Olague, was at Zubiri. The junction of all these troops was thus secured, the loss of the day was less than 200, and neither wounded men nor baggage had been left behind. However the French gathered in front and at four o'clock seized some heights on the allies' left, which endangered their position, wherefore again falling back a mile, Cole offered battle on the ridge separating the valley of Urroz from that of Zubiri. During this skirmish Campbell coming from Eugui showed his Portuguese on the ridges above the right flank of the French, but they were distant, Picton's troops were still at Zubiri, and there was light for an action. Soult however, disturbed with intelligence received from D'Erlon, and perhaps doubtful what Campbell's troops might be, put off the attack until next morning, and after dark the junction of all the allies was effected.

This delay on the part of the French general seems injudicious. Cole was alone for five hours. Every action, by increasing the number of wounded men and creating confusion in the rear, would have augmented the difficulties of the retreat; and the troops were fatigued with incessant fighting and marching for two days and one night. Moreover the alteration of Reille's march, occasioned by the fog, had reduced the chances dependant on the primary combinations to the operations of D'Erlon's corps, but the evening reports brought the mortifying conviction that he also had gone wrong, and by rough fighting only could Soult now attain his object. It is said that his expressions discovered a secret anticipation of failure, if so, his temper was too steadfast to yield for he gave the signal to march the next day, and more strongly renewed his orders to D'Erlon whose operations must now be noticed.

That general had three divisions of infantry, furnishing 21,000 men, of which about 18,000 were combatants. Early on the morning of the 25th he assembled two of them behind some heights near the passes of Maya, having caused the national guards of Baygorry to make previous demonstrations towards the passes of Arriette, Yspéguy, and Lorient. No change had been made in the disposition of General Hill's force, but General Stewart, deceived by the movements of the national guards, looked towards Sylveira's posts on the right rather than to his own front; his division, consisting of two British brigades, was consequently neither posted as it should be nor otherwise prepared for an attack. The ground to be defended was indeed very strong, but however rugged a mountain position may be, if it is too extensive for the troops or those troops are not disposed with judgment, the very inequalities constituting its defensive strength become advantageous to an assailant.

There were three passes to defend. Aretesque on the right, Lessessa in the centre, Maya on the left, and from these entrances two ways led to Elizondo in parallel directions; one down the valley through the town of Maya, receiving in its course the Erazu road; the other along the Atchiola mountain. General Pringle's brigade was charged to defend the Aretesque, and Colonel Cameron's brigade the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col itself was broad on the summit, about three miles long, and on each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above another; those on the right blending with the Goramendi mountains, those on the left with the Atchiola, near the summit of which the 82nd regiment belonging to the seventh division was posted.

Cameron's brigade, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops coming from Urdax; but at Aretesque a great round hill, one mile in front, masked the movements of an enemy coming from Espelette. This hill was not occupied at night, nor in the daytime save by some Portuguese cavalry videttes, and the next guard was an infantry picquet posted on that slope of the Col which fronted the great hill. Behind this picquet of 80 men there was no immediate support, but four light companies were encamped one mile down the reverse slope, which was more

rugged and difficult of access than that towards the enemy. The rest of General Pringle's brigade was disposed at various distances from two to three miles in the rear, and the signal for assembling on the position was to be the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks above the Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments furnishing more than 3000 fighting men, half only were in line of battle, and those chiefly massed on the left of a position, wide open, and of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side, and their general, Stewart, quite deceived as to the real state of affairs, was at Elizondo when about mid-day D'Erlon commenced the battle.

COMBAT OF MAYA.

Captain Moyle Sherer, the officer commanding the picquet at the Aretesque pass was told by his predecessor that at dawn a glimpse had been obtained of cavalry and infantry in movement along the hills in front, some peasants also announced the approach of the French, and at nine o'clock Major Thorne, a staff-officer, having patroled round the great hill in front of the pass, discovered sufficient to make him order up the light companies to support the picquet. These companies had just formed on the ridge with their left at the rock of Aretesque, when D'Armagnac's division coming from Espelette mounted the great hill in front, Abbé followed, and General Maransin with a third division, advanced from Ainhoa and Urdax against the Maya pass, meaning also to turn it by a narrow way leading up the Atchiola mountain.

D'Armagnac's men pushed forwards at once in several columns, and forced the picquet back with great loss upon the light companies, who sustained his vehement assault with infinite difficulty. The alarm guns were now heard from the Maya pass, and General Pringle hastened to the front, but his regiments moving hurriedly from different camps were necessarily brought into action one after the other. The 34th came up first at a running pace, yet by companies not in mass and breathless from the length and ruggedness of the ascent; the 39th and 28th followed, but not immediately nor together, and meanwhile D'Armagnac, closely supported by Abbé, with domineering numbers and valour combined, maugre the desperate fighting of the picquet of the light companies, and of the 34th, had established his columns on the broad ridge of the position.

Colonel Cameron then sent the 50th from the left to the assistance of the over-matched troops, and that fierce and formidable old regiment, charging the head of an advancing column, drove it clear out of the pass of Lessessa in the centre. Yet the French were so many that, checked at one point, they assembled with increased force at another; nor could General Pringle restore the battle with the 39th and 28th regiments, which, cut off from the others were, though fighting desperately, forced back to a second and lower ridge crossing the main road to Elizondo. They were followed by D'Armagnac, but Abbé continued to press the 50th and 34th, whose natural line of retreat was towards the Atchiola road on the left, because the position trended backward from Aretesque towards that point, and because Cameron's brigade was there. And that officer, still holding the pass of Maya with the left wings of the 71st and 92nd regiments, brought their right wings and the Portuguese guns into action and thus maintained the fight; but so dreadful was the slaughter, especially of the 92nd, that it is said the advancing enemy was actually stopped by the heaped mass of dead and dying;* and then the left wing of that noble regiment coming down from the higher ground smote wounded friends and exulting foes alike, as mingled together they stood or crawled before its fire.

It was in this state of affairs that General Stewart, returning from Elizondo by the mountain road, reached the field of battle. The passes of Lessessa and Aretesque were lost, that of Maya was still held by the left wing of the 71st, but Stewart, seeing Maransin's men gathered thickly on one side and Abbé's men on the other, abandoned it to take a new position on the first rocky ridge covering the road over the Atchiola; and he called down the 82nd regiment from the highest part of that mountain, and sent messengers to demand further aid from the seventh division. Meanwhile, although wounded himself he made a strenuous resistance,

* Appendix No. 25.

for he was a very gallant man ; but during the retrograde movement, Maransin no longer seeking to turn the position, suddenly thrust the head of his division across the front of the British line and connected his left with Abbé, throwing as he passed a destructive fire into the wasted remnant of the 92nd, which even then sullenly gave way, for the men fell until two-thirds of the whole had gone to the ground. Still the survivors fought, and the left wing of the 71st came into action, but one after the other all the régiments were forced back, and the first position was lost together with the Portuguese guns.

Abbé's division now followed D'Armagnac on the road to the town of Maya, leaving Maransin to deal with Stewart's new position, and notwithstanding its extreme strength the French gained ground until six o'clock, for the British, shrunk in numbers, also wanted ammunition, and a part of the 82nd, under Major Fitzgerald, were forced to roll down stones to defend the rocks on which they were posted. In this desperate condition Stewart was upon the point of abandoning the mountain entirely, when a brigade of the seventh division, commanded by General Barnes, arrived from Echallar, and that officer charging at the head of the 6th regiment, drove the French back to the Maya ridge. Stewart thus remained master of the Atchiola, and the Count D'Erlon, who probably thought greater reinforcements had come up, recalled his other divisions from the Maya road and reunited his whole corps on the *Col*. He had lost 1500 men and a general ; but he took four guns, and 1400 British soldiers were killed or wounded.

Such was the fight of Maya, a disaster, yet one much exaggerated by French writers, and by an English author misrepresented as a surprise caused by the negligence of the cavalry. General Stewart was surprised, his troops were not, and never did soldiers fight better, seldom so well. The stern valour of the 92nd, principally composed of Irishmen, would have graced Thermopylæ. The Portuguese cavalry patrols, if any went out, which is uncertain, might have neglected their duty, and doubtless the front should have been scoured in a more military manner ; but the infantry picquets, and the light companies so happily ordered up by Major Thorne, were ready, and no man wondered to see the French columns crown the great hill in front of the pass. Stewart expecting no attack at Maya, had gone to Elizondo leaving orders for the soldiers to cook ; from his erroneous views therefore the misfortune sprung and from no other source. Having deceived himself as to the true point of attack he did not take proper military precautions on his own front ; his position was only half occupied, his troops brought into action wildly, and finally he caused the loss of his guns by a misdirection as to the road. General Stewart was a brave, energetic, zealous, indefatigable man, and of a magnanimous spirit, but he possessed neither the calm reflective judgment nor the intuitive genius which belongs to nature's generals.

It is difficult to understand Count D'Erlon's operations. Why, when he had carried the right of the position, did he follow two weak régiments with two divisions and leave only one division to attack five régiments, posted on the strongest ground and having hopes of succour from Echallar ? Certainly if Abbé's division had acted with Maransin's Stewart, who was so hardly pressed by the latter alone, must have passed the road from Echallar in retreat before general Barnes's brigade arrived. On the other hand, Soult's orders directed D'Erlon to operate by his left, with the view of connecting the whole army on the summit of the great chain of the Pyrenees. He should therefore either have used his whole force to crush the troops on the Atchiola before they could be succoured from Echallar ; or, leaving Maransin there, have marched by the Maya road upon Ariscun to cut Sylveira's line of retreat ; instead of this he remained inactive upon the *Col de Maya* for 20 hours after the battle ! And General Hill concentrating his whole force, now augmented by Barnes's brigade, would probably have fallen upon him from the commanding rocks of Atchiola the next day, if intelligence of Cole's retreat from the Roncesvalles passes had not come through the Alduides. This rendered the recovery of the *Col de Maya* useless, and Hill withdrawing all his troops during the night, posted the British brigades which had been engaged, together with one Portuguese brigade of infantry and a Portuguese battery, on the heights in rear of Irueta, 15 miles from the scene of action. The other Portuguese brigade he left in front of Elizondo, thus covering

the road of San Estevan on his left, that of Berderez on his right, and the pass of Vellate in his rear.

Such was the commencement of Soult's operations to restore the fortunes of France. Three considerable actions, fought on the same day, had each been favourable. At St. Sebastian the allies were repulsed; at Roncesvalles they abandoned the passes; at Maya they were defeated; but the decisive blow had not yet been struck.

Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on his way back from St. Sebastian, but with the false addition that D'Erlon was beaten. As early as the 22nd he had known that Soult was preparing a great offensive movement, but the immovable attitude of the French centre, the skilful disposition of their reserve which was twice as strong as he at first supposed, together with the preparations made to throw bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriattou, were all calculated to mislead and did mislead him.

Soult's complicated combinations to bring D'Erlon's divisions finally into line on the crest of the great chain were impenetrable, and the English general could not believe his adversary would throw himself with only 30,000 men into the valley of the Ebro unless sure of aid from Suchet, and that general's movements indicated a determination to remain in Catalonia; moreover Wellington, in contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna was not in extremity, and before the failure of the assault that San Sebastian was. Hence, the operations against his right, their full extent not known, appeared a feint, and he judged the real effort would be to throw bridges over the Bidassoa and raise the siege of San Sebastian. But in the night correct intelligence of the Maya and Roncesvalles affairs arrived, Soult's object was then scarcely doubtful, and Sir T. Graham was ordered to turn the siege into a blockade to embark his guns and stores, and hold all his spare troops in hand to join Giron, on a position of battle marked out near the Bidassoa. General Cotton was ordered to move the cavalry up to Pampeluna, and O'Donnell was instructed to hold some of his Spanish troops ready to act in advance. This done Wellington arranged his lines of correspondence and proceeded to San Estevan, which he reached early in the morning.

While the embarkation of the guns and stores was going on it was essential to hold the posts at Vera and Echallar, because D'Erlon's object was not pronounced and an enemy in possession of those places could approach San Sebastian by the roads leading over the Peña de Haya, a rocky mountain behind Lesaca, or by the defiles of Zubietta leading round that mountain from the valley of Lerins. Wherefore in passing through Estevan on the morning of the 26th, Wellington merely directed General Pack to guard the bridges over the Bidassoa. But when he reached Irueta, saw the reduced state of Stewart's division, and heard that Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all the troops within his power upon Pampeluna; and to prevent mistakes indicated the valley of Lanz as the general line of movement. Of Picton's exact position or of his intentions nothing positive was known, but supposing him to have joined Cole at Linzoain, as indeed he had, Wellington judged that their combined forces would be sufficient to check the enemy until assistance could reach them from the centre or from Pampeluna, and he so advised Picton on the evening of the 26th.

In consequence of these orders the seventh division abandoned Echallar in the night of the 26th, the sixth division quitted San Estevan at daylight on the 27th, and General Hill concentrating his own troops and Barnes's brigade on the heights of Irueta, halted until the evening of the 27th but marched during the night through the pass of Vellate upon the town of Lanz. Meanwhile the light division quitting Vera also on the 27th retired by Lesaca to the summit of the Santa Cruz mountain, overlooking the valley of Lerins, and there halted, apparently to cover the pass of Zubietta until Longa's Spaniards should take post to block the roads leading over the Peña de Haya and protect the embarkation of the guns on that flank. That object being effected, it was to thread the passes and descend upon Lecumberri on the great road of Irurzun, thus securing Sir Thomas Graham's communication with the army round Pampeluna. These various movements spread fear and confusion far and wide. All the narrow valleys and roads were crowded with baggage, commissariat

stores, artillery and fugitive families; reports of the most alarming nature were as usual rife; each division, ignorant of what had really happened to the other, dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes related might be true; none knew what to expect or where they were to meet the enemy, and one universal hubbub filled the wild regions through which the French army was now working its fiery path towards Pampeluna.

D'Erlon's inactivity gave great uneasiness to Soult, who repeated the order to push forward by his left whatever might be the force opposed, and thus stimulated he advanced to Elizondo on the 27th, but thinking the sixth division was still at San Estevan, again halted, and it was not until the morning of the 28th, when General Hill's retreat had opened the way, that he followed through the pass of Vellate. His further progress belongs to other combinations arising from Soult's direct operations which are now to be continued.

General Picton, having assumed the command of all the troops in the valley of Zubiri on the evening of the 26th, recommenced the retreat before dawn on the 27th, and without the hope or intention of covering Pampeluna. Soult followed in the morning, having first sent scouts towards the ridges where Campbell's troops had appeared the evening before. Reille marched by the left bank of the Guy river, Clausel by the right bank, the cavalry and artillery closed the rear and as the whole moved in compact order the narrow valley was overgorged with troops, a hasty bicker of musketry alone marking the separation of the hostile forces. Meanwhile, the garrison of Pampeluna made a sally and O'Donnel in great alarm spiked some of his guns, destroyed his magazines, and would have suffered a disaster, if Carlos D'Espana had not fortunately arrived with his division and checked the garrison. Nevertheless the danger was imminent, for General Cole, first emerging from the valley of Zubiri, had passed Villalba, only three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat; Picton following close, was at Huarte, and O'Donnel's Spaniards were in confusion; in fine Soult was all but successful when Picton, feeling the importance of the crisis, suddenly turned on some steep ridges which, stretching under the names of San Miguel, Mont Escava and San Christoval quite across the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys, screen Pampeluna.

Posting the third division on the right of Huarte he prolonged his line to the left with Morillo's Spaniards, called upon O'Donnel to support him, and directed Cole to occupy some heights between Oricain and Arletta. But that general having with a surer eye observed a salient hill near Zabaldica, one mile in advance and commanding the road to Huarte, demanded and obtained permission to occupy it instead of the heights first appointed. Two Spanish regiments belonging to the blockading troops were still posted there, and towards them Cole directed his course. Soult had also marked this hill, a French detachment issuing from the mouth of the Val de Zubiri was in full career to seize it, and the hostile masses were rapidly approaching the summit on either side when the Spaniards, seeing the British so close, vindicated their own post by a sudden charge. This was for Soult the stroke of fate. His double columns just then emerging, exultant, from the narrow valley, were arrested at the sight of 10,000 men which under Cole crowned the summit of the mountain in opposition; and two miles further back stood Picton with a greater number, for O'Donnel had now taken post on Morillo's left. To advance by the Huarte road was impossible, and to stand still was dangerous, because the French army, contracted to a span in front, was cleft in its whole length by the river Guy, and compressed on each side by the mountains which in that part narrowed the valley to a quarter of a mile. Soult however, like a great and ready commander, at once shot the head of Clausel's columns to his right across the mountain which separated the Val de Zubiri from the Val de Lanz, and at the same time threw one of Reille's divisions of infantry and a body of cavalry across the mountains on his left, beyond the Guy river, as far as the village of Elcano, to menace the front and right flank of Picton's position at Huarte. The other two divisions of infantry he established at the village of Zabaldica in the Val de Zubiri, close under Cole's right, and meanwhile Clausel seized the village of Sauroren close under that general's left.

While the French general thus formed his line of battle, Lord Wellington, who had quitted Sir Rowland Hill's quarters in the Bastan very early on the 27th,

crossed the main ridge and descended the valley of Lanz without having been able to learn anything of Picton's movements or position, and in this state of uncertainty reached Ostiz, a few miles from Sauroren, where he found General Long with the brigade of light cavalry which had furnished the posts of correspondence in the mountains. Here learning that Picton, having abandoned the heights of Linzoain, was moving on Huarte, he left his quarter-master-general with instructions to stop all the troops coming down the valley of Lanz until the state of affairs at Huarte should be ascertained. Then at racing speed he made for Sauroren. As he entered that village he saw Clausel's divisions moving from Zabaldica along the crest of the mountain, and it was clear that the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were intercepted, wherefore pulling up his horse he wrote on the parapet of the bridge of Sauroren fresh instructions to turn everything from that valley to the right, by a road which led through Lizasso and Marcalain behind the hills to the village of Oricain, that is to say, in rear of the position now occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the only staff-officer who had kept up with him, galloped with these orders out of Sauroren by one road, the French light cavalry dashed in by another, and the English general rode alone up the mountain to reach his troops. One of Campbell's Portuguese battalions first descried him and raised a cry of joy, and the shrill clamour caught up by the next regiments swelled as it ran along the line into that stern and appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give upon the edge of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. Lord Wellington suddenly stopped in a conspicuous place, he desired that both armies should know he was there, and a double spy who was present pointed out Soult, then so near that his features could be plainly distinguished. The English general, it is said, fixed his eyes attentively upon this formidable man, and speaking as if to himself, said, "*Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious one and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause of these cheers; that will give time for the sixth division to arrive and I shall beat him.*" And certain it is that the French general made no serious attack that day.

The position adopted by Cole was the summit of a mountain mass which filled all the space between the Guy and the Lanz rivers as far back as Huarte and Villalba. It was highest in the centre, and boldly defined towards the enemy, but the trace was irregular, the right being thrown back towards the village of Arletta so as to flank the high road to Huarte. This road was also swept by some guns placed on a lower range, or neck, connecting the right of Cole with Picton and Morillo.

Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river was the bulging hill vindicated by the Spaniards; it was a distinct point on the right of the fourth division, dependent upon the centre of the position but considerably lower. The left of the position, also abating in height, was yet extremely rugged and steep, overlooking the Lanz river and the road to Villalba. General Ross's brigade of the fourth division was posted on that side, having a Portuguese battalion, whose flank rested on a small chapel, in his front. General Campbell was on the right of Ross. General Anson was on the highest ground, partly behind, and partly on the right of Campbell. General Byng's brigade was on a second mass of hills in reserve, and the Spanish hill was reinforced by a battalion of the fourth Portuguese regiment.

The front of battle being less than two miles was well filled, and the Lanz and Guy river washed the flanks. Those torrents continuing their course break by narrow passages through the steep ridges of San Miguel and Christoval, and then flowing past Huarte and Villalba meet behind those places to form the Arga river. On the ridges thus cleft by the waters the second line was posted, that is to say, at the distance of two miles from, and nearly parallel to the first position, but on a more extended front. Picton's left was at Huarte, his right strengthened with a battery stretched to the village of Goraitz, covering more than a mile of ground on that flank. Morillo prolonged Picton's left along the crest of San Miguel to Villalba, and O'Donnel continued the line to San Christoval; Carlos d'España's division maintained the blockade behind these ridges, and the British cavalry under General Cotton, coming up from Tafalla and Olite, took post, the heavy brigades on some open ground behind Picton, the hussar brigade on his right. This second

line being on a wider trace than the first and equally well filled with troops, entirely barred the openings of the two valleys leading down to Pampeluna.

Soult's position was also a mountain filling the space between the two rivers. It was even more rugged than the allies' mountain and they were only separated by a deep narrow valley. Clause's three divisions leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren, which was quite down in the valley of Lanz and close under the chapel height where the left of the fourth division was posted. His left was prolonged by two of Reille's divisions, which also occupied the village of Zabaldica quite down in the valley of Zubiri under the right of the allies. The remaining division of this wing and a division of cavalry, were, as I have before stated, thrown forward on the mountains at the other side of the Guy river, menacing Picton and seeking for an opportunity to communicate with the garrison of Pampeluna. Some guns were pushed in front of Zabaldica, but the elevation required to send the shot upward rendered their fire ineffectual and the greatest part of the artillery remained therefore in the narrow valley of Zubiri.

Combat of the 27th.—Soult's first effort was to gain the Spaniards' hill, and establish himself near the centre of the allies' line of battle. The attack was vigorous, but the French were valiantly repulsed about the time Lord Wellington arrived, and he immediately reinforced that post with the 40th British regiment. There was then a general skirmish along the front, under cover of which Soult carefully examined the whole position, and the firing continued on the mountain side until evening, when a terrible storm, the usual precursor of English battles in the Peninsula, brought on premature darkness, and terminated the dispute. This was the state of affairs at day-break on the 28th, but a signal alteration had place before the great battle of that day commenced, and the movements of the wandering divisions by which this change was effected must now be traced.

It has been shown that the Lanz covered the left of the allies and the right of the French. Nevertheless, the heights occupied by either army were prolonged beyond that river, the continuation of the allies' ridge sweeping forward so as to look into the rear of Sauroren, while the continuation of the French heights fell back in a direction nearly parallel to the forward inclination of the opposing ridge. They were both steep and high, yet lower and less rugged than the heights on which the armies stood opposed, for the latter were mountains where rocks piled on rocks stood out like castles, difficult to approach and so dangerous to assail, that the hardened veterans of the Peninsula only would have dared the trial. Now, the road by which the sixth division marched on the 27th, after clearing the pass of Doña Maria, sends one branch to Lanz, another to Ostiz, a third through Lizasso and Marcalain; the first and second fall into the road from Bellate and descend the valley of Lanz to Sauroren; the third passing behind the ridges, just described as prolonging the positions of the armies, also falls into the valley of Lanz, but at the village of Oricain, that is to say, one mile behind the ground occupied by General Cole's left.

It was by this road of Marcalain that Wellington now expected the sixth and seventh divisions, but the rapidity with which Soult seized Sauroren caused a delay of 18 hours. For the sixth division, having reached Olague, in the valley of Lanz, about one o'clock on the 27th, halted there until four, and then following the orders brought by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, marched by Lizasso to gain the Marcalain road; but the great length of these mountain marches, and the heavy storm which had terminated the action at Zabaldica, sweeping with equal violence in this direction, prevented the division from passing Lizasso that night. However, the march was renewed at daylight on the 28th, and meanwhile General Hill, having quitted the Bastan on the evening of the 27th, reached the town of Lanz on the morning of the 28th, and rallying General Long's cavalry and his own artillery, which were in that valley, moved likewise upon Lizasso. At that place he met the seventh division coming from San Estevan, and having restored General Barnes's brigade to Lord Dalhousie, took a position on a ridge covering the road to Marcalain. The seventh division being on his right, was in military communication with the sixth division, and thus Lord Wellington's left was prolonged, and covered the great road leading from Pampeluna by Irurzun to Tolosa. And during these im-

portant movements, which were not completed until the evening of the 28th, which brought 6000 men into the allies' line of battle, and 15,000 more into military communication with their left, D'Erlon remained planted in his position of observation near Elizondo !

The near approach of the sixth division, early on the morning of the 28th, and the certainty of Hill's junction, made Wellington imagine that Soult would not venture an attack ; and certainly that marshal, disquieted about D'Erlon, of whom he only knew that he had not followed his instructions, viewed the strong position of his adversary with uneasy anticipations. Again, with anxious eyes, he took cognizance of all its rugged strength, and seemed dubious and distrustful of his fortune. He could not operate with advantage by his own left beyond the Guy river, because the mountains there were rough, and Wellington, having shorter lines of movement, could meet him with all arms combined ; and meanwhile the French artillery, unable to emerge from the Val de Zubiri, except by the Huarte road, would have been exposed to a counter-attack. He crossed the Lanz river, and ascended the prolongation of the allies' ridge, which, as he had possession of the bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own ground. From this height he could see all the left and rear of Cole's position, looking down the valley of Lanz as far as Villalba, but the country beyond the ridge, towards Marcalain, was so broken, that he could not discern the march of the sixth division ; he knew, however, from the deserters that Wellington expected four fresh divisions from that side, that is to say, the second, sixth and seventh British, and Sylviera's Portuguese division, which always marched with Hill. This information and the nature of the ground decided the plan of attack. The valley of Lanz growing wider as it descended, offered the means of assailing the allies' left in front and rear at one moment, and the same combination would cut off the reinforcements expected from the side of Marcalain.

One of Clausel's divisions already occupied Sauroren, and the other two coming from the mountain took post upon each side of that village. The division on the right hand was ordered to throw some flankers on the ridge from whence Soult was taking his observations, and upon a signal given, to move in one body to a convenient distance down the valley, and then, wheeling to its left, assail the rear of the allies' left flank, while the other two divisions, advancing from their respective positions near Sauroren, assailed the front. Cole's left, which did not exceed 5000 men, would thus be enveloped by 16,000, and Soult expected to crush it, notwithstanding the strength of the ground. Meanwhile Reille's two divisions advancing from the mountain on the side of Zabaldica, were each to send a brigade against the hill occupied by the 40th regiment ; the right of this attack was to be connected with the left of Clausel, the remaining brigades were closely to support the assailing masses, the divisions beyond the Guy were to keep Picton in check, and Soult, who had no time to lose, ordered his lieutenants to throw their troops frankly and at once into action.

First battle of Sauroren.—It was fought on the fourth anniversary of the battle of Talavera.

About mid-day the French gathered at the foot of the position, and their skirmishers rushing forward spread over the face of the mountain, working upward like a conflagration ; but the columns of attack were not all prepared when Clausel's division in the valley of Lanz, too impatient to await the general signal of battle, threw out its flankers on the ridge beyond the river and pushed down the valley in one mass. With a rapid pace it turned Cole's left and was preparing to wheel up on his rear, when a Portuguese brigade of the sixth division, suddenly appearing on the crest of the ridge beyond the river, drove the French flankers back and instantly descended with a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the column in the valley. And almost at the same instant, the main body of the sixth division emerging from behind the same ridge, near the village of Oricain, formed in order of battle across the front. It was the counter-stroke of Salamanca ! The French, striving to encompass the left of the allies were themselves encompassed, for two brigades of the fourth division turned and smote them from the left, the Portuguese smote them from the right ; and while thus scathed on both flanks with

fire, they were violently shocked and pushed back with a mighty force by the sixth division, yet not in flight, but fighting fiercely and strewing the ground with their enemies' bodies as well as with their own.

Clausel's second division, seeing this dire conflict, with a hurried movement assailed the chapel height to draw off the fire from the troops in the valley, and gallantly did the French soldiers throng up the craggy steep, but the general unity of the attack was ruined ; neither their third division nor Reille's brigades had yet received the signal, and their attacks instead of being simultaneous were made in succession, running from right to left as the necessity of aiding the others became apparent. It was however a terrible battle and well fought. One column darting out of the village of Sauroren, silently, sternly, without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel under a tempest of bullets which swept away whole ranks without abating the speed and power of the mass. The 7th Caçadores shrunk abashed, and that part of the position was won. Soon however they rallied upon General Ross's British brigade, and the whole running forward charged the French with a loud shout and dashed them down the hill. Heavily stricken they were, yet undismayed, and recovering their ranks again, they ascended in the same manner to be again broken and overturned. But the other columns of attack were now bearing upwards through the smoke and flame with which the skirmishers had covered the face of the mountain, and the 10th Portuguese regiment fighting on the right of Ross's brigade yielded to their fury ; a heavy body crowned the heights and wheeling against the exposed flank of Ross forced that gallant officer also to go back. His ground was instantly occupied by the enemies with whom he had been engaged in front, and the fight raged close and desperate on the crest of the position, charge succeeded charge and each side yielded and recovered by turns ; yet this astounding effort of French valour was of little avail. Lord Wellington brought Byng's brigade forward at a running pace, and sent the 27th and 48th British regiments belonging to Anson's brigade down from the higher ground in the centre against the crowded masses, rolling them backward in disorder and throwing them one after the other violently down the mountain side ; and with no child's play ; the two British regiments fell upon the enemy three separate times with the bayonet and lost more than half their own numbers.

During this battle on the mountain top, the British brigades of the sixth division strengthened by a battery of guns, gained ground in the valley of Lanz and arrived on the same front with the left of the victorious troops about the chapel. Lord Wellington then seeing the momentary disorder of the enemy ordered Madden's Portuguese brigade, which had never ceased its fire against the right flank of the French column, to assail the village of Sauroren in the rear, but the state of the action in other parts and the exhaustion of the troops soon induced him to countermand this movement. Meanwhile Reille's brigades, connecting their right with the left of Clausel's third division, had environed the Spanish hill, ascended it unchecked, and at the moment when the fourth division was so hardly pressed made the regiment of El Pravia give way on the left of the 40th. A Portuguese battalion rushing forward covered the flank of that invincible regiment, which waited in stern silence until the French set their feet upon the broad summit ; but when their glittering arms appeared over the brow of the mountain the charging cry was heard, the crowded mass was broken to pieces, and a tempest of bullets followed its flight. Four times this assault was renewed, and the French officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the belts, so fierce and resolute they were to win. It was however the labour of *Sisyphus*. The vehement shout and shock of the British soldier always prevailed, and at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, hearts fainting, and hopeless from repeated failures, they were so abashed that three British companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade.

While the battle was thus being fought on the height the French cavalry beyond the Guy river, passed a rivulet, and with a fire of carbines forced the 10th hussars to yield some rocky ground on Picton's right, but the 18th hussars having better firearms than the 10th renewed the combat, killed two officers, and finally drove the French over the rivulet again.

Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, which Lord Wellington

fresh from the fight with homely emphasis called "*bludgeon work*." Two generals and 1800 men had been killed or wounded on the French side, following their official reports, a number far below the estimate made at the time by the allies, whose loss amounted to 2600. These discrepancies between hostile calculations ever occur, and there is little wisdom in disputing where proof is unattainable; but the numbers actually engaged were, of French, 25,000, of the allies 12,000, and if the strength of the latter's position did not save them from the greater loss their steadfast courage is to be the more admired.

The 29th the armies rested in position without firing a shot, but the wandering divisions on both sides were now entering the line.

General Hill, having sent all his baggage, artillery, and wounded men to Berioplano behind the Christoval ridge, still occupied his strong ground between Lizasso and Arestegui, covering the Marcalain and Irurzun roads, and menacing that leading from Lizasso to Olague in rear of Soult's right. His communication with Oricain was maintained by the seventh division, and the light division was approaching his left. Thus on Wellington's side the crisis was over. He had vindicated his position with only 16,000 combatants, and now, including the troops still maintaining the blockade, he had 50,000, 20,000 being British, in close military combination. Thirty thousand flushed with recent success were in hand, and Hill's troops were well placed for retaking the offensive.

Soult's situation was proportionably difficult. Finding that he could not force the allies' position in front, he had sent his artillery, part of his cavalry, and his wounded men back to France immediately after the battle, ordering the two former to join Villatte on the Lower Bidassoa and there await further instructions. Having shaken off this burthen he awaited D'Erlon's arrival by the valley of Lanz, and that general reached Ostiz a few miles above Sauroren at mid-day on the 29th, bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his march, that General Graham had retired from the Bidassoa and Villatte had crossed that river. This gave Soult a hope that his first movements had disengaged San Sebastian, and he instantly conceived a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed, yet conformable to the critical state of his affairs.

No success was to be expected from another attack, yet he could not at the moment of being reinforced with 18,000 men, retire by the road he came without some dishonour; nor could he remain where he was, because his supplies of provisions and ammunition derived from distant magazines by slow and small convoys was unequal to the consumption. Two-thirds of the British troops, the greatest part of the Portuguese, and all the Spaniards were, as he supposed, assembled in his front under Wellington, or on his right flank under Hill, and it was probable that other reinforcements were on the march; wherefore he resolved to prolong his right with D'Erlon's corps, and then cautiously drawing off the rest of his army place himself between the allies and the Bastan, in military connection with his reserve and closer to his frontier magazines. Thus posted and able to combine all his troops in one operation, he expected to relieve San Sebastian entirely and profit from the new state of affairs.

In the evening of the 29th the second division of cavalry, which was in the valley of Zubiri, passed over the position to the valley of Lanz, and joined D'Erlon, who was ordered to march early on the 30th by Etulain upon Lizasso, sending out strong scouting parties to his left on all the roads leading upon Pampeluna, and also towards Letassa and Irurzun. During the night the first division of cavalry and La Martiniere's division of infantry, both at Elcano on the extreme left of the French army, retired over the mountains by Illurdos to Eugui, in the upper part of the valley of the Zubiri, having orders to cross the separating ridge, enter the valley of Lanz, and join D'Erlon. The remainder of Reille's wing was at the same time to march by the crest of the position from Zabaldica to the village of Sauroren, and gradually relieve Clausel's troops which were then to assemble behind Sauroren, that is to say towards Ostiz, and thus following the march of D'Erlon were to be themselves followed in like manner by Reille's troops. To cover these last movements Clausel detached two regiments to occupy the French heights beyond the Lanz river, and they were also to maintain his connection with D'Erlon, whose line

of operations was just beyond those heights. He was however to hold by Reille rather than by D'Erlon until the former had perfected his dangerous march across Wellington's front.

In the night of the 29th Soult heard from the deserters that three divisions were to make an offensive movement towards Lizasso on the 30th, and when daylight came he was convinced the men spoke truly, because from a point beyond Sauroren he discerned certain columns descending the ridge of Christoval and the heights above Oricain, while others were in march on a wide sweep apparently to turn Clausel's right flank. These columns were Morillo's Spaniards, Campbell's Portuguese, and the seventh division, the former rejoining Hill to whose corps they properly belonged, the others adapting themselves to a new disposition of Wellington's line of battle which shall be presently explained.

At six o'clock in the morning Foy's division of Reille's wing was in march along the crest of the mountain from Zabaldica towards Sauroren, where Maucune's division had already relieved Conroux's; the latter, belonging to Clausel's wing, was moving up the valley of Lanz to rejoin that general, who had, with exception of the two flanking regiments before mentioned, concentrated his remaining divisions between Olabe and Ostiz. In this state of affairs Wellington opening his batteries from the chapel height sent skirmishers against Sauroren, and the fire spreading to the allies' right became brisk between Cole and Foy. It subsided however at Sauroren, and Soult, relying on the strength of the position, ordered Reille to maintain it until nightfall unless hardly pressed, and went off himself at a gallop to join D'Erlon, for his design was to fall upon the division attempting to turn his right and crush them with superior numbers; a daring project, well and quickly conceived, but he had to deal with a man whose rapid perception and rough stroke rendered sleight of hand dangerous. The marshal overtook D'Erlon at the moment when that general, having entered the valley of Ulzema with three divisions of infantry and two divisions of heavy cavalry, was making dispositions to assail Hill, who was between Buena and Arestegui.

Combat of Buena.—The allies, who were about 10,000 fighting men, including Long's brigade of light cavalry, occupied a very extensive mountain ridge. Their right was strongly posted on rugged ground, but the left prolonged towards Buena was insecure, and D'Erlon, who including his two divisions of heavy cavalry had not less than 20,000 sabres and bayonets, was followed by La Martiniere's division of infantry now coming from Lanz. Soult's combination was therefore extremely powerful. The light troops were already engaged when he arrived, and the same soldiers on both sides who had so strenuously combated at Maya on the 25th were again opposed to each other.

D'Armagnac's division was directed to make a false attack upon Hill's right; Abbé's division, emerging by Lizasso, endeavoured to turn the allies' left and gain the summit of the ridge in the direction of Buena! Maranzin followed Abbé, and the divisions of cavalry entering the line supported and connected the two attacks. The action was brisk at both points, but D'Armagnac pushing his feint too far became seriously engaged, and was beaten by Da Costa and Ashworth's Portuguese, aided by a part of the 28th British regiment. Nor were the French at first more successful on the other flank, being repeatedly repulsed, until Abbé, turning that wing gained the summit of the mountain and rendered the position untenable. General Hill who had lost about 400 men then retired to the heights of Equaros behind Arestegui and Berasin, thus drawing towards Marcalain with his right and throwing back his left. Here being joined by Campbell and Morillo he again offered battle, but Soult whose principal loss was in D'Armagnac's division had now gained his main object; he had turned Hill's left, secured a fresh line of retreat, a shorter communication with Villatte by the pass of Donna Maria, and withal, the great Irurzun road to Tolosa, distant only one league and a half, was in his power. His first thought was to seize it and march through Lecumberri either upon Tolosa, or Andoain and Ernani. There was nothing to oppose except the light division, whose movements shall be noticed hereafter, but neither the French marshal nor General Hill knew of its presence, and the former thought himself strong enough to force his way to San Sebastian and there unite with Villatte, and his artillery which following his previous orders was now on the Lower Bidassoa.

This project was feasible. Lamartiniere's division of Reille's wing, coming from Lanz, was not far off. Clausel's three divisions were momentarily expected, and Reille's during the night. On the 31st therefore, Soult with at least 50,000 men would have broken into Guipuscoa, thrusting aside the light division in his march, and menacing Sir Thomas Graham's position in reverse while Villatte's reserve attacked it in front. The country about Lecumberri was however very strong for defence, and Lord Wellington would have followed, yet scarcely in time, for he did not suspect his views and was ignorant of his strength, thinking D'Erlon's force to be originally two divisions of infantry and now only reinforced with a third division, whereas that general had three divisions originally and was now reinforced by a fourth division of infantry and two of cavalry. This error however did not prevent him from seizing, with the rapidity of a great commander, the decisive point of operation, and giving a counter-stroke which Soult, trusting to the strength of Reille's position, little expected.

When Wellington saw that La Martiniere's division and the cavalry had abandoned the mountains above Elcano, and that Zabaldica was evacuated, he ordered Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of cavalry and a battery of artillery, to enter the valley of Zubiri and turn the French left; the seventh division was directed to sweep over the hills beyond the Lanz river upon the French right; the march of Campbell and Morillo insured the communication with Hill; and that general was to point his columns upon Olague and Lanz threatening the French rear, but meeting as we have seen with D'Erlon was forced back to Eguaros. The fourth division was to assail Foy's position, but respecting its great strength the attack was to be measured according to the effect produced on the flanks. Meanwhile Byng's brigade and the sixth division, the latter having a battery of guns and some squadrons of cavalry, were combined to assault Sauroren. La Bispal's Spaniards followed the sixth division. Fane's horsemen were stationed at Berioplano with a detachment pushed to Irurzun, the heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte, and Carlos d'Espana maintained the blockade.

Second battle of Sauroren.—These movements began at daylight. Picton's advance was rapid. He gained the valley of Zubiri and threw his skirmishers at once on Foy's flank, and about the same time General Inglis, one of those veterans who purchase every step of promotion with their blood, advancing with only 500 men of the seventh division, broke at one shock the two French regiments covering Clausel's right, and drove them down into the valley of Lanz. He lost indeed one-third of his own men, but instantly spreading the remainder in skirmishing order along the descent, opened a biting fire upon the flank of Conroux's division, which was then moving up the valley from Sauroren, sorely amazed and disordered by this sudden fall of two regiments from the top of the mountain into the midst of the column.

Foy's division, marching to support Conroux and Maucune, was on the crest of the mountains between Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of attack, but too far off to give aid, and his own light troops were engaged with the skirmishers of the fourth division; and Inglis had been so sudden and vigorous, that before the evil could be well perceived it was past remedy. For Wellington instantly pushed the sixth division, now commanded by General Pakenham, Pack having been wounded on the 28th, to the left of Sauroren, and shoved Byng's brigade headlong down from the chapel height against that village, which was defended by Maucune's division. Byng's vigorous assault was simultaneously enforced from the opposite direction by Madden's Portuguese of the sixth division, and at the same time the battery near the chapel sent its bullets crashing through the houses, and booming up the valley towards Conroux's column, which Inglis never ceased to vex, and he was closely supported by the remainder of the seventh division.

The village and bridge of Sauroren and the straits beyond were now covered with a pall of smoke, the musketry pealed frequent and loud, and the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to mountain filled all the valley. Byng with hard fighting carried the village of Sauroren, and 1400 prisoners were made, for the two French divisions thus vehemently assailed in the front and flank were entirely broken. Part retreated along the valley towards Clausel's other divisions, which were now

beyond Ostiz, part fled up the mountain side to seek a refuge with Foy, who had remained on the summit a helpless spectator of this rout ; but though he rallied the fugitives in great numbers, he had soon to look to himself, for by this time his skirmishers had been driven up the mountain by those of the fourth division, and his left was infested by Picton's detachments. Thus pressed, he abandoned his strong position, and fell back along the summit of the mountain between the valley of Zubiri and valley of Lanz, and the woods enabled him to effect his retreat without much loss ; but he dared not descend into either valley, and thinking himself entirely cut off, sent advice of his situation to Soult and then retired into the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga. Meanwhile Wellington, pressing up the valley of Lanz, drove Clausel as far as Olague, and the latter now joined by La Martiniere's division took a position in the evening covering the roads of Lanz and Lizasso. The English general, whose pursuit had been damped by hearing of Hill's action, also halted near Ostiz.

The allies lost 1900 men killed and wounded, or taken, in the two battles of this day, and of these nearly 1200 were Portuguese, the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt of both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous. Conroux's and Maucune's divisions were completely disorganized ; Foy with 8000 men, including the fugitives he had rallied, was entirely separated from the main body ; 2000 men at the lowest computation had been killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the woods and ravines, and 3000 prisoners were taken. This blow, joined to former losses, reduced Soult's fighting men to 35,000, of which the 15,000 under Clausel and Reille were dispirited by defeat, and the whole were placed in a most critical situation. Hill's force, now increased to 15,000 men by the junction of Morillo and Campbell, was in front, and 30,000 were on the rear in the valley of Lanz, or on the hills at each side ; for the third division finding no more enemies in the valley of Zubiri, had crowned the heights in conjunction with the fourth division.

Lord Wellington had detached some of La Bispal's Spaniards to Marcalain when he heard of Hill's action, but he was not yet aware of the true state of affairs on that side. His operations were founded upon the notion that Soult was in retreat towards the Bastan. He designed to follow closely, pushing his own left forward to support Sir Thomas Graham on the Bidassoa, but always underrating D'Erlon's troops, he thought La Martiniere's division had retreated by the Roncesvalles road ; and as Foy's column was numerous and two divisions had been broken at Saureren, he judged the force immediately under Soult to be weak, and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth division and the 13th light dragoons were to march by Eugui to join the third division, which was directed upon Linzoain and Roncesvalles. The fourth division was to descend into the valley of Lanz. General Hill, supported by the Spaniards at Marcalain, was to press Soult closely, always turning his right but directing his own march upon Lanz, from whence he was to send Campbell's brigade to the Alduides. The seventh division, which had halted on the ridges between Hill and Wellington, was to suffer the former to cross its front and then march for the pass of Doña Maria.

It appears from these arrangements that Wellington, expecting Soult would rejoin Clausel and make for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate, intended to confine and press him closely in that district. But the French marshal was in a worse position than his adversary imagined, being too far advanced towards Buzeneta to return to Lanz ; in fine he was between two fires and without a retreat save by the pass of Doña Maria upon San Estevan. Wherefore calling in Clausel, and giving D'Erlon, whose divisions, hitherto successful were in good order and undismayed, the rear-guard, he commenced his march soon after midnight towards the pass. But mischief was thickening around him.

Sir Thomas Graham, having only the blockade of San Sebastian to maintain, was at the head of 20,000 men, ready to make a forward movement, and there remained besides the light division under Charles Alten of whose operations it is time to speak. That general, as we have seen, took post on the mountain of Santa Cruz the 27th. From thence on the evening of the 28th he marched to gain Lecumberri on the great road of Irurzun ; but whether by orders from Sir Thomas Graham or

in default of orders, the difficulty of communication being extreme in those wild regions, I know not, he commenced his descent into the valley of Lerins very late. His leading brigade, getting down with some difficulty, reached Leyza beyond the great chain by the pass of Goriti or Zubieta, but darkness caught the other brigade and the troops dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and precipices. Many made faggot torches, waving them as signals, and thus moving about, the lights served indeed to assist those who carried them, but misled and bewildered others who saw them at a distance. The heights and the ravines were alike studded with these small fires, and the soldiers calling to each other for directions filled the whole region with their clamour. Thus they continued to rove and shout until morning showed the face of the mountain covered with tired and scattered men and animals who had not gained half a league of ground beyond their starting place, and it was many hours, ere they could be collected to join the other brigade at Leyza.

General Alten, who had now been separated for three days from the army, sent mounted officers in various directions to obtain tidings, and at six o'clock in the evening renewed his march. At Areysa he halted for some time without suffering fires to be lighted, for he knew nothing of the enemy, and was fearful of discovering his situation; but at night he again moved, and finally established his bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th. The noise of Hill's battle at Buenza was clearly heard in the course of the day, and the light division was thus again comprised in the immediate system of operations directed by Wellington in person. Had Soult continued his march upon Guipuscoa, Alten would have been in great danger; but the French general being forced to retreat, the light division was a new power thrown into his opponent's hands, the value of which will be seen by a reference to the peculiarity of the country through which the French general was now to move.

It has been shown that Foy, cut off from the main army, was driven towards the Alduides; that the French artillery and part of the cavalry were again on the Bidassoa, whence Villatte, contrary to the intelligence received by Soult, had not advanced, though he had skirmished with Longa, leaving the latter, however, in possession of heights above Lesaca. The troops under Soult's immediate command were, therefore, completely isolated, and had no resources save what his ability and their own courage could supply. His single line of retreat by the pass of Doña Maria was secure as far as San Estevan, and from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to Elizondo, and so gain France by the Col de Maya, or down the same river towards Vera, by Sumbilla and Yanzi, from both of which places roads branching off to the right lead over the mountains to the passes of Echallar. There was also a third mountain-road, leading direct from Estevan to Zagaramurdi and Urdax, but it was too steep and rugged for his wounded men and baggage.

The road to Elizondo was very good, but that down the Bidassoa was a long and terrible defile, and so contracted about the bridges of Yanzi and Sumbilla, that a few men only could march abreast. This, then, Soult had to dread: that Wellington, who by the pass of Vellate could reach Elizondo before him, would block his passage on that side; that Graham would occupy the rocks about Yanzi, blocking the passage there, and, by detachments, cut off his line of march upon Echallar. Then, confined to the narrow mountain-way from San Estevan to Zagaramurdi, he would be followed hard by General Hill, exposed to attacks in rear and flank during his march, and perhaps be headed at Urdax by the allied troops moving through Vellate, Elizondo, and the Col de Maya. In this state, his first object being to get through the pass of Doña Maria, he commenced his retreat, as we have seen, in the night of the 30th, and Wellington, still deceived as to the real state of affairs, did not take the most fitting measures to stop his march, that is to say, he continued in his first design, halting in the valley of Lanz, while Hill passed his front, to enter the Bastan, into which district he sent Byng's brigade, as belonging to the second division. But early on the 31st, when Soult's real strength became known, he directed the seventh division to aid Hill, followed Byng through the pass of Vellate with the remainder of his forces, and thinking the light division

might be at Zubieta, in the valley of Lerins, sent Alten orders to head the French, if possible, at San Estevan or at Sumbilla, in fine, to cut in upon their line of march somewhere; Longa also was ordered to come down to the defiles at Yanzi, thus aiding the light division to block the way on that side, and Sir Thomas Graham was advertised to hold his army in readiness to move in the same view, and it would appear that the route of the sixth and third divisions were also changed for a time.

Combat of Doña Maria.—At ten o'clock in the morning of the 31st, General Hill overtook Soult's rear-guard between Lizasso and the Puerto. The seventh division, coming from the hills above Olague, was already ascending the mountain on his right, and the French only gained a wood on the summit of the pass, under the fire of Hill's guns. There, however, they turned, and throwing out their skirmishers, made strong battle. General Stewart, leading the attack of the second division, now for the third time engaged with D'Erlon's troops, was again wounded, and his first brigade was repulsed; but General Pringle, who succeeded to the command, renewed the attack with the second brigade, and the 34th regiment leading, broke the enemy at the moment that the seventh division did the same on the right. Some prisoners were taken, but a thick fog prevented further pursuit, and the loss of the French in the action is unknown, probably less than that of the allies, which was something short of 400 men.

The seventh division remained on the mountain, but Hill fell back to Lizasso, and then, following his orders, moved by a short but rugged way, leading between the passes of Doña Maria and Vellate over the great chain to Almandoz, to join Wellington, who had during the combat descended into the Bastan by the pass of Vellate. Meanwhile Byng reached Elizondo, and captured a large convoy of provisions and ammunition left there under guard of a battalion by D'Erlon on the 29th; he made several hundred prisoners also after a sharp skirmish, and then pushed forward to the pass of Maya. Wellington now occupied the hills through which the road leads from Elizondo to San Estevan, and full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow; for Soult, not being pursued after passing Doña Maria, had halted in San Estevan, although by his scouts he knew that the convoy had been taken at Elizondo. He was in a deep narrow valley, and three British divisions with one of Spaniards were behind the mountains overlooking the town; the seventh division was on the mountain of Doña Maria; the light division and Sir Thomas Graham's Spaniards were marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits from the valley; Byng was already at Maya, and Hill was moving by Almandoz just behind Wellington's own position. A few hours gained, and the French must surrender or disperse. Wellington gave strict orders to prevent the lighting of fires, the straggling of soldiers, or any other indication of the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst some rocks at a commanding point from whence he could observe every movement of the enemy. Soult seemed tranquil, and four of his *gens-d'armes* were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. Some of the staff proposed to cut them off; the English general, whose object was to hide his own presence, would not suffer it, but the next moment three marauding English soldiers entered the valley and were instantly carried off by the horsemen. Half an hour afterwards the French drums beat to arms and their columns began to move out of San Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander of the most splendid success, and saved another from the most terrible disaster.

The captives walked from their prison, but their chains hung upon them. The way was narrow, the multitude great, and the baggage, and wounded men borne on their comrades' shoulders, filed with such long procession, that Clausel's divisions forming the rear-guard were still about San Estevan on the morning of the 1st of August, and scarcely had they marched a league of ground, when the skirmishers of the fourth division and the Spaniards thronging along the heights on the right flank opened a fire to which little reply could be made. The troops and baggage then got mixed with an extreme disorder, numbers of the former fled up the hills, and the commanding energy of Soult whose personal exertions were conspicuous could scarcely prevent a general dispersion. However, prisoners and baggage fell

at every step into the hands of the pursuers, the boldest were dismayed at the peril, and worse would have awaited them in front, if Wellington had been on other points well seconded by his subordinate generals.

The head of the French column instead of taking the first road leading from Sumbilla to Echallar, had passed onward towards that leading from the bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa was on their left, and there was a tributary torrent to cross, the bridge of which was defended by a battalion of Spanish *caçadores* detached to that point from the heights of Vera by General Barceñas. The front was now as much disordered as the rear, and had Longa or Barceñas reinforced the *caçadores*, those only of the French who being near Sumbilla could take the road from that place to Echallar would have escaped; but the Spanish generals kept aloof, and D'Erlon won the defile. However, Reille's divisions were still to pass, and when they came up a new enemy had appeared.

It will be remembered that the light division was directed to head the French army at San Estevan, or Sumbilla. This order was received on the evening of the 31st, and the division, repassing the defiles of the Zubieta, descended the deep valley of Lerins and reached Elgoriaga about mid-day on the 1st of August, having then marched 24 miles and being little more than a league from Estevan and about the same distance from Sumbilla. The movement of the French along the Bidassoa was soon discovered, but the division instead of moving on Sumbilla turned to the left, clambered up the great mountain of Santa Cruz and made for the bridge of Yanzi. The weather was exceedingly sultry, the mountain steep and hard to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled, leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time.

Towards evening, after marching for 19 consecutive hours over 40 miles of mountain roads, the head of the exhausted column reached the edge of a precipice near the bridge of Yanzi. Below, within pistol-shot, Reille's divisions were seen hurrying forward along the horrid defile in which they were pent up, and a fire of musketry commenced, slightly from the British on the high rock, more vigorously from some low ground near the bridge of Yanzi, where the riflemen had ensconced themselves in the brushwood. The scene which followed is thus described by an eye-witness.

"We overlooked the enemy at stone's throw, and from the summit of a tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were wedged in a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side and the river on the other. Confusion impossible to describe followed, the wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echallar, but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded called out for quarter, while others pointed to them, supported as they were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different habitations to aid the sufferers."

On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire, and so piteous was the spectacle that it was with averted or doubtful aim they shot at the others, although the latter rapidly plied their muskets in passing, and some in their veteran hardihood even dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to make a counter-attack. It was a soldier-like but a vain effort! the night found the British in possession of the bridge, and though the great body of the enemy escaped by the road to Echallar, the baggage was cut off and fell, together with many prisoners, into the hands of the light troops which were still hanging on the rear in pursuit from San Estevan.

The loss of the French this day was very great, that of the allies about 200 men, of which 65 were British, principally of the fourth division. Nevertheless Lord Wellington was justly discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor General Alten had fulfilled their mission. The former excused himself as being too feeble to oppose the mass Soult led down the valley; but the rocks were so precipitous that the French could not have reached him, and the resistance made by the Spanish *caçadores* was Longa's condemnation. A lamentable fatuity prevailed in

many quarters. If Barceñas had sent his whole brigade instead of a weak battalion, the small torrent could not have been forced by D'Erlon; and if Longa had been near the bridge of Yanzi the French must have surrendered, for the perpendicular rocks on their right forbade even an escape by dispersion. Finally, if the light division, instead of marching down the valley of Lerins as far as Elgoriaga, had crossed the Santa Cruz mountain by the road used the night of the 28th, it would have arrived much earlier at the bridge of Yanzi, and then belike Longa and Barceñas would also have come down. Alten's instructions indeed prescribed Sumbilla and San Estevan as the first points to head the French army, but judging them too strong at Sumbilla he marched as we have seen upon Yanzi; and if he had passed the bridge there and seized the road to Echallar with one brigade, while the other plied the flank with fire from the left of the Bidassoa, he would have struck a great blow. It was for that the soldiers had made such a prodigious exertion, yet the prize was thrown away.

During the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar, and on the morning of the 2nd occupied the "*Puerto*" of that name. His left was placed at the rocks of Zagaramurdi; his right at the rock of Ivantelly, communicating with the left of Villatte's reserve, which was in position on the ridges between Soult's right and the head of the great Rhune mountain. Meanwhile Clausel's three divisions, now reduced to 6000 men, took post on a strong hill between the "*Puerto*" and town of Echallar. This position was momentarily adopted by Soult to save time, to examine the country, and to make Wellington discover his final object, but that general would not suffer the affront. He had sent the third and sixth divisions to re-occupy the passes of Roncesvalles and the Aldudes; Hill had reached the Col de Maya, and Byng was at Urdax; the fourth, seventh, and light divisions remained in hand, and with these he resolved to fall upon Clausel, whose position was dangerously advanced.

Combats of Echallar and Ivantelly.—The light division held the road running from the bridge of Yanzi to Echallar until relieved by the fourth division, and then marched by Lesaca to Santa Barbara, thus turning Clausel's right. The fourth division marched from Yanzi upon Echallar to attack his front, and the seventh moved from Sumbilla against his left; but Barnes's brigade, contrary to Lord Wellington's intention, arrived unsupported before the fourth and light divisions were either seen or felt, and without awaiting the arrival of more troops assailed Clausel's strong position. The fire became vehement, but neither the steepness of the mountain nor the overshadowing multitude of the enemy clustering above in support of their skirmishers could arrest the assailants, and then was seen the astonishing spectacle of 1500 men driving, by sheer valour and force of arms, 6000 good troops from a position so rugged that there would have been little to boast of if the numbers had been reversed and the defence made good. It is true that the fourth division arrived towards the end of the action, that the French had fulfilled their mission as a rear-guard, that they were worn with fatigue and ill-provided with ammunition, having exhausted all their reserve stores during the retreat, but the real cause of their inferiority belongs to the highest part of war.

The British soldiers, their natural fierceness stimulated by the remarkable personal daring of their general, Barnes, were excited by the pride of success; and the French divisions were those which had failed in the attack on the 28th, which had been utterly defeated on the 30th, and which had suffered so severely the day before about Sumbilla. Such then is the preponderance of moral power. The men who had assailed the terrible rocks above Sauroren, with a force and energy that all the valour of the hardest British veterans scarcely sufficed to repel, were now, only five days afterwards, although posted so strongly, unable to sustain the shock of one-fourth of their own numbers. And at this very time 80 British soldiers, the comrades and equals of those who achieved this wonderful exploit, having wandered to plunder, surrendered to some French peasants, who Lord Wellington truly observed, "*They would under other circumstances have eat up!*" What gross ignorance of human nature then do those writers display who assert, that the employing of brute force is the highest qualification of a general!

Clausel, thus dispossessed of the mountain, fell back fighting to a strong ridge

beyond the pass of Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly mountain which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile the light division emerging by Lesaca from the narrow valley of the Bidassoa, ascended the broad heights of Santa Barbara without opposition, and halted there until the operations of the fourth and seventh divisions were far enough advanced to render it advisable to attack the Ivantelly. This lofty mountain lifted its head on the right, rising as it were out of the Santa Barbara heights, and separating them from the ridges through which the French troops beaten at Echallar were now retiring. Evening was coming on, a thick mist capped the crowning rocks, which contained a strong French regiment, the British soldiers besides their long and terrible march the previous day had been for two days without sustenance, and were leaning, weak and fainting, on their arms, when the advancing fire of Barnes's action about Echallar indicated the necessity of dislodging the enemy from Ivantelly. Colonel Andrew Barnard instantly led five companies of his riflemen to the attack, and four companies of the 43rd followed in support. The misty cloud had descended, and the riflemen were soon lost to the view, but the sharp clang of their weapons heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous rolling musketry of the French, told what work was going on. For some time the echoes rendered it doubtful how the action went, but the following companies of the 43rd could find no trace of an enemy save the killed and wounded. Barnard had fought his way unaided and without a check to the summit, where his dark-clothed swarthy veterans raised their victorious shout from the highest peak, just as the coming night showed the long ridges of the mountains beyond sparkling with the last musket-flashes from Clausel's troops retiring in disorder from Echallar.

This day's fighting cost the British 400 men, and Lord Wellington narrowly escaped the enemy's hands. He had carried with him towards Echallar half a company of the 43rd as an escort, and placed a sergeant named Blood with a party to watch in front while he examined his maps. The French who were close at hand sent a detachment to cut the party off; and such was the nature of the ground that their troops, rushing on at speed, would infallibly have fallen unawares upon Lord Wellington, if Blood, a young intelligent man, seeing the danger, had not with surprising activity, leaping rather than running down the precipitous rocks he was posted on, given the general notice, and as it was the French arrived in time to send a volley of shot after him as he galloped away.

Soult now caused Count D'Erlon to re-occupy the hills about Ainhoa, Clausel to take post on the heights in advance of Sarre, and Reille to carry his two divisions to St. Jean de Luz in second line behind Villatte's reserve. Foy, who had rashly uncovered St. Jean Pied de Port by descending upon Cambo, was ordered to return and reinforce his troops with all that he could collect of national guards and detachments.

Wellington had on the 1st directed General Graham to collect his forces and bring up pontoons for crossing the Bidassoa, but he finally abandoned this design, and the two armies therefore rested quiet in their respective positions, after nine days of continual movement during which they had fought ten serious actions. Of the allies, including the Spaniards, 7300 officers and soldiers had been killed wounded or taken, and many were dispersed from fatigue or to plunder. On the French side the loss was terrible and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate. Nevertheless a close approximation may be made. Lord Wellington at first called it 12,000, but hearing that the French officers admitted more he raised his estimate to 15,000. The engineer, *Belmas*, in his "*Journals of Sieges*," compiled from official documents by order of the French government, sets down above 13,000. Soult in his despatches at the time, stated 1500 as the loss at Maya, 400 at Roncesvalles, 200 on the 27th, and 1800 on the 28th, after which he speaks no more of losses by battle. There remains therefore to be added the killed and wounded at the combats of Linzoain on the 26th, the double battles of Sauroren and Buzena on the 30th, the combats of the 31st, and those of the 1st and 2nd of August; finally, 4000 unwounded prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to sound the stream of blood in all its horrid depths.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The allies' line of defence was weak. Was it therefore injudiciously adopted?

The French beaten at Vittoria were disorganized and retreated without artillery or baggage on excentric lines ; Foy by Guipuscoa, Clausel by Zaragoza, Reille by San Estevan, the King by Pampeluna. There was no reserve to rally upon, the people fled from the frontier, Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port if not defenceless were certainly in a very neglected state, and the English general might have undertaken any operation, assumed any position, offensive or defensive, which seemed good to him. Why then did he not establish the Anglo-Portuguese beyond the mountains, leaving the Spaniards to blockade the fortresses behind him? The answer to this question involves the difference between the practice and the theory of war.

"The soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting themselves after the battle dispersed in the night to plunder, and were so fatigued that when the rain came on the next day they were incapable of marching and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy. Eighteen days after the victory 12,500 men, chiefly British, were absent, most of them marauding in the mountains."

Such were the reasons assigned by the English general for his slack pursuit after the battle of Vittoria, yet he had commanded that army for six years ! Was he then deficient in the first qualification of a general, the art of disciplining and inspiring troops, or was the English military system defective? It is certain that he always exacted the confidence of his soldiers as a leader. It is not so certain that he ever gained their affections. The barbarity of the English military code excited public horror, the inequality of promotion created public discontent ; yet the general complained he had no adequate power to reward or punish, and he condemned alike the system and the soldiers it produced. The latter *"were detestable for everything but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the men."* The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent with his celebrated observation, subsequently made, namely, "that he thought he could go anywhere and do anything with the army that fought on the Pyrenees," and although it cannot be denied that his complaints were generally too well founded, there were thousands of true and noble soldiers, and zealous worthy officers, who served their country honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough that they have been since neglected, exactly in proportion to their want of that corrupt aristocratic influence which produced the evils complained of.

2. When the misconduct of the troops had thus weakened the effect of victory, the question of following Joseph at once into France assumed a new aspect. Wellington's system of warfare had never varied after the battle of Talavera. Rejecting dangerous enterprise, it rested on profound calculation both as to time and resources for the accomplishment of a particular object, namely, the gradual liberation of Spain by the Anglo-Portuguese army. Not that he held it impossible to attain that object suddenly, and his battles in India, the passage of the Douro, the advance to Talavera, prove that by nature he was inclined to daring operations ; but such efforts, however glorious, could not be adopted by a commander who feared even the loss of a brigade lest the government he served should put an end to the war. Neither was it suitable to the state of his relations with the Portuguese and Spaniards : their ignorance, jealousy, and passionate pride, fierce in proportion to their weakness and improvidence, would have enhanced every danger.

No man could have anticipated the extraordinary errors of the French in 1813. Wellington did not expect to cross the Ebro before the end of the campaign, and his battering train was prepared for the siege of Burgos not for that of Bayonne. A sudden invasion of France, her military reputation considered, was therefore quite out of the pale of his methodized system of warfare, which was founded upon political as well as military considerations ; and of the most complicated nature, seeing that he had at all times to deal with the personal and factious interests and passions, as well as the great state interests of three distinct nations, two of which abhorred each other. At this moment also, the uncertain state of affairs in Germany strongly influenced his views. An armistice which might end in a separate peace excluding England would have brought Napoleon's whole force to the Pyrenees, and Wellington held cheap both the military and political proceedings of the coalesced powers. *"I would not move a corporal's guard in reliance upon such a system,"* was the significant phrase he employed to express his contempt.

These considerations justified his caution as to invading France, but there were local military reasons equally cogent. 1st. He could not dispense with a secure harbour, because the fortresses still in possession of the French, namely, Santona, Pancorbo, Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, interrupted his communications with the interior of Spain; hence the siege of the latter place. 2nd. He had to guard against the union of Suchet and Clausel on his right flank; hence his efforts to cut off the last named general; hence also the blockade of Pampeluna in preference to siege, and the launching of Mina and the bands on the side of Zaragoza.

3. After Vittoria the nature of the campaign depended upon Suchet's operations, which were rendered more important by Murray's misconduct. The allied force on the eastern coast was badly organized, it did not advance from Valencia as we have seen until the 16th, and then only partially and by the coast, whereas Suchet had assembled more than 20,000 excellent troops on the Ebro as early as the 12th of July; and had he continued his march upon Zaragoza he would have saved the castle of that place with its stores. Then rallying Paris's division, he could have menaced Wellington's flank with 25,000 men, exclusive of Clausel's force, and if that general joined him, with 40,000.

On the 16th, the day Lord William Bentinck quitted Valencia, Suchet might have marched from Zaragoza on Tudela or Sanguessa, and Soult's preparations, originally made as we have seen to attack on the 23rd instead of the 25th, would have naturally been hastened. How difficult it would then have been for the allies to maintain themselves beyond the Ebro is evident, much more so to hold a forward position in France. That Wellington feared an operation of this nature is clear from his instructions to Lord William Bentinck and to Mina; and because Picton's and Cole's divisions, instead of occupying the passes, were kept behind the mountains solely to watch Clausel; when the latter had regained the frontier of France Cole was permitted to join Byng and Morillo. It follows that the operations after the battle of Vittoria were well considered and consonant to Lord Wellington's general system. Their wisdom would have been proved if Suchet had seized the advantages within his reach.

4. A general's capacity is sometimes more taxed to profit from a victory than to gain one. Wellington, master of all Spain, Catalonia excepted, desired to establish himself solidly in the Pyrenees, lest a separate peace in Germany should enable Napoleon to turn his whole force against the allies. In this expectation, with astonishing exertion of body and mind, he had in three days achieved a rigorous examination of the whole mass of the Western Pyrenees, and concluded that if Pampeluna and San Sebastian fell, a defensive position as strong as that of Portugal, and a much stronger one than could be found behind the Ebro, might be established. But to invest those places and maintain so difficult a covering line was a greater task than to win the battle of Vittoria. However, the early fall of San Sebastian he expected, because the errors of execution in that siege could not be foreseen, and also for gain of time he counted upon the disorganized state of the French army, upon Joseph's want of military capacity, and upon the moral ascendancy which his own troops had acquired over the enemy by their victories. He could not anticipate the expeditious journey, the sudden arrival of Soult, whose rapid reorganization of the French army, and whose vigorous operations, contrasted with Joseph's abandonment of Spain, illustrated the old Greek saying, that a herd of deer led by a lion are more dangerous than a herd of lions led by a deer.

5. The Duke of Dalmatia was little beholden to fortune at the commencement of his movements. Her first contradiction was the bad weather, which breaking up the roads delayed the concentration of his army at St. Jean Pied de Port for two days; all officers know the effect which heavy rain and hard marches have upon the vigour and confidence of soldiers who are going to attack. If Soult had commenced on the 23rd instead of the 25th the surprise would have been more complete, his army more brisk; and as no conscript battalions would have arrived to delay Reille, that general would probably have been more ready in his attack, and might possibly have escaped the fog which on the 26th stopped his march along the superior crest of the mountain towards Vellate. On the other hand the allies would have been spared the unsuccessful assault on San Sebastian, and the pass of Maya might have

been better furnished with troops. However, Soult's combinations were so well knit that more than one error in execution, and more than one accident of fortune, were necessary to baffle him. Had Count D'Erlon followed his instructions even on the 26th, General Hill would probably have been shouldered off the valley of Lanz, and Soult would have had 20,000 additional troops in the combats of the 27th and 28th. Such failures however generally attend extensively combined movements, and it is by no means certain that the count would have been able to carry the position of the Col de Maya on the 25th, if all General Stewart's forces had been posted there. It would therefore perhaps have been more strictly within the rules of art, if D'Erlon had been directed to leave one of his three divisions to menace the Col de Maya while he marched with the other two by St. Etienne de Baygorry up the Alduides. This movement, covered by the national guards who occupied the mountain of La Houssa, could not have been stopped by Campbell's Portuguese brigade, and would have dislodged Hill from the Bastan while it secured the junction of D'Erlon with Soult on the crest of the superior chain.

6. The intrepid constancy with which Byng and Ross defended their several positions on the 25th, the able and clean retreat made by General Cole as far as the heights of Linzoain, gave full effect to the errors of Reille and D'Erlon, and would probably have baffled Soult at an early period if General Picton had truly comprehended the importance of his position. Lord Wellington says that the concentration of the army would have been effected on the 27th if that officer and General Cole had not agreed in thinking it impossible to make a stand behind Linzoain; and surely the necessity of retreating on that day may be questioned. For if Cole with 10,000 men maintained the position in front of Altobiscar, Ibañeta, and Atalosti, Picton might have maintained the more contracted one behind Linzoain and Erro with 20,000. And that number he could have assembled, because Campbell's Portuguese reached Eugui long before the evening of the 26th, and Lord Wellington had directed O'Donnel to keep 3500 of the blockading troops in readiness to act in advance, of which Picton could not have been ignorant. It was impossible to turn him by the valley of Urroz, that line being too rugged for the march of an army and not leading directly upon Pampeluna. The only roads into the Val de Zubiri were by Erro and Linzoain, lying close together and both leading upon the village of Zubiri over the ridges which Picton occupied, and the strength of which was evident from Soult's declining an attack on the evening of the 26th when Cole only was before him. To abandon this ground so hastily when the concentration of the army depended upon keeping it, appears therefore an error, aggravated by the neglect of sending timely information to the commander-in-chief, for Lord Wellington did not know of the retreat until the morning of the 27th and then only from General Long. It might be that Picton's messenger failed, but many should have been sent when a retrograde movement involving the fate of Pampeluna was contemplated.

It has been said that General Cole was the adviser of this retreat which if completed would have ruined Lord Wellington's campaign. This is incorrect, Picton was not a man to be guided by others. General Cole indeed gave him a report, drawn up by Colonel Bell, one of the ablest staff-officers of the army, which stated that no position suitable for a very inferior force existed between Zubiri and Pampeluna, and this was true in the sense of the report, which had reference only to a division not to an army; moreover, although the actual battle of Sauroren was fought by inferior numbers, the whole position, including the ridges of the second line occupied by Picton and the Spaniards, was only maintained by equal numbers; and if Soult had made the attack of the 28th, on the evening of the 27th before the sixth division arrived, the position would have been carried. However there is no doubt that Colonel Bell's report influenced Picton, and it was only when his troops had reached Huarte and Villalba that he suddenly resolved on battle. That was a military resolution, vigorous and prompt; and not the less worthy of praise that he so readily adopted Cole's saving proposition to regain the more forward heights above Zabaldica.

7. Marshal Soult appeared unwilling to attack on the evenings of the 26th and 27th. Yet success depended upon forestalling the allies at their point of concentration; and it is somewhat inexplicable that on the 28th, having possession of the

ridge beyond the Lanz river and plenty of cavalry, he should have known so little of the sixth division's movements. The general conception of his scheme on the 30th has also been blamed by some of his own countrymen, apparently from ignorance of the facts and because it failed. Crowned with success it would have been cited as a fine illustration of the art of war. To have retired at once by the two valleys of Zubiri and Lanz after being reinforced with 20,000 men would have given great importance to his repulse on the 28th; his reputation as a general capable of restoring the French affairs would have vanished, and mischief only have accrued, even though he should have effected his retreat safely, which, regard being had to the narrowness of the valleys, the position of General Hill on his right, and the boldness of his adversary, was not certain. To abandon the valley of Zubiri and secure that of Lanza; to obtain another and shorter line of retreat by the Doña Maria pass; to crush General Hill with superior numbers, and thus gaining the Irurzun road to succour San Sebastian, or failing of that, to secure the union of the whole army and give to his retreat the appearance of an able offensive movement; to combine all these chances by one operation immediately after a severe check was Soult's plan, it was not impracticable and was surely the conception of a great commander.

To succeed however it was essential either to beat General Hill off-hand and thus draw Wellington to that side by the way of Marcalain, or to secure the defence of the French left in such a solid manner that no efforts against it should prevail to the detriment of the offensive movement on the right: neither was effected. The French general indeed brought an overwhelming force to bear upon Hill, and drove him from the road of Irurzun, but he did not crush him, because that general fought so strongly and retired with such good order, that beyond the loss of the position no injury was sustained. Meanwhile the left wing of the French was completely beaten, and thus the advantage gained on the right was more than nullified. Soult trusted to the remarkable defensive strength of the ground occupied by his left, and he had reason to do so, for it was nearly impregnable. Lord Wellington turned it on both flanks at the same time, but neither Picton's advance into the valley of Zubiri on Foy's left, nor Cole's front attack on that general, nor Byng's assault upon the village of Sauron, would have seriously damaged the French without the sudden and complete success of General Inglis beyond the Lanz. The other attacks would indeed have forced the French to retire somewhat hastily up the valley of the Lanz, yet they could have held together in mass, secure of their junction with Soult. But when the ridges running between them and the right wing of the French army were carried by Inglis, and the whole of the seventh division was thrown upon their flank and rear, the front attack became decisive. It is clear therefore that the key of the defence was on the ridge beyond the Lanz, and instead of two regiments Clausel should have placed two divisions there.

8. Lord Wellington's quick perception and vigorous stroke on the 30th were to be expected from such a consummate commander, yet he certainly was not master of all the bearings of the French general's operations; he knew neither the extent of Hill's danger nor the difficulties of Soult, otherwise it is probable that he would have put stronger columns in motion, and at an earlier hour, towards the pass of Doña Maria on the morning of the 31st. Hill did not commence his march that day until 8 o'clock, and it has been shown that even with the help of the seventh division he was too weak against the heavy mass of the retreating French army. The faults and accidents which baffled Wellington's after operations have been sufficiently touched upon in the narrative, but he halted in the midst of his victorious career, when Soult's army was broken and flying, when Suchet had retired into Catalonia, and all things seemed favourable for the invasion of France.

His motives for this were strong. He knew the armistice in Germany had been renewed with a view to peace, and he had therefore reason to expect Soult would be reinforced. A forward position in France would have lent his right to the enemy who pivoted upon St. Jean Pied de Port, could operate against his flank. His arrangements for supply, and intercourse with his depôts and hospitals, would have been more difficult and complicated, and as the enemy possessed all the

French and Spanish fortresses commanding the great roads, his need to gain one, at least, before the season closed, was absolute if he would not resign his communications with the interior of Spain. Then long marches and frequent combats had fatigued his troops, destroyed their shoes, and used up their musket ammunition; and the loss of men had been great, especially of British in the second division where their proportion to foreign troops was become too small. The difficulty of re-equipping the troops would have been increased by entering an enemy's state; because the English system did not make war support war and his communications would have been lengthened. Finally it was France that was to be invaded, France in which every person was a soldier, where the whole population was armed and organized under men, not as in other countries inexperienced in war but who had all served more or less. Beyond the Adour the army could not advance, and if a separate peace was made by the northern powers, if any misfortune befel the allies in Catalonia, so as to leave Suchet at liberty to operate towards Pampeluna, or if Soult, profiting from the possession of San Jean Pied de Port, should turn the right flank of the new position, a retreat into Spain would become necessary, and however short would be dangerous from the hostility and warlike disposition of the people directed in a military manner.

These reasons, joined to the fact that a forward position, although offering better communications from right to left, would have given the enemy greater facilities for operating against an army which must until the fortresses fell hold a defensive and somewhat extended line, were conclusive as to the rashness of an invasion; but they do not appear so conclusive as to the necessity of stopping short after the action of the 2nd of August. The questions were distinct. The one was a great measure involving vast political and military conditions, the other was simply whether Wellington should profit of his own victory and the enemy's distresses; and in this view the objections above-mentioned, save the want of shoes, the scarcity of ammunition, and the fatigue of the troops, are inapplicable. But in the two last particulars the allies were not so badly off as the enemy, and in the first not so deficient as to cripple the army, wherefore if the advantage to be gained was worth the effort it was an error to halt.

The solution of this problem is to be found in the comparative condition of the armies. Soult had recovered his reserve, his cavalry, and artillery, but Wellington was reinforced by General Graham's corps which was more numerous and powerful than Villatte's reserve. The new chances then were for the allies, and the action of the 2nd of August demonstrated that their opponents however strongly posted could not stand before them; one more victory would have gone nigh to destroy the French force altogether; for such was the disorder that Maucune's division had on the 2nd only 1000 men left out of more than 5000, and on the 6th it had still 1000 stragglers besides killed and wounded: Conroux's and La Martinière's divisions were scarcely in better plight, and the losses of the other divisions although less remarkable were great. It must also be remembered that General Foy with 8000 men was cut off from the main body; and the Nivelles, the sources of which were in the allies' power, was behind the French. With their left pressed from the pass of Maya, and their front vigorously assailed by the main body of the allies, they could hardly have kept together, since more than 21,000 men exclusive of Foy's troops were then absent from their colours. And as late as the 12th of August Soult warned the minister of war that he was indeed preparing to assail his enemy again, but he had not the means of resisting a counter-attack, although he held a different language to his army and to the people of the country.*

Had Cæsar halted because his soldiers were fatigued, Pharsalia would have been but a common battle.

* Appendix, No. 25.

BOOK XXII.

CHAPTER I.

AFTER the combat of Echallar, Soult adopted a permanent position and reorganized his army. The left wing under D'Erlon occupied the hills of Ainhua, with an advanced guard on the heights overlooking Urdax and Zugaramurdi. The centre under Clausel was in advance of Sarre, guarding the issues from Vera and Echallar, his right resting on the greatest of the Rhune mountains. The right wing under Reille, composed of Maucune's and La Martinière's divisions, extended along the Lower Bidassoa to the sea; Villatte's reserve was encamped behind the Nivelle near Serres, and Reille's third division, under Foy, covered in conjunction with the national guards, St. Jean Pied de Port and the roads leading into France on that side. The cavalry for the convenience of forage were quartered, one division between the Nive and the Nivelle rivers, the other as far back as Dax.

Lord Wellington occupied his old positions from the pass of Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa, but the disposition of his troops was different. Sir Rowland Hill, reinforced by Morillo, held the Roncesvalles and Aldudes throwing up field-works at the former. The third and sixth divisions were in the Bastan guarding the Puerto de Maya, and the seventh division, reinforced by O'Donnel's army of reserve, occupied the passes at Echallar and Zugaramurdi. The light division was posted on the Santa Barbara heights, having picquets in the town of Vera; their left rested on the Bidassoa, their right on the Ivantelly rock, round which a bridge communication with Echallar was now made by the labour of the soldiers. Longa's troops were beyond the Bidassoa on the left of the light division; the fourth division was in reserve behind him, near Lesaca; the fourth Spanish army, now commanded by General Freyre, prolonged the line from the left of Longa to the sea; it crossed the royal causeway, occupied Irun and Fontarabia, and guarded the Jaizquibel mountain. The first division was in reserve behind these Spaniards; the fifth division was destined to resume the siege of San Sebastian; the blockade of Pampeluna was maintained by Carlos d'España's troops.

This disposition, made with increased means, was more powerful for defence than the former occupation of the same ground. A strong corps under a single command was well entrenched at Roncesvalles; and in the Bastan two British divisions, admonished by Stewart's error, were more than sufficient to defend the Puerto de Maya. The Echallar mountains were with the aid of O'Donnel's Spaniards equally secure, and the reserve instead of occupying San Estevan was posted near Lesaca in support of the left, now become the most important part of the line.

The castles of Zaragoza and Daroca had fallen, the Empecinado was directed upon Alcanitz and he maintained the communication between the Catalan army and Mina. The latter, now joined by Duran, was gathering near Jaca, from whence his line of retreat was by Sanguessa upon Pampeluna; in this position he menaced General Paris, who marched after a slight engagement on the 11th into France, leaving 800 men in the town and castle. At this time Lord William Bentinck having crossed the Ebro was investing Taragona, and thus the allies, acting on the offensive, were in direct military communication from the Mediterranean to the Bay of Biscay, while Suchet, though holding the fortresses, could only communicate with Soult through France.

This last-named marshal, being strongly posted, did not much expect a front attack, but the augmentation of the allies on the side of Roncesvalles and Maya gave him uneasiness, lest they should force him to abandon his position by operating

along the Nive river. To meet this danger General Paris took post at Oleron in second line to Foy, and the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navareins were put in a state of defence as pivots of operation on that side, while Bayonne served a like purpose on the other flank of the army. But with great diligence the French general fortified his line from the mouth of the Bidassoa to the rocks of Mondarain and the Nive.

Lord Wellington, whose reasons for not invading France at this period have been already noticed, and who had now little to fear from any renewal of the French operations against his right wing, turned his whole attention to the reduction of San Sebastian. In this object he was however crossed in a manner to prove that the English ministers were the very counterparts of the Spanish and Portuguese statesmen. Lord Melville was at the head of the board of admiralty; under his rule the navy of England for the first time met with disasters in battle, and his neglect of the general's demands for maritime aid went nigh to fasten the like misfortunes upon the army. This neglect, combined with the cabinet scheme of employing Lord Wellington in Germany, would seem to prove that experience had taught the English ministers nothing as to the nature of the Peninsular war, or that elated with the array of sovereigns against Napoleon they were now careless of a cause so mixed up with democracy. Still it would be incredible that Lord Melville, a man of ordinary capacity, should have been suffered to retard the great designs and endanger the final success of a general, whose sure judgment and extraordinary merit were authenticated by exploits unparalleled in English warfare, if Lord Wellington's correspondence and that of Mr. Stuart did not establish the following facts.

1. Desertion from the enemy was stopped, chiefly because the Admiralty, of which Lord Melville was the head, refused to let the ships of war carry deserters or prisoners to England; they were thus heaped up by hundreds at Lisbon and maltreated by the Portuguese government, which checked all desire in the French troops to come over.

2. When the disputes with America commenced, Mr. Stuart's efforts to obtain flour for the army were most vexatiously thwarted by the board of admiralty, which permitted if it did not encourage the English ships of war to capture American vessels trading under the secret licenses.

3. The refusal of the admiralty to establish certain cruisers along the coast, as recommended by Lord Wellington, caused the loss of many store-ships and merchantmen, to the great detriment of the army before it quitted Portugal. Fifteen were taken off Oporto, and one close to the bar of Lisbon in May.* And afterwards, the Mediterranean packet bearing despatches from Lord William Bentinck was captured, which led to lamentable consequences; for the papers were not in cypher, and contained detailed accounts of plots against the French in Italy, with the names of the principal persons engaged.

4. A like neglect of the coast of Spain caused ships containing money, shoes, and other indispensable stores to delay in port, or risk the being taken on the passage by cruisers issuing from Santona, Bayonne, and Bordeaux. And while the communications of the allies were thus intercepted, the French coasting vessels supplied their army and fortresses without difficulty.

5. After the battle of Vittoria Lord Wellington was forced to use French ammunition, though too small for the English muskets, because the ordnance store-ships which he had ordered from Lisbon to Santander could not sail for want of convoy. When the troops were in the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of 5000 men was kept at Gibraltar and Lisbon waiting for ships of war, and the transports employed to convey them were thus withdrawn from the service of carrying home wounded men, at a time when the Spanish authorities at Bilbao refused even for payment to concede public buildings for hospitals.

6. When snow was falling on the Pyrenees the soldiers were without proper clothing, because the ship containing their great coats, though ready to sail in August, was detained at Oporto until November waiting for convoy. When the victories of July were to be turned to profit ere the fitting season for the siege of

* Appendix, No. 23.

San Sebastian should pass away, the attack of that fortress was retarded 16 days, because a battering train and ammunition, demanded several months before by Lord Wellington, had not yet arrived from England.

7. During the siege the sea communication with Bayonne was free. "Anything in the shape of a naval force," said Lord Wellington, "would drive away Sir George Collier's squadron." The garrison received reinforcements, artillery ammunition, and all necessary stores for its defence, sending away the sick and wounded men in empty vessels. The Spanish general blockading Santona complained at the same time that the exertions of his troops were useless, because the French succoured the place by sea when they pleased; and after the battle of Vittoria not less than five vessels laden with stores and provisions, and one transport having British soldiers and clothing on board, were taken by cruisers issuing out of that port. The great advantage of attacking San Sebastian by water as well as by land was foregone for want of naval means, and from the same cause British soldiers were withdrawn from their own service to unload store-ships; the gun-boats employed in the blockade were Spanish vessels manned by Spanish soldiers withdrawn from the army, and the store-boats were navigated by Spanish women.

8. The coasting trade between Bordeaux and Bayonne being quite free, the French, whose military means of transport had been so crippled by their losses at Vittoria that they could scarcely have collected magazines for land carriage only, received their supplies by water, and were thus saved trouble and expense, and the unpopularity attending forced requisitions.

Between April and August, more than 20 applications and remonstrances were addressed by Lord Wellington to the government upon these points, without producing the slightest attention to his demands. Mr. Croker, the under-secretary of the Admiralty, of whose conduct he particularly complained, was indeed permitted to write an official offensive letter to him, but his demands and the dangers to be apprehended from neglecting them were disregarded, and to use his own words, "*since Great Britain had been a naval power a British army had never before been left in such a situation at a most important moment.*"

Nor is it easy to determine whether negligence and incapacity, or a grovelling sense of national honour, prevailed most in the cabinet, when we find this renowned general complaining that the government, ignorant even to ridicule of military operations, seemed to know nothing of the nature of the element with which England was surrounded, and Lord Melville, so insensible to the glorious toils of the Peninsula, as to tell him that his army was the last thing to be attended to.

RENEWED SIEGE OF SEBASTIAN.

Villatte's demonstration against Longa, on the 28th of July, caused the ships laden with the battering train to put to sea, but on the 5th of August the guns were re-landed and the works against the fortress resumed. On the 8th, a notion having spread that the enemy was mining under the cask redoubt, the engineers seized the occasion to exercise their inexperienced miners by sinking a shaft and driving a gallery. The men soon acquired expertness, and as the water rose in the shaft at 12 feet, the work was discontinued when the gallery had attained 80 feet. Meanwhile the old trenches were repaired, the heights of San Bartolomeo were strengthened, and the convent of Antigua, built on a rock to the left of those heights, was fortified and armed with two guns to scour the open beach and sweep the bay. The siege, however, languished for want of ammunition; and during this forced inactivity the garrison received supplies and reinforcements by sea, their damaged works were repaired, new defences constructed, the magazines filled, and 67 pieces of artillery put in a condition to play. Eight hundred and fifty men had been killed and wounded since the commencement of the attack in July, but as fresh men came by sea, more than 2600 good soldiers were still present under arms. And to show that their confidence was unabated, they celebrated the emperor's birthday by crowning the castle with a splendid illumination; encircling it with a fiery legend to his honour in characters so large as to be distinctly read by the besiegers.

On the 19th of August, that is to say after a delay of 16 days, the battering train

arrived from England, and in the night of the 22nd 15 heavy pieces were placed in battery, eight at the right attack, and seven at the left. A second battering train came on the 23rd, augmenting the number of pieces of various kinds to 117, including a large Spanish mortar; but with characteristic negligence this enormous armament had been sent out from England with no more shot and shells than would suffice for one day's consumption!

In the night of the 23rd the batteries on the Chofre sand-hills were reinforced with four long pieces and four 68-pound carronades, and the left attack with six additional guns. Ninety sappers and miners had come with the train from England, the seamen under Mr. O'Reilly were again attached to the batteries, and part of the field artillerymen were brought to the siege.

On the 24th the attack was recommenced with activity. The Chofre batteries were enlarged to contain 48 pieces, and two batteries for 13 pieces were begun on the heights of Bartolomeo, designed to breach at 700 yards distance the faces of the left demi-bastion of the horn-work, that of St. John on the main front, and the end of the high curtain, for these works rising in gradation one above another were in the same line of shot. The approaches on the isthmus were now also pushed forward by the sap, but the old trenches were still imperfect, and before daylight on the 25th the French coming from the horn-work swept the left of the parallel, injured the sap, and made some prisoners before they were repulsed.

On the night of the 25th the batteries were all armed on both sides of the Urumea, and on the 26th 57 pieces opened with a general salvo, and continued to play with astounding noise and rapidity until evening. The firing from the Chofre hills destroyed the revêtement of the demi-bastion of St. John, and nearly ruined the towers near the old breach together with the wall connecting them; but at the isthmus the batteries although they injured the horn-work, made little impression on the main front, from which they were too distant.

Lord Wellington, present at this attack and discontented with the operation, now ordered a battery for six guns to be constructed amongst some ruined houses on the right of the parallel, only 300 yards from the main front, and two shafts were sunk with a view to drive galleries for the protection of this new battery against the enemy's mines, but the work was slow because of the sandy nature of the soil.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 27th the boats of the squadron, commanded by Lieutenant Arbuthnot of the *Surveillante*, and carrying 100 soldiers of the 9th regiment under Captain Cameron, pulled to attack the island of Santa Clara. A heavy fire was opened on them, and the troops landed with some difficulty, but the island was then easily taken and a lodgment made with the loss of only 28 men and officers, of which 18 were seamen.

In the night of the 27th, about three o'clock, the French sallied against the new battery on the isthmus, but as Colonel Cameron of the 9th regiment met them on the very edge of the trenches with the bayonet the attempt failed, yet it delayed the arming of the battery. At daybreak the renewed fire of the besiegers, especially that from the Chofres sand-hills, was extremely heavy, and the shrapnel shells were supposed to be very destructive; nevertheless the practice with that missile was very uncertain, the bullets frequently flew amongst the guards in the parallel and one struck the field-officer. In the course of the day another sally was commenced, but the enemy being discovered and fired upon did not persist. The trenches were now furnished with banquettes and parapets as fast as the quantity of gabions and fascines would permit, yet the work was slow, because the Spanish authorities of Guipuscoa, like those in every other part of Spain, neglected to provide carts to convey the materials from the woods, and this hard labour was performed by the Portuguese soldiers. It would seem however an error not to have prepared all the materials of this nature during the blockade.

Lord Wellington again visited the works this day, and in the night the advanced battery, which, at the desire of Sir Richard Fletcher had been constructed for only four guns, was armed. The 29th it opened, but an accident had prevented the arrival of one gun, and the fire of the enemy soon dismounted another, so that only two instead of six guns as Lord Wellington had designed, smote at short range the

face of the demi-bastion of St. John and the end of the high curtain; however the general firing was severe both upon the castle and the town-works and great damage was done to the defences. By this time the French guns were nearly silenced and as additional mortars were mounted on the Chofre batteries, making in all 63 pieces of which 29 threw shells or spherical case-shot, the superiority of the besiegers was established.

The Urumea was now discovered to be fordable. Captain Alexander Macdonald of the artillery, without orders, waded across in the night passed close under the works to the breach and returned safely. Wherefore as a few minutes would suffice to bring the enemy into the Chofre batteries, to save the guns from being spiked, their vents were covered with iron plates fastened by chains; and this was also done at the advanced battery on the isthmus.

This day the materials and ordnance for a battery of six pieces, to take the defences of the Monte Orgullo in reverse, were sent to the island of Santa Clara; and several guns in the Chofre batteries were turned upon the retaining wall of the horn-work, in the hope of shaking down any mines the enemy might have prepared there, without destroying the wall itself which offered cover for the troops advancing to the assault.

The trenches leading from the parallel on the isthmus were now very wide and good, the sap was pushed on the right close to the demi-bastion of the horn-work, and the sea-wall supporting the high road into the town, which had increased the march and cramped the formation of the columns in the first assault, was broken through to give access to the strand and shorten the approach to the breaches. The crisis was at hand, and in the night of the 29th a false attack was ordered to make the enemy spring his mines; a desperate service and bravely executed by Lieutenant Macadam, of the 9th regiment. The order was sudden, no volunteers were demanded, no rewards offered, no means of excitement resorted to; yet such is the inherent bravery of British soldiers, that 17 men of the royals; the nearest at hand, immediately leaped forth ready and willing to encounter what seemed certain death. With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries playing hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach unperceived, and then mounted in extended order shouting and firing; but the French were too steady to be imposed upon and their musketry laid the whole party low with the exception of their commander, who returned alone to the trenches.

On the 30th, the sea flank of the place being opened from the half-bastion of St. John on the right, to the most distant of the old breaches, that is to say, for 500 feet, the batteries on the Chofres were turned against the castle and other defences of the Monte Orgullo, while the advanced battery on the isthmus, now containing three guns, demolished, in conjunction with the fire from the Chofres, the face of the half-bastion of St. John's, and the end of the high curtain above it. The whole of that quarter was in ruins, and at the same time the batteries on San Bartolomeo broke the face of the demi-bastion of the horn-work, and cut away the palisades.

The 30th the batteries continued their fire, and about three o'clock Lord Wellington, after examining the enemy's defence, resolved to make a lodgment on the breach, and in that view, ordered the assault to be made the next day at 11 o'clock, when the ebb of tide would leave full space between the hornwork and the water.

The galleries in front of the advanced battery on the isthmus were now pushed close up to the sea wall, under which three mines were formed, with the double view of opening a short and easy way for the troops to reach the strand, and rendering useless any subterranean works the enemy might have made in that part. At two o'clock in the morning of the 31st they were sprung, and opened three wide passages, which were immediately connected, and a traverse of gabions, six feet high, was run across the mouth of the main trench on the left, to screen the opening from the grape-shot of the castle. Everything was now ready for the assault; but before describing that terrible event, it will be fitting to show the exact state of the besieged in defence.

Sir Thomas Graham had been before the place for 52 days, during 30 of

which the attack was suspended. All this time the garrison had laboured incessantly, and though the heavy fire of the besiegers since the 26th appeared to have ruined the defences of the enormous breach in the sea flank, it was not so. A perpendicular fall behind of more than 20 feet barred progress, and beyond that, amongst the ruins of the burned houses, was a strong counter-wall 15 feet high, loopholed for musketry, and extending in a parallel direction with the breaches, which were also cut off from the sound part of the rampart by traverses at the extremities. The only really practicable road into the town was by the narrow end of the high curtain above the half-bastion of St. John.

In front of the counter-wall, about the middle of the great breach, stood the tower of Los Hornos, still capable of some defence, and beneath it a mine, charged with 12 hundred-weight of powder. The streets were all trenched, and furnished with traverses, to dispute the passage and to cover a retreat to the Monte Orgullo; but before the assailants could reach the main breach, it was necessary either to form a lodgment in the horn-work, or to pass, as in the former assault, under a flanking fire of musketry for a distance of nearly 200 yards. And the first step was close under the sea-wall, covering the salient angle of the covered way, where two mines, charged with 800 pounds of powder, were prepared to overwhelm the advancing columns.

To support this system of retrenchments and mines the French had still some artillery in reserve. One 16-pounder mounted at St. Elmo flanked the left of the breaches on the river face; a 12 and an 8-pounder preserved in the casemates of the cavalier were ready to flank the land face of the half-bastion of St. John; many guns from the Monte Orgullo, especially those of the Mirador, could play upon the columns, and there was a 4-pounder hidden on the horn-work, to be brought into action when the assault commenced. Neither the resolution of the governor nor the courage of the garrison were abated, but the overwhelming fire of the last few days had reduced the number of fighting men; General Rey had only 250 men in reserve, and he demanded of Soult whether his brave garrison should be exposed to another assault. "The army would endeavour to succour him," was the reply, and he abided his fate.

Napoleon's ordinance, which forbade the surrender of a fortress without having stood at least one assault, has been strongly censured by English writers upon slender grounds. The obstinate defences made by French governors in the Peninsula were the results, and to condemn an enemy's system from which we have ourselves suffered, will scarcely bring it into disrepute. But the argument runs, that the besiegers working by the rules of art must make a way into the place, and to risk an assault for the sake of military glory, or to augment the loss of the enemy, is to sacrifice brave men uselessly; that capitulation always followed a certain advance of the besiegers in Louis the Fourteenth's time, and to suppose Napoleon's upstart generals possessed of superior courage or sense of military honour to the high-minded nobility of that age was quite inadmissible; and it has been rather whimsically added that obedience to the emperor's orders might suit a predestinarian Turk, but could not be tolerated by a reflecting Christian. From this it would seem that certain nice distinctions as to the extent and manner reconcile human slaughter with Christianity, and that the true standard of military honour was fixed by the intriguing, depraved, and insolent court of Louis the Fourteenth. It may, however, be reasonably supposed that as the achievements of Napoleon's soldiers far exceeded the exploits of Louis's cringing courtiers, they possessed greater military virtues.

But the whole argument seems to rest upon false grounds. To inflict loss upon an enemy is the very essence of war, and as the bravest men and officers will always be foremost in an assault, the loss thus occasioned may be of the utmost importance. To resist when nothing can be gained or saved is an act of barbarous courage which reason spurns at; but how seldom does that crisis happen in war? Napoleon wisely insisted upon a resistance which should make it dangerous for the besiegers to hasten a siege beyond the rules of art. He would not have a weak governor yield to a simulation of force not really existing; he desired that military honour should rest upon the courage and resources of men, rather than upon the

strength of walls; in fine, he made a practical application of the proverb that necessity is the mother of invention.

Granted that a siege artfully conducted, and with sufficient means must reduce the fortress attacked; still there will be some opportunity for a governor to display his resources of mind. Vauban admits of one assault and several retrenchments, after a lodgment is made on the body of the place; Napoleon only insisted that every effort which courage and genius could dictate should be exhausted before a surrender; and those efforts can never be defined or bounded beforehand. Tarifa is a happy example. To be consistent, any attack which deviates from the rules of art must also be denounced as barbarous; yet how seldom has a general all the necessary means at his disposal. In Spain not one siege could be conducted by the British army according to the rules. And there is a manifest weakness in praising the Spanish defence of Zaragoza, and condemning Napoleon because he demanded from regular troops a devotion similar to that displayed by peasants and artisans. What governor was ever in a more desperate situation than General Bizanet at Bergen-op-Zoom, when Sir Thomas Graham, with a hardihood and daring which would alone place him amongst the foremost men of enterprise which Europe can boast of, threw more than 2000 men upon the ramparts of that almost impregnable fortress? The young soldiers of the garrison, frightened by a surprise in the night, were dispersed, were flying. The assailants had possession of the walls for several hours, yet some cool and brave officers rallying the men towards morning, charged up the narrow ramps, and drove the assailants over the parapets into the ditch. They who could not at first defend their works, were now able to retake them, and so completely successful and illustrative of Napoleon's principle was this counter-attack, that the number of prisoners equalled that of the garrison. There are no rules to limit energy and genius, and no man knew better than Napoleon how to call those qualities forth; he possessed them himself in the utmost perfection, and created them in others.


CHAPTER II.

STORMING OF SAN SEBASTIAN.

To assault the breaches without having destroyed the enemy's defences or established a lodgment on the horn-work, was, notwithstanding the increased fire and great facilities of the besiegers, obviously a repetition of the former fatal error. And the same generals who had before so indiscreetly made their disapproval of such operations public, now even more freely and imprudently dealt out censures, which not ill-founded in themselves were most ill-timed, since there is much danger when doubts come down from the commanders to the soldiers. Lord Wellington thought the fifth division had been thus discouraged, and incensed at the cause, demanded 50 volunteers from each of the 15 regiments composing the first, fourth, and light divisions, "*men who could show other troops how to mount a breach.*" This was the phrase employed, and 750 gallant soldiers instantly marched to San Sebastian in answer to the appeal. Colonel Cooke and Major Robertson led the guards and Germans of the first division, Major Rose commanded the men of the fourth division, and Colonel Hunt, a daring officer who had already won his promotion at former assaults, was at the head of the fierce rugged veterans of the light division, yet there were good officers and brave soldiers in the fifth division.

It being at first supposed that Lord Wellington merely designed a simple lodgment on the great breach, the volunteers and one brigade of the fifth division only were ordered to be ready; but in a council held at night Major Smith maintained that the orders were misunderstood, as no lodgment could be formed unless the high curtain was gained. General Oswald being called to the council was of the same opinion, whereupon the remainder of the fifth division was brought to the trenches, and General Bradford having offered the services of his Portuguese brigade was told he might ford the Urumea and assail the farthest breach if he judged it advisable.

Sir James Leith had resumed the command of the fifth division, and being assisted by General Oswald directed the attack from the isthmus. He was extremely offended by the arrival of the volunteers and would not suffer them to lead the



assault ; some he spread along the trenches to keep down the fire of the horn-work, the remainder were held as a reserve along with General Hay's British and Sprye's Portuguese brigades of the fifth division. To General Robinson's brigade the assault was confined. It was formed in two columns, one to assault the old breach between the towers, the other to storm the bastion of St John and the end of the high curtain. The small breach on the extreme right was left for General Bradford's Portuguese who were drawn up on the Chofre hills ; some large boats filled with troops, were directed to make a demonstration against the sea-line of the Monte Orgullo, and Sir Thomas Graham overlooked the whole operations from the right bank of the river.

The morning of the 31st broke heavily, a thick fog hid every object, and the besiegers' batteries could not open until eight o'clock. From that hour a constant shower of heavy missiles was poured upon the besieged until eleven, when Robinson's brigade getting out of the trenches passed through the openings in the sea-wall and was launched bodily against the breaches. While the head of the column was still gathering on the strand, about 30 yards from the salient angle of the horn-work, 12 men, commanded by a sergeant whose heroic death has not sufficed to preserve his name, running violently forward leaped upon the covered way with intent to cut the sausage of the enemy's mines. The French startled by this sudden assault fired the train prematurely, and though the sergeant and his brave followers were all destroyed and the high sea-wall was thrown with a dreadful crash upon the head of the advancing column, not more than 40 men were crushed by the ruins and the rush of the troops was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope had already passed beyond the play of the mine, and now speeded along the strand amidst a shower of grape and shells, the leader, Lieutenant Macguire of the 4th regiment, conspicuous from his long white plume his fine figure and his swiftness, bounded far ahead of his men in all the pride of youthful strength and courage, but at the foot of the great breach he fell dead, and the stormers went sweeping like a dark surge over his body ; many died however with him, and the trickling of wounded men to the rear was incessant.

This time there was a broad strand left by the retreating tide and the sun had dried the rocks, yet they disturbed the order and closeness of the formation, the distance to the main breach was still nearly 200 yards, and the French, seeing the first mass of assailants pass the horn-work regardless of its broken bastion, immediately abandoned the front and crowding on the river face of that work, poured their musketry into the flank of the second column as it rushed along a few yards below them ; but the soldiers still running forward towards the breach returned this fire without slackening their speed. The batteries of the Monte Orgullo and the St. Elmo now sent their showers of shot and shells, the two pieces on the cavalier swept the face of the breach in the bastion of St. John, and the 4-pounder in the horn-work being suddenly mounted on the broken bastion poured grape-shot into their rear.

Thus scourged with fire from all sides, the stormers, their array broken alike by the shot, and by the rocks they passed over, reached their destinations, and the head of the first column gained the top of the great breach ; but the unexpected gulf below could only be passed at a few places where meagre parcels of the burned houses were still attached to the rampart, and the deadly clatter of the French muskets from the loopholed wall beyond soon strewed the narrow crest of the ruins with dead. In vain the following multitude covered the ascent seeking an entrance at every part ; to advance was impossible and the mass of assailants, slowly sinking downwards remained stubborn and immovable on the lower part of the breach. Here they were covered from the musketry in front, but from several isolated points, especially the tower of Los Hornos, under which the great mine was placed, the French still smote them with small arms, and the artillery from the Monte Orgullo poured shells and grape without intermission.

Such was the state of affairs at the great breach, and at the half bastion of St. John it was even worse. The access to the top of the high curtain being quite practicable, the efforts to force a way were more persevering and constant, and the slaughter was in proportion ; for the traverse on the flank, cutting it off from the

cavalier, was defended by French grenadiers who would not yield; the two pieces on the cavalier itself swept along the front face of the opening, and the 4-pounder and the musketry from the horn-work swept in like manner along the river face. In the midst of this destruction some sappers and a working party attached to the assaulting columns endeavoured to form a lodgment, but no artificial materials had been provided, and most of the labourers were killed before they could raise the loose rocky fragments into a cover.

During this time the besiegers' artillery kept up a constant counter-fire which killed many of the French, and the reserve brigades of the fifth division were pushed on by degrees to feed the attack until the left wing of the 9th regiment only remained in the trenches. The volunteers also who had been with difficulty restrained in the trenches, "calling out to know, why they had been brought there if they were not to lead the assault," these men, whose presence had given such offence to General Leith that he would have kept them altogether from the assault, being now let loose went like a whirlwind to the breaches, and again the crowded masses swarmed up the face of the ruins, but reaching the crest line they came down like a falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to mount, to totter, and to sink, the deadly French fire was unabated, the smoke floated away, and the crest of the breach bore no living man.

Sir Thomas Graham, standing on the nearest of the Chofre batteries, beheld this frightful destruction with a stern resolution to win at any cost; and he was a man to have put himself at the head of the last company and died sword in hand upon the breach rather than sustain a second defeat, but neither his confidence nor his resources were yet exhausted. He directed an attempt to be made on the horn-work, and turned all the Chofre batteries and one on the Isthmus, that is to say, the concentrated fire of 50 heavy pieces, upon the high curtain. The shot ranged over the heads of the troops who now were gathered at the foot of the breach, and the stream of the missiles thus poured along the upper surface of the high curtain broke down the traverses, and in its fearful course shattering all things strewed the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders. When this flight of bullets first swept over the heads of the soldiers a cry arose, from some inexperienced people, "to retire because the batteries were firing on the stormers;" but the veterans of the light division under Hunt being at that point were not to be so disturbed, and in the very heat and fury of the cannonade effected a solid lodgment in some ruins of houses actually within the rampart on the right of the great breach.

For half an hour this horrid tempest smote upon the works and the houses behind, and then suddenly ceasing the small clatter of the French muskets showed that the assailants were again in activity; and at the same time the 13th Portuguese regiment led by Major Snodgrass and followed by a detachment of the 24th under Colonel Macbean entered the river from the Chofres. The ford was deep the water rose above the waist, and when the soldiers reached the middle of the stream which was 200 yards wide, a heavy gun struck on the head of the column with a shower of grape; the havoc was fearful but the survivors closed and moved on. A second discharge from the same piece tore the ranks from front to rear, still the regiment moved on, and amidst a confused fire of musketry from the ramparts, and of artillery from St. Elmo, from the castle, and from the Mirador, landed on the left bank and rushed against the third breach. Macbean's men, who had followed with equal bravery, then reinforced the great breach, about 80 yards to the left of the other although the line of ruins seemed to extend the whole way. The fighting now became fierce and obstinate again at all the breaches, but the French musketry still rolled with deadly effect, the heaps of slain increased, and once more the great mass of stormers sunk to the foot of the ruins unable to win; the living sheltered themselves as they could, but the dead and wounded lay so thickly that hardly could it be judged whether the hurt or unhurt were most numerous.

It was now evident that the assault must fail unless some accident intervened, for the tide was rising, the reserves all engaged, and no greater effort could be expected from men whose courage had been already pushed to the verge of madness. In this crisis fortune interfered. A number of powder barrels, live shells, and combustible materials which the French had accumulated behind the traverses

for their defence caught fire, a bright consuming flame wrapped the whole of the high curtain, a succession of loud explosions were heard, hundreds of the French grenadiers were destroyed, the rest were thrown into confusion, and while the ramparts were still involved with suffocating eddies of smoke the British soldiers broke in at the first traverse. The defenders, bewildered by this terrible disaster, yielded for a moment, yet soon rallied, and a close desperate struggle took place along the summit of the high curtain, but the fury of the stormers whose numbers increased every moment could not be stemmed. The French colours on the cavalier were torn away by Lieutenant Gethin of the 11th regiment. The horn-work and the land front below the curtain, and the loopholed wall behind the great breach were all abandoned; the light division soldiers, who had already established themselves in the ruins on the French left, immediately penetrated to the streets, and at the same moment the Portuguese at the small breach, mixed with British who had wandered to that point seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side.

Five hours the dreadful battle had lasted at the walls and now the stream of war went pouring into the town. The undaunted governor still disputed the victory for a short time with the aid of his barricades, but several hundreds of his men being cut off and taken in the horn-work, his garrison was so reduced that even to effect a retreat behind the line of defences which separated the town from the Monte Orgullo was difficult. Many of his troops flying from the horn-work along the harbour flank of the town broke through a body of the British who had reached the vicinity of the fortified convent of Santa Teresa before them, and this post was the only one retained by the French in the town. It was thought by some distinguished officers engaged in the action that Monte Orgullo might have been carried on this day, if a commander of sufficient rank to direct the troops had been at hand; but whether from wounds or accident, no general entered the place until long after the breach had been won, the commanders of battalions were embarrassed for want of orders, and a thunderstorm, which came down from the mountains with unbounded fury immediately after the place was carried, added to the confusion of the fight.

This storm seemed to be the signal of hell for the perpetration of villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the principal object; at Badajos lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian, the direst, and most revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes. One atrocity of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity. Some order was at first maintained, but the resolution of the troops to throw off discipline was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer was pursued with a volley of small arms and escaped with difficulty from men who mistook him for the provost-martial of the fifth division; a Portuguese adjutant, who endeavoured to prevent some atrocity, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately by a number of English soldiers. Many officers exerted themselves to preserve order, many men were well conducted, but the rapine and violence commenced by villains soon spread, the camp-followers crowded into the place, and the disorder continued until the flames following the steps of the plunderer put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town.

Three generals, Leith, Oswald, and Robinson, had been hurt in the trenches, Sir Richard Fletcher, the chief engineer, a brave man who had served his country honourably was killed, and Colonel Burgoyne the next in command of that arm was wounded.

The carnage at the breaches was appalling. The volunteers, although brought late into the action, had nearly half their number struck down, most of the regiments of the fifth division suffered in the same proportion, and the whole loss since the renewal of the siege exceeded 2500 men and officers.

The town being thus taken, the Monte Orgullo was to be attacked, but it was very steep and difficult to assail. The castle served as a citadel and just below it four batteries connected with masonry stretched across the face of the hill. From the Mirador and Queen's batteries at the extremities of this line, ramps, protected

by redans, led to the convent of Santa Teresa which was the most salient part of the defence. On the side of Santa Clara and behind the mountain were some sea batteries, and if all these works had been of good construction, the troops fresh and well supplied, the siege would have been long and difficult; but the garrison was shattered by the recent assault, most of the engineers and leaders killed, the governor and many others wounded, 500 men were sick or hurt, the soldiers fit for duty did not exceed 1300, and they had 400 prisoners to guard. The castle was small, the bomb-proofs scarcely sufficed to protect the ammunition and provisions; and only 10 guns remained in a condition for service, three of which were on the sea-line. There was very little water, and the troops were forced to lie out on the naked rock, exposed to the fire of the besiegers, or only covered by the asperities of ground. General Rey and his brave garrison were however still resolute to fight; and they received nightly by sea supplies of ammunition, though in small quantities.

Lord Wellington arrived the day after the assault. Regular approaches could not be carried up the steep naked rock, he doubted the power of vertical fire, and ordered batteries to be formed on the captured works of the town, intending to breach the enemy's remaining lines of defence and then storm the Orgullo. And as the convent of Santa Teresa would enable the French to sally by the rampart on the left of the allies' position in the town, he composed his first line with a few troops strongly barricaded, placing a supporting body in the market-place, and strong reserves on the high curtain and flank ramparts. Meanwhile from the convent, which being actually in the town might have been easily taken at first, the enemy killed many of the besiegers, and when after several days it was assaulted, they set the lower parts on fire and retired by a communication made from the roof to a ramp on the hill behind. All this time the flames were destroying the town, and the Orgullo was overwhelmed with shells shot upwards from the besiegers' batteries.

On the 3rd of September, the governor being summoned to surrender, demanded terms inadmissible, his resolution was not to be shaken, and the vertical fire was therefore continued day and night, though the British prisoners suffered as well as the enemy; for the officer commanding in the castle, irritated by the misery of the garrison, cruelly refused to let the unfortunate captives make trenches to cover themselves. The French on the other hand complain that their wounded and sick men, although placed in an empty magazine with a black flag flying, were fired upon by the besiegers, although the English prisoners in their red uniforms were placed round it to strengthen the claim of humanity.

The new breaching batteries were now commenced, one for three pieces on the isthmus, the other for 17 pieces on the land front of the horn-work. These guns were brought from the Chofres at low water across the Urumea, at first in the night, but the difficulty of labouring in the water during darkness induced the artillery officers to transport the remainder in daylight, and within reach of the enemy's batteries, which did not fire a shot. In the town the besiegers' labours were impeded by the flaming houses, but near the foot of the hill the ruins furnished shelter for the musketeers employed to gall the garrison, and the guns on the island of Santa Clara being reinforced were actively worked by the seamen. The besieged replied but little, their ammunition was scarce; and the horrible vertical fire subdued their energy. In this manner the action was prolonged until the 8th of September, when 59 heavy battering pieces opened at once from the island, the isthmus, the horn-work, and the Chofres. In two hours both the Mirador and the Queen's battery were broken; the fire of the besieged was entirely extinguished, and the summit and face of the hill torn and furrowed in a frightful manner; the bread-ovens were destroyed, a magazine exploded, and the castle, small and crowded with men, was overlaid with the descending shells. Then the governor, proudly bending to his fate, surrendered. On the 9th this brave man and his heroic garrison, reduced to one-third of their original number, and leaving 500 wounded behind them in the hospital, marched out with the honours of war. The Spanish flag was hoisted under a salute of 21 guns, and the siege terminated after 63 days open trenches, precisely when the tempestuous season, beginning to vex the coast, would have rendered a continuance of the sea blockade impossible.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. San Sebastian, a third-rate fortress, and in bad condition when first invested, resisted a besieging army possessing an enormous battering train for 63 days. This is to be attributed partly to the errors of the besiegers, principally to obstructions extraneous to the military operations. Amongst the last are to be reckoned the misconduct of the Admiralty, and the negligence of the government relative to the battering train and supply of ammunition ; the latter retarded the second siege for 16 days ; the former enabled the garrison to keep up and even increase its means as the siege proceeded.

Next in order and importance was the failure of the Spanish authorities, who neglected to supply carts and boats from the country, and even refused the use of their public buildings for hospitals. Thus between the sea and the shore, receiving aid from neither, Lord Wellington had to conduct an operation of war which more than any other depends for success upon labour and provident care. It was probably the first time that an important siege was maintained by women's exertions ; the stores of the besiegers were landed from boats rowed by Spanish girls !

Another impediment was Soult's advance towards Pampeluna, but the positive effect of this was slight, since the want of ammunition would have equally delayed the attack. The true measure of the English government's negligence is thus obtained. It was more mischievous than the operations of 60,000 men under a great general.

2. The errors of execution having been before touched upon need no further illustration. The greatest difference between the first and second part of the siege preceding the assaults was that in the latter, the approaches near the isthmus being carried further on and openings made in the sea-wall, the troops more easily and rapidly extricated themselves from the trenches, the distance to the breach was shortened, and the French fire bearing on the fronts of attack was somewhat less powerful. These advantages were considerable, but not proportionate to the enormous increase of the besiegers' means ; and it is quite clear from the terrible effects of the cannonade during the assault, that the whole of the defences might have been ruined, even those of the castle, if this overwhelming fire had, in compliance with the rules of art, been first employed to silence the enemy's fire. A lodgment in the horn-work could then have been made with little difficulty, and the breach attacked without much danger.

3. As the faults leading to failure in the first part of the siege were repeated in the second, while the enemy's resources had increased by the gain of time, and because his intercourse with France by sea never was cut off, it follows that there was no reasonable security for success ; not even to make a lodgment on the breach, since no artificial materials were prepared and the workmen failed to effect that object. But the first arrangement and the change adopted in the council of war, the option given to General Bradford, the remarkable fact that the simultaneous attack on the horn-work was only thought of when the first efforts against the breach had failed, all prove that the enemy's defensive means were underrated, and the extent of the success exceeded the preparations to obtain it.

The place was won by accident. For first the explosion of the great mine under the tower of Los Hornos, was only prevented by a happy shot which cut the sausage of the train during the fight, and this was followed by the ignition of the French powder-barrels and shells along the high curtain, which alone opened the way into the town. Sir Thomas Graham's firmness and perseverance in the assault, and the judicious usage of his artillery against the high curtain during the action, an operation however which only belonged to daylight, were no mean helps to the victory. It was on such sudden occasions that his prompt genius shone conspicuously, yet it was nothing wonderful that heavy guns at short distances, the range being perfectly known, should strike with certainty along a line of rampart more than 27 feet above the heads of the troops. Such practice was to be expected from British artillery, and Graham's genius was more evinced by the promptness of the thought and the trust he put in the valour of his soldiers. It was far more extraordinary that the stormers did not relinquish their attack when thus exposed to their own guns, for it is a mistake to say that no mischief occurred ; a sergeant of the 9th

regiment was killed by the batteries close to his commanding officer, and it is probable that other casualties also had place.

4. The explosion on the ramparts is generally supposed to have been caused by the cannonade from the Chofre batteries, yet a cool and careful observer, whose account I have adopted, because he was a spectator in perfect safety and undisturbed by having to give or receive orders, affirms that the cannonade ceased before Colonel Snodgrass forded the river, whereas the great explosion did not happen until half an hour after that event. By some persons that intrepid exploit of the Portuguese was thought one of the principal causes of success, and it appears certain that an entrance was made at the small breach by several soldiers, British and Portuguese, many of the former having wandered from the great breach and got mixed with the latter before the explosion happened on the high curtain. Whether those men would have been followed by greater numbers is doubtful, but the lodgment made by the light division volunteers within the great breach was solid and could have been maintained. The French call the Portuguese attack a feint. Sir Thomas Graham certainly did not found much upon it. He gave General Bradford the option to attack or remain tranquil, and Colonel M'Bean actually received counter-orders when his column was already in the river and too far advanced to be withdrawn.

5. When the destruction of San Sebastian became known, it was used by the anti-British party at Cadiz to excite the people against England. The political chief of Guipuscoa publicly accused Sir Thomas Graham, "that he sacked and burned the place because it had formerly traded entirely with France," his generals were said to have excited the furious soldiers to the horrid work, and his inferior officers to have boasted of it afterwards. A newspaper, edited by an agent of the Spanish government, repeating these accusations, called upon the people to avenge the injury upon the British army, and the Spanish minister of war, designated by Lord Wellington as the abettor and even the writer of this and other malignant libels published at Cadiz, officially demanded explanations.

Lord Wellington addressed a letter of indignant denial and remonstrance to Sir Henry Wellesley. "It was absurd," he said, "to suppose the officers of the army would have risked the loss of all their labours and gallantry, by encouraging the dispersion of the men while the enemy still held the castle. To him the town was of the utmost value as a secure place for magazines and hospitals. He had refused to bombard it when advised to do so, as he had previously refused to bombard Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, because the injury would fall on the inhabitants and not upon the enemy; yet nothing could have been more easy or less suspicious than this method of destroying the town if he had been so minded. It was the enemy who set fire to the houses, it was part of the defence; the British officers strove to extinguish the flames, some in doing so lost their lives by the French musketry from the castle, and the difficulty of communicating and working through the fire was so great, that he had been on the point of withdrawing the troops altogether. He admitted the plunder, observing, that he knew not whether that or the libels made him most angry; he had taken measures to stop it, but when two-thirds of the officers had been killed or wounded in the action, and when many of the inhabitants taking part with the enemy fired upon the troops, to prevent it was impossible. Moreover he was for several days unable from other circumstances to send fresh men to replace the stormers.

This was a solid reply to the scandalous libels circulated, but the broad facts remained. San Sebastian was a heap of smoking ruins, and atrocities degrading to human nature had been perpetrated by the troops. Of these crimes, the municipal and ecclesiastic bodies, the consuls and principal persons of San Sebastian, afterwards published a detailed statement, solemnly affirming the truth of each case; and if Spanish declarations on this occasion are not to be heeded, four-fifths of the excesses attributed to the French armies must be effaced as resting on a like foundation. That the town was first set on fire behind the breaches during the operations, and that it spread in the tumult following the assault is undoubted; yet it is not improbable that plunderers, to forward their own views increased it, and certainly the great destruction did not befall until long after the town was in possession of

the allies. I have been assured by a surgeon, that he was lodged the third day after the assault at a house well furnished, and in a street then untouched by fire or plunderers, but house and street were afterwards plundered and burned. The inhabitants could only have fired upon the allies the first day, and it might well have been in self-defence for they were barbarously treated. The abhorrent case alluded to was notorious, so were many others. I have myself heard around the picquet fires, when soldiers, as every experienced officer knows, speak without reserve of their past deeds and feelings, the abominable actions mentioned by the municipality related with little variation long before that narrative was published; told however with sorrow for the sufferers and indignation against the perpetrators, for these last were not so numerous as might be supposed from the extent of the calamities they inflicted.

It is a common but shallow and mischievous notion, that a villain makes never the worse soldier for an assault, because the appetite for plunder supplies the place of honour; as if the compatibility of vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and courage unnecessary in warlike matters. In all the host which stormed San Sebastian there was not a man who being sane would for plunder only have encountered the danger of that assault, yet under the spell of discipline all rushed eagerly to meet it. Discipline however has its root in patriotism, or how could armed men be controlled at all, and it would be wise and far from difficult to graft moderation and humanity upon such a noble stock. The modern soldier is not necessarily the stern bloody-handed man the ancient soldier was, there is as much difference between them as between the sportsman and the butcher; the ancient warrior, fighting with the sword and reaping his harvest of death when the enemy was in flight, became habituated to the act of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his bayonet, sees not his peculiar victim fall, and exults not over mangled limbs as proofs of personal prowess. Hence preserving his original feelings, his natural abhorrence of murder and crimes of violence, he differs not from other men unless often engaged in the assault of towns, where rapacity, lust, and inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said that no soldier can be restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least of all, because he is brutish and insensible to honour! Shame on such calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as no other soldier ever fights? His pay! Soldiers of all nations receive pay. At the period of this assault, a sergeant of the 28th regiment, named Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from Roncesvalles, to make purchases for his officers. He placed the money he was entrusted with, 2000 dollars, in the hands of a commissary, and having secured a receipt, persuaded his party to join in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the money, made his purchases, and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these the spirits who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear. It is precisely fear to which they are most insensible.

Undoubtedly, if soldiers hear and read that it is impossible to restrain their violence, they will not be restrained. But let the plunder of a town after an assault be expressly made criminal by the articles of war, with a due punishment attached; let it be constantly impressed upon the troops that such conduct is as much opposed to military honour and discipline as it is to morality; let a select permanent body of men receiving higher pay form a part of the army, and be charged to follow storming columns to aid in preserving order, and with power to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary valour should keep pace with chastisement for crimes committed under such temptation, it would be fitting that money, apportioned to the danger and importance of the service, should be insured to the successful troops and always paid without delay. This money might be taken as ransom from enemies, but if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor, government should furnish the amount. With such regulations the storming of towns would not produce more military disorders than the gaining of battles in the field.

CHAPTER III.

WHILE San Sebastian was being stormed Soult fought a battle with the covering force, not willingly nor with much hope of success, but he was averse to let San Sebastian fall without another effort, and thought a bold demeanour would best hide his real weakness. Guided however by the progress of the siege, which he knew perfectly through his sea communication, he awaited the last moment of action, striving meanwhile to improve his resources and to revive the confidence of the army and of the people. Of his dispersed soldiers 8000 had rejoined their regiments by the 12th of August, and he was promised a reinforcement of 30,000 conscripts; these last were however yet to be enrolled, and neither the progress of the siege, nor the general panic along the frontier, which recurred with increased violence after the late battles, would suffer him to remain inactive.

He was in no manner deceived as to his enemy's superior strength of position, number, and military confidence; but his former efforts on the side of Pampeluna had interrupted the attack of San Sebastian, and another offensive movement would necessarily produce a like effect; wherefore he hoped by repeating the disturbance, as long as a free intercourse by sea enabled him to reinforce and supply the garrison, to render the siege a wasting operation for the allies. To renew the movement against Pampeluna was most advantageous, but it required 50,000 infantry for the attack, and 20,000 as a corps of observation on the Lower Bidassoa, and he had not such numbers to dispose of. The subsistence of his troops also was uncertain, because the loss of all the military carriages at Vittoria was still felt, and the resources of the country were reluctantly yielded by the people. To act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port was therefore impracticable. And to attack the allies' centre, at Vera, Echallar, and the Bastan, was unpromising, seeing that two mountain-chains were to be forced before the movement could seriously effect Lord Wellington: moreover, the ways being impracticable for artillery, success if such should befall, would lead to no decisive result. It only remained to attack the left of the allies by the great road of Irun.

Against that quarter Soult could bring more than 40,000 infantry, but the positions were of perilous strength. The Upper Bidassoa was in Wellington's power, because the light division, occupying Vera and the heights of Santa Barbara on the right bank, covered all the bridges; but the Lower Bidassoa flowing from Vera with a bend to the left separated the hostile armies, and against this front about nine miles wide Soult's operations were necessarily directed. On his right, that is to say, from the broken bridge of Behobia in front of Irun to the sea, the river, broad and tidal, offered no apparent facility for a passage; and between the fords of Biriatu and those of Vera, a distance of three miles, there was only the one passage of Andarlassa about two miles below Vera; along this space also the banks of the river, steep craggy mountain ridges without roads, forbade any great operations. Thus the points of attack were restricted to Vera and the fords between Biriatu and the broken bridge of Behobia.

To raise the siege it was only necessary to force a way to Oyarzun, a small town about seven or eight miles beyond the Bidassoa, from thence the assailants could march at once upon Passages and upon the Urumea. To gain Oyarzun was therefore the object of the French marshal's combinations. The royal road led directly to it by the broad valley which separates the Peña de Haya from the Jaizquibel mountain. The latter was on the sea-coast, but the Peña de Haya, commonly called the four-crowned mountain, filled with its dependent ridges all the space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun and Oyarzun. Its staring head bound with a rocky diadem was impassable, but from the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, several roads, one of them not absolutely impracticable for guns, passed over its enormous flanks to Irun at one side and to Oyarzun on the other, falling into the royal road at both places. Soult's first design was to unite Clausel's and D'Erlon's troops, drive the light division from the heights of Santa Barbara, and then using the bridges of Lesaca and Vera force a passage over the Peña de Haya on the left of its summit, and push the heads of columns towards Oyarzun

and the Upper Urumea ; meanwhile Reille and Villatte, passing the Bidassoa at Biriatu, were to fight their way also to Oyarzun by the royal road. He foresaw that Wellington might during this time collect his right wing and seek to envelop the French army, or march upon Bayonne ; but he thought the general state of his affairs required bold measures, and the progress of the besiegers at San Sebastian soon drove him into action.

On the 29th Foy, marching by the road of Lohousoa, crossed the Nive at Cambo and reached Espelette, leaving behind him 600 men and the national guards, who were very numerous, with orders to watch the roads and valleys leading upon St. Jean Pied de Port. If pressed by superior forces, this corps of observation was to fall back upon that fortress, and it was supported with a brigade of light cavalry stationed at St. Palais.

In the night two of D'Erlon's divisions were secretly drawn from Ainhoa, Foy continued his march through Espelette, by the bridges of Amotz and Serres to San Jean de Luz, from whence the reserve moved forward, and thus in the morning of the 30th two strong French columns of attack were assembled on the Lower Bidassoa.

The first, under Clausel, consisted of four divisions, furnishing 20,000 men, with 20 pieces of artillery. It was concentrated in the woods behind the Commissary and Bayonette mountains, above Vera.

The second, commanded by General Reille, was composed of two divisions and Villatte's reserve, in all 18,000 men ; but Foy's division and some light cavalry were in rear ready to augment this column to about 25,000 and there were 36 pieces of artillery and two bridge equipages collected behind the camp of Urogne on the royal road.

Reille's troops were secreted, partly behind the Croix des Bouquets mountain, partly behind that of Louis XIV. and the lower ridges of the Mandale near Biriatu. Meanwhile D'Erlon, having Conroux's and Abbé's divisions and 20 pieces of artillery under his command, held the camps in advance of Sarre and Ainhoa. If the allies in his front marched to reinforce their own left on the crowned mountain, he was to vex and retard their movements, always however avoiding a serious engagement, and feeling to his right to secure his connection with Clausel's column ; that is to say, he was with Abbé's division, moving from Ainhoa, to menace the allies towards Zagaramurdi and the Puerto de Echallar ; and with Conroux's division, then in front of Sarre, to menace the light division, to seize the rock of Ivantelly if it was abandoned, and be ready to join Clausel if occasion offered. On the other hand, should the allies assemble a large force and operate offensively by the Nive and Nivelle rivers, D'Erlon, without losing his connection with the main army, was to concentrate on the slopes descending from the Rhune mountains towards San Pe. Finally, if the attack on the Lower Bidassoa succeeded, he was to join Clausel, either by Vera, or by the heights of Echallar and the bridge of Lesaca. Soult also desired to support D'Erlon with the two divisions of heavy cavalry, but forage could only be obtained for the artillery horses, two regiments of light horsemen, six chosen troops of dragoons and 200 or 300 gens-d'armes, which were all assembled on the royal road behind Reille's column.

It was the French marshal's intention to attack at daybreak on the 30th, but his preparations being incomplete he deferred it until the 31st, and took rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence passing over to the allies' camps. Nevertheless Wellington's emissaries advised him of the movements in the night of the 29th, the augmentation of troops in front of Irun was observed in the morning of the 30th, and in the evening the bridge equipage and the artillery were descried on the royal road beyond the Bidassoa. Thus warned he prepared for battle with little anxiety. For the brigade of English foot-guards, left at Oporto when the campaign commenced, was now come up ; most of the marauders and men wounded at Vittoria had rejoined ; and three regiments just arrived from England formed a new brigade under Lord Aylmer, making the total augmentation of British troops in this quarter little less than 5000 men.

The extreme left was on the Jaizquibel. This narrow mountain ridge, 1700 feet high, runs along the coast, abutting at one end upon the Passages harbour and at

the other upon the navigable mouth of the Bidassoa. Offering no mark for an attack it was only guarded by a flanking detachment of Spaniards, and at its foot the small fort of Figueras commanding the entrance of the river was garrisoned by seamen from the naval squadron. Fuenterrabia, a walled place, also at its base, was occupied, and the low ground between that town and Irun defended by a chain of eight large field redoubts, which connected the position of Jaizquibel with the heights covering the royal road to Oyarzun.

On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the burned bridge of Behobia, there was a sudden bend in the river, the concave towards the French, and their positions commanded the passage of the fords below; but opposed to them was the exceedingly stiff and lofty ridge, called San Marcial, terminating one of the great flanks of the Peña de Haya. The water flowed round the left of this ridge, confining the road leading from the bridge of Behobia to Irun, a distance of one mile, to the narrow space between its channel and the foot of the height, and Irun itself, strongly occupied and defended by a field-work, blocked this way. It followed that the French, after forcing the passage of the river, must of necessity win San Marcial before their army could use the great road.

About 6000 men of the fourth Spanish army, now under General Freyre, were established on the crest of San Marcial, which was strengthened by abattis and temporary field-works.



Behind Irun the first British division, under General Howard, was posted, and Lord Aylmer's brigade was pushed somewhat in advance of Howard's right to support the left of the Spaniards.

The right of San Marcial falling back from the river was, although distinct as a position, connected with the Peña de Haya, and in some degree exposed to an enemy passing the river above Biriatu, wherefore Longa's Spaniards were drawn off from those slopes of the Peña de Haya which descended towards Vera, to be posted on those descending towards Biriatu. In this situation he protected and supported the right of San Marcial.

Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus directly opposed to the progress of the enemy, and the fourth division quartered near Lesaca was still disposable. From this body a Portuguese brigade had been detached, to replace Longa on the heights opposite Vera, and to cover the roads leading from the bridge and fords of that place over the flanks of the Peña de Haya. Meanwhile the British brigades of the division were stationed up the mountain, close under the foundry of San Antonio and commanding the intersection of the roads coming from Vera and Lesaca; thus furnishing a reserve to the Portuguese brigade to Longa and to Freyre, they tied the whole together. The Portuguese brigade was however somewhat exposed, and too weak to guard the enormous slopes on which it was placed, wherefore Wellington drew General Inglis's brigade of the seventh division from Echallar to reinforce it, and even then the flanks of the Peña de Haya were so rough and vast that the troops seemed sprinkled here and there with little coherence. The English general aware that his positions were too extensive, had commenced the construction of several large redoubts on commanding points of the mountain, and had traced out a second fortified camp on a strong range of heights, which immediately in front of Oyarzun connected the Haya with the Jaizquibel, but these works were unfinished.

During the night of the 30th, Soult garnished with artillery all the points commanding the fords of Biriatu, the descent to the broken bridge and the banks below it, called the Bas de Behobia. This was partly to cover the passage of the fords and the formation of his bridges, partly to stop gun-boats coming up to molest the troops in crossing, and in this view also he spread Casa Palacio's brigade of Joseph's Spanish guards along the river as far down as Andaya, fronting Fuenterrabia.

General Reille, commanding La Martiniere's, Maucune's, and Villatte's divisions, directed the attack. His orders were to storm the camp of San Marcial, and leaving there a strong reserve to keep in check any reinforcement coming from the side of Vera or descending from the Peña de Haya, to drive the allies with the remainder of his force from ridge to ridge, until he gained that flank of the great mountain which descends upon Oyarzun. The royal road being thus opened, Foy's division,



Explanatory Sketch
of
Lord Wellington's
passage of the
Tucumán,
October 7th
And
Souls
Passage of that River
August 1st
1813

French 
Allos 

with the cavalry and artillery in one column, was to cross by bridges to be laid during the attack on San Marcial. And it was Soult's intention under any circumstances to retain this last-named ridge, and to fortify it as a bridge-head with a view to subsequent operations.

To aid Reille's progress and to provide for the concentration of the whole army at Oyarzun, Clausel was directed to make a simultaneous attack from Vera, not as at first designed by driving the allies from Santa Barbara and seizing the bridges, but, leaving one division and his guns on the ridges above Vera to keep the light division in check, to cross the river by two fords just below the town of Vera with the rest of his troops, and assail that slope of the Peña de Haya where the Portuguese brigade and the troops under General Inglis were posted. Then forcing his way upwards to the forge of San Antonio, which commanded the intersection of the roads leading round the head of the mountain, he could aid Reille directly by falling on the rear of San Marcial, or meet him at Oyarzun by turning the rocky summit of the Peña de Haya.

Combat of San Marcial.—At daylight on the 31st, Reille, under protection of the French guns, forded the river above Biriatu with two divisions and two pieces of artillery. He quickly seized a detached ridge of inferior height just under San Marcial, and leaving there one brigade as a reserve detached another to attack the Spanish left by a slope which descended in that quarter to the river. Meanwhile with La Martinière's division he assailed their right. But the side of the mountain was covered with brushwood and remarkably steep, the French troops being ill-managed preserved no order, the supports and the skirmishers mixing in one mass got into confusion, and when two-thirds of the height were gained the Spaniards charged in columns and drove the assailants headlong down.

During this action two bridges were thrown, partly on trestles, partly on boats, below the fords, and the head of Villatte's reserve crossing ascended the ridge and renewed the fight more vigorously; one brigade even reached the chapel of San Marcial and the left of the Spanish line was shaken, but the 85th regiment belonging to Lord Aylmer's brigade advanced a little way to support it, and at that moment Lord Wellington rode up with his staff. Then the Spaniards, who cared so little for their own officers, with that noble instinct which never abandons the poor people of any country acknowledged real greatness without reference to nation, and shouting aloud dashed their adversaries down with so much violence that many were driven into the river, and some of the French pontoon boats coming to their succour were overloaded and sunk. It was several hours before the broken and confused masses could be rallied, and the bridges, which had been broken up to let the boats save the drowning men, repaired. When this was effected, Soult, who overlooked the action from the summit of the mountain Louis XIV., sent the remainder of Villatte's reserve over the river, and calling up Foy's division prepared a more formidable and better arranged attack; and he expected greater success, inasmuch as the operation from the side of Vera, of which it is time to treat, was now making considerable progress up the Peña de Haya on the allies' right.

Combat of Vera.—General Clausel had descended the Bayonette and Commissary mountains immediately after daybreak, under cover of a thick fog, but at seven o'clock the weather cleared, and three divisions formed in heavy columns were seen, by the troops on Santa Barbara, making for the fords below Vera in the direction of two hamlets called the Silinas and the Barrio de Lesaca. A fourth division and the guns remained stationary on the slopes of the mountain, and the artillery opened now and then upon the little town of Vera, from which the picquets of the light division were recalled with exception of one post in a fortified house commanding the bridge.

About eight o'clock the enemy's columns began to pass the fords covered by the fire of their artillery, but the first shells thrown fell into the midst of their own ranks and the British troops on Santa Barbara cheered the French battery with a derisive shout. Their march was however sure, and a battalion of chosen light troops, without knapsacks, quickly commenced the battle on the left bank of the river, with the Portuguese brigade, and by their extreme activity and rapid fire forced the latter to retire up the slopes of the mountain. General Inglis then reinforced the line of

kirmishers and the whole of his brigade was soon afterwards engaged, but Clausel menaced his left flank from the lower ford, and the French troops still forced their way upwards in front without a check, until the whole mass disappeared fighting amidst the asperities of the Peña de la Haya. Inglis lost 270 men and 22 officers, but he finally halted on a ridge commanding the intersection of the roads leading from Vera and Lesaca to Irun and Oyarzun. That is to say somewhat below the foundry of Antonio, where the fourth division, having now recovered its Portuguese brigade, was in conjunction with Longa's Spaniards, so placed as to support and protect equally the left of Inglis and the right of Freyre on San Marcial.

These operations, from the great height and asperity of the mountain; occupied many hours, and it was past two o'clock before even the head of Clausel's columns reached this point. Meanwhile, as the French troops left in front of Santa Barbara made no movement, and Lord Wellington had before directed the light division to aid General Inglis, a wing of the 43rd and three companies of the riflemen from General Kempt's brigade, with three weak Spanish battalions drawn from O'Donnel's Andalusians at Echallar, crossed the Bidassoa by the Lesaca bridge, and marched towards some lower slopes on the right of Inglis where they covered another knot of minor communications coming from Lesaca and Vera. They were followed by the remainder of Kempt's brigade which occupied Lesaca itself, and thus the chain of connection and defence between Santa Barbara and the positions of the fourth division on the Peña de la Haya was completed.

Clausel seeing these movements, and thinking the allies at Echallar and Santa Barbara were only awaiting the proper moment to take him in flank and rear, by the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, if he engaged further up the mountain, now abated his battle and sent notice of his situation and views to Soult. This opinion was well-founded; Lord Wellington was not a general to let half his army be paralyzed by D'Erlon's divisions. On the 30th, when he observed Soult's first preparations in front of San Marcial, he had ordered attacks to be made upon D'Erlon from the Puerto of Echallar, Zagaramurdi, and Maya; General Hill was also directed to show the heads of columns towards St. Jean Pied de Port. And on the 31st when the force and direction of Clausel's columns were known, he ordered Lord Dalhousie to bring the remainder of the seventh division by Lesaca to aid Inglis.

Following these orders Giron, who commanded the Spaniards, O'Donnel being sick, slightly skirmished on the 30th with Conroux's advanced troops in front of Sarre, and on the 31st at daybreak the whole of the French line was assailed. That is to say, Giron again fought with Conroux, feebly as before, but two Portuguese brigades of the sixth and seventh divisions, directed by Lord Dalhousie and General Colville from the passes of Zagaramurdi and Maya, drove the French from their camp behind Urdax and burned it. Abbé, who commanded there, being thus pressed, collected his whole force in front of Ainhoa on an entrenched position, and making strong battle repulsed the allies with some loss of men by the sixth division. Thus five combats were fought in one day at different points of the general line, and D'Erlon, who had lost 300 or 400 men, seeing a fresh column coming from Maya as if to turn his left, judged that a great movement against Bayonne was in progress and sent notice to Soult. He was mistaken. Lord Wellington being entirely on the defensive, only sought by these demonstrations to disturb the plan of attack, and the seventh division, following the second order sent to Lord Dalhousie, marched towards Lesaca; but the fighting at Urdax having lasted until midday the movement was not completed that evening.

D'Erlon's despatch reached Soult at the same time that Clausel's report arrived. All his arrangements for a final attack on San Marcial were then completed, but these reports and the ominous cannonade at San Sebastian, plainly heard during the morning, induced him to abandon this object and hold his army ready for a general battle on the Nivelle. In this view he sent Foy's division, which had not yet crossed the Bidassoa, to the heights of Serres, behind the Nivelle, as a support to D'Erlon, and caused six chosen troops of dragoons to march upon San Pé higher up on that river. Clausel received orders to arrest his attack and repossess the Bidassoa in the night. He was to leave Maransin's division upon the

Bayonette mountain and the Col de Bera, and with the other three divisions to march by Ascaïn and join Foy on the heights of Serres.

Notwithstanding these movements Soult kept Reille's troops beyond the Bidassoa, and the battle went on sharply, for the Spaniards continually detached men from the ridge, endeavouring to drive the French from the lower positions into the river, until about four o'clock when their hardihood abating they desired to be relieved; but Wellington careful of their glory seeing the French attacks were exhausted and thinking it a good opportunity to fix the military spirit of his allies, refused to relieve or to aid them; yet it would not be just to measure their valour by this fact. The English general blushed while he called upon them to fight, knowing that they had been previously famished by their vile government, and that there were no hospitals to receive no care for them when wounded. The battle was however arrested by a tempest, which commencing in the mountains about three o'clock, raged for several hours with wonderful violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees and whirled through the air like feathers on the howling winds, while the thinnest streams swelling into torrents dashed down the mountains, rolling innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. Amidst this turmoil and under cover of night the French re-crossed the river, and the headquarters were fixed at St. Jean de Luz.

Clausel's retreat was more unhappy. Having received the order to retire early in the evening when the storm had already put an end to all fighting, he repassed the fords in person and before dark at the head of two brigades, ordering General Vandermaesen to follow with the remainder of his divisions. It would appear that he expected no difficulty, since he did not take possession of the bridge of Vera nor of the fortified house covering it; and apparently ignorant of the state of his own troops on the other bank of the river occupied himself with suggesting new projects displeasing to Soult. Meanwhile Vandermaesen's situation became critical. Many of his soldiers attempting to cross were drowned by the rising waters, and finally, unable to effect a passage at the fords, that general marched up the stream to seize the bridge of Vera. His advanced guard surprising a corporal's picquet, rushed over, but was driven back by a rifle company posted in the fortified house. This happened about three o'clock in the morning and the riflemen defended the passage until daylight when a second company and some Portuguese caçadores came to their aid. But the French reserve left at Vera seeing how matters stood opened a fire of guns against the fortified house from a high rock just above the town, and their skirmishers approached it on the right bank while Vandermaesen plied his musketry from the left bank. The two rifle captains and many men fell under this cross fire, and the passage was forced, but Vandermaesen, urging the attack in person, was killed, and more than 200 of his soldiers were hurt.

Soult now learning from D'Erlon that all offensive movements on the side of Maya had ceased at twelve o'clock on the 31st, contemplated another attack on San Marcial, but in the course of the day General Rey's report of the assault on San Sebastian reached him, and at the same time he heard that General Hill was in movement on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port. This state of affairs brought reflection. San Sebastian was lost, a fresh attempt to carry off the wasted garrison from the castle would cost 5000 or 6000 good soldiers, and the safety of the whole army would be endangered by pushing headlong amongst the terrible asperities of the crowned mountain. For Wellington could throw his right wing and centre, forming a mass of at least 35,000 men, upon the French left during the action, and he would be nearer to Bayonne than the French right when once the battle was engaged beyond the Lower Bidassoa. The army had lost in recent actions 3600 men. General Vandermaesen had been killed, and four others, La Martinière, Menne, Remond, and Guy, wounded, the first mortally; all the superior officers agreed that a fresh attempt would be most dangerous, and serious losses might draw on an immediate invasion of France before the necessary defensive measures were completed.

Yielding to these reasons he resolved to recover his former positions and thenceforward remain entirely on the defensive, for which his vast knowledge of war, his

foresight, his talent for methodical arrangement and his firmness of character, peculiarly fitted him. Twelve battles or combats, fought in seven weeks, bore testimony that he had striven hard to regain the offensive for the French army, and willing still to strive if it might be so, he had called upon Suchet to aid him and demanded fresh orders from the emperor; but Suchet helped him not, and Napoleon's answer indicated at once his own difficulties and his reliance upon the Duke of Dalmatia's capacity and fidelity.

"I have given you my confidence and can add neither to your means nor to your instructions."

The loss of the allies was 1000 Anglo-Portuguese, and 1600 Spaniards. Wherefore the cost of men on this day, including the storming of San Sebastian, exceeded 5000, but the battle in no manner disturbed the siege. The French army was powerless against such strong positions. Soult had brought 45,000 men to bear in two columns upon a square of less than five miles, and the 30,000 French actually engaged were repulsed by 10,000, for that number only of the allies fought.

But the battle was a half measure and ill-judged on Soult's part. Lord Wellington's experience of French warfare, his determined character, coolness and thorough acquaintance with the principles of his art, left no hope that he would suffer two-thirds of his army to be kept in check by D'Erlon's two divisions; and accordingly, the moment D'Erlon was menaced Soult stopped his own attack to make a counter-movement and deliver a decisive battle on favourable ground. Perhaps his secret hope was to draw his opponent to such a conclusion, but if so, the combat of San Marcial was too dear a price to pay for the chance.

A general who had made up his mind to force a way to San Sebastian, would have organized his rear so that no serious embarrassment could arise from any partial incursions towards Bayonne; he would have concentrated his whole army, and have calculated his attack so as to be felt at San Sebastian before his adversary's counter-movement could be felt towards Bayonne. In this view D'Erlon's two divisions should have come in the night of the 30th to Vera, which, without weakening the reserve opposed to the light division, would have augmented Clausel's force by 10,000 men; and on the most important line, because San Marcial offered no front for the action of great numbers, and the secret of mountain warfare is, by surprise or the power of overwhelming numbers, to seize such commanding points as shall force an enemy either to abandon his strong position, or become the assailant to recover those he has thus lost. Now the difficulty of defending the crowned mountain was evinced by the rapid manner in which Clausel at once gained the ridges as far as the foundry of San Antonio; with 10,000 additional men he might have gained a commanding position on the rear and left flank of San Marcial, and forced the allies to abandon it. That Lord Wellington thought himself weak on the Haya mountain is proved by his calling up the seventh division from Echallar, and by his orders to the light division.

Soult's object was to raise the siege, but his plan involved the risk of having 35,000 of the allies interposed during his attack between him and Bayonne, clearly a more decisive operation than the raising of the siege, therefore the enterprise may be pronounced injudicious. He admitted indeed, that excited to the enterprise, partly by insinuations, whether from the minister of war or his own lieutenants does not appear, partly by a generous repugnance to abandon the brave garrison, he was too precipitate, acting contrary to his judgment; but he was probably tempted by the hope of obtaining at least the camp of San Marcial as a bridge-head, and thus securing a favourable point for after combinations.

Lord Wellington, having resolved not to invade France at this time, was unprepared for so great an operation as throwing his right and centre upon Soult's left; and it is obvious also that on the 30th he expected only a partial attack at San Marcial. The order he first gave to assail D'Erlon's position, and then the counter-order for the seventh division to come to Lesaca, prove this, because the latter was issued after Clausel's numbers and the direction of his attack were ascertained. The efforts of two Portuguese brigades against D'Erlon sufficed therefore to render null the Duke of Dalmatia's great combinations, and his extreme sensitiveness to

their operations marks the vice of his own. Here it may be observed, that the movement of the 43rd, the rifle companies, and the Spaniards, to secure the right flank of Inglis, was ill-arranged. Despatched by different roads without knowing precisely the point they were to concentrate at, each fell in with the enemy at different places ; the Spaniards got under fire and were forced to alter their route ; the 43rd companies stumbling on a French division had to fall back half a mile ; it was only by thus feeling the enemy at different points that the destined position was at last found, and a disaster was scarcely prevented by the fury of the tempest. Nevertheless those detachments were finally well placed to have struck a blow the next morning, because their post was only half an hour's march from the high ground behind Vandermaesen's column when he forced the bridge at Vera, and the firing would have served as a guide. The remainder of Kempt's brigade could also have moved upon the same point from Lesaca. It is however very difficult to seize such occasions in mountain warfare where so little can be seen of the general state of affairs.

A more obvious advantage was neglected by General Skerrit. The defence of the bridge at Vera, by a single company of rifles, lasted more than an hour, and four brigades of the enemy, crossing in a tumultuous manner, could not have cleared the narrow passage after it was won in a moment. Lord Wellington's despatch erroneously describes the French as passing under the fire of great part of General Skerrit's brigade, whereas that officer remained in order of battle on the lower slopes of Santa Barbara, half a mile distant, and allowed the enemy to escape. It is true that a large mass of French troops were on the counter-slopes of the Bayonette mountain, beyond Vera, but the seventh division, being then close to San Barbara, would have prevented any serious disaster if the blow had failed. A great opportunity was certainly lost, but war in rough mountains is generally a series of errors.

CHAPTER IV.

SOULT, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of an attack along the Nive, that his uneasy movements made the allies think he was again preparing for offensive operations. This double misunderstanding did not, however, last long, and each army resumed its former position.

The fall of San Sebastian had given Lord Wellington a new port and point of support, had increased the value of Passages as a dépôt, and let loose a considerable body of troops for field operations; the armistice in Germany was at an end; Austria had joined the allies, and it seemed therefore certain that he would immediately invade France. The English cabinet had promised the continental sovereigns that it should be so when the French were expelled from Spain, meaning Navarre and Guipuscoa ; and the newspaper editors were, as usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries by their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions. Meanwhile the partisans of the Bourbons were secretly endeavouring to form a conspiracy in the south, and the Duke of Berri desired to join the British army, pretending that 20,000 Frenchmen were already armed and organized, at the head of which he would place himself. In fine, all was exultation and extravagance. But Lord Wellington, well understanding the inflated nature of such hopes and promises, while affecting to rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, by observing, "*that if he had done all that was expected, he should have been before that period in the moon.*"

With respect to the Duke of Berri's views, it was for the sovereigns, he said, to decide whether the restoration of the Bourbons should form part of their policy ; but as yet no fixed line of conduct, on that or any other political points, was declared. It was for their interest to get rid of Napoleon, and there could be no question of the advantage or propriety of accepting the aid of a Bourbon party, without pledging themselves to dethrone the emperor. The Bourbons might, indeed, decline, in default of such a pledge, to involve their partisans in rebellion, and he advised them to do so, because Napoleon's power rested, internally, upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption ever established in any country ; externally, upon his military force, which was supported almost exclu-

sively by foreign contributions. Once confined to the limits of France, he would be unable to bear the double expense of his government and army; the reduction of either would be fatal to him, and the object of the Bourbons would thus be obtained without risk. But, if they did not concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of Europe must declare they would dethrone Napoleon before the Duke of Berri should be allowed to join the army; and the British government must make up its mind upon the question.

This reasoning put an end to the project, because neither the English cabinet nor the allied sovereigns were ready to adopt a decisive open line of policy. The ministers, exulting at the progress of aristocratic domination, had no thought save that of wasting England's substance by extravagant subsidies and supplies, taken without gratitude by the continental powers, who held themselves noways bound thereby to uphold the common cause, which each secretly designed to make available for peculiar interests. Moreover, they all still trembled before the conqueror, and none would pledge themselves to a decided policy. Lord Wellington alone moved with a firm composure, the result of profound and well-understood calculations; yet his mind, naturally so dispassionate, was strangely clouded at this time by personal hatred of Napoleon.

Where is the proof, or even probability, of that great man's system of government being internally dependent upon "*the most extensive corruption ever established in any country?*"

The annual expenditure of France was scarcely half that of England, and Napoleon rejected public loans, which are the very life-blood of state corruption. He left no debt. Under him no man devoured the public substance in idleness merely because he was of a privileged class; the state servants were largely paid but they were made to labour effectually for the state. They did not eat their bread and sleep. His system of public accounts, remarkable for its exactness, simplicity, and comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public fraud, and therefore extremely unfavourable to corruption. Napoleon's power was supported in France by that deep sense of his goodness as a sovereign, and that admiration for his genius which pervaded the poorer and middle classes of the people; by the love which they bore towards him, and still bear for his memory because he cherished the principles of a just equality. They loved him also for his incessant activity in the public service, his freedom from all private vices, and because his public works, wondrous for their number their utility and grandeur, never stood still; under him the poor man never wanted work. To France he gave noble institutions, a comparatively just code of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the Romans. His *Cadastré*, more extensive and perfect than the Domesday Book, that monument of the wisdom and greatness of our Norman Conqueror, was alone sufficient to endear him to the nation. Rapidly advancing under his vigorous superintendence, it registered and taught every man the true value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities public or private. It was designed and most ably adapted to fix and secure titles to property, to prevent frauds, to abate litigation, to apportion the weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the revenue, and to secure the sacred freedom of the poor man's home. The French *Cadastré*, although not original, would from its comprehensiveness, have been when completed the greatest boon ever conferred upon a civilized nation by a statesman.

To say that the emperor was supported by his soldiers, is to say that he was supported by the people; because the law of conscription, that mighty staff on which France leaned when all Europe attempted to push her down, the conscription, without which she could never have sustained the dreadful war of antagonist principles entailed upon her by the revolution; that energetic law, which he did not establish but which he freed from abuse, and rendered great, national, and endurable by causing it to strike equally on all classes, the conscription made the soldiers the real representatives of the people. The troops idolized Napoleon, well they might, and to assert that their attachment commenced only when they became soldiers, is to acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness of mind turned hatred into devotion the moment he was approached. But Napoleon never was

hated by the people of France ; he was their own creation and they loved him so as never monarch was loved before. His march from Cannes to Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of poor men, who were not soldiers, can never be effaced or even disfigured. For six weeks, at any moment, a single assassin might by a single shot have acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide, and obtained vast rewards besides from the trembling monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who scrupled not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many there were base enough to undertake but none so hardy as to execute the crime, and Napoleon, guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed to a throne from whence it required a million of foreign bayonets to drive him again. From the throne they drove him, but not from the thoughts and hearts of men.

Lord Wellington having shaken off the weight of the continental policy, proceeded to consider the question of invading France simply as a military operation, which might conduce to or militate against the security of the Peninsula while Napoleon's power was weakened by the war in Germany ; and such was his inflexible probity of character, that no secret ambitious promptings, no facility of gaining personal reputation, diverted him from this object, all the renown of which he already enjoyed, the embarrassments, mortifications and difficulties, enormous, although to the surface-seeing public there appeared none, alone remaining.

The rupture of the congress of Prague, Austria's, accession to the coalition, and the fall of San Sebastian, were favourable circumstances ; but he relied not much on the military skill of the banded sovereigns, and a great defeat might at any moment dissolve their alliance. Napoleon could then reinforce Soult and drive the allies back upon Spain, where the French still possessed the fortresses of Santona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon, Fraga, Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum, and Denia. Meanwhile Lord William Bentinck, misled by false information, had committed a serious error in sending Del Parque's army to Tudela, because the Ordal disaster and subsequent retreat showed that Suchet was strong enough, if it so pleased him, to drive the Anglo-Sicilian army back even to the Xucar and recover all his strong places. In fine the affairs of Catalonia were in the same unsatisfactory state they had been in from the first. It was not even certain that a British army would remain there at all, for Lord William, assured of Murat's defection, was intent upon invading Italy ; and the ministers seemed to have leaned towards the project, since Wellington now seriously desired to know whether the Anglo-Sicilians were to go or stay in Spain.

Lord William himself had quitted that army, making the seventh change in 15 months ; this alone was sufficient to account for its misfortunes, and the Spanish generals, who had been placed under the English commander, ridiculed the latter's ill success and spoke vauntingly of themselves. Strenuously did Lord Wellington urge the appointment of some commander for the Anglo-Sicilian troops who would devote his whole attention to his business, observing that at no period of the war would he have quitted his own army even for a few days without danger to its interests. But the English minister's ignorance of everything relating to war was profound, and at this time he was himself being stript of generals. Graham, Picton, Leith, Lord Dalhousie, H. Clinton, and Skerrit, had gone or were going to England on account of ill health, wounds, or private business ; and Marshal Beresford was at Lisbon, where dangerous intrigues, to be noticed hereafter, menaced the existence of the Portuguese army. Castaños and Giron had been removed by the Spanish regency from their commands, and O'Donnel, described as an able officer but of the most impracticable temper, being denied the chief command of Elio's, Copons', and Del Parque's troops, quitted the army under pretext that his old wounds had broken out ; whereupon, Giron was placed at the head of the Andalusians. The operations in Catalonia were, however, so important, that Lord Wellington thought of going there himself ; and he would have done so, if the after misfortunes of Napoleon in Germany, had not rendered it impossible for that monarch to reinforce his troops on the Spanish frontier.

These general reasons for desiring to operate on the side of Catalonia were strengthened also by the consideration that the country immediately beyond the

Bidassoa, being sterile, the difficulty of feeding the army in winter would be increased; and the 25,000 half-starved Spaniards in his army would certainly plunder for subsistence and incense the people of France. Moreover Soult's actual position was strong, his troops still numerous, and his entrenched camp furnished a secure retreat. Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port were so placed that no serious invasion could be made until one or both were taken or blockaded, which, during the tempestuous season and while the Admiralty refused to furnish sufficient naval means, was scarcely possible; even to get at those fortresses would be a work of time, difficult against Soult alone, impracticable if Suchet, as he well might, came to the other's support. Towards Catalonia therefore Lord Wellington desired to turn when the frontier of the western Pyrenees should be secured by the fall of Pampeluna. Yet he thought it not amiss meanwhile to yield something to the allied sovereigns, and give a spur to public feeling by occupying a menacing position within the French territory. A simple thing this seemed, but the English general made no slight concession when he thus bent his military judgment to political considerations.

The French position was the base of a triangle, of which Bayonne was the apex, and the great roads leading from thence to Irun and St. Jean Pied de Port were the sides. A rugged mass of mountains intervened between the left and centre, but nearly all the valleys and communications, coming from Spain beyond the Nive, centred at St. Jean Pied de Port and were embraced by an entrenched camp which Foy occupied in front of that fortress. That general could, without calling upon Paris, who was at Oleron, bring 15,000 men including the national guards into action, and serious dispositions were necessary to dislodge him; but these could not be made secretly, and Soult calculated upon having time to aid him and deliver a general battle on chosen ground. Meanwhile Foy barred any movement along the right bank of the Nive, and he could, either by the great road leading to Bayonne or by shorter communications through Bidaray, reach the bridge of Cambo on the Nive and so gain Espelette behind the camps of Ainhoa. From thence, passing the Nivelle by the bridges at Amotz and Serres he could reach St. Jean de Luz, and it was by this route he moved to aid in the attack of San Marcial. However, the allies marching from the Alduides and the Bastan could also penetrate by St. Martin D'Arosa and the Gorospil mountain to Bidaray, that is to say, between Foy's and D'Erlon's positions. Yet the roads were very difficult, and as the French sent out frequent scouring detachments and the bridge of Cambo was secured by works, Foy could not be easily cut off from the rest of the army.

D'Erlon's advanced camps were near Urdax, and on the Mondarain and Choupera mountains, but his main position was a broad ridge behind Ainhoa, the right covering the bridge of Amotz. Beyond that bridge Clausel's position extended along a range of strong hills, trending towards Ascaïn and Serres, and as the Nivelle swept with a curve quite round his rear, his right flank rested on that river also. The redoubts of San Barbe and the camp of Sarre, barring the roads leading from Vera and the Puerto de Echallar, were in advance of his left, and the greater Rhune, whose bare rocky head lifted 2800 feet above the sea level overtopped all the neighbouring mountains, formed, in conjunction with its dependants the Commissary and Bayonette, a mask for his right.

From the Bayonette the French position run along the summit of the Mandale or Sulcogain mountain, on a single line, but from thence to the sea the ridges suddenly abated and there were two lines of defence; the first along the Bidassoa, the second commencing near St. Jean de Luz stretched from the heights of Bordegain towards Ascaïn, having the camps of Urogne and the Sans Culottes in advance. Reille's divisions guarded these lines, and the second was connected with Clausel's position by Villatte's reserve which was posted at Ascaïn. Finally the whole system of defence was tied to that of St. Jean Pied de Port, by the double bridge-head at Cambo which secured the junction of Foy with the rest of the army.

The French worked diligently on their entrenchments, yet they were but little advanced when the castle of San Sebastian surrendered, and Wellington had even then matured a plan of attack as daring as any undertaken during the whole war. This was to seize the great Rhune mountain and its dependants, and at the same

time to force the passage of the Lower Bidassoa and establish his left wing in the French territory. He would thus bring the Rhune Commissary and Bayonette mountains, forming a salient menacing point of great altitude and strength towards the French centre, within his own system, and shorten his communications by gaining the command of the road running along the river from Irun to Vera. Thus also he would obtain the port of Fuenterabia, which, though bad in winter, was some advantage to a general whose supplies came from the ocean, and who with scanty means of land-transport had to encounter the perverse negligence and even opposition of the Spanish authorities. Moreover Passages, his nearest port, was restricted in its anchorage-ground, hard to make from the sea, and dangerous when full of vessels.

He designed this operation for the middle of September, immediately after the castle of San Sebastian fell, and before the French works acquired strength, but some error retarded the arrival of his pontoons, the weather became bad, and the attack, which depended, as we shall find, upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity deferred until the 7th of October. Meanwhile, to mislead Soult, to ascertain Foy's true position about St. Jean Pied de Port, and to strengthen his own right, he brought part of Del Parque's force up from Tudela to Pampeluna. The Andalusian division which had remained at the blockade after the battle of Sauroren then rejoined Giron at Echallar, and at the same time Mina's troops gathered in the neighbourhood of Roncesvalles. Wellington himself repaired to that quarter on the 1st of October, and in his way, passing through the Alduides, he caused General Campbell to surprise some isolated posts on the rock of Airola ; a French scouting detachment was also cut off near the foundry of Baygorry, and 2000 sheep were swept from the valley.

These affairs awaked Soult's jealousy. He was in daily expectation of an attack without being able to ascertain on what quarter the blow would fall, and at first, deceived by false information that the fourth division had reinforced Hill, he thought the march of Mina's troops, and the Andalusians, was intended to mask an offensive moment by the Val de Baygorry. The arrival of light cavalry in the Bastan, Lord Wellington's presence at Roncesvalles, and the loss of the post at Airola seemed to confirm this ; but he knew the pontoons were at Oyarzun, and some deserters told him that the real object of the allies was to gain the great Rhune. On the other hand a French commissary, taken at San Sebastian and exchanged, after remaining 12 days at Lesaca, assured him, that nothing at Wellington's head-quarters indicated a serious attack, although the officers spoke of one, and there were many movements of troops ; and this weighed much with the French general, because the slow march of the pontoons, and the wet weather, had caused a delay contradictory to the reports of the spies and deserters. It was also beyond calculation that Wellington should, against his military judgment, push his left wing into France merely to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns in Germany, and as the most obvious line for a permanent invasion was by his right and centre, there was no apparent cause for deferring his operations.

The true reason of the procrastination, namely, the state of the tides and fords on the Lower Bidassoa, was necessarily hidden from Soult, who finally inclined to the notion that Wellington only designed to secure his blockade at Pampeluna from interruption by menacing the French and impeding their labours, the results of which were now becoming visible. However, as all the deserters and spies came with the same story, he recommended increased vigilance along the whole line. And yet so little did he anticipate the nature of his opponent's project, that on the 6th he reviewed D'Erlon's divisions at Ainhoa, and remained that night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended, and no way suspecting that it would be against his right. But Wellington could not diminish his troops on the side of Roncesvalles and the Alduides, lest Foy and Paris, and the light cavalry under Pierre Soult, should unite at St. Jean Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna ; the troops at Maya were already posted offensively, menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle, and it was therefore only with his left wing and left centre, and against the French right that he could act.

Early in October a reinforcement of 1200 British soldiers arrived from England.

Mina was then in the Ahescoa, on the right of General Hill, who was thus enabled to relieve Campbell's Portuguese in the Alduides ; and the latter marching to Maya replaced the third division, which, shifting to its left, occupied the heights above Zagaramurdi, to enable the seventh division to relieve Giron's Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar.

These dispositions were made with a view to the attack of the great Rhune and its dependents, the arrangements for which shall now be described.

Giron, moving with his Andalusians from the Ivantelly, was to assail a lofty ridge or saddle, uniting the Commissary and the great Rhune. A battalion, stealing up the slopes and hollows on his right flank, was to seize the rocky head of the last-named mountain, and after placing detachments there in observation of the roads leading round it from Sarre and Ascain, was to descend upon the saddle and menace the rear of the enemy's position at the Puerto de Vera. Meanwhile the principal attack was to be made in two columns, but to protect the right and rear against a counter-attack from Sarre, the Spanish general was to leave one brigade in the narrow pass leading from Vera, between the Ivantelly and the Rhune to that place.

On the left of Giron the light division was to assail the Bayonette mountain and the Puerto de Vera, connecting its right with Giron's left by skirmishers.

Longa, who had resumed his old positions above the Salinas de Lesaca, was to move in two columns across the Bidassoa. One passing by the ford of Salinas was to aid the left wing of the light division in its attack on the Bayonette ; the other passing by the bridge of Vera, was to move up the ravine separating the slopes of the Bayonette from the Puerto de Vera, and thus connect the two attacks of the light division. During these operations Longa was also to send some men over the river at Andarlassa, to seize a telegraph which the French used to communicate between the left and centre of their line.

Behind the light division General Cole was to take post, with the fourth division, on Santa Barbara, pushing forward detachments to secure the commanding points gained by the fighting troops in front. The sixth division was meanwhile to make a demonstration on the right by Urdax and Zagaramurdi, against D'Erlon's advanced posts. Thus, without weakening his line between Roncesvalles and Echallar, Lord Wellington put nearly 20,000 men in motion against the Rhune mountain and its dependants, and he had still 24,000 disposable to force the passage of the Lower Bidassoa.

It has been already shown that between Andarlassa and Biriatu, a distance of three miles, there were neither roads nor fords nor bridges. The French trusting to this difficulty of approach, and to their entrenchments on the craggy slopes of the Mandale, had collected their troops principally where the Bildox or green mountain and the entrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords. Against these points Wellington directed General Freyre's Spaniards, who were to descend from San Marcial, cross the upper fords of Biriatu, assail the Bildox and Mandale mountains, and turn the left of that part of the enemy's line which being prolonged from Biriatu crossed the royal road and passed behind the town of Andaya.

Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence were the mountain of *Louis XIV.*, the ridge called the *Caffé Republicain*, and the town of Andaya. Behind these the *Calvaire d'Urogne*, the *Croix des Bouquets*, and the camp of the *Sans Culottes*, served as rallying posts.

For the assault on these positions Wellington designed to employ the first and fifth divisions and the unattached brigades of Wilson and Lord Aylmer, in all about 15,000 men. By the help of Spanish fishermen he had secretly discovered three fords, practicable at low water, between the bridge of Behobia and the sea, and his intent was to pass his column at the old fords above, and at the new fords below the bridge, and this though the tides rose 16 feet, leaving at the ebb open heavy sands not less than half a mile broad. The left bank of the river also was completely exposed to observation from the enemy's hills, which though low in comparison of the mountains above the bridge, were nevertheless strong ridges of defence ; but relying on his previous measures to deceive the enemy the English general disdained these dangers, and his anticipations were not belied by the result.

The unlikelihood that a commander, having a better line of operations, would pass such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth, deceived the French general. Meanwhile his lieutenants were negligent. Of Reille's two divisions La Martinière's, now commanded by General Boyer, was at the camp of Urogne, and on the morning of the seventh was dispersed as usual to labour at the works; Villatte's reserve was at Ascain and Serres; the 5000 men composing Maucune's division were indeed on the first line but unexpectant of an attack, and though the works on the Mandale were finished, and those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter to the sea they were scarcely commenced.

Passage of the Bidassoa.—The night set in heavily. A sullen thunder-storm gathering about the craggy summit of the Peña de Haya came slowly down its flanks, and towards morning rolling over the Bidassoa fell in its greatest violence upon the French positions. During this turmoil Wellington, whose pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun, disposed a number of guns and howitzers along the crest of San Marcial, and his columns attained their respective stations along the banks of the river. Freyre's Spaniards, one brigade of the guards, and Wilson's Portuguese, stretching from the Biriatu fords to that near the broken bridge of Behobia, were ensconced behind the detached ridge which the French had first seized in the attack of the 31st. The second brigade of guards and the Germans of the first division were concealed near Irun, close to a ford below the bridge of Behobia called the great Jonco. The British brigades of the fifth division covered themselves behind a large river embankment opposite Andaya; Sprye's Portuguese and Lord Aylmer's brigade were posted in the ditch of Fuenterrabia.

As all the tents were left standing in the camps of the allies, the enemy could perceive no change on the morning of the 7th, but at seven o'clock, the fifth division and Lord Aylmer's brigade emerging from their concealment took the sands in two columns, that on the left pointing against the French camp of the Sans Culottes, that on the right against the ridge of Andaya. No shot was fired, but when they had passed the fords of the low-water channel a rocket was sent up from the steeple of Fuenterrabia as a signal. Then the guns and howitzers opened from San Marcial, the troops near Irun, covered by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco ford, and the passage above the bridge also commenced. From the crest of San Marcial seven columns could be seen at once, attacking on a line of five miles, those above the bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest, those below it appearing in the distance like huge sullen snakes winding over the heavy sands. The Germans missing the Jonco ford got into deep water but quickly recovered the true line, and the French, completely surprised, permitted even the brigades of the fifth division to gain the right bank and form their lines before a hostile musket flashed.

The cannonade from San Marcial was heard by Soult at Espelette, and at the same time the sixth division, advancing beyond Urdax and Zagaramurdi, made a false attack on D'Erlon's positions; the Portuguese brigade under Colonel Douglas, were however pushed too far and repulsed with the loss of 150 men, and the French marshal instantly detecting the true nature of this attack hurried to his right, but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before he arrived.

When the British artillery first opened, Maucune's troops had assembled at their different posts of defence, and the French guns, established principally near the mountain of Louis XIV. and the *Café Republicain*, commenced firing. The alarm spread, and Boyer's marched from the second line behind Urogne to support Maucune without waiting for the junction of the working parties; but his brigades moved separately as they could collect, and before the first came into action, Sprye's Portuguese, forming the extreme left of the allies, menaced the camp of the Sans Culottes; thither therefore one of Boyer's regiments was ordered, while the others advanced by the royal road towards the *Croix des Bouquets*. But Andaya guarded only by a picquet, was abandoned, and Reille thinking the camp of the Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer's men reached it, sent a battalion there from the centre, thus weakening his force at the chief point of attack; for the British brigades of the fifth division, were now advancing left in front from Andaya, and bearing under a sharp fire of artillery and musketry towards the *Croix des Bouquets*.

By this time the columns of the first division had passed the river, one above the bridge, preceded by Wilson's Portuguese, one below, preceded by Colin Halkett's German light troops, who aided by the fire of the guns on San Marcial, drove back the enemy's advanced posts, won the *Caffé Republicain*, the mountain of Louis XIV., and drove the French from those heights to the *Croix des Bouquets*: this was the key of the position, and towards it guns and troops were now hastening from every side. The Germans, who had lost many men in the previous attack, were here brought to a check, for the heights were very strong, and Boyer's leading battalions were now close at hand; but at this critical moment Colonel Cameron arrived with the 9th regiment of the fifth division, and passing through the German skirmishers rushed with great vehemence to the summit of the first height. The French infantry instantly opened their ranks to let their guns retire, and then retreated themselves at full speed to a second ridge, somewhat lower but where they could only be approached on a narrow front. Cameron as quickly threw his men into a single column and bore against this new position, which curving inwards enabled the French to pour a concentrated fire upon his regiment; nor did his violent course seem to dismay them until he was within ten yards, when appalled by the furious shout and charge of the ninth they gave way, and the ridges of the *Croix des Bouquets* were won as far as the royal road. The British regiment however lost many men and officers, and during the fight the French artillery and scattered troops, coming from different points and rallying on Boyer's battalions, were gathered on the ridges to the French left of the road.

The entrenched camp above Biriatu and the Bildoix, had been meanwhile defended with success in front, but Freyre turned them with his right wing, which being opposed only by a single battalion soon won the Mandale mountain, and the French fell back from that quarter to the *Calvaire d'Urogne* and *Jollimont*. Reille thus beaten at the *Croix des Bouquets*, and his flanks turned, the left by the Spaniards on the Mandale, the right by the allies along the sea-coast, retreated in great disorder along the royal causeway and the old road of Bayonne. He passed through the village of Urogne and the British skirmishers at first entered it in pursuit, but they were beaten out again by the second brigade of Boyer's division, for Soult now arrived with part of Villatte's reserve and many guns, and by his presence and activity restored order and revived the courage of the troops at the moment when the retreat was degenerating into a flight.

Reille lost eight pieces of artillery and about 400 men, the allies did not lose more than 600 of which half were Spaniards, so slight and easy had the skill of the general rendered this stupendous operation. But if the French commander, penetrating Wellington's design, and avoiding the surprise, had opposed all his troops, amounting, with what Villatte could spare, to 16,000, instead of the 5000 actually engaged, the passage could scarcely have been forced; and a check would have been tantamount to a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning tide would have come with a swallowing flood upon the rear.

Equally unprepared and equally unsuccessful were the French on the side of Vera, although the struggle there proved more fierce and constant.

At daybreak Giron had descended from the *Ivantly* rocks and General Alten from Santa Barbara; the first to the gorge of the pass leading from Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where he was joined by half of Longa's force.

One brigade, consisting of the 43rd, the 17th Portuguese regiment of the line, and the 1st and 3rd battalions of riflemen, drew up in column on an open space to the right of Vera. The other brigade, under Colonel Colborne, consisting of the 52nd, two battalions of *caçadores* and a battalion of British riflemen, was disposed on the left of Vera. Half of Longa's division was between these brigades, the other half after crossing the ford of Salinas drew up on Colborne's left. The whole of the narrow vale of Vera was thus filled with troops ready to ascend the mountains, and General Cole, displaying his force to advantage on the heights of Santa Barbara, presented a formidable reserve.

Taupin's division guarded the enormous positions in front of the allies. His right was on the Bayonette, from whence a single slope descended to a small plain about two parts down the mountain. From this platform three distinct tongues

shot into the valley below, each was defended by an advanced post, and the platform itself secured by a star redoubt, behind which, about half way up the single slope, there was a second retrenchment with abattis. Another large redoubt and an unfinished breast-work on the superior crest completed the system of defence for the Bayonette.

The Commissary, which is a continuation of the Bayonette towards the great Rhune, was covered by a profound gulf thickly wooded and defended with skirmishers, and between this gulf and another of the same nature the main road, leading from Vera over the Puerto, pierced the centre of the French position. Rugged and ascending with short abrupt turns, this road was blocked at every uncovered point with abattis and small retrenchments; each obstacle was commanded, at half musket shot, by small detachments placed on all the projecting parts overlooking the ascent, and a regiment, entrenched above on the Puerto itself, connected the troops on the crest of the Bayonette and Commissary with those on the saddle ridge, against which Giron's attack was directed.

But between Alten's right and Giron's left was an isolated ridge called by the soldiers the Boar's back, the summit of which, about half a mile long and rounded at each end, was occupied by four French companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as it were into the gulf to cover the Puerto and saddle ridges, although of mean height in comparison of the towering ranges behind, was yet so great that the few warning shots fired from the summit by the enemy, reached the allies at its base with that slow singing sound which marks the dying force of a musket-ball. It was essential to take the Boar's back before the general attack commenced, and five companies of British riflemen, supported by the 17th Portuguese regiment, were ordered to assail it at the Vera end, while a battalion of Giron's Spaniards, preceded by a detached company of the 43rd, attacked it on the other.

At four o'clock in the morning Clausel had received intelligence that the Bayonette was to be assaulted that day or the next, and at seven o'clock he heard from Conroux, who commanded at Sarre, that Giron's camps were abandoned although the tents of the seventh division were still standing; at the same time the sound of musketry was heard on the side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun, and then came Taupin's report that the vale of Vera was filled with troops. To this last quarter Clausel hurried. The Spaniards had already driven Conroux's outposts from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment was creeping up towards the unguarded head of the great Rhune. He immediately ordered four regiments of Conroux's division to occupy the summit, the front, and the flanks of that mountain, and he formed a reserve of two other regiments behind. With these troops he designed to secure the mountain and support Taupin, but ere they could reach their destination that general's fate was decided.

Second Combat of Vera.—Soon after seven o'clock a few cannon-shot from some mountain-guns, of which each side had a battery, were followed by the Spanish musketry on the right, and the next moment the "Boar's back" was simultaneously assailed at both ends. The riflemen on the Vera side ascended to a small pine-wood two-thirds of the way up and there rested, but soon resuming their movement with a scornful gallantry they swept the French off the top, disdaining to use their rifles beyond a few shots down the reverse side, to show that they were masters of the ridge. This was the signal for the general attack. The 17th Portuguese followed the victorious sharp-shooters, the 43rd, preceded by their own skirmishers and by the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged into the rugged pass, Longa's troops entered the gloomy wood of the ravine on the left, and beyond them Colborne's brigade moving by narrow paths and throwing out skirmishers assailed the Bayonette, the 52nd took the middle tongue, the caçadores and riflemen the two outermost, and all bore with a concentric movement against the star redoubt on the platform above. Longa's second brigade should have flanked the left of this attack with a wide skirting movement, but neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of such warfare, and therefore quietly followed the riflemen in reserve.

Soon the open slopes of the mountains were covered with men and with fire, a heavy confused sound of mingled shouts and musketry filled the deep hollows

between, and the white smoke came curling up above the dark forest trees which covered their gloomy recesses. The French, compared with their assailants, seemed few and scattered on the mountain side, and Kempt's brigade soon forced its way without a check through all the retrenchments on the main pass, his skirmishers spreading wider and breaking into small detachments of support as the depth of the ravine lessened and the slopes melted into the higher ridges. When about half-way up an open platform gave a clear view over the Bayonette slopes, and all eyes were turned that way. Longa's right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed labouring and over-matched, but beyond, on the broad open space in front of the star fort, the *caçadores* and riflemen of Colborne's brigade, were seen coming out, in small bodies, from a forest which covered the three tongues of land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire was sharp, their pace rapid, and in a few moments they closed upon the redoubt in a mass as if resolved to storm it. The 52nd were not then in sight, and the French thinking from the dark clothing that all were Portuguese rushed in close order out of the entrenchment; they were numerous and very sudden; the rifle as a weapon is over-matched by the musket and bayonet, and this rough charge sent the scattered assailants back over the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill cries the French followed, but just then the 52nd appeared, partly in line, partly in column, on the platform, and raising their shout rushed forward. The red uniform and full career of this regiment startled the hitherto adventurous French, they stopped short, wavered, and then turning fled to their entrenchment; the 52nd following hard entered the works with them, the riflemen and *caçadores* who had meanwhile rallied passed it on both flanks, and for a few moments everything was hidden by a dense volume of smoke. Soon however the British shout pealed again, and the whole mass emerged on the other side, the French, now the fewer, flying, the others pursuing, until the second entrenchment, half-way up the parent slope, enabled the retreating troops to make another stand.

The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt's brigade now echoed along the mountain side, and with renewed vigour the men continued to scale the craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to the top of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne, after having carried the second entrenchment above the star fort, was brought to a check by the works on the very crest of the mountain, from whence the French not only plied his troops with musketry at a great advantage, but rolled huge stones down the steep.

These works were extensive, well lined with men, and strengthened by a large redoubt on the right, but the defenders soon faltered, for their left flank was turned by Kempt and the effects of Lord Wellington's skilful combinations were now felt in another quarter. Freyre's Spaniards after carrying the Mandale mountain, between Biriātu and the Bayonette, had pushed to a road leading from the latter by Jollimont to St. Jean de Luz, and this was the line of retreat from the crest of the Bayonette for Taupin's right wing; but Freyre's Spaniards got there first, and if Longa's brigade instead of slowly following Colborne had spread out widely on the left, a military line would have been completed from Giron to Freyre. Still Taupin's right was cut off on that side, and he was forced to file it under fire along the crest of the Bayonette to reach the Puerto de Vera road, where he was joined by his centre. He effected this but lost his mountain battery and 300 men. These last, apparently the garrison of the large fort on the extreme right of the Bayonette crest, were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner. Accompanied by only one of his staff and half-a-dozen riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly, and with great presence of mind and intrepidity ordered them to lay down their arms, an order which they thinking themselves entirely cut off obeyed. Meanwhile the French skirmishers in the deep ravine, between the two lines of attack, being feebly pushed by Longa's troops, retreated too slowly and getting amongst some rocks from whence there was no escape surrendered to Kempt's brigade.

The right and centre of Taupin's division being now completely beaten, fled down the side of the mountain towards Olette, they were pursued by a part of the allies until they rallied upon Villatte's reserve, which was in order of battle on a ridge extending across the gorge of Olette between Urogne and Ascaïn. The Bayonette and Commissary, with the Puerto de Vera, were thus won after five hours' incessant

fighting and toiling up their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle was still maintained by the French troops on the Rhune.

Giron, after driving Conroux's advanced post from the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre had, following his orders, pushed a battalion from that side towards the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack which Conroux might make. And when his left wing was rendered free to move by the capture of the Boar's back, he fought his way up abreast with the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to his own right of the Puerto. There however he was arrested by a strong line of abattis from behind which two French regiments poured a heavy fire. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer Downie, now a Spanish general, encouraged them with his voice and they kept their ranks, they seemed irresolute and did not advance. There happened to be present an officer of the 43rd regiment named Havelock, who being attached to General Alten's staff was sent to ascertain Giron's progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He took off his hat, he called upon the Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his horse, at one bound cleared the abattis and went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for "*El chico blanco*," "*the fair boy*," so they called him, for he was very young and had light hair, with one shock broke through the French, and this at the very moment when their centre was flying under the fire of Kempt's skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera.

The two regiments thus defeated by the Spaniards retired by their left along the saddle-ridge to the flanks of the Rhune, so that Clausel had now eight regiments concentrated on this great mountain. Two occupied the crest, including the highest rock called the Hermitage; four were on the flanks, descending towards Ascain on one hand, and towards Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower and parallel crest behind called the Small Rhune. In this situation they were attacked at four o'clock by Giron's right wing. The Spaniards first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of crags about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage itself, endeavouring at the same time to turn it by their right. In both objects they were defeated with loss. The Hermitage was impregnable, the French rolled down stones large enough to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted to a distant musketry which lasted until night. This day's fighting cost Taupin's division two generals and 400 men killed and wounded, and 500 prisoners. The loss of the allies was nearly a thousand, of which about 500 were Spaniards, and the success was not complete, for while the French kept possession of the summit of the Rhune, the allies' new position was insecure.

The front and the right flank of that great mountain were impregnable, but Lord Wellington observing that the left flank, descending towards Sarre, was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards on that side on the 8th, designing a combined attack against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. At three o'clock in the afternoon the rocks which studded the lower parts of the Rhune slope were assailed by the Spaniards, and at the same time detachments of the seventh division descended from the Puerto de Echallar upon the fort of San Barbe, and other outworks covering the advanced French camp of Sarre. The Andalusians soon won the rocks and an entrenched height that commanded the camp, for Clausel, too easily alarmed at some slight demonstrations made by the sixth division towards the bridge of Amotz in rear of his left, thought he should be cut off from his great camp, and very suddenly abandoned not only the slope of the mountain but all his advanced works in the basin below, including the fort of San Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the height behind Sarre still holding with their right the smaller Rhune, but the consequences of his error were soon made apparent. Wellington immediately established a strong body of the Spanish troops close up to the rocks of the Hermitage, and the two French regiments there, seeing the lower slopes and the fort of San Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off, and without orders abandoned the impregnable rocks of the Hermitage and retired in the night to the smaller Rhune. The next morning some of the seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but they were quickly repulsed and

would have lost the camp and works taken the day before if the Spaniards had not succoured them.

The whole loss on the three days of fighting was about 1400 French and 1600 of the allies, one half being Spaniards, but many of the wounded were not brought in until the third day after the actions, and several perished miserably where they fell, it being impossible to discover them in those vast solitudes. Some men were also lost from want of discipline; having descended into the French villages they got drunk and were taken the next day by the enemy. Nor was the number small of those who plundered in defiance of Lord Wellington's proclamation; for he thought it necessary to arrest and send to England several officers, and renewed his proclamation, observing that if he had five times as many men he could not venture to invade France unless marauding was prevented. It is remarkable that the French troops on the same day acted towards their own countrymen in the same manner, but Soult also checked the mischief with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some reputation to be shot as an example, for having suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre during the action.

With exception of the slight checks sustained at Sarre and Ainhoa, the course of these operations had been eminently successful, and surely the bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous positions must be admired. To them the unfinished state of the French works was not visible. Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast slopes of mountains which were scarcely accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. This they could see, yet cared neither for the growing strength of the works, the height of the mountains, nor the breadth of the river with its heavy sands, and its mighty rushing tide; all were despised, and while they marched with this confident valour, it was observed that the French fought in defence of their dizzy steepes with far less fierceness than when, striving against insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren. Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the feebleness of the defence on this occasion may be traced to another cause. It was a general's not a soldier's battle. Wellington had with overmastering combinations overwhelmed each point of attack. Taupin's and Maucune's divisions were each less than 5000 strong, and they were separately assailed, the first by 18,000, the second by 15,000 men, and at neither point were Reille and Clausel able to bring their reserves into action before the positions were won.

Soult complained that he had repeatedly told his lieutenants an attack was to be expected, and recommended extreme vigilance; yet they were quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th and again on the night of the 6th. The passage of the river he said had commenced at seven o'clock, long after daylight, the allies' masses were then clearly to be seen forming on the banks, and there was full time for Boyer's division to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost. The battle was fought in disorder, with less than 5000 men, instead of with 10,000 in good order, and supported by a part of Villatte's reserve. To this negligence the generals added also discouragement. They had so little confidence in the strength of their positions, that if the allies had pushed vigorously forward before the marshal's arrival from Espelette, they would have entered St. Jean de Luz, turned the right of the second position and forced the French army back upon the Nive and the Adour.

This reasoning of Soult was correct, but such a stroke did not belong to Lord Wellington's system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted whether he could even maintain his army during the winter in the position he had already gained, and he was averse to the experiment while Pampeluna held out and the war in Germany bore an undecided aspect.

CHAPTER V.

SOULT was apprehensive for some days that Lord Wellington would push his offensive operations further, but when he knew by Foy's reports, and by the numbers of the allies assembled on his right, that there was no design of attacking his left, he resumed his labours to advance the works covering St. Jean de Luz. He also kept

a vigilant watch from his centre, holding his divisions in readiness to concentrate towards Sarre, and when he saw the heavy masses in his front disperse by degrees into different camps, he directed Clausel to recover the fort of San Barbe. This work was constructed on a comparatively low ridge barring issue from the gorge leading out of the vale of Vera to Sarre, and it defended the narrow ground between the Rhunes and the Nivelles river. Abandoned on the 8th without reason by the French, since it did not naturally belong to the position of the allies, it was now occupied by a Spanish picquet of 40 men. Some battalions were also encamped in a small wood close behind; but many officers and men slept in the fort, and on the night of the 12th, about 11 o'clock, three battalions of Conroux's division reached the platform on which the fort stood without being perceived. The work was then escalated, the troops behind it went off in confusion at the first alarm, and 200 soldiers with 15 officers were made prisoners. The Spaniards, ashamed of the surprise, made a vigorous effort to recover the fort at daylight, they were repulsed, and repeated the attempt with five battalions, but Clausel brought up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in the wood which lasted for several hours, the French endeavouring to regain the whole of their old entrenchments and the Spaniards to recover the fort. Neither succeeded, and San Barbe, too near the enemy's position to be safely held, was resigned with a loss of 200 men by the French and 500 by the Spaniards. Soon after this isolated action a French sloop freighted with stores for Santana attempted to run from St. Jean de Luz, and being chased by three English brigs and cut off from the open sea, her crew after exchanging a few distant shots with one of the brigs, set her on fire and escaped in their boats to the Adour.

Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was organized in three grand divisions. The right, having Mina's and Morillo's battalions attached to it, was commanded by Sir Rowland Hill, and extended from Roncesvalles to the Bastan. The centre, occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune, and Bayonette mountains, was given to Marshal Beresford. The left, extending from the Mandale mountain to the sea, was under Sir John Hope. This officer succeeded Graham, who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at Coruña after Sir John Moore's death, he was superior in rank to Lord Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular war, but when the latter obtained the baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope, with a patriotism and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie, the friend and comrade of Moore, offered to serve as second in command, and Lord Wellington joyfully accepted him, observing that he was the "*ablest officer in the army.*"

The positions of the right and centre were offensive and menacing, but the left was still on the defensive, and the Bidassoa, impassable at high water below the bridge, was close behind. However the ridges were strong, a powerful artillery was established on the right bank, field-works were constructed, and although the fords below Behobia furnished but a dangerous retreat even at low water, those above were always available, and a pontoon bridge laid down for the passage of the guns during the action was a sure resource. The front was along the heights of the Croix des Bouquets facing Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes, and there was a reserve in an entrenched camp above Andaya. The right of the line rested on the Mandale, and from that mountain and the Bayonette the allies could descend upon the flank of an attacking army.

Soult had, however, no intention of renewing the offensive. He had now lost many thousand men in battle, and the old soldiers remaining did not exceed 79,000 present under arms, including officers and artillerymen. Of this number the garrisons absorbed about 13,000, leaving 66,000 in the field, whereas the allies, counting Mina's and Del Parque's troops, now at Tudela, Pampeluna, and the Val de Irati, exceeded 100,000; 73,000, including officers, sergeants, and artillery-men, being British and Portuguese.* And this was below the calculation of the French general, for, deceived by the exaggerated reports which the Spaniards always made of their forces, he thought Del Parque had brought up 20,000 men, and that there were 140,000 combatants in his front. But it was not so, and as conscripts of a good description were now joining the French army rapidly, and the national

* Appendix, No. 29, section 2.

guards of the Pyrenees were many, it was in the number of soldiers rather than of men, that the English general had the advantage.

In this state of affairs Soult's policy was to maintain a strict defensive, under cover of which the spirit of the troops might be revived, the country in the rear organized, and the conscripts disciplined and hardened to war. The loss of the lower Bidassoa was in a political view mischievous to him. It had an injurious effect upon the spirit of the frontier departments, and gave encouragement to the secret partisans of the Bourbons; but in a military view it was a relief. The great development of the mountains bordering the Bidassoa had rendered their defence difficult; while holding them he had continual fear that his line would be pierced, and his army suddenly driven beyond the Adour. His position was now more concentrated.

The right, under Reille, formed two lines. One across the royal road on the fortified heights of Uroge and the camp of the *Sans Culottes*; the other in the entrenched camps of Bourdegain and Belchena, covering St. Jean de Luz, and barring the gorges of Olhette and Jollimont.

The centre, under Clausel, was posted on the ridges between Ascain and Amotz, holding the smaller Rhune in advance; but one division was retained by Soult in the camp of Serres, on the right of the Nivelle, overhanging Ascain. To replace it, one of D'Erlon's divisions crossed to the left of the Nivelle, and reinforced Clausel's left flank above Sarre.

Villatte's reserve was about St. Jean de Luz, but having the Italian brigade in the camp of Serres.

D'Erlon's remaining divisions continued in their old position, the right connected with Clausel's line by the bridge of Amotz; the left, holding the Choupera and Mondarin mountains, bordered on the Nive.

Behind Clausel and D'Erlon Soult had commenced a second chain of entrenched camps, prolonged from the camp of Serres up the right bank of the Nivelle to San Pé, thence by Suraide to the double bridge-head of Cambo on the Nive, and beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain, covering the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port. He had also called General Paris up from Oleron to the defence of the latter fortress and its entrenched camp, and now drew Foy down the Nive to Bidarray, half-way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo. There watching the issues from the Val de Baygorry he was ready to occupy the Ursouia mountain on the right of the Nive, or, moving by Cambo, to reinforce the great position on the left of that river according to circumstances.

To complete these immense entrenchments, which between the Nive and the sea were double, and on an opening of 16 miles, the whole army laboured incessantly, and all the resources of the country, whether of materials or working men, were called out by requisition. Nevertheless, this defensive warfare was justly regarded by the Duke of Dalmatia as unsuitable to the general state of affairs. Offensive operations were most consonant to the character of the French soldiers, and to the exigencies of the time. Recent experience had shown the impregnable nature of the allies' positions against a front attack, and he was too weak singly to change the theatre of operations. But when he looked at the strength of the armies appropriated by the emperor to the Spanish contest, he thought France would be ill-served if her generals could not resume the offensive successfully. Suchet had just proved his power at Ordal against Lord William Bentinck, and that nobleman's successor, with inferior rank and power, with an army unpaid and feeding on salt meat from the ships, with jealous and disputing colleagues amongst the Spanish generals, none of whom were willing to act cordially with him upon a fixed and well-considered plan, was in no condition to menace the French seriously. And that he was permitted at this important crisis to paralyse from 40,000 to 50,000 excellent French troops, possessing all the strong places of the country, was one of the most singular errors of the war.

Exclusive of national guards and detachments of the line disposed along the whole frontier, to guard the passes of the Pyrenees against sudden marauding excursions, the French armies counted at this time about 170,000 men and 17,000 horses.* Of these 138,000 were present under arms, and 30,000 conscripts were in

* Appendix, No. 30, section 2.

march to join them. They held all the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, and most of those in Aragon, Navarre, and Guipuscoa, and they could unite behind the Pyrenees for combined effort in safety. Lord Wellington could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians and all the Spaniards in arms on the eastern coast, bring into line 150,000 men. He had several sieges on his hands, and to unite his forces at any point required great dispositions to avoid an attack during a flank march. Suchet had above 30,000 disposable men; he could increase them to 40,000 by relinquishing some unimportant posts; his means in artillery were immense, and distributed in all his strong places, so that he could furnish himself from almost any point. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that 200 pieces of artillery, and 90,000 old soldiers, might have united at this period upon the flank of Lord Wellington, still leaving 30,000 conscripts and the national guards of the frontier, supported by the fortresses and entrenched camps of Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, the castles of Navarens and Jaca on one side, and the numerous garrisons of the fortresses in Catalonia on the other, to cover France from invasion.

To make this great power bear in a right direction was the Duke of Dalmatia's object, and his plans were large and worthy of his reputation. Yet he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his projects, and that marshal's resistance would appear to have sprung from personal dislike contracted during Soult's sojourn near Valencia in 1812. It has been already shown how lightly he abandoned Aragon and confined himself to Catalonia after quitting Valencia. He did not indeed then know that Soult had assumed the command of the army of Spain and was preparing for his great effort to relieve Pampeluna; but he was aware that Clausel and Paris were on the side of Jaca, and he was too good a general not to know that operating on the allies' flank was the best mode of palliating the defeat of Vittoria. He might have saved both his garrison and castle of Zaragoza; the guns and other materials of a very large field-artillery equipment were deposited there, and from thence, by Jaca, he could have opened a sure and short communication with Soult, obtained information of that general's projects, and saved Pampeluna.

It may be asked why the Duke of Dalmatia did not endeavour to communicate with Suchet. The reason was simple. The former quitted Dresden suddenly on the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the 12th, and on the 20th his troops were in full march towards St. Jean Pied de Port, and it was during this very rapid journey that the other marshal abandoned Valencia. Soult therefore knew neither Suchet's plans nor the force of his army, nor his movements, nor his actual position, and there was no time to wait for accurate information. However, between the 6th and the 16th of August, that is to say, immediately after his own retreat from Sauroren, he earnestly prayed that the army of Aragon should march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by Jaca, and thus drawing off some of Wellington's forces facilitate the efforts of the army of Spain to relieve San Sebastian. In this communication he stated that his recent operations had caused troops actually in march under General Hill towards Catalonia to be recalled. This was an error. His emissaries were deceived by the movements and counter-movements in pursuit of Clausel immediately after the battle of Vittoria, and by the change in Wellington's plans as to the siege of Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia, but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham, and the Conde de La Bisbal were all mentioned, in this correspondence between Soult and Suchet, as being actually in Catalonia or on the march, the three first having been really sounded as to taking the command in that quarter, and the last having demanded it himself.

Suchet treated Soult's proposal as chimerical. His moveable troops he said did not exceed 11,000, and a march upon Zaragoza with so few men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen, unless he could fly into France by Venasque, where he had a garrison. An extraordinary view of affairs which he supported by statements still more extraordinary!

"General Hill had joined Lord William Bentinck with 24,000 men." "La Bisbal had arrived with 15,000." "There were more than 200,000 men on the Ebro." "The Spanish insurrection was general and strongly organized." "He had recovered the garrison of Taragona and destroyed the works, and he must revictual

Barcelona and then withdraw to the vicinity of Gerona and remain on the defensive!"

This letter was written on the 23rd of August, when Lord William Bentinck had just retreated from the Gaya into the mountains above Hospitalet. The imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of Catalonia and Aragon, both under his command, exceeded 65,000 men, 56,000 being present under arms.* Thirty thousand were united in the field when he received Soult's letter. There was nothing to prevent him marching upon Tortosa, except Lord William Bentinck's army, which had just acknowledged by a retreat its inability to cope with him; there was nothing at all to prevent him marching to Lerida. The Count of Bispal had thrown up his command from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on the Echallar mountains. Sir Rowland Hill was at Roncesvalles, and not a man had moved from Wellington's army. Elio and Roche were near Valencia in a starving condition. The Anglo-Sicilian troops, only 14,000 strong, including Whittingham's division, were on the barren mountains above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army could remain; Del Parque's troops and Sarzfield's division had gone over the Ebro, and Copons' Catalans had taken refuge in the mountains of Cervera. In fine not 200,000, but less than 35,000 men, half-organized, ill-fed, and scattered from Vich to Vinaros were opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different views and different lines of operations. The Anglo-Sicilians could not abandon the coast, Copons could not abandon the mountains. Del Parque's troops soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and to use Lord Wellington's phrase, there was nothing to prevent Suchet "*tumbling Lord William Bentinck back even to the Xucar.*" The true nature of the great insurrection which the French general pretended to dread shall be shown when the political condition of Spain is treated of.

Suchet's errors respecting the allies were easily detected by Soult, those touching the French in Catalonia he could not suspect and acquiesced in the objections to his first plan; but fertile of resource he immediately proposed another, akin to that which he had urged Joseph to adopt in 1812, after the battle of Salamanca, namely, to change the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would, he said, inevitably fall before the allies in succession if the French armies remained on the defensive, and the only mode of rendering offensive operations successful was a general concentration of means and unity of action. The levy of conscripts under an imperial decree, issued in August, would furnish, in conjunction with the dépôts of the interior, a reinforcement of 40,000 men. Ten thousand would form a sufficient corps of observation about Gerona. The armies of Aragon and Catalonia could, he hoped, by sacrificing some posts, produce 20,000 infantry in the field. The imperial muster-rolls prove that they could have produced 40,000; but Soult, misled by Suchet's erroneous statements, assumed only 20,000, and he calculated that he could himself bring 35,000 or 40,000 good infantry and all his cavalry to a given point of junction for the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to be directed on that place, and thus 70,000 or 75,000 infantry, all the cavalry of both armies, and 100 guns, would be suddenly assembled to thread the narrow pass of Jaca and descend upon Aragon. Once in that kingdom they could attack the allied troops in Navarre, if the latter were dispersed, and if they were united, retire upon Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and deliver a general battle upon the new line of operations. Meanwhile the 15,000 unappropriated conscripts might reinforce the 20,000 or 25,000 old soldiers left to cover Bayonne.

An army so great and strongly constituted appearing in Aragon would, Soult argued, necessarily raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca, Fraga, and Monzon, the two last being now menaced by the bands, and it was probable that Tortosa and even Saguntum would be relieved. The great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca, yet he was resolved to try, even though he should convey them upon trucks to be made in Paris and sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious inconvenience from the union of the troops in France since Suchet had already declared his intention of retiring towards Gerona; and on the Bayonne side the army to be left there could dispute the entrenched line between Cambo and St. Jean de Luz. If driven from

* Appendix, No. 30, section 2.

thence it could take a flanking position behind the Nive, the right resting upon the entrenched camp of Bayonne, the left upon the works at Cambo and holding communication by the fortified mountain of Ursouia with St. Jean Pied de Port. But there could be little fear for this secondary force when the great army was once in Aragon. That which he most dreaded was delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected after the middle of October, would entirely close the pass of Jaca.

This proposition, written the 2nd of September, immediately after the battle of San Marcial, reached Suchet the 11th, and was peremptorily rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia discouragement, he said, would spread, desertion would commence, and France be immediately invaded by Lord William Bentinck at the head of 50,000 men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable, and the power of man could not open it for carriages under a year's labour. His wish was to act on the defensive, but if an offensive movement was absolutely necessary, he offered a counter project; that is, he would first make the English in his front re-embark at Taragona, or he would drive them over the Ebro and then march with 100 guns and 30,000 men by Lerida to the Gallego river near Zaragoza. Soult's army, coming by Jaca without guns, might there meet him, and the united forces could then do what was fitting. But to effect this he required a reinforcement of conscripts, and to have Paris's division and the artillerymen and draft horses of Soult's army sent to Catalonia; he demanded also that 2000 bullocks for the subsistence of his troops should be provided to meet him on the Gallego. Then touching upon the difficulties of the road from Sanguessa to Pampeluna, he declared that after forcing Wellington across the Ebro, he would return to Catalonia to revictual his fortresses and prevent an invasion of France. This plan he judged far less dangerous than Soult's, yet he enlarged upon its difficulties and its dangers if the combined movements were not exactly executed. In fine, he continued, "The French armies are entangled amongst rocks, and the emperor should direct a third army upon Spain, to act between the Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the army of Spain, 60,000 strong and that of Aragon, 30,000 strong, operate on the flanks. Thus *the reputation of the English army, too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will be abated.*"

This illiberal remark, combined with the defects of his project, proves that the Duke of Albufera was far below the Duke of Dalmatia's standard both in magnanimity and in capacity. The one, giving his adversary just praise, thought the force already supplied by the emperor sufficient to dispute for victory; the other, with an unseemly boast, desired overwhelming numbers.

Soult's letter reached Suchet the day before the combat of Ordal, and in pursuance of his own plan he should have driven Lord William Bentinck over the Ebro, as he could well have done, because the Catalan troops there separated from the Anglo-Sicilians. In his former letters he had estimated the enemies in his front at 200,000 fighting men, and affirmed that his own disposable force was only 11,000, giving that as a reason why he could not march to Aragon. Now, forgetful of his previous objections and estimates, he admitted that he had 30,000 disposable troops, and proposed the very movement which he had rejected as madness when suggested by the Duke of Dalmatia. And the futility of his arguments relative to the general discouragement, the desertion of his soldiers, and the temptation to an invasion of France if he adopted Soult's plan, is apparent; for these things could only happen on the supposition that he was retreating from weakness, a notion which would have effectually covered the real design until the great movement in advance should change the public opinion. Soult's plan was surer, better imagined, and grander than his; it was less dangerous in the event of failure, and more conformable to military principles. Suchet's project involved double lines of operation, without any sure communications, and consequently without any certainty of just co-operation; his point of junction was within the enemy's power, and the principal army was to be deprived of its artillery. There was no solidity in this design; a failure would have left no resource. But in Soult's project the armies were to be united at a point beyond the enemy's reach, and to operate afterwards in mass with all arms complete, which was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet indeed averred the impracticability of moving the guns by Jaca, yet Soult's counter-opinion

claims more respect. Clausel and Paris, who had lately passed with troops through that defile, were in his camp, he had besides made very exact inquiries of the country people, had caused the civil engineers of roads and bridges on the frontiers to examine the route, and from their reports he judged the difficulty to be not insurmountable.

Neither the inconsistency nor the exaggerations of Suchet's statements escaped Soult's observation ; but anxious to effect something while Pampeluna still held out, and the season permitted operations in the mountains, he frankly accepted the other's modification, and adopted every stipulation, save that of sending the artillerymen and horses of his army to Catalonia, which he considered dangerous. Moreover, he doubted not to pass his own guns by Jaca. The preparations for this great movement were, therefore, immediately commenced, and Suchet, on his part, seemed equally earnest, although he complained of increasing difficulties, pretended that Longa's and Morillo's divisions had arrived in Catalonia, that General Graham was also in march with troops to that quarter, and deplored the loss of Fraga, from whence the Empecinado had just driven his garrison. This post commanded, indeed, a bridge over the Cinca, a river lying in his way, and dangerous from its sudden and great floods, but he still possessed the bridge of Monzon.

During this correspondence between the French marshals Napoleon remained silent ; yet, at a later period, he expressed his discontent at Suchet's inactivity, and indirectly approved of Soult's plans, by recommending a movement towards Zaragoza, which Suchet, however, did not execute. It would appear that the emperor, having given all the reinforcements he could spare, and full powers to both marshals to act as they judged fitting for his service, would not at a distance, and while engaged in such vast operations as those he was carrying on at Dresden, decide so important a question. The vigorous execution essential to success was not to be expected if either marshal acted under constraint and against his own opinion. Soult had adopted Suchet's modification, and it would have been unwise to substitute a new plan, which would have probably displeased both commanders. Meanwhile Wellington passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet's project was annulled by the approach of winter, and by the further operations of the allies.

If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon had been happily achieved, it would certainly have forced Wellington to repass the Ebro, or fight a great battle with an army much less strongly constituted than the French army. If he chose the latter, victory would have profited him little, because his enemy, strong in cavalry, could have easily retired on the fortresses of Catalonia. If he received a check, he must have gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to Portugal, and the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre, and Valencia. It is not probable, however, that such a great operation could have been conducted without being discovered in time by Wellington. It has been already indicated in this History, that besides the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence employed by all generals, he had secret emissaries amongst Joseph's courtiers, and even amongst French officers of rank ; and it has been shown that Soult vainly endeavoured to surprise him on the 31st of August, when the combinations were only two days old. It is true that the retreat of Suchet from Catalonia, and his junction with Soult in France, at the moment when Napoleon was pressed in Germany, together with the known difficulty of passing guns by Jaca, would naturally have led to the belief that it was a movement of retreat and fear ; nevertheless, the secret must have been known to more than one person about each marshal, and the English general certainly had agents who were little suspected. Soult would, however, still have had the power of returning to his old positions ; and, with his numbers increased by Suchet's troops, could have repeated his former attack by the Roncesvalles. It might be that his secret design was thus to involve that marshal in his operations, and being disappointed, he was not very eager to adopt the modified plan of the latter, which the approach of the bad season, and the menacing position of Wellington rendered each day less promising. His own project was hardy, and dangerous for the allies, and well did it prove Lord Wellington's profound acquaintance with his art. For he had entered France only in compliance with the wishes of the allied

sovereigns, and always watched closely for Suchet, averring that the true military line of operations was towards Aragon and Catalonia. Being now, however, actually established in France, and the war in Germany having taken a favourable turn for the allies, he resolved to continue the operations on his actual front, awaiting only the

FALL OF PAMPELUNA.

This event was produced by a long blockade, less fertile of incident than the siege of San Sebastian, yet very honourable to the firmness of the governor-general, Cassan.

The town, containing 15,000 inhabitants, stood on a bold table-land, on which a number of valleys opened, and where the great roads, coming from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguessa, Tudela, Estella, Vittoria, and Irurzun were concentrated. The northern and eastern fronts of the fortress were covered by the Arga, and the defences there consisted of simple walls edging the perpendicular rocky bank of the river, but the other fronts were regularly fortified with ditches, covered way, and half-moons. Two bad unfinished outworks were constructed on the south front, but the citadel, which stood on the south west, was a regular pentagon, with bomb-proofs and magazines, vaulted barracks for 1000 men, and a complete system of mines.

Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by Mina for 18 months previous to the battle of Vittoria, and when Joseph arrived, after the action, the place was badly provisioned. The stragglers of his army increased the garrison to something more than 3500 men of all arms, who were immediately invested by the allies. Many of the inhabitants went off during the short interval between the king's arrival and departure, and General Cassan, finding his troops too few for action, and yet too many for the food, abandoned the two outworks on the south, demolished everything which could interfere with his defence outside, and commenced such works as he deemed necessary to improve it inside. Moreover, foreseeing that the French army might possibly make a sudden march, without guns, to succour the garrison, he prepared a field-train of 40 pieces to meet the occasion.

It has been already shown that Wellington, although at first inclined to besiege Pampeluna, finally established a blockade and ordered works of contravallation to be constructed. Cassan's chief object was then to obtain provisions, and on the 28th and 30th of June he sustained actions outside the place to cover his foragers. On the 1st of July he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the river Arga, and forced many inhabitants to quit the place before the blockaders' works were completed. Skirmishes now occurred almost daily, the French always seeking to gather the grain and vegetables which were ripe and abundant beyond the walls, and the allies endeavouring to set fire to the standing corn within range of the guns of the fortress.

On the 14th of July, O'Donnel's Andalusians were permanently established as the blockading force, and the next day the garrison made a successful forage on the south side of the town. This operation was repeated towards the east beyond the Arga on the 19th, when a sharp engagement of cavalry took place, during which the remainder of the garrison carried away a great deal of corn.

The 26th the sound of Soult's artillery reached the place, and Cassan, judging rightly that the marshal was in march to succour Pampeluna, made a sally in the night by the Roncesvalles road; he was driven back, but the next morning he came out again with 1100 men and two guns, overthrew the Spanish outguards, and advanced towards Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling back with the third and fourth divisions. Then O'Donnel, as I have before related, evacuated some of the entrenchments, destroyed a great deal of ammunition, spiked a number of guns, and but for the timely arrival of Carlos d'Espana's division, and the stand made by Picton at Huarte, would have abandoned the blockade altogether.

Soon the battle on the mountains of Oricain commenced, the smoke rose over the intervening heights of Escava and San Miguel, the French cavalry appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the baggage of the allies was seen filing in the opposite direction by Berioplano along the road of Irurzun. The garrison thought deliverance sure, and having reaped a good harvest withdrew into the place. The

bivouac fires of the French army cheered them during the night, and the next morning a fresh sally being made with the greatest confidence, a great deal of corn was gathered with little loss of men. Several deserters from the foreign regiments in the English service also came over with intelligence exaggerated and coloured after the manner of such men, and the French re-entered the place elated with hope; but in the evening the sound of the conflict ceased and the silence of the next day showed that the battle was not to the advantage of Soult. However, the governor losing no time, made another sally, and again obtained provisions from the south side.

The 30th the battle recommenced, but the retreating fire of the French told how the conflict was decided, and the spirit of the soldiers fell. Nevertheless their indefatigable officers led another sally on the south side, whence they carried off grain and some ammunition which had been left in one of the abandoned outworks.

On the 31st Carlos d'España's troops and 2000 of O'Donnel's Andalusians, in all about 7000 men, resumed the blockade, and maintained it until the middle of September, when the Prince of Anglona's division of Del Parque's army relieved the Andalusians, who rejoined their own corps near Echallar. The allies' works of contravallation were now augmented, and when Paris retired into France from Jaca, part of Mina's troops occupied the valleys leading from the side of Sanguesa to Pampeluna and made entrenchments to bar the escape of the garrison that way.

In October Cassan put his fighting men upon rations of horse-flesh, four ounces to each, with some rice, and he turned more families out of the town, but this time they were fired upon by their countrymen and forced to re-enter.

On the 9th of September Baron Maucune, who had conducted most of the sallies during the blockade, attacked and carried some fortified houses on the east side of the place; he was immediately assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them and pursued the fugitives close to Villalba. Carlos D'España then advanced to their aid in person with a greater body, and the French were driven in with the loss of 80 men, yet the Spaniards lost a far greater number, Carlos d'España himself was wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn, which was their principal object.

The soldiers were now feeding on rats and other disgusting animals; seeking also for roots beyond the walls, many in their hunger poisoned themselves with hemlock, and a number of others unable to bear their misery deserted. In this state Cassan made a general sally, on the 10th of October, to ascertain the strength of the lines around him, with a view to breaking through, but after some fighting, his troops were driven in with the loss of 70 men, and all hope of escape vanished. Yet he still spoke of attempting it, and the public manner in which he increased the mines under the citadel induced Wellington to reinforce the blockade, and to bring up his cavalry into the vicinity of Pampeluna.

The scurvy now invaded the garrison. One thousand men were sick, 800 had been wounded, the deaths by battle and disease exceeded 400, 120 had deserted, and the governor, moved by the great misery, offered on the 26th to surrender if he was allowed to retire into France with his troops and six pieces of cannon. This being refused, he proposed to yield on condition of not serving for a year and a day, which being also denied, he broke off the negotiation, giving out that he would blow up the works of the fortress and break through the blockade. To deter him a menacing letter was thrown to his outposts, and Lord Wellington being informed of his design denounced it as contrary to the laws of war, and directed Carlos d'España to put him, all his officers and non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of the soldiers to death when the place should be taken, if any damage were done to the works.

Cassan's object being merely to obtain better terms, this order remained dormant, and happily so, for the execution would never have borne the test of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna and break through the blockading force, as Brennier did at Almeida, would have been a very noble exploit, and a useful one for the French army if Soult's plan of changing the theatre of war by descending into Aragon had been followed. There could therefore be nothing contrary to the laws of war in a resolute action of that nature. On the other hand if the governor, having no chance whatever of success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence for destroying a great fortress belonging to the Spaniards and depriving the allies of the fruits of their long blockade and glorious battles, the conquerors might have

justly exercised that severe but undoubted right of war, refusing quarter to an enemy. But Lord Wellington's letter to España involved another question, namely, the putting of prisoners to death. For the soldiers could not be decimated until captured, and their crime would have been only obedience to orders in a matter of which they dared not judge. This would have been quite contrary to the usages of civilized nations, and the threat must undoubtedly be considered only as a device to save the works of Pampeluna and to avoid the odium of refusing quarter.

A few days longer the governor and garrison endured their distress, and then capitulated, having defended themselves more than four months with great constancy. The officers and soldiers became prisoners of war. The first were allowed to keep their arms and baggage, the second their knapsacks, expressly on the ground that they had treated the inhabitants well during the investment. The compliment was honourable to both sides, but there was another article, enforced by España without being accepted by the garrison, for which it is difficult to assign any motive but the vindictive ferocity of the Spanish character. No person of either sex was permitted to follow the French troops, and women's affections were thus barbarously brought under the action of the sword.

There was no stronghold now retained by the French in the north of Spain except Santona, and as the blockade of that place had been exceedingly tedious, Lord Wellington, whose sea communications were interrupted by the privateers from thence, formed a small British corps under Lord Aylmer with a view to attack Laredo, which, being on the opposite point of the harbour to Santona, commanded the anchorage. Accidental circumstances however prevented this body from proceeding to its destination, and Santona remained in the enemy's possession. With this exception the contest in the northern parts of Spain was terminated, and the south of France was now to be invaded; but it is fitting first to show with what great political labour Wellington brought the war to this state, what contemptible actions and sentiments, what a faithless alliance, and what vile governments his dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world.

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of Portugal.—In this country the national jealousy, which had been compressed by the force of invasion, expanded again with violence as danger receded, and the influence of England sunk precisely in the measure that her army assured the safety of Portugal. When Wellington crossed the Ebro, the Souza faction, always opposed in the council to the British policy, became elate; and those members of the government who had hitherto cherished the British ascendancy because it sustained them against the Brazilian court intrigues, now sought popularity by taking an opposite direction. Each person of the regency had his own line of opposition marked out. Noguera vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial and financial operations; the Principal Souza wrangled more fiercely and insolently at the council-board; the Patriarch fomented ill-will at Lisbon and in the northern provinces; Forjas, ambitious to command the national troops, became the organ of discontent upon military matters. The return of the prince-regent, the treaty of commerce, the Oporto company, the privileges of the British factory merchants, the mode of paying the subsidy, the means of military transport, the convention with Spain relative to the supply of the Portuguese troops in that country, the recruiting, the organization, the command of the national army, and the honours due to it, all furnished occasions for factious proceedings, which were conducted with the ignoble subtlety that invariably characterizes the politics of the Peninsula. Moreover the expenditure of the British army had been immense, the trade and commerce dependent upon it, now removed to the Spanish ports, enormous. Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal taxes, carelessly or partially enforced, were vexatious to the people without being profitable to the government. Nine-tenths of the revenue accrued from duties upon British trade, and the sudden cessation of markets and of employment, the absence of ready money, the loss of profit, public and private, occasioned by the departure of the army, while the contributions and other exactions remained the same, galled all classes, and the whole nation was ready to shake off the burthen of gratitude.

In this state of feeling emissaries were employed to promulgate in various directions tales, some true, some false, of the disorders perpetrated by the military detachments on the lines of communication, adding that they were the result of secret orders from Wellington to satisfy his personal hatred of Portugal! At the same time discourses and writings against the British influence abounded in Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed or surpassed by the London newspapers, whose statements, overflowing of falsehood, could be traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital. It was asserted that England, intending to retain her power in Portugal, opposed the return of the prince-regent; that the war itself being removed to the frontier of France was become wholly a Spanish cause; that it was not for Portugal to levy troops and exhaust her resources to help a nation whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner or later to resist.

Mr. Stuart's diplomatic intercourse with the government, always difficult, was now a continual remonstrance and dispute; his complaints were met with insolence or subterfuge, and illegal violence against the persons and property of British subjects was pushed so far that Mr. Sloane, an English gentleman upon whom no suspicion rested, was cast into prison for three months because he had come to Lisbon without a passport. The rights of the English factory were invaded, and the Oporto company, which had been established as its rival in violation of treaty, was openly cherished. Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious company robbed everybody, and the prince-regent, promising either to reform or totally abolish it, ordered a preparatory investigation, but to use the words of Mr. Stuart, the regency acted on the occasion no less unfairly by their sovereign than unjustly by their ally.

Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants were another cause of disquiet. They pretended to exemption from certain taxes, and from billets, and that a fixed number of their clerks, domestics, and cattle should be exonerated of military service. These pretensions were disputed. The one touching servants and cattle, doubtful at best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to billets unfounded; but the taxes were justly resisted, and the merchants offered a voluntary contribution to the same amount. The government rudely refused this offer, seized their property, imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to transport supplies that never reached the troops, and made soldiers of their clerks and servants without any intention of reinforcing the army. Mr. Stuart immediately deducted from the subsidy the amount of the property thus forcibly taken, and repaid the sufferers. The regency then commenced a dispute upon the fourth article of the treaty of commerce, and the prince, though he openly ordered it to be executed, secretly permitted Count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain in London as ambassador until the disputes arising upon this treaty generally were arranged. Funchal, who disliked to quit London, took care to interpose many obstacles to a final decision, always advising delay under pretence of rendering ultimate concession of value in other negotiations then depending.

When the battle of Vittoria became known, the regency proposed to entreat the return of the prince from the Brazils, hoping thereby to excite the opposition of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to their expectations, approved of the proposal they deferred the execution. The British cabinet, which had long neglected Wellington's suggestions on this head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro, and Funchal who had been at first averse now urged it warmly, fearing that if the prince remained he could no longer defer going to the Brazils. However, few of the Portuguese nobles desired the return of the royal family, and when the thing was proposed to the regent he discovered no inclination for the voyage.

But the most important subject of discord was the army. The absence of the sovereign and the intrigues which ruled the court of Rio Janeiro had virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government formed for mischief. The whole course of this history has shown that all Wellington's energy and ability, aided by the sagacity and firmness of Mr. Stuart and by the influence of England's power and riches, were scarcely sufficient to meet the evils flowing from this foul source. Even while the French armies were menacing the capital the regency was split into factions, the financial resources were neglected or wasted, the public servants were insolent, incapable and corrupt,

the poorer people oppressed, and the military force for want of sustenance was, at the end of 1812, on the point of dissolving together. The strenuous interference of the English general and envoy, seconded by the extraordinary exertions of the British officers in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the efficiency of the army, and in the campaign of 1813 the spirit of the troops was surpassing. Even the militiamen, who had been deprived of their colours and drafted into the line to punish their bad conduct at Guarda under General Trant in 1812, nobly regained their standards on the Pyrenees.

But this state of affairs, acting upon the naturally sanguine temperament and vanity of the Portuguese, created a very exaggerated notion of their military prowess and importance, and withal a morbid sensitiveness to praise or neglect. General Picton had thrown some slur upon the conduct of a regiment at Vittoria, and Marshal Beresford complained that full justice had not been done to their merits. The eulogiums passed in the English parliament and in the despatches upon the conduct of the British and Spanish troops, but not extended to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation, and the remarks and omissions of the London newspapers were as wormwood.

Meanwhile the regency, under pretext of a dispute with Spain relative to a breach of the military convention of supply, neglected the subsistence of the army altogether; and at the same time so many obstacles to the recruiting were raised, that the dépôts, which ought to have furnished 12,000 men to replace the losses sustained in the campaign, only contained 4000, who were also without the means of taking the field. This matter became so serious that Beresford, quitting the army in October, came to Lisbon to propose a new regulation which should disregard the exemptions claimed by the nobles, the clergy, and the English merchants for their servants and followers. On his arrival Forjas urged the public discontent at the political position of the Portuguese troops. They were, he said, generally incorporated with the British divisions, commanded by British officers, and having no distinct recognized existence their services were unnoticed and the glory of the country suffered. The world at large knew not how many men Portugal furnished for the war. It was known indeed that there were Portuguese soldiers, as it was known that there were Brunswickers and Hanoverians, but as a national army nothing was known of them; their exertions, their courage, only went to swell the general triumph of England, while the Spaniards, inferior in numbers and far inferior in all military qualities, were flattered, praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the English newspapers, and in the discourses and votes of the British parliament. He proposed therefore to have the Portuguese formed into a distinct army acting under Lord Wellington.

It was objected that the brigades incorporated with the British divisions were fed by the British commissariat, the cost being deducted from the subsidy, an advantage the loss of which the Portuguese could not sustain. Forjas rejoined that they could feed their own troops cheaper if the subsidy was paid in money, but Beresford referred him to his scanty means of transport, so scanty that the few stores they were then bound to furnish for the unattached brigades depending upon the Portuguese commissariat were not forwarded. Foiled on this point Forjas proposed gradually to withdraw the best brigades from the English divisions, to incorporate them with the unattached brigades of native troops and so form an auxiliary corps; but the same objection of transport still applied and this matter dropped for the moment. The regency then agreed to reduce the legal age of men liable to the conscription for the army, but the islands, which ought to have given 300 men yearly, were exempt from their control, and the governors, supported by the prince-regent, refused to permit any levies in their jurisdictions, and even granted asylums to all those who wished to avoid the levy in Portugal. In the islands also the persons so unjustly and cruelly imprisoned in 1810 were still kept in durance, although the regency, yielding to the persevering remonstrances of Mr. Stuart and Lord Wellington, had released those at Lisbon.

Soon after this Beresford desired to go to England, and the occasion was seized by Forjas to renew his complaints and his proposition for a separate army, which he designed to command himself. General Sylveira's claim to that honour was

however supported by the Souzas, to whose faction he belonged, and the only matter in which all agreed was the display of ill-will towards England. Lord Wellington became indignant. The English newspapers, he said, did much mischief by their assertions, but he never suspected they could by their omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and government. The latter complained that their troops were not praised in parliament, nothing could be more different from a debate within the house than the representation of it in the newspapers. The latter seldom stated an event or transaction as it really occurred, unless when they absolutely copied what was written for them; and even then their observations branched out so far from the text, that they appeared absolutely incapable of understanding much less of stating the truth upon any subject. The Portuguese people should therefore be cautious of taking English newspapers as a test of the estimation in which the Portuguese army was held in England, where its character stood high and was rising daily. "Mr. Forjas is," said Lord Wellington, "the ablest man of business I have met with in the Peninsula, it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have the folly to alter a successful military system. I understand something of the organization and feeding of troops, and I assure him that separated from the British, the Portuguese army could not keep the field in a good state although their government were to incur ten times the expense under the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting state for the field they can gain no honour, they must suffer dishonour! The vexatious disputes with Spain are increasing daily, and if the omissions or assertions of newspapers are to be the causes of disagreement with the Portuguese *I will quit the Peninsula for ever!*"

This remonstrance being read to the regency, Forjas replied officially.

"The Portuguese government demanded nothing unreasonable. The happy campaign of 1813 was not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its means. It had a right to expect greater exertions from Spain, which was more interested than Portugal in the actual operations, since the safety of the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a solid peace, she did not expect increase of territory, nor any advantage save the consideration and influence which the services and gallantry of her troops would give her amongst European nations, and which, unhappily, she would probably require in her future intercourse with Spain. The English prince-regent, his ministers, and his generals, had rendered full justice to her military services in the official reports, but that did not suffice to give them weight in Europe. Official reports did not remove this inconvenience. It was only the public expressions of the English prince and his ministers that could do justice. The Portuguese army was commanded by Marshal Beresford, Marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be so considered and thanked accordingly for its exploits, and with as much form and solemnity by the English parliament and general as was used towards the Spanish army. The more so that the Portuguese had sacrificed their national pride to the common good, whereas the Spanish pride had retarded the success of the cause and the liberty of Europe. It was necessary also to form good native generals to be of use after the war; but putting that question aside, it was only demanded to have the divisions separated by degrees and given to Portuguese officers. Nevertheless, such grave objections being advanced, they were willing," he said, "to drop the matter altogether."

The discontent, however, remained, for the argument had weight, and if any native officers' reputation had been sufficient to make the proceeding plausible, the British officers would have been driven from the Portuguese service, the armies separated and both ruined. As it was, the regency terminated the discussion from inability to succeed; from fear not from reason. The persons who pretended to the command were Forjas and Sylveira; but the English officers who were as yet well-liked by the troops, would not have served under the former, and Wellington objected strongly to the latter, having by experience discovered that he was an incapable officer seeking a base and pernicious popularity by encouraging the views of the soldiers. Beresford then relinquished his intention of going to England, and the justice of the complaint relative to the reputation of the Portuguese army being obvious, the general orders became more marked in favour of the troops. But the most effectual check to the project of the regency was the significant intimation of

Mr. Stuart, that England, being bound by no conditions in the payment of the subsidy, had a right, if it was not applied in the manner most agreeable to her, to withdraw it altogether.

To have this subsidy in specie and to supply their own troops continued to be the cry of the regency, until their inability to effect the latter became at last so apparent that they gave the matter up in despair. Indeed Forjas was too able a man ever to have supposed that the badly organized administration of Portugal was capable of supporting an efficient army in the field 500 miles from its own country; the real object was to shake off the British influence if possible without losing the subsidy. For the honour of the army or the welfare of the soldiers neither the regency nor the prince himself had any care. While the former were thus disputing for the command, they suffered their subordinates to ruin an establishment at Ruña, the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated soldiers, and turned the helpless veterans adrift. And the prince, while he lavished honours upon the dependents and creatures of his Court at Rio Janeiro, placed those officers whose fidelity and hard fighting had preserved his throne in Portugal at the bottom of the list, amongst the menial servants of the palace who were decorated with the same ribands! Honour, justice, humanity, were alike despised by the ruling men, and Lord Wellington thus expressed his strong disgust.

"The British army, which I have the honour to command, has met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services, everything that could be done has been done by the civil authorities lately to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope however that we have seen the last of Portugal!"

Such were the relations of the Portuguese government with England, and with Spain they were not more friendly. Seven envoys from that country had succeeded each other at Lisbon in three years. The Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic opinions which had obtained ground in Spain, and the leading party in the Cortes were intent to spread those opinions over the whole Peninsula. The only bond of sympathy between the two governments was hatred of the English, who had saved both. On all other points they differed. The exiled Bishop of Orense, from his asylum on the frontier of Portugal, excited the Gallicians against the Cortes so vigorously that his expulsion from Portugal, or at least his removal from the northern frontier, was specially demanded by the Spanish minister; but though a long and angry discussion followed, the bishop was only civilly requested by the Portuguese government to abstain from acts disagreeable to the Spanish regency. The latter then demanded that he should be delivered up as a delinquent, whereupon the Portuguese quoted a decree of the Cortes which deprived the bishop of his rights as a Spanish citizen and denaturalized him. However, he was removed 20 leagues from the frontier. Nor was the Portuguese government itself quite free from ecclesiastic troubles. The bishop of Braganza preached doctrines which were offensive to the patriarch and the government; he was confined, but soon released, and an ecclesiastical sentence pronounced against him, which only increased his followers and extended the influence of his doctrines.

Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period, was the return of Ballesteros from his exile at Ceuta. He had been permitted towards the end of 1813, and as Lord Wellington thought, with no good intent, to reside at Fregenal. The Portuguese regency, fearing that he would rally round him other discontented persons, set agents to watch his proceedings, and under pretence of putting down robbers who abounded on that frontier, established a line of cavalry and called out the militia, thus making it manifest that but a little was wanting to kindle a war between the two countries.

Political state of Spain.—Lord Wellington's victories had put an end to the intercourse between Joseph and the Spaniards who desired to make terms with the French; but those people, not losing hope, formed a strong anti-English party and watched to profit by the disputes between the two great factions at Cadiz, which had now become most rancorous and dangerous to the common cause. The serviles, extremely bigoted both in religion and politics, had the whole body of the clergy on their side. They were the most numerous in the Cortes and their views

were generally in accord with the feelings of the people beyond the Isla de Leon, although their doctrines were comprised in two sentences—*An absolute king; An intolerant church.* The liberals, supported and instigated by all ardent innovators, by the commercial body and populace of Cadiz, had also partisans beyond the Isla; and taking as guides the revolutionary writings of the French philosophers, were hastening onwards to a democracy, without regard to ancient usages or feelings, and without practical ability to carry their theories into execution. There was also a fourth faction in the Cortes, formed by the American deputies, who were secretly labouring for the independence of the colonies; they sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes the serviles, as it suited their purposes, and thus often produced anomalous results, because they were numerous enough to turn the scale in favour of the side which they espoused. Jealousy of England was however common to all, and "*Inglésismo*" was used as a term of contempt. Posterity will scarcely believe, that when Lord Wellington was commencing the campaign of 1813 the Cortes was with difficulty, and by threats rather than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding foreign troops to enter a Spanish fortress. Alicant, Tarifa, Cadiz itself where they held their sittings, had been preserved; Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, had been retaken for them by British valour; English money had restored their broken walls and replenished their exhausted magazines; English and Portuguese blood still smoked from their ramparts; but the men from whose veins that blood had flowed, were to be denied entrance at gates which they could not approach without treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades who had sacrificed their lives to procure for this sordid ungrateful assembly the power to offer the insult.

The subjection of the bishops and other clergy, who had in Galicia openly opposed the abolition of the Inquisition and excited the people to resistance, was an object of prominent interest with an active section of the liberals called the Jacobins. And this section generally ruled the Cortes, because the Americanos leaned strongly towards their doctrines, and the interest of the anti-English, or French party, was to produce dissensions which could be best effected by supporting the most violent public men. A fierce and obstinate faction they were, and they compelled the churchmen to submit for the time, but not until the dispute became so serious that Lord Wellington when in the Pyrenees expected a civil war on his communications, and thought the clergy and the peasantry would take part with the French. This notion, which gives his measure for the patriotism of both parties, proved however unfounded; his extreme discontent at the progress of liberal doctrines had somewhat warped his judgment; the people were less attached to the church than he imagined, the clergy of Galicia, meeting with no solid support, submitted to the Cortes, and the Archbishop of Santiago fled to Portugal.

Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed the moving spring of the English Tories' policy. Napoleon was warred against, not as they pretended because he was a tyrant and usurper, for he was neither; not because his invasion of Spain was unjust, but because he was the powerful and successful enemy of aristocratic privileges. The happiness and independence of the Peninsula were words without meaning in their state-papers and speeches, and their anger and mortification were extreme when they found success against the emperor had fostered that democracy it was their object to destroy. They were indeed only prevented by the superior prudence and sagacity of their general, from interfering with the internal government of Spain in so arrogant and injudicious a manner, that an open rupture wherein the Spaniards would have had all appearance of justice, must have ensued. This folly was however stifled by Wellington, who desired to wait until the blow could be given with some effect, and he was quite willing to deal it himself; yet the conduct of the Cortes, and that of the executive government which acted under its control, was so injurious to Spain and to his military operations, and so unjust to him personally, that the warmest friends of freedom cannot blame his enmity. Rather should his moderation be admired, when we find his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by Vegas, a considerable member of the Cortes and perfectly acquainted with the subject.

Speaking of the *Afrancesados*, or French party, more numerous than was

supposed and active to increase their numbers, he says, "The thing which they most enforced and which made most progress was the diminution of the English influence. Amongst the serviles they gained proselytes, by objecting the English religion and constitution, which restricted the power of the sovereign. With the liberals, they said the same constitution gave the sovereign too much power; and the Spanish constitution having brought the king's authority under that of the Cortes was an object of jealousy to the English cabinet and aristocracy, who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers of England, were resolved that the Spanish constitution should not stand. To the Americans they observed that Lord Wellington opposed them, because he did not help them and permitted expeditions to be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans, who wished to retain the colonies and exclude foreign trade, they represented the English as fomenters and sustainers of the colonial rebellion, because they did not join their forces with Spain to put it down. To the honest patriots of all parties they said that every concession to the English general was an offence against the dignity and independence of the nation. If he was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to impose his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers, turn the army against the country, and thus render Spain dependent on England. And these perfidious insinuations were effectual because they flattered the national pride, as proving that the Spaniards could do everything for themselves without the aid of foreigners. Finally that nothing could stop the spread of such dangerous doctrines but new victories, which would bring the simple honesty and gratitude of the people at large into activity. Those victories came and did indeed stifle the French party in Spain, but many of their arguments were too well founded to be stifled with their party."

The change of government, which had place in the beginning of the year, gave hope that the democratic violence of the Cortes would decline under the control of the Cardinal Bourbon; but that prince, who was not of true royal blood in the estimation of the Spaniards, because his father had married without the consent of the king, was from age, and infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The new regency became therefore more the slaves of the Cortes than their predecessors, and the Cadiz editors of newspapers, pre-eminent in falsehood and wickedness even amongst their unprincipled European brotherhood, being the champions of the Jacobins, directed the populace of that city as they pleased. And always the serviles yielded under the dread of personal violence. Their own crimes had become their punishment. They had taught the people at the commencement of the contest that murder was patriotism, and now their spirit sunk and quailed, because at every step, to use the terribly significant expression of Wellington, "*The ghost of Solano was staring them in the face.*"

The principal points of the Jacobins' policy in support of their crude constitution, which they considered as perfect as an emanation from the Deity, were, 1st. The abolition of the Inquisition, the arrest and punishment of the Gallician bishops, and the consequent warfare with the clergy. 2nd. The putting aside the claim of Carlotta to the regency. 3rd. The appointment of captain-generals and other officers to suit their factious purposes. 4th. The obtaining of money for their necessities, without including therein the nourishment of the armies. 5th. The control of the elections for a new Cortes, so as to procure an assembly of their own way of thinking, or to prevent its assembling at the legal period in October.

The matter of the bishops, as we have seen, nearly involved them in a national war with Portugal, and a civil war with Galicia. The affair with the princess was less serious, but she had never ceased intriguing, and her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British ministers and general while the army was cooped up in Portugal, were, although she was a declared enemy to the English alliance, now rather favoured by Sir Henry Wellesley as a mode of checking the spread of democracy. Lord Wellington, however, still held aloof, observing that if appointed according to the constitution, she would not be less a slave to the Cortes than her predecessors,

and England would have the discredit of giving power to the "worst woman in existence."

To remove the seat of government from the influence of the Cadiz populace was one mode of abating the power of the democratic party, and the yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing of the general Cortes in September, had apparently given the executive government some freedom of action, and seemed to furnish a favourable opportunity for the English ambassador to effect its removal. The regency, dreading the epidemic, suddenly resolved to proceed to Madrid, telling Sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their sole motive. They had secretly formed this resolution at night, and proposed to commence the journey next day; but a disturbance arose in the city, and the alarmed regents convoked the extraordinary Cortes; the ministers were immediately called before it, and bending in fear before their masters, declared, with a scandalous disregard of truth, that there was no intention to quit the Isla without consulting the Cortes.* Certain deputies were thereupon appointed to inquire if there was any fever, and a few cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently to shield the regents, recommended that they should remove to Port St. Mary.

This did not satisfy the assembly. The government was commanded to remain at Cadiz until the new general Cortes should be installed, and a committee was appointed to probe the whole affair or rather to pacify the populace, who were so offended with the report of the first deputation, that the speech of Arguelles on presenting it was hissed from the galleries, although he was the most popular and eloquent member of the Cortes. The more moderate liberals thus discovered that they were equally with the serviles the slaves of the newspaper writers. Nevertheless the inherent excellence of freedom, though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble shapes, was involuntarily admitted by Lord Wellington when he declared, that wherever the Cortes and government should fix themselves the press would follow to control, and the people of Seville, Granada, or Madrid, would become as bad as the people of Cadiz.

The composition of the new Cortes was naturally an object of hope and fear to all factions, and the result being uncertain, the existing assembly took such measures to prolong its own power that it was expected two Cortes would be established, the one at Cadiz, the other at Seville, each striving for mastery in the nation. However, the new body, after many delays, was installed at Cadiz in November, and the Jacobins, strong in the violence of the populace, still swayed the assembly, and kept the seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid spread of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. Then the resolution to repair to Madrid was adopted, and the sessions in the Isla closed on the 29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For the general belief being that no person could take the sickness twice, and almost every resident family had already suffered from former visitations, the merchants, with an infamous cupidity declaring that there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously to issue clean bills of health to ships leaving the port, and endeavoured by intimidation to keep the regency and Cortes in the city. †

An exact and copious account of these factions and disputes, and of the permanent influence which these discussions of the principles of government, this constant collision of opposite doctrines had upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously traced, form a lesson of the highest interest for nations. But to treat the subject largely would be to write a political history of the Spanish revolution, and it is only the effect upon the military operations which properly appertains to a history of the war. That effect was one of unmitigated evil, but it must be observed that this did not necessarily spring from the democratic system, since precisely the same mischiefs were to be traced in Portugal, where arbitrary power, called legitimate government, was prevalent. In both cases alike, the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes of factious politicians.

It has been shown, in a former volume, that one Spanish regency contracted an engagement with Lord Wellington, on the faith of which he took the command of their armies in 1813. It was scrupulously adhered to by him, but systematically violated by the new regency and minister of war almost as soon as it was concluded.

* Appendix, No. 24.

† Appendix, No. 24.

His recommendations for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were made in the commands and in the destinations of the troops without his concurrence, and without passing through him as generalissimo. Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, captain-general of Galicia, Estremadura, and Castile, was disgracefully removed from his government under pretence of calling him to assist in the council of state. His nephew, General Giron, was at the same time deprived of his command over the Gallician army, although both he and Castaños had been largely commended for their conduct by Lord Wellington. General Frere, appointed captain-general of Castile and Estremadura, succeeded Giron in command of the troops, and the infamous Lacy replaced Castaños in Galicia, chosen, it was believed, as a fitter tool to work out the measures of the Jacobins against the clergy in that kingdom. Nor was the sagacity of that faction at fault, for Castaños would, according to Lord Wellington, have turned his arms against the Cortes if an opportunity had offered. He and others were now menaced with death, and the Cortes contemplated an attack upon the tithes, upon the feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates of the *grandees*. All except the last very fitting to do if the times and circumstances had been favourable for a peaceful arrangement; but most insane when the nation generally was averse, and there was an invader in the country to whom the discontented could turn. The clergy were at open warfare with the government, many generals were dissatisfied and menacing in their communications with the superior civil authorities, the soldiers were starving, and the people, tired of their miseries, only desired to get rid of the invaders, and to avoid the burthen of supplying the troops of either side. The English cabinet, after having gorged Spain with gold and flattery, was totally without influence. A terrible convulsion was at hand if the French could have maintained the war with any vigour in Spain itself; and the following passages, from Wellington's letters to the ministers, prove that even he contemplated a forcible change in the government and constitution.

"If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders, as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them."—"It is quite impossible such a system can last. What I regret is, that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it, and I am much mistaken if O'Donnel and even Castaños, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the king should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric, if he has any spirit."—"I wish you would let me know whether, if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at the democracy, the government would approve of my doing it." And in another letter he seriously treated the question of withdrawing from the contest altogether. "The government were the best judges," he said, "of whether they could or ought to withdraw, but he did not believe that Spain could be a useful ally, or at all in alliance with England, if the republican system was not put down. Meanwhile he recommended to the English government and to his brother, to take no part either for or against the princess of Brazil, to discountenance the democratical principles and measures of the Cortes, and if their opinion was asked regarding the formation of a new regency, to recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution which lodged all power with the Cortes, and to give instead some authority to the executive government, whether in the hands of king or regent. To fill the latter office one of royal blood, uniting the strongest claims of birth with the best capacity, should, he thought, be selected; but if capacity was wanting in the royal race, then to choose the Spaniard who was most deserving in the public estimation!" Thus necessity teaches privilege to bend before merit.

The whole force of Spain in arms was at this period about 160,000 men. Of this number not more than 50,000 were available for operations in the field, and those only because they were paid, clothed, and armed by England, and kept together by the ability and vigour of the English general. He had proposed when at Cadiz an arrangement for the civil and political government of the provinces rescued from the French, with a view to the supply of the armies, but his plan was

rejected, and his repeated representations of the misery the army and the people endured under the system of the Spanish government were unheeded. Certain districts were allotted for the support of each army, yet, with a jealous fear of military domination, the government refused the captain-generals of those districts the necessary powers to draw forth the resources of the country, powers which Lord Wellington recommended that they should have, and wanting which, the whole system was sure to become a nullity. Each branch of administration was thus conducted by chiefs independent in their attributes, yet each too restricted in authority, generally at variance with one another, and all of them neglectful of their duty. The evil effect upon the troops was thus described by the English general as early as August :—

"More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year, and the whole of Spain, excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon, since the months of May and June last. The most abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country ; millions of money spent by the contending armies are circulating everywhere, and yet your armies, however weak in numbers, are literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese armies under my command have been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea ; and I am concerned to inform your excellency that, besides money for the pay of all the armies, which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies, in order to enable them to remain in the field at all. And notwithstanding this assistance, I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish troops on the outposts obliged to plunder the nut and apple trees for subsistence, and to know that the Spanish troops employed in the blockade of Pampeluna and Santona were starving upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading were at the same time receiving their full allowance. The system, then, is insufficient to procure supplies for the army, and at the same time I assure your excellency that it is the most oppressive and injurious to the country that could be devised. It cannot be pretended that the country does not produce the means of maintaining the men necessary for its defence ; those means are undoubtedly superabundant, and the enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger than are necessary for its defence."

These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the public servants, and to their overwhelming numbers—that certain sign of an unprosperous state ; to the disgraceful negligence and disregard of public duties, and to there being no power in the country for enforcing the law. The collection of the revenue cost in several branches 70 and 80 per cent. Meanwhile no Spanish officers capable of commanding a large body of troops or keeping it in an efficient state had yet appeared, no efficient staff, no system of military administration had been formed, and no shame for these deficiencies, no exertions to amend were visible.

From this picture two conclusions are to be drawn : 1st. That the provinces, thus described as superabounding in resources, having been for several years occupied by the French armies, the warfare of the latter could not have been so devastating and barbarous as it was represented. 2nd. That Spain being now towards the end as helpless as she had been at the beginning and all through the war, was quite unequal to her own deliverance, either by arms or policy ; that it was English valour, English steel, directed by the genius of an English general, which, rising superior to all obstacles, whether presented by his own or the Peninsular governments, or by the perversity of national character, worked out her independence. So utterly inefficient were the Spaniards themselves, that now, at the end of six years' war, Lord Wellington declared 30,000 of their troops could not be trusted to act separately ; they were only useful when mixed in the line with larger numbers of other nations. And yet all men in authority, to the lowest alcalde, were as presumptuous, as arrogant, and as perverse as ever. Seeming to be rendered callous to public misery by the desperate state of affairs, they were reckless of the consequences of their actions, and never suffered prudential considerations or national honour to check the execution of any project. The generals,

from repeated failures, had become insensible to misfortunes, and without any remarkable display of personal daring, were always ready to deliver battle on slight occasions, as if that were a common matter instead of being the great event of war.

The government agents were corrupt, and the government itself was, as it had ever been, tyrannical, faithless, mean, and equivocating to the lowest degree. In 1812 a Spaniard of known and active patriotism thus commenced an elaborate plan of defence for the provinces. "Catalonia abhors France as her oppressor, but she abhors still more the despotism which has been carried on in all the branches of her administration since the beginning of the war." In fine there was no healthy action in any part of the body politic, everything was rotten except the hearts of the poorer people. Even at Cadiz Spanish writers compared the state to a vessel in a hurricane, without captain, pilot, compass, chart, sails, or rudder, and advised the crew to cry to heaven as their sole resource. But they only blasphemed.

When Wellington, indignant at the systematic breach of his engagement, remonstrated, he was answered that the actual regency did not hold itself bound by the contracts of the former government. Hence it was plain no considerations of truth, for they had themselves also accepted the contract, nor of honest policy, nor the usages of civilized states with respect to national faith, had any influence on their conduct. Enraged at this scandalous subterfuge, he was yet conscious how essential it was he should retain his command. And seeing all Spanish generals more or less engaged in political intrigues, none capable of co-operating with him, and that no Spanish army could possibly subsist as a military body under the neglect and bad arrangement of the Spanish authorities, conscious also that public opinion in Spain would, better than the menaces of the English government, enable him to obtain a counterpoise to the democratic party, he tendered indeed his resignation if the government engagement was not fulfilled, but earnestly endeavoured by a due mixture of mildness, argument, and reproof to reduce the ruling authorities to reason. Nevertheless there were, he told them, limits to his forbearance to his submission under injury, and he had been already most unworthily treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish government.

From the world these quarrels were covered by an appearance of the utmost respect and honour. He was made a grandee of the first class, and the estate of Soto de Roma, in Grenada, of which the much maligned and miserable Prince of Peace had been despoiled, was settled upon him. He accepted the gift, but, as he had before done with his Portuguese and Spanish pay, transferred the proceeds to the public treasury during the war. The regents, however, under the pressure of the Jacobins, and apparently bearing some personal enmity, although one of them, Ciscar, had been instrumental in procuring him the command of the Spanish army, were now intent to drive him from it; and the excesses committed at San Sebastian served their factious writers as a topic for exciting the people not only to demand his resignation, but to commence a warfare of assassination against the British soldiers. Moreover, combining extreme folly with wickedness, they pretended amongst other absurdities that the nobility had offered, if he would change his religion, to make him king of Spain. This tale was eagerly adopted by the English newspapers, and three Spanish grandees thought it necessary to declare that they were not among the nobles who made the proposition. His resignation was accepted in the latter end of September, and he held the command only until the assembling of the new Cortes, but the attempt to render him odious failed even at Cadiz, owing chiefly to the personal ascendancy which all great minds so surely attain over the masses in troubled times. Both the people and the soldiers respected him more than they did their own government, and the Spanish officers had generally yielded as ready obedience to his wishes, before he was appointed generalissimo, as they did to his orders when holding that high office. It was this ascendancy which enabled him to maintain the war with such troublesome allies; and yet so little were the English ministers capable of appreciating its importance, that after the battle of Vittoria they entertained the design of removing him from Spain to take part in the German operations. His answer was short and modest, but full of wisdom.

"Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can both here and in

Germany, but nobody would enjoy the same advantages here, and I should be no better than another in Germany."

The egregious folly which dictated this proposition was thus checked, and in December the new Cortes decided that he should retain the command of the armies and the regency be bound to fulfil its predecessor's engagements. Nevertheless, so deeply had he been offended by the libels relative to San Sebastian, that a private letter to his brother terminated thus :—"It will rest with the king's government to determine what they will do, upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, but if I was to decide I would not keep the army in Spain for one hour." And to many other persons at different times he expressed his fears and convictions that the cause was lost and that he should fail at last. It was under these and other enormous difficulties he carried on his military operations. It was with an enemy at his back more to be dreaded than the foe in his front that he invaded the south of France ; and that is the answer to those French writers who have described him as being at the head of more than 200,000 well-furnished soldiers, supported by a well-organized insurrection of the Spanish people, unembarrassed in his movements, and luxuriously rioting in all the resources of the Peninsula and of England.

BOOK XXIII.

CHAPTER I.

WAR IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.

WHILE Pampeluna held out, Soult laboured to complete his works of defence, especially the entrenched camp of St. Jean Pied de Port, that he might be free to change the theatre of war to Aragon. He pretended to entertain this project as late as November; but he must have secretly renounced all hope before that period, because the snows of an early and severe winter had rendered even the passes of the Lower Pyrenees impracticable in October. Meanwhile his political difficulties were not less than Lord Wellington's; all his efforts to draw forth the resources of France were met with apathy, or secret hostility, and there was no money in the military chest to answer the common daily expenses. A junta of the leading merchants in Bayonne voluntarily provided for the most pressing necessities of the troops, but their means were limited, and Soult vainly urged the merchants of Bordeaux and Toulouse to follow the patriotic example. It required, therefore, all his firmness of character to support the crisis; and if the English naval force had been sufficient to intercept the coasting vessels between Bordeaux and Bayonne, the French army must have retired beyond the Adour. As it was, the greatest part of the field artillery and all the cavalry were sent so far to the rear for forage, that they could not be counted a part of the fighting troops; and the infantry, in addition to their immense labours, were forced to carry their own provisions from the navigable points of the rivers to the top of the mountains.

Soult was strongly affected. "*Tell the emperor,*" he wrote to the minister of war, "*tell him when you make your next report, that on the very soil of France this is the situation of the army destined to defend the southern provinces from invasion; tell him also that the unheard-of contradictions and obstacles I meet with shall not make me fail in my duty.*"

The French troops suffered much, but the privations of the allies were perhaps greater, for being on higher mountains, more extended, more dependent upon the sea, their distress was in proportion to their distance from the coast. A much shorter line had been indeed gained for the supply of the centre, and a bridge was laid down at Andarlassa which gave access to the roots of the Bayonnette mountain, yet the troops were fed with difficulty, and so scantily, that Lord Wellington in amends reduced the usual stoppage of pay, and invoked the army by its military honour to sustain with firmness the unavoidable pressure. The effect was striking. The murmurs, loud in the camps before, were hushed instantly, although the soldiers knew that some commissaries, leaguings with the speculators upon the coast, secretly loaded the provision mules with condiments and other luxuries, to sell on the mountains at enormous profit. The desertion was, however, great, more than 1200 men went over to the enemy in less than four months; and they were all Germans, Englishmen, or Spaniards, for the Portuguese who abandoned their colours invariably went back to their own country.

This difficulty of feeding the Anglo-Portuguese, the extreme distress of the Spaniards, and the certainty that they would plunder in France, and so raise the people in arms, together with the uneasy state of the political affairs in the Peninsula, rendered Lord Wellington very averse to further offensive operations while Napoleon so tenaciously maintained his positions on the Elbe against the allied sovereigns. It was impossible to make a formidable and sustained invasion of France with the Anglo-Portuguese alone, and he had neither money nor means of transport to feed the Spaniards, even if policy warranted such a measure. The nature of the country also forbade a decisive victory, and hence an advance was

attended with the risk of returning to Spain again during the winter, when a retreat would be dangerous and dishonouring. But on the 20th of October a letter from the governor of Pampeluna was intercepted, and Lord Fitzroy Somerset, observing that the compliment of ceremony at the beginning was also in numerals, ingeniously followed the cue and made out the whole. It announced that the place could not hold out more than a week, and as intelligence of Napoleon's disasters in Germany became known at the same time, Lord Wellington was induced to yield once more to the wishes of the allied sovereigns and the English ministers, who were earnest that he should invade France.

His intent was to attack Soult's entrenched camp on the 29th, thinking Pampeluna would fall before that period. In this he was mistaken; and bad weather stopped his movements, for in the passes above Roncesvalles the troops were knee-deep in snow. The preparations, however, continued, and strict precautions were taken to baffle the enemy's emissaries. Soult was nevertheless perfectly informed by the deserters of the original design and the cause of the delay; and he likewise obtained from a sergeant-major of artillery, who, losing his road, was taken on the 29th, certain letters and orders indicating an attack in the direction of the bridge of Amotz, between D'Erlon's right and Clausel's left. Some French peasants also who had been allowed to pass the allied outposts declared they had been closely questioned about that bridge and the roads leading to it. The defences there were therefore augmented with new redoubts and abattis, and Soult having thus as he judged, sufficiently provided for its safety, and being in no pain for his right, nor for Clausel's position, covered as the latter was by the smaller Rhune, turned his attention towards Foy's corps.

That general had been posted at Bidarray, half way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo, to watch certain roads, which leading to the Nive from Val Baigorri by St. Martin d'Arosa, and from the Bastan by Yspegui and the Gorospil mountain, gave Soult anxiety for his left; but now expecting the principal attack at the bridge of Amotz, and not by these roads, nor by St. Jean Pied de Port, as he at first supposed and as Lord Wellington had at one time designed, he resolved to use Foy's division offensively. In this view, on the 3rd of November, he instructed Lim if St. Jean Pied de Port should be only slightly attacked, to draw all the troops he could possibly spare from its defence to Bidarray, and when the allies assailed D'Erlon, he was to seize the Gorospil mountain and fall upon their right as they descended from the Puerto de Maya. If on the other hand he was himself assailed by those lines, he was to call in all his detached troops from St. Jean Pied de Port, repass the Nive by the bridge of Bidarray, make the best defence possible behind that river, and open a communication with Pierre Soult and Trielhard, whose divisions of cavalry were at St. Palais and Orthes.

On the 6th Foy, thinking the Gorospil difficult to pass, proposed to seize the Col de Yspegui from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and so descend into the Bastan. Soult, however, preferred Bidarray as a safer point and more united with the main body of the army; but he gave Foy a discretionary power to march along the left of the Nive upon Itzatzu and Espelette, if he judged it fitting to reinforce D'Erlon's left rather than to attack the enemy.

Having thus arranged his regular defence, the French general directed the prefect of the Lower Pyrenees to post the organized national guards at the issues of all the valleys about St. Jean Pied de Port, but to keep the mass of the people quiet until the allies, penetrating into the country, should at once provoke and offer facilities for an irregular warfare.

On the 9th, being still uneasy about the San Martin d'Arosa and Gorospil roads, he brought up his brother's cavalry from St. Palais to the heights above Cambo, and the next day the long-expected storm burst.

Allured by some fine weather on the 6th and 7th of November, Lord Wellington had moved Sir Rowland Hill's troops from the Roncesvalles to the Bastan with a view to attack Soult, leaving Mina on the position of Altobiscar and in the Alduides. The other corps had also received their orders, and the battle was to commence on the 8th, but General Freyre suddenly declared, that unable to subsist on the mountains, he must withdraw a part of his troops. This was a scheme to obtain

provisions from the English magazines, and it was successful, for the projected attack could not be made without his aid. Forty thousand rations of flour, with a formal intimation that if he did not co-operate the whole army must retire again into Spain, contented Freyre for the moment; but the extravagant abuses of the Spanish commissariat were plainly exposed when the chief of the staff declared that the flour would only suffice for two days, although there were less than 10,000 soldiers in the field. Spain therefore furnished at the rate of two rations for every fighting man and yet her troops were starving!

When this difficulty was surmounted, heavy rain caused the attack to be again deferred, but on the 10th 90,000 combatants of all arms and ranks, above 74,000 being Anglo-Portuguese, descended to the battle, and with them went 95 pieces of artillery, which, under the command of Colonel Dickson, were all with inconceivable vigour and activity thrown into action.* Nor in this host do I reckon 4500 cavalry, nor the Spaniards of the blockading division, which remained in reserve. On the other hand the French numbers were now increased by the new levy of conscripts, but many had deserted again into the interior, and the fighting men did not exceed 79,000, including the garrisons. Six thousand of these were cavalry, and as Foy's operations were extraneous to the line of defence, scarcely 60,000 infantry and artillery were opposed to the allies.†

Lord Wellington, seeing that the right of Soult's line could not be forced without great loss, resolved to hold it in check while he turned it by forcing the centre and left, pushing down the Nivelle to San Pé. In this view the second and sixth British divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese, Morillo's Spaniards, four of Mina's battalions, and Grant's brigade of light cavalry, in all 26,000 fighting men and officers, with nine guns, were collected under General Hill in the Bastan to attack D'Erlon. The position of Roncesvalles was meanwhile occupied by the remainder of Mina's troops, supported by the blockading force under Carlos d'España.

The third, fourth, and seventh divisions, and Giron's Andalusians, the whole under the command of Marshal Beresford, were disposed about Zagaramurdi, the Puerto de Echallar, and the lower parts of those slopes of the greater Rhune which descended upon Sarre. On the left of this body the light division and Longa's Spaniards, both under Charles Alten, were disposed on those slopes of the greater Rhune which led down towards Ascain. Victor Alten's brigade of light cavalry, and three British batteries, were placed on the road to Sarre, and six mountain guns followed Giron's and Charles Alten's troops. Thus 36,000 fighting men and officers, with 24 guns, were concentrated in this quarter to attack Clausel.

General Freyre's Spaniards, about 9000 strong, with six guns, were disposed on Alten's left, at the fort of Calvary and towards Jollimont, ready to fall upon any troops which might be detached from the camp of Serres by the bridge of Ascain, to support Clausel.

General Hope having the first and fifth divisions, Wilson's, Bradford's, and Lord Aylmer's brigades of infantry, Vandeleur's brigade of light dragoons, and the heavy German cavalry, in all about 19,000 men and officers, with 54 guns, was opposed to Soult's right wing; and the naval squadron hovering on Hope's left flank was to aid the land operations.

On the French side each lieutenant-general had a special position to defend. D'Erlon's first line, its left resting on the fortified rocks of Mondarin which could not be turned, run from thence along the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains by the forge of Urdax to the Nivelle. This range was strongly entrenched and occupied by one of Abbé's and one of D'Armagnac's brigades, Espelette being behind the former and Ainhoa behind the latter. The second line or main position was several miles distant on a broad ridge, behind Ainhoa, and it was occupied by the remaining brigades of the two divisions. The left did not extend beyond the centre of the first line, but the right reaching to the bridge of Amotz stretched with a wider flank, because the Nivelle flowing in a slanting direction towards the French gave greater space as their positions receded. Three great redoubts were constructed in a line on this ridge, and a fourth had been commenced close to the bridge.

* Appendix, No. 29 (No. 3).

† Appendix, No. 30.

On the right of D'Erlon's second line, that is to say beyond the bridge of Amotz, Clausel's position extended to Ascaïn, also along a strong range of heights fortified with many redoubts, trenches, and abattis, and as the Nivelle after passing Amotz swept in a curve completely round the range to Ascaïn, both flanks rested alike upon that river, having communication by the bridges of Amotz and Ascaïn on the right and left, and a retreat by the bridges of San Pé and Harastagua which were in rear of the centre. Two of Clausel's divisions reinforced by one of D'Erlon's under General Maransin were here posted. In front of the left were the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada covering the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the right was the smaller Rhune, which was fortified and occupied by a brigade of Maransin's division. A new redoubt with abattis was also commenced to cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz.

On the right of this line beyond the bridge of Ascaïn, Daricau's division, belonging to Clausel's corps, and the Italian brigade of San Pol drawn from Villatte's reserve, were posted to hold the entrenched camp of Serres and to connect Clausel's position with Villatte's, which was as I have before said on a ridge crossing the gorges of Olette and Jollimont. The French right wing under Reille, strongly fortified on the lower ground and partially covered by inundations, was nearly impregnable.

Soult's weakest point of general defence was certainly the opening between the Rhune mountains and the Nivelle. Gradually narrowing as it approached the bridge of Amotz this space was the most open, the least fortified, and the Nivelle being fordable above that bridge could not hamper the allies' movements. Wherefore a powerful force acting in this direction could pass by D'Erlon's first line and breaking in upon the main position, between the right of that general's second line and Clausel's left, turn both by the same attack.

Lord Wellington thus designed his battle. General Hill, leaving Mina's four battalions on the Gorospil mountain facing the rocks of Mondarin, moved in the night by the different passes of the Puerto de Maya, Morillo's Spaniards being to menace the French on the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains, the second division to attack Ainhoa and Urdax. The sixth division and Hamilton's Portuguese were to assault the works covering the bridge of Amotz, either on the right or left bank of the Nivelle according to circumstances. Thus the action of 26,000 men was combined against D'Erlon's position, and on their left Beresford's corps was assembled. The third division, under General Colville, descending from Zagaramurdi, was to move against the unfinished redoubts and entrenchments covering the approaches to the bridge of Amotz on the left bank of the Nivelle, thus turning D'Erlon's right at the moment when it was attacked in front by Hill's corps. On the left of the third division, the seventh, descending from the mouth of the Echallar pass, was to storm the Grenada redoubt, and then passing the village of Sarre assail Clausel's main position abreast with the attack of the third division. On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling on the lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon the redoubt of San Barbe, and then moving through Sarre also to assail Clausel's main position abreast with the seventh division. On the left of the fourth division, Giron's Spaniards, gathered higher up on the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast with the others, leaving Sarre on their right. They were to drive the enemy from the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune and then in concert with the rest attack Clausel's main position. In this way Hill's and Beresford's corps, forming a mass of more than 40,000 infantry were to be thrust, on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clausel and D'Erlon to break their line of battle.

Charles Alten with the light division and Longa's Spaniards, furnishing together about 8000 men, was likewise to attack Clausel's line on the left of Giron, while Freyre's Galicians approached the bridge of Ascaïn to prevent reinforcements coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten could assail Clausel's right, the smaller Rhune which covered it was to be stormed. This mountain outwork was a hog's-back ridge rising abruptly out of table-land and parallel with the greater Rhune. It was inaccessible along its front, which was precipitous and from 50 to 200 feet high; but on the enemy's left these rocks gradually decreased, descending

by a long slope to the valley of Sarre, and about two-thirds of the way down the 34th French regiment was placed, with an advanced post on some isolated crags situated in the hollow between the two Rhunes. On the enemy's right the hog's-back sunk by degrees into the plain or platform. It was however covered at that point by a marsh scarcely passable, and the attacking troops were therefore first to move up against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to file to their left under fire, between the marsh and the lower crags, until they gained an accessible point from whence they could fight their way along the narrow ridge of the hog's-back. But the bristles of the latter were huge perpendicular crags connected with walls of loose stones so as to form several small forts or castles communicating with each other by narrow foot-ways, and rising one above another until the culminant point was attained. The table-land beyond this ridge was extensive and terminated in a very deep ravine on every side, save a narrow space on the right of the marsh, where the enemy had drawn a traverse of loose stones, running perpendicularly from behind the hog's-back and ending in a star fort which overhung the edge of the ravine.

This rampart and fort, and the hog's back itself, were defended by Barbot's brigade of Maransin's division, and the line of retreat was towards a low narrow neck of land which, bridging the deep ravine, linked the Rhune to Clausel's main position: a reserve was placed here, partly to sustain the 34th French regiment posted on the slope of the mountain towards Sarre, partly to protect the neck of land on the side of that village. As this neck was the only approach to the French position in that part, to storm the smaller Rhune was a necessary preliminary to the general battle, wherefore Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th from the Hermitage, the Commissary mountain, and the Puerto de Vera, collected them at midnight on that slope of the greater Rhune which descended towards Ascain. The main body of the light division, turning the marsh by the left, was to assail the stone traverse and lap over the star fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; and the 43rd regiment, supported by the 17th Portuguese, was to assail the hog's back. One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns were however left on the summit of the greater Rhune, with orders to assail the craggy post between the Rhunes and connect Alten's attack with that of Giron's Spaniards. All these troops gained their respective stations so secretly that the enemy had no suspicion of their presence, although for several hours the columns were lying within half musket-shot of the works. Towards morning indeed five or six guns, fired in a hurried manner from the low ground near the sea, broke the stillness, but the French on the Rhune remained quiet, and the British troops awaited the rising of the sun, when three guns fired from the Atchubia mountain were to give the signal of attack.

BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE.

The day broke with great splendour, and as the first ray of light played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal guns were fired in rapid succession from its summit. The soldiers instantly leaped up, and the French beheld with astonishment several columns rushing forward from the flank of the great Rhune. Running to their defences with much tumult they opened a few pieces, which were answered from the top of the greater Rhune by the mountain-artillery, and at the same moment two companies of the 43rd, were detached to cross the marsh if possible, and keep down the enemy's fire from the lower part of the hog's back. The action being thus commenced, the remainder of the regiment, formed partly in line, partly in a column of reserve, turned the marsh by the right and advanced against the high rocks. From these crags the French shot fast and thickly, but the quick even movement of the British line deceived their aim, and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly, though the ground was rough, turned suddenly between the rocks and the marsh, and were immediately joined by the two companies which had passed that obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all together jumped into the lower works, but the men exhausted by their exertions, for they had passed over half a mile of very difficult ground with a wonderful speed, remained for a few minutes inactive within half pistol-shot of the first stone castle, from whence came a sharp

and biting musketry. When they had recovered breath they arose and with a stern shout commenced the assault.

The defenders were as numerous as the assailants, and for six weeks they had been labouring on their well-contrived castles; but strong and valiant in arms must the soldiers have been who stood in that hour before the veterans of the 43rd. One French grenadier officer only dared to sustain the rush. Standing alone on the high wall of the first castle and flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men shrinking on each side sought safety among the rocks on his flanks. • Close and confused then was the action, man met man at every turn, but with a rattling fire of musketry, sometimes struggling in the intricate narrow paths, sometimes climbing the loose stone walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way until they had carried the second castle, called by the French the place of arms, and the magpie's nest, because of a lofty pillar of rock which rose above it, and on which a few marksmen were perched. From these points the defenders were driven into their last castle, which being higher and larger than the others, and covered by a natural ditch or cleft in the rocks 15 feet deep, was called the Donjon. Here they made a stand, and the assailants, having advanced so far as to look into the rear of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below, suspended the vehement throng of their attack for a while, partly to gather a head for storming the Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy beneath them, who were now warmly engaged with the two battalions of riflemen, the Portuguese caçadores, and the 17th Portuguese. This last regiment was to have followed the 43rd, but seeing how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the rocks, had moved at once against the traverse on the other side of the marsh; and very soon the French defending the rampart, being thus pressed in front, and warned by the direction of the fire that they were turned on the ridge above, seeing also the 52nd, forming the extreme left of the division, now emerging from the deep ravine beyond the star fort on the other flank, abandoned their works. Then the 43rd gathering a strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped with a shout down the deep cleft in the rock, others turned it by the narrow paths on each flank, and the enemy abandoned the loose walls at the moment they were being scaled. Thus in 20 minutes 600 old soldiers were hustled out of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the victors lost 11 officers and 67 men.

The whole mountain was now cleared of the French, for the riflemen dropping perpendicularly down from the greater Rhune upon the post of crags in the hollow between the Rhunes, seized it with small loss; but they were ill-seconded by Giron's Spaniards, and were hardly handled by the 34th French regiment, which maintaining its post on the slope, covered the flight of the confused crowd which came rushing down the mountain behind them towards the neck of land leading to the main position. At that point they all rallied, and seemed inclined to renew the action, but after some hesitation continued their retreat. This favourable moment for a decisive stroke had been looked for by the commander of the 43rd, but the officer entrusted with the reserve companies of the regiment had thrown them needlessly into the fight, thus rendering it impossible to collect a body strong enough to assail such a heavy mass.

The contest at the stone rampart and star fort, being shortened by the rapid success on the hog's-back, was not very severe, but General Kempt, always conspicuous for his valour, was severely wounded, nevertheless he did not quit the field, and soon reformed his brigade on the platform he had thus so gallantly won. Meanwhile the 52nd having turned the position by the ravine was now approaching the enemy's line of retreat, when General Alten, following his instructions, halted the division partly in the ravine itself to the left of the neck, partly on the table-land, and during this action Longa's Spaniards, having got near Ascaín, were in connection with Freyre's Gallicians. In this position, with the enemy now and then cannonading Longa's people and the troops in the ravine, Alten awaited the progress of the army on his right, for the columns there had a long way to march and it was essential to regulate the movements.

The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent the light division against the Rhune, had also put the fourth and seventh divisions in movement against the redoubts

of San Barbe and Grenada. Eighteen guns were immediately placed in battery against the former, and while they poured their stream of shot the troops advanced with scaling ladders, and the skirmishers of the fourth division got into the rear of the work, whereupon the French leaped out and fled. Ross's battery of horse artillery galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada fort drove the enemy from there also, and then the fourth and seventh divisions carried the village of Sarre and the position beyond it and advanced to the attack of Clausel's main position.

It was now eight o'clock, and from the smaller Rhune a splendid spectacle of war opened upon the view. On one hand the ships of war slowly sailing to and fro were exchanging shots with the fort of Socoa ; Hope, menacing all the French lines in the low ground, sent the sound of a hundred pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks, and they were answered by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains. On the other hand the summit of the great Atchubia was just lighted by the rising sun, and 50,000 men rushing down its enormous slopes with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding shadows into the deep valley. The plains of France, so long overlooked from the towering crags of the Pyrenees, were to be the prize of battle, and the half-famished soldiers in their fury broke through the iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of reeds.

The principal action was on a space of seven or eight miles, but the skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point had the combinations failed. Far on the right General Hill, after a long and difficult night march, had got within reach of the enemy a little before seven o'clock. Opposing Morillo's, and Mina's Spaniards to Abbé's troops on the Mondarain and Atchuleguy rocks, he directed the second division against D'Armagnac's brigade and brushed it back from the forge of Urdax and the village of Ainhua. Meanwhile the aid of the sixth division and Hamilton's Portuguese being demanded by him, they passed the Nivelle lower down and bent their march along the right bank towards the bridge of Amotz. Thus while Mina's battalion and Morillo's division kept Abbé in check on the mountains, the three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, marching left flank in advance, approached D'Erlon's second position, but the country being very rugged it was eleven o'clock before they got within cannon-shot of the French redoubts. Each of these contained 500 men, and they were placed along the summit of a high ridge which, being thickly clothed with bushes, and covered by a deep ravine, was very difficult to attack. However, General Clinton, leading the sixth division on the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy from the works covering the approaches to the bridge, after which, wheeling to his right, he advanced against the nearest redoubt, and the garrison, not daring to await the assault, abandoned it. Then the Portuguese division passing the ravine and marching on the right of the sixth, menaced the second redoubt, and the second division in like manner approached the third redoubt. D'Armagnac's troops now set fire to their hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda behind San Pé, pursued by the sixth division. Abbé's second brigade, forming the French left, was separated by a ravine from D'Armagnac's ground, but he also after some hesitation retreated towards Espelette and Cambo, where his other brigade, which had meanwhile fallen back from the Mondarain before Morillo, rejoined him.

It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive that rendered D'Erlon's defence so feeble. After the fall of the St. Barbe and Grenada redoubts Conroux's right and centre endeavoured to defend the village and heights of Sarre ; but while the fourth and seventh divisions, aided by the 94th regiment detached from the third division, attacked and carried those points, the third division being on their right and less opposed pushed rapidly towards the bridge of Amotz, forming in conjunction with the sixth division the narrow end of the wedge into which Beresford's and Hill's corps were now thrown. The French were thus driven from all their new unfinished works covering the approaches to that bridge on both sides of the Nivelle, and Conroux's division, spreading from Sarre to Amotz, was broken by superior numbers at every point. That general indeed vigorously defended the old works around the bridge itself, but he soon fell mortally wounded, his troops were again broken, and the third division seized the

bridge and established itself on the heights between that structure and the redoubt of Louis the XIV., which having been also lately commenced was unfinished. This happened about eleven o'clock, and D'Erlon fearing to be cut off from San Pé yielded as we have seen at once to the attack of the sixth division, and at the same time the remainder of Conroux's troops fell back in disorder from Sarre, closely pursued by the fourth and seventh divisions, which were immediately established on the left of the third. Thus the communication between Clausel and D'Erlon was cut, the left flank of one and the right flank of the other broken, and a direct communication between Hill and Beresford secured by the same blow.

D'Erlon abandoned his position, but Clausel stood firm with Taupin's and Maransin's divisions. The latter, now completed by the return of Barbot's brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt of Louis the XIV., and supported with eight field-pieces attempted to cover the flight of Conroux's troops. The guns opened briskly but they were silenced by Ross's battery of horse artillery, the only one which had surmounted the difficulties of the ground after passing Sarre, the infantry were then assailed, in front by the fourth and seventh divisions, in flank by the third division, the redoubt of Louis XIV. was stormed, the garrison bayonnetted, Conroux's men continued to fly, Maransin's after a stiff combat were cast headlong into the ravines behind their position, and Maransin himself was taken but escaped in the confusion. Giron's Spaniards now came up on the left of the fourth division, somewhat late however, and after having abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune.

On the French side Taupin's division and a large body of conscripts, forming Clausel's right wing, still remained to fight. The left rested on a large work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery but overlooked the whole position; the right was covered by two redoubts overhanging a ravine which separated them from the camp of Serres, and some works in the ravine itself protected the communication by the bridge of Ascain. Behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing the road to San Pé and along which Maransin's and Conroux's beaten divisions were now flying in disorder, there was another work called the redoubt of Harastagua, and Clausel, thinking he might still dispute the victory if his reserve division, posted in the camp of Serres, could come to his aid, drew the 31st French regiment from Taupin, and posted it in front of this redoubt of Harastagua. His object was to rally Maransin's and Conroux's troops there and so form a new line, the left on the Harastagua, the right on the signal redoubt, into which last he threw 600 of the 88th regiment. In this position, having a retreat by the bridge of Ascain, he resolved to renew the battle, but his plan failed at the moment of conception, because Taupin could not stand before the light division, which was now again in full action.

About half-past nine, General Alten, seeing the whole of the columns on his right, as far as the eye could reach, well engaged with the enemy, had crossed the low neck of land in his front. It was first passed by the 52nd regiment with a rapid pace and a very narrow front, under a destructive cannonade and fire of musketry from the entrenchments which covered the side of the opposite mountain; a road coming from Ascain by the ravine led up the position, and as the 52nd pushed their attack along it the enemy abandoned his entrenchments on each side, and forsook even his crowning works above. This formidable regiment was followed by the remainder of Alten's troops, and Taupin, though his division was weak from its losses on the 7th of October and now still further diminished by the absence of the 31st regiment, awaited the assault above, being supported by the conscripts drawn up in his rear. But at this time Longa, having turned the smaller Rhune, approached Ascain, and being joined by part of Freyre's troops their skirmishers opened a distant musketry against the works covering that bridge on Taupin's right; a panic immediately seized the French, the 70th regiment abandoned the two redoubts above, and the conscripts were withdrawn. Clausel ordered Taupin to retake the forts, but this only added to the disorder, the 70th regiment, instead of facing about, disbanded entirely, and were not reassembled until next day. There remained only four regiments unbroken, one, the 88th, was in the signal redoubt, two under Taupin in person kept together in rear of the works on the right, and the 31st covered the fort of Harastagua, now the only line of retreat.

[illegible]

Right Attack.

A detailed tactical map from a historical document, likely a manuscript or early printed work, illustrating a battle plan. The title "Right Attack." is written in a cursive script at the bottom left. The map depicts a landscape with several towns and villages, including Walsingham, Atherstone, and Marston. Rivers are shown flowing through the area, with labels like "Great Ouse" and "Little Ouse". Numerous small icons represent military units, some with numbers (e.g., "1000", "500"). Arrows indicate the movement of troops, showing a general advance from the top left towards the center-right, with specific points of engagement marked near Marston. The map is oriented with North roughly at the top.

In this emergency, Clausel, anxious to bring off the 88th regiment, ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal redoubt, intending to do the same himself on the other at the head of the 31st regiment; but the latter was now vigorously attacked by the Portuguese of the seventh division, and the fourth division was rapidly interposing between that regiment and the signal redoubt. Moreover Alten, previous to this, had directed the 43rd, preceded by Barnard's riflemen, to turn at the distance of musket-shot the right flank of the signal redoubt, wherefore Taupin instead of charging, was himself charged in front by the riflemen, and being menaced at the same in flank by the fourth division, retreated, closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer fell dangerously wounded. During this struggle the seventh division broke the 31st, the rout was complete; and the French fled to the different bridges over the Nivelles and the signal redoubt was left to its fate.

This formidable work barred the way of the light division, but it was of no value to the defence when the forts on its flanks were abandoned. Colborne approached it in front with the 52nd regiment, Giron's Spaniards menaced it on Colborne's right, the fourth division was passing to its rear, and Kempt's brigade was as we have seen turning it on the left. Colborne whose military judgment was seldom at fault, halted under the brow of the conical hill on which the work was situated, but some of Giron's Spaniards making a vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking it on his right were beaten back, and at that moment a staff-officer without warrant, for General Alten on the spot assured the Author of this History that he sent no such order, rode up and directed Colborne to advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance and his troops, covered by the steepness of the hill, reached the flat top which was about 40 yards across to the redoubt; then they made their rush, but a wide ditch, 30 feet deep well fraised and palisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of the enemy stretched all the foremost men dead. The intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously for he was always at the head and on horseback, immediately led the regiment under cover of the brow to another point, and thinking to take the French unawares made another rush, yet with the same result. At three different places did he rise to the surface in this manner, and each time the French fire swept away the head of his column. Resorting then to persuasion, he held out a white handkerchief and summoned the commandant, pointing out to him how his work was surrounded and how hopeless his defence, whereupon the garrison yielded having had only one man killed, whereas on the British side there fell 200 soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms were first borne by men.

During this affair Clausel's divisions had crossed the Nivelles in great disorder, Maransin's and Conroux's troops near San Pé, the 31st regiment at Harastagua, Taupin between that place and the bridge of Serres. They were pursued by the third and seventh divisions, and the skirmishers of the former crossing by Amotz and a bridge above San Pé entered that place while the French were in the act of passing the river below. It was now past two o'clock, Conroux's troops pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position on the road from San Pé to Bayonne, where they were joined by Taupin and by D'Erlon with D'Armagnac's division, but Clausel rallied Maransin's men and took post on some heights immediately above San Pé. Meanwhile Soult had hurried from St. Jean de Luz to the camp of Serres, with all his reserve artillery and spare troops to menace the allies' left flank by Ascain, and Wellington thereupon halted the fourth and light divisions, and Giron's Spaniards, on the reverse slopes of Clausel's original position, facing the camp of Serres, waiting until the sixth division, then following D'Armagnac's retreat on the right of the Nivelles, was well advanced. When he was assured of Clinton's progress he crossed the Nivelles with the third and seventh divisions and drove Maransin from his new position after a hard struggle, in which General Inglis was wounded and the 51st and 68th regiments handled very roughly. This ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming on and the troops were exhausted, especially the sixth division which had been marching or fighting for 24 hours. However, three divisions were firmly established in rear of Soult's right wing of whose operations it is now time to treat.

In front of Reille's entrenchments were two advanced positions, the camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bons Secours in the centre covering Uroge. The

first had been attacked and carried early in the morning by the fifth division, which advanced to the inundation covering the heights of Bordegain and Ciboure. The second, after a short cannonade, was taken by Halket's Germans and the guards, and immediately afterwards the 85th regiment, of Lord Alymer's brigade, drove a French battalion out of Urogne. The first division, being on the right, then menaced the camp of Belchena, and the German skirmishers passed a small stream covering this part of the line, but they were driven back by the enemy whose musketry and cannonade were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile Freyre, advancing in two columns from Jollimont and the Calvaire on the right of the first division, placed eight guns in battery against the Nassau redoubt, a large work constructed on the ridge occupied by Villatte to cover the approaches to Ascaïn. The Spaniards were here opposed by their own countrymen under Casa Palacio who commanded the remains of Joseph's Spanish guards, and during the fight General Freyre's skirmishers on the right united with Longa's men. Thus a kind of false battle was maintained along the whole line to the sea until nightfall, with equal loss of men but great advantage to the allies, because it entirely occupied Reille's two divisions and Villatte's reserve, and prevented the troops in the camp of Serres from passing by the bridge of Ascaïn to aid Clausel, who was thus overpowered. When that event happened and Lord Wellington had passed the Nivelle at San Pé, Daricau and the Italian brigade withdrew from Serres, and Villatte's reserve occupied it, whereupon Freyre and Longa entered the town of Ascaïn. Villatte, however, held the camp above until Reille had withdrawn into St. Jean de Luz and destroyed all the bridges on the Lower Nivelle; when that was effected the whole retired and at day-break reached the heights of Bidart on the road to Bayonne.

During the night the allies halted on the position they had gained in the centre, but an accidental conflagration catching a wood completely separated the picquets towards Ascaïn from the main body, and spreading far and wide over the heath lighted up all the hills, a blazing sign of war to France.

On the 11th the army advanced in order of battle. Sir John Hope, on the left, forded the river above St. Jean de Luz with his infantry, and marched on Bidart. Marshal Beresford, in the centre, moved by the roads leading upon Arbonne. General Hill, communicating by his right with Morillo, who was on the rocks of Mondarain, brought his left forward into communication with Beresford, and with his centre took possession of Suraide and Espelette facing towards Cambo. The time required to restore the bridges for the artillery at Ciboure, and the change of front on the right rendered these movements slow, and gave the Duke of Dalmatia time to rally his army upon a third line of fortified camps which he had previously commenced, the right resting on the coast at Bidart, the centre at Helbacen Borda, the left at Ustaritz on the Nive. This front was about eight miles, but the works were only slightly advanced, and Soult, dreading a second battle on so wide a field, drew back his centre and left to Arbonne and Arauntz, broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and at two o'clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the allies in the centre, closed the day's proceedings. The next morning the French retired to the ridge of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet and their left in the entrenched camp of Bayonne near Marac. During this movement a dense fog arrested the allies, but when the day cleared Sir John Hope took post at Bidart on the left, and Beresford occupied Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe, in the centre. General Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges of Ustaritz and he also made a demonstration against the works at Cambo, but the rain which fell heavily in the mountains on the 11th rendered the fords impassable, and both points were defended successfully by Foy, whose operations had been distinct from the rest.

In the night of the 9th D'Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his own position, had sent that general orders to march from Bidarray to Espelette, but the messenger did not arrive in time and on the morning of the 10th about 11 o'clock Foy, following Soult's previous instructions, drove Mina's battalions from the Gorospil mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo he forced him also back fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However, D'Erlon's battle was at this period receding fast, and Foy fearing to be cut off retired with the loss of a colonel and 150 men, having however, taken a quantity of baggage and 100 prisoners. Continuing his retreat all

night, he reached Cambo and Ustaritz on the 11th, just in time to relieve Abbé's division at those posts, and on the 12th defended them against General Hill. Such were the principal circumstances of the battle of the Nivelle, whereby Soult was driven from a mountain position which he had been fortifying for three months. He lost 4265 men and officers, including 1200 or 1400 prisoners, and one general was killed. His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz and Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and 51 pieces of artillery were taken, the greater part having been abandoned in the redoubts of the low country to Sir John Hope. The allies had two generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost 2694 men and officers.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Soult fared in this battle as most generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of numbers, or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers lines may avail, seldom against accomplished generals, never when the assailants are the better soldiers. Caesar at Alesia resisted the Gauls, but his lines served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey. Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus; and in modern times the Duke of Marlborough broke through all the French lines in Flanders. If Wellington triumphed at Torres Vedras, it was perhaps because his lines were not attacked, and, it may be, Soult was seduced by that example. His works were almost as gigantic, and upon the same plan, that is to say, a river on one flank, the ocean on the other, and the front upon mountains covered with redoubts and partially protected by inundations. But the Duke of Dalmatia had only three months to complete his system; his labours were under the gaze of his enemy; his troops, twice defeated during the execution, were inferior in confidence and numbers to the assailants. Lord Wellington's lines at Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year. Massena only knew of them when they stopped his progress, and his army, inferior in numbers, had been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco.

It is not meant by this to decry entrenched camps within compass, and around which an active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or avoiding battle according to circumstances. The objection applies only to those extensive covering lines by which soldiers are taught to consider themselves inferior in strength and courage to their enemies. A general is thus precluded from showing himself at important points and at critical periods; he is unable to encourage his troops, or to correct errors; his sudden resources and the combinations of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering to the works, while the assailants may make whatever dispositions they like, menace every point, and select where to break through. The defenders, seeing large masses directed against them, and unable to draw confidence from a like display of numbers, become fearful, knowing there must be some weak point which is the measure of strength for the whole. The assailants fall on with that heat and vehemence which belongs to those who act voluntarily and on the offensive; each mass strives to outdo those on its right and left, and failure is only a repulse, whereas the assailed, having no resource but victory, look to their flanks, and are more anxious about their neighbours' fighting than their own.

All these disadvantages were experienced at the battle of the Nivelle. D'Erlon attributed his defeat to the loss of the bridge of Amotz by Conroux's division, and to this cause also Maransin traced his misfortunes. Taupin laid his defeat at Maransin's door, but Clausel, on the other hand, ascribed it at once to want of firmness in the troops, although he also asserted that if Daricau's division had come to his aid from the camp of Serres, he would have maintained his ground. Soult, however, traced Clausel's defeat to injudicious measures. That general, he said, attempted to defend the village of Sarre, after the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada were carried, whereby Conroux's division was overwhelmed in detail, and driven back in flight to Amotz. Clausel should rather have assembled his three divisions at once in the main position, which was his battle-ground, and there, covered by the smaller Rhune, ought to have been victorious. It was scarcely credible, he observed, that such entrenchments as Clausel's and D'Erlon's should have been carried. For his part, he relied on their strength so confidently as to think the allies must sacrifice 25,000 men to force them, and perhaps fail then. He had been on the right when the battle began, no reports came to him, he could

judge of events only by the fire, and when he reached the camp of Serres with his reserve troops and artillery, Clausel's works were lost! His arrival had, however, paralysed the march of three divisions. This was true, yet there seems some foundation for Clausel's complaint, namely, that he had for five hours fought on his main position, and during that time no help had come, although the camp of Serres was close at hand, the distance from St. Jean de Luz to that place only four miles, and the attack in the low ground evidently a feint. This, then, was Soult's error. He suffered Sir John Hope to hold in play 25,000 men in the low ground, while 15,000 under Clausel lost the battle on the hills.

2. The French army was inferior in numbers, and many of the works were unfinished; and yet two strong divisions, Daricau's and Foy's, were quite thrown out of the fight, for the slight offensive movement made by the latter produced no effect whatever. Vigorous counter-attacks are, no doubt, essential to a good defence, and it was in allusion to this that Napoleon, speaking of Joseph's position behind the Ebro in the beginning of the war, said, "If a river were as broad and rapid as the Danube, it would be nothing without secure points for passing to the offensive." The same maxim applies to lines, and Soult grandly conceived and applied this principle when he proposed the descent upon Aragon to Suchet. But he conceived it meanly and poorly when he ordered Foy to attack by the Gorospil mountain. That general's numbers were too few, and the direction of the march false; one regiment in the field of battle at the decisive moment would have been worth three on a distant and secondary point. Foy's retreat was inevitable if D'Erlon failed, and wanting the other's aid he did fail. What success could Foy obtain? He might have driven Mina's battalions over the Puerto de Maya and quite through the Bastan; he might have defeated Morillo, and perhaps have taken General Hill's baggage; yet all this would have weighed little against the allies' success at Amotz; and the deeper he penetrated, the more difficult would have been his retreat. The incursion into the Bastan by Yspegui, proposed by him on the 6th, although properly rejected by Soult, would probably have produced greater effects than the one executed by Gorospil on the 10th. A surprise on the 6th, Hill's troops being then in march by brigades through the Alduides, might have brought some advantages to the French, and perhaps delayed the general attack beyond the 10th, when the heavy rains which set in on the 11th would have rendered it difficult to attack at all: Soult would thus have had time to complete his works.

3. It has been observed that a minor cause of defeat was the drawing up of the French troops in front instead of in rear of the redoubts. This may possibly have happened in some places from error and confusion, not by design, for Clausel's report expressly states that Maransin was directed to form in rear of the redoubts and charge the allies when they were between the works and the abattis. It is, however, needless to pry closely into these matters when the true cause lies broad on the surface. Lord Wellington directed superior numbers with superior skill. The following analysis will prove this, but it must be remembered that the conscripts are not included in the enumeration of the French force: being quite undisciplined, they were kept in masses behind and never engaged.

Abbé's division, furnishing 5000 old soldiers, was posted in two lines one behind the other, and they were both paralyzed by the position of Morillo's division and Mina's battalions. Foy's division was entirely occupied by the same troops. Six thousand of Wellington's worst soldiers therefore sufficed to employ 12,000 of Soult's best troops during the whole day. Meanwhile Hill fell upon the decisive point where there was only D'Armagnac's division to oppose him, that is to say, 5000 against 20,000. And while the battle was secured on the right of the Nivelle by this disproportion, Beresford on the other bank thrust 24,000 against the 10,000 composing Conroux's and Maransin's divisions. Moreover as Hill and Beresford, advancing, the one from his left the other from his right, formed a wedge towards the bridge of Amotz, 44,000 men composing the six divisions under those generals, fell upon the 15,000 composing the divisions of D'Armagnac, Conroux, and Maransin; and these last were also attacked in detail, because part of Conroux's troops were defeated near Sarre, and Barbot's brigade of Maransin's corps was beaten on the Rhune by the light division before the main position was attacked.

Finally, Alten with 8000 men, having first defeated Barbot's brigade, fell upon Taupin, who had only 3000, while the rest of the French army was held in check by Freyre and Hope. Thus more than 50,000 troops, full of confidence from repeated victories, were suddenly thrown upon the decisive point where there were only 18,000 dispirited by previous reverses to oppose them. Against such a thunderbolt there was no defence in the French works. Was it then a simple matter for Wellington so to combine his battle? The mountains on whose huge flanks he gathered his fierce soldiers, the roads he opened, the horrid crags he surmounted, the headlong steeps he descended, the wild regions through which he poured the destructive fire of more than 90 guns, these and the reputation of the French commander furnish the everlasting reply.

And yet he did not compass all that he designed. The French right escaped, because when he passed the Nivelle at San Pé he had only two divisions in hand, the sixth had not come up, three were in observation of the camp at Serres, and before he could assemble enough men to descend upon the enemy in the low ground the day had closed. The great object of the battle was therefore unattained, and it may be a question, seeing the shortness of the days and the difficulty of the roads were not unexpected obstacles, whether the combinations would not have been surer if the principal attack had been directed entirely against Clausel's position. Carlos D'España's force and the remainder of Mina's battalions could have reinforced Morillo's division with 5000 men to occupy D'Erlon's attention; it was not essential to defeat him, for though he attributed his retreat to Clausel's reverse that general did not complain that D'Erlon's retreat endangered his position. This arrangement would have enabled the rest of Hill's troops to reinforce Beresford and have given Lord Wellington three additional divisions in hand with which to cross the Nivelle before two o'clock. Soult's right wing could not then have escaped.

4. In the report of the battle Lord Wellington, from some oversight, did but scant and tardy justice to the light division. Acting alone, for Longa's Spaniards went off towards Ascaín and scarcely fired a shot, this division furnishing only 4700 men and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot's brigade, and then beat Taupin's division from the main position, thus driving superior numbers from the strongest works. In fine, being less than one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clausel, they defeated one-third of that general's corps. Many brave men they lost, and of two who fell in this battle I will speak.

The first, low in rank, for he was but a lieutenant, rich in honour, for he bore many scars, was young of days. He was only 19. But he had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. So slight in person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty that the Spaniards often thought him a girl disguised in man's clothing, he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring and experienced veterans watched his looks on the field of battle, and implicitly following where he led, would like children obey his slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His education was incomplete, yet were his natural powers so happy, the keenest and best-furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and every thought and aspiration was proud and noble, indicating future greatness if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the 43rd, one of three brothers who covered with wounds have all died in the service. Assailed the night before the battle with that strange anticipation of coming death so often felt by military men, he was pierced with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept even in the middle of the fight when they heard of his fate.

On the same day and at the same hour was killed Colonel Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a long time in the 43rd. Under him Freer had learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the course of the war promotion placed Lloyd at the head of the 94th, and it was leading that regiment he fell. In him also were combined mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A graceful symmetry combined with Herculean strength, and a countenance at once frank and majestic, gave the true index of his nature, for his capacity was great and commanding, and his military knowledge extensive both from experience and study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, I will not dwell, save to remark, that he used the

latter without offence, yet so, as to increase his ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse, for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He like Freer was prescient of, and predicted his own fall, yet with no abatement of courage. When he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, he would not suffer himself to be moved, but remained watching the battle and making observations upon the changes in it until death came. It was thus at the age of 30, that the good, the brave, the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to his merit have been published by Lord Wellington and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine, let those who served on equal terms with him say whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts.

CHAPTER II.

SOULT having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to leave part of his forces in the entrenched camp of Bayonne, and with the remainder take a flanking position behind the Nive, half-way between Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, securing his left by the entrenched mountain of Ursouia, and his right on the heights above Cambo, the bridge-head of which would give him the power of making offensive movements. He could thus keep his troops together, and restore their confidence, while he confined the allies to a small sterile district of France, between the river and the sea, and rendered their situation very uneasy during the winter, if they did not retire. However, he soon modified this plan. The works of the Bayonne camp were not complete, and his presence was necessary to urge their progress. The camp on the Ursouia mountain had been neglected, contrary to his orders, and the bridge-head at Cambo was only commenced on the right bank. On the left it was indeed complete, but constructed on a bad trace. Moreover, he found that the Nive in dry weather was fordable at Ustaritz, below Cambo, and at many places above that point. Remaining, therefore, at Bayonne himself with six divisions and Villatte's reserve, he sent D'Erlon with three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo. Yet neither D'Erlon's divisions nor Soult's whole army could have stopped Lord Wellington at this time, if other circumstances had permitted the latter to follow up his victory as he designed.

The hardships and privations endured on the mountains by the Anglo-Portuguese troops had been beneficial to them as an army. The fine air and the impossibility of the soldiers committing their usual excesses in drink had rendered them unusually healthy, while the facility of enforcing a strict discipline, and their natural impatience to win the fair plains spread out before them, had raised their moral and physical qualities in a wonderful degree. Danger was their sport, and their experienced general, in the prime and vigour of life, was as impatient for action as his soldiers. Neither the works of the Bayonne camp nor the barrier of the Nive, suddenly manned by a beaten and dispirited army, could have long withstood the progress of such a fiery host, and if Wellington could have let their strength and fury loose in the first days succeeding the battle of the Nivelle, France would have felt his conquering footsteps to her centre. But the country at the foot of the Pyrenees is a deep clay, quite impassable after rain, except by the royal road near the coast, and that of St. Jean Pied de Port, both of which were in the power of the French. On the by-roads the infantry sunk to the mid-leg, the cavalry above the horses' knees, and even to the saddle-girths in some places. The artillery could not move at all. The rain had commenced on the 11th, the mist in the early part of the 12th had given Soult time to regain his camp and secure the high road to St. Jean Pied de Port, by which his troops easily gained their proper posts on the Nive, while his adversary, fixed in the swamps, could only make the ineffectual demonstration at Ustaritz and Cambo already noticed.

Wellington, uneasy for his right flank while the French commanded the Cambo passage across the Nive, directed General Hill to menace it again on the 16th. Foy had received orders to preserve the bridge-head on the right bank in any circumstances, but he was permitted to abandon the work on the left bank in the event of a general attack. However, at Hill's approach, the officer placed there in command destroyed all the works and the bridge itself. This was a great cross to

Soult, and the allies' flank being thus secured, they were put into cantonments to avoid the rain, which fell heavily. The bad weather was, however, not the only obstacle to the English general's operations. On the very day of the battle Freyre's and Longa's soldiers entering Ascain, pillaged it and murdered several persons; the next day the whole of the Spanish troops continued these excesses in various places, and on the right Mina's battalions, some of whom were also in a state of mutiny, made a plundering and murdering incursion from the mountains towards Hellette. The Portuguese and British soldiers of the left wing had commenced the like outrages, and two French persons were killed in one town; however, the adjutant-general, Pakenham, arriving at the moment saw and instantly put the perpetrators to death, thus nipping this wickedness in the bud, but at his own risk, for legally he had not that power. This general, whose generosity, humanity, and chivalric spirit excited the admiration of every honourable person who approached him, is the man who afterwards fell at New Orleans, and who has been so foully traduced by American writers. He who was pre-eminently distinguished by his detestation of inhumanity and outrage has been, with astounding falsehood, represented as instigating his troops to the most infamous excesses. But from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prate and vaunt of liberty until all men turn with loathing from the sickening folly, what can be expected?

Terrified by these excesses, the French people fled even from the larger towns, but Wellington quickly relieved their terror. On the 12th, although expecting a battle, he put to death all the Spanish marauders he could take in the act, and then, with many reproaches, and despite of the discontent of their generals, forced the whole to withdraw into their own country. He disarmed the insubordinate battalions under Mina, quartered Giron's Andalusians in the Bastan, where O'Donnell resumed the command; sent Freyre's Galicians to the district between Irun and Ernani, and Longa over the Ebro. Morillo's division alone remained with the army. These decisive proceedings, marking the lofty character of the man, proved not less politic than resolute. The French people immediately returned, and finding the strictest discipline preserved, and all things paid for, adopted an amicable intercourse with the invaders. However, the loss of such a mass of troops and the effects of weather on the roads reduced the army for the moment to a state of inactivity; the head-quarters were suddenly fixed at St. Jean de Luz, and the troops were established in permanent cantonments, with the following line of battle:—

The left wing occupied a broad ridge on both sides of the great road beyond Bidart, the principal post being at a mansion belonging to the mayor of Biarritz. The front was covered by a small stream spreading here and there into large ponds or tanks, between which the road was conducted. The centre, posted partly on the continuation of this ridge in front of Arcangues, partly on the hill of San Barbe, extended by Arrauntz to Ustaritz, the right being thrown back to face Count D'Erlon's position, extended by Cambo to Itzassu. From this position, which might stretch about six miles on the front and eight miles on the flank, strong picquets were pushed forwards to several points, and the infantry occupied all the villages and towns behind as far back as Espelette, Suraide, Ainhoa, San Pé, Sarre, and Ascain. One regiment of Vandeleur's cavalry was with the advanced post on the left, the remainder were sent to Andaya and Urogne, Victor Alten's horsemen were about San Pé, and the heavy cavalry remained in Spain.

In this state of affairs the establishment of the different posts in front led to several skirmishes. In one on the 18th, General John Wilson and General Vandeleur were wounded; but on the same day Beresford drove the French from the bridge of Urdains, near the junction of the Ustaritz and San Pé roads, and though attacked in force the next day he maintained his acquisition. A more serious action occurred on the 23rd in front of Arcangues. This village, held by the picquets of the light division, was two or three miles in front of Arbonne where the nearest support was cantoned. It is built on the centre of a crescent-shaped ridge, and the sentries of both armies were so close that the reliefs and patrols actually passed each other in their rounds, so that a surprise was inevitable if it

sued either side to attempt it. Lord Wellington visited this post, and the field-officer on duty made known to him its disadvantages and the means of remedying them by taking entire possession of the village, pushing picquets along the horns of the crescent, and establishing a chain of posts across the valley between them. He appeared satisfied with this project, and two days afterwards the 43rd and some of the riflemen were employed to effect it, the greatest part of the division being brought up in support. The French, after a few shots, abandoned Arcangues, Bussussary, and both horns of the crescent, retiring before the picquets to a large fortified house situated at the mouth of the valley. The project suggested by the field-officer was thus executed with the loss of only five men wounded and the action should have ceased, but the picquets of the 43rd suddenly received orders to attack the fortified house, and the columns of support were shown at several points of the semicircle; the French then conceiving they were going to be seriously assailed reinforced their post; a sharp skirmish ensued, and the picquets were finally withdrawn to the ground they had originally gained, and beyond which they should never have been pushed. This ill-managed affair cost 88 men and officers, of which 80 were of the 43rd.

Lord Wellington, whose powerful artillery and cavalry, the former consisting of nearly 100 field-pieces, and the latter furnishing more than 8600 sabres, were paralyzed in the contracted space he occupied, was now anxious to pass the Nive, but the rain which continued to fall baffled him, and meanwhile Mina's Spaniards descending once more from the Alduides to plunder Baigorri were beaten by the national guards of that valley. However, early in December the weather amended, 40 or 50 pieces of artillery were brought up, and other preparations made to surprise or force the passage of the Nive at Cambo and Ustaritz. And as this operation led to sanguinary battles, it is fitting first to describe the exact position of the French.

Bayonne, situated at the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, commands the passage of both. A weak fortress of the third order, its importance was in its position, and its entrenched camp, exceedingly strong and commanded by the fortress, could not be safely attacked in front, wherefore Soult kept only six divisions there. His right composed of Reille's two divisions and Villatte's reserve touched on the Lower Adour where there was a flotilla of gun-boats. It was covered by a swamp and artificial inundation, through which the royal road led to St. Jean de Luz, and the advanced posts, well entrenched, were pushed forward beyond Anglet on this causeway. His left under Clausel, composed of three divisions, extended from Anglet to the Nive; it was covered partly by the swamp, partly by the large fortified house which the light division assailed on the 23rd, partly by an inundation spreading below Urdains towards the Nive. Thus entrenched the fortified outposts may be called the front of battle, the entrenched camp, the second line, and the fortress the citadel. The country in front a deep clay soil, enclosed and covered with small wood and farmhouses, was very difficult to move in.

Beyond the Nive the entrenched camp, stretching from that river to the Adour, was called the front of Mousserroles. It was in the keeping of D'Erlon's four divisions, which were also extended up the right bank of the Nive; that is to say, D'Armagnac's troops were in front of Ustaritz, and Foy prolonged the line to Cambo. The remainder of D'Erlon's corps was in reserve, occupying a strong range of heights about two miles in front of Mousserroles, the right at Villefranque on the Nive, the left at Old Moguerre towards the Adour. D'Erlon's communications with the rest of the army were double, one circuitous through Bayonne, the other direct by a bridge of boats thrown above that place.

After the battle of the Nivelle, Soult brought General Paris's division from St. Jean Pied de Port to Lahousoa, close under the Ursouia mountain, where it was in connection with Foy's left, communicating by the great road to St. Jean Pied de Port which ran in a parallel direction to the river.

The Nive, the Adour, and the Gave de Pau, which falls into the latter many miles above Bayonne, were all navigable, the first as far as Ustaritz, the second to Dax, the third to Peyrehorade, and the great French magazines were collected at

the two latter places. But the army was fed with difficulty, and hence to restrain Soult to the country beyond the Nive, to intercept his communications with St. Jean Pied de Port, to bring a powerful cavalry into activity, and to obtain secret intelligence from the interior of Spain were Wellington's inducements to force a passage over the Nive. Yet to place the troops on both sides of a navigable river with communications bad at all times and subject to entire interruptions from rain; to do this in face of an army possessing short communications, good roads, and entrenched camps for retreat, was a delicate and dangerous operation.

On the 7th orders were issued for forcing the passage on the 9th. On that day Sir John Hope and Charles Alten, with the first, fifth, and light divisions, the unattached brigades of infantry, Vandeleur's cavalry, and 12 guns, in all about 24,000 combatants, were to drive back the French advanced posts along the whole front of the entrenched camp between the Nive and the sea. This movement was partly to examine the course of the Lower Adour with a view to subsequent operations, but principally to make Soult discover his dispositions of defence on that side, and to keep his troops in check while Beresford and Hill crossed the Nive. To support this double operation the fourth and seventh divisions were secretly brought up from Ascaïn and Espelette on the 8th, the latter to the hill of St. Barbe, from whence it detached one brigade to relieve the posts of the third division. There remained the second, the third, and the sixth divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese, and Morillo's Spaniards, for the passage. Beresford, leading the third and sixth, reinforced with six guns and a squadron of cavalry, was to cross at Ustaritz with pontoons, Hill having the second division, Hamilton's Portuguese, Vivian's and Victor Alten's cavalry, and 14 guns, was to ford the river at Cambo and Larressore. Both generals were then to repair the bridges at these respective points with materials prepared beforehand; and to cover Hill's movement on the right and protect the valley of the Nive from Paris, who being at Lahoussoua might have penetrated to the rear of the army during the operations, Morillo's Spaniards were to cross at Itzassu. At this time Foy's division was extended from Halzou in front of Larressore, to the fords above Cambo, the Ursouia mountain being between his left and Paris. The rest of D'Erlon's troops remained on the heights of Moguerre in front of Mousserolles.

PASSAGE OF THE NIVE AND BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE.

At Ustaritz the French had broken both bridges, but the island connecting them was in possession of the British. Beresford laid his pontoons down on the hither side in the night of the 8th, and in the morning of the 9th a beacon lighted on the heights above Cambo gave the signal of attack. The passage was immediately forced under the fire of the artillery, the second bridge was laid, and D'Armagnac's brigade was driven back by the sixth division; but the swampy nature of the country between the river and the high road retarded the allies' march and gave the French time to retreat with little loss. At the same time Hill's troops, also covered by the fire of artillery, forced the passage in three columns above and below Cambo with slight resistance, though the fords were so deep that several horsemen were drowned, and the French strongly posted, especially at Halzou where there was a deep and strong mill-race to cross as well as the river.

Foy seeing, by the direction of Beresford's fire, that his retreat was endangered, retired hastily with his left, leaving his right wing under General Berlier at Halzou without orders. Hence when General Pringle attacked the latter from Larressore, the sixth division was already on the high road between Foy and Berlier, who escaped by cross roads towards Hasparen, but did not rejoin his division until two o'clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile Morillo crossed at Itzassu, and Paris retired to Hellette, where he was joined by a regiment of light cavalry belonging to Pierre Soult, who was then on the Bidouse river. Morillo followed, and in one village near Hellette his troops killed 15 peasants, amongst them several women and children.

General Hill having won the passage, placed a brigade of infantry at Urcurray to cover the bridge of Cambo, and to support the cavalry which he despatched to scour the roads towards Lahoussoua, St. Jean Pied de Port, and Hasparen, and to observe Paris and Pierre Soult. With the rest of his troops he marched to the

heights of Lormenthoe in front of the hills of Moguerre and Villefranque, and was there joined by the sixth division, the third remaining to cover the bridge of Ustaritz. It was now about one o'clock, and Soult, coming hastily from Bayonne, approved of the disposition made by D'Erlon, and offered battle, his line being extended so as to bar the high road. D'Armagnac's brigade, which had retired from Ustaritz, was now in advance at Villefranque, and a heavy cannonade and skirmish ensued along the front, but no general attack was made because the deep roads had retarded the rear of Hill's columns. However, the Portuguese of the sixth division, descending from Lormenthoe about three o'clock, drove D'Armagnac's brigade with sharp fighting and after one repulse out of Villefranque. A brigade of the second division was then established in advance connecting Hill's corps with the troops in Villefranque. Thus three divisions of infantry, wanting the brigade left at Urcurray, hemmed up four French divisions; and as the latter, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, made no advantage of the broken movements of the allies caused by the deep roads, the passage of the Nive may be judged a surprise. Wellington thus far over-reached his able adversary, yet he had not trusted to this uncertain chance alone.

The French masses falling upon the heads of his columns at Lormenthoe while the rear was still labouring in the deep roads, might have caused some disorder, but could not have driven either Hill or Beresford over the river again, because the third division was close at hand to reinforce the sixth, and the brigade of the seventh, left at San Barbe, could have followed by the bridge of Ustaritz, thus giving the allies the superiority of numbers. The greatest danger was, that Paris, reinforced by Pierre Soult's cavalry, should have returned and fallen either upon Morillo or the brigade left at Urcurray in the rear, while Soult, reinforcing D'Erlon with fresh divisions brought from the other side of the Nive, attacked Hill and Beresford in front. It was to prevent this that Hope and Alten, whose operations are now to be related, pressed the enemy on the left bank.

The first-named general, having 12 miles to march from St. Jean de Luz before he could reach the French works, put his troops in motion during the night, and about eight o'clock passed between the tanks in front of Barrouilhet with his right, while his left descended from the platform of Bidart and crossed the valley towards Biaritz. The French outposts retired fighting, and Hope sweeping with a half circle to his right, and being preceded by the fire of his guns and many skirmishers, arrived in front of the entrenched camp about one o'clock. His left then rested on the Lower Adour, his centre menaced a very strong advanced work on the ridge of Beyris beyond Anglet, and his right was in communication with Alten. That general having a shorter distance to move, halted about Bussussary and Arcangues until Hope's fiery crescent was closing on the French camp, and then he also advanced, but with the exception of a slight skirmish at the fortified house there was no resistance. Three divisions, some cavalry, and the unattached brigades, equal to a fourth division, sufficed therefore to keep six French divisions in check on this side.

When evening closed the allies fell back towards their original positions, but under heavy rain, and with great fatigue to Hope's wing, for even the royal road was knee-deep of mud and his troops were 24 hours under arms. The whole day's fighting cost about 800 men for each side, the loss of the allies being rather greater on the left bank of the Nive than on the right.

Wellington's wings being now divided by the Nive, the French general resolved to fall upon one of them with the whole of his forces united; and misled by the prisoners, who assured him that the third and fourth divisions were both on the heights of Lormenthoe, he resolved, being able to assemble his troops with greater facility on the left of the Nive where also the allies' front was most extended, to choose that side for his counter-stroke. The garrison of Bayonne was 8000 strong, partly troops of the line partly national guards, with which he ordered the governor to occupy the entrenched camp of Mousserolles; then stationing ten gun-boats on the Upper Adour to watch that river as high as the confluence of the Gave de Pau, he made D'Erlon file his four divisions over the bridge of boats between the fortress and Mousserolles, directing him to gain the camp of Marac and take post

behind Clausel's corps on the other side of the river. He thus concentrated nine divisions of infantry and Villatte's reserve, a brigade of cavalry, and 40 guns, furnishing in all about 60,000 combatants, including conscripts, to assail a quarter where the allies, although stronger by one division than the French general imagined, had yet only 30,000 infantry with 24 pieces of cannon.

The French marshal's first design was to burst with his whole army on the tableland of Bussussary and Arcangues, and then to act as circumstances should dictate; and he judged so well of his position that he desired the minister of war to expect good news for the next day. Indeed the situation of the allies, although better than he knew of, gave him some right to anticipate success. On no point was there any expectation of this formidable counter-attack. Lord Wellington was on the left of the Nive preparing to assault the heights where he had last seen the French the evening before. Hope's troops, with the exception of Wilson's Portuguese now commanded by General Campbell and posted at Barrouilhet, had retired to their cantonments; the first division was at St. Jean de Luz and Ciboure more than six miles distant from the outposts; the fifth division was between those places and Bidart, and all exceedingly fatigued. The light division had orders to retire from Bussussary to Arbonne a distance of four miles, and part of the second brigade had already marched, when fortunately General Kempt, somewhat suspicious of the enemy's movements, delayed obedience until he could see what was going on in his front, he thus as the event proved saved the position.

The extraordinary difficulty of moving through the country even for single horsemen, the numerous enclosures and copses which denied any distinct view, the easy success of the operation to cross the Nive, and a certain haughty confidence the sure attendant of a long course of victory, seems to have rendered the English general at this time somewhat negligent of his own security. Undoubtedly the troops were not disposed as if a battle was expected. The general position, composed of two distinct parts was indeed very strong; the ridge of Barrouilhet could only be attacked along the royal road on a narrow front between the tanks, and he had directed entrenchments to be made; but there was only one brigade there, and a road made with difficulty by the engineers supplied a bad flank communication with the light division. This Barrouilhet ridge was prolonged to the platform of Bussussary, but in its winding bulged out too near the enemy's works in the centre to be safely occupied in force, and behind it there was a deep valley or basin extending to Arbonne.

The ridge of Arcangues on the other side of this basin was the position of battle for the centre. Three tongues of land shot out from this part to the front, and the valleys between them as well as their slopes were covered with copse-woods almost impenetrable. The church of Arcangues, a gentleman's house, and parts of the village, furnished rallying points of defence for the picquets, which were necessarily numerous because of the extent of front. At this time the left-hand ridge or tongue of land was occupied by the 52nd regiment, which had also posts in the great basin separating the Arcangues position from that of Barrouilhet; the central tongue was held by the picquets of the 43rd with supporting companies placed in succession towards Bussussary, where was an open common across which troops in retreat would have to pass to the church of Arcangues. The third tongue was guarded, partly by the 43rd, partly by the riflemen, but the valley between was not occupied, and the picquets on the extreme right extended to an inundation, across a narrow part of which, near the house of the senator Garrat, there was a bridge: the facility for attack was there however small.

One brigade of the seventh division continued this line of posts to the Nive, holding the bridge of Urdains, the rest of the division was behind San Barbe and belonged rather to Ustaritz than to this front. The fourth division was several miles behind the right of the light division.

In this state of affairs if Soult had, as he first designed, burst with his whole army upon Bussussary and Arcangues it would have been impossible for the light division, scattered as it was over such an extent of difficult ground, to have stopped him for half an hour; and there was no support within several miles, no superior officer to direct the concentration of the different divisions. Lord Wellington had

indeed ordered all the line to be entrenched, but the works were commenced on a great scale, and, as is common when danger does not spur, the soldiers had laboured so carelessly that beyond a few abattis, the tracing of some lines and redoubts, and the opening of a road of communication, the ground remained in its natural state. The French general would therefore quickly have gained the broad open hills beyond Arcangues, separated the fourth and seventh divisions from the light division, and cut them off from Hope. Soult, however, in the course of the night, for reasons which I do not find stated, changed his project, and at day-break Reille marched with Boyer's and Maucune's divisions, Sparre's cavalry and from 20 to 30 guns against Hope by the main road. He was followed by Foy and Villatte, but Clausel assembled his troops under cover of the ridges near the fortified house in front of Bussussary, and one of D'Erlon's divisions approached the bridge of Urdains.



Combat of the 10th.—A heavy rain fell in the night yet the morning broke fair, and soon after dawn the French infantry were observed by the picquets of the 43rd pushing each other about as if at gambols, yet lining by degrees the nearest ditches; a general officer was also seen behind a farmhouse close to the sentinels, and at the same time the heads of columns could be perceived in the rear. Thus warned, some companies of the 43rd were thrown on the right into the basin to prevent the enemy from penetrating that way to the small plain between Bussussary and Arcangues. General Kempt was with the picquets, and his foresight in delaying his march to Arbonne now saved the position, for he immediately placed the reserves of his brigade in the church and mansion-house of Arcangues. Meanwhile the French breaking forth with loud cries, and a rattling musketry, fell at a running pace upon the picquets of the 43rd both on the tongue and in the basin, and a cloud of skirmishers descending on their left, penetrating between them and the 52nd regiment, sought to turn both. The right tongue was in like manner assailed and at the same time the picquets at the bridge near Garrat's house were driven back.

The assault was so strong and rapid, the enemy so numerous, and the ground so extensive, that it would have been impossible to have reached the small plain beyond Bussussary in time to regain the church of Arcangues if any serious resistance had been attempted; wherefore delivering their fire at pistol-shot distance the picquets fell back in succession, and never were the steadiness and intelligence of veteran soldiers more eminently displayed; for though it was necessary to run at full speed to gain the small plain before the enemy, who was constantly outflanking the line of posts by the basin, though the ways were so deep and narrow that no formation could be preserved, though the fire of the French was thick and close, and their cries vehement as they rushed on in pursuit, the instant the open ground at Bussussary was attained, the apparently disordered crowd of fugitives became a compact and well-formed body defying and deriding the fruitless efforts of their adversaries.

The 52nd being about half a mile to the left, though only slightly assailed fell back also to the main ridge, for though the closeness of the country did not permit Colonel Colborne to observe the strength of the enemy he could see the rapid retreat of the 43rd, and thence judging how serious the affair was, so well did the regiments of the light division understand each other's qualities, withdrew his outposts to secure the main position. And in good time he did so.

On the right-hand tongue the troops were not so fortunate, for whether they delayed their retreat too long, or that the country was more intricate, the enemy moving by the basin, reached Bussussary before the rear arrived, and about 100 of the 43rd and riflemen were thus intercepted. The French were in a hollow road and careless, never doubting that the officer of the 43rd, Ensign Campbell, a youth scarcely 18 years of age, would surrender; but he with a shout broke into their column sword in hand, and though the struggle was severe and 20 of the 43rd and 30 of the riflemen with their officer remained prisoners, reached the church with the rest.

D'Armagnac's division of D'Erlon's corps now pushed close up to the bridge of Urdains, and Clausel assembled his three divisions by degrees at Bussussary, opening meanwhile a sharp fire of musketry. The position was however safe. The



mansion-house on the right, covered by abattis and not easily accessible, was defended by a rifle battalion and the Portuguese. The church and churchyard were occupied by the 43rd, who were supported with two mountain-guns, their front being covered by a declivity of thick copse-wood filled with riflemen, and only to be turned by narrow hollow roads leading on each side to the church. On the left the 52nd, now supported by the remainder of the division, spread as far as the great basin which separated the right wing from the ridge of Barrouilhet, towards which some small posts were pushed, but there was still a great interval between Alten's and Hope's positions.

The skirmishing fire grew hot, Clausel brought up 12 guns to the ridge of Bus-sussary, with which he threw shot and shells into the churchyard of Arcangues, and 400 or 500 infantry then made a rush forwards, but a heavy fire from the 43rd sent them back over the ridge where their guns were posted. Yet the practice of the latter, well directed at first, would have been murderous if this musketry from the churchyard had not made the French gunners withdraw their pieces a little behind the ridge, which caused their shot to fly wild and high. General Kempt thinking the distance too great, was at first inclined to stop this fire, but the moment it lulled the French gunners pushed their pieces forwards again and their shells knocked down eight men in an instant. The small arms then recommenced and the shells again flew high. The French were in like manner kept at bay by the riflemen in the village and mansion-house, and the action, hottest where the 52nd fought, continued all day. It was not very severe but it has been noticed in detail because both French and English writers, misled perhaps by an inaccurate phrase in the public despatch, have represented it as a desperate attack by which the light division was driven into its entrenchments, whereas it was the picquets only that were forced back, there were no entrenchments save those made on the spur of the moment by the soldiers in the churchyard, and the French can hardly be said to have attacked at all. The real battle was at Barrouilhet.

On that side Reille, advancing with two divisions about nine o'clock, drove Campbell's Portuguese from Anglet, and Sparre's cavalry charging during the fight cut down a great many men. The French infantry then assailed the ridge at Barrouilhet, but moving along a narrow ridge and confined on each flank by the tanks, only two brigades could get into action by the main road, and the rain of the preceding night had rendered all the by-roads so deep that it was mid-day before the French line of battle was filled. This delay saved the allies, for the attack here also was so unexpected, that the first division and Lord Alymer's brigade were at rest in St. Jean de Luz and Bidart when the action commenced. The latter did not reach the position before 11 o'clock; the foot-guards did not march from St. Jean until after 12, and only arrived at three o'clock in the afternoon when the fight was done; all the troops were exceedingly fatigued, only 10 guns could be brought into play, and from some negligence part of the infantry were at first without ammunition.

Robinson's brigade of the fifth division first arrived to support Campbell's Portuguese, and fight the battle. The French spread their skirmishers along the whole valley in front of Biaritz, but their principal effort was directed by the great road and against the platform of Barrouilhet about the mayor's house, where the ground was so thick of hedges and coppice-wood that a most confused fight took place. The assailants, cutting ways through the hedges, poured on in smaller or larger bodies as the openings allowed, and were immediately engaged with the defenders; at some points they were successful at others beaten back, and few knew what was going on to the right or left of where they stood. By degrees Reille engaged both his divisions, and some of Villatte's reserve also entered the fight, and then Bradford's Portuguese and Lord Alymer's brigade arrived on the allies' side, which enabled Colonel Greville's brigade of the fifth division, hitherto kept in reserve, to relieve Robinson's; that general was however dangerously wounded and his troops suffered severely.

And now a very notable action was performed by the 9th regiment under Colonel Cameron. This officer was on the extreme left of Greville's brigade, Robinson's being then shifted in second line and towards the right, Bradford's brigade was at the mayor's house some distance to the left of the 9th regiment,

and the space between was occupied by a Portuguese battalion. There was in front of Greville's brigade a thick hedge, but immediately opposite the 9th was a coppice-wood possessed by the enemy, whose skirmishers were continually gathering in masses and rushing out as if to assail the line, they were as often driven back, yet the ground was so broken that nothing could be seen beyond the flanks, and when some time had passed in this manner, Cameron, who had received no orders, heard a sudden firing along the main road close to his left. His adjutant was sent to look out, and returned immediately with intelligence that there was little fighting on the road, but a French regiment, which must have passed unseen in small bodies through the Portuguese between the 9th and the mayor's house, was rapidly filing into line on the rear. The 4th British regiment was then in close column at a short distance, and its commander, Colonel Piper was directed by Cameron to face about, march to the rear, and then bring up his left shoulder when he would infallibly fall in with the French regiment. Piper marched, but whether he misunderstood the order, took a wrong direction, or mistook the enemy for Portuguese, he passed them. No firing was heard, the adjutant again hurried to the rear, and returned with intelligence that the 4th regiment was not to be seen, but the enemy's line was nearly formed. Cameron, leaving 50 men to answer the skirmishing fire which now increased from the copse, immediately faced about and marched in line against the new enemy, who was about his own strength, as fast as the rough nature of the ground would permit. The French fire, slow at first, increased vehemently as the distance lessened, but when the 9th, coming close up, sprung forwards to the charge, the adverse line broke and fled to the flanks in the utmost disorder. Those who made for their own right brushed the left of Greville's brigade, and even carried off an officer of the royals in their rush, yet the greatest number were made prisoners, and the 9th, having lost about 80 men and officers, resumed their old ground.

The final result of the battle at Barrouilhet was the repulse of Reille's divisions, but Villatte still menaced the right flank, and Foy, taking possession of the narrow ridge connecting Bussussary with the platform of Barrouilhet, threw his skirmishers into the great basin leading to Arbonne, and connecting his right with Reille's left menaced Hope's flank at Barrouilhet. This was about two o'clock, Soult, whose columns were now all in hand gave orders to renew the battle, and his masses were beginning to move, when Clausel reported that a large body of fresh troops, apparently coming from the other side of the Nive, was menacing D'Armagnac's division from the heights above Urdains. Unable to account for this, Soult, who saw the guards and Germans moving up fast from St. Jean de Luz and all the unattached brigades already in line, hesitated, suspended his own attack, and ordered D'Erlon, who had two divisions in reserve, to detach one to the support of D'Armagnac: before this disposition could be completed, the night fell.

The fresh troops seen by Clausel were the third, fourth, sixth, and seventh divisions, whose movements during the battle it is time to notice. When Lord Wellington, who remained on the right of the Nive during the night of the 9th, discovered at day-break that the French had abandoned the heights in Hill's front, he directed that officer to occupy them, and push parties close up to the entrenched camp of Mousseroles while his cavalry spread beyond Hasparen and up the Adour. Meanwhile, the cannonade on the left bank of the Nive being heard, he repaired in person to that side, first making the third and sixth divisions repass the river, and directing Beresford to lay another bridge of communication lower down the Nive, near Villefranque, to shorten the line of movement. When he reached the left of the Nive and saw how the battle stood, he made the seventh division close to the left from the hill of San Barbe, placed the third division at Urdains, and brought up the fourth division to an open heathy ridge on a hill about a mile behind the church of Arcangues. From this point General Cole sent Ross's brigade down into the basin on the left of Colborne, to cover Arbonne, being prepared himself to march with his whole division if the enemy attempted to penetrate in force between Hope and Alten. These dispositions were for the most part completed about two o'clock, and thus Clausel was held in check at Bussussary, and the renewed attack by Foy, Villatte, and Reille's divisions on Barrouilhet prevented.

This day's battle cost the Anglo-Portuguese more than 1200 men killed and wounded, two generals were amongst the latter and about 300 men were made prisoners. The French had one general, Villatte, wounded, and lost about 2000 men, but when the action terminated two regiments of Nassau and one of Frankfurt, the whole under the command of a Colonel Kruse, came over to the allies. These men were not deserters. Their prince having abandoned Napoleon in Germany sent secret instructions to his troops to do so likewise, and in good time, for orders to disarm them reached Soult the next morning. The generals on each side, the one hoping to profit, the other to prevent mischief, immediately transmitted notice of the event to Catalonia where several regiments of the same nations were serving. Lord Wellington failed for reasons to be hereafter mentioned, but Suchet disarmed his Germans with reluctance thinking they could be trusted, and the Nassau troops at Bayonne were perhaps less influenced by patriotism than by an old quarrel; for when belonging to the army of the centre they had forcibly foraged Soult's district early in the year, and carried off the spoil in defiance of his authority, which gave rise to bitter disputes at the time and was probably not forgotten by him.

Combat of the 11th.—In the night of the 10th Reille withdrew behind the tanks as far as Pucho, Foy and Villatte likewise drew back along the connecting ridge towards Bussussary, thus uniting with Clausel's left and D'Erlon's reserve, so that on the morning of the 11th the French army, with the exception of D'Armagnac's division which remained in front of Urdains, was concentrated, for Soult feared a counter-attack. The French deserters indeed declared that Clausel had formed a body of 2000 choice grenadiers to assault the village and church of Arcangues, but the day passed without any event in that quarter save a slight skirmish in which a few men were wounded. Not so on the side of Barrouilhet. There was a thick fog, and Lord Wellington, desirous to ascertain what the French were about, directed the 9th regiment about ten o'clock to open a skirmish beyond the tanks towards Pucho, and to push the action if the French augmented their force. Cameron did so, and the fight was becoming warm, when Colonel Delancy, a staff-officer, rashly directed the 9th to enter the village. The error was soon and sharply corrected, for the fog cleared up, and Soult, who had 24,000 men at that point, observing the 9th unsupported, ordered a counter-attack which was so strong and sudden that Cameron only saved his regiment with the aid of some Portuguese troops hastily brought up by Sir John Hope. The fighting then ceased and Lord Wellington went to the right, leaving Hope with orders to push back the French picquets and re-establish his former outposts on the connecting ridge towards Bussussary.

Soult had hitherto appeared undecided, but roused by this second insult, he ordered Darricau's division to attack Barrouilhet along the connecting ridge, while Boyer's division fell on by the main road between the tanks. This was about two o'clock and the allies expecting no battle had dispersed to gather fuel, for the time was wet and cold. In an instant the French penetrated in all directions, they out-flanked the right, they passed the tanks, seized the out-buildings of the mayor's house, and occupied the coppice in front of it; they were indeed quickly driven from the out-buildings by the royals, but the tumult was great and the coppice was filled with men of all nations intermixed and fighting in a perilous manner. Robinson's brigade was very hardly handled, the officer commanding it was wounded, a squadron of French cavalry suddenly cut down some of the Portuguese near the wood, and on the right the colonel of the 84th, having unwisely engaged his regiment in a hollow road where the French possessed the high bank, was killed with a great number of men. However, the 9th regiment, posted on the main road, plied Boyer's flank with fire, the 85th regiment of Lord Aylmer's brigade came into action, and Sir John Hope, conspicuous from his gigantic stature and heroic courage, was seen wherever danger pressed rallying and encouraging the troops; at one time he was in the midst of the enemy, his clothes were pierced with bullets, and he received a severe wound in the ankle, yet he would not quit the field and by his great presence of mind and calm intrepidity restored the battle. The French were finally beaten back from the position of Barrouilhet yet they had recovered their original posts, and continued to gall the allies with a fire of shot and shells until the fall of night. The total loss in this fight was about 600 men of a side, and as the fifth division was now

considerably reduced in numbers the first division took its place on the front line. Meanwhile Soult sent his cavalry over the Nive to Mousseroles to check the incursions of Hill's horsemen.

Combat of the 12th.—The rain fell heavily in the night, and though the morning broke fair neither side seemed inclined to recommence hostilities. The advanced posts were, however, very close to each other, and about 10 o'clock a misunderstanding arose. The French general observing the fresh regiments of the first division close to his posts, imagined the allies were going to attack him and immediately reinforced his front; this movement causing an English battery to fall into a like error, it opened upon the advancing French troops, and in an instant the whole line of posts was engaged. Soult then brought up a number of guns, the firing continued without an object for many hours, and 300 or 400 men of a side were killed and wounded, but the great body of the French army remained concentrated and quiet on the ridge between Barrouilhet and Bussussary.

Lord Wellington as early as the 10th had expected Soult would abandon this attack to fall upon Hill, and therefore had given Beresford orders to carry the sixth division to that general's assistance by the new bridge and the seventh division by Ustaritz, without waiting for further instructions, if Hill was assailed; now observing Soult's tenacity at Barrouilhet he drew the seventh division towards Arbonne. Beresford had, however, made a movement towards the Nive, and this with the march of the seventh division and some changes in the position of the fourth division, caused Soult to believe the allies were gathering with a view to attack his centre on the morning of the 13th; and it is remarkable that the deserters at this early period told him the Spaniards had re-entered France although orders to that effect were not as we shall find given until the next day. Convinced then that his bolt was shot on the left of the Nive, he left two divisions and Villatte's reserve in the entrenched camp, and marched with the other seven to Mousseroles, intending to fall upon Hill.

That general had pushed his scouting parties to the Gambouri, and when General Sparre's horsemen arrived at Mousserolles on the 12th, Pierre Soult advanced from the Bidouze with all the light cavalry. He was supported by the infantry of General Paris, and drove the allies' posts from Hasparen. Colonel Vivian, who commanded there, immediately ordered Major Brotherton to charge with the 14th dragoons across the bridge, but it was an ill-judged order, and the impossibility of succeeding so manifest, that when Brotherton, noted throughout the army for his daring, galloped forward, only two men and one subaltern, Lieutenant Southwell, passed the narrow bridge with him, and they were all taken. Vivian then, seeing his error, charged with his whole brigade to rescue them, yet in vain, he was forced to fall back upon Urcuray, where Morillo's Spaniards had relieved the British infantry brigade on the 11th. This threatening movement induced General Hill to put the British brigade in march again for Urcuray on the 12th, but he recalled it at sunset, having then discovered Soult's columns passing the Nive by the boat-bridge above Bayonne.


Lord Wellington, now feeling the want of numbers, brought forward a division of Gallicians to St. Jean de Luz, and one of Andalusians from the Bastan to Itzassu, and, to prevent their plundering, fed them from the British magazines. The Gallicians were to support Hope, the Andalusians to watch the upper valley of the Nive, and protect the rear of the army from Paris and Pierre Soult, who could easily be reinforced with a strong body of national guards. Meanwhile Hill had taken a position of battle on a front of two miles.

His left, composed of the 28th, 34th, and 39th regiments, under General Pringle, occupied a wooded and broken range crowned by the chateau of Villefranque; it covered the new pontoon bridge of communication, which was a mile and a half higher up the river, but it was separated from the centre by a small stream forming a chain of ponds in a very deep and marshy valley.

The centre, placed on both sides of the high road, near the hamlet of St. Pierre, occupied a crescent-shaped height, broken with rocks and close brushwood on the left hand, and on the right hand enclosed with high and thick hedges, one of which, covering at the distance of 100 yards part of the line, was nearly impassable. Here Ashworth's Portuguese and Barnes's brigade of the second division

Explanatory
Sketch
of the
Passage of the Nive,
And
Battle of St-Herre,
December
9th and 13th
1813.

— French
— Allies



were posted. The 71st regiment was on the left, the 50th in the centre, the 92nd on the right. Ashworth's Portuguese were posted in advance immediately in front of St. Pierre, and their skirmishers occupied a small wood covering their right. Twelve guns, under the Colonels Ross and Tullock, were concentrated in front of the centre, looking down the great road, and half a mile in rear of this point Lecor's Portuguese division was stationed with two guns as a reserve.

The right, under Byng, was composed of the 3rd, 57th, 31st, and 66th. One of these regiments, the 3rd, was posted on a height running nearly parallel with the Adour, called the ridge of Partouhiria, or Old Moguerre, because a village of that name was situated upon the summit. This regiment was pushed in advance to a point where it could only be approached by crossing the lower part of a narrow swampy valley, which separated Moguerre from the heights of St. Pierre. The upper part of this valley was held by Byng with the remainder of his brigade, and his post was well covered by a mill-pond leading towards the enemy and nearly filling all the valley.

One mile in front of St. Pierre was a range of counter-heights belonging to the French, but the basin between was broad, open, and commanded in every part by the fire of the allies, and in all parts the country was too heavy and too much enclosed for the action of cavalry. Nor could the enemy approach in force, except on a narrow front of battle and by the high road, until within cannon-shot, when two narrow difficult lanes branched off to the right and left, and crossing the swampy valleys on each side, led, the one to the height where the 3rd regiment was posted on the extreme right of the allies, the other to General Pringle's position on the left.

In the night of the 12th the rain swelled the Nive and carried away the allies' bridge of communication. It was soon restored, but on the morning of the 13th General Hill was completely cut off from the rest of the army; and while seven French divisions of infantry, furnishing at least 35,000 combatants, approached him in front, an eighth, under General Paris, and the cavalry division of Pierre Soult menaced him in rear.* To meet the French in his front he had less than 14,000 men and officers, with 14 guns in position; and there were only 4000 Spaniards with Vivian's cavalry at Urcuray.

Battle of St. Pierre.—The morning broke with a heavy mist, under cover of which Soult formed his order of battle. D'Erlon, having D'Armagnac's, Abbé's, and Daricau's divisions of infantry, Sparre's cavalry, and 22 guns, marched in front; he was followed by Foy and Maransin, but the remainder of the French army was in reserve, for the roads would not allow of any other order. The mist hung heavily, and the French masses, at one moment quite shrouded in vapour, at another dimly seen, or looming sudden and large and dark at different points, appeared like thunder-clouds gathering before the storm. At half-past eight Soult pushed back the British picquets in the centre; the sun burst out at that moment, the sparkling fire of the light troops spread wide in the valley, and crept up the hills on either flank, while the bellowing of 40 pieces of artillery shook the banks of the Nive and the Adour. Daricau, marching on the French right, was directed against General Pringle. D'Armagnac, moving on their left, and taking Old Moguerre as the point of direction, was ordered to force Byng's right. Abbé assailed the centre at St. Pierre, where General Stewart commanded, for Sir Rowland Hill had taken his station on a commanding mount in the rear, from whence he could see the whole battle and direct the movements.

Abbé, a man noted for vigour, pushed his attack with great violence, and gained ground so rapidly with his light troops, on the left of Ashworth's Portuguese, that Stewart sent the 71st regiment and two guns from St. Pierre to the latter's aid; the French skirmishers likewise won the small wood on Ashworth's right, and half of the 50th regiment was also detached from St. Pierre to that quarter. The wood was thus retaken, and the flanks of Stewart's position secured, but his centre was very much weakened, and the fire of the French artillery was concentrated against it. Abbé then pushed on a column of attack there with such a power, that in despite of the play of musketry on his flanks, and a crashing cannonade in his

* Appendix, No. 29, (No. 4.)

front, he gained the top of the position, and drove back the remainder of Ashworth's Portuguese and the other half of the 50th regiment which had remained in reserve.

General Barnes, who had still the 92nd regiment in hand behind St. Pierre, immediately brought it on with a strong counter-attack. The French skirmishers fell back on each side, leaving two regiments composing the column to meet the charge of the 92nd; it was rough and pushed home, the French mass wavered and gave way. Abbé immediately replaced it and Soult, redoubling the heavy play of his guns from the height he occupied, sent forward a battery of horse artillery which galloping down into the valley opened its fire close to the allies with most destructive activity. The cannonade and musketry rolled like a prolonged peal of thunder, and the second French column, regardless of Ross's guns, though they tore the ranks in a horrible manner, advanced so steadily up the high road that the 92nd yielding to the tempest slowly regained its old position behind St. Pierre. The Portuguese guns, their British commanding officer having fallen wounded, then limbered up to retire, and the French skirmishers reached the impenetrable hedge in front of Ashworth's right. General Barnes now seeing that hard fighting only could save the position, made the Portuguese guns resume their fire, and the wing of the 50th and the caçadores gallantly held the small wood on the right; but Barnes was soon wounded, the greatest part of his and General Stewart's staff were hurt, and the matter seemed desperate. For the light troops, overpowered by numbers, were all driven in except those in the wood, the artillerymen were falling at the guns, Ashworth's line of Portuguese crumbled away rapidly before the musketry and cannonade, the ground was strewn with the dead in front, and the wounded crawling to the rear were many.

If the French light troops could then have penetrated through the thick hedge in front of the Portuguese, defeat would have been inevitable on this point, for the main column of attack still steadily advanced up the main road, and a second column launched on its right was already victorious, because the colonel of the 71st had shamefully withdrawn that gallant regiment out of action and abandoned the Portuguese. Pringle was indeed fighting strongly against Daricau's superior numbers on the hill of Villefranque, but on the extreme right the colonel of the 3rd regiment had also abandoned his strong post to D'Armagnac, whose leading brigade was thus rapidly turning Byng's other regiments on that side. And now Foy's and Maransin's divisions, hitherto retarded by the deep roads, were coming into line ready to support Abbé, and this at the moment when the troops opposed to him were deprived of their reserve. For when General Hill beheld the retreat of the 3rd and 71st regiments he descended in haste from his mount, met, and turned the latter back to renew the fight, and then in person leading one brigade of Le Cor's reserve division to the same quarter sent the other against D'Armagnac on the hill of Old Moguerre. Thus at the decisive moment of the battle the French reserve was augmented and that of the allies thrown as a last resource into action. However, the right wing of the 50th and Ashworth's caçadores, both spread as skirmishers, never lost the small wood in front, upholding the fight there and towards the high road with such unflinching courage that the 92nd regiment had time to reform behind the hamlet of St. Pierre. Then its gallant colonel, Cameron, once more led it down the road with colours flying and music playing resolved to give the shock to whatever stood in the way. At this sight the British skirmishers on the flanks, suddenly changing from retreat to attack, rushed forward and drove those of the enemy back on each side; yet the battle seemed hopeless, for Ashworth was badly wounded, his line was shattered to atoms, and Barnes, who had not quitted the field for his former hurt, was now shot through the body.

The 92nd was but a small body compared with the heavy mass in its front, and the French soldiers seemed willing enough to close with the bayonet; but an officer riding at their head suddenly turned his horse waved his sword and appeared to order a retreat, then they faced about and immediately retired across the valley to their original position, in good order however and scarcely pursued by the allies, so exhausted were the victors. This retrograde movement, for there was no panic or disorder, was produced partly by the gallant advance of the 92nd and the

returning rush of the skirmishers, partly by the state of affairs immediately on the right of the French column. For the 71st, indignant at their colonel's conduct, had returned to the fight with such alacrity, and were so well aided by Le Cor's Portuguese, Generals Hill and Stewart each in person leading an attack, that the hitherto victorious French were overthrown there also in the very moment when the 92nd came with such a brave show down the main road: Le Cor was however wounded.

This double action in the centre being seen from the hill of Villefranke, Daricau's division, already roughly handled by Pringle, fell back in confusion; and meantime on the right, Buchan's Portuguese, detached by Hill to recover the Moguerre or Partouhiria ridge, crossed the valley, and ascending under a heavy flank fire from Soult's guns rallied the 3rd regiment; in happy time, for D'Armagnac's first brigade having already passed the flank of Byng's regiments at the mill-pond was actually in rear of the allies' lines. It was now 12 o'clock, and while the fire of the light troops in the front and the cannonade in the centre continued, the contending generals restored their respective orders of battle. Soult's right wing had been quite repulsed by Pringle, his left was giving way before Buchan, and the difficult ground forbade his sending immediate succour to either; moreover in the exigency of the moment he had called D'Armagnac's reserve brigade to sustain Abbé's retiring columns. However that brigade and Foy's and Maransin's divisions were in hand to renew the fight in the centre, and the allies could not, unsuccoured, have sustained a fresh assault; for their ranks were wasted with fire, nearly all the staff had been killed or wounded, and three generals had quitted the field badly hurt.

In this crisis General Hill, seeing that Buchan was now well and successfully engaged on the Partouhiria ridge, and that Byng's regiments were quite masters of their ground in the valley of the mill-pond, drew the 57th regiment from the latter place to reinforce his centre. At the same time, the bridge above Villefranke having been restored, the sixth division, which had been marching since day-break, appeared in order of battle on the mount from whence Hill had descended to rally the 71st. It was soon followed by the fourth division, and that again by the brigades of the third division; two other brigades of the seventh division were likewise in march. With the first of these troops came Lord Wellington, who had hurried from Barrouilhet when the first sound of the cannon reached him, yet he arrived only to witness the close of the battle, the crisis was past, Hill's day of glory was complete. Soult had, according to the French method, made indeed another attack, or rather demonstration, against the centre, to cover his new dispositions, an effort easily repulsed, but at the same moment Buchan drove D'Armagnac headlong off the Partouhiria ridge. The sixth division then appeared on the commanding mount in the rear of St. Pierre, and though the French masses still maintained a menacing position on the high road, and on a hillock rising between the road and the mill-pond, they were quickly dispossessed. For the English general being now supported by the sixth division, sent Byng with two battalions against the hillock, and some troops from the centre against those on the high road. At this last point the generals and staff had been so cut down that Colonel Currie, the aide-de-camp who brought the order, could find no superior officer to deliver it to and led the troops himself to the attack, but both charges were successful; and two guns of the light battery sent down in the early part of the fight by Soult, and which had played without ceasing up to this moment, were taken.

The battle now abated to a skirmish of light troops, under cover of which the French endeavoured to carry off their wounded and rally their stragglers, but at two o'clock Lord Wellington commanded a general advance of the whole line. Then the French retreated fighting, and the allies following close on the side of the Nive plied them with musketry until dark. Yet they maintained their line towards the Adour, for Sparre's cavalry passing out that way rejoined Pierre Soult on the side of Hasparen. This last-named general and Paris had during the day menaced Morillo and Vivian's cavalry at Urcaray; however, not more than 30 men of a side were hurt, and when Soult's ill success became known the French retired to Bonloc.

In this bloody action Soult had designed to employ seven divisions of infantry with one brigade of cavalry on the front, and one brigade of infantry with a division of cavalry on the rear; but the state of the roads and the narrow front he was forced to move upon did not permit more than five divisions to act at St. Pierre, and only half of those were seriously engaged. His loss was certainly 3000, making a total of the five days' fighting of 6000 men with two generals, Villatte and Maucombe, wounded. The estimate made by the British at the time far exceeded this number, and one French writer makes their loss 10,000 including probably the Nassau and Frankfort regiments. The same writer however estimates the loss of the allies at 16,000! Whereas Hill had only three generals and about 1500 men killed and wounded on the 13th, and Morillo lost but 26 men at Urcuray. The real loss of the allies in the whole five days' fighting was only 5019, including, however, five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes, Lecor, and Ashworth. Of this number 500 were prisoners.

The Duke of Dalmatia, baffled by the unexpected result of the battle of St. Pierre, left D'Erlon's three divisions in front of the camp of Mousseroles, sent two others over the Nive to Marac, and passing the Adour himself during the night with Foy's division, spread it along the right bank of that river as far as the confluence of the Gave de Pau.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The French general's plan was conceived with genius, but the execution offers a great contrast to the conception. What a difference between the sudden concentration of his whole army on the platforms of Arcangues and Bussussary, where there were only a few picquets to withstand him, and from whence he could have fallen with the roll of an avalanche upon any point of the allies' line! what a difference between that and the petty attack of Clausel, which 1000 men of the light division sufficed to arrest at the village and church of Arcangues. There beyond question was the weak part of the English general's cuirass. The spear pushed home there would have drawn blood. For the disposition and movements of the third, fourth, and seventh divisions were made more with reference to the support of Hill than to sustain an attack from Soult's army, and it is evident that Wellington, trusting to the effect of his victory on the 10th of November, had treated the French general and his troops more contemptuously than he could have justified by arms without the aid of fortune. I know not what induced Marshal Soult to direct his main attack by Anglet and the connecting ridge of Bussussary, against Barrouilhet; instead of assailing Arcangues as he at first proposed; but this is certain, that for three hours after Clausel first attacked the picquets at the latter place, there were not troops enough to stop three French divisions, much less a whole army. And this point being nearer to the bridge by which D'Erlon passed the Nive, the concentration of the French troops could have been made sooner than at Barrouilhet, where the want of unity in the attack caused by the difficulty of the roads ruined the French combinations.

The allies were so unexpectant of an attack, that the battle at Barrouilhet which might have been fought with 17,000 men, was actually fought by 10,000. And those were not brought into action at once, for Robinson's brigade and Campbell's Portuguese, favoured by the narrow opening between the tanks, resisted Reille's divisions for two hours, and gave time for the rest of the fifth division and Bradford's brigade to arrive. But if Foy's division and Villatte's reserve had been able to assail the flank at the same time, by the ridge coming from Bussussary, the battle would have been won by the French; and meanwhile three divisions under Clausel, and two under D'Erlon, remained hesitating before Urdains and Arcangues, for the cannonade and skirmishing at the latter place were the very marks and signs of indecision.

2. On the 11th the inactivity of the French during the morning may be easily accounted for. The defection of the German regiments, the necessity of disarming and removing those that remained, the care of the wounded, and the time required to re-examine the allies' position and ascertain what changes had taken place during the night, must have given ample employment to the French general. His attack in the afternoon also was well judged because already he must have seen,

from the increase of troops in his front, from the intrenched battery and other works rapidly constructed at the church of Arcangues, that no decisive success could be expected on the left of the Nive, and that his best chance was to change his line of attack again to the right bank. To do this with effect, it was necessary, not only to draw all Lord Wellington's reserves from the right of the Nive but to be certain that they had come, and this could only be done by repeating the attacks at Barrouilhet. The same cause operated on the 12th, for it was not until the fourth and seventh divisions were seen by him on the side of Arbonne that he knew his wife had succeeded. Yet again the execution was below the conception, for first, the bivouac fires on the ridge of Bussussary were extinguished in the evening, and then others were lighted on the side of Mousseroles, thus plainly indicating the march, which was also begun too early, because the leading division was by Hill seen to pass the bridge of boats before sunset.

These were serious errors, yet the Duke of Dalmatia's generalship cannot be thus fairly tested. There are many circumstances which combine to prove, that when he complained to the emperor of the contradictions and obstacles he had to encounter he alluded to military as well as to political and financial difficulties. It is a part of human nature to dislike any disturbance of previous habits, and soldiers are never pleased at first with a general, who introduces and rigorously exacts a system of discipline differing from what they have been accustomed to. Its utility must be proved and confirmed by habit ere it will find favour in their eyes. Now Soult suddenly assumed the command of troops who had been long serving under various generals and were used to much license in Spain. They were therefore, men and officers, uneasy at being suddenly subjected to the austere and resolute command of one who, from natural character as well as the exigency of the times, the war being now in his own country, demanded a ready and exact obedience, and a regularity which long habits of a different kind rendered onerous. Hence we find in all the French writers, and in Soult's own reports, manifest proofs that his designs were frequently thwarted or disregarded by his subordinates when circumstances promised impunity. His greatest and ablest military combinations were certainly rendered abortive by the errors of his lieutenants in the first operations to relieve Pampeluna, and on the 31st of August a manifest negligence of his earnest recommendations to vigilance led to serious danger and loss at the passage of the Lower Bidassoa. Complaint and recrimination were rife in all quarters about the defeat on the 10th of November, and on the 19th the bridge-head of Cambo was destroyed contrary to the spirit of his instructions. These things, joined to the acknowledged jealousy and disputes prevalent amongst the French generals employed in Spain, would indicate that the discrepancy between the conception and execution of the operations in front of Bayonne was not the error of the commander-in-chief. Perhaps King Joseph's faction, so inimical to the Duke of Dalmatia, was still powerful in the army and difficult to deal with.

3. Lord Wellington has been blamed for putting his troops in a false position, and no doubt he under-valued, it was not the first time, the military genius and resources of his able adversary, when he exposed Hill's troops on the left of the Nive to a species of surprise. But the passage of the Nive itself, the rapidity with which he moved his divisions from bank to bank, and the confidence with which he relied upon the valour of his troops, so far from justifying the censures which have been passed upon him by French writers, emphatically mark his mastery in the art. The stern justice of sending the Spaniards back into Spain after the battle of the Nivelle is apparent, but the magnanimity of that measure can only be understood by considering Lord Wellington's military situation at the time. The battle of the Nivelle was delivered on political grounds, but of what avail would his gaining it have been if he had remained enclosed as it were in a net between the Nive and the sea, Bayonne and the Pyrenees, unable to open communications with the disaffected in France, and having the beaten army absolutely forbidding him to forage or even to look beyond the river on his right. The invasion of France was not his own operation, it was the project of the English cabinet and the allied sovereigns; both were naturally urging him to complete it, and to pass the Nive and free his flank was indispensable, if he would draw any profit from his victory

of the 10th of November. But he could not pass it with his whole army unless he resigned the sea-coast and his communications with Spain. He was therefore to operate with a portion only of his force and consequently required all the men he could gather to ensure success. Yet at that crisis he divested himself of 25,000 Spanish soldiers!

Was this done in ignorance of the military glory awaiting him beyond the spot where he stood?

"If I had 20,000 Spaniards, paid and fed," he wrote to Lord Bathurst, "I should have Bayonne. If I had 40,000 I do not know where I should stop. Now I have both the 20,000 and the 40,000, but I have not the means of paying and supplying them, and if they plunder they will ruin all."

Requisitions which the French expected as a part of war would have enabled him to run this career, but he looked further; he had promised the people protection and his greatness of mind was disclosed in a single sentence. "*I must tell your lordship that our success and everything depends upon our moderation and justice.*" Rather than infringe on either, he sent the Spaniards to the rear, and passed the Nive with the British and Portuguese only, thus violating the military rule which forbids a general to disseminate his troops before an enemy who remains in mass lest he should be beaten in detail. But genius begins where rules end. A great general always seeks moral power in preference to physical force. Wellington's choice here was between a shameful inactivity or a dangerous enterprise. Trusting to the influence of his reputation, to his previous victories, and to the ascendancy of his troops in the field, he chose the latter, and the result, though he committed some errors of execution, justified his boldness. He surprised the passage of the Nive, laid his bridges of communication, and but for the rain of the night before, which ruined the roads and retarded the march of Hill's columns, he would have won the heights of St. Pierre the same day. Soult could not then have withdrawn his divisions from the right bank without being observed. Still it was an error to have the troops on the left bank so unprepared for the battle of the 10th. It was perhaps another error not to have occupied the valley or basin between Hope and Alten, and surely it was negligence not to entrench Hill's position on the 10th, 11th, and 12th. Yet with all this, so brave, so hardy, so unconquerable were his soldiers that he was successful at every point, and that is the justification of his generalship. Hannibal crossed the Alps and descended upon Italy, not in madness but because he knew himself and his troops.

4. It is agreed by French and English that the battle of St. Pierre was one of the most desperate of the whole war. Lord Wellington declared that he had never seen a field so thickly strewn with dead, nor can the vigour of the combatants be well denied where 5000 men were killed or wounded in three hours upon a space of one mile square. How then did it happen, valour being so conspicuous on both sides, that six English and Portuguese brigades, furnishing less than 14,000 men and officers with 14 guns, were enabled to withstand seven French divisions, certainly furnishing 35,000 men and officers with 22 guns? * The analysis of this fact shows upon what nice calculations and accidents war depends.

If Hill had not observed the French passing their bridge on the evening of the 12th, and their bivouac fires in the night, Barnes's brigade, with which he saved the day, would have been at Urcuray, and Soult could not have been stopped. But the French general could only bring five divisions into action, and those only in succession, so that in fact three divisions or about 16,000 men with 22 guns actually fought the battle. Foy's and Maransin's troops did not engage until after the crisis had passed. On the other hand the proceedings of Colonel Peacocke of the 71st, and Colonel Bunbury of the 3rd, for which they were both obliged to quit the service, forced General Hill to carry his reserve away from the decisive point at that critical period which always occurs in a well-disputed field and which every great general watches for with the utmost anxiety. This was no error, it was a necessity, and the superior military quality of the British troops rendered it successful.

The French officer who rode at the head of the second attacking column might be a brave man, doubtless he was; he might be an able man, but he had not the

* Appendix, No. 29 (No. 4).

instinct of a general. On his right flank indeed Hill's vigorous counter-attack was successful, but the battle was to be won in the centre; his column was heavy, undismayed, and only one weak battalion, the 92nd, was before it; a short exhortation, a decided gesture, a daring example, and it would have overborne the small body in its front, Foy's, Maransin's, and the half of D'Armagnac's divisions would then have followed in the path thus marked out. Instead of this he weighed chances and retreated. How different was the conduct of the British generals, two of whom and nearly all their staff fell at this point, resolute not to yield a step at such a critical period; how desperately did the 50th and Portuguese fight to give time for the 92nd to rally and reform behind St. Pierre; how gloriously did that regiment come forth again to charge with their colours flying and their national music playing as if going to a review. This was to understand war. The man who in that moment and immediately after a repulse thought of such military pomp was by nature a soldier.

I have said that Sir Rowland Hill's employment of his reserve was no error, it was indeed worthy of all praise. From the commanding mount on which he stood, he saw at once, that the misconduct of the two colonels would cause the loss of his position more surely than any direct attack upon it, and with a promptness and decision truly military he descended at once to the spot, playing the soldier as well as the general, rallying the 71st and leading the reserve himself; trusting meanwhile with a noble and well-placed confidence to the courage of the 92nd and the 50th to sustain the fight at St. Pierre. He knew indeed that the sixth division was then close at hand and that the battle might be fought over again, but like a thorough soldier he was resolved to win his own fight with his own troops if he could. And he did so after a manner that in less eventful times would have rendered him the hero of a nation.

CHAPTER III.

To understand all the importance of the battle of St. Pierre, the nature of the country and the relative positions of the opposing generals before and after that action must be considered. Bayonne, although a mean fortress in itself, was at this period truly designated by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks of France. Covered by its entrenched camp, which the inundations and the deep country rendered impregnable while there was an army to defend it, this place could not be assailed until that army was drawn away, and it was obviously impossible to pass it and leave the enemy to act upon the communications with Spain and the sea-coast. To force the French army to abandon Bayonne was therefore Lord Wellington's object, and his first step was the passage of the Nive; he thus cut Soult's direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port, obtained an intercourse with the malcontents in France, opened a large tract of fertile country for his cavalry, and menaced the navigation of the Adour so as to render it difficult for the French general to receive supplies. This was however but a first step, because the country beyond the Nive was still the same deep clayey soil with bad roads; and it was traversed by many rivers more or less considerable, which flooding with every shower in the mountains, formed in their concentric courses towards the Adour a number of successive barriers, behind which Soult could maintain himself on Lord Wellington's right and hold communication with St. Jean Pied de Port. He could still stem them in the allies as before; upon a more extended scale however and with less effect, for he was thrown more on the defensive, his line was now the longest, and his adversary possessed the central position.

On the other hand, Wellington could not, in that deep impracticable country, carry on the wide operations necessary to pass the rivers on his right, and render the French position at Bayonne untenable, until fine weather hardened the roads, and the winter of 1813 was peculiarly wet and inclement.

From this exposition it is obvious that to nourish their own armies and circumvent their adversaries in that respect, were the objects of both generals. Soult aimed to make Wellington retire into Spain, Wellington to make Soult abandon Bayonne entirely, or so reduce his force in the entrenched camp that the works might be stormed. The French general's recent losses forbade him to maintain his

extended positions except during the wet season ; three days' fine weather made him tremble ; and the works of his camp were still too unfinished to leave a small force there. The difficulty of the roads and want of military transport threw his army almost entirely upon water-carriage for subsistence, and his great magazines were therefore established at Dax, on the Adour, and at Peyrehorade, on the Gave of Pau, the latter being about 24 miles from Bayonne. These places he fortified to resist sudden incursions, and he threw a bridge across the Adour at the port of Landes, just above its confluence with the Gave de Pau. But the navigation of the Adour below that point, especially at Urt, the stream being confined there, could be interrupted by the allies, who were now on the left bank. To remedy this, Soult ordered Foy to pass the Adour at Urt, and construct a bridge with a head of works ; but the movement was foreseen by Wellington, and Foy, menaced with a superior force, recrossed the river. The navigation was then carried on at night by stealth, or guarded by the French gun-boats, and exposed to the fire of the allies. Thus provisions became scarce, and the supply would have been quite unequal to the demand, if the French coasting trade, now revived between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been interrupted by the navy, but Lord Wellington's representations on this head were still unheeded.

Soult was embarrassed by Foy's failure at Urt. He reinforced him with Boyer's and D'Armagnac's divisions, which were extended to the Port de Lannes ; then leaving Reille with four divisions to guard the entrenched camp and to finish the works, he completed the garrison of Bayonne, and transferred his head-quarters to Peyrehorade. Clausel, with two divisions of infantry and the light cavalry, now took post on the Bidouze, being supported with Trielhard's heavy dragoons, and having his left in communication with Paris and with St. Jean Pied de Port, where there was a garrison of 1800 men, besides national guards. He soon pushed his advanced posts to the Joyeuse or Gambouri, and the Aran, streams which unite to fall into the Adour near Urt, and he also occupied Hellette, Mendionde, Bonloc, and the Bastide de Clerence. A bridge-head was constructed at Peyrehorade, Hastings was fortified on the Gave de Pau, Guiche, Bidache, and Came, on the Bidouze, and the works of Navarens were augmented. In fine, Soult, with equal activity and intelligence, profited from the rain which stopped the allies' operations in that deep country.

Lord Wellington also made some changes of position. Having increased his works at Barrouilhet, he was enabled to shift some of Hope's troops towards Arcangues, and he placed the sixth division on the heights of Villefranque, which permitted General Hill to extend his right up the Adour to Urt. The third division was posted near Urcuray, the light cavalry on the Joyeuse, facing Clausel's out-posts, and a chain of telegraphs was established from the right of the Nive, by the hill of San Barbe, to St. Jean de Luz. Freyre's Gallicians were placed in reserve about St. Pé, and Morillo was withdrawn to Itzassu, where, supported by the Andalusian division and by Freyre, he guarded the valley of the Upper Nive, and watched General Paris beyond the Ursouia mountain. Such was the state of affairs in the beginning of January, but some minor actions happened before these arrangements were completed.

In December the allies seized the island of Holriague, near La Honce, on the Adour, which gave them a better command of that river, but Foy kept possession of the islands of Berens and Broc above Holriague. The allies' bridges of communication on the Nive were now carried away by floods, which occasioned some embarrassment, and meanwhile, without any orders from Lord Wellington, probably with a view to plunder, for his troops were exceedingly licentious, Morillo obtained from Victor Alten two squadrons of the 18th hussars, under pretence of exploring the enemy's position towards Mendionde and Maccaye. Their commander, Major Hughes, having with difficulty ascertained that he was to form an advanced guard in a close wooded country, demanded the aid of some Spanish caçadores, and then moving forwards drove in the picquets, crossed the bridge of Mendionde, and commenced a skirmish. But during this action Morillo withdrew his division, without giving any notice, and at the same time the caçadores fled in a shameful manner from the left. The cavalry were thus turned, and escaped with

difficulty, having had one captain killed, two other captains and a lieutenant, and Hughes himself, badly wounded. The unfortunate issue of this skirmish was attributed at the time to the bad conduct of the 18th hussars, against whom Lord Wellington was, by malicious misrepresentation, previously prejudiced; for at Vittoria they were unjustly accused of being more licentious than others in plundering the captured property on the field, whereas they had fought well and plundered less than many who were praised for their orderly demeanour.

About the same time that this disaster occurred at Mendionde, Mina, acting independently, and being pressed for provisions in the mountains, invaded the Val de Baygorry and the Val des Osses, where his men committed the greatest enormities, plundering and burning, and murdering men, women, and children without distinction. The people of these valleys, distinguished amongst the Basques for their warlike qualities, immediately took arms, under the command of one of their principal men, named Etchevery, and being reinforced with 250 men from St. Jean Pied de Port, surprised one of Mina's battalions, and attacked the rest with great vigour. This event gave Soult hopes of exciting the Basques to commence such a war as they had carried on at the commencement of the French revolution. His efforts to accomplish it were unceasing, and he had for two months been expecting the arrival of General Harispe, an officer whose courage and talents have been frequently noticed in this History, and who, being the head of an ancient Basque family, had great local influence, which was increased by his military reputation. It was thought that if he had come when first expected, about November, Lord Wellington's strict discipline being then unknown to the people, he would have raised a formidable partisan war in the mountains. But now the English general's attention to all complaints, his proclamation, and the proof he gave of his sincerity by sending the Spaniards back when they misconducted themselves, had, in conjunction with the love of gain, that master passion with all mountaineers, tamed the Basque spirit, and disinclined them to exchange ease and profit for turbulence and ravage. Nevertheless, this incursion by Mina, and the licentious conduct of Morillo's troops, awakened the warlike propensities of the Val de Baygorry Basques, and Harispe was enabled to make a levy, with which he immediately commenced active operations, and was supported by General Paris.

Soult, with a view to aid Harispe, to extend his own cantonments, and to restrict those of the allies, now resolved to drive the latter's detachments altogether from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and fix Clausel's left at Hellette, the culminant point of the great road to that fortress. To effect this, on the 3rd of January, he caused Clausel to establish two divisions of infantry at the heights of La Costa, near the Bastide de Clerence and beyond the Joyeuse river. Buchan's Portuguese brigade, placed in observation there, was thus forced to retreat upon Briscons, and at the same time Paris, advancing to Bonloc, connected his right with Clausel's left at Ayherre, while the light cavalry menaced all the allies' line of outposts. Informed of this movement by telegraph, Wellington, thinking Soult was seeking a general battle on the side of Hasparen, made the fifth division and Lord Aylmer's brigade relieve the light division, which marched to Arauntz; the fourth division then passed the Nive at Ustaritz, and the sixth division made ready to march from Villefranque, by the high road of St. Jean Pied de Port, towards Hasparen, as a reserve to the third, fourth, and seventh divisions. The latter were concentrated beyond Urcuray on the 4th, their left in communication with Hill's right at Briscons, and their right, supported by Morillo, who advanced from Itzassu for this purpose.

The English general's intent was to fall upon the enemy at once, but the swelling of the small rivers prevented him. However, on the 5th, having ascertained the true object and dispositions of the French general, and having 24,000 infantry in hand, with a division of cavalry and four or five brigades of artillery, he resolved to attack Clausel's divisions on the heights of La Costa. In this view Le Cor's Portuguese marched against the French right, the fourth division marched against their centre, the third division supported by cavalry against their left; the remainder of the cavalry and the seventh division, the whole under Stapleton Cotton, were posted at Hasparen to watch Paris on the side of Bonloc. Soult was in person at the Bastide de Clerence, and a general battle seemed inevitable, but the intention of the English

general was merely to drive back the enemy from the Joyeuse, and the French general, thinking the whole allied army was in movement resolved to act on the defensive, and directed the troops at La Costa to retire fighting upon the Bidouze: the affair terminated therefore with a slight skirmish on the evening of the 6th. The allies then resumed their old positions on the right of the Nive, the Andalusians were ordered back to the Bastan, and Carlos D'Espano's Gallicians were brought up to Ascaïn in their place.

When Clausel saw that nothing serious was designed, he sent his horsemen to drive away General Hill's detachments, which had taken advantage of the great movements to forage on the lower parts of the Joyeuse and Aran rivers. Meanwhile Soult, observing how sensitive his adversary was to any demonstration beyond the Bidouze, resolved to maintain the line of those two rivers. In this view he reduced his defence of the Adour to a line drawn from the confluence of the Aran to Bayonne, which enabled him to reinforce Clausel with Foy's division and all the light cavalry. Meantime General Harispe, having the division of Paris and the brigade of General Dauture placed under his orders to support his mountaineers, fixed his quarters at Hellette and commenced an active partisan warfare. On the 8th he fell upon Mina in the Val des Osses and drove him with loss into Baygorry. On the 10th returning to Hellette he surprised Morillo's foragers with some English dragoons on the side of Maccaye, and took a few prisoners. On the 12th he again attacked Mina and drove him up into the Alduides. During these affairs at the outposts Lord Wellington might have stormed the entrenched camp in front of Bayonne, but he could not hold it except under the fire of the fortress, and not being prepared for a siege avoided that operation. Nor would the weather, which was again become terrible, permit him to make a general movement to drive Harispe from his position in the upper country; wherefore he preferred leaving that general in quiet possession to irritating the mountaineers by a counter-warfare. He endeavoured however to launch some armed boats on the Adour above Bayonne, where Soult had increased the flotilla to 20 gun-boats for the protection of his convoys, which were notwithstanding forced to run past Urt under the fire of a battery constructed by General Hill.

Lord Wellington now dreading the bad effect which the excesses committed by Mina's and Morillo's men were likely to produce, for the Basques were already beginning to speak of vengeance, put forth his authority in repression. Rebuking Morillo for his unauthorized and disastrous advance upon Mendionde, and for the excesses of his troops, he ordered him to keep the latter constantly under arms. This was resented generally by the Spanish officers, and especially by Morillo, whose savage, untractable, and bloody disposition, since so horribly displayed in South America, prompted him to encourage violence. He asserted falsely that his troops were starving, declared that a settled design to ill-use the Spaniards existed, and that the British soldiers were suffered to commit every crime with impunity. The English general in reply explained himself both to Morillo, and to Freyre, who had alluded to the libels about San Sebastian, with a clearness and resolution that showed how hopeless it would be to strive against him.

"He had not," he said, "lost thousands of men to pillage and ill-treat the French peasantry, he preferred a small army obedient to a large one disobedient and undisciplined. If his measures to enforce good order deprived him of the Spanish troops the fault would rest with those who suffered their soldiers to commit disorders. Professions without corresponding actions would not do; he was determined to enforce obedience one way or another, and would not command insubordinate troops. The question between them was whether they should or should not pillage the French peasants. His measures were taken to prevent it, and the conduct which called them forth was more dishonouring to the Spaniards than the measures themselves. For libels he cared not, he was used to them, and he did not believe the union of the two nations depended upon such things; but if it did he desired no union founded upon such an infamous interest as pillage. He had not lost 20,000 men in the campaign to enable Morillo to plunder, and he would not permit it. If the Spaniards were resolved to do so, let them march their great armies into France under their own generals, he would meanwhile cover

Spain itself and they would find they could not remain in France for 15 days. They had neither money nor magazines, nothing to maintain an army in the field, the country behind was incapable of supporting them, and were he scoundrel enough to permit pillage France, rich as it was, could not sustain the burthen. Even with a view to living on the enemy by contributions it would be essential to prevent plunder; and yet in defiance of all these reasons he was called an enemy by the Spanish generals because he opposed such conduct, and his measures to prevent it were considered dishonouring!

"Something also he could say against it in a political point of view, but it was unnecessary, because careless whether he commanded a large or a small army he was resolved that it should obey him and should not pillage.

"General Morillo expressed doubts of his right to interfere with the Spaniards. It was his right and his duty, and never before did he hear that to put soldiers under arms was a disgrace. It was a measure to prevent evil and misfortunes. Mina could tell by recent experience what a warfare the French peasants could carry on, and Morillo was openly menaced with a like trial. It was in vain for that general to palliate or deny the plundering of his division, after having acknowledged to General Hill that it was impossible to prevent it because the officers and soldiers received by every post letters from their friends, congratulating them upon their good luck in entering France and urging them to seize the opportunity of making fortunes. General Morillo asserted that the British troops were allowed to commit crimes with impunity. Neither he nor any other man could produce an instance of injury done where, proof being adduced, the perpetrators had escaped punishment. Let him inquire how many soldiers had been hanged, how many stricken with minor chastisements and made to pay for damages done. But had the English troops no cause of complaint against the Spaniards? Officers and soldiers were frequently shot and robbed on the high roads, and a soldier had been lately murdered between Oyarzun and Lesaca; the English stores and convoys were plundered by the Spanish soldiers, a British officer had been put to death at Vittoria, and others were ill-treated at Santarém."

A sullen obedience followed this correspondence for the moment, but the plundering system was soon renewed, and this with the mischief already done was sufficient to rouse the inhabitants of Bidarray as well as those of the Val de Baygorry into action. They commenced and continued a partisan warfare until Lord Wellington, incensed by their activity, issued a proclamation calling upon them to take arms openly and join Soult or stay peaceably at home, declaring that he would otherwise burn their villages and hang all the inhabitants. Thus it appeared that, notwithstanding all the outcries made against the French for resorting to this system of repressing the warfare of peasants in Spain, it was considered by the English general both justifiable and necessary. However the threat was sufficient for this occasion. The Basques set the pecuniary advantages to be derived from the friendship of the British and Portuguese troops and the misery of an avenging warfare against the evils of Spanish plunder, and generally disregarded Harispe's appeals to their patriotism.

Meanwhile Soult, who expected reinforcements, seeing that little was to be gained by insurrection and being desirous to resume the offensive, ordered Harispe to leave only the troops absolutely necessary for the defence of St. Jean Pied de Port and its entrenched camp with a few Basques as scouts in the valleys, and to concentrate the remainder of his force at Mendionde, Hellette and La Houssou, thus closely hemming in the right of the allies' line with a view to making incursions beyond the Upper Nive. This was on the 14th, on the 23rd Harispe, getting information that Morillo was to forage in force on the side of Bidarray, endeavoured to cut him off, the supporting troops, consisting of Spanish infantry and some English hussars, repulsed his first attack, but they were finally pushed back with some loss in horses and mules. About the same time one of Hill's posts near the confluence of the Aran with the Adour was surprised by some French companies who remained in advance until fresh troops detached from Urt forced them to repossess the river again. This affair was a retaliation for the surprise of a French post a few days before by the sixth division, which was attended with some

circumstances repugnant to the friendly habits long established between the French and British troops at the outposts. The value of such a generous intercourse old soldiers well understand, and some illustrations of it at this period may be quoted.

On the 9th of December, the 43rd was assembled in column on an open space within 20 yards of the enemy's out-sentry, yet the latter continued to walk his beat for an hour without concern, relying so confidently on the customary system that he placed his knapsack on the ground to ease his shoulders. When at last the order to advance was given, one of the British soldiers stepping out told him to go away and helped him to replace his pack, the firing then commenced; the next morning the French in like manner warned a 43rd sentry to retire. But the most remarkable instance happened on the occasion of Lord Wellington's being desirous of getting to the top of a hill occupied by the enemy near Bayonne. He ordered the riflemen who escorted him to drive the French away, and seeing the former stealing up, as he thought too close, called out to commence firing; with a loud voice one of those old soldiers replied "*no firing!*" and then holding up the butt of his rifle towards the French, tapped it in a peculiar way. At the well-understood signal which meant "*we must have the hill for a short time,*" the French who though they could not maintain would not have relinquished the post without a fight if they had been fired upon, quietly retired. And this signal would never have been made if the post had been one capable of a permanent defence, so well do veterans understand war and its proprieties.

The English general now only waited until the roads were practicable, to take the offensive with an army superior in every point of view to Soult's. That general's numbers were also about to be reduced. His conscripts were deserting fast, and the inclemency of the weather was filling his hospitals, while the bronzed veterans of Wellington's army impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, fierce in execution, were free from serious maladies, ready and able to plant their colours wherever their general listed. At this time however the country was a vast quagmire; it was with difficulty that provisions or even orders could be conveyed to the different quarters, and a Portuguese brigade on the right of the Nive, was several days without food from the swelling of the rivulets, which stopped the commissariat mules. At the sea-side the troops were better off, yet with a horrible counterpoise, for on that iron-bound coast storms and shipwrecks were so frequent, that scarcely a day passed but some vessel, sometimes many together, were seen embayed and drifting towards the reefs which shoot out like needles for several miles. Once in this situation there was no human help! a faint cry might be heard at intervals, but the tall ship floated slowly and solemnly onwards until the first rock arrested her, a roaring surge then dashed her to pieces and the shore was strewn with broken timbers and dead bodies. December and January were thus passed by the allies, but February saw Wellington break into France the successful invader of that mighty country. Yet neither his nor Soult's military operations can be understood without a previous description of political affairs, which shall be given in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

Portugal.—It has been shown that Marshal Beresford's arrival at Lisbon put a momentary check upon the intrigues of the regency relative to the command of the troops; when he rejoined the army the vexatious conduct of the government was renewed with greater violence, and its ill-will was vented upon the English residents, whose goods were arbitrarily seized and their persons imprisoned without regard to justice or international law. The supply and reinforcing of the army were the pretences for these exactions, yet the army was neither supplied nor recruited, for though the new regulations had produced 9000 trained soldiers, they were, in contempt of the subsidizing treaty, retained in the dépôts. At first this was attributed to the want of transport to enable them to march through Spain, but though Lord Wellington obtained, in the beginning of 1814, shipping to convey them to the army, the Portuguese government still withheld the greatest number, alleging in excuse the ill-conduct of the Spaniards relative to the military convention established between the two countries.

This convention had been concluded in 1812 to enable the Portuguese troops to

establish hospitals and to draw certain resources from Spain upon fixed conditions. One of these was that all supplies might be purchased, half with ready money, half with bills on the Portuguese treasury ; nevertheless, in December, 1813, the Spanish envoy at Lisbon informed the Portuguese government, that to give up the shells of certain public buildings for hospitals was the only effect they would give to the convention. Wherefore, as neither troops nor horses could march through Spain, and the supply of those already with the army became nearly impossible, the regency detained the reinforcements. Lord Wellington strongly reproached the Spanish government for this foul conduct, yet observed with great force to the Portuguese regency, that the treaty by which a certain number of soldiers were to be constantly in the field was made with England, not with Spain ; and as the government of the former country continued to pay the subsidy and provided ships for the transport of the troops there was no excuse for retaining them in Portugal.

His remonstrances, Beresford's orders, and Mr. Stuart's exertions, although backed by the menaces of Lord Castlereagh, were however alike powerless ; the regency embarked only 3000 men out of 9000, and those not until the month of March, when the war was on the point of terminating. Thus instead of 30,000 Portuguese under arms Lord Wellington had less than 20,000, and yet Mr. Stuart affirmed that by doing away with the militia and introducing the Prussian system of granting furloughs, 100,000 troops of the line might have been furnished and supported by Portugal, without pressing more severely on the finances of the country than the actual system which supplied these 20,000. The regency were now more than usually importunate to have the subsidy paid in specie, in which case their army would have disappeared altogether. Mr. Stuart firmly opposed this, knowing the money would be misapplied if it fell into their hands, and thinking their importunity peculiarly ill-timed when their quota of troops was withheld, and when Lord Wellington, forced to pay ready money for his supplies in France, wanted all the specie that could be procured for the military chest. Such was the countenance assumed by Portugal towards England in return for the independence which the latter had secured for her ; and it is obvious that if the war had not terminated immediately afterwards the alliance could not have continued. The British army, deserted by Portugal, and treated hostilely, as we shall find, by the Spaniards, must then have abandoned the Peninsula.

Spain.—The malice evinced towards Lord Wellington by the Spanish government, the libels upon him and upon the Anglo-Portuguese army, the vices of the system by which the Spanish troops were supplied, and their own evil propensities, fostered by long and cruel neglect and suffering, the activity of those intriguing politicians who were inimical to the British alliance, the insolence and duplicity of the minister of war, the growing enmity between Spain and Portugal, the virulence of all parties, and the absolute hostility of the local authorities towards the British army, the officers and soldiers of which were on all occasions treated as if they were invaders rather than friends, drove Lord Wellington in the latter end of November to extremity. He judged the general disposition of the Spanish people to be still favourable to the English alliance, and with the aid of the serviles hoped to put down the liberals ; but an open rupture with the government he thought inevitable, and if the liberal influence should prove most powerful with the people he might be unable to effect a retreat into Portugal. Wherefore he recommended the British ministers to take measures with a view to a war against Spain ! And this at the very moment when, victorious in every battle, he seemed to have placed the cause he supported beyond the power of fortune. Who when Napoleon was defeated at Leipsic, when all Europe and even part of Asia were pouring their armed hordes into the northern and eastern parts of France, when Soult was unable to defend the western frontier ; who then looking only on the surface could have supposed that Wellington, the long-enduring general, whose profound calculations and untiring vigour in war had brought the affairs of the Peninsula to their apparently prosperous state, that he the victorious commander could with truth thus describe his own uneasy situation to his government ?

"Matters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards that I think it necessary to draw your attention seriously to the subject. You will have seen the

libels about San Sebastian, which I know were written and published by an officer of the war department and I believe under the direction of the minister at war, Don Juan O'Donoju. Advantage has been taken of the impression made by these libels to circulate others, in which the old stories are repeated about the outrages committed by Sir John Moore's army in Galicia, and endeavours are made to irritate the public mind about our still keeping garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagea, and particularly in Ceuta. They exaggerate the conduct of our traders in South America, and every little concern of a master of a ship who may behave ill in a Spanish port is represented as an attack upon the sovereignty of the Spanish nation. I believe these libels all proceed from the same source, the government and their immediate servants and officers; and although I have no reason to believe that they have as yet made any impression on the nation at large, they certainly have upon the officers of the government, and even upon the principal officers of the army. These persons must see that if the libels are not written or encouraged by the government they are at least not discouraged, they know that we are odious to the government and they treat us accordingly. The Spanish troops plunder everything they approach, neither their own nor our magazines are sacred. Until recently there was some semblance of inquiry and of a desire to punish offenders, lately these acts of disorder have been left entirely unnoticed, unless when I have interfered with my authority as commander-in-chief of the Spanish army. The civil magistrates in the country have not only refused us assistance, but have particularly ordered the inhabitants not to give it for payment, and when robberies have been discovered, and the property proved to belong to the commissariat, the law has been violated and possession withheld. This was the case lately at Tolosa.

"Then what is more extraordinary and more difficult to understand is a transaction which occurred lately at Fuenterrabia. It was settled that the British and Portuguese hospital should go to that town. There is a building there which has been a Spanish hospital, and the Spanish authority who gave it over wanted to carry off, in order to burn as fire-wood, the beds, that our soldiers might not have the use of them; and these are people to whom we have given medicines, instruments, and other aids, who when wounded and sick we have taken into our hospitals, and to whom we have rendered every service in our power after having recovered their country from the enemy! These are not the people of Spain but the officers of government, who would not dare to conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that their conduct was agreeable to their employers. If this spirit is not checked, if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury done to our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly nature of such proceedings, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave towards us in the same manner, and that we shall have no friend or none who will dare to avow him as such in Spain. Consider what will be the consequence of this state of affairs if any reverse should happen, or if an aggravation of the insults and injuries or any other cause should cause the English army to be withdrawn. I think I should experience great difficulty, the Spanish people being hostile, in retiring through Spain into Portugal from the peculiar nature of our equipments, and I think I might be able to embark the army at Passages in spite of all the French and Spanish armies united. But I should be much more certain of getting clear off as we ought if we had possession of San Sebastian, and this view of the subject is the motive for the advice I am about to give you as the remedy for the evils with which I have made you acquainted.

"First, then, I recommend you to alter the nature of your political relations with Spain and to have nothing there but a *chargé d'affaires*. Secondly, to complain seriously of the conduct of the government and their servants, to remind them that Cadiz, Carthagea, and I believe Ceuta, were garrisoned by British troops at their earnest request, and that the troops were not sent to the two former till the government agreed to certain conditions. If we had not garrisoned the last it would before now have fallen into the hand of the Moors. Thirdly, to demand, as security for the safety of the king's troops against the criminal disposition of the government and of those in authority under them, that a British garrison should be admitted into San Sebastian, giving notice that unless this demand was complied with the troops should be withdrawn. Fourthly, to withdraw the troops if this demand be

not complied with, be the consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly. You may rely upon this, that if you take a firm decided line, and show your determination to go through with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you, and will bring the government to their senses, and you will put an end at once to all the petty cabals and counter-action existing at the present moment, and you will not be under the necessity of bringing matters to extremities; if you take any other than a decided line and one which in its consequences will involve them in ruin, you may depend upon it you will gain nothing and will only make matters worse. I recommend these measures whatever may be the decision respecting my command of the army. They are probably the more necessary if I should keep my command. The truth is that a crisis is approaching in our connection with Spain, and if you do not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from services rendered to them."

Thus it appears that Lord Wellington, at the end of the war, described the Spaniards precisely as Sir John Moore described them at the beginning. But the seat of government was now transferred to Madrid and the new Cortes, as I have already noticed, decided, against the wishes of the regency, that the English general should keep the command of the Spanish armies. The liberals, indeed, with great diligence, had previously sought to establish a system of control over the Cortes by means of the populace of Madrid, as they had done at Cadiz, and they were so active and created so much alarm by their apparent success, that the serviles, backed by the Americans, were ready to make the Princess Carlotta sole regent, as the only resource for stemming the progress of democracy. However, when they had proved their strength upon the question of Lord Wellington's command, they deferred the Princess's affair and resolved to oppose their adversaries more vigorously in the assembly. They were encouraged also by a tumult which happened at Madrid, where the populace instigated by their agents, or disliking the new constitution, for the measures of the democratic party were generally considered evil in the great towns beyond the Isla, rose and forced the authorities to imprison a number of obnoxious persons; the new Cortes then arrived, the serviles got the upper hand, and being resolved to change the regency took as their ground of attack its conduct towards the English general. Pursuing this scheme of opposition with ardour, they caused the minister of war to be dismissed, and were ready to attack the regency itself, expecting full success, when to their amazement and extreme anger Lord Wellington, far from desiring to have his personal enemies thus thrust out of power, expressed his earnest desire to keep them in their stations.

To men who were alike devoid of patriotism or principle, and whose only rule of action was the momentary impulse of passion, such a proceeding was incomprehensible; yet it was a wise and well-considered political change on his part showing that private feelings were never the guides of his conduct in public matters, and that he ever seemed to bear in mind the maxim which Sophocles has put into the mouth of Ajax, "*carrying himself towards his friends as if they might one day become enemies, and treating his foes as men who might become friends.*"⁶⁵ The new spirit had given him no hopes of any general alteration of the system, nor was he less convinced that sooner or later he must come to extremities with the Spaniards; but he was averse to any appearance of disunion becoming public at the moment he was invading France, lest it should check his projects of raising an anti-Napoleon party in that country. He therefore advised the British government to keep his hostile propositions in abeyance, leaving it to him and to his brother to put them in execution or not as events might dictate. Meanwhile he sent orders to evacuate Cadiz and Carthagen, and opposed the projected change in the Spanish government, observing that "the minister of war being dismissed, the most obnoxious opponent of military arrangement was gone; that the mob of Madrid, being worked upon by the same press in the hands of the same people who had made the mob of Cadiz so ungovernable, would become as bad as these last, and though the mercantile interest would not have so much power in the capital they would not want partisans when desirous of carrying a question by violence. The grandees were too poor to retain their former natural influence, and the constitution gave them no political

power. The only chance which the serviles had was to conduct themselves with prudence, and when in the right with a firm contempt for the efforts of the press and the mob; but this was what no person in Spain ever did, and the smaller party being wiser, bolder, and more active, would soon govern the Cortes at Madrid as they did that at Cadiz."

No permanent change for the better could be expected, and meanwhile the actual government, alarmed by the tumults in the capital, by the strength of the serviles in the Cortes, by the rebukes and remonstrances of the English general and ministers, and by the evident danger of an open rupture with England, displayed, according to Lord Wellington, the utmost prudence and fairness in a most important affair which occurred at this time. That is to say, their own views and interests coinciding with those of the English commander and government, there was a momentary agreement, and Wellington wisely preferred this opening for conciliation to the more dangerous mode he had before recommended.

The event which called forth his approval of their conduct was the secret arrival of the duke of San Carlos at Madrid in December. He brought with him a treaty of peace, proposed by Napoleon and accepted by Ferdinand, called the treaty of Valençay. It acknowledged Ferdinand as King of Spain and the Indies, and the integrity of the Spanish empire was recognized. He was in return to make the English evacuate Spain, and the French troops were to abandon the country at the same time. The contracting powers were to maintain their respective maritime rights as they had been stipulated by the treaty of Utrecht, and observed until 1792. The sales of the national domains made by Joseph were to be confirmed; all the Spaniards who had attached themselves to the French cause were to be reinstated in their dignities and property, those who chose to quit Spain were to have 10 years to dispose of their possessions. Prisoners, including all those delivered up by Spain to the English, were to be sent home on both sides. The king was to pay annually 30,000,000 of reals to his father, Charles IV., and 2,000,000 to his widow; a treaty of commerce was to be arranged.

Ferdinand, being entirely devoid of principle, acted with that cunning which marked his infamous career through life. He gave the duke of San Carlos secret instructions to tell the serviles, if he found them all powerful in the Cortes, to ratify this treaty with a secret resolution to break it when time served; but if the Jacobins were strongest San Carlos was merely to ask them to ratify it, Ferdinand in that case reserving to himself the task of violating it on his own authority. These instructions were made known to the English ministers and the English general, but they, putting no trust in such a negotiator, and thinking his intention was rather to deceive the allies than Napoleon, thwarted him as much as they could, and in this they were joined by the Portuguese government. The British authorities were naturally little pleased with the prospect of being forced to abandon Spain under a treaty, which would necessarily give Napoleon great influence over that country in after times, and for the present enable him to concentrate all the old troops on the eastern frontier of his empire; nor was the Jacobinical Spanish government more content to have a master. Wherefore, all parties being agreed, the regency, keeping the matter secret, dismissed San Carlos on the 8th of January with a copy of the decree passed by the Cortes, which rendered null and void all acts of Ferdinand while a prisoner, and forbade negotiation for peace while a French army remained in the Peninsula. And that the king might fully understand them, they told him "*the monster despotism had been driven from the throne of Spain.*" Meanwhile Joseph Palafox, who had been a prisoner ever since the siege of Zaragoza, was by the French emperor first sent to Valençay, after which he was to follow San Carlos, and he arrived at Madrid four days after the latter's departure. But his negotiations were equally fruitless with the regency, and in the secret sittings of the Cortes measures were discussed for watching the king's movements and forcing him to swear to the constitution and to the Cortes before he passed the frontier.

Lord Wellington was alarmed at the treaty of Valençay. He had, he said, long suspected Napoleon would adopt such an expedient, and if he had shown less pride and more common sense it would have succeeded. This sarcasm was perhaps well applied to the measure as it appeared at the time, but the emperor's real proceed-

ings he was unacquainted with, and this splenetic ebullition only indicated his own vexation at approaching mischief, for he was forced to acknowledge that the project was not unlikely even then to succeed, because the misery of Spain was so great and so clearly to be traced to the views of the government and of the new constitution, that many persons must have been desirous to put an end to the general suffering under the sanction of this treaty. "If Napoleon," he said, "had withdrawn the garrisons from Catalonia and Valencia and sent Ferdinand, who must be *as useless a person in France as he would probably be in Spain*, at once to the frontier, or into the Peninsula, peace would have been made or the war at least rendered so difficult as to be almost impracticable and without hope of great success." Now this was precisely what Napoleon had designed, and it seems nearly certain that he contemplated the treaty of Valençay and the restoration of Ferdinand as early as the period of the battle of Vittoria, if not before.

The scheme was one which demanded the utmost secrecy, that it might be too sudden for the English influence to defeat it; the emperor had therefore arranged that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in November, that is, at the very moment when it would have been most injurious to the English interest, because then the disputes in the Cortes between the serviles and Jacobins were most rancorous, and the hostility of the regencies both in Portugal and Spain towards the English general and English influence undisguised. Suchet had then also proved his superiority to the allies in Catalonia, and Soult's gigantic lines, being unassayed, seemed impregnable. But in Napoleon's council were persons seeking only to betray him. It was the great misfortune of his life to have been driven by circumstances to suffer such men as Talleyrand and Fouché, whose innate treachery has become proverbial, to meddle in his affairs or even to approach his court. Mischiefs of this kind, however, necessarily awaits men who like Napoleon and Oliver Cromwell have the courage to attempt after great convulsions and civil wars the rebuilding of the social edifice without spilling blood. Either to create universal abhorrence by their cruelty, or to employ the basest of men, the Talleyrands, Fouchés, and Monks, of revolutions, is their inevitable fate; and never can they escape the opposition, more dangerous still, of honest and resolute men, who unable to comprehend the necessity of the times, see nothing but tyranny in the vigour which prevents anarchy.

The treaty of Valençay was too important a measure to escape the sagacity of the traitors around Napoleon, and when their opposition in the council and their secret insinuations proved unavailing to dissuade him from it, they divulged the secret to the partisans of the Bourbons. Taking advantage of the troubled state of public affairs, which occupied the emperor's time and distracted his attention, they contrived that Ferdinand's emissaries should precede him to Madrid, and delayed his own departure until March when the struggle was at an end. Nevertheless the chances of success for this scheme, even in its imperfect execution, were so many and so alarming that Lord Wellington's sudden change from fierce enmity to a warm support of the regency, when he found it resolute and frank in its rejection of the treaty, although it created so much surprise and anger at the moment, cannot be judged otherwise than as the wise and prudent proceeding of a consummate statesman. Nor did he fail to point out to his own government the more distant as well as the immediate danger to England and Spain involved in this singularly complicated and important affair.

The evils as affecting the war and English alliance with Spain were obvious, but the two articles relating to the provision for Ferdinand's father and mother, and to the future state of the Spaniards who had joined the French involved great interests. It was essential, he said, that the Spanish government should explicitly declare its intentions. Negotiations for a general peace were said to be commenced, of that he knew nothing, but he supposed, such being the case, that a basis would be embodied in a preliminary treaty which all the belligerents would ratify, each power then to arrange its own peculiar treaty with France under protection of the general confederation. Napoleon would necessarily put forward his treaty with Ferdinand. It could be got rid of by the statement that the latter was a prisoner when negotiating; but new articles would then have to be framed and therefore the Spanish government should be called upon previously to declare what their inten-

tions were as to the two articles in the treaty of Valençay. His objections to them were that the allowance to Charles IV. was beyond the financial means of Spain, and were it not so, Napoleon should not be allowed to stipulate for any provision for him. Neither should he be suffered to embody or establish a permanent French party in Spain, under protection of a treaty, an article of which provided for the restoration of the Spaniards who had taken part with the French. It would give him the right, which he would not fail to exercise, of interfering in their favour in every question of property or other interest, and the Spanish government would be involved in perpetual disputes with France. It was probable the allied sovereigns would be desirous of getting rid of this question, and would think it desirable that Spain should pardon her rebellious subjects. For this reason he had before advised the Spanish government to publish a general amnesty, with the view of removing the difficulty when a general peace should come to be negotiated, and this difficulty and danger be enhanced, if not before provided for, by the desire which each of the allied powers would feel, when negotiating on their separate grounds, to save their finances by disbanding their armies.

This suggestion of an amnesty, made 10 days before the battle of Vittoria, illustrates Wellington's sagacity, his long and provident reach of mind, his discriminating and magnanimous mode of viewing the errors and weaknesses of human nature. Let it be remembered that in the full tide of success, after having passed the Douro, and when Joseph, surprised and bewildered, was flying before him, that he who had been called the iron duke in the midst of his bivouac fires, found time to consider, and had sufficient humanity and grandeur of mind thus to address the Spanish government on this subject.

"A large number of Spaniards who have taken the side of the French are now with the enemy's army, many of these are highly meritorious and have rendered most essential service to the cause even during the period in which they have been in the service of the enemy. It is also a known fact that fear, the misery and distress which they suffered during the contest, and despair of the result, were the motives which induced many of these unfortunate persons to take the part which they have taken, and I would suggest for consideration whether it is expedient to involve the country in all the consequences of a rigid adherence to the existing law in order to punish such persons. I am the last man who will be found to diminish the merit of those Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the country during the severe trial which I hope has passed, particularly of those who, having remained amongst the enemy without entering their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives. But at the same time that I can appreciate the merits of these individuals and of the nation at large, I can forgive the weakness of those who have been induced by terror, by distress, or by despair, to pursue a different line of conduct.

"I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances of the commencement and of the different stages of this eventful contest, and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined that it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they were assailed and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and disorganization that followed, and let them decide whether those who were witnesses of these events are guilty because they could not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not guilty in any other manner, and many now deemed guilty in the eye of the law as having served the pretended king have by that very act acquired the means of serving and have rendered important services to their country. It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead the government and the Cortes to grant a general amnesty with certain exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of failing or succeeding in freeing the country from its oppressors. If the effort fail the enemy will by an amnesty be deprived of the principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which his armies will be stationed; he will see clearly that he can place no reliance on any partisans in Spain, and he will not have even a pretence for supposing that the country is divided in opinion.

If the effort succeed the object of the government should be to pacify the country and to heal the divisions which the contest has unavoidably occasioned. It is impossible to accomplish this object while there exists a great body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the largest property in the country, and others endowed with considerable talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest, conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have above adverted. These persons, their friends, and relations, will, if persecuted, naturally endeavour to perpetuate the divisions in the country in the hope at some time to take advantage of them, and adverting to their number and to that power which they must derive from their property and connections it must be feared that they will be too successful.

"But there are other important views of this question. First, should the effort to free the country from its oppressors succeed, at some time or other approaches to peace must be made between the two nations, and the amnesty to the persons above described will remove the greatest difficulty in the way of such an arrangement. Secondly, should even Spain be at peace with France and the proscription against these persons be continued, they will remain in France a perpetual instrument in the hands of that restless power to disturb the internal tranquillity of Spain; and in case of a renewal of the war, which will be their wish and object, they will be the most mischievous and most inveterate enemies of their country, of that country which, with mistaken severity, aggravates her misfortunes by casting off from her thousands of her useful subjects. On every ground then it is desirable that the measure should be adopted, and the present moment should be seized for adopting it."

Then pointing out with great accuracy and justice those who should be exempted from an amnesty, he thus terminated this record of his own true greatness, and of the littleness of the people to whom it was fruitlessly addressed.

"In bringing this subject under the consideration of the government I am perhaps intruding my opinion on a subject in which as a stranger I have no concern, but having had an advantage enjoyed by few of being acquainted with the concerns of the country since the commencement of the contest, and having been sensible both in the last and present campaign of the disadvantages suffered by Spain from the want of a measure of this description, I have thought it proper as a well-wisher to the cause to bring it under the consideration of the government, assuring them at the same time that I have never had the slightest communication on the subject with the government of my country, nor do I believe that they have ever turned their attention to it. What I have above stated are my own opinions, to which I may attribute more weight than they merit, but they are founded upon a sincere devotion to the interests of the country."

Such was the general political state of the Peninsula as bearing upon the military operations at the close of the year 1813, and the state of England and France shall be shown in the next chapters. But, however hateful and injurious to England the conduct of the Peninsular government appears, and however just and well-founded were the greatest part of Lord Wellington's complaints, it is not to be assumed that the Spanish government and Cortes were totally without excuse for their hostility or ingratitude. It was not solely upon military grounds that they were obnoxious to the English general. He united heartily with the English government in hatred of democratic institutions as opposed to aristocratic domination. Spain with the former seemed scarcely worth saving from France, and in a letter written about that period to the Conde de la Bisbal, who it would appear proposed some immediate stroke of violence against the regency, he openly avows that he was inimical to the constitution, because it admitted a free press and refused to property any political influence beyond what naturally belonged to it. That is, it refused to heap undue honours, privileges, and power upon those who already possessed all the luxury and happiness which riches can bestow; it refused to admit the principle that those who have much should have more, that the indolence, corruption, and insolence, naturally attendant upon wealth should be supported and increased by irresponsible power; that those who laboured and produced all things should enjoy nothing, that the rich should be tyrants, and the poor slaves. But these essential principles of aristocratic

government have never yet been, and never will be quietly received and submitted to by any thinking people : where they prevail there is no real freedom. Property inevitably confers power on its possessors, and far from adding to that natural power by political privileges, it should be the object of all men who love liberty to balance it by raising the poorer classes to political importance ; the influence and insolence of riches ought to be tamed and subdued instead of being inflated and excited by political institutions. This was the guiding principle of the most celebrated Greek legislators, the opposite principle produced the domestic dissensions of the Romans, and was the ruin of Carthage. It was the cause also of the French Revolution. But after many years of darkness, the light of reason is now breaking forth again, and that ancient principle of justice which places the right of man in himself, above the right of property, is beginning to be understood. A clear perception of it has produced the American Republic. France and Spain have admitted it, and England ripens for its adoption. Yet pure and bright and beautiful and healthful as the light of freedom is in itself, it fell at this time on such foul and stagnant pools, such horrid repulsive objects, that millions turned at first from its radiance with disgust and wished for darkness again.

CHAPTER V.

THE force and energy of Napoleon's system of government was evinced in a marvellous manner by the rapidity with which he returned to Germany, at the head of an enormous army, before his enemies had time even to understand the extent of his misfortunes in the Russian campaign. The victories of Lutzen and Bautzen then seemed to reinstate him as the arbiter of Europe. But those battles were fought with the heads of columns, the rear of which were still filing out of France. They were fought also with young troops. Wherefore the emperor, when he had given himself a fixed and menacing position in Germany, more readily listened to the fraudulent negotiations of his trembling opponents, partly in hopes of attaining his object without further appeal to arms, partly to obtain time to organize and discipline his soldiers, confident in his own unmatched skill in directing them if war was finally to decide his fate. He counted also upon the family ties between him and Austria, and believed that power willing to mediate sincerely. Not that he was so weak as to imagine the hope of regaining some of its former power and possessions was not uppermost, nor was he unprepared to make concessions ; but he seems to have been quite unsuspecting of the long course of treachery and deceit followed by the Austrian politicians.

It has been already shown that while negotiating with France an offensive and defensive treaty in 1812, the Austrian cabinet was cognizant of, and secretly aiding the plan of a vast insurrection extending from the Tyrol to Calabria and the Illyrian provinces. The management of this scheme was entrusted by the English cabinet to General Nugent and Mr. King, who were at Vienna ; their agents went from thence to Italy and the Illyrian coast, many Austrian officers were engaged in the project ; * and Italians of great families entered into commercial houses to enable them with more facility to carry on this plan. Moreover Austria while actually signing the treaty with Napoleon was with unceasing importunity urging Prussia to join the Russians in opposition to him. The feeble operations of Prince Swartzenberg, the manner in which he uncovered the emperor's right flank and permitted Tchitchagoff to move to the Beresina in the Russian campaign, were but continuations of this deceitful policy. And it was openly advanced as a merit by the Austrian cabinet, that her offer of mediation after the battle of Bautzen was made solely with the view of gaining time to organize the army which was to join the Russians and Prussians. Finally the armistice itself was violated, hostilities being commenced before its termination, to enable the Russian troops safely to join the Austrians in Bohemia.

Nevertheless Napoleon's genius triumphed at Dresden over the unskilful operations of the allies, directed by Swartzenburg, whose incapacity as a commander was made manifest in this campaign. Nor would the after misfortunes of Vandamme and Marshal Macdonald, or the defeat of Oudinot and Ney have

* Appendix, No. 23.

prevented the emperor's final success but for the continuation of a treachery, which seemed at the time to be considered a virtue by sovereigns who were unceasingly accusing their more noble adversary of the very baseness that they were practising so unblushingly. He had conceived a project so vast, so original, so hardy, so far above the imaginations of his contemporary generals, that even Wellington's sagacity failed to pierce it, and he censured the emperor's long stay on the Elbe as an obstinacy unwarranted by the rules of art. But Napoleon had more profoundly judged his own situation. The large forces he left at Dresden, at Torgau, and Wittenberg, for which he has been so much blamed by shallow military critics as lessening his numbers on the field of Leipsic, were essential parts of his gigantic plan. He quitted Dresden, apparently in retreat, to deceive his enemies, but with the intention of marching down the Elbe, recrossing that river and throwing his opponents into a false position. Then he would have seized Berlin, and reopening his communications with his garrisons both on the Elbe and the Oder have operated between those rivers; and with an army much augmented in power, because he would have recovered many thousand old soldiers cooped up in the garrisons; an army more compact and firmly established also, because he would have been in direct communication with the Danes and with Davoust's force at Hamburgh, and both his flanks would have been secured by his chains of fortresses on the two rivers. Already had Blücher and the Swedes felt his first stroke, the next would have taught the allies that the lion was still abroad in his strength, if at the very moment of execution, without any previous declaration, the Bavarians, upon whose operations he depended for keeping the Austrians in the valley of the Danube in check, had not formed common cause with his opponents, and the whole marched together towards the Rhine. The battle of Leipsic followed, the well-known treason of the Saxon troops led to the victory gained there by the allies, and Napoleon, now the prey of misfortune, reached France with only one-third of his army, having on the way however trampled in the dust the Bavarian Wrede who attempted to stop his passage at Hannau.

Meanwhile the allied sovereigns, by giving hopes to their subjects that constitutional liberty would be the reward of the prodigious popular exertions against France, hopes which with the most detestable baseness they had previously resolved to defraud, assembled greater forces than they were able to wield, and prepared to pass the Rhine. But, distrusting even their immense superiority of numbers, they still pursued their faithless system. When Napoleon in consequence of the Bavarian defection marched to Leipsic, he sent orders to Gouvion St. Cyr to abandon Dresden and unite with the garrisons on the Lower Elbe, the messengers were intercepted, and St. Cyr, too little enterprising to execute such a plan of his own accord, surrendered on condition of being allowed to regain France. The capitulation was broken, and general and soldiers remained prisoners.

After the Leipsic battle Napoleon's adherents fell away by nations. Murat, the husband of his sister, joined Austria and thus forced Prince Eugene to abandon his position on the Adige. A successful insurrection in favour of the Prince of Orange broke out in Holland. The neutrality of Switzerland was violated, and more than half a million of armed men were poured across the frontiers of France in all the violence of brute force, for their military combinations were contemptible and their course marked by murder and devastation. But previous to this the allies gave one more notable example of their faithless cunning.

St. Aignan the French resident minister at Gotha had been taken at Leipsic, and treated at first as a prisoner of war. He remonstrated, and being known to entertain a desire for peace, was judged a good tool with which to practise deception. Napoleon had offered on the field of battle at Leipsic to negotiate, no notice was taken of it at the time, but now the Austrian Metternich and the Russian Nesselrode had an interview with St. Aignan at Frankfort, and they assured him the Prussian minister agreed in all things with them. They had previously arranged that Lord Aberdeen should come in during the conference as if by accident; nothing was put down in writing, yet St. Aignan was suffered to make minutes of their proposals in reply to the emperor's offer to negotiate. These were generally that the alliance of the sovereigns was indissoluble—that they would have only a general

peace—that France was to be confined to her natural limits, viz. the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees—that the independence of Germany was a thing not to be disputed—that the Spanish Peninsula should be free and the Bourbon dynasty be restored—that Austria must have a frontier in Italy, the line of which could be afterwards discussed, but Italy itself was to be independent of any preponderating power—that Holland was also to be independent, and her frontier to be matter for after discussion—that England was ready to make great sacrifices for peace upon these bases, and would acknowledge that freedom of commerce and of navigation which France had a right to pretend to. St. Aignan here observed that Napoleon believed England was resolved to restrict France to the possession of thirty sail of the line, Lord Aberdeen replied that it was not true.

This conference had place at the Emperor of Austria's head-quarters on the 10th of November, and Lord Aberdeen inclosed the account of it in a despatch dated at Smalcalde the 16th of November. He had objected verbally to the passage relating to the maritime question with England, nevertheless he permitted it to remain in St. Aignan's minutes. It was decided also that the military operations should go on notwithstanding the negotiation, and in truth the allies had not the slightest design to make peace. They thought Napoleon would refuse the basis proposed, which would give them an opportunity to declare he was opposed to all reasonable modes of putting an end to the war and thus work upon the French people. This is proved by what followed. For when, contrary to their expectations, the emperor's minister signified, on the 16th of November, that he accepted the propositions, observing that the independence of all nations at sea as well as by land had been always Napoleon's object, Metternich in his reply, on the 25th of November, pretended to consider this answer as avoiding the acceptance of the basis. The emperor, however, put that obstacle aside, on the 2nd of December, by accepting explicitly the basis, generally and summarily, such as it had been presented to him, adding, that France would make great sacrifices, but the emperor was content if by like sacrifices on the part of England, that general peace which was the declared object of the allies could be obtained. Metternich, thus driven from his subterfuge required Napoleon to send a like declaration to each of the allies separately, when negotiations might, he said, commence.

Meanwhile Lord Aberdeen, who had permitted St. Aignan to retain the article relating to maritime rights in his minutes of conference, presented to Metternich, on the 27th of November, a note declaring that England would not admit the turn given by France to her share of the negotiation; that she was ready to yield all the rights of commerce and navigation which France had a right to pretend to, but the question would turn upon what that right was. England would never permit her navigation laws to be discussed at a congress, it was a matter essentially foreign to the object of such an assembly, and England would never depart from the great principle thereby announced as to her maritime rights. Metternich approved of Lord Aberdeen's views, saying they were his own and those of his court, thus proving that the negotiation had been a deceit from the beginning. This fact was, however, placed beyond doubt by Lord Castlereagh's simultaneous proceedings in London.

In a note, dated the 30th November, that minister told Lord Aberdeen England admitted as a basis, that the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees, should be the frontier of France, subject to such modifications as might be necessary to give a secure frontier to Holland, and to Switzerland also, although the latter had not been mentioned in the proposals given by St. Aignan. He applauded the resolution to pursue military operations notwithstanding the negotiations, and he approved of demanding nothing but what they were resolved to have. Nevertheless he said that any sacrifice to be made by England was only to secure the independence of Holland and Switzerland, and the former having already declared for the house of Nassau, was now out of the pale of discussion. Finally, he recommended that any unnecessary delay or equivocation on the part of the enemy should be considered as tantamount to a rejection of the basis, and that the allies *should then put forward the offer of peace to show that it was not they but France that opposed an honourable termination of the war.* Having thus thrown fresh obstacles in the way of that

peace which the allies pretended to have so much at heart, he, on the 21st December, sent notes to the different ambassadors of the allied powers then in London, demanding explicit answers about the intentions of their courts as to England's maritime code. To this they all responded that their cabinets would not suffer any question relative to that code to be entertained at a congress in which England was represented, and this on the express ground that it would mar the great object of peace.

Lord Castlereagh thus provided, declared that France should be informed of their resolutions before negotiations commenced, but 20 days before this, Napoleon having decreed a fresh levy of 300,000 conscripts, the allies had published a manifesto treating this measure, so essentially a defensive one since they would not suspend their military operations, as a fresh provocation on his part, because the motives assigned for the conscription contained a just and powerful description of their past deceits and violence with a view to rouse the national spirit of France. Thus having first by a pretended desire for peace and a willingness on the part of England to consent to an arrangement about her maritime code, inveigled the French emperor into negotiations and thereby ascertained that the maritime question was uppermost in his mind and the only obstacle to peace, they declared that vital question should not even be discussed. And when by this subtlety they had rendered peace impossible, proclaimed that Napoleon alone resisted the desire of the world for tranquillity. And at this very moment Austria was secretly endeavouring to obtain England's consent to her seizing upon Alsace, a project which was stopped by Lord Wellington, who forcibly pointed out the danger of rousing France to a general insurrection by such a proceeding.

The contrast between these wiles to gain a momentary advantage, and the manly, vigorous policy of Lord Wellington, must make honest men of all nations blush for the cunning which diplomatists call policy. On one side the arts of guileful negotiation masked with fair protestations but accompanied by a savage and revolting system of warfare; on the other a broad open hostility declared on manly and just grounds followed up with a strict regard to humanity and good faith; nothing put forward with an equivocal meaning and the actions true to the word. On the eastern frontier the Cossack let loose to ravage with all the barbarity of Asiatic warfare. On the western frontier the Spaniards turned back into their own country, in the very midst of triumph, for daring to pass the bounds of discipline prescribed by the wise and generous policy of their commander. Terror and desolation and the insurrection of a people rendered frantic by the cruelty of the invaders marked the progress of the ferocious multitudes who crossed the Rhine. Order and tranquillity, profound even on the very edge of the battle-field, attended the march of the civilized army which passed the Bidassoa. And what were the military actions? Napoleon rising even above himself hurtled against the armed myriads opposed to him with such a terrible energy that though ten times his number they were rolled back on every side in confusion and dismay. But Wellington advanced without a check, victorious in every battle, although one half of the veterans opposed to him would have decided the campaign on the eastern frontier. Nor can this be gainsaid, since Napoleon's career in this campaign was only stayed by the defection of his brother-in-law Murat, and by the sickening treachery of two marshals to whom he had been prodigal of benefits. It is undeniable that Lord Wellington with 60,000 Anglo-Portuguese acting in the south, effected more than half a million of the allies were able to effect on the opposite side of France; and yet Soult's army on the 10th of November was stronger than that with which Napoleon fought the battle of Brienne.

That great man was never personally deceived by the allies' pretended negotiations. He joined issue with them to satisfy the French people that he was not averse to peace, but his instructions, dated the 4th of January, and addressed to Caulaincourt, prove at once his sagacity and firmness. "I think," he said, "that both the allies' good faith and the wish of England to make peace is doubtful; for my part, I desire peace, but it must be solid and honourable. I have accepted the basis proposed at Frankfort, yet it is more than probable the allies have other notions. These propositions are but a mask; the negotiations are placed under the influence of the military operations, and it easy to foresee what the conse-

quences of such a system must be. It is necessary, therefore, to listen to and observe everything. It is not certain even that you will be admitted to the headquarters of the allies. The Russians and the English watch to prevent any opening for explanation and reconciliation with the emperor of Austria. You must, therefore, endeavour to ascertain the real views of the allies, and let me know day by day what you learn that I may frame instructions, for which at present I have no sure grounds."

The internal state of France was more disquieting to his mind than foreign negotiations, or the number of invaders. The sincere republicans were, naturally, averse to him as the restorer of monarchy, yet they should have felt that the sovereign whose ruin was so eagerly sought by the legitimate kings and nobles of Europe could not be really opposed to liberty. Meanwhile the advocates of legitimacy shrunk from him as an usurper, and all those tired of war, and they were a majority of the nation, judging from the stupendous power of his genius that he had only to will peace to attain it with security, blamed his tardiness in negotiation. An unexpected opposition to his wishes was also displayed in the legislative body, and the partisans of the Bourbons were endeavouring to form a great conspiracy in favour of that house. There were many traitors likewise to him and to their country, men devoid of principle, patriotism, or honour, who, with instinctive hatred of a failing cause, plotted to thwart his projects for the defence of the nation. In fine, the men of action and the men of theories were alike combined for mischief. Nor is this outbreak of passion to be wondered at, when it is considered how recently Napoleon had stopped the anarchy of the revolution, and rebuilt the social and political structure in France. But of all who, by their untimely opposition to the emperor, hurt their country, the most pernicious were those silly politicians, whom he so felicitously described as "*discussing abstract systems of government when the battering-ram was at the gates.*"

Such, however, has been in all ages the conduct of excited and disturbed nations, and it seems to be inherent in human nature, because a saving policy can only be understood and worked to good by master-spirits, and they are few and far between, their time on earth short, their task immense. They have not time to teach, they must command, although they know that pride and ignorance, and even honesty, will carp at the despotism which brings general safety. It was this vain, short-sighted impatience that drove Hannibal into exile, caused the assassination of Cæsar, and strewed thorns beneath the gigantic footsteps of Oliver Cromwell. It raged fiercely in Spain against Lord Wellington, and in France against Napoleon, and always with the most grievous injury to the several nations. Time only hallows human institutions. Under that guarantee men will yield implicit obedience and respect to the wildest caprices of the most stupid tyrant that ever disgraced a throne, and wanting it, they will cavil at and reject the wisest measures of the most sublime genius. The painful notion is thus excited, that if governments are conducted with just the degree of stability and tranquillity which they deserve and no more, the people of all nations, much as they may be oppressed, enjoy upon an average of years precisely the degree of liberty they are fitted for. National discontents mark, according to their bitterness and constancy, not so much the oppression of the rulers, as the real progress of the ruled in civilization and its attendant political knowledge. When, from peculiar circumstances, those discontents explode in violent revolutions, shattering the fabric of society, and giving free vent and activity to all the passions and follies of mankind, fortunate is the nation which possesses a Napoleon or an Oliver Cromwell "*to step into their state of dominion with spirit to control and capacity to subdue the factions of the hour, and reconstruct the frame of reasonable government.*"

For great as these two men were in the field of battle, especially the former, they were infinitely greater when they placed themselves in the seat of power, and put forth the gigantic despotism of genius essential to the completion of their holy work. Nor do I hold the conduct of Washington to be comparable to either of those men. His situation was one of infinitely less difficulty, and there is no reason to believe that his capacity would have been equal to the emergencies of a more formidable crisis than he had to deal with. Washington could not have made

himself master of all, had it been necessary and he so inclined, for he was neither the foremost general nor the foremost statesman of his nation. His forbearance was a matter of necessity, and his love of liberty did not prevent him from bequeathing his black slaves to his widow.

Such was Napoleon's situation, and as he read the signs of the times truly, he knew that in his military skill and the rage of the peasants at the ravages of the enemy he must find the means to extricate himself from his difficulties, or rather to extricate his country, for self had no place in his policy save as his personal glory was identified with France and her prosperity. Never before did the world see a man soaring so high and devoid of all selfish ambition. Let those who honestly seeking truth doubt this, study Napoleon carefully; let them read the record of his second abdication published by his brother Lucien, that stern republican who refused kingdoms as the price of his principles, and they will doubt no longer. It is not, however, with these matters that this History has to deal, but with the emperor's measures affecting his lieutenants on the Spanish frontier of France. There disaffection to his government was extensive, but principally from local causes. The conscription was peculiarly hateful to the wild mountaineers, who like most borderers cherish very independent notions. The war with England had ruined the foreign commerce of their great towns, and the advantage of increased traffic by land on the east was less directly felt in the south. There also the recollection of the Vendean struggle still lingered, and the partisans of the Bourbons had many connections. But the chief danger arose from the just and politic conduct of Lord Wellington, which, offering no cause of anger and very much of private advantage to the people gave little or no hope of insurrection from sufferings.

While France was in this state England presented a scene of universal exultation. Tory politics were triumphant, opposition in the parliament was nearly crushed by events, the press was either subdued by persecution or in the pay of the ministers, and the latter with undisguised joy hailed the coming moment when aristocratic tyranny was to be firmly established in England. The most enormous subsidies and military supplies were poured into the continent, and an act was passed to enable three-fourths of the militia to serve abroad. They were not however very forward to volunteer, and a new army, which ought to have reinforced Wellington, was sent under the command of General Graham, to support the insurrection of Holland, where it was of necessity engaged in trifling or unsuccessful operations in no manner affecting the great objects of the war. Meanwhile the importance of Lord Wellington's army and views was quite overlooked or misunderstood. The ministers persevered in the foolish plan of removing him to another quarter of Europe, and at the same time, instigated by the ambassadors of the allied sovereigns, were continually urging him to push his operations with more vigour in France. As if he was the man who had done least!

His letters were filled with strong and well-founded complaints that his army was neglected. Let his real position be borne in mind. He had, not as a military man, but with a political view and to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns, backed by the importunities of his own government, placed himself in a confined and difficult district of France, where his operations were cramped by rivers and fortresses, and by a powerful army occupying strong positions on his front and flanks. In this situation, unable to act at all in wet weather, he was necessarily dependent upon the ocean for supplies and reinforcements, and upon the Spanish authorities for his hospitals, depôts, and communications. Numbers were requisite to balance the advantages derived by the enemy from the peculiar conformation of the country and the position of the fortresses. Money also was wanted to procure supplies which he could not carry with him, and must pay for exactly, if he would avoid a general insurrection and the consequent ruin of the political object for which he had adopted such critical military operations. But though he had undertaken the invasion of France at the express desire of the government, the latter seemed to be alike ignorant of its importance and of the means to accomplish it, at one moment urging progress beyond reason, at another ready to change lightly what they had proposed ignorantly. Their unsettled policy proved their incapacity

even to comprehend the nature of the great tide of events on which they floated rather than sailed. Lord Wellington was forced day by day to teach them the value of their own schemes, and to show them how small their knowledge was of the true bearing of the political and military affairs they pretended to direct.

"Assure," he wrote on the 21st of December to Lord Bathurst, in reply to one of their ill-founded remonstrances, "Assure the Russian ambassador there is nothing I can do to forward the general interest that I will not do. What do they require? I am already further advanced on the French territory than any of the allied powers, and better prepared to take advantage of any opportunities which might offer as a consequence of my own situation or of their proceedings."—

"In military operations there are some things which can not be done, and one is to move troops in this country during or immediately after a violent fall of rain. To attempt it will be to lose more men than can be replaced, a guilty waste of life."

"The proper scene of action for the army was undoubtedly a question for the government to decide, but with 30,000 men in the Peninsula, he had for five years held 200,000 of Napoleon's best soldiers in check, since it was ridiculous to suppose that the Spaniards and Portuguese could have resisted for a moment if the British troops had been withdrawn. The French armies actually employed against him could not be less than 100,000 men, more if he included garrisons, and the French newspapers spoke of orders to form a fresh reserve of 100,000 at Bordeaux. Was there any man weak enough to suppose one-third of the number first mentioned would be employed against the Spaniards and Portuguese if the British were withdrawn? They would if it were an object with Bonaparte to conquer the Peninsula and he would in that case succeed; but he was more likely to give peace to the Peninsula, and turn against the allied sovereigns his 200,000 men, of which 100,000 were such troops as their armies had not yet dealt with. The war every day offered a crisis the result of which might effect the world for ages, and to change the scene of operations for the British army would render it incapable of fighting for four months, even if the scene were Holland, and it would even then be a deteriorated machine."

"The ministers might reasonably ask how by remaining where he was he could induce Napoleon to make peace. The answer was ready. He held a commanding situation on the most vulnerable frontier of France, probably the only vulnerable one, and if he could put 20,000 Spaniards in activity, and he could do it if he had money and was properly supported by the fleet, Bayonne the only fortress on the frontier, if it could be called a fortress, would fall to him in a short time. If he could put 40,000 Spaniards in motion his posts would soon be on the Garonne, and did any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position more than he would feel 30,000 or 40,000 British troops laying siege to one of his fortresses in Holland? The resources in men and money of which the emperor would be thus deprived, and the loss of reputation would do ten times more to procure peace than ten armies on the side of Flanders. But if he was right in believing a strong Bourbon party existed in France, and that it preponderated in the south, what mischief would not an advance to the Garonne do Napoleon! What sacrifices would he not make to get rid of the danger!"

"It was for the government not for him to dispose of the nation's resources, he had no right to give an opinion upon the subject, but military operations in Holland and in the Peninsula could not be maintained at the same time with British troops; one or other must be given up, the British military establishment was not equal to maintain two armies in the field. He had begun the recent campaign with 70,000 Anglo-Portuguese, and if the men got from the English militia, and the Portuguese recruits which he expected, had been added to his force, even though the Germans were removed from his army according to the ministers' plan, he might have taken the field early in 1814 with 80,000 men. That was now impossible. The formation of a Hanoverian army was the most reasonable plan of acting on the continent, but the withdrawal of the Germans would reduce his force to 50,000 men, unless he received real and efficient assistance to bring up the Portuguese recruits. This would increase his numbers to 55,000 or even 60,000 if his own wounded recovered well and he had no more battles, but he

would even then be 20,000 less than he had calculated upon, and it was certain that if the government extended their operations to other countries new means must be put in activity or the war must be stinted on the old stage. He did not desire to complain, but every branch of the service in the Peninsula was already stinted especially in what concerned the navy and the supplies which came directly from England !”

While thus combating the false views of the English cabinet as to the general state of affairs, he had also to struggle with its negligence and even opposition to his measures in details.

The general clothing of the Spanish troops and the great coats of the British soldiers for 1813, were not ready in January, 1814, because the inferior departments could not comprehend that the opening of new scenes of exertion required new means, and the soldiers had to brave the winter half naked, first on the snowy mountains, then in the more chilling damps of the low country about Bayonne. The clothing of the British soldiers for 1814 should have arrived in the end of 1813, when the army, lying inactive near the coast by reason of the bad weather, could have received and fitted it without difficulty. It did not however arrive until the troops were in progress towards the interior of France, wherefore, there being no means of transporting it by land, many of the best regiments were obliged to return to the coast to receive it, and the army, as we shall find, had to fight a critical battle without them.

He had, upon commencing the invasion of France, issued a proclamation promising protection to persons and property. This was construed by the French to cover their vessels in the Nivelle when the battle of that name gave the allies St. Jean de Luz. Lord Wellington, sacrificing personal profit to the good of the service, admitted this claim as tending to render the people amicable, but it clashed with the prize-money pretensions of Lord Keith who commanded the fleet of which Collier's squadron formed a detached portion. The serious evils endured by the army in default of sufficient naval assistance had been treated as of very slight importance, the object of a trifling personal gain for the navy excited a marvellous activity, and vigorous interference on the part of the government. Upon these subjects, and others of a like vexatious nature affecting his operations, Lord Wellington repeatedly and forcibly declared his discontent during the months of December, January, and February.

“As to the naval affairs,” he said, “the reports of the number of ships on the stations, striking off those coming out and going home, would show whether he had just ground of complaint, and whatever their numbers there remained the right of complaint because they did not perform the service required. The French had recommenced their coast navigation from Bordeaux to Bayonne, and if the blockade of Santona had been maintained the place would have been forced to surrender at an early period. The proclamation of protection which he had issued, and the licenses which he had granted to French vessels, every act of that description, and two-thirds of the acts which he performed every day could not he knew be considered of any avail as affecting the king's government, unless approved of and confirmed by the prince regent ; and he knew that no power short of the regent's could save the property of French subjects on the seas from the British navy. For that reason he had requested the sanction of the government to the sea passports which he had granted. His proclamation of protection had been construed whether rightfully or wrongfully to protect the French ships in the rivers ; his personal interest, greater than others, would lead him to deny this, but he sacrificed his profit to the general good.

“Were Lord Keith and Sir George Collier, because the latter happened to have a brig or two cruising off the coast, to claim as prizes all the vessels lying in every river which the army might pass in its operations ? and this to the detriment of the cause which required the strictest respect for private property. For the last five years he had been acting in the confidence that his conduct would be approved of and supported, and he concluded it would be so still ; but he was placed in a novel situation and asked for legal advice to determine, whether Lord Keith and the channel fleet were to be considered as engaged in a conjoint expedition with the

army under his command against the subjects of France, neither having any specific instructions from government, and the fleet having nothing to do with the operations by land. He only required that fleet to give him a free communication with the coast of Spain, and prevent the enemy's sea communication between the Garonne and the Adour, and this last was a part of its duty before the army arrived. Was his proclamation of protection to hold good as regarded the ships in the rivers? He desired to have it sanctioned by the prince regent, or that he might be permitted to issue another declaring that it was of no value."

This remonstrance produced so much effect that Lord Keith relinquished his claims, and Admiral Penrose was sent to command upon the station instead of Sir George Collier. The immediate intercourse of Lord Wellington with the navy was thus ameliorated by the superior power of this officer, who was remarkable for his suavity. Yet the licenses given to French vessels were strongly condemned by the government, and rendered null, for we find him again complaining that "he had granted them only in hopes of drawing money and supplies from France, and of interesting the French mercantile men to aid the army; but he feared the government were not aware of, and did not feel the difficulties in which he was placed at all times for want of money, and judged his measures without adverting to the necessity which occasioned them; hence their frequent disapprobation of what he did."

Strange this may sound to those who seeing the Duke of Wellington in the fulness of his glory have been accustomed to regard him as the star of England's greatness; but those who at that period frequented the society of ministers know well that he was then looked upon by those self-sufficient men as a person whose views were wild and visionary, requiring the corroboration of older and wiser heads before they could be assented to. Yea! even thus at the eleventh hour was the giant Wellington measured by the political dwarfs.

Although he gained something by making San Jean de Luz a free port for all nations not at war with France, his financial situation was nearly intolerable, and at the moment of greatest pressure Colonel Bunbury, under-secretary of state, was sent out to protest against his expenses. One hundred thousand pounds a month was the maximum in specie which the government would consent to supply, a sum quite inadequate to his wants. And this remonstrance was addressed to this victorious commander at the very crisis of his stupendous struggle, when he was overwhelmed with debts and could scarcely stir out of his quarters on account of the multitude of creditors waiting at his door for payment of just claims.

"Some of his muleteers," he said, "were 26 months in arrears, and recently, instigated by British merchants, they had become so clamorous that rather than lose their services he had given them bills on the treasury for a part of their claims, though he knew they would sell these bills at a discount to the *sharks*, who had urged them to be thus importunate and who were waiting at the ports to take advantage of the public distresses. A dangerous measure which he desired not to repeat.

"It might be true that the supply of £100,000 a month had been even exceeded for some time past, but it was incontestible that the English army and all its departments, and the Spanish and Portuguese armies were at the moment paralyzed for want of money. The arrears of pay to the soldiers was entering the seventh month, the debt was immense, and the king's engagements with the Spanish and Portuguese governments were not fulfilled. Indebted in every part of Spain he was becoming so in France, the price of all commodities was increasing in proportion to the delay of payment, to the difficulty of getting food at all, and the want of credit into which all the departments of the army had fallen. Of \$200,000 given to Marshal Beresford for the pay of his troops on account of the Portuguese subsidy he had been forced to take back 50,000 to keep the Spaniards together, and was even then forced to withhold 10,000 to prevent the British cavalry from perishing. Money to pay the Spaniards had sailed from Cadiz, but the vessel conveying it, and another containing the soldiers' great coats, were by the admiralty arrangements obliged to go first to Corunna, and neither had arrived there in January although the money had been ready in October. But the ship of war designed to carry it did

not arrive at Cadiz until the end of December. Sixteen thousand Spanish troops were thus rendered useless because without pay they could not be trusted in France."

"The commissary-in-chief in England had been regularly informed of the state of the supplies of the military chest and of the wants and prospects of the army, but those wants were not attended to. The monthly £100,000 spoken of as the maximum, even if it had been given regularly, would not cover the ordinary expenses of the troops, and there were besides the subsidies other outlays requiring ready money, such as meat for the soldiers, hospital expenses, commissariat labourers, and a variety of minor engagements. The Portuguese government had been reduced to a monthly sum of \$200,000 out of a subsidy of 2,000,000 sterling. The Spanish government got what they could out of a subsidy of 1,000,000. And when money was obtained for the government in the markets of Lisbon and Cadiz, it came not in due time, because, such were the admiralty arrangements, there were no ships to convey the treasure to the north coast of Spain. The whole sum which had passed through the military chest during the past year was scarcely more than £2,400,000, out of which part of the subsidies had been paid. This was quite inadequate, the government had desired him to push his operations to the Garonne during the winter, he was prepared to do so in every point excepting money, and he knew the greatest advantages would accrue from such a movement but he could not stir. His posts were already so distant from the coast that his means of transport were daily destroyed by the journeys, he had not a shilling to pay for anything in the country, and his credit was gone. He had been obliged privately to borrow the expense of a single courier sent to General Clinton. It was not his duty to suggest the fitting measures for relief, but it was obvious that an immediate and large supply from England was necessary and that ships should be provided to convey that which was obtained at Lisbon and Cadiz to the army."

Such was the denuded state of the victorious Wellington at a time when millions, and the worth of more millions were being poured by the English ministers into the continent; when every petty German sovereign, partisan, or robber, who raised a band, or a cry against Napoleon, was supplied to satiety. And all this time there was not in England one public salary reduced, one contract checked, one abuse corrected, one public servant rebuked for negligence; not a writer dared to expose the mischief lest he should be crushed by persecution; no minister ceased to claim and to receive the boasting congratulations of the Tories, no Whig had sense to discover, or spirit to denounce the iniquitous system, no voice of reprehension was heard from that selfish faction unless it were in sneering contempt of the general whose mighty genius sustained England under this load of folly.

Nor were these difficulties all that Lord Wellington had to contend with. We have seen that the Portuguese regency withheld his reinforcements even when he had provided transports for their conveyance. The Duke of York meanwhile insisted upon withdrawing his provisional battalions, which being all composed of old soldiers, the remains of regiments reduced by the casualties of war, were of more value in a winter campaign than three times their numbers of new men. With respect to the English militia regiments, he had no desire for them, because they possessed, he said, all the worst faults of the regulars and some peculiar to themselves besides. What he desired was that 8000 or 10,000 men should be drafted from them to fill up his ranks, he could then without much injury let his foreign battalions be taken away to reform a Hanoverian army on the continent; and this plan he was inclined to, because the Germans, brave and strong soldiers, were yet extremely addicted to desertion and in that particular set a bad example to the British: this suggestion was however, disregarded, and other reinforcements were promised to him.

But the most serious of all the secondary vexations he endured sprang from the conduct of the Spanish authorities. His hospitals and depôts were for the most part necessarily in the Spanish territories and principally at Santander. To avoid inconvenience to the inhabitants he had caused portable wooden houses to be brought from England in which to shelter his sick and wounded men; and he paid extravagantly and regularly for every aid demanded from the natives. Nevertheless

the natural arrogance or ill-will which produced the libels about St. Sebastian, the insolence of the minister of war, and the sullen insubordination of Morillo and other generals, broke out here also. After much underhand and irritating conduct at different times, the municipality, resolute to drive the hospitals from their town, suddenly, and under the false pretext that there was a contagious fever, placed all the British hospitals with their officers and attendants under quarantine. This was in the middle of January. Thirty thousand men had been wounded since June in the service of Spain, and the return was to make those wounded men close prisoners and drive their general to the necessity of fixing his hospitals in England. Vessels coming from Santander were thus rendered objects of dread, and the municipalities of the other ports, either really fearing or pretending to fear the contagion, would not suffer them to enter their waters. To such a height did this cowardice and villainy attain that the political chief of Guipuscoa, without giving any notice to Lord Wellington, shut all the ports of that province against vessels coming from Santander, and the Alcalde of Fuenterrabia endeavoured to prevent a Portuguese military officer from assisting an English vessel which was about to be and was afterwards actually cast away, because she came from Santander.

Now in consequence of the difficulties and dangers of navigating the Bay of Biscay in the winter, and the badness of the ports near the positions of the army, all the stores and provisions coming by sea went in the first instance to Santander, the only good port, there to wait until favourable opportunities occurred for reaching the more eastern harbours. Moreover all the provision magazines of the Spanish army were there, but this blow cut them off, the army was reduced to the smaller magazines at Passages, which could only last for a few days, and when that supply was expended Lord Wellington would have had no resource but to withdraw across the Pyrenees! "*Here," he exclaimed, "here are the consequences of the system by which these provinces are governed! Duties of the highest description, military operations, political interests, and the salvation of the state, are made to depend upon the caprices of a few ignorant individuals, who have adopted a measure unnecessary and harsh without advertent to its objects or consequences, and merely with a view to their personal interests and convenience."*

They carried it into execution also with the utmost hardness, caprice, and injustice, regardless of the loss of ships and lives which must follow, and finally desired Lord Wellington to relinquish the harbour and town of Santander altogether as a depôt! However, his vigorous remonstrances stopped this nefarious proceeding in time to avert the danger which it menaced.

Be it remembered now, that these dangers and difficulties and vexations, although related in succession, happened not one after another, but altogether; that it was when crossing the Bidassoa, breaking through the mountain fortifications of Soult, passing the Nive, fighting the battles in front of Bayonne, and when still greater and more intricate combinations were to be arranged, that all these vials of folly and enmity were poured upon his head. Who then shall refuse to admire the undaunted firmness, the unwearied temper and vigilance, the piercing judgment with which he steered his gallant vessel, and with a flowing sail, unhurt through this howling storm of passion, this tumultuous sea of folly.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN THE EASTERN PARTS OF SPAIN.

WHEN General Clinton succeeded Lord William Bentinck, his whole force, composed of the Anglo-Sicilians, Whittingham's and Sarzfield's Spaniards, and two battalions of Roche's division, did not furnish quite 19,000 men under arms. Copons, blockading Mequinenza, Lerida, and Monzon, and having garrisons in Cardona and the Seo d'Urgel, the only places in his possession, could not bring more than 9000 men into the field.* Elio had nominally 25,000, but this included Sarzfield's and Roche's troops, the greater part of which were with Clinton. It included likewise the bands of Villa Campa, Duran, and the Empecinado, all scattered in Castile, Aragon and Valencia, and acting according to the caprices of

* Appendix, No. 28.

their chiefs. His force, daily diminishing also from the extreme unhealthiness of the country about Tortoza, was scarcely sufficient to maintain the blockades of the French fortresses beyond the Ebro.

Copons' army having no base but the mountains about Vich and Monserrat, having no magazines or dépôts or place of arms, having very little artillery and scarcely any cavalry, lived as it could from day to day; in like manner lived Sarzfield's and Whittingham's troops, and Clinton's army was chiefly fed on salt provisions from the ships. The two former, having no means of transport, were unable to make even one day's march with ease, they were continually upon the point of starvation, and could never be reckoned as a moveable force. Nor indeed could the Anglo-Sicilians, owing to their scanty means of transport, make above two or three marches from the sea; and they were at this time more than usually hampered, being without pay and shut out from their principal dépôts at Gibraltar and Malta, by plague at the first and yellow fever at the second place. In fine, the courage and discipline of the British and Germans set aside, it would be difficult to find armies less efficient for an offensive campaign than those of the allies in Catalonia. Moreover Lord William Bentinck had been invested with the command of all the Spanish armies, but Clinton had only Whittingham's and Sarzfield's troops under him, and notwithstanding his constant endeavours to conciliate Copons, the indolence and incapacity of that general impeded or baffled all useful operations: and to these disqualifications he added an extreme jealousy of Eroles and Manso, men designated by the public voice as the most worthy of command.

This analysis shows that Elio, being entirely engaged in Valencia, and Sarzfield and Whittingham unprovided with the means of movement, the army of Copons and the Anglo-Sicilians, together furnishing, when the posts and escorts and the labourers employed on the fortifications of Taragona were deducted, not more than 18,000 men in line of battle, were the only troops to be counted on to oppose Suchet, who having 65,000 men, of which 56,000 were present under arms, could, without drawing a man from his garrisons, attack them with 30,000. But Copons and Clinton could not act together above a few days, because their bases and lines of retreat were on different sides. The Spaniard depended upon the mountains and plains of the interior for security and subsistence, the Englishman's base was Taragona and the fleet. Hence the only mode of combining on a single line was to make Valencia a common base, and throwing bridges over the Ebro, construct works on both sides to defend them. This was strongly recommended by Lord Wellington to Lord William and to Clinton; but the former had several times lost his bridges, partly from the rapidity of the stream, partly from the activity of the garrison of Tortoza. And for General Clinton the difficulty was enhanced by distance, because Taragona, where all his materials were deposited, was 60 miles from Amposta, and all his artificers were required to restore the defences of the former place. The blockade of Tortoza was therefore always liable to be raised, and the troops employed there exposed to a sudden and fatal attack, since Suchet, sure to separate the Anglo-Sicilians from Copons when he advanced, could penetrate between them; and while the former rallied at Taragona and the latter at Igualada, his march would be direct upon Tortoza. He could thus either carry off his strong garrison, or passing the Ebro by the bridge of the fortress, move without let or hindrance upon Peniscola, Saguntum, and Valencia, and driving Elio back upon Alicant, collect his garrisons and return too powerful to be meddled with.

In these circumstances Lord Wellington's opinion was, that the blockade of Tortoza should be given up and the two armies, acting on their own peculiar lines, the one from Taragona, the other from the mountains, harass in concert the enemy's flanks and rear, alternately if he attacked either, but together if he moved upon Tortoza. To besiege or blockade that place with safety it was necessary to throw two bridges over the Ebro below, to enable the armies to avoid Suchet, by either bank, when he should succour the place, as he was sure to do. But it was essential that Copons should not abandon Catalonia, and difficult for him to do so, wherefore it would be advisable to make Taragona the point of retreat for both armies in the first instance, after which they could separate and infest the French rear.

The difficulties of besieging Tortoza he thought insuperable, and he especially

recommended that they should be well considered beforehand, and if it was invested, that the troops should be entrenched around it. In fine, all his instructions tended towards defence, and were founded upon his conviction of the weak and dangerous position of the allies, yet he believed them to have more resources than they really had, and to be superior in number to the French. a great error, as I have already shown. Nothing, therefore, could be more preposterous than Suchet's alarm for the frontier of France at this time, and it is unquestionable that his personal reluctance was the only bar to aiding Soult either indirectly, by marching on Tortosa and Valencia, or directly, by adopting that marshal's great project of uniting the two armies in Aragon. So certain indeed is this that General Clinton, seeing the difficulties of his own situation, only retained the command from a strong sense of duty, and Lord Wellington, despairing of any advantage in Catalonia, recommended that the Anglo-Sicilian army should be broken up and employed in other places. The French general's inactivity was the more injurious to the interests of his sovereign, because any reverse or appearance of reverse to the allies would at this time have gone nigh to destroy the alliance between Spain and England; but personal jealousy, the preference given to local and momentary interest before general considerations, hurt the French cause at all periods in the Peninsula, and enabled the allies to conquer.

General Clinton had no thoughts of besieging Tortosa, his efforts were directed to the obtaining a secure place of arms, yet, despite of his intrinsic weakness, he resolved to show a confident front, hoping thus to keep Suchet at arm's length. In this view he endeavoured to render Taragona once more defensible, notwithstanding the 19 breaches which had been broken in its walls; the progress of the work was, however, tedious and vexatious, because he depended for his materials upon the Spanish authorities. Thus immersed in difficulties of all kinds he could make little change in his positions, which were generally about the Campo, Sarzfield's division only being pushed to Villafranca. Suchet meanwhile held the line of the Llobregat, and apparently to colour his refusal to join Soult, grounded on the great strength of the allies in Catalonia, he suffered General Clinton to remain in tranquillity.

Towards the end of October reports that the French were concentrating, for what purpose was not known, caused the English general, although Taragona was still indefensible, to make a forward movement. He dared not indeed provoke a battle, but unwilling to yield the resources which Villafranca and other districts occupied by the allies still offered, he adopted the resolution of pushing an advanced guard to the former place. He even fixed his head-quarters there, appearing ready to fight, yet his troops were so disposed in succession at Arbos, Vendrills and Torredembarra, that he could retreat without dishonour if the French advanced in force, or could concentrate at Villafranca in time to harass their flank and rear if they attempted to carry off their garrisons on the Segre. In this state of affairs Suchet made several demonstrations, sometimes against Copons, sometimes against Clinton, but the latter maintained his offensive attitude with firmness, and even in opposition to Lord Wellington's implied opinion that the line of the Ebro was the most suitable to his weakness; for he liked not to abandon Taragona, the repairs of which were now advancing, though slowly, to completion. His perseverance was crowned with success; he preserved the few resources left for the support of the Spanish troops, and furnished Suchet with that semblance of excuse which he desired for keeping aloof from Soult.

In this manner October and November were passed, but on the 1st of December the French general attempted to surprise the allies' cantonments at Villafranca, as he had before surprised them at Ordal. He moved in the same order. One column marched by San Sadurni on his right, another by Bejer and Avionet on his left, and the main body kept the great road. But he did not find Colonel Adam there. Clinton had blocked the Ordal so as to render a night surprise impossible, and the natural difficulties of the other roads delayed the flanking columns. Hence when the French reached Villafranca, Sarzfield was in full march for Igualada, and the Anglo-Sicilians, who had only three men wounded at one of the advanced posts, were on the strong ground about Arbos, where being joined by the supporting

divisions they offered battle ; but Suchet retired to the Llobregat, apparently so mortified by his failure that he has not even mentioned it in his "Memoirs."

Clinton now resumed his former ground, yet his embarrassments increased, and though he transferred two of Whittingham's regiments to Copons, and sent Roche's battalions back to Valencia, the country was so exhausted that the enduring constancy of the Spanish soldiers under privations alone enabled Sarzfield to remain in the field ; more than once that general, a man of undoubted firmness and courage, was upon the point of re-crossing the Ebro to save his soldiers from perishing of famine. Here, as in other parts, the Spanish government not only starved their troops but would not even provide a piece of ordnance or any stores for the defence of Taragona, now, by the exertions of the English general, rendered defensible. Nay ! when Admiral Hallowell, in conjunction with Quesada, the Spanish commodore at Port Mahon, brought some ship-guns from that place to the fortress, the minister of war, O'Donoju, expressed his disapprobation, observing with a sneer that the English might provide the guns wanting from the Spanish ordnance moved into Gibraltar by General Campbell when he destroyed the lines of San Roque !

The 9th, Suchet pushed a small corps by Bejer between the Ordal and Sitjes, and on the 10th surprised at the Ostel of Ordal an officer and 30 men of the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry. This disaster was the result of negligence. The detachment after patrolling to the front had dismounted without examining the buildings of the inn, and some French troopers who were concealed within immediately seized the horses and captured the whole party.

On the 17th, French troops appeared at Martorel, the Ordal, and Bejer, with a view to mask the march of a large convoy coming from Upper Catalonia to Barcelona ; they then resumed their former positions, and at the same time Soult's and Lord Wellington's respective letters, announcing the defection of the Nassau battalions in front of Bayonne, arrived. Lord Wellington's came first, and enclosed a communication from Colonel Kruse to his countryman, Colonel Meder, who was serving in Barcelona and as Kruse supposed willing to abandon the French. But when Clinton by the aid of Manso transmitted the letter to Meder, that officer handed it to General Habert, who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the command of the city. All the German regiments, principally cavalry, were immediately disarmed and sent to France. Severoli's Italians were at the same time recalled to Italy, and a number of French soldiers, selected to fill the wasted ranks of the imperial guards, marched with them ; 2000 officers and soldiers were likewise detached to the depôts of the interior to organize the conscripts of the new levy destined to reinforce the army of Catalonia. Besides these drafts 1000 gens-d'armes, hitherto employed on the Spanish frontier in aid of the regular troops, were withdrawn ; Suchet thus lost 7000 veterans, yet he had still an overwhelming power compared to the allies.

It was in this state of affairs that the Duke of San Carlos, bearing the treaty of Valençay, arrived secretly at the French head-quarters on his way to Madrid. Copons knew this, and it seems certain was only deterred from openly acceding to the views of the French emperor and concluding a military convention, by the decided conduct of the Cortes, and the ascendancy which Lord Wellington had obtained over him in common with the other Spanish officers ; an ascendancy which had not escaped Soult's sagacity, for he early warned the French minister that nothing could be expected from them while under the powerful spell of the English general. Meanwhile Clinton, getting information that the French troops were diminished in numbers, especially in front of Barcelona and on the Llobregat, proposed to pass that river and invest Barcelona if Copons, who was in the mountains, would undertake to provision Sarzfield's division and keep the French troops between Barcelona and Gerona in check. For this purpose he offered him the aid of a Spanish regiment of cavalry which Elio had lent for the operations in Catalonia ; but Copons, whether influenced by San Carlos' mission and his secret wishes for its success, or knowing that the enemy were really stronger than Clinton imagined, declared that he was unable to hold the French troops between Gerona and Barcelona in check, and that he could not provision either Sarzfield's division or the regiment of cavalry. He suggested instead of Clinton's plan, a combined attack

upon some of Suchet's posts on the Llobregat, promising to send Manso to Villafranca to confer upon the execution. Clinton's proposal was made early in January yet it was the middle of that month before Copons replied, and then he only sent Manso to offer the aid of his brigade in a combined attack upon 2000 French who were at Molino del Rey. It was, however, at last arranged that Manso should at day-break on the 16th seize the high ground above Molino, on the left of the Llobregat, to intercept the enemy's retreat upon Barcelona, while the Anglo-Sicilians fell upon them from the right bank.

Success depended upon Clinton's remaining quiet until the moment of execution, wherefore he could only use the troops immediately in hand about Villafranca, in all 6000 men with three pieces of artillery; but with these he made a night march of 18 miles, and was close to the ford of San Vicente about two miles below the fortified bridge of Molino del Rey before daylight. The French were tranquil and unsuspecting, and he anxiously but vainly awaited the signal of Manso's arrival. When the day broke, the French piquets at San Vicente describing his troops commenced a skirmish, and at the same time a column with a piece of artillery, coming from Molino, advanced to attack him thinking there was only a patrolling detachment to deal with, for he had concealed his main body. Thus pressed he opened his guns per force and crippled the French piece, whereupon the reinforcements retired hastily to the entrenchments at Molino; he could then easily have forced the passage at the ford and attacked the enemy's works in the rear, but this would not have ensured the capture of their troops, wherefore he still awaited Manso's arrival, relying on that partisan's zeal and knowledge of the country. He appeared at last, not, as agreed upon, at San Filieu, between Molino and Barcelona, but at Papiol above Molino, and the French immediately retreated by San Filieu. Sarzfield, and the cavalry, which Clinton now detached across the Llobregat, followed them hard, but the country was difficult, the distance short, and they soon gained a second entrenched camp above San Filieu. A small garrison remained in the masonry-works at Molino, General Clinton endeavoured to reduce them but his guns were not of a calibre to break the walls, and the enemy was strongly reinforced towards evening from Barcelona; whereupon Manso went off to the mountains, and Clinton returned to Villafranca, having killed and wounded about 180 French, and lost only 64 men, all Spaniards.

Manso's failure surprised the English general, because that officer, unlike the generality of his countrymen, was zealous, skilful, vigilant, modest, and humane, and a sincere co-operator with the British officers. He however soon cleared himself of blame, assuring Clinton that Copons, contrary to his previous declarations, had joined him with 4000 men, and taking the control of his troops not only commenced the march two hours too late, but without any reason halted for three hours on the way. Nor did that general offer any excuse or explanation of his conduct, merely observing, that the plan having failed, nothing more could be done and he must return to his mountainous asylum about Vich. A man of any other nation would have been accused of treachery, but with the Spaniards there is no limit to absurdity, and from their actions no conclusion can be drawn as to their motives.

The great events of the general war were now beginning to affect the struggle in Catalonia. Suchet, finding that Copons dared not agree to the military convention dependent upon the treaty of Valençay, resigned all thoughts of carrying off his garrisons beyond the Ebro, and secretly instructed the governor of Tortosa, that when his provisions, calculated to last until April, were exhausted, he should march upon Mequinenza and Lerida, unite the garrisons there to his own, and make way by Venasque into France. Meanwhile he increased the garrison of Barcelona to 8000 men, and prepared to take the line of the Fluvia; for the allied sovereigns were in France and Napoleon had recalled more of his cavalry and infantry, in all 10,000 men with 80 pieces of artillery, from Catalonia, desiring that they should march as soon as the results expected from the mission of San Carlos were felt by the allies. Suchet prepared the troops but proposed that instead of waiting for the uncertain result of San Carlos' mission, Ferdinand should himself be sent to Spain through Catalonia and be trusted on his faith to restore the garrisons in Valencia.

Then he said he could march with his whole army to Lyons which would be more efficacious than sending detachments. The restoration of Ferdinand was the emperor's great object, but this plausible proposition can only be viewed as a colourable counter-project to Soult's plan for a junction of the two armies in Bearn, since the emperor was undoubtedly the best judge of what was required for the warfare immediately under his own direction.

It was in the midst of these operations that Clinton attacked Molino del Rey, and as we have seen would but for the interference of Copons have stricken a great blow, which was however soon inflicted in another manner.

There was at this time in the French service a Spaniard of Flemish descent called Van Halen. This man, of fair complexion, handsome person, and a natural genius for desperate treasons, appears to have been at first attached to Joseph's court. After that monarch's retreat from Spain he was placed by the Duke de Feltre on Suchet's staff; but the French party was now a failing one and Van Halen only sought by some notable treachery to make his peace with his country. Through the medium of a young widow, who followed him without suffering their connection to appear, he informed Eroles of his object. He transmitted through the same channel regular returns of Suchet's force and other matters of interest, and at last having secretly opened Suchet's portfolio he copied the key of his cypher, and transmitted that also, with an intimation that he would now soon pass over and endeavour to perform some other service at the same time. The opportunity soon offered. Suchet went to Gerona to meet the duke of San Carlos, leaving Van Halen at Barcelona, and the latter immediately taking an escort of three hussars went to Granollers where the cuirassiers were quartered. Using the marshal's name he ordered them to escort him to the Spanish outposts, which being in the mountains could only be approached by a long and narrow pass where cavalry would be helpless. In this pass he ordered the troops to bivouac for the night, and when their colonel expressed his uneasiness, Van Halen quieted him and made a solitary mill their common quarters. He had before this, however, sent the widow to give Eroles information of the situation into which he would bring the troops, and now with anxiety awaited his attack; but the Spanish general failed to come, and at day-break Van Halen, still pretending he carried a flag of truce from Suchet, rode off with his first escort of hussars and a trumpeter to the Spanish lines. There he ascertained that the widow had been detained by the outposts and immediately delivered over his escort to their enemies, giving notice also of the situation of the cuirassiers with a view to their destruction, but they escaped the danger.

Van Halen and Eroles now forged Suchet's signature, and the former addressed letters in cypher to the governors of Tortosa, Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, telling them that the emperor, in consequence of his reverses, required large drafts of men from Catalonia, and had given Suchet orders to negotiate a convention by which the garrisons south of the Llobregat were to join the army with arms and baggage and followers. The result was uncertain, but if the treaty could not be effected the governors were to join the army by force, and they were therefore immediately to mine their principal bastions and be prepared to sally forth at an appointed time. The marches and points of junction were all given in detail, yet they were told that if the convention took place the marshal would immediately send an officer of his staff to them, with such verbal instructions as might be necessary. The document finished with deploring the necessity which called for the sacrifice of conquests achieved by the valour of the troops.

Spies and emissaries who act for both sides are common in all wars, but in the Peninsula so many pretended to serve the French and were yet true to the Spaniards, that to avoid the danger of betrayal Suchet had recourse to the ingenious artifice of placing a very small piece of light-coloured hair in the cyphered paper, the latter was then enclosed in a quill sealed and wrapped in lead. When received, the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of white paper and if the hair was discovered the communication was good, if not, the treachery was apparent, because the hair would escape the vigilance of uninitiated persons and be lost by any intermediate examination. Van Halen knew this secret also, and when his emissaries had returned after delivering the preparatory communication, he

proceeded in person with a forged convention, first to Tortosa, for Suchet has erroneously stated in his "Memoirs" that the primary attempts were made at Lerida and Mequinenza. He was accompanied by several Spanish officers, and by some French deserters dressed in the uniforms of the hussars he had betrayed to the Spanish outposts. The governor Robert, though a vigilant officer, was deceived and prepared to evacuate the place. During the night however a true emissary arrived with a letter from Suchet of later date than the forged convention. Robert then endeavoured to entice Van Halen into the fortress, but the other was too wary, and proceeded at once to Mequinenza and Lerida, where he completely overreached the governors and then went to Monzon.

This small fortress had now been besieged since the 28th of September, 1813, by detachments from the Catalan army and the bands from Aragon. Its means of defence were slight, but there was within a man of resolution and genius called St. Jacques. He was a Piedmontese by birth, and only a private soldier of engineers, but the commandant appreciating his worth was so modest and prudent as to yield the direction of the defence entirely to him. Abounding in resources, he met, and at every point baffled the besiegers who worked principally by mines, and being as brave as he was ingenious always led the numerous counter-attacks which he contrived to check the approaches above and below ground. The siege continued until the 18th of February when the subtle Van Halen arrived, and by his Spanish wiles obtained in a few hours what Spanish courage and perseverance had vainly striven to gain for 140 days. The commandant was suspicious at first, but when Van Halen suffered him to send an officer to ascertain that Lerida and Mequinenza were evacuated, he was beguiled like the others and marched to join the garrisons of those places.

Sir William Clinton had been informed of this project by Eroles as early as the 22nd of January, and though he did not expect any French general would be so egregiously misled, readily promised the assistance of his army to capture the garrisons on their march. But Suchet was now falling back upon the Fluvia, and Clinton, seeing the fortified line of the Llobregat weakened, and being uncertain of Suchet's real strength and designs, renewed his former proposal to Copons for a combined attack which should force the French general to discover his real situation and projects. Ere he could obtain an answer, the want of forage obliged him to refuse the assistance of the Spanish cavalry lent to him by Elio, and Sarzfield's division was reduced to its last ration. The French thus made their retreat unmolested, for Clinton's project necessarily involved the investment of Barcelona after passing the Llobregat, and the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry, being mounted on small Egyptian animals the greatest part of which were foundered or unserviceable from sand-cracks, a disease very common amongst the horses of that country, were too weak to act without the aid of Elio's horsemen. Moreover, as a division of infantry was left at Taragona awaiting the effect of Van Halen's wiles against Tortosa, the aid of Sarzfield's troops was indispensable.

Copons accepted the proposition towards the end of the month, the Spanish cavalry was then gone to the rear, but Sarzfield having with great difficulty obtained some provisions, the army was put in movement on the 3rd of February, and as Suchet was now near Gerona, it passed the Llobregat at the bridge of Molino del Rey without resistance. On the 5th Sarzfield's picquets were vigorously attacked at San Filieu by the garrison of Barcelona, he however, supported them with his whole division and being reinforced with some cavalry repulsed the French and pursued them to the walls. On the 7th the city was invested on the land side by Copons, who was soon aided by Manso; on the sea-board by Admiral Hallowell, who following the movements of the army with the fleet, blockaded the harbour with the *Castor* frigate, and anchored the *Fame*, a 74, off Mataro. On the 8th intelligence arrived of Van Halen's failure at Tortosa, but the blockade of Barcelona continued uninterrupted until the 16th, when Clinton was informed by Copons of the success at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon. The garrisons, he said, would march upon Igualada, and Eroles who, under pretence of causing the convention to be observed by the Somatenes, was to follow in their rear, proposed to undeceive and disarm them at that place. On the 17th, however, he sent notice that Martorel had been fixed upon in preference to Igualada for undeceiving and disarming the French,

and as they would be at the former place that evening, General Clinton was desired to send some of his troops there to ensure the success of the project.

This change of plan and the short warning, for Martorel was a long march from Barcelona, together with the doubts and embarrassments which Copons' conduct always caused, inclined the English general to avoid meddling with the matter at all; yet fearing that it would fail in the Spaniard's hands, he finally drafted a strong division of troops and marched in person to Martorel. There he met Copons, who now told him that the French would not pass Esparaguera that night, that Eroles was close in their rear, and another division of the Catalan army at Bispal blocking the bridge of Martorel. Clinton immediately undertook to pass the Llobregat, meet the French column, and block the road of San Sadurni; and he arranged with Copons the necessary precautions and signals.

About nine o'clock General Isidore Lamarque arrived with the garrisons at Martorel, followed at a short distance by Eroles. No other troops were to be seen and after a short halt the French continued their march on the right bank of the Llobregat, where the Barcelona road enters a narrow pass between the river and a precipitous hill. When they were completely entangled Clinton sent an officer to forbid their further progress and referred them to Copons who was at Martorel for an explanation, then giving the signal, all the heights around were instantly covered with armed men. It was in vain to offer resistance, and two generals, having 2600 men, four guns, and a rich military chest, capitulated, but upon conditions, which were granted and immediately violated with circumstances of great harshness and insult to the prisoners. The odium of this baseness, which was quite gratuitous, since the French, helpless in the defile, must have submitted to any terms, attaches entirely to the Spaniards. Clinton refused to meddle in any manner with the convention, he had not been a party to Van Halen's deceit, he appeared only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in the field which the Spaniards could not have subdued without his aid, he refused even to be present at any consultation previous to the capitulation, and notwithstanding an assertion to the contrary in Suchet's "Memoirs" no appeal on the subject from that marshal ever reached him.

During the whole of these transactions the infatuation of the French leaders was extreme. The chief of one of the battalions, more sagacious than his general, told Lamarque in the night of the 16th at Igualada that he was betrayed, at the same time urging him vainly to abandon his artillery and baggage and march in the direction of Vich, to which place they could force their way in despite of the Spaniards. It is remarkable also that Robert, when he had detected the imposture and failed to entice Van Halen into Tortosa, did not make a sudden sally upon him and the Spanish officers who were with him, all close to the works. And still more notable is it that the other governors, the more especially as Van Halen was a foreigner, did not insist upon the bearer of such a convention remaining to accompany their march. It has been well observed by Suchet that Van Halen's refusal to enter the gates was alone sufficient to prove his treachery.

The detachment recalled by Napoleon now moved into France, and in March was followed by a second column of equal force which was at first directed upon Lyons, but the arrival of Lord Wellington's troops on the Garonne caused, as we shall hereafter find, a change in its destination. Meanwhile by order of the minister at war, Suchet entered into a fresh negotiation with Copons, to deliver up all the fortresses held by his troops except Figueras and Rosas, provided the garrisons were allowed to rejoin the army. The Spanish commander assented and the authorities generally were anxious to adopt the proposal, but the regency referred the matter to Lord Wellington, who rejected it without hesitation, as tending to increase the force immediately opposed to him. Thus baffled and overreached at all points, Suchet destroyed the works of Olot, Besalu, Bascara, and Palamos, dismantled Gerona and Rosas, and concentrated his forces at Figueras. He was followed by Copons, but though he still had 12,000 veterans besides the national guards and depôts of the French departments, he continued most obstinately to refuse any aid to Soult, and yet remained inactive himself. The blockade of Barcelona was therefore maintained by the allies without difficulty or danger, save what arose from their commissariat embarrassments and the efforts of the garrison.

On the 23rd of February Habert made a sally with six battalions, thinking to surprise Sarzfield, he was however beaten, and Colonel Meder, the Nassau officer who had before shown his attachment to the French cause, was killed. The blockade was thus continued until the 12th of March, when Clinton received orders from Lord Wellington to break up his army, send the foreign troops to Lord William Bentinck in Sicily, and march with the British battalions by Tudela to join the great army in France. Clinton at first prepared to obey, but Suchet was still in strength, Copons appeared to be provoking a collision, though he was quite unable to oppose the French in the field; and to maintain the blockade of Barcelona in addition, after the Anglo-Sicilians should depart, was quite impossible. The latter therefore remained, and on the 19th of March King Ferdinand reached the French frontier.

This event, which happening five or even three months before, would probably have changed the fate of the war, was now of little consequence. Suchet first proposed to Copons to escort Ferdinand with the French army to Barcelona and put him in possession of that place, but this the Spanish general dared not assent to, for he feared Lord Wellington and his own regency, and was closely watched by Colonel Coffin who had been placed near him by Sir William Clinton. The French general then proposed to the king a convention for the recovery of his garrisons, to which Ferdinand agreed with the facility of a false heart. His great anxiety was to reach Valencia, because the determination of the Cortes to bind him to conditions before he recovered his throne was evident, the Spanish generals were apparently faithful to the Cortes, and the British influence was sure to be opposed to him while he was burthened with French engagements.

Suchet had been ordered to demand securities for the restoration of his garrisons previous to Ferdinand's entry into Spain, but time was precious, and he determined to escort him at once with the whole French army to the Fluvia, having first received a promise to restore the garrisons. He also retained his brother, Don Carlos, as a hostage for their return; but even this security he relinquished when the king, in a second letter, written from Gerona, solemnly confirmed his first promise. On the 24th, therefore, in presence of the Catalan and French armies, ranged in order of battle on either bank of the Fluvia, Ferdinand passed that river, and became once more king of Spain. He had been a rebellious son in the palace, a plotting traitor at Aranjuez, a dastard at Bayonne, an effeminate, superstitious, fawning slave at Valençay, and now, after six years' captivity, he returned to his own country, an ungrateful and cruel tyrant. He would have been the most odious and contemptible of princes if his favourite brother, Don Carlos, had not existed. Reaching the camp at Barcelona on the 30th, he dined with Sir William Clinton, reviewed the allied troops, and then proceeded first to Zaragoza, and finally to Valencia. Marshal Suchet says the honours of war were paid to him by all the French garrisons, but this was not the case at Barcelona; no man appeared, even on the walls. After this event the French marshal repassed the Pyrenees, leaving only one division at Figueras, and Clinton proceeded to break up his army, but was again stopped by the vexatious conduct of Copons, who would not relieve the Anglo-Sicilians at the blockade, nor, indeed, take any notice of the English general's communications on the subject before the 11th of April. On the 14th, however, the troops marched, part to embark at Taragona, part to join Lord Wellington. Copons then became terrified lest General Robert, abandoning Tortosa, should join Habert at Barcelona, and enclose him between them and the division at Figueras, wherefore Clinton once more halted to protect the Spaniards.

Copons had indeed some reason to fear, for Habert about this time received, and transmitted to Robert, the emperor's orders to break out of Tortosa and gain Barcelona, instead of passing by the valley of Venasque, as Suchet had before prescribed; the 12,000 men thus united were then to push into France. This letter was intercepted, copied, and sent on to Robert, whose answer being likewise intercepted, showed that he was not prepared, and had no inclination for the enterprise. This seen, Clinton continued his embarkation, and thus completed his honourable but difficult task. With a force weak in numbers, and nearly destitute of everything that constitutes strength in the field, he had maintained a forward and dangerous position for eight months; and though Copons' incapacity and ill-

will, and other circumstances beyond control, did not permit him to perform any brilliant actions, he occupied the attention of a very superior army, suffered no disaster, and gained some advantages.

While his troops were embarking, Habert, in furtherance of the emperor's project, made a vigorous sally on the 18th, and though repulsed with loss, he killed or wounded 800 Spaniards. This was a lamentable combat. The war had terminated long before, yet intelligence of the cessation of hostilities only arrived four days later. Habert was now repeatedly ordered by Suchet and the Duke of Feltré to give up Barcelona; but, warned by the breach of former conventions, he held it until he was assured that all the French garrisons in Valencia had returned safely to France, which did not happen until the 28th of May, when he yielded up the town and marched to his own country. This event, the last operation of the whole war, released the Duchess of Bourbon. She and the old Prince of Conti had been retained prisoners in the city during the Spanish struggle. The prince died early in 1814, the duchess survived, and now returned to France.

How strong Napoleon's hold of the Peninsula had been, how little the Spaniards were able of their own strength to shake him off, was now apparent to all the world. For notwithstanding Lord Wellington's great victories, notwithstanding the invasion of France, six fortresses, Figueras, Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum, and Denia were recovered, not by arms, but by the general peace. And but for the deceptions of Van Halen, there would have been three others similarly situated in the eastern parts alone, while in the north Santona was recovered in the same manner; for neither the long blockade nor the active operations against that place, of which some account shall now be given, caused it to surrender.

The site of Santona is one of those promontories frequent on the coast of Spain which, connected by low sandy necks with the main land, offer good harbours. Its waters, deep and capacious, furnished two bays. The outer one, or roadstead, was commanded by the works of Santona itself, and by those of Laredo, a considerable town, lying at the foot of a mountain, on the opposite point of the harbour. A narrow entrance to the inner port was between a spit of land, called the Puntal, and the low isthmus on which the town of Santona is built. The natural strength of the ground was very great, but the importance of Santona arose from its peculiar situation as a harbour and fort of support in the *Montaña de Santander*. By holding it, the French shut out the British shipping from the only place which, being defensible on the land side, furnished a good harbour between San Sebastian and Coruña; they thus protected the sea-flank of their long line of invasion, obtained a port of refuge for their own coasting vessels, and a post of support for the moveable columns sent to chase the *Partidas*, which abounded in that rough district. And when the battle of Vittoria placed the allies on the *Bidasoa*, from Santona issued forth a number of privateers who, as we have seen, intercepted Lord Wellington's supplies, and interrupted his communication with Coruña, Oporto, Lisbon, and even with England.

The advantages of possessing Santona were felt early by both parties; the French seized it at once, and although the Spaniards recovered possession of it in 1810, they were driven out again immediately. The English ministers then commenced deliberating and concocting extensive, and for that reason injudicious and impracticable, plans of offensive operations, to be based upon the possession of Santona; meanwhile Napoleon fortified it, and kept it to the end of the war. In August, 1812, its importance was better understood by the Spaniards, and it was continually menaced by the numerous bands of Biscay, the Asturias, and the *Montaña*. Fourteen hundred men, including the crew of a corvette, then formed its garrison; the works were not very strong, and only 40 pieces of artillery were mounted. Napoleon, however, foreseeing the disasters which Marmont was provoking, sent General Lameth, a chosen officer, to take charge of the defence. He immediately augmented the works, and constructed advanced redoubts on two hills, called the *Grumo* and the *Brusco*, which, like San Bartolomeo at San Sebastian, closed the isthmus inland. He also erected a strong redoubt and block-house on the Puntal, to command the straits, and to sweep the roadstead in

conjunction with the fort of Laredo, which he repaired. This done, he formed several minor batteries, and cast a chain to secure the narrow entrance to the inner harbour, and then covered the rocky promontory of Santana itself with defensive works.

Some dismantled guns remained in the arsenal, others, which had been thrown into the sea by the Spaniards when they took the place in 1810, were fished up, and the garrison, felling trees in the vicinity, made carriages for them; by these means 120 guns were finally placed in battery, and there was abundance of ammunition. The corvette was not sea-worthy, but the governor established a flotilla of gun-boats and other small craft, which sallied forth whenever the signal-posts on the headland gave notice of the approach of vessels liable to attack, or of French coasters bringing provisions and stores. The garrison had previously lost many men, killed in a barbarous manner by the Partidas, and in revenge, they never gave quarter to their enemies. Lameth, shocked at their inhumanity, resolutely forbade, under pain of death, any further reprisals, rewarded those men who brought in prisoners, and treated the latter with gentleness; the Spaniards discovering this, also changed their system, and civilization resumed its rights. From this time military operations were incessant; the garrison sometimes made sallies, sometimes sustained partial attacks, sometimes aided the moveable columns employed by the different generals of the army of the north to put down the partisan warfare, which was seldom even lulled in the Montaña.

After the battle of Vittoria Santana, being left to its own resources, was invested on the land side by a part of the troops composing the Gallician or fourth Spanish army. It was blockaded on the sea-board by the English ships of war, but only nominally, for the garrison received supplies, and the flotilla vexed Lord Wellington's communications, took many of his store-ships and other vessels, delayed his convoys, and added greatly to the difficulties of his situation. The land blockade thus also became a nullity, and the Spanish officers complained with reason that they suffered privations and endured hardships without an object. These complaints and his own embarrassments, caused by Lord Melville's neglect, induced Lord Wellington in October, 1813, when he could ill spare troops, to employ a British brigade under Lord Aylmer in the attack of Santana; the project, for reasons already mentioned, was not executed, but an English engineer, Captain Wells, was sent with some sappers and miners to quicken the operations of the Spanish officers, and his small detachment has been by a French writer magnified into a whole battalion.

Captain Wells remained six months, for the Spanish generals though brave and willing were tainted with the national defect of procrastination. The siege made no progress until the 13th of February, 1814, when General Barco the Spanish commander carried the fort of Puntal in the night by escalade, killing 30 men and taking 23 prisoners, yet the fort being under the heavy fire of the Santana works was necessarily dismantled and abandoned the next morning. A picquet was however left there and the French opened their batteries, but as this did not dislodge the Spaniards, Lameth embarked a detachment and recovered his fort. However, in the night of the 21st, General Barco ordered an attack to be made with a part of his force upon the outposts of El Grumo and Brusco, on the Santana side of the harbour, and led the remainder of his troops in person to storm the fort and town of Laredo. He carried the latter and also some outer defences of the fort, which being on a rock was only to be approached by an isthmus so narrow as to be closed by a single fortified house. In the assault of the body of this fort Barco was killed and the attack ceased, but the troops retained what they had won and established themselves at the foot of the rock where they were covered from fire. The attack on the other side, conducted by Colonel Llorente, was successful; he carried the smallest of the two outworks on the Brusco, and closely invested the largest after an ineffectual attempt by mine and assault to take it. A large breach was however made and the commandant, seeing he could no longer defend his post, valiantly broke through the investment and gained the work of the Grumo. He was however aided by the appearance on the isthmus of a strong column which sallied at the same time from the works on the Santana promontory, and the next day the Grumo itself was abandoned by the French.

Captain Wells, who had been wounded at the Puntal escalade, now strenuously urged the Spaniards to crown the counter-scarp of the fort at Laredo and attack vigorously, but they preferred establishing four field-pieces to batter it in form at the distance of 600 yards. These guns, as might be expected, were dismounted the moment they began to fire, and thus corrected, the Spanish generals committed the direction of the attack to Wells. He immediately opened a heavy musketry fire on the fort to stifle the noise of his workmen, then pushing trenches up the hill close to the counter-scarp in the night, he was proceeding to burst open the gate with a few field-pieces and to cut down the palisades, when the Italian garrison, whose muskets from constant use had become so foul that few would go off, mutinied against their commander and making him a prisoner surrendered the place. This event gave the allies the command of the entrance to the harbour, and Lameth offered to capitulate in April upon condition of returning to France with his garrison. Lord Wellington refused the condition, Santona therefore remained a few days longer in possession of the enemy, and was finally evacuated at the general cessation of hostilities.

Having now terminated the narrative of all military and political events which happened in the Peninsula, the reader will henceforth be enabled to follow without interruption the events of the war in the south of France, which shall be continued in the next book.

BOOK XXIV.

CHAPTER I.

LORD WELLINGTON'S difficulties have been described. Those of his adversary were even more embarrassing because the evil was at the root; it was not misapplication of power but the want of power itself which paralyzed Soult's operations. Napoleon trusted much to the effect of his treaty with Ferdinand, who, following his intentions, should have entered Spain in November, but the intrigues to retard his journey continued, and though Napoleon, when the refusal of the treaty by the Spanish government became known, permitted him to return without any conditions, as thinking his presence would alone embarrass and perhaps break the English alliance with Spain, he did not as we have seen arrive until March. How the emperor's views were frustrated by his secret enemies is one of the obscure parts of French history at this period, which time may possibly clear but probably only with a feeble and uncertain light. For truth can never be expected in the memoirs, if any should appear, of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other politicians of their stamp, whose plots rendered his supernatural efforts to rescue France from her invaders abortive. Meanwhile there is nothing to check and expose the political and literary empirics who never fail on such occasions to poison the sources of history.

Relying upon the effect which the expected journey of Ferdinand would produce, and pressed by the necessity of augmenting his own weak army, Napoleon gave notice to Soult that he must ultimately take from him two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The undecided nature of his first battle at Brienne caused him to enforce this notice in the beginning of February, but he had previously sent imperial commissaries to the different departments of France, with instructions to hasten the new conscription, to form national and urban guards, to draw forth all the resources of the country, and to aid the operations of the armies by the action of the people. These measures, however, failed generally in the south. The urban cohorts were indeed readily formed as a means of police, and the conscription was successful, but the people remained sullen and apathetic; and the civil commissaries are said to have been, with some exceptions, pompous, declamatory, and affecting great state and dignity without energy and activity. Ill-will was also produced by the vexatious and corrupt conduct of the subordinate government agents, who seeing in the general distress and confusion a good opportunity to forward their personal interests, oppressed the people for their own profit. This it was easy to do, because the extreme want of money rendered requisitions unavoidable, and under the confused direction of civilians, partly ignorant and unused to difficult times, partly corrupt, and partly disaffected to the emperor, the abuses inevitably attendant upon such a system were numerous, and to the people so offensive, that numbers to avoid them, passed with their carts and utensils into the lines of the allies. An official letter written from Bayonne at this period runs thus: "The English general's policy and the good discipline he maintains does us more harm than ten battles. Every peasant wishes to be under his protection."

Another source of anger was Soult's works near Bayonne, where the richer inhabitants could not bear to have their country villas and gardens destroyed by the engineer, he who spares not for beauty or for pleasure where his military traces are crossed. The merchants, a class nearly alike in all nations, with whom profit stands for country, had been with a few exceptions long averse to Napoleon's policy, which from necessity interfered with their commerce. And this feeling must have been very strong in Bayonne and Bordeaux, for one Batbedat, a banker of

the former place, having obtained leave to go to St. Jean de Luz, under pretence of settling the accounts of English officers, prisoners of war, to whom he had advanced money, offered Lord Wellington to supply his army with various commodities and even provide money for bills on the English treasury. In return he demanded licenses for 20 vessels to go from Bordeaux, Rochelle, and Mants, to St. Jean de Luz, and they were given on condition that he should not carry back colonial produce. The English navy, however, showed so little inclination to respect them, that the banker and his coadjutors hesitated to risk their vessels, and thus saved them, for the English ministers refused to sanction the licenses and rebuked their general.

During these events the partisans of the Bourbons, coming from Brittany and La Vendée, spread themselves all over the south of France and entered into direct communication with Lord Wellington. One of the celebrated family of La Roche Jacquelin arrived at his head-quarters, Bernadotte sent an agent to those parts, and the Count of Grammont, then serving as a captain in the British cavalry, was at the desire of the Marquis de Maillos, another of the malcontents, sent to England to call the princes of the house of Bourbon forward. Finally the Duke of Angoulême arrived suddenly at the head-quarters, and he was received with respect in private though not suffered to attend the movements of the army. The English general, indeed, being persuaded that the great body of the French people, especially in the south, were inimical to Napoleon's government, was sanguine as to the utility of encouraging a Bourbon party. Yet he held his judgment in abeyance, sagaciously observing that he could not come to a safe conclusion merely from the feelings of some people in one corner of France; and as the allied sovereigns seemed backward to take the matter in hand unless some positive general movement in favour of the Bourbons was made, and there were negotiations for peace actually going on, it would be, he observed, unwise and ungenerous to precipitate the partisans of the fallen house into a premature outbreak and then leave them to the vengeance of the enemy.

That Lord Wellington should have been convinced the prevailing opinion was against Napoleon is not surprising, because every appearance at the time would seem to prove it so; and certain it is that a very strong Bourbon party, and one still stronger averse to the continuation of war, existed. But in civil commotions nothing is more dangerous, nothing more deceitful, than the outward show and declarations on such occasions. The great mass of men in all nations are only endowed with moderate capacity and spirit, and as their thoughts are intent upon the preservation of their families and property they must bend to circumstances; thus fear and suspicion, ignorance, baseness, and good feeling, all combine to urge men in troubled times to put on the mask of enthusiasm for the most powerful, while selfish knaves ever shout with the loudest. Let the scene change and the multitude will turn with the facility of a weathercock. Lord Wellington soon discovered that the Count of Viel Chastel, Bernadotte's agent, while pretending to aid the Bourbons was playing a double part, and only one year after this period Napoleon returned from Elba, and neither the presence of the Duke of Angoulême, nor the energy of the duchess, nor all the activity of their partisans, could raise in this very country more than the semblance of an opposition to him. The tricolor was everywhere hoisted and the Bourbon party vanished. And this was the true test of national feeling, because in 1814 the white colours were supported by foreign armies, and misfortune had bowed the great democratic chief to the earth; but when rising again in his wondrous might he came back alone from Elba, the poorer people, with whom only patriotism is ever really to be found, and that because they are poor and therefore unsophisticated, crowded to meet and hail him as a father. Not because they held him entirely blameless. Who born of woman is? They demanded redress of grievances even while they clung instinctively to him as their stay and protection against the locust tyranny of aristocracy.

There was, however, at this period in France enough of discontent, passion and intrigue, enough of treason, and enough of grovelling spirit in adversity, added to the natural desire of escaping the ravages of war, a desire so carefully fostered by the admirable policy of the English general, as to render the French general's

position extremely difficult and dangerous. Nor is it the least remarkable circumstance of this remarkable period, that while Soult expected relief by the Spaniards falling away from the English alliance, Lord Wellington received from the French secret and earnest warnings to beware of some great act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards. It was at this period also that Morillo and other generals encouraged their soldiers' licentiousness, and displayed their own ill-will by sullen discontent and captious complaints, while the civil authorities disturbed the communications and made war in their fashion against the hospitals and magazines.

His apprehensions and vigilance are plainly to be traced in his correspondence. Writing about General Copons, he says, "his conduct is quite unjustifiable, both in concealing what he knew of the Duke de San Carlos' arrival and the nature of his mission." In another letter he observes, that the Spanish military people about himself desired peace with Napoleon according to the treaty of Valençay; that they all had some notion of what had occurred, and yet had been quite silent about it; that he had repeated intelligence from the French of some act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards; that several persons of that nation had come from Bayonne to circulate reports of peace, and charges against the British which he knew would be well received on that frontier; that he had arrested a man calling himself an agent of and actually bearing a letter of credence from Ferdinand.

But the most striking proof of the alarm he felt was his great satisfaction at the conduct of the Spanish government in rejecting the treaty brought by San Carlos and Palafox. Sacrificing all his former great and just resentment, he changed at once from an enemy to a friend of the regency, supported the members of it even against the serviles, spoke of the matter as being the most important concern of all that had engaged his attention, and when the Count of La Bispa, the deadly enemy of the regency, proposed some violent and decided action of hostility, which a few weeks before would have been received with pleasure, he checked and softened him, observing, that the conduct of the government about the treaty should content every Spaniard, that it was not possible to act with more frankness and loyalty, and that they had procured honour for themselves and for their nation not only in England, but all over Europe. Such is the light mood in which words are applied by public men, even by the noblest and greatest, when their wishes are fulfilled. This glorious and honourable conduct of the regency, was simply a resolution to uphold their personal power, and that of their faction, both of which would have been destroyed by the arrival of the king.

Napoleon, hoping much from the effect of these machinations not only intimated to Soult, as I have already shown, that he would require 10,000 of his infantry immediately, but that twice that number, with a division of cavalry, would be called away if the Spaniards fell off from the English alliance. The Duke of Dalmatia then foreseeing the ultimate result of his own operations against Wellington, conceived a vast general plan of action which showed how capable a man he was to treat the greatest questions of military policy.

"Neither his numbers nor means of supply, after Wellington had gained the banks of the Adour above Bayonne, would, he said, suffice to maintain his positions covering that fortress and menacing the allies' right flank; the time therefore approached when he must, even without a reduction of force, abandon Bayonne to its own resources and fight his battles on the numerous rivers which run with concentric courses from the Pyrenees to the Adour. Leval's and Boyer's divisions of infantry were to join the grand army on the eastern frontier, Abbé's division was to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne and its camp to 14,000 men, but he considered this force too great for a simple general of division, and wished to give it to General Reille, whose corps would be broken up by the departure of the detachments. That officer was however altogether averse, and as an unwilling commander would be half beaten before the battle commenced, he desired that Count D'Erlon should be appointed in Reille's place.

"The active army remaining could not then be expected to fight the allies in pitched battles, and he therefore recommended the throwing it as a great partisan corps on the left, touching always upon the Pyrenees and ready to fall upon Lord Wellington's flank and rear if he should penetrate into France. Clausel, a native of

those parts and speaking the country language, was by his military qualities and knowledge the most suitable person to command. General Reille could then march with the troops called to the great army, and as there would be nothing left for him, Soult, to do in these parts, he desired to be employed where he could aid the emperor with more effect. This he pressed urgently because, notwithstanding the refusal of the Cortes to receive the treaty of Valençay, it was probable the war on the eastern frontier would oblige the emperor to recall all the troops designated. It would then become imperative to change from a regular to an irregular warfare, in which a numerous corps of partisans would be more valuable than the shadow of a regular army without value or confidence, and likely to be destroyed in the first great battle. For these partisans it was necessary to have a central power and director. Clausel was the man most fitted for the task. He ought to have under his orders all the generals who were in command in the military departments between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, with power to force all the inhabitants to take arms and act under his directions.

"I am sensible," he continued, "that this system, one of the least unhappy consequences of which would be to leave the enemy apparently master of all the country between the mountains and the Garonne, can only be justified by the necessity of forming an army in the centre of France sufficiently powerful to fend off the multitude of our enemies from the capital; but if Paris falls all will be lost, whereas if it be saved the loss of a few large towns in the south can be repaired. I propose then to form a great army in front of Paris by a union of all the disposable troops of the armies on the different frontiers, and at the same time to spread what remains of the latter as partisans wherever the enemy penetrates or threatens to penetrate. All the marshals of France, the generals and other officers, either in activity or in retirement, who shall not be attached to the great central army, should then repair to their departments to organize the partisan corps and bring those not actively useful as such up to the great point of union, and they should have military power to make all men able to bear arms find them at their own expense." "This measure is revolutionary but will infallibly produce important results, while none or at least a very feeble effect will be caused by the majority of the imperial commissioners already sent to the military divisions. They are grand persons, they temporize, make proclamations and treat everything as civilians instead of acting with vigour to obtain promptly a result which would astonish the world; for notwithstanding the cry to the contrary, the resources of France are not exhausted, what is wanted is to make those who possess resources use them for the defence of the throne and the emperor."

Having thus explained his views, he again requested to be recalled to Paris to serve near the emperor, but declared that he was ready to obey any order and serve in any manner; all he demanded was clear instructions with reference to the events that might occur. 1st. What he should do if the treaty arrangements with Ferdinand had no effect, and the Spanish troops remained with Lord Wellington. 2nd. If those troops retired and the British, seeing the French weakened by detachments, should alone penetrate into France. 3rd. If the changes in Spain should cause the allies to retire altogether.

Such was Soult's plan of action, but his great project was not adopted and the emperor's reasons for neglecting it have not been made known. Nor can the workings of that capacious mind be judged of without a knowledge of all the objects and conditions of his combinations. Yet it is not improbable that at this period he did not despair of rejecting the allies beyond the Rhine either by force of arms, by negotiation, or by working upon the family pride of the emperor of Austria. With this hope he would be naturally averse to incur the risk of a civil war by placing France under martial law, or of reviving the devouring fire of revolution which it had been his object for so many years to quell; and this is the more probable because it seems nearly certain that one of his reasons for replacing Ferdinand on the Spanish throne was his fear lest the republican doctrines which had gained ground in Spain should spread to France. Was he wrong? The fierce democrat will answer, Yes! But the man who thinks that real liberty was never attained under a single unmixed form of government giving no natural vent to the swelling pride of honour birth or

riches; those who measure the weakness of pure republicanism by the miserable state of France at home and abroad when Napoleon by assuming power saved her; those who saw America with all her militia and her licentious liberty unable to prevent 3000 British soldiers from passing 3000 miles of ocean and burning her capital, will hesitate to condemn him. And this without detriment to the democratic principle which in substance may and should always govern under judicious forms. Napoleon early judged, and the event has proved he judged truly, that the democratic spirit of France, however violent, was unable to overbear the aristocratic and monarchic tendencies of Europe; wisely therefore, while he preserved the essence of the first by fostering equality, he endeavoured to blend it with the other two; thus satisfying as far as the nature of human institutions would permit the conditions of the great problem he had undertaken to solve. His object was the reconstruction of the social fabric which had been shattered by the French revolution, mixing with the new materials all that remained of the old sufficiently unbroken to build with again. If he failed to render his structure stable it was because his design was misunderstood, and the terrible passions let loose by the previous stupendous explosions were too mighty even for him to compress.

To have accepted Soult's project would have been to endanger his work, to save himself at the expense of his system, and probably to plunge France again into the anarchy from which he had with so much care and labour drawn her. But, as I have before said, and it is true, Napoleon's ambition was for the greatness and prosperity of France, for the regeneration of Europe, for the stability of the system which he had formed with that end, never for himself personally; and hence it is that the multitudes of many nations instinctively revere his memory. And neither the monarch, nor the aristocrat, dominant though they be by his fall, feel themselves so easy in their high places as to rejoice much in their victory.

Whatever Napoleon's motive was, he did not adopt Soult's project, and in February two divisions of infantry and Trielhard's cavalry, with many batteries, were withdrawn. Two thousand of the best soldiers were also selected to join the imperial guards, and all the gens-d'armes were sent to the interior. The total number of old soldiers left, did not, including the division of General Paris, exceed 40,000, exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne and other posts, and the conscripts, beardless youths, were for the most part unfit to enter the line, nor were there enough of muskets in the arsenals to arm them. It is remarkable also, as showing how easily military operations may be affected by distant operations, that Soult expected and dreaded at this time the descent of a great English army upon the coast of La Vendée, led thereto by intelligence of an expedition preparing in England, under Sir Thomas Graham, really to aid the Dutch revolt.

While the French general's power was thus diminished, Lord Wellington's situation was as suddenly ameliorated. First by the arrival of reinforcements, next by the security he felt from the rejection of the treaty of Valençay, lastly by the approach of better weather, and the acquisition of a very large sum in gold, which enabled him not only to put his Anglo-Portuguese in activity, but also to bring the Spaniards again into line with less danger of their plundering the country. During the forced cessation of operations he had been actively engaged preparing the means to enter France with power and security, sending before him the fame of a just discipline and a wise consideration for the people who were likely to fall under his power, for there was nothing he so much dreaded as the partisan and insurgent warfare proposed by Soult. The peasants of Baygorry and Bidarray had done him more mischief than the French army, and his terrible menace of destroying their villages; and hanging all the population he could lay his hands upon if they ceased not their hostility, marks his apprehensions in the strongest manner. Yet he left all the local authorities free to carry on the internal government, to draw their salaries, and raise the necessary taxes in the same mode and with as much tranquillity as if perfect peace prevailed; he opened the ports and drew a large commerce which served to support his own army and engage the mercantile interests in his favour; he established many sure channels for intelligence, political and military, and would have extended his policy further and to more advantage if the English ministers had not so abruptly and ignorantly interfered with his proceedings. Finally, foreseeing

that the money he might receive would, being in foreign coin, create embarrassment, he adopted an expedient which he had before practised in India to obviate this. Knowing that in a British army a wonderful variety of knowledge and vocations good and bad may be found, he secretly caused the coiners and die-sinkers amongst the soldiers to be sought out, and once assured that no mischief was intended them, it was not difficult to persuade them to acknowledge their peculiar talents. With these men he established a secret mint at which he coined gold Napoleons, marking them with a private stamp and carefully preserving their just fineness and weight with a view of enabling the French government, when peace should be established, to call them in again. He thus avoided all the difficulties of exchange, and removed a very fruitful source of quarrels and ill-will between the troops and the country people and shopkeepers ; for the latter are always fastidious in taking and desirous of abating the current worth of strange coin, and the former attribute to fraud any declination from the value at which they receive their money. This sudden increase of the current coin tended also to diminish the pressure necessarily attendant upon troubled times.

Nor was his provident sagacity less eminently displayed in purely military matters than in his administrative and political operations. During the bad weather he had formed large magazines at the ports, examined the course of the Adour, and carefully meditated upon his future plans. To penetrate into France and rally a great Bourbon party under the protection of his army was the system he desired to follow ; and though the last point depended upon the political proceedings and successes of the allied sovereigns, the military operations most suitable at the moment did not clash with it. To drive the French army from Bayonne and either blockade or besiege that place were the first steps in either case. But this required extensive and daring combinations. For the fortress and its citadel, comprising in their circuit the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, could not be safely invested with less than three times the number necessary to resist the garrison at any one point, because the communications of the invested being short, internal, and secure, those of the investors external, difficult, and unsafe, it behoved that each division should be able to resist a sally of the whole garrison. Hence, though reduced to the lowest point, the whole must be so numerous as seriously to weaken the forces operating towards the interior.

How and where to cross the Adour with a view to the investment was also a subject of solicitude. It was a great river, with a strong current, and well guarded by troops and gun-boats above Bayonne ; still greater was it below the town ; there the ebb tide runs seven miles an hour, there also there were gun-boats, a sloop of war, and several merchant vessels which could be armed and employed to interrupt the passage. The number of pontoons or other boats required to bridge the stream across, either above or below, and the carriage of them, an immense operation in itself, would inevitably give notice of the design and render it abortive, unless the French army were first driven away, and even then the garrison of Bayonne, nearly 15,000 strong, might be sufficient to baffle the attempt. Nevertheless, in the face of these difficulties he resolved to pass, the means adopted being proportionate to the greatness of the design.

He considered that, besides the difficulty of bringing the materials across the Nive and through the deep country on each side of that river, he could not throw his bridge above Bayonne without first driving Soult entirely from the confluents of the Adour and from the Adour itself ; that when he had effected this his own communications between the bridge and his magazines at the sea-ports would still be difficult and unsafe, because his convoys would have a flank march, passing the Nive as well as the Adour and liable to interruption from the overflowing of those rivers ; finally, that his means of transport would be unequal to the wear and tear of the deep roads and be interrupted by rain. But throwing his bridge below the town he would have the Adour itself as a harbour, while his land convoys used the royal causeway leading close to the river and not liable to be interrupted by weather. His line of retreat also would then be more secure if any unforeseen misfortune should render it necessary to break up the investment. He had no fear that Soult, while retiring before the active force he intended to employ against him on the

upper parts of the rivers, would take his line of retreat by the great Bordeaux road and fall upon the investing force : that road led behind Bayonne through the sandy wilderness called the Landes, into which the French general would not care to throw himself, lest his opponent's operations along the edge of the desert should prevent him from ever getting out. To draw the attention of the French army by an attack on their left near the roots of the Pyrenees would be sure to keep the lower Adour free from any formidable defensive force, because the rapidity and breadth of the stream there denied the use of common pontoons, and the mouth, about six miles below Bayonne, was so barred with sand, so beaten by surges, and so difficult of navigation even with the help of the land-marks, some of which had been removed, that the French would never expect small vessels fit for constructing a bridge could enter that way. Yet it was thus Lord Wellington designed to achieve his object. He had collected 40 large sailing boats of from 15 to 30 tons burthen, called *chasse marées*, as if for the commissariat service, but he secretly loaded them with planks and other materials for his bridge. These and some gun-boats he designed, with the aid of the navy, to run up the Adour to a certain point upon which he meant also to direct the troops and artillery, and then with hawsers, and pontoons formed into rafts, to throw over a covering body and destroy a small battery near the mouth of the river. He trusted to the greatness and danger of the attempt for success, and in this he was favoured by fortune.

The French trading vessels in the Adour had offered secretly to come out upon licenses and enter the service of his commissariat, but he was obliged to forego the advantage because of the former interference and dissent of the English ministers about the passports he had previously granted. This added greatly to the difficulty of the enterprise. He was thus forced to maltreat men willing to be friends, to prepare grates for heating shot, and a battery of Congreve rockets with which to burn their vessels and the sloop of war, or at least to drive them up the river, after which he proposed to protect his bridge with the gun-boats and a boom.

While he was thus preparing for offensive operations the French general was active in defensive measures. He had fortified all the main passes of the rivers by the great roads leading against his left, but the diminution of his force in January obliged him to withdraw his outposts from Anglet, which enabled Lord Wellington to examine the whole course of the Adour below Bayonne and arrange for the passage with more facility. Soult then, in pursuance of Napoleon's system of warfare, which always prescribed a recourse to moral force to cover physical weakness, immediately concentrated his left wing against the allies' right beyond the Nive, and redoubled that harassing partisan warfare which I have already noticed, endeavouring to throw his adversary entirely upon the defensive. Thus on the 26th of January, Morillo having taking possession of an advanced post near Mendionde not properly belonging to him, Soult, who desired to ascertain the feelings of the Spaniards about the English alliance, caused Harispe under pretence of remonstrating to sound him ; he did not respond, and Harispe then drove him, not without a vigorous resistance, from the post.

The French marshal had however no hope of checking the allies long by these means. He judged justly that Wellington was resolved to obtain Bordeaux and the line of the Garonne, and foreseeing that his own line of retreat must ultimately be in a parallel direction with the Pyrenees, he desired to organize in time a strong defensive system in the country behind him and to cover Bordeaux if possible. In this view he sent General Darricau, a native of the Landes, to prepare an insurgent levy in that wilderness, and directed Maransin to the High Pyrenees to extend the insurrection of the mountaineers already commenced in the Lower Pyrenees by Harispe. The castle of Jaca was still held by 800 men, but they were starving, and a convoy collected at Navarrens being stopped by the snow in the mountain-passes made a surrender inevitable. Better would it have been to have withdrawn the troops at an early period ; for though the Spaniards would thus have gained access to the rear of the French army and perhaps ravaged a part of the frontier, they could have done no essential mischief to the army ; and their excesses would have disposed the people of those parts who had not yet felt the benefit of Lord Wellington's politic discipline to insurrection.

At Bordeaux there was a small reserve commanded by General La Huillier, Soult urged the minister of war to increase it with conscripts from the interior. Meanwhile he sent artillerymen from Bayonne, ordered 1500 national guards to be selected as a garrison for the citadel of Blaye, and desired that the Médoc and Paté forts and the batteries along the banks of the Garonne should be put in a state of defence. The vessels in that river fit for the purpose he desired might be armed, and a flotilla of 50 gun-boats established below Bordeaux, with a like number to navigate that river above the city as far as Toulouse. But these orders were feebly carried into execution or entirely neglected, for there was no public spirit, and treason and disaffection were rife in the city.

On the side of the Lower Pyrenees Soult enlarged and improved the works of Navarrens and designed to commence an entrenched camp in front of it. The castle of Lourdes in the High Pyrenees was already defensible, and he gave orders to fortify the castle of Pau, thus providing a number of supporting points for the retreat which he foresaw. At Mauleon he put on foot some partisan corps, and the imperial commissary, Caffarelli, gave him hopes of being able to form a reserve of 7000 or 8000 national guards, gens-d'armes, and artillerymen, at Tarbes. Dax, containing his principal dépôts, was already being fortified, and the communication with it was maintained across the rivers by the bridges and bridge-heads at Port de Landes, Hastings, Pereyhorade, and Sauveterre; but the floods in the beginning of February carried away his bridge at the Port de Landes, and the communication between Bayonne and the left of the army was thus interrupted until he established a flying bridge in place of the one carried away.

Such was the situation of the French general when Lord Wellington advanced, and as the former supposed, with 120,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, for he knew nothing of the various political and financial difficulties which had reduced the English general's power and prevented all the reinforcements he expected from joining him. His emissaries told him that Clinton's force was actually broken up, and the British part in march to join Wellington; that the garrisons of Carthagená, Cadiz, and Ceuta were on the point of arriving and that reinforcements were coming from England and Portugal. This information made him conclude that there was no intention of pressing the war in Catalonia, and that all the allied troops would be united and march against him; wherefore with more earnestness than before he urged that Suchet should be ordered to join him that their united forces might form a "dike against the torrent" which threatened to overwhelm the south of France. The real power opposed to him was however very much below his calculations. The 20,000 British and Portuguese reinforcements promised had not arrived, Clinton's army was still in Catalonia; and though it is impossible to fix the exact numbers of the Spaniards, their regular forces available, and that only partially and with great caution on account of their licentious conduct, did not exceed the following approximation.

Twelve thousand Gallicians under Freyre, including Carlos d'Espana's division; 4000 under Morillo; 6000 Andalusians, under O'Donnel; 8000 of Del Parque's troops under the Prince of Anglona. In all 32,000. The Anglo-Portuguese present under arms were by the morning states on the 13th of February, the day on which the advance commenced, about 70,000 men and officers of all arms, nearly 10,000 being cavalry. The whole force, exclusive of Mina's bands, which were spread as we have seen from Navarre to the borders of Catalonia, was therefore 100,000 men and officers, with 100 pieces of field-artillery, of which 95 were Anglo-Portuguese.

It is difficult to fix with precision the number of the French army at this period, because the imperial muster-rolls, owing to the troubled state of the emperor's affairs, were either not continued beyond December, 1813, or have been lost. But from Soult's correspondence and other documents it would appear, that exclusive of his garrisons, his reserves and detachments at Bordeaux and in the department of the High Pyrenees, exclusive also of the conscripts of the second levy, which were now beginning to arrive, he could place in line of battle about 35,000 soldiers of all arms, 3000 being cavalry, with 40 pieces of artillery. But Bayonne alone, without reckoning the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navarrens, occupied 28,000 of the allies; and by this and other drains Lord Wellington's superiority in the field was

so reduced that his penetrating into France, that France which had made all Europe tremble at her arms, must be viewed as a surprising example of courage and fine conduct, military and political.

PASSAGE OF THE GAVES.

In the second week of February the weather set in with a strong frost, the roads became practicable, and the English general, eagerly seizing the long expected opportunity, advanced at the moment when General Paris had again marched with the convoy from Navarrens to make a last effort for the relief of Jaca. But the troops were at this time receiving the clothing which had been so long delayed in England, and the regiments, wanting the means of carriage, marched to the stores; the English general's first design was therefore merely to threaten the French left and turn it by the sources of the rivers with Hill's corps, which was to march by the roots of the Pyrenees, while Beresford kept the centre in check upon the lower parts of the same rivers. Soult's attention would thus he hoped be drawn to that side while the passage of the Adour was being made below Bayonne. And it would seem that, uncertain if he should be able to force the passage of the tributary rivers with his right, he intended, if his bridge was happily thrown, to push his main operations on that side and thus turn the Gaves by the right bank of the Adour: a fine conception by which his superiority of numbers would have best availed him to seize Dax and the Port de Landes and cut Soult off from Bordeaux.

On the 12th and 13th, Hill's corps, which including Picton's division and five regiments of cavalry furnished 20,000 combatants with 16 guns, being relieved by the sixth and seventh divisions in front of Mousserolles and on the Adour, was concentrated about Urcurray and Hasparen. The 14th it marched in two columns. One by Bonloc to drive the French posts beyond the Joyeuse; another by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port against Harispe, who was at Hellette. This second column had the Ursouia mountain on the right, and a third, composed of Morillo's Spaniards, having that mountain on its left marched from La Houssoa against the same point. Harispe, who had only three brigades, principally conscripts, retired skirmishing in the direction of St. Palais, and took a position for the night at Meharin. Not more than 30 men on each side were hurt, but the line of the Joyeuse was turned by the allies, the direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port cut, and that place was immediately invested by Mina's battalions.

On the 15th Hill, leaving the 57th regiment at Hellette to observe the road to St. Jean Pied de Port, marched through Meharin upon Garris, 11 miles distant, but that road being impracticable for artillery, the guns moved by Armendaritz more to the right. Harispe's rear-guard was overtaken and pushed back fighting, and meanwhile Lord Wellington directed Beresford to send a brigade of the seventh division from the heights of La Costa across the Gamboury to the Bastide de Clerence. The front, being thus extended from Urt by Briscons, the Bastide and Isturitz, towards Garris, a distance of more than 20 miles, was too attenuated; wherefore he caused the fourth division to occupy La Costa in support of the troops at the Bastide. At the same time learning that the French had weakened their force at Mousserolles, and thinking that might be to concentrate on the heights of Anglet, which would have frustrated his plan for throwing a bridge over the Adour, he directed Hope secretly to occupy the back of those heights in force and to prevent any intercourse between Bayonne and the country.

Soult knew of the intended operations against his left on the 12th, but hearing the allies had collected boats and constructed a fresh battery near Urt on the Upper Adour, and that the pontoons had reached Urcurray, he thought Lord Wellington designed to turn his left with Hill's corps, to press him on the Bidouze with Beresford's, and to keep the garrison of Bayonne in check with the Spaniards while Hope crossed the Adour above that fortress. Wherefore, on the 14th, when Hill's movement commenced, he repaired to Passarou near the Bastide de Clerence and made his dispositions to dispute the passage, first of the Bidouze and the Soissons or Gave of Mauleon, and then of the Gave of Oleron. He had four divisions in hand, with which he occupied a position on the 15th along the Bidouze; and he recalled General Paris, posting him on the road between St. Palais and St. Jean Pied de Port, with a view to watch Mina's battalions which he supposed to be more numerous than

they really were. Jaca thus abandoned, capitulated on the 17th, the garrison returning to France on condition of not serving until exchanged. This part of the capitulation it appears was broken by the French, but the recent violation by the Spaniards of the convention made with the deluded garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, furnished a reply.

Harispe, having Paris under his command and being supported by Pierre Soult with a brigade of light cavalry, now covered the road from St. Jean Pied de Port with his left, and the upper line of the Bidouze with his right. Lower down that river, Villatte occupied Ilharre, Taupin was on the heights of Bergoney below Villatte, and Foy guarded the banks of the river from Came to its confluence with the Adour. The rest of the army remained under D'Erlon on the right of the latter river.

Combat of Garris.—Harispe had just taken a position in advance of the Bidouze, on a height called the Garris mountain, which stretched to St. Palais, when his rear-guard came plunging into a deep ravine in his front, closely followed by the light troops of the second division. Upon the parallel counter-ridge thus gained by the allies general Hill's corps was immediately established, and though the evening was beginning to close the skirmishers descended into the ravine, and two guns played over it upon Harispe's troops. These last, to the number of 4000, were drawn up on the opposite mountain, and in this state of affairs Wellington arrived. He was anxious to turn the line of the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen himself there, and seeing that the communication with General Paris by St. Palais was not well maintained, sent Morillo by a flank march along the ridge now occupied by the allies towards that place; then menacing the enemy's centre with Le Cor's Portuguese division, he at the same time directed the 39th and 28th regiments, forming Pringle's brigade to attack, observing with a concise energy, "*you must take the hill before dark.*"

The expression caught the attention of the troops, and it was repeated by Colonel O'Callaghan as he and General Pringle placed themselves at the head of the 39th, which, followed by the 28th, rushed with loud and prolonged shouts into the ravine. The French fire was violent, Pringle fell wounded, and most of the mounted officers had their horses killed, but the troops covered by the thick wood gained with little loss the summit of the Garris mountain, on the right of the enemy, who thought from the shouting that a larger force was coming against them and retreated. The 39th then wheeled to their own right, intending to sweep the summit, but soon the French discovering their error came back at a charging pace, and receiving a volley without flinching tried the bayonet. Colonel O'Callaghan distinguished by his strength and courage received two strokes of that weapon but repaid them with fatal power in each instance, and the French, nearly all conscripts, were beaten off. Twice, however, they came back and fought, until the fire of the 28th was beginning to be felt, when Harispe, seeing the remainder of the second division ready to support the attack, Le Cor's Portuguese advancing against the centre, and the Spaniards in march towards St. Palais, retreated to that town, and calling in Paris from the side of Mauleon, immediately broke down the bridges over the Bidouze. He lost on this day nearly 500 men, of whom 200 were prisoners, and he would hardly have escaped if Morillo had not been slow. The allies lost only 160, of whom not more than 50 fell at Garris, and these chiefly in the bayonet contest, for the trees and the darkness screened them at first.

During these operations at Garris Picton moved from Bonloc to Oreque, on Hill's left, menacing Villatte, but though Beresford's scouting parties, acting on the left of Picton, approached the Bidouze facing Taupin and Foy, his principal force remained on the Gamboury, the pivot upon which Wellington's line hinged while the right sweeping forward turned the French positions. Foy, however, though in retreat observed the movement of the fourth and seventh divisions on the heights between the Nive and the Adour, pointing their march as he thought towards the French left, and his reports to that effect reached Soult at the moment that General Blondeau gave notice of the investment of St. Jean Pied de Port. The French general being thus convinced that Lord Wellington's design was not to pass the Adour above Bayonne, but to gain the line of that river by constantly turning the French left, made new dispositions.

The line of the Bidouze was strong, if he could have supported Harispe at St. Palais, and guarded at the same time the passage of the Soissons at Maulcon ; but this would have extended his front, already too wide, wherefore he resolved to abandon both the Bidouze and the Soissons and take the line of the Gave d'Oleron, placing his right at Peyrehorade and his left at Navarrens. In this view D'Erlon was ordered to pass the Adour by the flying bridge at the Port de Landes, and take post on the left bank of that river, while Harispe, having Paris's infantry still attached to his division, defended the Gave de Mauleon and pushed parties on his left towards the town of that name. Villatte occupied Sauveterre, where the bridge was fortified with a head on the left bank, and from thence Taupin lined the right bank to Sordes near the confluence of the Gave de Pau. Foy occupied the works of the bridge-head at Peyrehorade and Hastings, guarding that river to its confluence with the Adour ; this line was prolonged by D'Erlon towards Dax, but Soult still kept advanced parties on the lower Bidouze at the different entrenched passages of that river. One brigade of cavalry was in reserve at Sauveterre, another distributed along the line. Head-quarters were transported to Orthes, and the park of artillery to Aire. The principal magazines of ammunition were however at Bayonne, Navarrens, and Dax, and the French general, seeing that his communications with all these places were likely to be intercepted before he could remove his stores, anticipated distress, and wrote to the minister of war to form new depôts.

On the 16th Lord Wellington repaired the broken bridges of St. Palais, after a skirmish in which a few men were wounded. Hill then crossed the Bidouze, the cavalry and artillery by the repaired bridge, the infantry by the fords, but the day being spent in the operation the head of the column only marched beyond St. Palais. Meanwhile the fourth and part of the seventh divisions occupied the Bastide de Clerence, on the right of the Joyeuse, and the light division came up in support to the heights of La Costa on the left bank of that river.

The 17th Hill, marching at eight o'clock, passed through Domenzain towards the Soissons, while the third division advancing from Orequé on his left passed by Masparraute to the heights of Somberraute, both corps converging upon General Paris, who was in position at Arriveriete to defend the Soissons above its confluence with the Gave d'Oleron. The French outposts were immediately driven across the Gave. General Paris attempted to destroy the bridge of Arriveriete but Lord Wellington was too quick ; the 92nd regiment, covered by the fire of some guns, crossed at a ford above the bridge, and beating two French battalions from the village secured the passage. The allies then halted for the day near Arriveriete, having marched only five miles and lost one man killed with 23 wounded. Paris relinquished the Soissons, but remained between the two rivers during the night and retired on the morning of the 18th. The allies then seized the great road, which here runs from Sauveterre to Navarrens up the left bank of the Oleron Gave.

Harispe, Villatte, and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, were now at Sauveterre, occupying the bridge-head on the left bank, Taupin's division was opposite the Bastide de Bearn lower down on the right, Foy on the right of Taupin, and D'Erlon on the left of the Adour above its confluence with the Gave de Pau. Meanwhile the fourth division advanced to Bidache on the Bidouze, and the light division followed in support to the Bastide de Clerence, the seventh division remaining as before, partly in that vicinity partly extended on the left to the Adour. The cavalry of the centre, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, arrived also on the banks of the Bidouze, connecting the fourth with the third division at Somberraute. In this state of affairs Hill sent Morillo up the Soissons to guard the fords as high as Nabas, then spreading Fane's cavalry and the British and Portuguese infantry between that river and the Gave d'Oleron, he occupied all the villages along the road to Navarrens and at the same time cannonaded the bridge-head of Sauveterre.

Soult, thrown from the commencement of the operations entirely upon the defensive, was now at a loss to discover his adversary's object. The situation of the seventh division, and the march of the fourth and light divisions, led him to think his works at Hastings and Peyrehorade would be assailed. The weakness of his line, he having only Taupin's division to guard the river between Sauveterre and Sordes, a distance of 10 miles, made him fear the passage of the Gave would be

forced near the Bastide de Bearn, to which post there was a good road from Came and-Bidache. On the other hand the prolongation of Hill's line up the Gave towards Navarrens indicated a design to march on Pau, or it might be to keep him in check on the Gaves while the camp at Bayonne was assaulted. In this uncertainty he sent Pierre Soult, with a cavalry brigade and two battalions of infantry to act between Oleron and Pau, and keep open a communication with the partisan corps forming at Mauleon. That done, he decided to hold the Gaves as long as he could, and when they were forced, to abandon the defensive, concentrate his whole force at Orthes, and fall suddenly upon the first of the allies' converging columns that approached him.

CHAPTER II.

THE French general's various conjectures embraced every project but the true one of the English general. The latter did indeed design to keep him in check upon the rivers, not to obtain an opportunity of assaulting the camp of Bayonne but to throw his stupendous bridge over the Adour; yet were his combinations so made that failing in that he could still pursue his operations on the Gaves. When, therefore, he had established his offensive line strongly beyond the Soissons and the Bidouze, and knew that his pontoon train was well advanced towards Garris, he on the 19th returned rapidly to St. Jean de Luz. Everything there depending on man was ready, but the weather was boisterous with snow for two days, and Wellington, fearful of letting Soult strengthen himself on the Gave of Oleron, returned on the 21st to Garris, having decided to press his operations on that side in person and leave to Sir John Hope and Admiral Penrose the charge of effecting

THE PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR.

The heights of Anglet had been occupied since the 15th by the guards and Germans, small parties were cautiously pushed towards the river through the pine-forest, called the wood of Bayonne, and the fifth division, now commanded by General Colville, occupied Bussussary and the bridge of Urdains. On the 21st Colville relieved the sixth division in the blockade of Mousserolles on the right of the Nive. To replace these troops at Bussussary, Freyre's Spaniards passed the Bidassoa, but the Andalusians and Del Parque's troops and the heavy British and Portuguese cavalry were still retained within the frontiers of Spain. Sir John Hope had therefore only two British and two Spanish divisions, three independent brigades of Anglo-Portuguese infantry, and Vandeleur's brigade of cavalry, furnishing altogether about 28,000 men and officers, with 20 pieces of artillery. There were however two regiments which had been sent to the rear sick, and several others expected from England, destined to join him.

In the night of the 22nd the first division, six 18-pounders, and the rocket battery, were cautiously filed from the causeway near Anglet towards the Adour, but the road was deep and heavy and one of the guns falling into a ditch delayed the march. Nevertheless at day-break the whole reached some sand-downs which extended behind the pine-forest to the river. The French picquets were then driven into the entrenched camp at Beyris, the pontoon train and the field-artillery were brought down to the Adour opposite to the village of Boucaut, and the 18-pounders were placed in battery on the bank. The light troops meanwhile closed to the edge of the marsh which covered the right of the French camp, and Carlos España's division taking post on the heights of Anglet, in concert with the independent brigades, which were at Arcangues and the bridge of Urdains, attracted the enemy's attention by false attacks which were prolonged beyond the Nive by the fifth division.

It was intended that the arrival of the gun-boats and chasse-marées at the mouth of the Adour should have been simultaneous with that of the troops, but the wind having continued contrary none were to be seen, and Sir John Hope, whose firmness no untoward event could ever shake, resolved to attempt the passage with the army alone. The French flotilla opened its fire on his columns about nine o'clock, his artillery and rockets retorted upon the French gun-boats and the sloop of war so fiercely, that three of the former were destroyed and the sloop so hardly handled that about one o'clock the whole took refuge higher up the river.

Meanwhile 60 men of the guards were rowed in a pontoon across the mouth of the river in the face of a French picquet, which, seemingly bewildered, retired without firing. A raft was then formed with the remainder of the pontoons, and a hawser being stretched across, 600 of the guards and the 60th regiment, with a part of the rocket battery, the whole under Colonel Stopford, passed, yet slowly, and at slack water only, for the tide ran strongly and the waters were wide.

During this operation General Thouvenot, deceived by spies and prisoners, thought that the light division was with Hope as well as the first division, and that 15,000 men were embarked at St. Jean de Luz to land between Cape Breton and the Adour. Wherefore, fearing to endanger his garrison by sending a strong force to any distance down the river, when he heard Stopford's detachment was on the right bank, he detached only two battalions under General Macomble to ascertain the state of affairs, for the pine-forest and a great bending of the river prevented him from obtaining any view from Bayonne. Macomble made a show of attacking Stopford, but the latter, flanked by the field-artillery from the left bank, received him with a discharge of rockets, projectiles which, like the elephants in ancient warfare, often turn upon their own side. This time however, amenable to their directors, they smote the French column and it fled, amazed, and with a loss of 30 wounded. It is nevertheless obvious that if Thouvenot had kept strong guards, with a field-battery, on the right bank of the Adour, Sir John Hope could not have passed over the troops in pontoons, nor could any vessels have crossed the bar; no resource save that of disembarking troops between the river and Cape Breton would then have remained. This error was fatal to the French. The British continued to pass all night, and until 12 o'clock on the 24th, when the flotilla was seen under a press of sail making with a strong breeze for the mouth of the river.

To enter the Adour is, from the flatness of the coast, never an easy task, it was now most difficult, because the high winds of the preceding days had raised a great sea, and the enemy had removed one of the guiding flag-staves by which the navigation was ordinarily directed. In front of the flotilla came the boats of the men of war, and ahead of all, the naval captain, O'Reilly, run his craft, a chosen Spanish vessel, into the midst of the breakers, which, rolling in a frightful manner over the bar, dashed her on to the beach. That brave officer, stretched senseless on the shore, would have perished with his crew but for the ready succour of the soldiers; however, a few only were drowned, and the remainder, with an intrepid spirit, launched their boat again to aid the passage of the troops which was still going on. O'Reilly was followed, and successfully, by Lieutenant Debenham, in a six-oared cutter, but the tide was falling, wherefore the remainder of the boats, the impossibility of passing until high water being evident, drew off, and a pilot was landed to direct the line of navigation by concerted signals.

When the water rose again the crews were promised rewards in proportion to their successful daring, and the whole flotilla approached in close order, but with it came black clouds and a driving gale, which covered the whole line of coast with a rough tumbling sea, dashing and foaming without an interval of dark water to mark the entrance of the river. The men-of-war's boats first drew near this terrible line of surge, and Mr. Bloye of the *Lyra*, having the chief pilot with him, heroically led into it, but in an instant his barge was engulfed, and he and all with him were drowned. The *Lyra's* boat thus swallowed up, the following vessels swerved in their course, and shooting up to the right and left kept hovering, undecided, on the edge of the tormented waters. Suddenly Lieutenant Cheyne, of the *Woodlark*, pulled ahead, and striking the right line, with courage and fortune combined, safely passed the bar. The wind then lulled, the waves, as if conquered, abated somewhat of their rage, and the chasse-marées, manned with Spanish seamen, but having an engineer officer with a party of sappers in each, who compelled them to follow the men-of-war's boats, came plunging one after another through the huge breakers, and reached the point designed for the bridge. Thus was achieved this perilous and glorious exploit, but Captain Elliot, of the *Martial*, with his launch and crew and three transports' boats, perished close to the shore in despite of the most violent efforts made by the troops to save them; three other vessels, cast on the beach, lost part of their crews; and one large chasse-marée, full of men, after passing

the line of surf safely was overtaken by a swift bellying wave which, breaking on her deck, dashed her to pieces.

The whole of the first division and Bradford's Portuguese, in all 8000 men, being now on the right bank took post on the sand-hills for the night. The next morning, sweeping in a half circle round the citadel and its entrenchments, they placed their left on the Adour above the fortress, and their right on the same river below the place; for the water here made such a bend in their favour that their front was little more than two miles wide, and for the most part covered by a marshy ravine. This nice operation was effected without opposition because the entrenched camps, menaced by the troops on the other side of the Adour, were so enormous that Thouvenot's force was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. Meanwhile the bridge was constructed, about three miles below Bayonne, at a place where the river was contracted to 800 feet by strong retaining walls, built with a view of sweeping away the bar by increasing the force of the current. The plan of the bridge and boom were the conception of Colonel Sturgeon and Major Todd, but the execution was confided entirely to the latter, who, with a mind less brilliant than Sturgeon's but more indefatigable, very ably and usefully served his country throughout this war.

Twenty-six of the *chasse-marées*, moored head and stern at distances of 40 feet, reckoning from centre to centre, were bound together with ropes, two thick cables were then carried loosely across their decks, and the ends being cast over the walls on each bank, were strained and fastened in various modes to the sands. They were sufficiently slack to meet the spring-tides, which rose 14 feet, and planks were laid upon them without any supporting beams. The boom, moored with anchors above and below, was a double line of masts connected with chains and cables, so as to form a succession of squares, in the design that if a vessel broke through the outside, it should by the shock turn round in the square and become entangled with the floating wrecks of the line through which it had broken. Gun-boats, with aiding batteries on the banks, were then stationed to protect the boom, and to keep off fire-vessels, many row-boats were furnished with grappling irons. The whole was, by the united labour of seamen and soldiers, finished on the 26th. And contrary to the general opinion on such matters, Major Todd assured the Author of this History that he found the soldiers, with minds quickened by the wider range and variety of knowledge, attendant on their service, more ready of resource and their efforts, combined by a more regular discipline, of more avail, with less loss of time, than the irregular activity of the seamen.

The agitation of the water in the river from the force of the tides was generally so great that to maintain a pontoon bridge on it was impossible. A knowledge of this had rendered the French officers too careless of watch and defence, and this year the shifting sands had given the course of the Adour such a slanting direction towards the west that it ran for some distance almost parallel to the shore; the outer bank thus acting as a breakwater lessened the agitation within and enabled the large two-masted boats employed to ride safely, and support the heaviest artillery and carriages. Nevertheless, this fortune, the errors of the enemy, the matchless skill and daring of the British seamen, and the discipline and intrepidity of the British soldiers, all combined by the genius of Wellington, were necessary to the success of this stupendous undertaking, which must always rank amongst the prodigies of war.

When the bridge was finished Sir John Hope resolved to contract his line of investment round the citadel. This was a serious affair. The position of the French outside that fort was exceedingly strong, for the flanks were protected by ravines the sides of which were covered with fortified villas; and in the centre a ridge, along which the great roads from Bordeaux and Peyrehorade led into Bayonne, was occupied by the village and church of St. Etienne, both situated on rising points of ground strongly entrenched and under the fire of the citadel guns. The allies advanced in three converging columns covered by skirmishers. Their wings easily attained the edges of the ravines at either side, resting their flanks on the Adour above and below the town, at about 900 yards from the enemy's works. But a severe action took place in the centre. The assailing body, composed of Germans and a brigade of guards, was divided into three parts which should have

attacked simultaneously, the guards on the left, the light battalions of Germans on the right, and their heavy infantry in the centre. The flanks were retarded by some accident and the centre first attacked the heights of St. Etienne. The French guns immediately opened from the citadel and the skirmishing fire became heavy, but the Germans stormed church and village, forced the entrenched line of houses, and took a gun, which however they could not carry off under the close fire from the citadel. The wings then gained their positions and the action ceased for a time, but the people of Bayonne were in such consternation that Thouvenot to re-assure them sallied at the head of his troops. He charged the Germans twice and fought well but was wounded and finally lost his gun and the position of St. Etienne. There is no return of the allies' loss, it could not have been less than 500 men and officers of which 400 were Germans, and the latter were dissatisfied that their conduct was unnoticed in the despatch: an omission somewhat remarkable because their conduct was by Sir John Hope always spoken of with great commendation.

The new position thus gained was defended by ravines on each flank, and the centre being close to the enemy's works on the ridge of St. Etienne was entrenched. Preparations for besieging the citadel were then commenced under the direction of the German Colonel Hartmann, a code of signals was established, and infinite pains taken to protect the bridge and to secure a unity of action between the three investing bodies. The communications however required complicated arrangements, for the ground on the right bank of the river being low was overflowed every tide, and would have occasioned great difficulty but for the retaining wall which being four feet thick was made use of as a carriage road.

While these events were in progress at Bayonne, Lord Wellington pushed his operations on the Gaves with great vigour. On the 21st he returned as we have seen to Garris, the pontoons had already reached that place and on the 23rd they were carried beyond the Gave de Mauleon. During his absence the sixth and light divisions had come up, and thus six divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry were concentrated beyond that river on the Gave d'Oleron, between Sauveterre and Navarrens. Beresford meanwhile held the line of the Bidouze down to its confluence with the Adour, and apparently to distract the enemy threw a battalion over the latter river near Urt, and collected boats as if to form a bridge there. In the evening he recalled this detachment, yet continued the appearance of preparations for a bridge until late in the 23rd, when he moved forward and drove Foy's posts from the works at Oeyergave and Hastings, on the lower parts of the Oleron Gave, into the entrenchments of the bridge-head at Peyrehorade. The allies lost 50 men, principally Portuguese, but Soult's right and centre were thus held in check, for Beresford, having the fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian's cavalry, was strong enough for Foy at Peyrehorade and Taupin at the Bastide of Bearn. The rest of the French army was distributed at Orthes and Sauveterre, feeling towards Navarrens, and on the 24th Wellington put his troops in motion to pass the Gave d'Oleron.

During the previous days his movements and the arrival of his reinforcements had again deceived the French general, who seems to have known nothing of the presence of the light division, and imagined the first division was at Came on the 22nd as well as the fourth and seventh divisions. However, his dispositions remained the same, he did not expect to hold the Gave and looked to a final concentration at Orthes.

On the 24th Morillo, reinforced with a strong detachment of cavalry, moved to the Laussette, a small river running in front of Navarrens, where rough ground concealed his real force, while his scouts beat back the French outposts, and a battalion marching higher up menaced the fords of the Gave at Doguen, with a view to draw the attention of the garrison of Navarrens from the ford of Ville Nave. This ford, about three miles below Doguen, was the point where Lord Wellington designed really to pass, and a great concentric movement was now in progress towards it. Le Cor's Portuguese division marched from Gestas, the light division from Aroue crossing the Soissons at Nabas; the second division, three batteries of artillery, the pontoons, and four regiments of cavalry moved from other points.

Favoured by the hilly nature of the country the columns were well concealed from the enemy, and at the same time the sixth division advanced towards the fords of Montfort about three miles below that of Ville Nave. A battalion of the second division was sent to menace the ford of Barraute below Montfort, while the third division, reinforced with a brigade of hussars and the batteries of the second division, marched by Osserrain and Arriveriete against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, with orders to make a feint of forcing a passage there. The bulk of the light cavalry remained in reserve under Cotton, but Vivian's hussars, coming up from Beresford's right, threatened all the fords between Picton's left and the Bastide of Bearn; and below this Bastide some detachments were directed upon the fords of Sindos Castagnhede and Hauterive. During this movement Beresford keeping Foy in check at Peyrehorade with the seventh division, sent the fourth towards Sordes and Leren above the confluence of the Gaves to seek a fit place to throw a bridge. Thus the whole of the French front was menaced on a line of 25 miles, but the great force was above Sauveterre.

The first operations were not happily executed. The columns directed on the side of Sindos missed the fords. Picton opened a cannonade against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, and made four companies of Keane's brigade and some cavalry pass the Gave in the vicinity of the bridge; they were immediately assailed by a French regiment, and driven across the river again with a loss of 90 men and officers, of whom some were drowned and 30 were made prisoners, whereupon the cavalry returned to the left bank and the cannonade ceased. Nevertheless the diversion was complete, and the general operations were successful. Soult on the first alarm drew Harispe from Sauveterre, and placed him on the road to Orthes at Monstrueig, where a range of hills running parallel to the Gave of Oleron separates it from that of Pau; thus only a division of infantry and Berton's cavalry remained under Villatte at Sauveterre, and that general, notwithstanding his success against the four companies, alarmed by the vigour of Picton's demonstrations, abandoned his works on the left bank and destroyed the bridge. Meanwhile the sixth division passed without opposition at Montfort above Sauveterre, and at the same time the great body of the other troops coming down upon the ford of Villenave, met only with a small cavalry picquet, and crossed with no more loss than two men drowned: a happy circumstance, for the waters were deep and rapid, the cold intense, and the ford so narrow that the passage was not completed before dark. To have forced it in face of an enemy would have been exceedingly difficult and dangerous, and it was remarkable that Soult who was with Harispe, only five miles from Montfort and about seven from Villenave, should not have sent that general down to oppose the passage. The heads of the allies' columns immediately pushed forward to the range of hills before spoken of, the right being established near Loubeing, the left towards Sauveterre, from whence Villatte and Berton had been withdrawn by Clausel, who commanding at this part seems to have kept a bad watch when Clinton passed at Montfort.

The French divisions now took a position to give time for Taupin to retire from the lower parts of the Gave of Oleron towards the bridge of Berenx on the Gave of Pau, for both he and Foy had received orders to march upon Orthes, and break down all the bridges as they passed. When the night fell Soult sent Harispe's division also over the bridge of Orthes, and D'Erlon was already established in that town, but General Clausel remained until the morning at Orion to cover the movement. Meanwhile Pierre Soult, posted beyond Navarrens with his cavalry and two battalions of infantry to watch the road to Pau, was pressed by Morillo, and being cut off from the army by the passage of the allies at Villenave, was forced to retreat by Monein.

On the 25th, at daylight, Lord Wellington with some cavalry and guns pushed Clausel's rear-guard from Magret into the suburb of Orthes, which covered the bridge of that place on the left bank. He also cannonaded the French troops beyond the river, and the Portuguese of the light division, skirmishing with the French in the houses to prevent the destruction of the bridge, lost 25 men.

The second, sixth, and light divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese, five regiments of cavalry, and three batteries, were now massed in front of Orthes; the third

division and a brigade of cavalry was in front of the broken bridge of Berenx, about five miles lower down the Gave; the fourth and seventh divisions, with Vivian's cavalry, were in front of Peyrehorade, from whence Foy retired by the great Bayonne road to Orthes. Affairs being in this state, Morillo was directed to invest Navarrens. And as Mina's battalions were no sure guarantee against the combined efforts of the garrison of St. Jean Pied de Port and the warlike inhabitants of Baygorry, five British regiments, which had gone to the rear for clothing and were now coming up separately, were ordered to halt at St. Palais in observation, relieving each other in succession as they arrived at that place.

On the morning of the 26th, Beresford, finding that Foy had abandoned the French works at Peyrehorade, passed the Gave, partly by a pontoon bridge, partly by a ford, where the current ran so strong that a column of the seventh division was like to have been carried away bodily. He had previously detached the 18th hussars to find another ford higher up, and this being effected under the guidance of a miller, the hussars gained the high road about half-way between Peyrehorade and Orthes, and drove some French cavalry through Puyoo and Ramous. The French rallying upon their reserves, turned and beat back the foremost of the pursuers, but they would not await the shock of the main body, now reinforced by Vivian's brigade and commanded by Beresford in person. In this affair Major Sewell, an officer of the staff, who had frequently distinguished himself by his personal prowess, happening to be without a sword, pulled a large stake from a hedge, and with that weapon overthrew two hussars in succession, and only relinquished the combat when a third had cut his club in twain.

Beresford now threw out a detachment to Habas on his left to intercept the enemy's communication with Dax, and Lord Wellington immediately ordered Lord Edward Somerset's cavalry and the third division to cross the Gave by fords below the broken bridge of Berenx. Then directing Beresford to take a position for the night on some heights near the village of Baights, he proceeded to throw a pontoon bridge at Berenx, and thus after a circuitous march of more than 50 miles with his right wing, he again united it with his centre, and secured a direct communication with Hope.

During the 25th and 26th he had carefully examined Soult's position. The bridge of Orthes could not be easily forced. That ancient and beautiful structure consisted of several irregular arches, with a high tower in the centre, the gateway of which was built up by the French, the principal arch in front of the tower was mined, and the houses on both sides contributed to the defence. The river above and below was deep and full of tall pointed rocks, but above the town the water spreading wide with flat banks presented the means of crossing. Lord Wellington's first design was to pass there with Hill's troops and the light division, but when he heard that Beresford had crossed the Gave he suddenly changed his design, and as we have seen passed the third division over and threw his bridge at Berenx. This operation was covered by Beresford, while Soult's attention was diverted by the continual skirmish at the suburbs of Orthes, by the appearance of Hill's columns above, and by Wellington's taking cognizance of the position near the bridge so openly as to draw a cannonade.

The English general did not expect Soult would, when he found Beresford and Picton were over the Gave, await a battle, and his emissaries reported that the French army was already in retreat, a circumstance to be borne in mind because the next day's operation required success to justify it. Hope's happy passage of the Adour being now known, that officer was instructed to establish a line of communication to the port of Landes, where a permanent bridge was to be formed with boats brought up from Urt. A direct line of intercourse was thus secured with the army at Bayonne. But Lord Wellington felt that he was pushing his operations beyond his strength if Suchet should send reinforcements to Soult; wherefore he called up Freyre's Spaniards, ordering that general to cross the Adour below Bayonne, with two of his divisions and a brigade of Portuguese 9-pounders, and join him by the port of Landes. O'Donnell's Andalusians and the Prince of Anglona's troops were also directed to be in readiness to enter France.

These orders were given with the greatest reluctance.

The feeble resistance made by the French in the difficult country already passed, left him without much uneasiness as to the power of Soult's army in the field, but his disquietude was extreme about the danger of an insurgent warfare. "Maintain the strictest discipline, *without that we are lost*," was his expression to General Freyre, and he issued a proclamation authorizing the people of the districts he had overrun to arm themselves for the preservation of order under the direction of their mayors. He invited them to arrest all straggling soldiers and followers of the army, and all plunderers, and evil-doers, and convey them to head-quarters with proof of their crimes, promising to punish the culpable and to pay for all damages. At the same time he confirmed all the local authorities who chose to retain their offices, on the sole condition of having no political or military intercourse with the countries still possessed by the French army. Nor was his proclamation a dead letter, for in the night of the 25th the inhabitants of a village, situated near the road leading from Sauveterre to Orthes, shot one English soldier dead and wounded a second who had come with others to plunder. Lord Wellington caused the wounded man to be hung as an example, and he also forced an English colonel to quit the army for suffering his soldiers to destroy the municipal archives of a small town.

Soult had no thought of retreating. His previous retrograde movements had been effected with order, his army was concentrated with its front to the Gave, and every bridge, except the noble structure at Orthes the ancient masonry of which resisted his mines, had been destroyed. One regiment of cavalry was detached on the right to watch the fords as far as Peyrehorade, three others, with two battalions of infantry, under Pierre Soult, watched those between Orthes and Pau, and a body of horsemen and gens-d'armes covered the latter town from Morillo's incursions. Two regiments of cavalry remained with the army, and the French general's intention was to fall upon the head of the first column which should cross the Gave. But the negligence of the officer stationed at Puyoo, who had suffered Vivian's hussars, as we have seen, to pass on the 26th without opposition and without making any report of the event, enabled Beresford to make his movement in safety when otherwise he would have been assailed by at least two-thirds of the French army. It was not until three o'clock in the evening that Soult received intelligence of his march, and his columns were then close to Baigts on the right flank of the French army, his scouts were on the Dax road in its rear, and at the same time the sixth and light divisions were seen descending by different roads from the heights beyond the river pointing towards Berenx.

In this crisis the French marshal hesitated whether to fall upon Beresford and Picton, while the latter was still passing the river, or take a defensive position, but finally judging that he had not time to form his columns of attack he decided upon the latter. Wherefore, under cover of a skirmish, sustained near Baigts by a battalion of infantry which coming from the bridge of Berenx was joined by the light cavalry from Puyoo, he hastily threw D'Erlon's and Reille's divisions on a new line across the road from Peyrehorade. The right extended to the heights of San Boës along which runs the road from Orthes to Dax, and this line was prolonged by Clausel's troops to Caste Tarbe, a village close to the Gave. Having thus opposed a temporary front to Beresford, he made his dispositions to receive battle the next morning, bringing Villatte's infantry and Pierre Soult's cavalry from the other side of Orthes through that town, and it was this movement that led Lord Wellington's emissaries to report that the army was retiring.

Soult's new line was on a ridge of hills partly wooded partly naked.

In the centre was an open rounded hill from whence long narrow tongues were pushed out, on the French left towards the high road of Peyrehorade, on their right by St. Boës towards the high church of Baigts, the whole presenting a concave to the allies.

The front was generally covered by a deep and marshy ravine broken by two short tongues of land which jutted out from the principal hill.

The road from Orthes to Dax passed behind the front to the village of St. Boës, and thence along the ridge forming the right flank.

Behind the centre a succession of undulating bare heathy hills trended for several miles to the rear, but behind the right the country was low and deep.

The town of Orthes, receding from the river up the slope of a steep hill and terminating with an ancient tower, was behind the left wing.

General Reille, having Taupin's, Roguet's, and Paris's divisions under him, commanded on the right, and occupied all the ground from the village of St. Boës to the centre of the position.



Count D'Erlon, commanding Foy's and D'Armagnac's divisions, was on the left of Reille. He placed the first along a ridge extending towards the road of Peyrehorade, the second in reserve. In rear of this last Villatte's division and the cavalry were posted above the village of Rontun, that is to say, on the open hills behind the main position. In this situation, with the right overlooking the low country beyond St. Boës, and the left extended towards Orthes, this division furnished a reserve to both D'Erlon and Reille.

Harispe, whose troops, as well as Villatte's, were under Clausel, occupied Orthes and the bridge, having a regiment near the ford of Souars above the town. Thus the French army extended from St. Boës to Orthes, but the great mass was disposed towards the centre. Twelve guns were attached to General Harispe's troops, 12 were upon the round hill in the centre, sweeping in their range the ground beyond St. Boës, and 16 were in reserve on the Dax road.

The 27th, at day-break, the sixth and light divisions, having passed the Gave near Berenx, by the pontoon bridge thrown in the night, wound up a narrow way between high rocks to the great road of Peyrehorade. The third division and Lord Edward Somerset's cavalry were already established there in columns of march, with skirmishers pushed forwards to the edge of the wooded height occupied by D'Erlon's left, and Beresford with the fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian's cavalry had meanwhile gained the ridge of St. Boës, and approached the Dax road beyond. Hill remained with the second British and Le Cor's Portuguese divisions, menacing the bridge of Orthes and the ford of Souars. Between Beresford and Picton, a distance of a mile and a half, there were no troops; but about half-way, exactly in front of the French centre, was a Roman camp crowning an isolated peering hill of singular appearance, and nearly as lofty as the centre of Soult's position.

On this camp, now covered with vineyards, but then open and grassy, with a few trees, Lord Wellington, after viewing the country on Beresford's left, stopped for an hour or more to examine the enemy's disposition for battle. During this time the two divisions were coming up from the river, but so hemmed in by rocks that only a few men could march abreast, and their point of union with the third division was little more than cannon-shot from the enemy's position. The moment was critical. Picton did not conceal his disquietude, but Wellington, undisturbed as the deep sea, continued his observations without seeming to notice the dangerous position of his troops. When they had reached the main road, he reinforced Picton with the sixth, and drew the light division by cross roads behind the Roman camp, thus connecting his wings and forming a central reserve. From this point by-ways led, on the left to the high church of Baigts and the Dax road, on the right to the Peyrehorade road; and two others led straight across the marsh to the French position.

This marsh, the open hill about which Soult's guns and reserves were principally gathered, the form and nature of the ridges on the flanks, all combined to forbid an attack in front, and the flanks were scarcely more promising. The extremity of the French left sunk indeed to a gentle undulation in crossing the Peyrehorade road, yet it would have been useless to push troops on that line towards Orthes, between D'Erlon and Caste Tarbe, for the town was strongly occupied by Harispe, and was there covered by an ancient wall and the bed of a torrent. It was equally difficult to turn the St. Boës flank, because of the low marshy country into which the troops must have descended beyond the Dax road; and the brows of the hills trending backwards from the centre of the French position would have enabled Soult to oppose a new and formidable front at right angles to his actual position. The whole of the allied army must therefore have made a circuitous flank movement within gun-shot, and through a most difficult country, or Beresford's left must have been dangerously extended and the whole line weakened.



Nor could the movement be hidden, because the hills, although only moderately high, were abrupt on that side, affording a full view of the low country, and Soult's cavalry detachments were in observation on every brow.

It only remained to assail the French flanks along the ridges, making the principal efforts on the side of St. Boës, with intent, if successful, to overlap the French right beyond, and seize the road of St. Sever, while Hill passed the Gave at Souars and cut off the road to Pau, thus enclosing the beaten army in Orthes. This was, however, no slight affair. On Picton's side it was easy to obtain a footing on the flank ridge near the high road, but beyond that the ground rose rapidly and the French were gathered thickly, with a narrow front and plenty of guns. On Beresford's side they could only be assailed along the summit of the St Boës ridge, advancing from the high church of Baights and the Dax road. But the village of St. Boës was strongly occupied, the ground immediately behind it was strangled to a narrow pass by the ravine, and the French reserve of 16 guns, placed on the Dax road, behind the hill in the centre of Soult's line, and well covered from counter-fire, was in readiness to crush the head of any column which should emerge from the gorge of St. Boës.

BATTLE OF ORTHES.

During the whole morning a slight skirmish, with now and then a cannon-shot, had been going on with the third division on the right, and the French cavalry at times pushed parties forward on each flank, but at nine o'clock Wellington commenced the real attack. The third and sixth divisions won without difficulty the lower part of the ridges opposed to them, and endeavoured to extend their left along the French front with a sharp fire of musketry; but the main battle was on the other flank. There General Cole, keeping Anson's brigade of the fourth division in reserve, assailed St. Boës with Ross's British brigade and Vasconcellos' Portuguese; his object was to get on to the open ground beyond it, but fierce and slaughtering was the struggle. Five times breaking through the scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the wider space beyond; yet ever as the troops issued forth, the French guns from the open hill smote them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax road swept through them with grape from flank to flank. And then Taupin's supporting masses rushed forwards with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on either hand, forced the shattered columns back into the village. It was in vain that with desperate valour the allies, time after time, broke through the narrow way and struggled to spread a front beyond. Ross fell, dangerously wounded, and Taupin, whose troops were clustered thickly and well supported, defied their utmost efforts. Nor was Soult less happy on the other side. The nature of the ground would not permit the third and sixth divisions to engage many men at once, so that no progress was made; and one small detachment which Picton extended to his left, having made an attempt to gain the smaller tongue jutting out from the central hill, was suddenly charged as it neared the summit by Foy, and driven down again in confusion, losing several prisoners.

When the combat had thus continued with unabated fury on the side of St. Boës for about three hours, Lord Wellington sent a *caçadore* regiment of the light division from the Roman camp to protect the right flank of Ross's brigade against the French skirmishers; but this was of no avail, for Vasconcellos' Portuguese, unable to sustain the violence of the enemy any longer, gave way in disorder, and the French pouring on, the British troops retreated through St. Boës with difficulty. As this happened at the moment when the detachment on Picton's left was repulsed, victory seemed to declare for the French; and Soult, conspicuous on his commanding open hill, the knot of all his combinations, seeing his enemies thus broken and thrown backwards on each side put all his reserves in movement to complete the success. It is said that in the exultation of the moment he smote his thigh, exclaiming, "*At last I have him.*" Whether this be so or not it was no vain-glorious speech, for the moment was most dangerous. There was, however, a small black cloud rising just beneath him, unheeded at first amidst the thundering din and tumult that now shook the field of battle, but which soon burst with irresistible violence. Wellington, seeing that St. Boës was inexpugnable, had suddenly changed

his plan of battle. Supporting Ross with Anson's brigade, which had not hitherto been engaged, he backed both with the seventh division and Vivian's cavalry, now forming one heavy body, towards the Dax road. Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions to be thrown in mass upon Foy's left flank, and at the same time sent the 52nd regiment down from the Roman camp, with instructions to cross the marsh in front, to mount the French ridge beyond, and to assail the flank and rear of the troops engaged with the fourth division at St. Boës.

Colonel Colborne, so often distinguished in this war, immediately led the 52nd down and crossed the marsh under fire, the men sinking at every step above the knees, in some places to the middle, but still pressing forwards with that stern resolution and order to be expected from the veterans of the light division, soldiers who had never yet met their match in the field. They soon obtained footing on firm land, and ascended the heights in line at the moment that Taupin was pushing vigorously through St. Boës, Foy and D'Armagnac, hitherto more than masters of their positions, being at the same time seriously assailed on the other flank by the third and sixth divisions. With a mighty shout and a rolling fire the 52nd soldiers dashed forwards between Foy and Taupin, beating down a French battalion in their course and throwing everything before them into disorder. General Bechaud was killed in Taupin's division, Foy was dangerously wounded, and his troops, discouraged by his fall and by this sudden burst from a quarter where no enemy was expected, for the march of the 52nd had been hardly perceived save by the skirmishers, got into confusion, and the disorder spreading to Reille's wing he also was forced to fall back and take a new position to restore his line of battle. The narrow pass behind St. Boës was thus opened, and Wellington, seizing the critical moment, thrust the fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian's cavalry, and two batteries of artillery through, and spread a front beyond.

The victory was thus secured. For the third and sixth divisions had now won D'Armagnac's position and established a battery of guns on a knoll, from whence their shot ploughed through the French masses from one flank to another. Suddenly a squadron of French chasseurs came at a hard gallop down the main road of Orthes to charge these guns, and sweeping to their right they rode over some of the sixth division which had advanced too far ; but pushing this charge too madly got into a hollow lane and were nearly all destroyed. The third and seventh divisions then continued to advance, and the wings of the army were united. The French general rallied all his forces on the open hills beyond the Dax road, and with Taupin's Rouguet's, Paris's, and D'Armagnac's divisions made strong battle to cover the reformation of Foy's disordered troops, but his foes were not all in front. This part of the battle was fought with only two-thirds of the allied army. Hill, who had remained with 12,000 combatants, cavalry and infantry, before the bridge of Orthes received orders, when Wellington changed his plan of attack, to force the passage of the Gave, partly in the view of preventing Harispe from falling upon the flank of the sixth division, partly in the hope of a successful issue to the attempt : and so it happened. Hill, though unable to force the bridge, forded the river above at Souars, and driving back the troops posted there, seized the heights above, cut off the French from the road to Pau, and turned the town of Orthes. He thus menaced Soult's only line of retreat by Salespice, on the road to St. Sever, at the very moment when the 52nd having opened the defile of St. Boës the junction of the allies' wings was effected on the French position.

Clausel immediately ordered Harispe to abandon Orthes, and close towards Villatte on the heights above Rontun, leaving however some conscript battalions on a rising point beyond the road of St. Sever called the *Motte de Turenne*. Meanwhile in person he endeavoured to keep General Hill in check by the menacing action of two cavalry regiments and a brigade of infantry ; but Soult arrived at the moment, and seeing that the loss of Souars had rendered his whole position untenable, gave orders for a general retreat.

This was a perilous matter. The heathy hills upon which he was now fighting, although for a short distance they furnished a succession of parallel positions favourable enough for defence, soon resolved themselves into a low ridge running to the rear on a line parallel with the road to St. Sever ; and on the opposite side of that

road about cannon-shot distance was a corresponding ridge along which General Hill, judging by the firing how matters went, was now rapidly advancing. Five miles distant was the *Luy de Bearn*, and four miles beyond that the *Luy de France*, two rivers, deep and with difficult banks. Behind these the Lutz, the Gabas, and the Adour, crossed the line, and though once beyond the wooden bridge of Sault de Navailles on the *Luy de Bearn*, these streams would necessarily cover the retreat, to carry off by one road and one bridge a defeated army still closely engaged in front seemed impossible. Nevertheless Soult did so. For Paris sustained the fight on his right until Foy and Taupin's troops rallied, and when the impetuous assault of the 52nd and the rush of the fourth and seventh divisions drove Paris back, D'Armagnac interposed to cover him until the union of the allies' wings was completed, then both retired, being covered in turn by Villatte. In this manner the French yielded, step by step and without confusion, the allies advancing with an incessant deafening musketry and cannonade, yet losing many men, especially on the right, where the third division were very strongly opposed. However, as the danger of being cut off at Salespice by Hill became more imminent, the retrograde movements were more hurried and confused; Hill seeing this, quickened his pace until at last both sides began to run violently, and so many men broke from the French ranks making across the fields towards the fords, and such a rush was necessarily made by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, that the whole country was covered with scattered bands. Sir Stapleton Cotton then breaking with Lord Edward Somerset's hussars through a small covering body opposed to him by Harispe sabred 200 or 300 men, and the 7th hussars cut off about 2000 who threw down their arms in an enclosed field; yet some confusion or mismanagement occurring, the greatest part, recovering their weapons, escaped, and the pursuit ceased at the Luy of Bearn.

The French army appeared to be entirely dispersed, but it was more disordered in appearance than reality, for Soult passed the Luy of Bearn and destroyed the bridge with the loss of only six guns and less than 4000 men killed, wounded, and prisoners. Many thousands of conscripts however threw away their arms, and we shall find one month afterwards the stragglers still amounting to 3000. Nor would the passage of the river have been effected so happily if Lord Wellington had not been struck by a musket-ball just above the thigh, which caused him to ride with difficulty, whereby the vigour and unity of the pursuit was necessarily abated. The loss of the allies was 2300, of which 50, with three officers, were taken, but among the wounded were Lord Wellington, General Walker, General Ross, and the Duke of Richmond, then Lord March. He had served on Lord Wellington's personal staff during the whole war without a hurt, but being made a captain in the 52nd, like a good soldier joined his regiment the night before the battle. He was shot through the chest a few hours afterwards, thus learning by experience, the difference between the labours and dangers of staff and regimental officers, which are generally in the inverse ratio to their promotions.

General Berton, stationed between Pau and Orthes during the battle, had been cut off by Hill's movement, yet skirting that general's march he retreated by Mant and Samadet with his cavalry, picking up two battalions of conscripts on the road. Meanwhile Soult, having no position to rally upon, continued his retreat in the night to St. Sever, breaking down all the bridges behind him. Lord Wellington pursued at daylight in three columns, the right by Lacadée and St. Medard to Samadet, the centre by the main road, the left by St. Cricq. At St. Sever he hoped to find the enemy still in confusion, but he was too late; the French were across the river, the bridge was broken, and the army halted. The result of the battle was however soon made known far and wide, and Darricau, who with a few hundred soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent levy at Dax, the works of which were incomplete and still unarmed, immediately destroyed part of the stores, the rest had been removed to Mont Marsan, and retreated through the Landes to Langon on the Garonne.

From St. Sever, which offered no position, Soult turned short to the right and moved upon Barcelona, higher up the Adour; but he left D'Erlon with two divisions of infantry, some cavalry, and four guns at Caceres on the right bank, and sent

Clausel to occupy Aire on the other side of the river. He thus abandoned his magazines at Mont Marsan, and left open the direct road to Bordeaux, but holding Caceres with his right, he commanded another road by Rocqufort to that city, while his left being at Aire, protected the magazines and artillery park at that place and covered the road to Pau. Meanwhile the main body at Barcelona equally supported Clausel and D'Erlon, and covered the great roads leading to Agen and Toulouse on the Garonne, and to the mountains by Tarbes.

In this situation it was difficult to judge what line of operations he meant to adopt. Wellington, however, passed the Adour about one o'clock, partly by the repaired bridge of St. Sever, partly by a deep ford below, and immediately detached Beresford with the light division and Vivian's cavalry to seize the magazines at Mont Marsan; at the same time he pushed the head of a column towards Caceres, where a cannonade and charge of cavalry had place, and a few men and officers were hurt on both sides. The next day Hill's corps marching from Samadet reached the Adour between St. Sever and Aire, and D'Erlon was again assailed on the right bank and driven back skirmishing to Barcelona. This event proved that Soult had abandoned Bordeaux, but the English general could not push the pursuit more vigorously, because every bridge was broken, and a violent storm on the evening of the 1st had filled the smaller rivers and torrents, carried away the pontoon bridges, and cut off all communication between the troops and the supplies.

The bulk of the army was now necessarily halted on the right bank of the Adour until the bridges could be repaired, but Hill, who was on the left bank, marched to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in two columns from St. Savin and St. Gillies on the 2nd, he reached his destination about three o'clock, with two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and a battery of horse-artillery; he expected no serious opposition, but General Clausel had arrived a few hours before and was in order of battle covering the town with Villatte's and Harispe's divisions, and some guns. The French occupied a steep ridge in front of Aire, high and wooded on the right where it overlooked the river, but merging on the left into a wide table-land over which the great road led to Pau. The position was strong for battle, yet it could be readily out-flanked on the left by the table-land, and was an uneasy one for retreat on the right where the ridge was narrow, the ravine behind steep and rugged, with a mill-stream at the bottom between it and the town. A branch of the Adour also flowing behind Aire cut it off from Barcelona, while behind the left wing was the greater Lees, a river with steep banks and only one bridge.

COMBAT OF AIRE.

General Hill, arriving about two o'clock attacked without hesitation. General Stewart with two British brigades fell on the French right, a Portuguese brigade assailed their centre, and the other brigades followed in columns of march. The action was however very sudden, the Portuguese were pushed forward in a slovenly manner by General Da Costa, a man of no ability, and the French under Harispe met them on the flat summit of the height with so rough a charge that they gave way in flight. The rear of the allies' column being still in march, the battle was like to be lost, but General Stewart having by this time won the heights on the French right, where Villatte, fearing to be enclosed, made but a feeble resistance, immediately detached General Barnes with the 50th and 92nd regiments to the aid of the Portuguese. The vehement charge of these troops turned the stream of battle, the French were broken in turn and thrown back on their reserves, yet they rallied and renewed the action with great courage, fighting obstinately until General Byng's British brigade came up, when Harispe was driven towards the river Lees, and Villatte quite through the town of Aire into the space between the two branches of the Adour behind.

General Reille, who was at Barcelona when the action began, brought up Roguet's division to support Villatte, the combat was thus continued until night at that point, meanwhile Harispe crossed the Lees and broke the bridge, but the French lost many men. Two generals, Dauture and Gasquet, were wounded, a colonel of engineers was killed, 100 prisoners were taken, many of Harispe's conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their homes, and the magazines fell into the conqueror's hands. The loss of the British troops was 150, General Barnes

was wounded, and Colonel Hood killed. The loss of the Portuguese was never officially stated, yet it could not have been less than that of the British, and the vigour of the action proved that the French courage was very little abated by the battle of Orthes. Soult immediately retreated up the Adour by both banks towards Maubourget and Marciac, and he was not followed, for new combinations were now opened to the generals on both sides.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. On the 14th of February the passage of the Gaves was commenced, by Hill's attack on Harispe at Hellette. On the 2nd of March the first series of operations was terminated by the combat at Aire. In these 16 days Lord Wellington traversed with his right wing 80 miles, passed five large and several small rivers, forced the enemy to abandon two fortified bridge-heads and many minor works, gained one great battle and two combats, captured six guns and about 1000 prisoners, seized the magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and Aire, forced Soult to abandon Bayonne and cut him off from Bordeaux. And in this time he also threw his stupendous bridge below Bayonne and closely invested that fortress, after a sharp and bloody action. Success in war, like charity in religion, covers a multitude of sins; but success often belongs to fortune as much, as skill, and the combinations of Wellington, profound and sagacious, might in this manner be confounded with the lucky operations of the allies on the other side of France, where the presumption and the vacillation of ignorance alternately predominated.

2. Soult attributed the loss of his positions to the superior forces of the allies. Is this well-founded? The French general's numbers cannot be determined exactly, but after all his losses in December, after the detachments made by the emperor's order in January, and after completing the garrison of Bayonne to 14,000 men, he informed the minister of war that 30,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 40 pieces of artillery were in line. This did not include the conscripts of the new levy, all youths indeed, and hastily sent to the army by battalions as they could be armed, but brave, and about 8000 of them might have joined before the battle of Orthes. Wherefore, deducting the detachments of cavalry and infantry under Berton on the side of Pau, and under Dariau on the side of Dax, it may be said that 40,000 combatants of all arms were engaged in that action. Thirty-five thousand were very excellent soldiers, for the conscripts of the old levy, who joined before the battle of the Nivelle, were stout men; their vigorous fighting at Garris and Aire proved it, for of them was Harispe's division composed.

Now Lord Wellington commenced his operations with the second, third, fourth, and seventh British divisions, the independent Portuguese division under Le Cor, Morillo's Spaniards, 48 pieces of artillery, and only four brigades of light cavalry, for Vandaleur's brigade remained with Hope, and all the heavy cavalry and the Portuguese were left in Spain. Following the morning states of the army, this would furnish, exclusive of Morillo's Spaniards, something more than 40,000 fighting men and officers of all arms, of which 4000 were horsemen. But five regiments of infantry, and amongst them two of the strongest British regiments of the light division, were absent to receive their clothing; deduct these and we have about 37,000 Anglo-Portuguese combatants. It is true that Mina's battalions and Morillo's aided in the commencement of the operations, but the first immediately invested St. Jean Pied de Port and the latter invested Navarrens. Lord Wellington was therefore in the battle superior by 1000 horsemen and eight guns, but Soult outnumbered him in infantry by 4000 or 5000, conscripts it is true, yet useful. Why then was the passage of the Gaves so feebly disputed? Because the French general remained entirely on the defensive in positions too extended for his numbers.

3. *Offensive operations must be the basis of a good defensive system.* Let Soult's operations be tried by this rule. On the 12th he knew that the allies were in motion for some great operation and he judged rightly that it was to drive him from the Gaves. From the 14th to the 18th his left was continually assailed by very superior numbers, but during part of that time Beresford could only oppose to his right and centre the fourth and a portion of the seventh divisions, with some cavalry; and those not in a body and at once but parcelled and extended, for it

was not until the 16th that the fourth, seventh, and light divisions were so closed towards the Bidouze as to act in one mass. On the 15th, Lord Wellington admitted that his troops were too extended, Villatte's, Taupin's, and Foy's divisions, were never menaced until the 18th, and there was nothing to prevent D'Erlon's divisions which only crossed the Adour on the 17th from being on the Bidouze also the 15th. Soult might therefore by rapid and well-digested combinations have united four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry to attack Beresford on the 15th or 16th between the Nive and the Adour. If successful the defeated troops, pushed back upon the sixth division, must have fought for life with the rivers on their flanks, Soult in front, and the garrison of Bayonne issuing from the works of Mousserolles on their rear. If unsuccessful, the French retreat behind the Gave of Oleron could not have been prevented.

It is, however, to be pleaded that Soult was not exactly informed of the numbers and situation of his opponents. He thought Beresford had the first division also on the Lower Bidouze; he knew that Wellington had large reserves to employ, and, that general's design of passing the Adour below Bayonne being unknown to him, he naturally supposed they would be used to support the operations on the Gaves: he therefore remained on the defensive. It might possibly also have been difficult to bring D'Erlon's division across the Adour by the Port de Landes before the 17th, because the regular bridge had been carried away and the communications interrupted a few days before by the floods. In fine there are many matters of detail in war, known only to a general-in-chief, which forbid the best combinations, and this it is that makes the art so difficult and uncertain. Great captains worship Fortune.

On the 24th, the passage of the Gave d'Oleron was effected. Soult then recognized his error and concentrated his troops at Orthes to retake the offensive. It was a fine movement and effected with ability, but he suffered another favourable opportunity of giving a counter-blow to escape him. The infantry under Villatte, Harispe, and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, were about Sauveterre, that is to say, four miles from Montfort and only seven from Villenave, where the principal passage was effected, where the ford was deep, the stream rapid, and the left bank although favourable for the passage not entirely commanding the right bank. How then did it happen that the operation was effected without opposition? Amongst the allies it was rumoured at the time that Soult complained of the negligence of a general who had orders to march against the passing troops. The position of Harispe's division at Monstrueig, forming a reserve at equal distances from Sauveterre and Villenave, would seem to have been adopted with that view, but I find no confirmation of the report in Soult's correspondence, and it is certain he thought Picton's demonstrations at Sauveterre was a real attack.

4. The position adopted by the French general at Orthes was excellent for offence. It was not so for defence, when Beresford and Picton had crossed the Gave below in force. Lord Wellington could then throw his whole army on that side, and secure his communication with Hope, after which, out-flanking the right of the French, he could seize the defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from their magazines at Dax, Mont Marsan, and Aire, and force them to retreat by the Pau road leaving open the way to Bordeaux. To await this attack was therefore an error, but Soult's original design was to assail the head of the first column which should come near him, and Beresford's approach to Baigts on the 26th furnished the opportunity. It is true that the French light cavalry gave intelligence of that general's march too late and marred the combination, but there was still time to fall on the head of the column while the third division was in the act of passing the river and entangled in the narrow way leading from the ford to the Peyrehorade road: it is said the French marshal appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally took a defensive position in which to receive battle.

However, when the morning came, he neglected another opportunity. For two hours the third division and the hussars remained close to him, covering the march of the sixth and light divisions through the narrow ways leading from the bridge of Berenx up to the main road; the infantry had no defined position, the cavalry had no room to extend, and there were no troops between them and Beresford who was

then in march by the heights of Baights to the Dax road. If the French general had pushed a column across the marsh to seize the Roman camp he would have separated the wings of the allies ; then pouring down the Peyrehorade road with Foy's, D'Armagnac's, and Villatte's divisions he would probably have overwhelmed the third division before the other two could have extricated themselves from the defiles. Picton therefore had grounds for uneasiness.

With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of battle at Orthes, fiercely and strongly did he fight, and wonderfully did he effect his retreat across the Luy of Bearn but twice in 24 hours he had neglected those happy occasions which in war take birth and flight at the same instant ; and as the value of his position, essentially an offensive one, was thereby lost, a slowness to strike may be objected to his generalship. Yet there is no commander, unless a Hannibal or a Napoleon, surpassing the human proportions, but will abate something of his confidence and hesitate after repeated defeats. Soult in this campaign as in many others proved himself a hardy captain full of resources.

5. Lord Wellington, with a vastness of conception and a capacity for arrangement and combination equal to his opponent, possessed in a high degree that daring promptness of action, that faculty of inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole campaigns with which Napoleon was endowed beyond all mankind. It is this which especially constitutes military genius. For so vast, so complicated are the combinations of war, so easily and by such slight causes are they affected, that the best generals do but grope in the dark, and they acknowledge the humiliating truth. By the number and extent of their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors, the merit of commanders is to be measured.

In this campaign Lord Wellington designed to penetrate France, not with a hasty incursion but solidly, to force Soult over the Garonne, and if possible in the direction of Bordeaux, because it was the direct line, because the citizens were inimical to the emperor, and the town, lying on the left bank of the river, could not be defended ; because a junction with Suchet would thus be prevented. Finally, if by operating against Soult's left he could throw the French army into the Landes, where his own superior cavalry could act, it would probably be destroyed.

To operate against Soult's left in the direction of Pau was the most obvious method of preventing a junction with Suchet, and rendering the positions which the French general had fortified on the Gaves useless. But the investment of Bayonne required a large force, which was yet weak against an outer attack because separated in three parts by the rivers ; hence if Lord Wellington had made a wide movement on Pau, Soult might have placed the Adour between him and the main army and then fallen upon Hope's troops on the right side of that river. The English general was thus reduced to act upon a more contracted line, and to cross all the Gaves. To effect this he collected his principal mass on his right by the help of the great road leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, then by rapid marches and reiterated attacks he forced the passage of the rivers above the points which Soult had fortified for defence, and so turned that general's left with the view of finally cutting him off from Suchet and driving him into the wilderness of the Landes. During these marches he left Beresford on the lower parts of the rivers to occupy the enemy's attention and cover the troops blockading Mousserolles. Meanwhile, by the collection of boats at Urt and other demonstrations indicating a design of throwing a bridge over the Adour above Bayonne, he diverted attention from the point chosen below the fortress for that operation, and at the same time provided the means of throwing another bridge at the Port de Landes to secure the communication with Hope by the right bank whenever Soult should be forced to abandon the Gaves. These were fine combinations.

I have shown that Beresford's corps was so weak at first that Soult might have struck a counter-blow. Lord Wellington admitted the error. Writing on the 15th he says, " If the enemy stand upon the Bidouze I am not so strong as I ought to be," and he ordered up the fourth and light divisions ; but this excepted, his movements were conformable to the principles of war. He chose the best strategic line of operations, his main attack was made with heavy masses against the enemy's weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and daring. His conduct was

conformable also to his peculiar situation. He had two distinct operations in hand, namely, to throw his bridge below Bayonne and to force the Gaves. He had the numbers required to obtain these objects, but he dared not use them lest he should put the Spanish troops into contact with the French people; yet he could not entirely dispense with them; wherefore bringing Freyre up to Bayonne, Morillo to Navarrens, and Mina to St. Jean Pied de Port, he seemed to put his whole army in motion, thus gaining the appearance of military strength with as little political danger as possible. Nevertheless, so terrible had the Spaniards already made themselves by their cruel lawless habits, that their mere return across the frontier threw the whole country into consternation.

6. When in front of Orthes it would at first sight appear as if Lord Wellington had changed his plan of driving the enemy upon the Landes, but it was not so. He did not expect a battle on the 27th. This is proved by his letter to Sir John Hope in which he tells that general that he anticipated no difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau, that on the evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring, and that he designed to visit the position at Bayonne. To pass the Gave in the quickest and surest manner, to re-establish the direct communications with Hope, and to unite with Beresford, were his immediate objects; if he finally worked by his left it was a sudden act and extraneous to the general design, which was certainly to operate with Hill's corps and the light division by the right.

It was after passing the Gave at Berenx on the morning of the 27th Lord Wellington first discovered Soult's intention to fight, and that consequently he was himself in a false position. Had he shown any hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured to take a defensive position with either Beresford's or Picton's troops, he would inevitably have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous situation. Instead of this, judging that Soult would not on the instant change from the defensive to the offensive, he confidently pushed Picton's skirmishers forward as if to assail the left of the French position, and put Beresford in movement against their right, and this with all the coolness imaginable. The success was complete. Soult, who supposed the allies stronger than they really were, naturally imagined the wings would not be so bold unless well supported in the centre, where the Roman camp could hide a multitude. He therefore held fast to his position until the movement was more developed, and in two hours the sixth and light divisions were up and the battle commenced. It was well fought on both sides, but the crisis was decided by the 52nd, and when that regiment was put in movement only a single Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the Roman camp: upon such nice combinations of time and place does the fate of battles turn.

7. Soult certainly committed an error in receiving battle at Orthes, and it has been said that Lord Wellington's wound at the most critical period of the retreat alone saved the hostile army. Nevertheless the clear manner in which the French general carried his troops away, his prompt judgment, shown in the sudden change of his line of retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which he halted and showed front again at Caçeres, Barcelonne, and Aire, were all proofs of no common ability. It was Wellington's aim to drive the French on to the Landes, Soult's to avoid this, he therefore shifted from the Bordeaux line to that of Toulouse, not in confusion but with the resolution of a man ready to dispute every foot of ground. The loss of the magazines at Mont Marsan was no fault of his; he had given orders for transporting them towards the Toulouse side 15 days before, but the matter, depending upon the civil authorities, was neglected. He was blamed by some of his officers for fighting at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover the magazines there, and essential to his design of keeping up the courage of the soldiers under the adverse circumstances which he anticipated. And here the palm of generalship remained with him, for certainly the battle of Orthes was less decisive than it should have been. I speak not of the pursuit to Sault de Navailles, nor of the next day's march upon St. Sever, but of Hill's march on the right. That general halted near Samadet the 28th, reached St. Savin on the Adour the 1st, and fought the battle of Aire on the evening of the 2nd of March. But from Samadet to Aire is not longer than from Samadet to St. Savin where he was on the 1st. He could therefore, if his orders had prescribed it so, have seized Aire on the 1st before Clausel arrived,

and thus spared the obstinate combat at that place. It may also be observed that his attack did not receive a right direction. It should have been towards the French left, because they were more weakly posted there, and the ridge held by their right was so difficult to retire from that no troops would stay on it if any progress was made on the left. This was, however, an accident of war; General Hill had no time to examine the ground, his orders were to attack, and to fall without hesitation upon a retreating enemy after such a defeat as Orthes was undoubtedly the right thing to do, but it cannot be said that Lord Wellington pushed the pursuit with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm on the evening of the 1st he could have reinforced Hill, and should not have given the French army time to recover from their recent defeat. "The secret of war," says Napoleon, "is to march 12 leagues, fight a battle, and march 12 more in pursuit."

CHAPTER III.

EXTREMELY perilous and disheartening was the situation of the French general. His army was greatly reduced by his losses in battle and by the desertion of the conscripts, and 3000 stragglers, old soldiers who ought to have rejoined their eagles, were collected by different generals, into whose districts they had wandered, and employed to strengthen detached corps instead of being restored to the army. All his magazines were taken, discontent the natural offspring of misfortune prevailed amongst his officers, a powerful enemy was in front, no certain resources of men or money behind, and his efforts were ill seconded by the civil authorities. The troops, indignant at the people's apathy, behaved with so much violence and insolence, especially during the retreat from St. Sever, that Soult, who wanted officers very badly, proposed to fill the vacancies from the national guards that he might have "men who would respect property." On the other hand the people comparing the conduct of their own army with the discipline of the Anglo-Portuguese, and contrasting the requisitions necessarily imposed by their countrymen with the ready and copious disbursements in gold made by their enemies, for now one commissary preceded each division to order rations for the troops and another followed to arrange and pay on the spot, were become so absolutely averse to the French army that Soult writing to the minister of war thus expressed himself: "If the population of the departments of the Landes of Gers, and the Lower Pyrenees, were animated with a good spirit, this is the moment to make the enemy suffer by carrying off his convoys and prisoners, but they appear more disposed to favour the invaders than to second the army. It is scarcely possible to obtain a carriage for transport, and I shall not be surprised to find in a short time these inhabitants taking arms against us." Soult was, however, a man formed by nature and by experience to struggle against difficulties, always appearing greater when in a desperate condition than when more happily circumstanced. At Genoa under Massena, at Oporto, and in Andalusia, he had been inured to military distress, and probably for that reason the emperor selected him to sustain this dangerous contest in preference to others accounted more ready tacticians on a field of battle.

On the 3rd and 4th he retreated by Plaisance and Madiran to Rabastens, Marcia, and Maubourget, where he halted, covering Tarbes, for his design was to keep in mass and await the development of the allies' plans. In this view he called in the detachments of cavalry and infantry which had been left on the side of Pau before the battle of Orthes, and hearing that Darricau was at Langon with 1000 men he ordered him to march by Agen and join the army immediately. He likewise put the national guards and gens-d'armes in activity on the side of the Pyrenees, and directed the commanders of the military districts in his rear to keep their old soldiers, of which there were many scattered through the country, in readiness to aid the army.

While thus acting he received from the minister of war a note dictated by the emperor.

"Fortresses," said Napoleon, "are nothing in themselves when the enemy, having the command of the sea, can collect as many shells and bullets and guns as he pleases to crush them. Leave therefore only a few troops in Bayonne, the way to prevent the siege is to keep the army close to the place. Resume the offensive,

fall upon one or other of the enemy's wings, and though you should have but 20,000 men, if you seize the proper moment and attack hardily, you ought to gain some advantage. You have enough talent to understand my meaning."

This note came 14 days too late. But what if it had come before? Lord Wellington, after winning the battle of St. Pierre, the 13th of December, was firmly established on the Adour above Bayonne, and able to interrupt the French convoys as they descended from the Port de Landes. It was evident then that when dry weather enabled the allies to move, Soult must abandon Bayonne to defend the passage of the Gaves, or risk being turned and driven upon the Landes from whence it would be difficult for him to escape. Napoleon, however, desired him to leave only a few men in Bayonne; another division would thus have been added to his field army, and this diminution of the garrison would not have increased Lord Wellington's active forces, because the investment of Bayonne would still have required three separate corps: moreover, until the bridge-head at Peyrehorade was abandoned to concentrate at Orthes, Bayonne was not, rigorously speaking, left to its own defence.

To the emperor's observations Soult therefore replied, that several months before, he had told the minister of war Bayonne was incapable of sustaining 15 days open trenches unless the entrenched camp was well occupied, and he had been by the minister authorized so to occupy it. Taking that as his base he had left a garrison of 13,500 men, and now that he knew the emperor's wishes it was no longer in his power to withdraw them. With respect to keeping close to the place, he had done so as long as he could without endangering the safety of the army, but Lord Wellington's operations had forced him to abandon it, and he had only changed his line of operations at St. Sever when he was being pushed back upon Bordeaux with little prospect of being able to pass the Garonne in time. He had for several months thought of establishing a pivot of support for his movements at Dax, in the design of still holding by Bayonne, and with that view had ordered the old works of the former place to be repaired and a camp to be fortified; but from poverty of means even the body of the place was not completed or armed at the moment when the battle of Orthes forced him to relinquish it. Moreover the insurgent levy of the Landes upon which he depended to man the works, had failed, not more than 200 men had come forward. Neither was he very confident of the advantage of such a position, because Wellington, with superior numbers, would probably have turned his left and forced him to retire precipitately towards Bordeaux by the desert of the greater Landes.

The emperor ordered him to take the offensive, were it only with 20,000 men. He would obey with this observation, that from the 14th of February to that moment he had had no power to take the initiatory movement, having been constantly attacked by infinitely superior numbers. He had defended himself as he could, but had not expected to succeed against the enormous disproportion of force. It being thus impossible, even though he sacrificed his last man in the attempt, to stop the enemy, he now sought to prolong the war as much as possible on the frontier, and by defending every position to keep the invaders in check and prevent them from attacking Bordeaux or Toulouse, save by detachments. He had taken his line of operations by the road of Tarbes, St. Gaudens, and Toulouse, that is to say, by the roots of the Pyrenees, calculating that if Lord Wellington sent small detachments against Bordeaux or Toulouse, the generals commanding at those places would be able if the national guards would fight for their country, to defend them.

If the enemy made large detachments, an attack in front while he was thus weakened would bring them back again. If he marched with his whole army upon Bordeaux he could be followed and forced to face about. If he attempted to march by Auch against Toulouse he might be stopped by an attack in flank. If he remained stationary he should be provoked by an advance to develop his objects. But if, as was to be expected, the French army was itself attacked, it would defend its position vigorously, and then retreating by St. Gaudens draw the allies into a difficult mountain country, where the ground might be disputed step by step, the war be kept still on the frontier, and the passage of the Garonne be delayed. He had meditated deeply upon his task and could find no better mode. But his army was weakened by combats, still more by desertion; the conscripts went off so fast

that of five battalions lately called up from Toulouse two-thirds were already gone without having seen an enemy.

Soult was mistaken as to the real force of the allies in the recent operations. In other respects he displayed clear views and great activity. He reorganized his army in six divisions, called in his detachments, urged the imperial commissioners and local authorities to hasten the levies and restore deserters, and he prepared a plan of action for the partisans which had been organized towards the mountains. Nevertheless his difficulties increased. The conscripts who did arrive were for the most part unarmed and he had none to spare. The imperial commissary Cornudet, and the prefect of the Gironde, quitted Bordeaux, and when General L'Huillier attempted to remove the military stores belonging to the army from Langon, Podensac, and Bordeaux, the inferior authorities opposed him. There was no money they said to pay the expense, but in truth Bordeaux was the focus of Bourbon conspiracy, and the mayor, Count Lynch, was eager to betray his sovereign.

Nor was Wellington without embarrassments. The storms prevented him following up his victory while the French army was in confusion. Now it was reorganized on a new line and could retreat for many days in a direction parallel to the Pyrenees with strong defensive positions. Should he press it closely? His army weakened at every step would have to move between the mountains and the Garonne, exposing its flanks and rear to the operations of any force which the French might be able to collect on those boundaries; that is to say all the power of France beyond the Garonne. It was essential to find some counterpoise, and to increase his field army. To establish a Bourbon party at Bordeaux was an obvious mode of attaining the first object. Should he then seize that city by a detachment? He must employ 12,000 men and remain with 26,000 to oppose Soult, who he erroneously believed was being joined by the 10,000 men which Suchet had sent to Lyons. The five regiments detached for their clothing had rejoined the army, and all the reserves of cavalry and artillery were now called up, but the reinforcements from England and Portugal, amounting to 20,000 men, upon which he had calculated were detained by the respective governments. Wherefore, driven by necessity, he directed Freyre to join him by the Port de Landes with two divisions of the Gallician army, a measure which was instantly followed by innumerable complaints of outrages and excesses, although the Spaniards were entirely provided from the English military chest. Now also Clinton was ordered to send the British and Germans of the Anglo-Sicilian army to St. Jean de Luz. This done, he determined to seize Bordeaux. Meanwhile he repaired the destroyed bridges, brought up one of Morillo's brigades from Navarrens to the vicinity of Aire, sent Campbell's Portuguese dragoons to Rocquefort, General Fane with two regiments of cavalry and a brigade of infantry to Pau, and pushed posts towards Tarbes and Vic Bigorre.

Soult, now fearing the general apathy and ill-will of the people would become fatal to him, endeavoured to arouse the energies of the people and the army by the following proclamation, which has been unreasonably railled at by several English writers, for it was a judicious, well-timed, and powerful address.

"Soldiers, at the battle of Orthes you did your duty, the enemy's losses surpassed yours; his blood moistened all the ground he gained. You may consider that feat of arms as an advantage. Other combats are at hand; no repose for us until his army, formed of such extraordinary elements, shall evacuate the French territory or be annihilated. Its numbers and progress may be great, but at hand are unexpected perils. Time will teach the enemy's general that French honour is not to be outraged with impunity.

"Soldiers, he has had the indecency to provoke you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition; he speaks of peace, but firebrands of discord follow him! He speaks of peace and excites the French to a civil war! Thanks be to him for making known his projects, our forces are thereby centupled; and he himself rallies round the imperial eagles all those who, deceived by appearances, believed our enemies would make a loyal war. No peace with the disloyal and perfidious nation! no peace with the English and their auxiliaries until they quit the French territory! they have dared to insult the national honour, the infamy to incite Frenchmen to

become perjured towards the emperor. Revenge the offence in blood. To arms ! Let this cry resound through the south of France, the Frenchman that hesitates abjures his country, and belongs to her enemies.

"Yet a few days and those who believe in English delicacy and sincerity will learn to their cost that cunning promises are made to abate their courage and subjugate them. They will learn also that if the English pay to-day, and are generous, they will to-morrow retake, and with interest, in contributions what they disburse. Let the pusillanimous beings who calculate the cost of saving their country remember that the English have in view to reduce Frenchmen to the same servitude as the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Sicilians, who groan under their domination. Past history will recall to those unworthy Frenchmen who prefer momentary enjoyment, to the safety of the great family, the English making Frenchmen kill Frenchmen at Quiberon ; it will show them at the head of all conspiracies, all odious political intrigues, plots, and assassinations, aiming to overthrow all principles, to destroy all grand establishments of trade to satisfy their immeasurable ambition, their insatiable cupidity. Does there exist upon the face of the globe a point known to the English where they have not destroyed, by seditions and violence, all manufactures which could rival their own? Thus they will do to the French establishments if they prevail.

"Devote then to opprobrium and execration all Frenchmen who favour their insidious projects, aye ! even those who are under his power if they seek not to hurt him. Devote to opprobrium and reject, as Frenchmen, those who think under specious pretexts to avoid serving their country ; and those also who, from corruption or indolence, hide deserters, instead of driving them back to their colours. With such men we have nothing in common, and history will pass their names with execrations to posterity. As to us soldiers, our duty is clear. Honour and fidelity. This is our motto, and we will fight to the last the enemies of our emperor and France. Respect persons and property. Grieve for those who have momentarily fallen under the enemy's yoke, and hasten the moment of their deliverance. Be obedient and disciplined, and bear implacable hatred towards traitors and enemies of the French name ! War to death against those who would divide us to destroy us ; and to those cowards who desert the imperial eagles to range themselves under another banner. Remember always that 15 ages of glory, triumphs innumerable, have illustrated our country. Contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great sovereign, his signal victories, which immortalize the French name. Let us be worthy of him, and we can then bequeath without a taint to our posterity the inheritance we hold from our fathers. Be, in fine, Frenchmen, and die arms in hand sooner than survive dishonour."

Let the time and the occasion of this proclamation be considered. Let it be remembered that no English writer, orator, or politician, had for many years used milder terms than robbers, murderers, atheists, and tyrant, when speaking of Frenchmen and their sovereign, that Lord Wellington, even at this time, refused that sovereign his title of emperor, calling him Buonaparte ; that on entering France he had published an order of the day, accusing the French commanders of authorising and encouraging the cruelties of their soldiers in Spain ; finally that for six years the Spanish, Portuguese, and English state papers were filled with most offensive ribald abuse of Napoleon, his ministers, and commanders. Let all this be remembered, and the acrimony of Soult's proclamation cannot be justly blamed, while the noble energy, the loyalty of the sentiments, the exciting passionate feeling of patriotism which pervades it must be admired. Was he, sprung from the ranks, a soldier of the republic, a general of the empire, after fighting 30 years under the tricolour, to be tame and measured to squeamishness in his phrases when he saw his country invaded by foreigners, and a pretender to the throne stalking behind their bayonets, beckoning his soldiers to desert their eagles, inviting his countrymen to betray their sovereign and dishonour their nation? Why, the man was surrounded by traitors, and proud and scornful of danger was his spirit to strive so mightily against defeat and treason combined.

It has been said in condemnation of him that the English general did not encourage the Bourbon party. Is that true? Did it so appear to the French

general? Had not the Duke of Angoulême come to the English head-quarters with mystery, and following the invading army, and protected by its arms, assembled round him all the ancient partisans of his house, sending forth agents, scattering proclamations even in Soult's camp, endeavouring to debauch his soldiers, and to aid strangers to subjugate France. Soult not only knew this, but was suffering under the effects. On every side he met with opposition and discontent from the civil authorities, his movements were made known to the enemy, and his measures thwarted in all directions. At Bordeaux a party were calling aloud with open arms to the invaders. At Tarbes the fear of provoking an action near the town had caused the dispersion of the insurrectional levy organized by the imperial commissioner Caffarelli. At Pau the aristocracy had secretly assembled to offer homage to the Duke of Angoulême, and there was a rumour that he was to be crowned at the castle of Henry IV. Was the French general to disregard these facts and symptoms because his opponent had avoided any public declaration in favour of the Bourbon family? Lord Wellington would have been the first to laugh at his simplicity if he had.

And what was the reason that the English general did not openly call upon the Bourbon partisans to raise the standard of revolt? Simply that Napoleon's astounding genius had so baffled the banded sovereigns and their innumerable hordes, that a peace seemed inevitable to avoid fatal disasters; and therefore Lord Wellington, who had instructions from his government not to embarrass any negotiation for peace by pledges to a Bourbon party, acting as an honest statesman and commander, would not excite men to their own ruin for a momentary advantage. But so far from discouraging treason to Napoleon on any other ground, he avowed his anxious desire for it, and his readiness to encourage every enemy of that monarch. He had seen and consulted with La Roche Jacquelin, with De Mailhols, and other vehement partisans for an immediate insurrection; and also with Viel Castel, an agent of Bernadotte's, until he found him intriguing against the Bourbons. He advised the Duke of Angoulême to form regular battalions, promised him arms, and actually collected 80,000 stand to arm the insurgents. Finally he rebuked the timid policy of the English ministers who, having such an opportunity of assailing Napoleon, refrained from doing it. Before Soult's proclamation appeared he thus wrote to Lord Bathurst:—

"I find the sentiment as we advance in the country still more strong against the Buonaparte dynasty and in favour of the Bourbons, but I am quite certain there will be no declaration on the part of the people, if the allies do not in some manner declare themselves." *"I cannot discover the policy of not hitting one's enemy as hard as one can, and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that he would not so act by us; he would certainly overturn the British authority in Ireland if it were in his power."*

Soult and Wellington acted and wrote, each in the manner most suitable to their situation, but it was not a little remarkable that Ireland should so readily occur to the latter as a parallel case.

It was in this state of affairs that the English general detached Beresford, with 12,000 men, against Bordeaux, giving him instructions to occupy that city, and acquire the Garonne as a port for the allies, but to make the French authorities declare whether they would or would not continue to exercise their functions under the conditions announced by proclamation. For hitherto Lord Wellington had governed the country as he advanced in this public manner, thus nullifying the misrepresentations of political intriguers, obviating the danger of false reports and rumours of his projects, making his justice and moderation known to the poorest peasant, and securing the French local authorities who continued to act under him from any false and unjust representation of their conduct to the imperial government if peace should be made with Napoleon. This expedition against Bordeaux, however, involved political as well as military interests. Beresford was instructed that there were many partisans of the Bourbons in that city who might propose to hoist the white standard and proclaim Louis the Eighteenth, under protection of the troops. They were to be told that the British nation and its allies wished well to their cause, and while public tranquillity was maintained in the districts occupied

by the troops, there would be no hindrance to their political proceedings ; they or any party opposed to Napoleon would receive assistance. Nevertheless, as the allied sovereigns were negotiating with the French emperor, however well inclined the English general might be to support a party against the latter during war, he could give no help if peace were concluded ; and this they must weigh well before they revolted. Beresford was therefore not to meddle with any declaration in favour of Louis the Eighteenth, but he was not to oppose it, and if revolt took place, he was to supply the revolvers with the arms and ammunition collected at Dax.

On the 8th Beresford marched towards Langon with the fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian's horsemen, and some guns ; he was joined on the road by some of Vandeleur's cavalry from Bayonne, and he had orders to observe the enemy's movements towards Agen, for it was still in Soult's power, by a forced march on that side, to cross the Garonne and enter Bordeaux before him. La Roche Jacquelin preceded the troops, and the Duke of Angoulême followed closely, but his partisans in the city, frightened at the danger of their enterprise, now besought Beresford to delay his march. La Roche Jacquelin vehemently condemned their hesitation, and his influence, supported by the consternation which the battle of Orthes had created amongst the Napoleonists, decided the question in favour of revolt.

Long before this epoch, Soult, foreseeing that the probable course of the war would endanger Bordeaux, had given orders to place the forts in a state of defence, to arm the flotilla, and to organize the national guards and the urban legions ; he had urged these measures again when the imperial commissioner, Cornudet, first arrived ; but, according to the usual habits of civilians who have to meddle with military affairs, everything was promised and nothing done. Cornudet and the prefect quitted the city as early as the 4th, first burning, with a silly affectation of vigour, some ships of war upon the stocks. General L'Huilier, unable to oppose the allies, then destroyed the fort of Medoc, on the left bank of the Garonne, disarmed some of the river batteries, and passing in the night of the 11th to the right bank, occupied the fortress of Blaye, the Paté, and other points. Meanwhile Beresford, who reached Langon the 10th, left Lord Dalhousie there with the bulk of the forces, and advanced with 800 cavalry.

Entering Bordeaux the 12th, he met the municipality and a great body of Bourbonists, at the head of whom was the mayor, Count Lynch, decorated with the scarf of his office and the legion of honour, both conferred upon him, and probably at his own solicitation, by the sovereign he was then going to betray. After some formal discourse, in which Beresford explicitly made known his instructions, Lynch very justly tore the tricolor, the emblem of his country's glory, from his own shoulders ; the white flag was then displayed, and the allies took peaceable possession of the city. The Duke of Angoulême arrived on the same day, and Louis the Eighteenth was formally proclaimed. This event, the act of a party, was not generally approved, and the mayor, conscious of weakness, immediately issued, with the connivance of the Duke of Angoulême, a proclamation, in which he asserted that, " the British, Portuguese, and Spanish armies were united in the south, as the other nations were united in the north, solely to destroy Napoleon, and replace him by a Bourbon king, who was conducted thither by these generous allies, and only by accepting that king could the French appease the resentment of the Spaniards." At the same time the Duke of Angoulême, as if quite master of the country, appointed prefects and other authorities in districts beyond the limits of Bordeaux.

Both the duke and the mayor soon repented of their precipitancy. The English fleet, which should have acted simultaneously with the troops, had not arrived ; the *Regulus*, a French 74, with several inferior vessels of war, were anchored below Blaye, and Beresford was recalled with the fourth division and Vivian's cavalry. Lord Dalhousie remained with only the seventh division and three squadrons to oppose L'Huilier's troops and other French corps which were now on the Garonne. He could not guard the river below Bordeaux, and some French troops recrossing again took possession of the fort of Grave near the mouth ; a new army was forming under General Decaen beyond the Garonne, the Napoleonists recovering from their

first stupor began to stir themselves, and a partisan officer coming down to St. Macaire on the 18th surprised 50 men which Lord Dalhousie had sent across the Garonne from Langon to take possession of a French magazine. In the Landes the peasants forming bands burned the houses of the gentlemen who had joined the white standard, and in Bordeaux itself a counter-insurrection was preparing whenever Decaen should be ready to advance.

The prince frightened at these symptoms of reaction desired Lord Dalhousie to bring his troops into Bordeaux to awe the Napoleonists, and meanwhile each party strove to outvie the other in idle rumours and falsehoods relating to the emperor. Victories and defeats were invented or exaggerated, Napoleon was dead from illness, had committed suicide, was poisoned, stabbed; and all these things were related as certain with most circumstantial details. Meanwhile Wellington, writing to the Duke of Angoulême, denied the veracity of the mayor's proclamation and expressed his trust that the prince was not a party to such a mendacious document. The latter, however, with some excuses about hurry and confusion avowed his participation in its publication, and defended the mayor's conduct. He also forwarded a statement of the danger his party was exposed to, and demanded aid of men and money, supporting his application by a note of council in which, with more ingenuity than justice, it was argued that as civil government could not be conducted without executive power, and as Lord Wellington had suffered the Duke of Angoulême to assume the civil government at Bordeaux without an adequate executive force, he was bound to supply the deficiency from his army, and even to furnish money until taxes could be levied under the protection of the soldiers.

The English general was not a man to bear with such sophistry in excuse for a breach of faith. Sorry he was he said to find that the principle by which he regulated his conduct towards the Bourbon party, though often stated, had made so little impression that the duke could not perceive how inconsistent it was with the mayor's proclamation. Most cautious therefore must be his future conduct, seeing that as the chief of an army and the confidential agent of three independent nations, he could not permit his views to be misrepresented upon such an important question. He had occupied Bordeaux as a military point, but certain persons, contrary to his advice and opinion, thought proper to proclaim Louis the Eighteenth. Those persons made no exertions, subscribed not a shilling, raised not a soldier, yet because he would not extend the posts of his army beyond what was proper and convenient, merely to protect their families and property exposed to danger, not on account of their exertions for they had made none, but on account of their premature declaration contrary to his advice, they took him to task in a document delivered to Lord Dalhousie by the prince himself. The writer of that paper and all such persons however might be assured that nothing should make him swerve from what he thought his duty to the sovereigns who employed him, he would not risk even a company of infantry to save properties and families placed in a state of danger contrary to his advice. The duke had better then conduct his policy and compose his manifestoes in such a manner as not to force a public contradiction of them. His royal highness was free to act as he pleased for himself, but he was not free to adduce the name and authority of the allied governments in support of his measures when they had not been consulted, nor of their general when he had been consulted but had given his opinion against those measures.

He had told him that if any great town or extensive district declared in favour of the Bourbons, he would not interfere with the government of that town or district, and if there was a general declaration in favour of his house he would deliver the civil government of all the country overrun by the army into his hands, but the fact was that even at Bordeaux the movement in favour of the Bourbons was not unanimous. The spirit had not spread elsewhere, not even to La Vendée, nor in any part occupied by the army. The events contemplated had not therefore occurred, and it would be a great breach of duty towards the allied sovereigns, and cruel to the inhabitants if he were to deliver them over to his royal highness prematurely, or against their inclinations. He advised him therefore to withdraw his prefects and confine his government to Bordeaux. He could give him no money, and after what had passed he was doubtful if he should afford him any countenance

or protection. The argument of the note of council, affirming that he was bound to support the civil government of his royal highness, only rendered it more incumbent upon him to beware how he gave farther encouragement, or to speak plainly, *permission* to the Bourbonists to declare themselves. It was disagreeable to take any step which should publicly mark a want of good understanding between himself and the duke, but Count Lynch had not treated him with common fairness or with truth, wherefore as he could not allow the character of the allied sovereigns or his own to be doubted, if his royal highness did not within 10 days contradict the objectionable parts of the mayor's proclamation he would do so himself.

Thus it appeared that with the French as with the Spaniards and Portuguese neither enthusiastic declarations nor actual insurrection offered any guarantee for sense, truth, or exertion; and most surely all generals and politicians of every country who trust to sudden popular commotions will find that noisy declamations, vehement demonstrations of feeling, idle rumours and boasting, the life-blood of such affairs, are essentially opposed to useful public exertions.

When Beresford marched to rejoin the army the line of occupation was too extensive for Lord Dalhousie and Lord Wellington ordered him to keep clear of the city and hold his troops together, observing that his own projected operations on the Upper Garonne would keep matters quiet on the lower part of that river. Nevertheless if the war had continued for a month that officer's situation would have been critical. For when Napoleon knew that Bordeaux had fallen he sent Decaen by post to Libourne to form the "*army of the Gironde*." For this object General Despeaux, acting under Soult's orders, collected a body of gens-d'armes, custom-house officers, and national guards on the Upper Garonne, between Agen and La Reolle, and it was one of his detachments that surprised Lord Dalhousie's men at St. Macaire on the 18th. A battery of eight guns was sent down from Narbonne, other batteries were despatched from Paris to arrive at Perigueux on the 11th of April, and 300 or 400 cavalry coming from the side of Rochelle joined L'Huillier who with 1000 infantry was in position at St. André de Cubzac beyond the Dordogne. Behind these troops all the national guards, custom-house officers, and gens-d'armes of five departments were ordered to assemble and march to the Dordogne; but the formidable part of the intended army was a body of Suchet's veterans, 6000 in number, under General Beurman, who had been turned from the road of Lyons and directed upon Libourne.

Decaen entered Mucidan on the 1st of April, but Beurman's troops had not then reached Perigeaux, and Lord Dalhousie's cavalry were in Libourne between him and L'Huillier. The power of concentration was thus denied to the French and meanwhile Admiral Penrose had secured the command of the Garonne. It appears Lord Wellington thought this officer dilatory, but on the 27th he arrived with a 74 and two frigates, whereupon the *Regulus*, and other French vessels then at Royan, made sail up the river and were chased to the shoal of Talmont, but they escaped through the narrow channel on the north side and cast anchor under some batteries. Previous to this event Mr. Ogilvie, a commissary, being on the river in a boat manned with Frenchmen, discovered the *Requin* sloop, half French half American, pierced for 22 guns, lying at anchor not far below Bordeaux, at the same time he saw a sailor leap hastily into a boat above him and row for the vessel. This man being taken, proved to be the armourer of the *Requin*, he said there were not many men on board, and Mr. Ogilvie observing his alarm and judging that the crew would also be fearful, with ready resolution bore down upon the *Requin*, boarded, and took her without any opposition either from her crew or that of his own boat, although she had 14 guns mounted and 11 men with two officers on board.

The naval co-operation being thus assured, Lord Dalhousie crossed the Garonne above the city, drove the French posts beyond the Dordogne, pushed scouring parties to La Reolle and Marmande, and sending his cavalry over the Dordogne intercepted Decaen's and L'Huillier's communications; the former was thus forced to remain at Mucidan with 250 gens-d'armes awaiting the arrival of Beurman, and he found neither arms nor ammunition nor a willing spirit to enable him to organize the national guards.

The English horsemen repassed the Dordogne on the 2nd of April, but on the 4th Lord Dalhousie crossed it again lower down, near St. André de Cubzac, with about 3000 men, intending to march upon Blaye, but hearing that L'Huillier had halted at Etauliers he turned suddenly upon him. The French general formed his line on an open common, occupying some woods in front with his detachments. Overmatched in infantry, he had 300 cavalry opposed to one weak squadron, and yet his troops would not stand the shock of the battle. The allied infantry cleared the woods in a moment, the artillery then opened upon the main body, which retired in disorder, horsemen and infantry together, through Etauliers, leaving behind several scattered bodies upon whom the British cavalry galloped and made 200 or 300 men and 30 officers prisoners.

If the 6000 old troops under Beurman had, according to Napoleon's orders, arrived at this time in Lord Dalhousie's rear, his position would have been embarrassing; but they were delayed on the road until the 10th. Meanwhile Admiral Penrose, having on the 2nd observed the French flotilla, consisting of 15 armed vessels and gun-boats, coming down from Blaye to join the *Regulus* at Talmont, sent the boats of his fleet to attack them, whereupon the French vessels run on shore and the crews, aided by 200 soldiers from Blaye, lined the beach to protect them. Lieutenant Dunlop who commanded the English boats, landing all his seamen and marines, beat these troops and carried off or destroyed the whole flotilla with a loss to himself of only six men wounded and missing. This operation completed and the action at Etauliers known, the admiral, now reinforced with a second ship of the line, resolved to attack the French squadron and the shore batteries, but in the night of the 6th the enemy set fire to their vessels. Captain Harris of the *Belle Poule* frigate then landed with 600 seamen and marines and destroyed the batteries and forts on the right bank from Talmont to the Courbe point. Blaye still held out, but at Paris treason had done its work, and Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity known for good, was overthrown to make room for despots, who with minds enlarged only to cruelty, avarice, and dissoluteness, were at the very moment of triumph intent to defraud the people, by whose strength and suffering they had conquered, of the only reward they demanded, *just government*. The war was virtually over, but on the side of Toulouse, Bayonne, and Barcelona, the armies, ignorant of this great event, were still battling with unabated fury.

CHAPTER IV.

WHILE Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux, Soult and Wellington remained in observation, each thinking the other stronger than himself. For the English general having intelligence of Beurman's march, believed that his troops were intended to reinforce and had actually joined Soult. On the other hand that marshal, who knew not of Beresford's march until the 13th, concluded Wellington still had the 12,000 men detached to Bordeaux. The numbers on each side were however nearly equal. The French army was 31,000, infantry and cavalry, yet 3000 being stragglers detained by the generals of the military districts, Soult could only put into line, exclusive of conscripts without arms, 28,000 sabres and bayonets, with 38 pieces of artillery. On the allies' side 27,000 sabres and bayonets were under arms, with 42 guns, but from this number detachments had been sent to Pau on one side, Roquefort on the other, and the cavalry scouts were pushed into the Landes and to the Upper Garonne.

Lord Wellington, expecting Soult would retreat upon Auch, and designing to follow him, had caused Beresford to keep the bulk of his troops towards the Upper Garonne that he might the sooner rejoin the army; but the French general, having early fixed his line of retreat by St. Gaudens, was only prevented from retaking the offensive on the 9th or 10th by the loss of his magazines, which forced him first to organize a system of requisition for the subsistence of his army. Meanwhile his equality of force passed away, for on the 13th Freyre came up with 8000 Spanish infantry, and the next day Ponsonby's heavy cavalry arrived. Lord Wellington was then the strongest, yet he still awaited Beresford's troops, and was uneasy about his own situation. He dreaded the junction of Suchet's army, for it was at this time the Spanish regency referred the convention, proposed by that marshal

for the evacuation of the fortresses, to his decision. He gave a peremptory negative, observing that it would furnish 20,000 veterans for Soult, while the retention of Rosas and Figueras would bar the action of the Spanish armies of Catalonia in his favour. But his anxiety was great, because he foresaw that Ferdinand's return and his engagement with Suchet, already related, together with the evident desire of Copons that the garrisons should be admitted to a convention would finally render that measure inevitable. Meanwhile the number of his own army was likely to decrease. The English cabinet, less considerate even than the Spanish government, had sent the militia, permitted by the recent act of parliament to volunteer for foreign service, to Holland, and with them the other reinforcements originally promised for the army in France: two or three regiments of militia only came to the Garonne when the war was over. To make amends the ministers proposed that Lord William Bentinck should send 4000 men from Sicily to land at Rosas, or some point in France, and so join Lord Wellington, who was thus expected to extend his weakened force from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean in order to cover the junction of this uncertain reinforcement. In fine, experience had taught the English statesmen so little that we find their general thus addressing them only one week previous to the termination of the war.

Having before declared that he should be, contrary to his wishes, forced to bring more Spaniards into France, he says:

"There are limits to the numbers with which this army can contend, and I am convinced your lordship would not wish to see the safety and honour of this handful of brave men depend upon the doubtful exertions and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish troops."—"The service in Holland may doubtless be more important to the national interest than that in this country, but I hope it will be considered that that which is most important of all is not *to lose* the brave army which has struggled through its difficulties for nearly six years."

The French infantry was now reorganized in six divisions, commanded by Darricau, D'Armagnac, Taupin, Maransin, Villatte, and Harispe; General Paris' troops, hitherto acting as an unattached body, were thus absorbed, the cavalry composed of Berton's and Vial's brigades was commanded by Pierre Soult, and there was a reserve division of 7000 conscripts, infantry, under General Travot. The division into wings and a centre, each commanded by a lieutenant-general, continued, yet this distinction was not attended to in the movements. Reille, though commanding the right wing, was at Maubourget on the left of the line of battle; D'Erlon, commanding the centre, was at Marsiac on the right covering the road to Auch; Clausel was at Rabastens forming a reserve to both. The advanced guards were towards Plaisance on the right, Madiran in the centre, and Lembege on the left. Soult thus covered Tarbes, and could move on a direct line by good roads either to Auch or Pau.

Lord Wellington, driven by necessity, now sent orders to Giron's Andalusians and Del Parque's troops to enter France from the Bastan, although Freyre's soldiers had by their outrages already created a wide-spread consternation. His headquarters were fixed at Aire, his army was in position on each side of the Adour, he had repaired all the bridges behind him, restored that over the Lees in his front, and dispersed some small bands which had appeared upon his left flank and rear: Soult had however organized a more powerful system of partisans towards the mountains, and only wanted money to put them in activity. The main bodies of the two armies were a long day's march asunder, but their advanced posts were not very distant, the regular cavalry had frequent encounters and both generals claimed the superiority though neither made any particular report.

On the night of the 7th, Soult, thinking to find only some weak parties at Pau, sent a strong detachment there to arrest the nobles who had assembled to welcome the Duke of Angoulême, but General Fane getting there before him with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, the stroke failed; however, the French returning by another road made prisoners of an officer and four or five English dragoons. Meanwhile a second detachment, penetrating between Pau and Aire, carried off a post of correspondence; and two days after, when Fane had quitted Pau, a French officer accompanied by only four hussars captured there 34 Portuguese

with their commander and ten loaded mules. The French general, having by these excursions obtained exact intelligence of Beresford's march to Bordeaux, resolved to attack the allies, and the more readily that Napoleon had recently sent him instructions to draw the war to the side of Pau keeping his left resting on the Pyrenees, which accorded with his own designs.

Lord Wellington's main body was now concentrated round Aire and Barcelone, yet divided by the Adour, and the advanced guards were pushed to Garlin, Conchez, Viella, Riscle, and Pouydruguien, that is to say, on a semicircle to the front and about half a march in advance. Soult therefore thought to strike a good blow, and gathering his divisions on the side of Maubourget the 12th, marched on the 13th, designing to throw himself upon the high tabular land between Pau and Aire, and then act according to circumstances.

The country was suited to the action of all arms, offering a number of long and nearly parallel ridges of moderate height, the sides of which were sometimes covered with vineyards, but the summits commonly so open that troops could move along them without much difficulty, and between these ranges a number of small rivers and muddy fords descended from the Pyrenees to the Adour. This conformation determined the order of the French general's march, which followed the course of these rivers. Leaving one regiment of cavalry to watch the valley of the Adour, he moved with the rest of his army by Lembège upon Conchez down the smaller Lees. Clausel thus seized the high land of Daise and pushed troops to Portet; Reille supported him at Conchez; D'Erlon remained behind that place in reserve. In this position the head of the columns, pointing direct upon Aire, separated Viella from Garlin, which was the right of General Hill's position, and menaced that general's posts on the great Lees. Meanwhile Pierre Soult, marching with three regiments of cavalry along the high land between the two Lees, reached Mascaras and the castle of Sault, he thus covered the left flank of the French army, and pushed Fane's cavalry posts back with the loss of two officers taken and a few men wounded. During this movement Berton advancing from Madiran with two regiments of cavalry towards Viella, on the right flank of the French army, endeavoured to cross the Saye river at a difficult muddy ford near the broken bridge. Sir John Campbell, leading a squadron of the fourth Portuguese cavalry, overthrew the head of his column, but the Portuguese horsemen were too few to dispute the passage, and Berton finally getting a regiment over higher up, gained the table-land above, and charging the rear of the retiring troops in a narrow way leading to the Aire road, killed several and took some prisoners, amongst them Bernardo de Sà, the since well-known Count of Bandeira.

This terminated the French operations for the day, and Lord Wellington, imagining the arrival of Suchet's troops had made Soult thus bold, resolved to keep on the defensive until his reinforcements and detachments could come up. Hill, however, passed the greater Lees partly to support his posts, partly to make out the force and true direction of the French movement, but he recrossed that river during the night, and finally occupied the strong platform between Aire and Garlin, which Soult had designed to seize. Lord Wellington immediately brought the third and sixth division and the heavy cavalry over the Adour to his support, leaving the light division with the hussar brigade still on the right bank. The bulk of the army thus occupied a strong position parallel with the Pau road. The right was at Garlin, the left at Aire, the front covered by the greater Lees, a river difficult to pass; Fane's cavalry was extended along the Pau road as far as Boelho, and on the left of the Adour the hussars pushed the French cavalry regiment left there back upon Plaisance.

On the morning of the 14th Soult, intending to fall on Hill, whose columns he had seen the evening before on the right of the Lees, drove in the advanced posts which had been left to cover the retrograde movement, and then examined the allies' new position; but these operations wasted the day, and towards evening he disposed his army on the heights between the two Lees, placing Clausel and D'Erlon at Castle Pugon opposite Garlin, and Reille in reserve at Portet. Meanwhile Pierre Soult carried three regiments of cavalry to Clarac, on the Pau road, to intercept the communications with that town, and to menace the right flank of

the allies, against which the whole French army was now pointing. Fane's outposts being thus assailed retired with some loss at first, but they were soon supported, and drove the French horsemen in disorder clear off the Pau road to Carere.

Soult now seeing the strength of the position above Aire, and hearing from the peasants that 40,000 or 50,000 men were concentrated there, feared to attack, but changing his plan, resolved to hover about the right flank of the allies in the hopes of enticing them from their vantage-ground. Lord Wellington on the other hand drew his cavalry posts down the valley of the Adour, and keeping close on that side massed his forces on the right in expectation of an attack. In fine, each general, acting upon false intelligence of the other's strength, was afraid to strike. The English commander's error as to the junction of Suchet's troops was encouraged by Soult, who had formed his battalions upon two ranks instead of three to give himself an appearance of strength, and in the same view had caused his reserve of conscripts to move in rear of his line of battle. And he also judged the allies' strength by what it might have been rather than by what it was; for though Freyre's Spaniards and Ponsonby's dragoons were now up, the whole force did not exceed 36,000 men, including the light division and the hussars, who were on the right bank of the Adour. This number was however increasing every hour by the arrival of detachments and reserves; and it behoved Soult, who was entangled in a country extremely difficult if rain should fall, to watch that Wellington while holding the French in check with his right wing, did not strike with his left by Maubourget and Tarbes, and thus cast them upon the mountains about Lourdes.

This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of the fall of Bordeaux, induced the French general to retire before day on the 16th to Lembege and Simacourbe, where he occupied both sides of the two branches of the Lees and the heights between them; however, his outposts remained at Conchez, and Pierre Soult again getting upon the Pau road, detached 100 chosen troopers against the allies' communication with Orthes. Captain Dania commanding these men, making a forced march reached Hagetnau at nightfall, surprised six officers and eight medical men with their baggage, made a number of other prisoners, and returned on the evening of the 18th. This enterprize, extended to such a distance from the army, was supposed to be executed by the bands and seemed to indicate a disposition for insurrection; wherefore Lord Wellington to check it seized the civil authorities at Hagetnau, and declared that he would hang all the peasants caught in arms and burn their villages.

The offensive movement of the French general had now terminated, he sent his conscripts at once to Toulouse and prepared for a rapid retreat on that place. His recent operations had been commenced too late, he should have been on the Lees the 10th or 11th when there were not more than 20,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry to oppose him between Aire and Garlin. On the other hand the passive state of Wellington, which had been too much prolonged, was now also at an end, all his reinforcements and detachments were either up or close at hand, and he could put in motion six Anglo-Portuguese and three Spanish divisions of infantry, furnishing 40,000 bayonets, with five brigades of cavalry, furnishing nearly 6000 sabres, and from 50 to 60 pieces of artillery.

On the evening of the 17th, the English general pushed the hussars up the valley of the Adour, towards Plaisance, supporting them with the light division, which was followed at the distance of half a march by the fourth division coming from the side of Roquefort, on its return from Langon.

Th 18th at daylight the whole army was in movement, the hussars with the light and the fourth division, forming the left, marched upon Plaisance; Hill's troops, forming the right, marched from Garlin upon Conchez, keeping a detachment on the road to Pau in observation of Pierre Soult's cavalry. The main body moved in the centre, under Wellington in person, to Viella, by the high road leading from Aire to Maubourget. The French right was thus turned by the valley of the Adour, while General Hill with a sharp skirmish, in which about 80 British and Germans were killed and wounded, drove back their outposts upon Lembege.

Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge having a small river with rugged

banks, called the Laiza, in his front, and his right under D'Erlon was extended towards Vic Bigorre on the great road of Tarbes. Meanwhile Berton's cavalry, one regiment of which retreating from Viella on the 16th disengaged itself with some difficulty and loss, reached Maubourget, and took post in column behind that place, the road being confined on each side by deep and wide ditches. In this situation pressed by Bock's cavalry, which preceded the centre column of the allies, the French horsemen suddenly charged the Germans, at first with success, taking an officer and some men, but finally they were beaten and retreated through Vic Bigorre. Soult thinking a flanking column only was on this side in the valley of the Adour, resolved to fall upon it with his whole army; but he recognized the skill of his opponent when he found that the whole of the allies' centre, moving by Madiran, had been thrown on to the Tarbes road while he was retiring from Lembege. This heavy mass was now approaching Vic Bigorre, the light division, coming from Plaisance up the right bank of the Adour, were already near Auriebat, pointing to Rabastens, upon which place the hussars had already driven the French cavalry left in observation when the army first advanced: Vic Bigorre was thus turned, Berton's horsemen had passed it in retreat, and the danger was imminent. The French general immediately ordered Berton to support the cavalry regiment at Rabastens and cover that road to Tarbes. Then directing D'Erlon to take post at Vic Bigorre and check the allies on the main road, he marched, in person and in all haste, with Clausel's and Reille's divisions to Tarbes by a circuitous road leading through Ger-sur-landes.

D'Erlon, not seeming to comprehend the crisis, moved slowly, with his baggage in front, and having the river Lechez to cross, rode on before his troops expecting to find Berton at Vic Bigorre, but he met the German cavalry there. Then indeed he hurried his march, yet he had only time to place Darricau's division, now under General Paris, amongst some vineyards, two miles in front of Vic Bigorre, when hither came Picton to the support of the cavalry and fell upon him.

Combat of Vic Bigorre.—The French left flank was secured by the Lechez river, but their right, extending towards the Adour, being loose was menaced by the German cavalry while the front was attacked by Picton. The action commenced about two o'clock, and Paris was soon driven back in disorder, but then D'Armagnac's division entered the line and extending to the Adour renewed the fight, which lasted until D'Erlon, after losing many men, saw his right turned, beyond the Adour, by the light division and by the hussars, who were now close to Rabastens, whereupon he likewise fell back behind Vic Bigorre, and took post for the night. The action was vigorous. About 250 Anglo-Portuguese men and officers fell, and amongst them died Colonel Henry Sturgeon, so often mentioned in this history. Skilled to excellence in almost every branch of war and possessing a variety of accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently for himself and so usefully for the service that envy offered no bar to admiration, and the whole army felt painfully mortified that his merits were passed unnoticed in the public despatches.

Soult's march through the deep sandy plain of Ger was harassing, and would have been dangerous if Lord Wellington had sent Hill's cavalry, now reinforced by two regiments of heavy dragoons, in pursuit; but the country was unfavourable for quick observation and the French covered their movements with rear-guards whose real numbers it was difficult to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted on a hill the end of which abutted on the high road, the slope being clothed with trees and defended by skirmishers. Lord Wellington was desirous to know whether a small or a large force thus barred his way, but all who endeavoured to ascertain the fact were stopped by the fire of the enemy. At last Captain William Light, distinguished by the variety of his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman, and soldier, made the trial. He rode forward as if he would force his way through the French skirmishers, but when in the wood dropt his reins and leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of the enemy's light troops, and they thinking him mortally hurt ceased their fire and took no further notice. He thus passed unobserved through the wood to the other side of the hill, where there were no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit above put spurs to his horse and galloped along the French main line, counting their

regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence and his speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged, while he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the very skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed in front. Reaching the spot where Lord Wellington stood, he told him there were but five battalions on the hill.

Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse by St. Gaudens was inevitable, yet determined to dispute every position which offered the least advantage, his army was on the morning of the 20th again in line of battle on the heights of Oleac, two or three miles behind Tarbes, and covering Tournay on the road to St. Gaudens : however, he still held Tarbes with Clausel's corps, which was extended on the right towards Trie, as if to retain a power of retreat by that road to Toulouse. The plain of Tarbes although apparently open was full of deep ditches which forbade the action of horsemen, wherefore he sent his brother with five regiments of cavalry to the Trie road, with orders to cover the right flank and observe the route to Auch, for he feared lest Wellington should intercept his retreat by that line.

At day-break the allies again advanced in two columns. The right, under Hill, moved along the high road. The left, under Wellington in person, was composed of the light division and hussars, Ponsonby's heavy cavalry, the sixth division and Freyre's Spaniards. It marched by the road from Rabastens, and General Cole, still making forced marches with the fourth division and Vivian's cavalry, followed from Beaumarchez and La Deuze, sending detachments through Marciac to watch Pierre Soult on the side of Trie.

Combat of Tarbes.—The Adour separated Wellington's columns, but when the left approached Tarbes, the light division and the hussars bringing up their right shoulders attacked the centre of Harispe's division, which occupied the heights of Orliex and commanded the road from Rabastens with two guns. Under cover of this attack General Clinton made a flank movement to his left through the village of Dours, and opening a cannonade against Harispe's right endeavoured to get between that general and Soult's main position at Oleac. Meanwhile General Hill, moving by the other bank of the Adour, assailed the town and bridge of Tarbes, which was defended by Villatte's division. These operations were designed to envelop and crush Clausel's two divisions, which seemed the more easy because there appeared to be only a fine plain, fit for the action of all the cavalry, between him and Soult. The latter, however, having sent his baggage and encumbrances off during the night, saw the movement without alarm ; he was better acquainted with the nature of the plain behind Harispe and had made roads to enable him to retreat upon the second position without passing through Tarbes. Nevertheless Clausel was in some danger, for while Hill menaced his left at Tarbes, the light division, supported with cavalry and guns, fell upon his centre at Orliex, and General Clinton opening a brisk cannonade, passed through the villages of Oleat and Boulin, penetrated between Harispe and Pierre Soult, and cut the latter off from the army.

The action was begun about 12 o'clock. Hill's artillery thundered on the right, Clinton's answered it on the left, and Alten threw the light division in mass upon the centre where Harispe's left brigade, posted on a strong hill, was suddenly assailed by the three rifle battalions. Here the fight was short yet wonderfully fierce and violent, for the French, probably thinking their opponents to be Portuguese on account of their green dress, charged with great hardness, and being encountered by men not accustomed to yield, they fought muzzle to muzzle, and it was difficult to judge at first who would win. At last the French gave way, and Harispe's centre being thus suddenly overthrown, he retired rapidly through the fields, by the ways previously opened, before Clinton could get into his rear. Meanwhile Hill forced the passage of the Adour at Tarbes, and Villatte also retreated along the high road to Tournay, but under a continued cannonade. The flat country was now covered with confused masses of pursuers and pursued, all moving precipitately with an eager musketry, the French guns also replying as they could to the allies' artillery. The situation of the retreating troops seemed desperate, but as Soult had foreseen, the deep ditches and enclosures and the small copses, villages, and farm-houses, prevented the British cavalry from acting ; Clausel, therefore, extricating his troops

with great ability from their dangerous situation, finally gained the main position, where four fresh divisions were drawn up in order of battle and immediately opened all their batteries on the allies. The pursuit was thus checked, and before Lord Wellington could make arrangements for a new attack darkness came on and the army halted on the banks of the Larret and Larros rivers. The loss of the French is unknown, that of the allies did not exceed 120, but of that number 12 officers and 80 men were of the rifle battalions.

During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on different hills as points of direction. The next day he reached St. Gaudens with D'Erlon's and Reille's corps, while Clausel, who had retreated across the fields, halted at Monrejean and was there re-joined by Pierre Soult's cavalry. This march of more than 30 miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner. For the French general, having now seen nearly all Wellington's infantry and his 5000 horsemen, and hearing from his brother that the fourth division and Vivian's cavalry were pointing towards Mielan on his right, feared that the allies would by Trie and Castlenau suddenly gain the plains of Muret and intercept his retreat upon Toulouse, which was his great dépôt, the knot of all his future combinations, and the only position where he could hope to make a successful stand with his small army.

The allies pursued in three columns by St. Gaudens, Galan, and Trie, but their marches were short.

On the 21st Beresford, who had assumed the command of the left column, was at Castlenau, Hill in the vicinity of Lannemezan, Wellington at Tournay.

The 22nd, Beresford was at Castlenau, Wellington at Galan, Hill at Monrejean, and Fane's horsemen pushed forwards to St. Gaudens. Here four squadrons of French cavalry were drawn up in front of the town. Overthrown by two squadrons of the 13th dragoons at the first shock, they galloped in disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the other side and were again broken and pursued for two miles, many being sabred and above 100 taken prisoners. In this action the veteran Major Dogherty of the 13th was seen charging between his two sons at the head of the leading squadron.

On the 23rd Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at Puymauren, Wellington at Boulogne.

The 24th, Hill was in St. Martory, Beresford in Lombez, Wellington at Isle en Dodon.

The 25th, Hill entered Caceres, Beresford reached St. Foy, and Wellington was at Samatan.

The 26th, Beresford entered St. Lys and marching in order of battle by his left, while his cavalry skirmished on the right, took post on the Auch road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the French army, which was on the Touch covering Toulouse. The allies thus took seven days to march what Soult had done in four.

This tardiness, idly characterized by French military writers as the sign of timidity and indecision of character, has been by English writers excused on the score of wet weather and the encumbrance of a large train of artillery and pontoons; yet the rain equally affected the French, and the pontoons might have been as usefully waited for on the Garonne after the French army had been pressed in its retreat of 90 miles. It is more probable that the English general, not exactly informed of Soult's real numbers nor of his true line of retreat, nor perfectly acquainted with the country, was cautious; because being then acrimoniously disputing with the Duke of Angoulême he was also uneasy as to the state of the country behind him and on his flanks. The partisans were beginning to stir, his reinforcements from England and Portugal were stopped, and Admiral Penrose had not yet entered the Garonne. On the other hand Ferdinand had entered Spain and formed that engagement with Suchet about the garrisons already mentioned. In fine, Lord Wellington found himself with about 45,000 men composed of different nations, the Spaniards being almost as dangerous as useful to him, opposed to an able and obstinate enemy, and engaged on a line of operations running more than 150 miles along the French frontier. His right flank was likely to be vexed by the partisans forming in the Pyrenees, his left flank by those behind

the Garonne, on the right bank of which a considerable regular force was also collecting, while the generals commanding the military districts beyond Toulouse were forming corps of volunteers, national guards, and old soldiers of the regular *dépôts* : and ever he expected Suchet to arrive on his front and overmatch him in numbers. He was careful therefore to keep his troops well in hand, and to spare them fatigue that the hospitals might not increase. In battle their bravery would he knew bring him through any crisis, but if wearing down their numbers by forced marches he should cover the country with small posts and hospital stations, the French people would be tempted to rise against him. So little therefore was his caution allied to timidity that it was no slight indication of daring to have advanced at all.

It does seem, however, that with an overwhelming cavalry, and great superiority of artillery he should not have suffered the French general so to escape his hands. It must be admitted also that Soult proved himself a very able commander. His halting on the Adour, his success in reviving the courage of his army, and the front he showed in hopes to prevent his adversary from detaching troops against Bordeaux, were proofs not only of a firm unyielding temper but of a clear and ready judgment. For though, contrary to his hopes, Lord Wellington did send Beresford against Bordeaux, it was not on military grounds but because treason was there to aid him. Meanwhile he was forced to keep his army for 15 days passive within a few miles of an army he had just defeated, permitting his adversary to reorganize and restore the discipline and courage of the old troops, to rally the dispersed conscripts, to prepare the means of a partisan warfare, to send off all his encumbrances and sick to Toulouse, and to begin fortifying that city as a final and secure retreat ; for the works there were commenced on the 3rd or 4th of March, and at this time the entrenchments covering the bridge and suburb of St. Cyprien were nearly completed. The French general was even the first to retake the offensive after Orthes, too late indeed, and he struck no important blow, and twice placed his army in dangerous situations ; but his delay was a matter of necessity arising from the loss of his magazines, and if he got into difficulties they were inseparable from his operations and he extricated himself again.

That he gained no advantages in fight is rather argument for Lord Wellington than against Soult. The latter sought but did not find a favourable opportunity to strike, and it would have been unwise, because his adversary gave him no opening, to have fallen desperately upon superior numbers in a strong position with an army so recently defeated, and whose restored confidence it was so essential not to shake again by a repulse. He increased that confidence by appearing to insult the allied army with an inferior force, and in combination with his energetic proclamation encouraged the Napoleonists and alarmed the Bourbonists ; lastly, by his rapid retreat from Tarbes he gained two days to establish and strengthen himself on his grand position at Toulouse. And certainly he deceived his adversary, no common general and at the head of no common army ; for so little did Wellington expect him to make a determined stand there, that in a letter written on the 26th to Sir John Hope, he says, " I fear the Garonne is too full and large for our bridge, if not we shall be in that town, Toulouse, I hope immediately."

The French general's firmness and the extent of his views cannot however be fairly judged by merely considering his movements in the field. Having early proved the power of his adversary, he had never deceived himself about the ultimate course of the campaign, and therefore struggled without hope, a hard and distressing task ; yet he showed no faintness, fighting continually, and always for delay as thinking Suchet would finally cast personal feelings aside and strike for his country. Nor did he forbear importuning that marshal to do so. Notwithstanding his previous disappointments he wrote to him again on the 9th of February, urging the danger of the crisis, the certainty that the allies would make the greatest effort on the western frontier, and praying him to abandon Catalonia and come with the bulk of his troops to Bearn ; in the same strain he wrote to the minister of war, and his letters reached their destinations on the 13th. Suchet, having no orders to the contrary, could therefore have joined him with 13,000 men before the battle of Orthes ; but that marshal, giving a deceptive statement of his forces in reply, coldly

observed, that if he marched anywhere it would be to join the emperor and not the Duke of Dalmatia. The latter continued notwithstanding to inform him of all his battles and his movements, and his accumulating distresses, yet in vain, and Suchet's apathy would be incredible but for the unequivocal proofs of it furnished in the work of the French engineer, Choumara.

CHAPTER V.

THE two armies being now once more in presence of each other and with an equal resolution to fight, it is fitting to show the peculiar calculations upon which the generals founded their respective combinations. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country and chose Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south contained 50,000 inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. Here he could most easily feed his troops, assemble, arm, and discipline the conscripts, control and urge the civil authorities, and counteract the machinations of the discontented. Posted at Toulouse he was master of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet by Carcassonne, or towards Lyons by Alby. He could take a new position behind the Tarn, and prolong the contest by defending successively that river and the Lot, retreating if necessary upon Decaen's army of the Gironde, and thus drawing the allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank, being well assured that Lord Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces, as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet.

His first care was to place a considerable body of troops, collected from the dépôts and other parts of the interior at Montauban, under the command of General Loverdo, with orders to construct a bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that river, and a strong point of retreat and assembly for all the detachments sent to observe the Garonne below Toulouse, was thus secured, and withal the command of a number of great roads leading to the interior of France, consequently the power of making fresh combinations. To maintain himself as long as possible in Toulouse was, however, a great political object. It was the last point which connected him at once with Suchet and with Decaen; and while he held it, both the latter general and the partisans in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against the long lines of communications maintained by Wellington with Bordeaux and Bayonne. Suchet also could do the same, either by marching with his whole force or sending a detachment through the Arriège department to the Upper Garonne, where General Lafitte having 700 or 800 men, national guards and other troops, was already in activity. These operations Soult now strongly urged Suchet to adopt, but the latter treated the proposition, as he had done all those before made from the same quarter, with contempt.

Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.

The Garonne, flowing on the west, presented to the allies a deep loop, at the bottom of which was the bridge, completely covered by the suburb of St. Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers; these defences Soult had improved and he added a line of exterior entrenchments.

Beyond the Garonne was the city, surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to admit 16 and 24-pound guns.

The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles below the town, wound for the most part within point-blank shot of the walls, covering them on the north and east as the Garonne and St. Cyprien did on the west.

The suburbs of St. Stephen and Guillermerie, built on both sides of this canal, furnished outworks on the west, for they were entrenched and connected with and covered by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, also entrenched and flanking the approaches to the canal both above and below these suburbs.

Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong ridge, called the Mont Rave, run nearly parallel with the canal, its outer slope was exceedingly rugged, and overlooked a marshy plain through which the Ers river flowed.

The south side of the town opened on a plain, but the suburb of St. Michel lying there, between the Garonne and the canal, furnished another advanced defence, and at some distance beyond a range of heights, called the Pech David, commenced, trending up the Garonne in a direction nearly parallel to that river.

Such being the French general's position he calculated, that as Lord Wellington could not force the passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the flanks above or below Toulouse, and leave a sufficient force to blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having the French army issue on that side against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above its confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross that river also, which could not be effected nearer than Cintegabelle, one march higher up. Then he must come down by the right of the Arriege, an operation not to be feared in a country which the recent rains had rendered impracticable for guns. If the allies passed the Garonne below the confluence of the Arriege, Soult judged that he could from the Pech David, and its continuation, overlook their movements, and that he should be in position to fall upon the head of their column while in the disorder of passing the river; if he failed in this he had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont Rave to retire upon, where he could fight again, his retreat being secure upon Montauban.

For these reasons the passage of the Garonne above Toulouse would lead to no decisive result and he did not fear it, but a passage below the city was a different matter. Lord Wellington could thus cut him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern and eastern quarters; and if the French then lost the battle they could only retreat by Carcassonne to form a junction with Suchet in Roussillon, where, having their backs to the mountains and the allies between them and France, they could not exist. Hence, feeling certain the attack would finally be on that side, Soult lined the left bank of the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn, and called up General Despeaux's troops from Agen in the view of confining the allies to the space between the Tarn and the Garonne; for his first design was to attack them there rather than lose his communication with Montauban.

On the other hand Lord Wellington, whether from error, from necessity, or for the reasons I have before touched upon, having suffered the French army to gain three days' march in the retreat from Tarbes, had now little choice of operations. He could not halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque's troops should join him from the Bastan, without giving Soult all the time necessary to strengthen himself and organize his plan of defence, nor without appearing fearful and weak in the eyes of the French people, which would have been most dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had taken the offensive and could not resume the defensive with safety; the invasion of France once begun it was imperative to push it to a conclusion. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers his business was to bring his adversary to battle as soon as possible, and as he could not force his way through St. Cyprien in face of the whole French army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse.

It has been already shown that in a strategic view this passage should have been made below that town, but seeing that the south side of the city was the most open to attack, the English general resolved to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse, designing to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien. With this object, at eight o'clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill's brigades marched up from Muret, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced, the remainder of that general's troops being to pass at midnight. But when the river was measured the width was found too great for the pontoons and there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed some considerable advantage would probably have been gained, since it does not appear that Soult knew of the attempt until two days later, and then only by his emissaries, not by his scouts.

Wellington, thus baffled, tried another scheme; he drove the enemy from the Touch river on the 28th, and collected the infantry of his left and centre about

Portet, masking the movement with his cavalry. In the course of the operation, a single squadron of the 18th hussars, under Major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by Colonel Vivian across the bridge of St. Martyn de la Touch, suddenly came upon a whole regiment of French cavalry; the rashness of the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British, for the enemy, thinking that a strong support must be at hand, discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the speed of both sides increased, and as the nature of the road did not admit of any egress to the sides, this great body of French horsemen was pushed headlong by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.

During these movements Hill's troops were withdrawn to St. Roques, but in the night of the 30th, a new bridge being laid near Pensaguel, two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, that general passed the Garonne with two divisions of infantry, Morillo's Spaniards, Gardiner's and Maxwell's artillery, and Fane's cavalry, in all 13,000 sabres and bayonets, 18 guns, and a rocket brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition by the great road, having orders to seize the stone bridge of Cintegabelle, 15 miles up the Arriege, and, on the march, to secure a ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the troops followed, the intent being to pass the Arriege river hastily at Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on the south, while Lord Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march was to have been made privily in the night, but the bridge, though ordered for the evening of the 30th, was not finished until five o'clock in the morning of the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the enterprise in time to observe from the heights of Old Toulouse the strength of the column, and to ascertain that the great body of the army still remained in front of St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the country on the right of the Arriege was known to him, and the suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in a state to resist a partial attack, the matter appeared a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne passed below the city. In this persuasion he kept his infantry in hand, and sent only his cavalry up the right bank of the Arriege to observe the march of the allies; but he directed General Lafitte, who had collected some regular horsemen and the national guards of the department, to hang upon their skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet's army. He was, however, somewhat disquieted, because the baggage which, to avoid encumbering the march, had been sent up the Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being seen by his scouts, was reported to be a second column, increasing Hill's force to 18,000 men.

While in this uncertainty he heard of the measurement of the river made at Portet on the night of the 27th, and that many guns were still collected there; wherefore, being ignorant of the cause why the bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a design to cross there also when Hill should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger he put four divisions under Clausel, with orders to fall upon the head of the allies if they should attempt the passage before Hill came down, resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse and on the Mont Rave, because the positions on the right of the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was, however, soon relieved from anxiety. General Hill effected indeed the passage of the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry towards Villefranche and Nailloux, but his artillery were quite unable to move in the deep country there, and as success and safety alike depended on rapidity, he returned during the night to Pinsaguel, recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons, left only a flying bridge, with a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank. His retreat was followed by Lafitte's horsemen, who picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult remained well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important days.

The French general was now sure the next attempt would be below Toulouse, yet he changed his design of marching down the Garonne, to fight between that river and the Tarn, rather than lose his communications with Montauban. Having completed his works of defence for the city and the suburbs, and fortified all the bridges over the canal, he concluded not to abandon Toulouse under any circumstances, and therefore set his whole army and all the working population to

entrench the Mont Rave, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking he might thus securely meet the shock of battle, let it come on which side it would. Meanwhile the Garonne continued so full and rapid, that Lord Wellington was forced to remain inactive before St. Cyprien until the evening of the 3rd; then the waters falling, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade 15 miles below Toulouse, where the bridge was at last thrown, and 30 guns placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. The third, fourth, and sixth divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, immediately passed, and the cavalry, being pushed out two leagues on the front and flanks, captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the French army. But now the river again swelled so fast, that the light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge got damaged, and the pontoons were taken up.

This passage was made known to Soult immediately by his cavalry scouts, yet he knew not the exact force which had crossed, and as Morillo's Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre's, had taken the outposts in front of St. Cyprien, he imagined Hill also had moved to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over the Garonne. Wherefore, merely observing Beresford with his cavalry, he continued to strengthen his field of battle about Toulouse, his resolution to keep that city being confirmed by hearing on the 7th that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris.

On the 8th the waters subsided, the allies' bridge was again laid down, Freyre's Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery crossed, and Lord Wellington, taking the command in person, advanced to the heights of Fenoulhiet, within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both banks of the Ers, his columns were separated by that river, which was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure as soon as possible one of the stone bridges. Hence, when his left approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby, Vivian's horsemen drove Berton's cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of Bordes, and the 18th hussars descended towards that of Croix d'Orade. The latter was defended by Vial's dragoons, and after some skirmishing, the 18th was suddenly menaced by a regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite bank of the river being lined with dismounted carbineers. The two parties stood facing each other, hesitating to begin, until the approach of some British infantry, when both sides sounded a charge at the same moment; but the English horses were so quick, the French were in an instant jammed up on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and the mass, breaking away to the rear, went off in disorder, leaving many killed and wounded, and above 100 prisoners in the hands of the victors. They were pursued through the village of Croix d'Orade, but beyond it they rallied on the rest of their brigade and advanced again; the hussars then recrossed the bridge, which was now defended by the British infantry, whose fire stopped the French cavalry. The communication between the allied columns was thus secured.

The credit of this brilliant action was given to Colonel Vivian in the despatch, incorrectly, for that officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous to the charge at the bridge: the attack was conceived and conducted entirely by Major Hughes of the 18th.

Lord Wellington, from the heights of Kirie Eleison, carefully examined the French general's position, and resolved to attack on the 9th. Meanwhile, to shorten his communications with General Hill, he directed the pontoons to be removed from Grenade and relaid higher up at Seilh. The light division were to cross at the latter place at daybreak, but the bridge was not relaid until late in the day, and the English general, extremely incensed at the failure, was forced to defer his battle until the 10th.

Soult's combinations were now crowned with success. He had by means of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. He had gained 17 days for preparation, had brought the allies to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted for defence, and well fortified; where one-third of their force was separated by a great river from the rest, where they

could derive no advantage from their numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in artillery, notwithstanding their previous superiority in that arm.

His position covered three sides of Toulouse. Defending St. Cyprien on the west with his left, he guarded the canal on the north with his centre, and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east. His reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the urban guards while maintaining tranquillity aided to transport the artillery and ammunition to different posts. Hill was opposed to his left, but while the latter, well fortified at St. Cyprien, had short and direct communication with the centre by the great bridge of Toulouse, the former could only communicate with the main body under Wellington by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of 10 or 12 miles.

The English general was advancing from the north, but his intent was still to assail the city on the south side, where it was weakest in defence. With this design he had caused the country on the left of the Ers to be carefully examined, in the view of making, under cover of that river, a flank march round the eastern front, and thus gaining the open ground which he had formerly endeavoured to reach by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. But again he was baffled by the deep country, which he could not master so as to pass the Ers by force, because, all the bridges, with the exception of that at Croix d'Orade, were mined or destroyed by Soult, and the whole of the pontoons were on the Garonne. There was then no choice save to attack from the northern and eastern sides. The first, open and flat, and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence, because the canal, the bridges over which were strongly defended by works, was under the fire of the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part within musket-shot. Here then, as at St. Cyprien, it was a fortress and not a position which was opposed to him, and his field of battle was necessarily confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.

This range of heights, naturally strong and rugged, and covered by the Ers river, which as we have seen was not be forded, presented two distinct platforms, that of Calvinet, and that of St. Sypiere, on which the extreme right of the French was posted. Between them, where the ground dipped a little, two roads leading from Lavaur and Caraman were conducted to Toulouse, passing the canal behind the ridge at the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Etienne.

The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme left with a species of hornwork, consisting of several open retrenchments and small works, supported by two large redoubts, one of which flanked the approaches to the canal on the north: a range of abattis was also formed there by felling the trees on the Alby road. Continuing this line to the right two other large forts, called the Calvinet and the Colombette redoubts, terminated the works on this platform.

On that of St. Sypiere there were also two redoubts, one on the extreme right called St. Sypiere, the other without a name nearer to the road of Caraman.

The whole range of heights occupied was about two miles long, and an army attacking in front would have to cross the Ers under fire, advance through ground naturally steep and marshy, and now rendered almost impassable by means of artificial inundations, to the assault of the ridge and the works on the summit; and if the assailants should even force between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come upon the works of Cambon and Sacarin. If these fell the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Steven, the canal, and finally the ramparts of the town, would still have to be carried in succession. But it was not practicable to pass the Ers except by the bridge of Croix d'Orade which had been seized so happily on the 8th. Lord Wellington was therefore reduced to make a flank march under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and then to carry the latter with a view of crossing the canal above the suburb of Guillemerie, and establishing his army on the south side of Toulouse, where only the city could be assailed with any hope of success.



To impose this march upon him all Soult's dispositions had been directed. For this he had mined all the bridges on the Ers, save only that of Croix d'Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the Ers and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond that river by sending half his cavalry over to dispute the passage of the

numerous streams in the deep country on the right bank. His army was now disposed in the following order. General Reille defended the suburb of St. Cyprien with Taupin's and Maransin's divisions. Darricau's division lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to the road of Alby, defending with his left the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge with his right. Harispe's division was established in the works on the Mont Rave. His right at St. Sypiere looked towards the bridge of Bordes, his centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which Vial's horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Alby towards the bridge of Croix d'Orade. On this side a detached eminence within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, was occupied by St. Pol's brigade, drawn from Villatte's division. The two remaining divisions of infantry were formed in columns at certain points behind the Mont Rave, and Travot's reserve continued to man the walls of Toulouse behind the canal. This line of battle presented an angle towards the Croix d'Orade, each side about two miles in length and the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade.

Wellington having well observed the ground on the 8th and 9th, made the following disposition of attack for the 10th. General Hill was to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to draw the enemy's attention according to the progress of the battle on the right of the Garonne, which he could easily discern. The third and light divisions and Freyre's Spaniards, being already on the left of the Ers, were to advance against the northern front of Toulouse. The two first, supported by Bock's German cavalry, were to make demonstrations against the line of canal defended by Darricau. That is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux and the convent of the Minimes, while Alten maintained the communication between him and Freyre, who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover Beresford's column of march. This last, composed of the fourth and sixth divisions with three batteries was, after passing the bridge of Croix d'Orade, to move round the left of the Pugade and along the low ground between the French heights and the Ers, until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur, when the two divisions were to wheel into line and attack the platform of St. Sypiere. Freyre was then to assail that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby's dragoons following close were to connect that general's left with Beresford's column. Meanwhile Lord Edward Somerset's hussars were to move up the left of the Ers, while Vivian's cavalry moved up the right of that river, each destined to observe Berton's cavalry, which, having possession of the bridges of Bordes and Montaudran higher up, could pass from the right bank to the left, and destroying the bridge fall upon the head of Beresford's troops while in march.

BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

The 10th of April, at two o'clock in the morning, the light division passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and about six o'clock the whole army moved forwards in the order assigned for the different columns. Picton and Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced posts behind the works at the bridge over the canal. Freyre's columns, marching along the Alby road, were cannonaded by St. Pol with two guns until they had passed a small stream by the help of some temporary bridges, when the French general, following his instructions, retired to the horn-work on the Calvinet platform. The Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese guns under Major Arentschild opened a heavy cannonade against Calvinet. Meanwhile Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix d'Orade in three columns abreast. Passing behind the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc, he entered the marshy ground between the Ers river and the Mont Rave, but he left his artillery at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep and difficult country under the fire of the enemy. Beyond the Ers on his left, Vivian's cavalry, now under Colonel Arentschild, drove Berton's horsemen back with loss, and nearly seized the bridge of Bordes which the French general passed and destroyed with difficulty at the last moment. However the German hussars succeeded in gaining the bridge of Montaudran higher up, though it was barricaded, and defended by a detachment of cavalry sent there



by Berton who remained himself in position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.

While these operations were in progress, General Freyre, who had asked as a favour to lead the battle at Calvinet, whether from error or impatience, assailed the horn-work on that platform about 11 o'clock and while Beresford was still in march. The Spaniards, 9000 strong, moved in two lines and a reserve, and advanced with great resolution at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as to embrace the end of the Calvinet hill. The French musketry and great guns thinned the ranks at every step, yet closing upon their centre they still ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were exposed to increasing in violence until their right wing, which was also raked from the bridge of Matabiau, unable to endure the torment wavered. The leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped for shelter into a hollow road, 25 feet deep in parts, and covering this part of the French entrenchment; but the left wing and the second line run back in great disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers under Colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining their ground under cover of a bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping out of their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds entangled in the gulf below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau, constructed to rake this opening, sent its bullets from flank to flank hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones.

The Spanish generals, rallying the troops who had fled, led them back again to the brink of the fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage below and the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror. Again they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches pursued, while several battalions sallying from the bridge of Matabiau and from behind the Calvinet followed hard along the road of Alby. The country was now covered with fugitives whose headlong flight could not be restrained, and with pursuers whose numbers and vehemence increased, until Lord Wellington, who was at that point, covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby's cavalry and the reserve artillery, which opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the Portuguese guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the victorious French who immediately retired to their entrenchments on Calvinet: but more than 1500 Spaniards had been killed or wounded and their defeat was not the only misfortune.

General Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such occasions being known, were especially given, had turned his false attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux, and the enemy fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders and approachable only along an open flat, repulsed him with a loss of nearly 400 men and officers: amongst the latter Colonel Forbes of the 45th was killed, and General Brisbane, who commanded the brigade, was wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to the Garonne the French had completely vindicated their position, the allies had suffered enormously, and beyond the Garonne, although General Hill had now forced the first line of entrenchments covering St. Cyprien and was menacing the second line, the latter being much more contracted and very strongly fortified could not be stormed. The musketry battle therefore subsided for a time, but a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line, and on the allies' side from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery left by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the Portuguese guns on the Pugade, poured its shot incessantly against the works on the Calvinet platform: injudiciously it has been said, because the ammunition thus used for a secondary object was afterwards wanted when a vital advantage might have been gained.

It was now evident that the victory must be won or lost by Beresford, and yet, from Picton's error, Lord Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision; for the light division and the heavy cavalry only remained in hand, and these troops were necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and to protect the artillery employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore approached with all happy promise to the French general. The repulse of Picton, the utter dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first Taupin's whole division, and then one of Maransin's

brigades from that quarter, to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus three divisions and his cavalry, that is to say nearly 15,000 combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement without in any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, whose force, originally less than 13,000 bayonets, was cruelly reduced as it made slow and difficult way for two miles through a deep marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses. For, sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French musketry, and always under the fire of their artillery from the Mont Rave, without a gun to reply, the length of the column had augmented so much at every step from the difficulty of the way that frequent halts were necessary to close up the ranks.

The flat miry ground between the river and the heights became narrower and deeper as the troops advanced, Berton's cavalry was ahead, an impassable river was on the left, and three French divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right flank! Fortune came to their aid. Soult always eyeing their march, had, when the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin's division to the platform of St. Sypiere, and supporting it with a brigade of D'Armagnac's division disposed the whole about the redoubts. From thence after a short hortative to act vigorously he ordered Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the same time directing a regiment of Vial's cavalry to descend the heights by the Lavaur road and intercept the line of retreat, while Berton's horsemen assailed the other flank from the side of the bridge of Bordes. But this was not half of the force which the French general might have employed. Taupin's artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets of Toulouse, and that general instead of attacking at once took ground to his right, waiting until Beresford having completed his flank march had wheeled into lines at the foot of the heights.

Taupin's infantry, unskillfully arranged for action it is said, at last poured down the hill, but some rockets discharged in good time ravaged the ranks and with their noise and terrible appearance, unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers; then the British skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting fire, and Lambert's brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson's brigade and some provisional battalions of the fourth division, for it is an error to say the sixth division alone repulsed this attack, Lambert's brigade I say, rushed forwards with a terrible shout, and the French turning fled back to the upper ground. Vial's horsemen trotting down the Lavaur road now charged on the right flank, but the second and third lines of the sixth division being thrown into squares repulsed them, and on the other flank General Cole had been so sudden in his advance up the heights, that Berton's cavalry had no opportunity to charge. Lambert, following hard upon the beaten infantry in his front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a check won the summit of the platform, his skirmishers even descended in pursuit on the reverse slope, and meanwhile, on his left, General Cole meeting with less resistance had still more rapidly gained the height at that side: so complete was the rout that the two redoubts were abandoned from panic, and the French with the utmost disorder sought shelter in the works of Sacarin and Cambon.

Soult astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected so much, and who had but just before given him assurances of their resolution and confidence, was in fear that Beresford, pushing his success, would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal. Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with the remainder of Vial's cavalry, he hastily led D'Armagnac's reserve brigade to the works of Sacarin, checked the foremost British skirmishers and rallied the fugitives; Taupin's guns arrived from the town at the same moment, and the mischief being stayed, a part of Travot's reserve immediately moved to defend the bridge of the Demoiselles. A fresh order of battle was thus organized, but the indomitable courage of the British soldiers overcoming all obstacles and all opposition, had decided the first great crisis of the fight.

Lambert's brigade immediately wheeled to its right across the platform on the line of the Lavaur road, menacing the flank of the French on the Calvinet platform, while Pack's Scotch brigade and Douglas's Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the sixth division, were disposed on the right with a view to march

against the Colombette redoubts on the original front of the enemy. And now also the 18th and German hussars, having forced the bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, came round the south end of the Mont Rave, where in conjunction with the skirmishers of the fourth division they menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles, from whence and from the works of Cambon and Sacarin the enemy's guns played incessantly.

The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely changed. The French thrown entirely on the defensive occupied three sides of a square. Their right, extending from the works of Sacarin to the redoubts of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced by Lambert, who was solidly posted on the platform of St. Sypiere while the redoubts themselves were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French left, thrown back to the bridge-head of Matabiau, awaited the renewed attack of the Spaniards, and the whole position was very strong, not exceeding 1000 yards on each side, with the angles all defended by formidable works. The canal and city of Toulouse, its walls and entrenched suburbs, offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, insured the power of retreat.

In this contracted space were concentrated Vial's cavalry, the whole of Villatte's division, one brigade of Maransin's, another of D'Armagnac's, and with the exception of the regiment driven from the St. Sypiere redoubt, the whole of Harispe's division. On the allies' side therefore defeat had been staved off, but victory was still to be contended for, and with apparently inadequate means; for Picton being successfully opposed by Darricau, was so far paralyzed, the Spaniards rallying slowly, were not to be depended upon for another attack, and there remained only the heavy cavalry and the light division, which Lord Wellington could not venture to thrust into the action under pain of being left without any reserve in the event of a repulse. The final stroke therefore was still to be made on the left, and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert's brigade and the fourth division were necessarily employed to keep in check the French troops at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon and Sacarin. This heavy mass, comprising one brigade of Travot's reserve, the half of D'Armagnac's division, and all of Taupin's, together with the regiment belonging to Harispe which had abandoned the forts of St. Sypiere, was commanded by General Clausel, who disposed the greater part in advance of the entrenchments as if to retake the offensive.

Such was the state of affairs about half past two o'clock, when Beresford renewed the action with Pack's Scotch brigade, and the Portuguese of the sixth division under Colonel Douglas. These troops, ensconced in the hollow Lavour road on Lambert's right, had been hitherto well protected from the fire of the French works, but now scrambling up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to their left by wings of regiments as they could get out, and ascending the heights by the slope facing the Ers, under a wasting fire of cannon and musketry carried all the French breastworks, and the Colombette and Calvinet redoubts. It was a surprising action, when the loose disorderly nature of the attack imposed by the difficulty of the ground is considered; but the French, although they yielded at first to the thronging rush of the British troops, soon rallied and came back with a reflux. Their cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible. For Harispe, who commanded in person at this part, and under whom the French seemed always to fight with redoubled vigour, brought up fresh men, and surrounding the two redoubts with a surging multitude absolutely broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths of the 42nd, and drove the rest out. The British troops were however supported by the 71st and 91st, and the whole clinging to the brow of the hill fought with a wonderful courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen that their order of battle was reduced to a thin line of skirmishers. Some of the British cavalry then rode up from the low ground and attempted a charge, but they were stopped by a deep hollow road, of which there were many, and some of the foremost troopers tumbling headlong in perished. Meanwhile the combat about the redoubt continued fiercely, the French from their numbers had certainly the advantage, but they never retook the Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents down from the brow of the hill. At last, when the whole of the sixth division

had rallied, and again assailed them, flank and front, when their generals, Harispe and Baurot, had fallen dangerously wounded and the Colombrette was retaken by the 79th, the battle turned, and the French finally abandoned the platform, falling back, partly by their right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the bridge of Matabiau.

It was now about four o'clock. The Spaniards, during this contest, had once more partially attacked, but they were again put to flight, and the French thus remained masters of their entrenchments in that quarter; for the sixth division had been very hardly handled, and Beresford halted to reform his order of battle, and receive his artillery; it came to him, indeed, about this time, yet with great difficulty, and with little ammunition, in consequence of the heavy cannonade it had previously furnished from Montblanc. However, Soult, seeing that the Spaniards, supported by the light division, had rallied a fourth time, that Picton again menaced the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now advancing along the summit, deemed farther resistance useless, and relinquished the northern end of the Calvinet platform also. About five o'clock he withdrew his whole army behind the canal, still, however, holding the advanced works of Sacarin and Cambon. Lord Wellington then established the Spaniards in the abandoned works and so became master of the Mont Rave in all its extent. Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The French had five generals, and perhaps 3000 men killed or wounded, and they lost one piece of artillery. The allies lost four generals, and 4659 men and officers, of which 2000 were Spaniards. A lamentable spilling of blood, and a useless, for before this period Napoleon had abdicated the throne of France, and a provisional government was constituted at Paris.

During the night the French general, defeated but undismayed, replaced the ammunition expended in the action, re-organized and augmented his field artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal. Yet looking to the final necessity of a retreat he wrote to Suchet to inform him of the result of the contest and proposed a combined plan of operations illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his temper. "March," said he, "with the whole of your forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne, I will meet you there with my army, we can then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the Upper Garonne, and holding on by the mountains oblige the enemy to recall his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that city and make a diversion in our favour."

On the morning of the 11th he was again ready to fight, but the English general was not. The French position, within musket-shot of the walls of Toulouse, was still inexpugnable on the northern and eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave was only a preliminary step to the passage of the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles and other points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon, with the view of throwing the army as originally designed on to the south side of the town. But this was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions, and a fresh provision of ammunition only to be obtained from the park on the other side of the Garonne. Hence to accelerate the preparations, to ascertain the state of General Hill's position, and to give that general farther instructions, Lord Wellington repaired on the 11th to St. Cyprien; but though he had shortened his communications by removing the pontoon bridge from Grenade to Seilh, the day was spent before the ammunition arrived and the final arrangements for the passage of the canal could be completed. The attack was therefore deferred until daylight on the 12th.

Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet and menace Soult's retreat by the road leading to Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen on the heights of St. Martyn, above Baziege, together with the preparations in his front, taught Soult that he could no longer delay if he would not be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated all his arrangements, he left eight pieces of heavy artillery, two generals, the gallant Harispe being one, and 1600 men whose wounds were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors; then filing out of the city with surprising order and ability, he made a forced march of 22 miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the Upper Ers,

and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. On the same day General Hill's troops were pushed close to Baziege in pursuit, and the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, beat the French with the loss of 25 men, and cut off a like number of *gens-d'armes* on the side of Revel.

Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph; the white flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon colours, but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had retired with the French army. The British general, true to his honest line of policy, did not fail to warn the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk, but in the afternoon two officers, the English colonel, Cooke, and the French colonel, St. Simon, arrived from Paris. Charged to make known to the armies the abdication of Napoleon, they had been detained near Blois by the officiousness of the police attending the court of the Empress Louisa, and the blood of 8000 brave men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence. Nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to the war. When St. Simon, in pursuance of his mission, reached Soult's quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause, demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities until authentic information could be obtained from the ministers of the emperor: then sending all his incumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnau-dary, and awaited the progress of events. Lord Wellington refused to accede to his proposal, and as General Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, acknowledged the authority of the provincial government and readily concluded an armistice, he judged that Soult designed to make a civil war, and therefore marched against him. The 17th the outposts were on the point of engaging when the Duke of Dalmatia, who had now received official information from the chief of the emperor's staff, notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France: and with this honourable distinction, that he had faithfully sustained the cause of his great monarch until the very last moment.

A convention, which included Suchet's army, was immediately agreed upon, but that marshal had previously adopted the white colours of his own motion, and Lord Wellington instantly transmitted the intelligence to General Clinton, in Catalonia, and to the troops at Bayonne. Too late it came for both, and useless battles were fought. That at Barcelona has been already described, but at Bayonne misfortune and suffering had fallen upon one of the brightest soldiers of the British army.

SALLY FROM BAYONNE.

During the progress of the main army in the interior, Sir John Hope conducted the investment of Bayonne with all the zeal, the intelligence, and unremitting vigilance and activity which the difficult nature of the operation required. He had gathered great stores of gabions, and fascines, and platforms, and was ready to attack the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly, and without any official character, to warrant a formal communication to the garrison without Lord Wellington's authority. These rumours were, however, made known at the outposts, and perhaps lulled the vigilance of the besiegers, but to such irregular communications, which might be intended to deceive, the governor naturally paid little attention.

The picquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were at this time furnished by a brigade of the fifth division, but from thence to the extreme right the guards had charge of the line, and they had also one company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber's German brigade was encamped as a support to the left, the remainder of the first division was encamped in the rear, towards Boucaut. In this state, about one o'clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter, coming over to General Hay, who commanded the outposts that night, gave an exact account of the projected sally. The general, not able to speak French, sent him to General Hinuber, who immediately interpreting the man's story to General Hay, assembled his own troops under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to Sir John Hope. It would appear that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man's story, took no additional precautions, and it is probable that neither the German brigade nor the reserves of the guards would have been put under arms but for the activity of General Hinuber. However, at

three o'clock, the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of 3000 combatants. They surprised the picquets, and with loud shouts breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with one rush the church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne, with the exception of a fortified house, which was defended by Captain Forster of the 38th regiment. Masters of every other part, and overthrowing all who stood before them, they drove the picquets and supports in heaps along the Peyrehorade road, killed General Hay, took Colonel Townsend of the guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing troops, and passing in rear of the right, threw the whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, having his Germans well in hand, moved up on the side of St. Etienne, rallied some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of General Bradford's Portuguese, from the side of St. Esprit, bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy, and regained the village and church.

The combat on the right was at first even more disastrous than in the centre, neither the picquets nor the reserves were able to sustain the fury of the assault, and the battle was most confused and terrible; for on both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the enclosures, and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes friends encountered sometimes foes; all was tumult and horror. The guns of the citadel, vaguely guided by the flashes of the musketry, sent their shot and shells, booming at random, through the lines of fight, and the gun-boats, dropping down the river, opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns, which, being put in motion by Sir John Hope on the first alarm, were now coming up from the side of Boucaut. Thus nearly 100 pieces of artillery were in full play at once, and the shells having set fire to the fascine-dépôts and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the striving masses.

Amidst this confusion Sir John Hope suddenly disappeared, none knew how, or wherefore, at the time, but it afterwards appeared that, having brought up the reserves on the right to stem the torrent in that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road which led close behind the line of picquets; the French had, however, lined both banks, and when he endeavoured to return, a shot struck him in the arm, while his horse, a large one, as was necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, received eight bullets and fell upon his leg. His followers had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of them, Captain Herries, and Mr. Moore, a nephew of Sir John Moore, seeing his helpless state turned back, and alighting, endeavoured, amidst the heavy fire of the enemy, to draw him from beneath the horse. While thus engaged they were both struck down with dangerous wounds, the French carried them all off, and Sir John Hope was again severely hurt in the foot by an English bullet before they gained the citadel.

The day was now beginning to break, and the allies were enabled to act with more unity and effect. The Germans were in possession of St. Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards, being properly disposed by General Howard, who had succeeded to the command, suddenly raised a loud shout, and running in upon the French drove them back into the works with such slaughter that their own writers admit a loss of one general and more than 900 men. But on the British side General Stopford was wounded, and the whole loss was 830 men and officers. Of these more than 200 were taken, besides the commander-in-chief; and it is generally acknowledged that Captain Forster's firm defence of the fortified house first, and next the readiness and gallantry with which General Hinuber and his Germans retook St. Etienne, saved the allies from a very terrible disaster.

A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult became known, and hostilities ceased.

All the French troops in the south were now re-organized in one body under the command of Suchet, but they were so little inclined to acquiesce in the revolution, that Prince Polignac, acting for the Duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general, Kennedy, for a sum of money to quiet them.

The Portuguese army returned to Portugal. The Spanish army to Spain, the generals being it is said inclined at first to declare for the Cortes against the king,

but they were diverted from their purpose by the influence and authority of Lord Wellington.

The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England, and the cavalry marching through France took shipping at Boulogne.

Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veteran's services.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

MARSHAL SOULT and General Thouvenot have been accused of fighting with a full knowledge of Napoleon's abdication. This charge, circulated originally by the Bourbon party, is utterly unfounded. The extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot through the advanced posts has been already noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to induce Sir John Hope to make a formal communication, and the governor could only treat it as an idle story to insult or to deceive him, and baffle his defence by retarding his counter-operations while the works for the siege were advancing. For how unlikely, nay, impossible, must it not have appeared, that the Emperor Napoleon, whose victories at Mont-Mirail and Champaubert were known before the close investment of Bayonne, should have been deprived of his crown in the space of a few weeks, and the stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts without any relaxation in the preparations for the siege.

As false and unsubstantial is the charge against Soult.

The acute remark of an English military writer, that if the Duke of Dalmatia had known of the peace before he fought, he would certainly have announced it after the battle, were it only to maintain himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable; but there are direct proofs of the falsehood of the accusation. How was the intelligence to reach him? It was not until the 7th that the provisional government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer could not have reached Toulouse under three days even by the most direct way, which was through Montauban. Now the allies were in possession of that road on the 4th, and on the 9th the French army was actually invested. The intelligence from Paris must therefore have reached the allies first, as in fact it did, and it was not Soult, it was Lord Wellington who commenced the battle. The charge would therefore bear more against the English general, who would yet have been the most insane as well as the wickedest of men to have risked his army and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles seemed to deny success. He also was the person of all others called upon, by honour, gratitude, justice, and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter of his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the punishment of his inhuman adversary.

Did he ever by word or deed countenance the calumny?

Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English reform bill, repeated the accusation in the house of lords and reviled the minister for being on amicable political terms with a man capable of such a crime. Lord Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically declared that Marshal Soult did not know, and that it was impossible he could know of the emperor's abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable distinction of sporting with men's lives by wholesale attaches to no general on the records of history save the Orange William, the murderer of Glencoe. And though Marshal Soult had known of the emperor's abdication he could not for that have been justly placed beside that cold-blooded prince, who fought at St. Denis with the peace of Nimeguen in his pocket, because "*he would not deny himself a safe lesson in his trade.*"

The French marshal was at the head of a brave army, and it was impossible to know whether Napoleon had abdicated voluntarily or been constrained. The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other intriguers, forming a provisional government, self-instituted and under the protection of foreign bayonets, demanded no respect from Soult. He had even the right of denying the emperor's legal power to abdicate. He had the right, if he thought himself strong enough, to declare, that he would not suffer the throne to become the play-thing of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine it was a question of patriotism and of calculation, a national question which

the general of an army had a right to decide for himself, having reference always to the real will and desire of the people at large.

It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter, even after the battle and when he had seen Colonel St. Simon.

Writing to Talleyrand on the 22nd, he says, "The circumstances which preceded my act of adhesion are so extraordinary as to create astonishment. The 7th the provisional government informed me of the events which had happened since the 1st of April. The 6th and 7th, Count Dupont wrote to me on the same subject. On the 8th the Duke of Feltre, in his quality of war minister, gave me notice, that having left the military cipher at Paris he would immediately forward to me another. The 9th the Prince Berthier, vice-constable and major-general, wrote to me from Fontainebleau, transmitting the copy of a convention and armistice which had been arranged at Paris with the allied powers; he demanded at the same time a state of the force and condition of my army: but neither the prince nor the Duke of Feltre mentioned events, we had then only knowledge of a proclamation of the empress, dated the 3rd, *which forbade us to recognize anything coming from Paris.*

"The 10th I was attacked near Toulouse by the whole allied army under the orders of Lord Wellington. This vigorous action, where the French army the weakest by half showed all its worth, cost the allies from 8000 to 10,000 men; Lord Wellington might perhaps have dispensed with it.

"The 12th I received through the English the first hints of the events at Paris. I proposed an armistice, it was refused, I renewed the demand, it was again refused. At last I sent Count Gazan to Toulouse, and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms was accepted and signed the 18th, the armies being then in presence of each other. The 19th I ratified this convention and gave my adhesion to the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject I ought to declare that I sought to obtain a suspension of arms before I manifested my sentiments in order that my will and that of the army should be free. *That neither France nor posterity should have power to say it was torn from us by force of arms. To follow only the will of the nation was a homage I owed to my country.*"

The reader will observe in the above letter certain assertions, relative to the numbers of the contending armies and the loss of the allies, which are at variance with the statements in this history; and this loose but common mode of assuming the state of an adverse force has been the ground-work for great exaggeration by some French writers, who strangely enough claim a victory for the French army, although the French general himself made no such claim at the time, and so far as appears has not done so since.

Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences. By this test we shall know who won the battle of Toulouse.

Now all persons, French and English, who have treated the subject, including the generals on both sides, are agreed that Soult fortified Toulouse, the canal, and the Mont Rave as positions of battle; that he was attacked, that Taupin's division was beaten, that the Mont Rave, with all its redoubts and entrenchments, fell into the allies' power. Finally, that the French army abandoned Toulouse, leaving there three wounded generals, 1600 men, several guns, and a quantity of stores at the discretion of their adversaries; and this without any fresh forces having joined the allies, or any remarkable event affecting the operations happening elsewhere.

Was Toulouse worth preserving? Was the abandonment of it forced or voluntary? Let the French general speak! "I have entrenched the suburb of St. Cyprien which forms a good bridge-head. The enemy will not I think attack me there unless he desires to lose a part of his army. Two nights ago he made a demonstration of passing the Garonne two leagues above the city, but he will probably try to pass it below, in which case I will attack him whatever his force may be, because it is of the utmost importance to me not to be cut off from Montauban where I have made a bridge-head."—"I think the enemy will not move on your side *unless I move that way first, and I am determined to avoid that as long as I can.*"—"If I could remain a month on the Garonne I should be able to put 6000 or 8000 conscripts into the ranks who now embarrass me, and who want arms which

I expect with great impatience from Perpignan."—"I am resolved to deliver battle near Toulouse whatever may be the superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified a *position*, which, *supported by the town and the canal*, furnishes me with a retrenched camp susceptible of defence."—"I have received the unhappy news of the enemy's entrance into Paris. This misfortune strengthens my determination to defend Toulouse whatever may happen. The preservation of the place, which contains establishments of all kinds, is of the utmost importance to us, but if unhappily I am forced to quit it, my movements will naturally bring me nearer to you. In that case you cannot sustain yourself at Perpignan because the enemy will inevitably follow me."—"The enemy appears astonished at the determination I have taken to defend Toulouse, four days ago he passed the Garonne and has done nothing since, perhaps the bad weather is the cause."

From these extracts it is clear that Soult resolved if possible not to fall back upon Suchet, and was determined even to fight for the preservation of his communications with Montauban; yet he finally resigned this important object for the more important one of defending Toulouse. And so intent upon its preservation was he, that having on the 25th of March ordered all the stores and artillery not of immediate utility to be sent away, he on the 2nd of April forbade further progress in that work and even had those things already removed brought back. Moreover he very clearly marks that to abandon the city and retreat towards Suchet will be the signs and consequences of defeat.

These points being fixed, we find him on the evening of the 10th writing to the same general thus:

"The battle which I announced to you took place to-day, the enemy has been horribly maltreated, but he succeeded in *establishing himself upon a position which I occupied to the right of Toulouse*. The general of division, Taupin, has been killed, General Harispe has lost his foot by a cannon-ball, and three generals of brigade are wounded. I am prepared to recommence to-morrow if the enemy attacks, but *I do not believe I can stay in Toulouse, it might even happen that I shall be forced to open a passage to get out.*"

On the 11th of April he writes again:

"As I told you in my letter of yesterday I am in the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear being obliged to fight my way at Baziege where the enemy is directing a column to cut my communications. To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche, because I have good hope that this obstacle will not prevent my passing."

To the minister of war he also writes on the 10th:

"To-day I rest in position. If the enemy attacks me I will defend myself. I have great need to replenish my means before I put the army in march, yet I believe that in the coming night I shall be forced to abandon Toulouse, and it is probable I shall direct my movements so as to rally upon the troops of the Duke of Albufera."

Soult lays no claim here to victory. He admits that all the events previously indicated by him as the consequences of defeat were fulfilled to the letter. That is to say, the loss of the position of battle, the consequent evacuation of the city, and the march to join Suchet. On the other hand Lord Wellington clearly obtained all that he sought. He desired to pass the Garonne and he did pass it; he desired to win the position and works of Mont Rave and he did win them; he desired to enter Toulouse and he did enter it as a conqueror at the head of his troops.

Amongst the French writers who, without denying these facts lay claim to a victory, Choumara is most deserving of notice. This gentleman, known as an able engineer, with a praiseworthy desire to render justice to the great capacity of Marshal Soult, shows very clearly that his genius would have shone in this campaign with far greater lustre if Marshal Suchet had adopted his plans and supported him in a cordial manner. But Mr. Choumara, heated by his subject, completes the picture by a crowning victory at Toulouse which the marshal himself appears not to recognize. The work is a very valuable historical document with respect to the disputes between Soult and Suchet, but with respect to the battle of Toulouse it contains grave errors as to facts, and the inferences are untenable though the premises were admitted.

The substance of Mr. Choumara's argument is, that the position of Toulouse was of the nature of a fortress. That the canal was the real position of battle, the Mont Rave an outwork, the loss of which weighed little in the balance, because the French army was victorious at Calvinet against the Spaniards, at the convent of the Minimes against the light division, at the bridge of Jumeaux against Picton, at St. Cyprien against General Hill. Finally, that the French general certainly won the victory because he offered battle the next day and did not retreat from Toulouse until the following night.

Now admitting that all these facts were established, the fortress was still taken.

But the facts are surprisingly incorrect. For first Marshal Soult himself tells Suchet that the Mont Rave was his *position of battle*, and that the town and the canal *supported it*. Nothing could be more accurate than this description. For when he lost the Mont Rave, the town and the canal enabled him to rally his army and take measures for a retreat. But the loss of the Mont Rave rendered the canal untenable, why else was Toulouse abandoned? That the line of the canal was a more formidable one to attack in front than the Mont Rave is true, yet that did not constitute it a position; it was not necessary to attack it, except partially at Sacarin and Cambon, and the bridge of the Demoiselles; those points once forced the canal would, with the aid of the Mont Rave, have helped to keep the French in Toulouse as it had before helped to keep the allies out. Lord Wellington once established on the south side of the city and holding the Pech David could have removed the bridge from Seilh to Portet, above Toulouse, thus shortening and securing his communication with Hill; the French army must then have surrendered, or broken out, no easy matter in such a difficult and strangled country. The Mont Rave was therefore not only the position of battle, it was also the key of the position behind the canal, and Mr. de Choumara is placed in this dilemma. He must admit the allies won the fight, or confess the main position was so badly chosen that a slight reverse at an outwork was sufficient to make the French army abandon it at every other point.

But were the French victorious at every other point? Against the Spaniards they were, and Picton also was repulsed. The order of movements for the battle proves, indeed, that this general's attack was intended to be a false one;* he disobeyed his orders, however, and one of his brigades was repulsed; but to check one brigade, with a loss of 300 or 400 men, is a small matter in a battle where more than 80,000 combatants were engaged.

The light division made a demonstration against the convent of the Minimes and nothing more. Its loss on the whole day was only 56 men and officers, and no French veteran of the Peninsula but would laugh at the notion that a real attack by that matchless division could be so stopped.

It is said the exterior line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien was occupied with a view to offensive movements, and to prevent the allies from establishing batteries to rake the line of the canal from that side of the Garonne; but whatever may have been the object, General Hill got possession of it, and was so far victorious. He was ordered not to assail the second line seriously and he did not, for his whole loss scarcely exceeded 80 men and officers.

From these undeniable facts, it is clear that the French gained an advantage against Picton, and a marked success against the Spaniards; but Beresford's attack was so decisive as to counter-balance these failures and even to put the defeated Spaniards in possession of the height they had originally contended for in vain.

Mr. Choumara attributes Beresford's success to Taupin's errors and to a vast superiority of numbers on the side of the allies. "Fifty-three thousand infantry, more than 8000 cavalry, and a reserve of 18,000 men of all arms, opposed to 25,000 French infantry, 2500 cavalry, and a reserve of 7000 conscripts 3000 of which were unarmed." Such is the enormous disproportion assumed on the authority of General Vaudoncourt.

Now the errors of Taupin may have been great, and his countrymen are the best judges of his demerit; but the numbers here assumed are most inaccurate. The imperial muster-rolls are not of a later date than December 1813, yet an official table

* Appendix, No. 31.

of the organization of Soult's army, published by the French military historian Kock, gives 36,635 combatants on the 10th of March. Of these, in round numbers, 28,600 were infantry, 2700 cavalry, and 5700 were artillery-men, engineers, miners, sappers, gens-d'armes, and military workmen. Nothing is said of the reserve division of conscripts commanded by General Travot, but General Vaudoncourt's table of the same army on the 1st of April, adopted by Choumara, supplies the deficiency. The conscripts are there set down, 7267, and this cipher being added to Kock's, gives a total of 43,900 fighting men. The loss in combats and marches from the 10th of March to the 1st of April must be deducted, but on the other hand we find Soult informing the minister of war, on the 7th of March, that 3000 soldiers dispersed by the battle of Orthes were still wandering behind the army: the greatest part must have joined before the battle of Toulouse. There was also the regular garrison of that city, composed of the dépôts of several regiments and the urban guards, all under Travot. Thus little less than 50,000 men were at Soult's disposal.

Let 12,000 be deducted for, 1st, the urban guard which was only employed to maintain the police of the town; 2nd, the unarmed conscripts; 3rd, the military workmen not brought into action; 4th, the detachments employed on the flanks to communicate with La Fitte in the Arriege, and to reinforce General Loverdo at Montauban. There will remain 38,000 fighting men of all arms. And with a very powerful artillery; for we find Soult, after the action, directing seven field-batteries of eight pieces each to attend the army; and the French writers mention, besides this field train, 1st, 15 pieces which were transferred during the battle from the exterior line of St. Cyprien to the northern and eastern fronts; 2nd, four 24-pounders and several 16-pounders mounted on the walls of the city; 3rd, the armaments of the bridge-heads, the works on Calvinet, and those at Sacarin and Cambon. Wherefore, not less than 80, or perhaps 90, pieces of French artillery were engaged.

An approximation to the strength of the French army being thus made, it remains to show the number of the allies, and with respect to the Anglo-Portuguese troops that can be done very exactly, not by approximative estimates but positively from the original returns.

The morning state delivered to Lord Wellington on the 10th of April, bears 43,744 British and Germans, and 20,793 Portuguese, in all 64,537 soldiers and officers present under arms, exclusive of artillerymen.* Of this number nearly 10,000 were cavalry, 1188 being Portuguese.

The Spanish auxiliaries, exclusive of Mina's bands investing St. Jean Pied de Port, were 1st, Giron's Andalusians and the third army under O'Donnel, 15,000; 2nd, the Gallicians under General Freyre, 14,000; 3rd, 3000 Gallicians under Morillo, and as many more under Longa, making with the Anglo-Portuguese a total of 90,000 combatants with somewhat more than 100 pieces of field-artillery.

Of this force, O'Donnel's troops were in the valley of the Bastan, Longa's on the Upper Ebro; one division of Freyre's Gallicians was under Carlos D'Espagne in front of Bayonne; one half of Morillo's division was blockading Navarrens, the other half and the 9000 Gallicians remaining under Freyre, were in front of Toulouse. Of the Anglo-Portuguese, the first and fifth divisions, and three unattached brigades of infantry, with one brigade of cavalry, were with Sir John Hope at Bayonne; the seventh division was at Bordeaux; the household brigade of heavy cavalry was on the march from the Ebro where it had passed the winter; the Portuguese horsemen were partly employed on the communications in the rear, partly near Agen, where Sir John Campbell commanding the 4th regiment had an engagement on the 11th with the celebrated partisan Florian.† The second, third, fourth, sixth, and light divisions of infantry, and Le Cor's Portuguese, called the unattached division, were with Lord Wellington, who had also Bock's, Ponsonby's, Fane's, Vivian's, and Lord E. Somerset's brigades of cavalry.‡

These troops, on the morning of the 10th, mustered under arms, in round numbers, 31,000 infantry, of which 4300 were officers, sergeants, and drummers, leaving 26,600 bayonets. Add 12,000 Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, and we

* See note at the end of the Appendix.

† See note at the end of the Appendix.

‡ Appendix, No. 29 (Nos. 6, 7).

have a total of 43,500 infantry. The cavalry amounted to 7200, and there were 64 pieces of artillery. Hence about 52,000 of all ranks and arms were in line to fight 38,000 French with more than 80 pieces of artillery, some being of the largest calibre.

But of the allies, only 24,000 men with 52 guns can be said to have been seriously engaged. Thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets with 18 guns were on the left of the Garonne under General Hill. Neither the light division nor Ponsonby's heavy cavalry, nor Bock's Germans were really engaged. Wherefore, 12,600 sabres and bayonets under Beresford, 9000 bayonets under Freyre, and 2500 of Picton's division really fought the battle. Thus the enormous disproportion assumed by the French writers disappears entirely; for if the allies had the advantage of numbers it was chiefly in cavalry, and horsemen were of little avail against the entrenched position and preponderating artillery of the French general.

The Duke of Dalmatia's claim to the admiration of his countrymen is well-founded and requires no vain assumption to prop it up. Vast combinations, inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment, unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, unwavering fidelity to his sovereign and his country, are what no man can justly deny him. In this celebrated campaign of only nine months, although counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of his countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works of five strong places and entrenched five great camps with such works as Marius himself would not have disdained; once he changed his line of operations and either attacking or defending delivered 24 battles and combats. Defeated in all, he yet fought the last as fiercely as the first, remaining unconquered in mind, and still intent upon renewing the struggle when peace came to put a stop to his prodigious efforts. Those efforts were fruitless because Suchet renounced him, because the people of the south were apathetic and fortune was adverse; because he was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world at the head of unconquerable troops. For what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's Africans at Cannæ, Cæsar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's guards at Austerlitz, such were Wellington's British soldiers at this period. The same men who had fought at Vimiera and Talavera contended at Orthes and Toulouse. Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength and fierceness a confidence which rendered them invincible. It is by this measure Soult's firmness and the constancy of his army is to be valued, and the equality to which he reduced his great adversary at Toulouse is a proof of ability which a judicious friend would put forward rather than suppress.

Was he not a great general who, being originally opposed on the Adour by nearly double his own numbers, for such was the proportion after the great detachments were withdrawn from the French army by the emperor in January, did yet by the aid of his fortresses, by his able marches and combinations, oblige his adversary to employ so many troops for blockades, sieges, and detached posts, that at Toulouse his army was scarcely more numerous than the French? Was it nothing to have drawn Wellington from such a distance along the frontier, and force him at last, either to fight a battle under the most astonishing disadvantages or to retreat with dishonour. And this not because the English general had committed any fault, but by the force of combinations which, embracing all the advantages offered by the country, left him no option.

That Soult made some mistakes is true, and perhaps the most important was that which the emperor warned him against, though too late, the leaving so many men in Bayonne. He did so he says because the place could not hold out 15 days without the entrenched camp, and the latter required men; but the result proved Napoleon's sagacity, for the allies made no attempt to try the strength of the camp, and on the 18th of March Lord Wellington knew not the real force of the garrison. Up to that period Sir John Hope was inclined to blockade the place only, and from the difficulty of gathering the necessary stores and ammunition on the right bank of the Adour, the siege though resolved upon was not even commenced on the 14th of April when that bloody and most lamentable sally was made. Hence the citadel could not even with a weaker garrison have been taken before the end of April, and Soult might have had Abbé's division of 6000 good troops in the battles of Orthes and Toulouse.

Had Suchet joined him, his army would have been numerous enough to bar Lord Wellington's progress altogether, especially in the latter position. Here it is impossible not to admire the sagacity of the English general, who from the first was averse to entering France and only did so for a political object, under the promise of great reinforcements and in the expectation that he should be allowed to organize a Bourbon army. What could he have done if Soult had retained the 20,000 men drafted in January, or if Suchet had joined, or the people had taken arms?

How well Soult chose his ground at Toulouse, how confidently he trusted that his adversary would eventually pass the Garonne below and not above the city, with what foresight he constructed the bridge-head at Montauban, and prepared the difficulties Lord Wellington had to encounter have been already touched upon. But Mr. Choumara has assumed that the English general's reason for relinquishing the passage of the Garonne at Portet on the night of the 27th, was not the want of pontoons but the fear of being attacked during the operation, adducing in proof Soult's orders to assail the heads of his columns. Those orders are however dated the 31st, three days after the attempt of which Soult appears to have known nothing at the time: they were given in the supposition that Lord Wellington wished to effect a second passage at that point to aid General Hill while descending the Arriege. And what reason has any man to suppose that the same general and troops who passed the Nive and defeated a like counter-attack near Bayonne, would be deterred by the fear of a battle from attempting it on the Garonne? The passage of the Nive was clearly more dangerous, because the communication with the rest of the army was more difficult, Soult's disposable force larger, his counter-movements more easily hidden until the moment of execution. At Portet the passage, designed for the night season, would have been a surprise, and the whole army, drawn close to that side could have been thrown over in three or four hours with the exception of the divisions destined to keep the French in check at St. Cyprien. Soult's orders did not embrace such an operation. They directed Clausel to fall upon the head of the troops and crush them while in the disorder of a later passage which was expected and watched for.

General Clausel, having four divisions in hand, was no doubt a formidable enemy, and Soult's notion of defending the river by a counter-attack was excellent in principle; but to conceive is one thing, to execute is another. His orders were, as I have said, only issued on the 31st, when Hill was across both the Garonne and the Arriege. Lord Wellington's design was then not to force a passage at Portet, but to menace that point, and really attack St. Cyprien when Hill should have descended the Arriege. Nor did Soult himself much expect Clausel would have any opportunity to attack, for in his letter to the minister of war he said, the positions between the Arriege and the canal were all disadvantageous to the French, and his intention was to fight in Toulouse if the allies approached from the south; yet he still believed Hill's movement to be only a blind and that Lord Wellington would finally attempt the passage below Toulouse.

The French general's views and measures were profoundly reasoned but extremely simple. His first care on arriving at Toulouse was to secure the only bridge over the Garonne by completing the works of St. Cyprien, which he had begun while the army was still at Tarbes. He thus gained time, and as he felt sure that the allies could not act in the Arriege district, he next directed his attention to the bridge-head of Montauban to secure a retreat behind the Tarn and the power of establishing a fresh line of operations. Meanwhile, contrary to his expectation, Lord Wellington did attempt to act on the Arriege, and the French general, turning of necessity in observation to that side, entrenched a position on the south; soon however he had proof that his first notion was well-founded, that his adversary after losing much time must at last pass below Toulouse; wherefore he proceeded with prodigious activity to fortify the Mont Rave and prepare a field of battle on the northern and eastern fronts of the city. These works advanced so rapidly, while the wet weather, by keeping the rivers flooded, reduced Lord Wellington to inactivity, that Soult became confident in their strength, and being influenced also by the news from Paris, relinquished his first design of opposing the passage of the Garonne and preserving the line of operations by Montauban. To hold Toulouse

then became his great object, nor was he diverted from this by the accident which befel Lord Wellington's bridge at Grenade. Most writers, French and English, have blamed him for letting slip that opportunity of attacking Beresford. It is said that General Reille first informed him of the rupture of the bridge, and strongly advised him to attack the troops on the right bank; but Choumara has well defended him on that point; the distance was 15 miles, the event uncertain, the works on the Mount Rave would have stood still meanwhile, and the allies might perhaps have stormed St. Cyprien.

Lord Wellington was, however, under no alarm for Beresford, or rather for himself, because each day he passed the river in a boat and remained on that side. His force was not less than 20,000 including sergeants and officers, principally British; his position was on a gentle range, the flanks covered by the Ers and the Garonne; he had 18 guns in battery on his front, which was likewise flanked by 30 other pieces placed on the left of the Garonne. Nor was he without retreat. He could cross the Ers, and Soult dared not have followed to any distance lest the river should subside and the rest of the army pass on his rear, unless, reverting to his original design of operating by Montauban, he lightly abandoned his now matured plan of defending Toulouse. Wisely therefore he continued to strengthen his position round that city, his combinations being all directed to force the allies to attack him between the Ers and the Mont Rave, where it seemed scarcely possible to succeed.

He has been also charged with this fault, that he did not entrench the hill of Ptugade. Choumara holds that troops placed there would have been endangered without adequate advantage. This does not seem conclusive. The hill was under the shot of the main height, it might have been entrenched with works open to the rear, and St. Pol's brigade would thus have incurred no more danger than when placed there without any entrenchments. Beresford could not have moved up the left bank of the Ers until these works were carried, and this would have cost men. It is therefore probable that want of time caused Soult to neglect this advantage. He committed a graver error during the battle by falling upon Beresford with Taupin's division only, when he could have employed D'Armagnac's and Villatte's likewise in that attack. He should have fallen on him also while in the deep country below, and before he had formed his lines at the foot of the heights. What hindered him? Picton was repulsed, Freyre was defeated, the light division was protecting the fugitives, and one of Maransin's brigades withdrawn from St. Cyprien had reinforced the victorious troops on the extreme left of the Calvinet platform. Beresford's column, entangled in the marshy ground, without artillery, and menaced both front and rear by cavalry, could not have resisted such an overwhelming mass, and Lord Wellington can scarcely escape criticism for placing him in that predicament.

A commander is not indeed to refrain from high attempts because of their perilous nature, the greatest have ever been the most daring, and the English general, who could not remain inactive before Toulouse, was not deterred by danger or difficulty: twice he passed the broad and rapid Garonne, and reckless of his enemy's strength and skill, worked his way to a crowning victory. This was hardihood, greatness. But in Beresford's particular attack he did not overstep the rules of art, he hurtled against them, and that he was not damaged by the shock, is owing to his good fortune, the fierceness of his soldiers, and the errors of his adversary. What if Beresford had been overthrown on the Ers? Wellington must have repassed the Garonne, happy if by rapidity he could reunite in time with Hill on the left bank. Beresford's failure would have been absolute ruin, and that alone refutes the French claim to a victory. Was there no other mode of attack? That can hardly be said. Beresford passed the Lavaur road to assail the platform of St. Sypiere, and he was probably so ordered to avoid an attack in flank by the Lavaur road, and because the platform of Calvinet on the side of the Ers river was more strongly entrenched than that of St. Sypiere. But for this gain it was too much to throw his column into the deep ground without guns, and quite separated from the rest of the army, seeing that the cavalry intended to maintain the connection were unable to act in that miry labyrinth of water-courses. If the Spaniards were judged capable of carrying the strongest part of the Calvinet platform, Beres-

ford's fine Anglo-Portuguese divisions were surely equal to attacking this same platform on the immediate left of the Spaniards, and an advanced guard would have sufficed to protect the left flank. The assault would then have been made with unity, by a great mass and on the most important point : for the conquest of St. Sypiere was but a step towards that of Calvinet, but the conquest of Calvinet would have rendered St. Sypiere untenable. It is however to be observed that the Spaniards attacked too soon, and their dispersion exceeded all reasonable calculation : so panic-stricken they were as to draw from Lord Wellington at the time the bitter observation, that he had seen many curious spectacles, but never before saw 10,000 men running a race.

Soult's retreat from Toulouse, a model of order and regularity, was made in the night. This proves the difficulty of his situation. Nevertheless it was not desperate; nor was it owing to his adversary's generous forbearance that he passed unmolested under the allies' guns, as an English writer has erroneously assumed. For first those guns had no ammunition, and this was one reason why Lord Wellington, though eager to fall upon him on the 11th, could not do so. On the 12th Soult was gone, and his march covered by the great canal could scarcely have been molested, because the nearest point occupied by the allies was more than a mile and a half distant. Nor do I believe that Soult, as some other writers have imagined, ever designed to hold Toulouse to the last. It would have been an avowal of military insolvency to which his proposal that Suchet should join him at Carcassonne and retake the offensive, written on the night of the 11th, is quite opposed. Neither was it in the spirit of French warfare. The impetuous valour and susceptibility of that people are ill-suited for stern Numantian despair. Place an attainable object of war before the French soldier and he will make supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing he becomes proportionally discouraged. Let some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with unbounded energy : the fear of death never checks him, he will attempt anything. But the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance wears his fury out ; it was so proved in the Peninsula, where the sudden deafening shout, rolling over a field of battle, more full and terrible than that of any other nation, and followed by the strong unwavering charge, often startled and appalled a French column, before whose fierce and vehement assault any other troops would have given way.

Napoleon's system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and augment the military excellence, and to strengthen the weakness of the national character. His discipline, severe but appealing to the feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the French soldiers to patience under hardships, and strong endurance under fire ; he taught the generals to rely on their own talents, to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to dare everything even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of France might have full play : hence the violence of their attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and to keep strong reserves, that sudden disorders might be repaired and the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine spirit, certain that they would then renew the battle with the same confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier, but so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of their exploits surpassed those of all other nations : the Romans not excepted, if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the Macedonians, if the quality of their opponents be considered.

Let their amazing toils in the Peninsula war alone, which though so great and important was but an episode in their military history, be considered. "*In Spain large armies will starve and small armies will be beaten,*" was the saying of Henry IV. of France, and this was no light phrase of an indolent monarch, but the profound conclusion of a sagacious general. Yet Napoleon's enormous armies were so wonderfully organized that they existed and fought in Spain for six years, and without cessation, for to them winters and summers were alike. Their large armies endured incredible toils and privations, but were not starved out, nor were their small armies beaten by the Spaniards. And for their daring and resource a

single fact recorded by Lord Wellington will suffice. They captured more than one strong place in Spain without any provision of bullets, save those fired at them by their enemies, having trusted to that chance when they formed the siege ! Before the British troops they fell, but how terrible was the struggle ! how many defeats they recovered from, how many brave men they slew, what changes and interpositions of fortune occurred before they could be rolled back upon their own frontiers ! And this is the glory of England, that her soldiers and hers only were capable of overthrowing them in equal battle. I seek not to defraud the Portuguese of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard the merit of his constancy. England could not alone have triumphed in the struggle, but for her share in the deliverance of the Peninsula let this brief summary speak.

She expended more than 100,000,000 sterling on her own operations, she subsidized Spain and Portugal besides, and with her supplies of clothing, arms, and ammunition maintained the armies of both even to the guerillas. From 30,000 up to 70,000 British troops were employed by her constantly, and while her naval squadrons continually harassed the French with descents upon the coasts, her land forces fought and won 19 pitched battles and innumerable combats ; they made or sustained 10 sieges, took four great fortresses, twice expelled the French from Portugal, preserved Alicant, Carthagená, Cadiz, Lisbon ; they killed, wounded, and took about 200,000 enemies, and the bones of 40,000 British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and mountains of the Peninsula.

Finally, for Portugal she re-organized a native army and supplied officers who led it to victory, and to the whole Peninsula she gave a general whose like has seldom gone forth to conquer. And all this and more was necessary to redeem the Peninsula from France !

The Duke of Wellington's campaigns furnish lessons for generals of all nations, but they must always be peculiarly models for British commanders in future continental wars, because he modified and reconciled the great principles of art with the peculiar difficulties which attend generals controlled by politicians who, depending upon private intrigue, prefer parliamentary to national interests. An English commander must not trust his fortune. He dare not risk much however conscious he may be of personal resources when one disaster will be his ruin at home. His measures must therefore be subordinate to this primary consideration. Lord Wellington's caution, springing from that source, has led friends and foes alike into wrong conclusions as to his system of war. The French call it want of enterprise, timidity ; the English have denominated it the Fabian system. These are mere phrases. His system was the same as that of all great generals. He held his army in hand, keeping it with unmitigated labour always in a fit state to march or to fight ; and thus prepared he acted indifferently as occasion offered on the offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete mastery of his art. Sometimes he was indebted to fortune, sometimes to his natural genius, but always to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically a painstaking man.

That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon must be admitted, and being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed that he learned something of the art from that greatest of all masters ; yet something besides the difference of genius must be allowed for the difference of situation ; Napoleon was never even in his first campaign of Italy so harassed by the French as Wellington was by the English, Spanish, and Portuguese governments. Their systems of war were however alike in principle, their operations being necessarily modified by their different political positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to protect their flanks and communications without scattering their forces, these were common to both. In defence firm, cool, enduring ; in attack fierce and obstinate ; daring when daring was politic, but always operating by the flanks in preference to the front : in these things they were alike, but in following up a victory the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins. The battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded and the roaring flood poured onwards covering all.

Yet was there nothing of timidity or natural want of enterprise to be discerned in the English general's campaigns. Neither was he of the Fabian school. He recommended that commander's system to the Spaniards, but he did not follow it himself. His military policy more resembled that of Scipio Africanus. Fabius dreading Hannibal's veterans, red with the blood of four consular armies, hovered on the mountains, refused battle, and to the unmatched skill and valour of the great Carthaginian opposed the almost inexhaustible military resources of Rome. Lord Wellington was never loath to fight when there was any equality of numbers. He landed in Portugal with only 9000 men, with intent to attack Junot who had 24,000. At Roliç a he was the assailant, at Vimiera he was assailed, but he would have changed to the offensive during the battle if others had not interfered. At Oporto he was again the daring and successful assailant. In the Talavera campaign he took the initiatory movements, although in the battle itself he sustained the shock. His campaign of 1810 in Portugal was entirely defensive, because the Portuguese army was young and untried, but his pursuit of Massena in 1811 was as entirely aggressive although cautiously so, as well knowing that in mountain warfare those who attack labour at a disadvantage. The operations of the following campaign, including the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera, the first siege of Badajoz, and the combat of Guinaldo, were of a mixed character; so was the campaign of Salamanca; but the campaign of Vittoria and that in the south of France were entirely and eminently offensive.

Slight, therefore, is the resemblance to the Fabian warfare. And for the Englishman's hardiness and enterprise, bear witness the passage of the Douro at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, the storming of Badajoz, the surprise of the forts at Mirabete, the march to Vittoria, the passage of the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle, the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthes, the crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he committed faults is only to say that he made war; but to deny him the qualities of a great commander, is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want of light. How few of his combinations failed! How many battles he fought, victorious in all! Iron hardihood of body, a quick and sure vision, a grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the habit of laborious, minute investigation and arrangement—all these qualities he possessed, and with them that most rare faculty of coming to prompt and sure conclusions on sudden emergencies. This is the certain mark of a master spirit in war, without it a commander may be distinguished, he may be a great man, but he cannot be a great captain; where troops nearly alike in arms and knowledge are opposed, the battle generally turns upon the decision of the moment.

At the Somosierra, Napoleon's sudden, and what to those about him appeared an insensate order, sent the Polish cavalry successfully charging up the mountain when more studied arrangements with ten times that force might have failed. At Talavera, if Joseph had not yielded to the imprudent heat of Victor, the fate of the allies would have been sealed. At the Coa, Montbrun's refusal to charge with his cavalry saved General Craufurd's division, the loss of which would have gone far towards producing the evacuation of Portugal. At Busaco, Massena would not suffer Ney to attack the first day, and thus lost the only favourable opportunity for assailing that formidable position. At Fuentes Onoro, the same Massena suddenly suspended his attack when a powerful effort would probably have been decisive. At Albuera, Soult's column of attack, instead of pushing forward, halted to fire from the first height they had gained on Beresford's right, which saved that general from an early and total defeat. Again, at a later period of that battle, the unpremeditated attack of the fusiliers decided the contest. At Barosa, General Graham, with a wonderful promptitude, snatched the victory at the very moment when a terrible defeat seemed inevitable. At Sabugal, not even the astonishing fighting of the light division could have saved it, if General Reynier had possessed this essential quality of a general. At El Bodon, Marmont failed to seize the most favourable opportunity which occurred during the whole war for crushing the allies. At Orthes Soult let slip two opportunities of falling upon the allies with advantage, and at Toulouse he failed to crush Beresford.

At Vimiera, Lord Wellington was debarred by Burrard from giving a signal

illustration of this intuitive generalship ; but at Busaco and the heights of San Cristoval, near Salamanca, he suffered Massena and Marmont to commit glaring faults unpunished. On the other hand, he has furnished many examples of that successful improvisation in which Napoleon seems to have surpassed all mankind. His sudden retreat from Oropesa across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo ; his passage of the Douro in 1809 ; his halt at Guinaldo, in the face of Marmont's overwhelming numbers ; the battle of Salamanca ; his sudden rush with the third division to seize the hill of Arinez at Vittoria ; his counter-stroke with the sixth division at Sauroren ; his battle of the 30th, two days afterwards ; his sudden passage of the Gave below Orthes. Add to these his wonderful battle of Assye, and the proofs are complete that he possesses in an eminent degree that intuitive perception which distinguishes the greatest generals.

Fortune, however, always asserts her supremacy in war, and often from a slight mistake such disastrous consequences flow, that in every age and every nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial. Napoleon's march upon Madrid in 1808, before he knew the exact situation of the British army, is an example. By that march he lent his flank to his enemy. Sir John Moore seized the advantage, and though the French emperor repaired the error for the moment by his astonishing march from Madrid to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula was then decided. If he had not been forced to turn against Moore, Lisbon would have fallen, Portugal could not have been organized for resistance, and the jealousy of the Spaniards would never have suffered Wellington to establish a solid base at Cadiz : that general's after successes would then have been with the things that are unborn. It was not so ordained. Wellington was victorious ; the great conqueror was overthrown. England stood the most triumphant nation of the world. But with an enormous debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace without tranquillity, greatness without intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms ! And it is a stirring sound ! War is the condition of this world. From man to the smallest insect, all are at strife, and the glory of arms, which cannot be obtained without the exercise of honour, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance, excites the brave man's patriotism, and is a chastening corrective for the rich man's pride. It is yet no security for power. Napoleon, the greatest man of whom history makes mention ; Napoleon, the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms Poland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and France. Fortune, that name for the unknown combinations of infinite power, was wanting to him, and without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled ocean.

APPENDIX.

NO. I.

THE following extracts of letters are published to avoid any future cavils upon the points they refer to, and also to show how difficult it is for the historian to obtain certain and accurate details, when eye-witnesses, having no wish to mislead, differ so much.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

Extract of a memoir by SIR CHARLES DALBIAC, who was one of LE MARCHANT'S brigade of heavy cavalry.

"Throughout these charges upon the enemy, *the heavy brigade was unsupported by any other portion of the cavalry whatever*; but was followed, as rapidly as it was possible for infantry to follow, by the third division which had so gloriously led the attack in the first instance and had so effectually turned the enemy's extreme left."

Extract from a memoir by COLONEL MONEY, who was one of GENERAL ANSON'S brigade of light cavalry.

"The third division moved to the right, and *the cavalry, Le Marchand's and Anson's*, were ordered to charge as soon as the tirailleurs of the third division began to ascend the right flank of the hill."—"The rapid movement of the cavalry which now began to gallop, and the third division pressing them (the French), they run into the wood, which separated them from the army; *we (Anson's light cavalry) charged them under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery from another height*; near 2000 threw down their arms in different parts of the wood, and we continued the charge through the wood until our brigade came into an open plain of ploughed fields, where the dust was so great we could see nothing, and halted; when it cleared away, we found ourselves within 300 yards of a large body of French infantry and artillery, formed on the declivity of a hill. A tremendous battle was heard on the other side, which prevented the enemy from perceiving us. At last they opened a fire of musketry and grape-shot, and we retired in good order and without any loss."

Extract of a letter from SIR HENRY WATSON, commanding the first regiment of Portuguese cavalry under GENERAL D'URBAN.

"When Marmont, at the battle of Salamanca, advanced his left, Lord Wellington ordered down the reserve, of which the 1st and 10th Portuguese cavalry and two squadrons of the British cavalry under Captain Townsend, now Lieutenant-Colonel Townsend, formed a part under Sir B. D'Urban. The cavalry was pushed forward in contiguous columns, and were protected from the enemy by a small rising ground, which, as soon as I had passed, I was ordered to wheel up, and charge the front in line. *The enemy had formed a square*, and gave us a volley as we advanced, the 11th and the 14th remained *en potence*. *In this charge we completely succeeded*, and the enemy appeared panic-struck, and made no attempt to prevent our cutting and thrusting at them in all directions until the moment I was about to withdraw; then a soldier, at not more than six or eight paces, levelled his musket at me, and shot me through the shoulder, which knocked me off my horse, where I continued to lie till the whole of our infantry had passed over."

Extract from a letter of COLONEL TOWNSEND, 14th Dragoons.

"At the battle of Salamanca I perfectly recollect seeing D'Urban's cavalry advance up the hill, and charge the French infantry. *They were repulsed*, and left Watson (now Sir Henry), who led his regiment, the first Portuguese, badly wounded on the field." "*I am almost positive the French were not in square, but in line, waiting to receive the attack of the leading brigade of the third division, which gallantly carried everything before it.*"

No. II.

Copies de deux dépêches de L'EMPEREUR au MINISTRE DE LA GUERRE relatives au DUC DE RAGUSE.

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE,

Dresde, le 28 Mai, 1812.

Je vous renvoie la correspondance d'Espagne. Ecrivez au Duc de Raguse que c'est le Roi qui doit lui donner des directions, que je suppose qu'il s'est retiré devant Lord Wellington selon les règles de la guerre, en l'obligeant à se masser, et non en se reployant devant sa cavalerie légère; qu'il aura conservé des têtes de pont sur l'Agueda, ce qui peut seul lui permettre d'avoir des nouvelles de l'ennemi tous les jours, et de le tenir en respect. Que si au contraire il a mis trente lieues d'intervalle entre lui et l'ennemi, comme il l'a déjà fait deux fois contre tous les principes de la guerre, il laisse le général Anglais maître de se porter où il veut, il perd constamment l'initiative, et n'est plus d'aucun poids dans les affaires d'Espagne, que la Biscaye et le nord sont dans des dispositions fâcheuses par les suites de l'évacuation des Asturias par la division Bonnet, que la réoccupation de cette province n'a pas encore eu lieu, que le nord est exposé à de grands malheurs, que Santona et St. Sebastian sont compromis, que les libres communications des guerillas avec la Galice et les Asturias par la mer les rendront formidables, que s'il ne fait pas réoccuper promptement les Asturias, sa position ne peut s'améliorer.

Recommandez au Général Caffarelli de réunir davantage ses troupes, et d'avoir toujours une colonne dans la main.

Ecrivez au Général L'Huillier d'avoir l'œil sur St. Sebastian, et d'avoir toujours 3000 hommes dans la main pour les diriger sur cette place si elle avoit besoin d'être secourue.

En général pour parer à la mauvaise manœuvre et à la mauvaise direction que le Duc de Raguse donne à nos affaires il est nécessaire d'avoir beaucoup de monde à Bayonne. Activez la marche du 3^e et du 106^{me} et de la 5^e demi brigade provisoire sur cette place. Tenez y deux généraux de brigade afin que le Général L'Huillier puisse toujours disposer des forces pour être en mesure d'agir selon les circonstances.

Réunissez un millier d'hommes des dépôts de cavalerie de l'armée d'Espagne, et dirigez les en régiments de marche sur Bayonne.

Prescrivez au Général L'Huillier de tenir ses troupes dans la vallée de Bastan, à Bayonne, St. Jean de Luz, et Irun, en les munissant bien, les barraquant, les exerçant, et les formant. Ce sera au moyen de cette ressource que si le Duc de Raguse continue à faire des bévues on pourra empêcher le mal de devenir extrême.

Sur ce, je prie Dieu, etc.

(Signé)

NAPOLEON.

[For second despatch, see Appendix, No. VII.]

No. III.

Lettre de M. LE DUC DE DALMATIE AU ROI.

Seville, 12 Août, 1812.

Je n'avais reçu aucune nouvelle de V. M. depuis les lettres qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur m'écrire des 6 et 7 Juillet dernier. Enfin je viens de recevoir celle datée de Segovie le 29 du même mois. Les rapports publiés par les ennemis m'avaient déjà instruit des événements survenus en Castille lesquels étaient naturellement exagérés; V. M. a bien voulu en quelque sorte fixer à ce sujet mes idées. Je déplore les pertes que l'armée de Portugal a éprouvées. Dans l'état où étaient les affaires d'Espagne une bataille ne devait se donner qu'à la dernière extrémité, mais tout n'est pas perdu. V. M. après m'avoir communiqué les dispositions qu'elle a faites depuis le 6 (date de la dernière lettre) au 19 Juillet m'ordonne comme une ressource d'évacuer l'Andalousie et de me diriger sur Tolède. Je ne puis dissimuler que cette disposition me paraît fort extraordinaire. J'étais loin de penser que V. M. s'y serait déterminée. Le sort de l'Espagne est il donc décidé? V. M. veut elle sacrifier le royaume à la capitale? et a-t-elle la certitude de la conserver en prenant ce parti? Enfin l'évacuation de l'Andalousie et ma marche sur Tolède sont elles l'unique ressource qui nous reste? Je vais me préparer à cette disposition que je regarde comme des plus funestes pour l'honneur des armes impériales, le bien du service de l'empereur et l'intérêt de V. M. dans l'espoir qu'avant qu'elle s'exécute V. M. l'aura changée ou modifiée suivant les propositions que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui faire le 19 Juillet, le 8 de ce mois, et par M. le Colonel Desprez.

J'ai l'honneur d'adresser à votre Majesté triplicata de ma lettre du 8 de ce mois. En me référant aux observations et propositions qu'elle renferme, si V. M. ne prend pas des dispositions en conséquence, je considère que l'évacuation de toute l'Espagne est décidée, car il faut que V. M. se persuade que du moment que mon mouvement sera commencé je serai suivi par soixante mille ennemis lesquels ne me donneront pas le temps ni la liberté de prendre la direction que V. M. m'indique et qui se réuniront à ceux qui ont pénétré en Castille et m'empêcheront de séjourner sur le Tage encore moins d'arriver à Madrid. Il n'y a qu'un moyen pour rétablir les affaires: que V. M. Vienne en Andalousie et qu'elle y amène toutes les troupes de l'armée du centre, de l'armée de Portugal, de l'armée d'Arragon auxquelles ses

ordres pourront parvenir, quand bien même tout le royaume de Valence devrait être évacué. Qu'importe à V. M. de conserver Madrid si elle perd le royaume? Philippe V. en sortit trois fois et y reentra en souverain. Du moment que nous aurons 70 ou 80 mille Français réunis dans le midi de l'Espagne, le théâtre de la guerre est changé; l'armée de Portugal se trouve dégagée et elle peut se reporter successivement jusqu'au Tage. D'ailleurs ce serait sans inconvénient qu'elle gardât Burgos et la rive gauche de l'Ebre et que tout l'espace compris entre elle et le Sierra Morena fut à la disposition des ennemis jusqu'à ce que des renforts vinssent de France et que l'Empereur eût pu prendre des dispositions. Le sacrifice une fois fait il n'y a plus de moyen d'y remédier. Les armées impériales en Espagne repassent l'Ebre d'où peut-être la famine les chassera, les affaires de l'Empereur dans le nord de l'Europe peuvent s'en ressentir, l'Amérique qui vient de déclarer la guerre à l'Angleterre fera peut-être la paix. V. M. a sans doute réfléchi à toutes les conséquences d'un pareil changement; la perte momentanée de Madrid et des Castilles est nulle pour la politique de l'empereur, elle peut se réparer en plus ou moins de tems. La perte d'une bataille par l'armée de Portugal n'est qu'un grand duel qui se répare également, mais la perte de l'Andalousie et la levée du siège de Cadix sont des évènements dont les effets seront ressentis dans toute l'Europe et dans le nouveau monde. Enfin en fidèle sujet de l'empereur je dois déclarer à V. M. que je ne crois pas les affaires d'Espagne assez désespérées pour prendre un parti aussi violent. J'entrevois encore du remède si V. M. veut prendre les dispositions que j'ai proposées; tout en me préparant à l'exécution de ses ordres je me permets de lui demander de nouvelles instructions. J'ai surtout l'honneur de prier V. M. d'ordonner que les communications de l'Andalousie avec Tolède soient rétablies et quelque évènement qui survienne de vouloir bien faire prendre à l'armée du centre, la direction de Despeña Perros ou d'Almaden pour se joindre à l'armée du midi. Alors je reponds de tout, et j'exécuterai les dispositions que j'ai énoncées dans ma lettre du 8 de ce mois.

Je, etc., etc., etc.

No. IV.

*Lettre de M. LE MARÉCHAL, DUC DE DALMATIE, Á M. LE MINISTRE DE LA GUERRE
À Paris.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Toute communication de l'Andalousie avec la France étant interrompue et n'ayant rien reçu depuis les premiers jours de Mai; depuis un mois le roi ayant même retiré les troupes qui étoient dans la Manche et ne pouvant communiquer avec Madrid, j'entreprends de faire parvenir mes rapports à votre excellence par la voie de mer. Si le bâtiment que je fais à cet effet partir de Malaga peut arriver à Marseille, l'Empereur sera plutôt instruit de ce qui se passe dans le midi de l'Espagne et de la position de son armée.

A ce sujet j'ai l'honneur d'adresser à votre excellence copie des derniers rapports que j'ai faits au roi, lesquels contiennent les représentations que j'ai cru devoir soumettre à sa majesté pour le bien du service de l'empereur, la conservation des conquêtes et l'honneur des armées impériales.

Je ne suis instruit des malheurs que l'armée de Portugal a éprouvés que par les bruits populaires et les rapports de l'ennemi; car le roi en m'écrivant le 29 Juillet de Ségovie ne m'en a donné aucun détail. Je dois donc m'imaginer que les pertes que nous avons faites en Castille sont beaucoup exagérées et j'en tire la conséquence que les affaires de l'empereur en Espagne ne sont pas aussi désespérées que le roi paraît en être persuadé. Cependant sa majesté après être resté 23 jours sans m'écrire, lorsque les ennemis étoient en plein mouvement et que sa majesté se portoit avec 14,000 hommes de l'armée du centre à la rencontre du Duc de Raguse qui sans l'attendre s'étoit engagé précipitamment et éprouvoit une défaite; le roi dis-je en me faisant part le 29 Juillet de ses mouvemens me donna l'ordre formel d'évacuer l'Andalousie et me diriger sur Tolède, et il me dit expressément que c'est l'unique ressource qui nous reste.

Je suis loin de partager l'avis de sa majesté, je crois fermement qu'il est possible de mieux faire et que tout peut s'arranger en attendant que d'après les ordres de l'empereur V. E. ait pu mettre les armées qui sont dans le nord de l'Espagne à même de reprendre les opérations, ainsi que j'en fais la proposition à sa majesté dans les lettres dont je mets ci-joint copies. Mais mon devoir est d'obéir et je me chargerais d'une trop grande responsabilité si j'éluais l'exécution de l'ordre formel d'évacuer que le roi m'a donné.

Je vais donc me préparer à exécuter cette disposition que je regarde comme funeste, puisqu'elle me force à livrer aux ennemis des places de guerre susceptibles d'une bonne défense tout approvisionnées, les établissemens et un matériel d'artillerie immense et de laisser dans les hôpitaux beaucoup de malades que leur situation et le manque de transport ne permettent point d'emmener. Je ne ferai cependant mon mouvement que progressivement et je ne négligerai aucun soin pour qu'il ne reste en arrière rien de ce qui peut être utile à l'armée.

Je ne puis encore assurer que je ne ferai ce mouvement par Tolède, car du moment qu'il sera entrepris je serai suivi par 60,000 ennemis qui se joindront aux divisions que Lord Wellington aura déjà portées sur le Tage. Ainsi il est possible que je me dirige par Murcie sur Valence suivant ce que j'apprendrai ou les nouveaux ordres que je recevrai du roi.

Dans cet état de choses, je ne puis dissimuler à V. E. que je regarde l'évacuation de l'Espagne au moins jusqu'à l'Èbre comme décidée du moment que le roi m'ordonna d'évacuer l'Andalousie et de me diriger sur Tolède, car il est bien certain qu'il ne sera pas possible de rester en position sur le Tage ni dans les Castilles et que dès-lors les conquêtes des armes impériales en Espagne dont l'Empereur avait ordonné la conservation, sont sacrifiées.

A ce sujet je ne puis me défendre de réfléchir sur d'autres évènements qui se passent. J'ai lu dans les journaux de Cadix, que l'ambassadeur du roi en Russie avait joint l'armée Russe, que le roi avait fait des insinuations au gouvernement insurgent de Cadix, que la Suède avait fait un traité avec l'Angleterre, et que le prince héréditaire avait demandé à la regence de Cadix 250 Espagnols pour sa garde personnelle. (Avant hier un parlementaire que le Général Semélé avait envoyé à l'escadre Anglaise pour réclamer des prisonniers resta pendant quelques instans à bord de l'amiral, lequel lui montra une frégate, qui, dit il, est destinée à porter en Angleterre et ensuite en Suède les 250 Espagnols que le Prince Bernadotte demande pour sa garde personnelle.) Enfin j'ai vu dans les mêmes journaux que Moreau et Blucher étaient arrivés à Stockholm, et que Rapatel, aide-de-camp de Moreau, était à Londres. Je ne tire aucune conséquence de tous ces faits, mais j'en serai plus attentif. Cependant j'ai cru devoir déposer mes craintes entre les mains de six généraux de l'armée, après avoir exigé d'eux le serment qu'ils ne révéleront ce que je leur ai dit qu'à l'empereur lui-même ou aux personnes que S. M. aura spécialement déléguées pour en recevoir la déclaration, si auparavant je ne puis moi-même en rendre compte. Il est pourtant de mon devoir de manifester à V. E. que je crains que le bât de toutes les fausses dispositions que l'on a prises et celui des intrigues qui ont lieu ne soient de forcer les armées impériales qui sont en Espagne à repasser au moins l'Èbre et ensuite de présenter cet évènement comme l'unique ressource (expression du roi, lettre du 20 Juillet) dans l'espérance d'en profiter par quelque arrangement.

Mes craintes sont peut-être mal fondées, mais en pareille situation il vaut mieux les pousser à l'extrémité que d'être négligent, d'autant plus que ces craintes et ma sollicitude tournent au bien du service de l'empereur et à la sûreté de l'armée dont le commandement m'est confié.

J'ai l'honneur de prier V. E. de vouloir bien si ma lettre lui parvient, la mettre le plutôt possible sous les yeux de l'Empereur et d'assurer S. M. que moi et son armée du midi serons toujours dignes de sa suprême confiance. Je désire bien vivement que V. E. puisse me faire savoir que mes dépêches lui sont parvenues et surtout recevoir par elle les ordres de sa majesté.

Seville, 12 Août, 1812.

(Signé)

DALMATIE.

No. V.

SIRE,

Je suis arrivé à Paris hier 21 du courant. Je me suis sur le champ présenté chez le ministre de la guerre et je lui ai remis la lettre de V. M. ainsi que celles de M. le Maréchal Jourdan. S. E. m'a questionné sur les affaires d'Espagne, mais sans me demander mes dépêches pour l'Empereur. Elle m'a, suivant les intentions de V. M., pourvu des ordres dont j'ai besoin pour poursuivre ma route avec célérité.

Ce matin le ministre m'a fait appeler et j'ai eu avec lui une longue conférence. Il m'a pressé de m'expliquer avec franchise sur ce que j'avais pu remarquer pendant mon séjour en Andalousie, m'a témoigné quelque inquiétude sur l'influence que pouvoit exercer le maréchal tant sur l'armée que sur les autorités civiles. Il a rappelé les intrigues de Portugal et a conclu en me disant qu'il dépouillait devant moi le caractère de ministre pour causer avec un homme de votre confiance, et que les services que vous lui aviez rendus à l'époque de sa disgrâce devoient être pour V. M. une garantie du désir qu'il avait d'agir suivant ses intentions. Quelques franchises que m'aient parus ces ouvertures, je n'ai pas cru devoir parler de la partie la plus délicate de ma mission. J'ai seulement répondu que l'armée du midi serait toujours celle de l'Empereur, que lorsque S. M. enverrait ses ordres déterminés, elle serait obéie, et que tout ce que j'avais entendu en Andalousie ne me laissait à ce sujet aucun doute. Au reste ma conversation avec le Duc de Feltre m'a prouvé qu'aucune lettre de la nature de celle dont je suis porteur ne lui était encore parvenue et cela est pour ma mission une circonstance favorable.

J'ai causé avec S. E. de la résistance que les chefs de l'armée Française en Espagne avaient toujours opposée aux ordres de V. M. Il a déclaré que tous avaient été mis sous vos ordres et sans aucune restriction, qu'avant son départ l'empereur avait témoigné son étonnement sur les doutes que manifestaient à cet égard les lettres de V. M. et qu'il avait ordonné que l'on fit connaître ses intentions d'une manière encore plus positive. J'ai cité la lettre ou le Maréchal Suchet s'autorise d'une phrase du Prince de Neufchatel, celles du Général Dorsenne et du Général Caffarelli, il paraît que tous les obstacles qui pouvaient entraver l'exécution de vos ordres ont été levés par des instructions adressées postérieurement aux généraux en chef. Quant à la désobéissance formelle du Maréchal Soult S. E. a dit d'abord que V. M. avait le droit de lui ôter le commandement, mais elle est convenue ensuite qu'une démarche semblable ne pouvoit être faite que par l'ordre exprès de l'Empereur.

Le ministre est aussi entré dans quelques détails sur les affaires militaires, les ordres donnés par V. M. et par le Maréchal Jourdan aux diverses époques de la campagne, ont eu, m'a-t-il

dit, l'approbation générale et ce qu'a écrit l'Empereur depuis qu'il a appris la bataille de Salamanque prouve qu'il donne entièrement droit à V. M. l'opinion publique à cet égard est encore plus prononcée que celle des hommes en place, et je ne puis exprimer à V. M. avec quelle rigueur sont jugés en France les Maréchaux Soult et Marmont.

Le Duc de Feltre m'a parlé du mouvement sur Blasco Sancho. Peut-être a-t-il dit, l'Empereur reprochera un peu d'hésitation; exécuté deux jours plutôt il aurait produit les plus heureux effets. V. M. se rappelle que j'avais prévu cette objection et je ne serai point embarrassé pour y répondre.

S. E. a cru que j'allais auprès de l'Empereur pour solliciter de nouveaux renforts; elle m'a dit que la guerre de Russie avait jusqu'à présent absorbé tous les moyens, qu'il était loin de pouvoir envoyer les troupes sur lesquelles paraissait compter M. le Maréchal Jourdan, que l'on pourrait seulement pourvoir à la perte matérielle faite par l'armée de Portugal, il paraît que les nouvelles troupes envoyées en Espagne ne s'élèvent pas au-delà de vingt mille hommes, au reste la grande victoire remportée par l'empereur fera probablement prendre des dispositions plus favorables aux affaires de la Péninsule.

Le Duc de Feltre a reçu des nouvelles du Général Clausel. Ce général annonce que l'armée Anglaise marche vers le nord, que Lord Wellington s'est de sa personne porté vers le Duero, que l'armée de Portugal s'est ralliée, que ses pertes sont beaucoup moindres qu'on ne l'avait cru, que le Général Foy avait fait un mouvement pour délivrer Astorga et Tordesillas, mais que déjà ces deux places s'étaient rendues que l'on pourrait accuser de faiblesse les deux gouverneurs et que peut-être la conduite de celui de Tordesillas devait être jugée plus sévèrement encore.

J'ai parlé au ministre de la position embarrassante dans laquelle me mettait le décret du 26 Août, il a répondu que je pouvais sans inconvénient me présenter à l'Empereur avec les décorations du grade que m'a donné V. M. que ce n'était point contre les officiers à votre service que le décret avait été dirigé et qu'il serait modifié en leur faveur.

J'ai l'honneur de prévenir V. M. que je partirai ce soir de Paris, je poursuivrai sans m'arrêter ma route jusqu'au quartier général de l'Empereur.

J'ai l'honneur de mettre aux pieds de V. M. l'hommage de mon profond respect et de mon entier dévouement.

Paris, 22 Septembre, 1812.

(Signé) LE COLONEL DESPRES.

No. VI. A.

Lettre confidentielle écrite au Roi par MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE.

SIRE,

Paris, 10 Novembre, 1812.

La lettre chiffrée que V. M. m'a écrite de Requena le 18 Octobre, m'est parvenue il y a quelques jours, et je l'ai sur le champ transmise à l'Empereur qui ne la recevra toute fois que 19 jours après le départ de cette même lettre de Paris. A la distance où l'Empereur se trouve de sa capitale, il est des choses sur lesquelles la politique force à fermer les yeux : du moins momentanément. Si la conduite de Monsieur le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie est équivoque et cauteleuse; si ses démarches présentent le même aspect que celles qu'il parait avoir faites et qui ont précédé l'abandon du Portugal après la prise d'Oporto, il viendra un moment où l'Empereur pourra l'en punir s'il le juge convenable, et peut-être est-il moins dangereux où il est qu'il ne le serait ici où quelques factieux ont pu du sein même des prisons qui les renfermaient méditer en l'absence de l'Empereur, une révolution contre l'Empereur et sa dynastie, et presque l'exécuter, le 2 et 3 Octobre dernier. Je pense donc, sire, qu'il est prudent de ne pas pousser à bout le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie tout en contrariant sous main les démarches ambitieuses qu'il pourrait tenter, et en s'assurant de la fidélité des principaux officiers de l'armée du midi envers l'Empereur et même de celle des Espagnols qu'il traîne à sa suite. L'arme du ridicule qu'il est facile de manier en cette occasion suffira, ce me semble, pour déjouer ses coupables projets s'ils existent, et le ramener à son devoir, sauf à faire prendre par la suite des précautions pour qu'il ne s'en écarte jamais.

Quoiqu'il en soit je suis incontestablement dans la nécessité d'attendre les ordres de l'Empereur sur le contenu de la lettre de V. M. datée de Requena le 18 Oct. Elle voit par la présente que je partage ses sentiments sur l'objet dont elle traite; je viens d'être assez heureux pour donner à l'Empereur et à sa famille de nouvelles preuves de ma fidélité et de mon attachement, et je suis assuré que si V. M. connaît les détails de ma conduite le 2 et 3 Octobre, elle la trouvera conforme aux sentiments que je me suis fait un plaisir de lui exprimer en faveur de l'Empereur et de sa famille au moment où j'ai pris congé de V. M. à Luneville il y a quelques années, etc., etc.

Note.—It is only necessary to add to this letter that notwithstanding the Duke of Feltre's professions of attachment he was soon afterwards one of the most zealous courtiers of the Bourbons and the most bitter enemy of the Emperor.

The constancy with which the Duke of Dalmatia served that great man is well known.

No. VI. B.

COLONEL DESPRES to the KING.

SIRE,

Paris, 3 Janvier, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer à V. M. mon arrivée à Paris. Mais j'ai dû en me servant de la voie de l'estafette user d'une extrême discrétion. La reine m'ayant conseillé de vous écrire avec quelque détail et ayant daigné m'offrir de faire partir ma lettre par le premier courrier qu'elle expédierait, j'en profite pour rendre compte à V. M. de ma mission et lui faire connaître une partie des évènements dont j'ai été témoin.

Je suis arrivé à Moscou le 18 Octobre au soir. L'Empereur venait d'apprendre que l'avant garde commandée par le Roi de Naples avait été attaquée et forcée à la retraite avec une partie de son artillerie. Déjà le départ était résolu et les troupes se mettaient en mouvement. On m'annonça à S. M. qui répondit d'abord d'une manière peu favorable. Cependant au milieu de la nuit on me fit appeler. Je remis à l'Empereur les dépêches dont V. M. m'avait chargé, et sans les ouvrir, il me questionna sur leur contenu. Puis il fit sur les opérations de la campagne une partie des objections qu'avait prévues V. M.

Il dit que le mouvement en faveur de l'armée de Portugal avait été commencé trop tard, qu'il aurait pu être fait un mois plutôt, que lui-même avait daté la conduite à tenir dans cette circonstance lorsqu'en 1808 il avait sans hésiter quitté Madrid pour marcher aux Anglais qui s'étaient avancés jusqu'à Valladolid. Je répondis que V. M. s'était mise en marche peu d'heures après la division Palombini, qu'elle avait dû attendre cette division pour conduire vers l'armée de Portugal un renfort tel que le succès ne pût être douteux ; qu'elle avait d'autant moins cru devoir précipiter son mouvement, que M. le Maréchal Marmont avait écrit plusieurs fois qu'il se croyait trop faible pour lutter seul contre l'armée Anglaise, que ce maréchal avait été maître du tems, qu'il n'avait point été battu dans sa position sur le Duero, mais bien sur un champ de bataille dans lequel rien ne l'avait forcé de s'engager. L'Empereur prétendit ensuite que V. M. après avoir appris la perte de la bataille de Salamanque aurait dû se porter sur le Duero et rallier l'armée de Portugal. Je rappelai alors le mouvement fait du Guadarama vers Ségovie et la position critique dans laquelle vous avez laissé la Duc de Raguse qui avait lui-même proposé ce mouvement. L'Empereur dit qu'il connaissait très bien tous les reproches qu'à cet égard on pouvait faire au Maréchal Marmont. Il ajouta que l'armée du centre ayant fait sa retraite sur Madrid elle aurait dû garder plus longtems les défilés du Guadarama, qu'on avait trop tôt passé le Tage, que du moins ce mouvement ayant été résolu, il fallait ne point laisser de garnison au Retiro, briser tous les affûts, emporter les aigles et bruler les effets d'habillement ; qu'il n'avait jamais considéré ce poste que comme propre à contenir la population de Madrid, que l'ennemi étant maître de la campagne, on devait l'abandonner et que de toutes les fautes de la campagne c'était celle qu'il avait le moins conçue. Je répondis à cette objection ainsi que j'en étais convenu avec V. M. L'Empereur en venant ensuite à la lettre du Duc de Dalmatie me dit qu'elle lui était déjà parvenue par une autre voie, mais qu'il n'y avait attaché aucune importance ; que le Maréchal Soult s'était trompé, qu'il ne pouvait s'occuper de semblables *pauvretés* dans un moment où il était à la tête de cinq cent mille hommes et faisait des choses immenses. Ce sont ses expressions, qu'au reste les soupçons du Duc de Dalmatie ne l'étonnaient que faiblement ; que beaucoup de généraux de l'armée d'Espagne les partageaient et pensaient que V. M. préférerait l'Espagne à la France ; qu'il savait parfaitement qu'elle avait le cœur François mais que ceux qui la jugeaient par ces discours devaient avoir une autre opinion. Il ajouta que le Maréchal Soult était la seule tête militaire qu'il eut en Espagne, qu'il ne pouvait l'en retirer sans compromettre l'armée, que d'ailleurs il devait être parfaitement tranquille sur ses intentions puisqu'il venait d'apprendre par les journaux Anglais qu'il évacuait l'Andalousie et se réunissait aux armées du centre et d'Aragon, que cette réunion opérée on devait être assez en force pour reprendre l'offensive ; que d'ailleurs il n'avait point d'ordres à envoyer, qu'il ne savait point en donner de si loin, qu'il ne se dissimulait point l'étendue du mal et qu'il regrettaît plus que jamais que V. M. n'ait point suivi le conseil qu'il lui avait donné de ne pas retourner en Espagne ; qu'il était inutile que je repartisse, que je resterais à l'armée ou l'on m'emploierait. J'insistai alors pour être renvoyé à V. M. d'une manière qui parut faire sur l'Empereur quelque impression, et il finit par me dire que je serai expédié mais que je ne pouvais l'être dans ce moment, qu'ayant besoin de repos je resterais à Moscou, et que puisque j'étais officier du génie, je serais chargé de diriger sous les ordres du Duc de Trevise les travaux et la défense du Kremlin. Je reçus en conséquence un ordre écrit du Prince de Neufchatel. Lorsqu'après l'entière évacuation de Moscou le corps de M. le M. Mortier eut rejoint l'armée, je demandai et j'obtins d'y rester attaché jusqu'à ce que je fusse expédié. Je craignais que si je restais au quartier général on ne m'y désignât des fonctions qui seraient un nouvel obstacle à mon retour. Je pensai que peut-être on éviterait d'envoyer à V. M. un témoin des évènements qui se passaient, et je préférai attendre qu'une occasion favorable se présentât. Etant arrivé à Wilna peu de tems après le départ de l'Empereur, je demandai au Duc de Bassano, et il me donna l'autorisation de venir attendre des ordres à Paris. J'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer à V. M. dans un autre lettre que l'altération de ma santé me forçait à suspendre mon retour en Espagne.

L'armée au moment où je la quittai était dans la plus affreuse détresse. Depuis longtems déjà la désorganisation et les pertes étaient effrayantes, l'artillerie et la cavalerie n'existaient

plus. Tous les corps étaient confondus. Les soldats marchaient pêle-mêle et ne songaient qu'à prolonger machinalement leur existence ; quoique l'ennemi fut sur nos flancs, chaque jour des milliers d'hommes isolés se répandaient dans les villages voisins de la route et tombaient dans les mains des Cosaques. Cependant quelque grand que soit le nombre des prisonniers, celui des morts l'est incomparablement davantage. Il est impossible de peindre jusqu'à quel point la disette s'est fait sentir pendant plus d'un mois ; il n'y eut point de distributions ; les chevaux morts étaient la seule ressource, et bien souvent les maréchaux mêmes manquaient de pain. La rigueur du climat rendait la disette plus meurtrière, chaque nuit nous laissions au bivouac plusieurs centaines de morts. Je crois pouvoir sans exagérer porter à cent mille le nombre qu'on a perdu ainsi, et peindre avec assez de vérité la situation des choses en disant que l'armée est morte : la jeune garde qui faisait partie du corps auquel j'étais attaché était forte de 8000 hommes lorsque nous avons quitté Moscou, à Wilna elle en comptait à peine quatre cents. Tous les autres corps d'armée sont réduits dans la même proportion, et la retraite ayant dû se prolonger au-delà du Niemen, je suis convaincu que vingt mille hommes n'auront pas atteints la Vistule. On croyait à l'armée que beaucoup de soldats avaient pris les devants et qu'ils se rallieraient lorsqu'on pourrait suspendre le mouvement rétrograde. Je me suis assuré du contraire ; à cinq lieues du quartier général, je ne rencontrai plus d'hommes isolés et je connus bien alors la profondeur de la plaie. Une phrase pourrait donner à V. M. une idée de l'état des choses, depuis le passage du Niemen un corps de 800 Napolitains, le seul corps qui eût conservé quelque consistance, faisait l'arrière garde d'une armée Française, forte n'aguère de trois cents mille hommes. Il est impossible d'exprimer jusqu'à quel point le désordre était contagieux ; les corps réunis des Ducs de Bellune et de Reggio comptaient 30,000 hommes au passage de la Beresina, deux jours après ils étaient dissous comme le reste de l'armée. Envoyer des renforts c'était augmenter les pertes et l'on reconnut enfin qu'il fallait empêcher les troupes neuves de se mettre en contact avec cette multitude en désordre à laquelle on ne peut plus donner le nom d'armée. Le Roi de Naples disait hautement qu'en lui laissant le commandement l'Empereur avait exigé le plus grand sacrifice qu'il pût attendre de son dévouement. Les forces physiques et morales du Prince de Neuchâtel étaient entièrement épuisées. Si maintenant V. M. me demandait quel doit être le terme du mouvement rétrograde, je lui répondrais que l'ennemi est maître de le fixer. Je ne crois pas que les Prussiens fassent de grands efforts pour défendre leur territoire. M. de Narbonne que j'ai vu à Berlin et qui était chargé de lettres de l'Empereur pour le Roi de Prusse, m'a dit que les dispositions de ce prince et de son premier ministre étaient favorables, mais il ne se dissimulait pas que celles de la nation ne sont pas les mêmes. Déjà plusieurs rixes s'étaient engagées entre les habitants de Berlin et des soldats de la garnison Française ; et en traversant la Prusse j'ai eu lieu de m'assurer que l'on ne pouvait guère compter sur cette alliée de nouvelle date.

Il paraît aussi que dans l'armée autrichienne les officiers déclamaient publiquement contre la guerre.

Quel triste que soit ce tableau, je crois l'avoir peint sans exagération et l'avoir observé de sang froid. Mon opinion sur l'étendue due du mal est la même que lorsque j'étais plus voisin du théâtre.

No. VII.

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE FELTRE,

Ghiart, le 2 Septembre, 1812.

J'ai reçu le rapport du Duc de Raguse sur la bataille du 22. Il est impossible de rien lire de plus insignifiant : il y a plus de fatras et plus de rouages que dans une horloge, et pas un mot qui fasse connaître l'état réel des choses. Voici ma manière de voir sur cette affaire, et la conduite que vous devez tenir. Vous attendrez que le Duc de Raguse soit arrivé, qu'il soit remis de sa blessure, et à-peu-près entièrement rétabli. Vous lui demanderez alors de répondre catégoriquement à ces questions. Pourquoi a-t-il livré bataille sans les ordres de son général-en-chef ? Pourquoi n'a-t-il pas pris des ordres sur le parti qu'il devait suivre, subordonné au système général sur mes armées d'Espagne ? Il y a là *un crime d'insubordination* qui est la cause de tous les malheurs de cette affaire, et quand même il n'eût pas été dans l'obligation de se mettre en communication avec son général-en-chef pour exécuter les ordres qu'il en recevrait, comment a-t-il pu sortir de sa défensive sur le Duero, lorsque, sans un grand effort d'imagination, il étoit facile de concevoir qu'il pouvoit être secouru par l'arrivée de la division de dragons, d'une trentaine de pièces de canon, et de plus de 15 mille hommes de troupes Françaises que le roi avoit dans la main ? Et comment pouvoit-il sortir de la défensive pour prendre l'offensive sans attendre la réunion et le secours d'un corps de 15 à 17 mille hommes ?

Le roi avoit ordonné à l'armée du nord d'envoyer sa cavalerie à son secours ; elle étoit en marche. Le Duc de Raguse ne pouvoit l'ignorer, puisque cette cavalerie est arrivée le soir de la bataille. De Salamanque à Burgos il y a bien des marches. Pourquoi n'a-t-il pas retardé de deux jours pour avoir le secours de cette cavalerie, qui lui étoit si importante ? Il faudroit avoir une explication sur les raisons qui ont porté le Duc de Raguse à ne pas attendre les ordres de son général-en-chef pour livrer bataille sans attendre les renforts que le roi, comme commandant supérieur de mes armées en Espagne, pouvoit retirer de l'armée du centre, de l'armée de Valence et de l'Andalousie. Le seul fonds de l'armée du centre fournissoit 15 mille

hommes de pied, et 2500 chevaux, lesquels pouvoient être rendus dans le même temps que le Duc de Raguse faisoit battre son corps, et en prenant dans ses deux armées, le roi pouvoit lui amener 40 mille hommes. Enfin le Duc de Raguse sachant que 1500 chevaux étoient partis de Burgos pour le rejoindre, comment ne les a-t-il pas attendus ?

En faisant coïncider ces deux circonstances d'avoir pris l'offensive sans l'ordre de son général-en-chef et de ne pas avoir retardé la bataille de deux jours pour ne pas recevoir 15,000 hommes d'infanterie que lui amenoit le roi, et 1500 chevaux de l'armée du nord, on est fondé à penser que ce maréchal a craint que le roi ne participe au succès de la bataille, et qu'il a sacrifié à la vanité la gloire de la patrie et l'avantage de mon service.

Donnez ordre aux généraux divisionnaires d'envoyer les états de leurs pertes. Il est intolérable qu'on rende des comptes faux et qu'on me dissimule la vérité.

Prescrivez au Général Clausel, qui commande l'armée, d'envoyer la situation avant et après la bataille. Demandez également aux chefs de corps des situations exactes. Finalement, vous ferez connoître au Duc de Raguse en temps opportun combien je suis indigné de la conduite inexplicable qu'il a tenue, en n'attendant pas deux jours que les secours de l'armée du centre et de l'armée du nord le rejoignent. J'attends avec impatience l'arrivée du général aide-de-camp du roi pour avoir des renseignements précis. Ce qu'il a écrit ne signifie pas grande chose.

(Signé)

NAPOLEON.

No. VIII. A.

Extract from GENERAL SOUHAM's despatch to the MINISTER OF WAR, Briviesca, 2nd October, 1812.

“Par votre lettre du 6 Octobre vous m'annoncez que le Duc de Dalmatie venait de réunir son armée à Grenade et à Jaen, et que le roi alloit se mettre incessamment en communication avec ce maréchal pour marcher de concert sur Madrid. En conséquence de ces mouvemens je résolus de marcher à la rencontre de l'ennemi, et de le forcer à lever le siège de Burgos. Le 18 toute mon armée se mit en mouvement sur trois colonnes, et le 19 elle occupait les positions ainsi qu'il suit. La droite à Termino, le centre sur les hauteurs de Monasterio, et la gauche à Villa Escuso la Solano et Villa Escuso la Sombria. La journée du 20 devait être celle du combat, lorsque je reçus à l'instant, à deux heures du matin, par un aide-de-camp, une lettre de S. M. C. qui m'ordonne de ne point engager d'affaire générale, et d'attendre que par ses manœuvres Lord Wellington soit forcé d'évacuer sa position de Burgos; ainsi il me faut renoncer à tous mes projets, et non sans un violent chagrin, car je puis assurer V. E. que mon armée était parfaitement disposée, et que j'aurais pu combattre l'ennemi avec avantage. Cependant l'armée n'a des vivres que pour quatre jours, et à cette époque, si Lord Wellington n'est point en retraite, je serai forcé de l'attaquer. J'entrevois moins de peril de marcher en avant que de rétrograder. Dans un instant où le moral du soldat commence à se raffermir tout mouvement en arrière produit le plus mauvais effet.

(Signé)

COMTE SOUHAM.”

No. VIII. B.

Extracts from two letters written by the DUKE OF FELTRE to KING JOSEPH, dated Paris, 8th Oct. and 19th Nov., 1812.

On one of the letters is the following note, in pencil, by the Duke of Wellington. “*Advantage of English newspapers.*”

“Sire,—J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à votre majesté quelques extraits des journaux Anglais les plus récents dont j'ai choisi ce qui pourrait être de quelque intérêt dans les circonstances actuels.”

“Sire,—J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à V. M. plusieurs extraits des journaux Anglais contenant quelques faits utiles ou intéressans à connaître.”

These extracts, taken from the *Courier*, *Morning Post*, *Times*, *Alfred*, *Statesman*, and *Morning Chronicle*, contained minute details upon the numbers, situation, and destination of the Sicilian, Spanish, and Anglo-Portuguese armies, and the most exact account of the reinforcements sent from England. In fine a complete system of intelligence for the enemy.

No. IX.

Extract of a letter from MARSHAL JOURDAN to COLONEL NAPIER.

“*Soisy sous Etiole, 14 Janvier, 1820.*

“Le 10 Novembre, 1812. Les armées du midi, du Portugal, et du centre se trouvaient réunies sur la Tormes. Vous connaissez la position qu'occupait l'armée des alliés. Cette position ayant été bien reconnue, dans la journée du 11, par le roi, accompagné du Duc de Dalmatie, de plusieurs généraux, et de moi, je proposai de passer la Tormes, guéable presque

partout entre Villa-Gonzala et Huerta, et de nous porter rapidement sur Calvarissa de Ariba, qui se trouvait au centre de la ligne des ennemis. J'espérais que Lord Wellington ne pourrait éviter la bataille; et j'étais d'avis que nous devions faire tous nos efforts pour le forcer à l'accepter; me flattant qu'avec une armée de 80 milles hommes, dont 10 milles de cavalerie et 120 pièces de canon,* nous étions en état de remporter un brillant succès, sur le même champ de bataille où quelques mois avant nous avions essuyé un revers.

"Le Duc de Dalmatie, n'étant pas de mon avis, proposa d'aller passer la Tormes, à des guës qu'il avait reconnus à deux lieues au-dessus d'Alba; ce parti était sans doute plus prudent; mais il avoit, suivant moi, l'inconvénient que je voulais éviter, c'est-à-dire, qu'il laissait à nos adversaires la facilité de se retirer sans combattre. Cependant comme je n'étais revêtu d'aucun commandement, tandis que le Duc de Dalmatie avait sous ses ordres les deux tiers de l'armée, le roi jugea convenable d'adopter son plan, et lui en confia l'exécution; vous en connaissez le résultat: il fut tel que je l'avais prévu.

"Permettez moi, Monsieur, d'ajouter une reflexion. Il me semble que Lord Wellington décidé à battre en retraite, aurait dû commencer à l'opérer le 14^{ème} jour, où nous franchîmes la Tormes. En ne se mettant en mouvement que le 15, il se trouva dans la nécessité de défilier devant nous pendant une partie de la journée; et sans les mauvais tems, et surtout sans beaucoup trop de circonspection de notre côté il eût peut-être couru quelque danger.

"On a publié que pendant leur retraite les alliés ne perdirent que 50 ou 60 tués, 150 blessés, 170 prisonniers. Il est, cependant, certain que le nombre de prisonniers Anglais, Portugais, et Espagnols, conduits au quartier général à Salamanque, étoit, le 20 Novembre, de 3520.

The justice of the marshal's opinion as to Lord Wellington having staid too long on the Tormes is confirmed by the following note of a conversation held with the Duke of Wellington on the subject.

"Lord Wellington would have fought the French on the old position of the Arapiles in 1812, notwithstanding their superior numbers, but he staid too long at Salamanca."

No. X.

The DUKE OF FELTRE, Minister of War, to the KING OF SPAIN.

SIRE,

Paris, le 29 Janvier, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à V. M. le 4 de ce mois pour lui faire connaître les intentions de l'Empereur au sujet des affaires d'Espagne, et la nécessité de transporter le quartier général de Madrid à Valladolid. Cette dépêche a été expédiée par duplicate et triplicate, et j'ignore encore si elle est parvenue à V. M. Depuis sa dépêche de Madrid du 4 Décembre je suis privé de ses lettres, et ce long silence me prouve que les communications de Madrid à Vittoria restent constamment *interceptées*. Il est vrai que les opérations du Général Caffarelli qui s'est porté avec toutes ses troupes disponibles sur la côte de Biscaye pour dégager Santona fortement menacé par l'ennemi et parcourir la côte, a donné aux bandes de la Castille une facilité entière d'intercepter la route de Burgos à Vittoria. Les dernières nouvelles que je reçois à l'instant de l'armée de Portugal sont du 5 Janvier. A cette époque tout y était tranquille, mais je vois toujours la même difficulté pour communiquer. Cet état de choses rend toujours plus nécessaire de s'occuper très sérieusement et très instamment de balayer les provinces du nord, et de les délivrer enfin de ces bandes qui ont augmentés en forces et en consistance à un point qui exige indispensablement toute notre attention et tous nos efforts. Cette pensée a tellement attiré l'attention de l'empereur que S. M. I. m'a réitéré quatre fois successivement l'ordre exprès de renouveler encore l'expression de ses intentions que j'ai déjà adressée à V. M. par ma lettre du 4 Janvier pour l'engager à revenir à Valladolid, à garder Madrid par une division seulement, et à concentrer ses forces de manière à pouvoir envoyer des troupes de l'armée de Portugal vers le nord, en Navarre, et en Biscaye, afin de délivrer ces provinces, et d'y rétablir la tranquillité. Le Général Reille également frappé de l'état des choses dans le nord de l'Espagne a bien compris la nécessité de prendre un parti décisif à cet égard. Il m'a transmis à cette occasion la lettre qu'il a eu l'honneur d'écrire à V. M. le 13 Octobre dernier, et j'ai vu qu'il lui a présenté un tableau frappant et vrai de la situation des affaires qui vient entièrement à l'appui de ma dépêche du 4 courant. Quant à l'occupation de Madrid, l'Empereur m'ordonne de mettre sous les yeux de V. M. le danger qu'il y aurait dans l'état actuel des affaires de vouloir occuper cette capitale comme point central, et d'y avoir encore des hôpitaux et établissemens qu'il faudrait abandonner à l'ennemi au premier mouvement prononcé qu'il ferait vers le nord. Cette considération seule doit l'emporter sur toute autre, et je n'y ajouterai que le dernier mot de l'Empereur à ce sujet; c'est que toutes les convenances dans la position de l'Europe veulent que V. M. occupe Valladolid, et pacifie le nord.

* These numbers are somewhat below those I have assigned to the French army; my calculation was made from the imperial muster-rolls, but the difference may be easily accounted for by the length of time which elapsed when Marshal Jourdan wrote this letter. His numbers are evidently from memory, and probably he did not mean to include the king's guards and Spaniards.

Le premier objet rempli facilitera beaucoup le second, et pour y contribuer par tous les moyens comme pour économiser un tems précieux, et mettre à profit l'inaction des Anglais, je transmets directement aux généraux commandant en chef les armées du nord et de Portugal, les ordres de l'Empereur pour que leur exécution ne souffre aucun retard, et que ceux de V. M. pour appuyer et consolider leurs opérations n'éprouvent ni lenteur ni difficulté lorsqu'ils parviendront à ces généraux. Je joins ici copie de mes lettres, sur lesquelles j'ai toujours réservé les ordres que V. M. jugera à-propos de donner pour l'entière exécution de ceux de l'Empereur. Ma lettre était terminée lorsqu'un aide-de-camp de M. le Maréchal Jourdan est arrivé avec plusieurs dépêches, dont la dernière est du 24 Decembre. J'ai eu soin de les mettre sous les yeux de l'Empereur, mais leur contenu de saurait rien changer aux intentions de S. M. I. et ne peut que confirmer les observations qui se trouvent dans ma lettre. J'aurai l'honneur d'écrire encore à V. M. par le retour de l'officier porteur des dépêches de M. le Maréchal Jourdan. Je suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté, le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Le Ministre de la Guerre,
DUC DE FELTRE.

No. XI.

The Duke of Feltre to the King of Spain.

SIRE,

Depuis la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à votre majesté le 29 Janvier, l'Empereur, après avoir pris connoissance des dépêches apportées par l'aide-de-camp de Monsieur le Maréchal Jourdan, me charge encore de réitérer son intention formelle et déjà deux fois transmise à votre majesté, qu'elle porte son quartier général à Valladolid afin de pouvoir s'occuper efficacement de soumettre et pacifier le nord ; par une conséquence nécessaire de ce changement, Madrid ne doit être occupé que par l'extrémité de la gauche de manière à ne plus faire partie essentielle de la position générale et à pouvoir être abandonné sans inconvénient, au cas qu'il soit nécessaire de se réunir sur un autre point. Cette nouvelle disposition procure à votre majesté les moyens de faire refluer des forces considérables dans le nord et jusqu'à l'Arragon pour y détruire les rassemblemens qui existent, occuper en force tous les points importans, interdire l'accès des côtes aux Anglais, et opérer la soumission entière du pays. Il est donc d'une importance extrême pour parvenir à ce but, de profiter de l'inaction des Anglais, qui permet en ce moment l'emploi de tous nos moyens contre les insurgés et doit amener promptement leur entière destruction, si les opérations entreprises pour cette effet sont conduites avec l'activité, l'énergie et la suite qu'elles exigent. Votre majesté a pu se convaincre par la longue et constante interruption des communications autant que par les rapports qui lui sont parvenus de toute l'étendue du mal, et de la nécessité d'y porter remède. On ne peut donc mettre en doute son empressement à remplir les intentions de l'Empereur sur ces points importans des changemens, qui ont eu lieu pour le commandement en chef des armées du midi, du nord, et de Portugal, me font espérer que votre majesté n'éprouvera plus de difficultés pour l'exécution de ses ordres et que tout marchera au même but sans contradiction, et sans obstacle. Ces nouvelles dispositions me dispensent de répondre à différentes observations contenues dans les lettres de votre majesté, et m'engagent à attendre qu'elle me fasse connoître les résultats des changemens ordonnés par l'Empereur. Je ne dois pas oublier de prévenir votre majesté d'un ordre que sa majesté impériale m'a chargé de transmettre directement à Monsieur le Général Reille pour lui faire envoyer une division de son armée en Navarre dont la situation exige impérieusement des secours prompts et efficaces. Cette disposition ne peut contrarier aucune de celles que votre majesté sera dans le cas d'ordonner à l'armée de Portugal pour concourir au même but et amener la soumission des provinces du nord de l'Espagne.

Je suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté,
Les très humble et très obéissant serviteur,
Le Ministre de la Guerre,
DUC DE FELTRE.

No. XII.

Duke of Feltre to the King of Spain.

SIRE,

Par ma lettre de ce jour No. 1, j'ai eu l'honneur de faire connaître à V. M. les intentions de l'Empereur sur les opérations à suivre en Espagne. La présente aura pour but de répondre plus particulièrement à la lettre dont V. M. m'a honoré en date du 8 Janvier et que j'ai eu soin de mettre sous les yeux de l'Empereur. Les plaintes qu'elle contient sur la conduite du Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie et du Général Caffarelli deviennent aujourd'hui sans objet par l'éloignement de ces deux généraux en chef. Je dois cependant prévenir V. M. qu'ayant fait connaître au Général Caffarelli qu'on se plaignait à Madrid de ne point recevoir de comptes de l'armée du nord, ce général me répond sous la date du 27 Janvier qu'il a eu l'honneur de rendre à V. M. des comptes extrêmement fréquens, qu'il lui a envoyé la situation de l'armée

Paris, le 12 Fevrier, (No. 2.) 1813.

et des doubles des rapports qui me sont adressés. La Général Caffarelli ajoute qu'il avait demandé à V. M. d'ordonner que deux divisions de l'armée de Portugal vinssent appuyer les opérations de l'armée du nord, et il pense que ces lettres se seront croisées avec les dépêches de Madrid parceque les courriers ont éprouvé beaucoup de retard, mais il y a lieu de présumer que tout ce qui a été adressé de l'armée du nord a du parvenir à Madrid avant la fin de Janvier. V. M. réitéra dans sa lettre du 8 Janvier ses demandes relativement aux besoins de l'armée. Toutes ont été mises sous les yeux de l'Empereur. S. M. I. m'ordonne de répondre au sujet des fonds dont la demande se retrouve dans plusieurs dépêches précédentes que l'argent nécessaire aux armées d'Espagne se serait trouvé dans ces riches et fertiles provinces dévastées par les bandes et par les juntes insurrectionnelles, qu'en s'occupant avec l'activité et la vigueur convenables pour rétablir l'ordre et la tranquillité, on y gagnera toutes les ressources qu'elles peuvent encore offrir, et que le tems ramènera dans toute leur étendue. C'est donc un motif de plus pour V. M. d'employer tous les moyens dont elle dispose pour mettre fin à cette guerre interne qui trouble le repos des habitans paisibles, ruine le pays, fatigue nos armées et les prive de tous les avantages qu'elles trouveraient dans l'occupation tranquille de ces belles contrées. L'Arragon et la Navarre aujourd'hui sous les loix de Mina alimentent de leurs productions et de leur revenu cette lutte désastreuse, il est tems de mettre un terme à cet état de choses et de faire rentrer dans les mains du gouvernement légitime les ressources d'un pays florissant lorsqu'il est paisible, mais qui ne servent aujourd'hui qu'à son détriment.

Je suis avec respect, Sire, de votre majesté, le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,
Le Ministre de la Guerre,
DUC DE FELTRE.

No. XIII.

The Duke of Feltre to the King of Spain.

SIRE,

Paris, le 12 Fevrier, 1813.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire trois fois à V. M. dans le courant de Janvier, pour lui transmettre les intentions de l'Empereur sur la conduite des affaires en Espagne, et j'ai eu soin de faire expedier toutes mes dépêches au moins par triplicata, tellement que je puis et dois espérer aujourd'hui qu'elles sont parvenues à leur destination. Je reçois en ce moment le dup^{ta} d'une lettre de V. M. en date du 8 Janvier, dont le primata n'est point arrivé et j'y vois une nouvelle preuve de la difficulté toujours subsistante de communication, les inconvénients de cet état de choses deviennent plus sensibles dans les circonstances actuelles, où il étoit d'une haute importance que les ordres de l'Empereur reçussent une prompte exécution. S. M. I. pénétrée de cette idée, attend avec une véritable impatience de savoir ce qui s'est opéré à Madrid, d'après ses instructions, et cette attente, journellement deque lui fait craindre qu'on n'ait perdu un tems précieux, les Anglais étant depuis plus de deux mois dans l'impuissance de rien faire. L'Empereur espère du moins que lorsque V. M. aura eu connaissance du 29^{me} bulletin, elle aura été frappée de la nécessité de se mettre promptement en communication avec la France et de l'assurer par tous les moyens possibles. On ne peut parvenir à ce bût qu'en faisant refluer successivement les forces dont V. M. peut disposer sur la ligne de communication de Valladolid à Bayonne, et en portant en outre des forces suffisantes en Navarre et en Aragon pour combattre avec avantage et détruire les bandes qui dévastent ces provinces.

L'armée de Portugal combinée avec celle du nord est bien suffisante pour remplir cet objet tandisque les armées du centre et du midi, occupant Salamanque et Valladolid, présentent assez de forces pour tenir les Anglais en échec en attendant les évènements. L'Empereur m'ordonne de réitérer à V. M. que l'occupation de Valladolid comme quartier général et résidence pour la personne, est un préliminaire indispensable, à toute operation. C'est de-là qu'il faut diriger sur la route de Burgos et successivement sur tous les points convenables les forces disponibles qui doivent renforcer ou seconder l'armée du nord. Madrid et même Valence ne peuvent être considérés dans ce système que comme des points à occuper par l'extrémité gauche de la ligne, et nullement comme lieux à maintenir exclusivement par une concentration de forces. Valladolid et Salamanque deviennent aujourd'hui les points essentiels entre lesquels doivent être réparties des forces prêtes à prendre l'offensive contre les Anglais et à faire échouer leurs projets. L'Empereur est instruit qu'ils se renforcent en Portugal, et qu'ils paraissent avoir le double projet ou de pousser en Espagne ou de partir du port de Lisbonne pour faire une expédition de 25 mille hommes, partie Anglais partie Espagnols, sur un point quelconque des côtes de France pendant que la lutte sera engagée dans le nord. Pour empêcher l'exécution de ce plan il faut être toujours en mesure de se porter en avant et menacer de marcher sur Lisbonne ou de conquérir le Portugal. En même tems il faut conserver des communications aussi sûres que faciles avec la France pour être promptement instruits de tout ce qui s'y passe, et le seul moyen d'y parvenir est d'employer le tems ou les Anglais sont dans l'inaction pour pacifier la Biscaye et la Navarre comme j'ai eu soin de le faire connaître à V. M. dan mes précédentes. La sollicitude de l'Empereur pour les affaires d'Espagne lui ayant fait réitérer à plusieurs reprises et reproduire sous toutes les formes ses intentions à cet égard je ne puis achever mieux de les remplir qu'en récapitulant les idées principales que j'ai eu l'ordre de faire

connaître à V. M. Occuper Valladolid et Salamanque, employer avec la plus grande activité possible tous les moyens de pacifier la Navarre et l'Aragon, maintenir des communications très rapides et très sûres avec la France, rester toujours en mesure de prendre l'offensive au besoin, voilà ce que l'empereur me prescrit de faire considérer à V. M. comme instruction générale pour toute la campagne et qui doit faire la base de ses opérations. J'ai à peine besoin d'ajouter que si les armées Françaises en Espagne restaient oisives et laissaient les Anglais maîtres de faire des expéditions sur nos côtes, la tranquillité de la France serait compromise et la décadence de nos affaires en Espagne en serait l'infaillible résultat. Je suis avec respect,

Sire, de votre majesté,

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Le Ministre de la Guerre,

DUC DE FELTRE.

NO. XIV.

The DUKE OF FELTRE to the KING OF SPAIN.

SIRE,

Paris, le 12 Mars, 1813.

La difficulté toujours subsistante des communications a apporté dans ma correspondance avec V. M. des retards considérables et de longues interruptions dont les résultats ne peuvent être que très préjudiciables au service de l'Empereur. Depuis plus de deux mois j'expédie sans cesse et par tous les moyens possibles ordre sur ordre pour faire exécuter les dispositions prescrites par S. M. I. et je n'ai aucune certitude que ces ordres soient parvenus à leur destination. L'Empereur extrêmement mécontent de cet état de choses renouvelle sans cesse l'injonction la plus précise de le faire cesser, et j'ignore encore en ce moment si les mouvements prescrits se préparent ou s'exécutent, mais je vois toujours d'avantage que si des ordres relatifs à cette mesure doivent partir de Madrid cela entraînerait une grande perte de tems. L'Empereur en a été frappé. Il devient donc tout-à-fait indispensable de s'écarter un moment de la voie ordinaire et des dispositions par lesquelles tout devrait émaner de V. M. au moins pour ce qui concerne le nord et l'armée de Portugal. Je prends pour cet effet le parti d'adresser directement aux généraux commandant de ces armées les ordres d'exécution qui dans d'autres circonstances devraient leur parvenir de Madrid, et j'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à V. M. copies des lettres que j'ai écrites au Général Reille et au Général Clausel pour déterminer enfin l'arrivée des renforts absolument nécessaires pour soumettre l'Aragon, la Navarre et la Biscaye ; les détails contenus dans ma lettre au Général Clausel me dispensent de m'étendre d'avantage sur cet objet important. V. M. y verra surtout qu'en prescrivant l'exécution prompte et entière des ordres de l'Empereur j'ai toujours réservé l'exercice de l'autorité supérieure remise entre les mains de V. M. et qu'elle conserve également la direction ultérieure des opérations des qu'elle pourra les conduire par elle-même.

Toutes mes précédentes dépêches sont d'ailleurs assez précises sur ce point pour ne de laisser pas doute à cet égard.

The DUKE OF FELTRE to the KING.

SIRE,

Paris, 18 Mars, 1813.

Parmi les lettres dont V. M. m'a honoré, la plus récente de celles qui me sont parvenues jusqu'à ce jour est du 1^{er} Fevrier, et je vois qu'à cette époque V. M. n'avait point encore reçu celle que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser par ordre de l'Empereur le 4 Janvier pour l'engager à transférer son quartier général à Valladolid. Cette disposition a été renouvelée dans toutes mes dépêches postérieures sous les dates de 14, 29 Janvier, 3, 12, 25 Fevrier, 1, 11 et 12 Mars, sans avoir eu jusqu'à présent de certitude que mes lettres fussent arrivées à leur destination. Enfin une lettre de M. le Duc d'Albufera en date 4 Mars me transmit copie de celle que V. M. lui a adressée le 23 Fevrier pour le prévenir que ma lettre du 4 Janvier est arrivée à Madrid, et qu'on s'y préparait à exécuter les dispositions prescrites par l'Empereur. Ainsi c'est de Valence que j'ai reçu la première nouvelle positive à cet égard, et cette circonstance qui dévoile entièrement notre situation dans le nord d'Espagne est une nouvelle preuve de l'extrême urgence des mesures prescrites par l'Empereur et de tout le mal que d'inexplicables retards ont causé. S. M. I. vient à cette occasion de me réitérer l'injonction de faire sentir à V. M. la fausse direction qu'ont prise les affaires d'Espagne par le peu de soin qu'on a apporté à maintenir les communications avec les frontières. L'Empereur est étonné qu'on ait si peu compris à Madrid l'extrême importance de conserver des communications sûres et rapides avec la France. Le défaut constant de nouvelles était un avertissement assez clair et assez positif de l'impuissance ou se trouvait l'armée du nord de protéger la route de Madrid à Bayonne. L'état des affaires dans le nord de l'Europe devait plus que jamais faire sentir la nécessité de recevoir des nouvelles de Paris et de prendre enfin des mesures décisives pour ne pas rester si longuement dans un état d'isolement et d'ignorance absolu sur les vues et l'intention de l'Empereur. V. M. avoit trois armées à sa disposition pour rétablir les communications avec l'armée du nord, et l'on ne voit pas un mouvement de l'armée de Portugal ou de celle du centre qui soit approprié aux circonstances, tandis que l'inaction des Anglais permettait de profiter de notre supériorité pour chasser les bandes, nettoyer la route, assurer la tranquillité dans le pays.

L'Empereur m'a ordonné de faire connaître sa façon de penser sur cet objet au Général Reille, auquel j'ai adressé directement les ordres de S. M. I. pour les forces qu'il a dû mettre sans retard sous les ordres du Général Clausel ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur d'en prévenir V. M. par mes lettres du 29 Janvier, 3 Février et 12 Mars. En effet les circonstances rendent cette mesure d'une extrême urgence. L'inaction où l'on est resté pendant l'hiver a encouragé et propagé l'insurrection. Elle s'étend maintenant de la Biscaye, en Catalogne, et l'Aragon exige, pour ainsi dire, le même emploi des forces pour la pacifier, que la Biscaye et la Navarre. Il est donc de la plus haute importance que V. M. étende ses soins sur l'Aragon comme sur les autres provinces du nord de l'Espagne, et les évènements qui se préparent rendront ce soin toujours plus nécessaire. D'un côté toutes les bandes chassées de la Biscaye et de la Navarre se trouveront bientôt forcées à refluer dans l'Aragon, et d'autre part l'évacuation de Cuenca, par résultat du mouvement général des armées du centre et du midi priverait le Général Suchet de toute communication avec V. M. dans un moment où les ennemis se renforcent devant lui d'une manière assez inquiétante. Il est donc très important de se procurer une autre ligne de communication avec Valence et cette ligne ne peut s'établir que par l'Aragon. C'est à votre majesté qu'il appartient de donner à cet égard les ordres nécessaires. Il suffira sans doute de lui avoir fait connaître l'état de choses et la position du Maréchal Suchet pour lui faire prendre les déterminations que les circonstances rendraient les plus convenables. Il me tarde beaucoup d'apprendre enfin de V. M. elle-même l'exécution des ordres de l'Empereur et de pouvoir satisfaire sur ce point la juste impatience de S. M. I.

No. XV.

JOSEPH O'DONNELL to GENERAL DONKIN.

DEAR SIR,

Malaga, the 6th December, 1812.

The letter you did me the honour to address to me on the 6th of September has been mislaid all this long time on account of my being separated from the armie since the moment I gave up the command of it, and it was only last night I had the pleasure of receiving it. I feel a great comfort in seeing an officer of your reputation affected so kindly with the sorrows which so unlucky as undeservedly (I believe) fell upon me as a consequence of my shameful defeat at Castalla. But I beg to be excused if I continue this letter in French. I know you understand it very well, and I can not explain my thoughts so well in English. Je crois, M. le Général, que tout militaire, instruit des faits, et à la vue du malheureux champ de bataille de Castalla, ou du plan qui le représente, doit faire le même raisonnement que vous avez fait, à moins qu'il ne soit épris des petites passions et des préjugés qui ne dominent que trop souvent les hommes. Je crois l'avoir démontré à l'évidence dans mon rapport officiel au gouvernement (que vous devez avoir vu imprimé) accompagné de la carte des environs et des copies de toutes les ordres que je donnai la veille du combat. J'aurais certainement été vainqueur si l'officier qui commandoit les 760 chevaux, avec deux pièces de 8 à mon aile gauche eut obéi mes ordres, on eut seulement tâché de se laisser voir de loin par la cavallerie ennemie, qui au nombre de 400 chevaux étoit stationnée dans le village de Viar; mais point du tout, cet officier, au lieu de se trouver sur Viar au point du jour de la bataille, pour tenir en échec la cavallerie ennemie, pour la battre s'il en trouvoit une occasion probable, ou pour la suivre en tout cas, et l'empêcher de tomber sur Castalla impunément, comme il lui étoit très expressément ordonné par des ordres écrites qu'il avoue, cet officier alla se cacher derrière Villena, et quoiqu'il entendit le canon de Castalla, et qu'il fut instruit de la marche des dragons de Viar par la route d'Onil, il resta tranquillement en position de l'autre côté de Villena jusqu'à passé huit heures du matin. Nous étions déjà battus, et trois malheureux bataillons hachés en pièces (quoiqu'ayant repoussé la première charge) quand M. le Brigadier Santistevan se mit en marche de Villena pour venir à mon secours. Jugez donc, Mons. le Général, si j'ay pu empêcher ce désastre. Cependant, le public, qui ne peut juger que par les résultats, se déchaina d'abord contre moi, et je ne m'en plains pas, car cela étoit fort naturel; c'est un malheur attaché à notre profession, et que les généraux Espagnols doivent ressentir sur tous les autres, puisqu'ils font la guerre sans ressources, et manquant de tout contre un ennemi aguerri qui ne manque de rien; mais je me plains des *Cortes* de la nation, je me plains de ces pères de la patrie, qui sachant que j'avois demandé moi-même à être jugé par un conseil de guerre, ont cependant donné le ton à l'opinion publique se rependant en invectives contre moi, et même contre mon frère le régent, avant de savoir si je suis en effet coupable. Après un pareil traitement, et dans l'état de misère et de détresse où se trouvent nos armées, ou trouvera t'on de généraux qui veuillent exposer leur honneur, et en accepter le commandement? Quant à moi je servirai ma patrie par devoir et par inclination jusqu'au dernier soupir, mais je n'accepterai jamais aucun commandement, supposant qu'il me fut offert. Les informations que l'on prend relativement à l'affaire en question ne sont pas encore finies, car tout va doucement chez nous. J'en attends le résultat ici avec l'aveu du gouvernement, et aussitôt que l'on aura prononcé en justice j'irai me présenter comme simple volontaire dans une de nos armées si l'on ne veut pas m'employer dans ma qualité de général subalterne. Je vous ay trop ennuyé de mes peines; c'est que j'en ay le cœur navré, et que votre bonté m'a excité à m'en soulager en vous les

racontant. Il me reste encore un espoir flatteur, c'est le jugement de tous mes camarades qui ont vu de près mes dispositions à l'affaire de Castalla, et les efforts que j'avois fait pendant sept mois, luttant toujours contre la détresse et le désordre, pour préparer à la victoire une armée qui étoit tout-à-fait nulle quand je fus obligé a en prendre, malgré moi, le commandement. Je m'estimerai heureux, Monsieur le Général, de mériter aussi le suffrage d'un officier aussi distingué que vous l'êtes, et je vous prie d'agréer le temoignage du sincère attachement de votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Monsieur le Général Donkin, etc., etc.

JOSEF O'DONELL.

No. XVI.

SIR,

Freneda, February 25th, 1813.

I have received your letter of the 12th instant, regarding the conduct of the second Italian regiment, and I entirely concur in all the measures you have adopted, and applaud the decision and firmness of your conduct. I am prepared likewise to approve of whatever you shall determine, upon deliberation, regarding the future state of the men of the regiment, whether to be formed into a regiment again, or not; or if so formed, whether to be kept as part of the army or sent back to Sicily.

The foreign troops are so much addicted to desertion that they are very unfit for our armies, of which they necessarily form too large a proportion to the native troops. The evil is aggravated by the practice which prevails of enlisting prisoners as well as deserters, and Frenchmen as well as other foreigners, notwithstanding the repeated orders of government upon the subject. The consequence is therefore that a foreign regiment cannot be placed in a situation in which the soldiers can desert from it, that they do not go off in hundreds; and in the Peninsula they convey to the enemy the only intelligence which he can acquire.

With this knowledge I seldom if ever use the foreign British troops of this army on the duty of outposts; and whatever you may determine regarding the second Italian regiment, I recommend the same practice to your consideration.

There is nothing new on this side of the Peninsula. The armies are nearly in the stations which they took up in the end of November.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Major-General Campbell, etc., etc., etc.

WELLINGTON.

No. XVII.

Extract of a letter from the MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON to LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JOHN MURRAY, dated Freneda, April 6th, 1813.

"In regard to feeding the Spanish troops in Spain, I have invariably set my face against it and have never consented to it or done it, even for a day in any instance. My reasons are, first, that it entails upon Great Britain an expense which the country is unable to bear; secondly, that it entails upon the department of the army which undertakes it a detail of business, and other means to which the departments, if formed upon any moderate scale, must be quite unequal; thirdly, I know from experience that if we don't interfere, the Spanish troops, particularly if paid as yours are, and in limited numbers, will not want food in any part of Spain, whereas the best and most experienced of our departments would not be able to draw from the country resources for them. I have already consented to the formation of a magazine for the use of General Whittingham and General Roche's corps for a certain number of days, if it should be found necessary to give them assistance of this description. I can go no farther, and I earnestly recommend to you, if you give assistance to all, to give over a magazine to last a given time, but not to take upon yourself to supply the Spanish troops engaged in operations. If, however, you should, notwithstanding this recommendation, take upon yourself to give such supplies, I must object, as commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, to your giving more than bread to the troops who receive pay, as that is positively contrary to the regulations and custom of the Spanish army. I recommend to you also to attend with caution to the demands of both General Whittingham and General Roche, and to observe that in proportion as you will comply with their demands, demands will be made upon you by General Elio and others, and you will involve yourself in a scale of expense and difficulty, which will cramp all your operations, and which is quite inconsistent with the views of government on the eastern coast of the Peninsula."

No. XVIII.

General state of the French army, April 15, 1812. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls.

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospitals.	Total.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Armée de Midi . . .	55,797	11,014	2,498	700	6,065	64,360	11,714
„ Centre . . .	19,148	3,993	144	51	624	19,916	4,044
„ Portugal . . .	56,937	8,108	4,394	2278	7,706	69,037	10,386
„ Ebre . . .	16,830	1,873	21	6	3,425	20,276	1,879
„ Arragon . . .	14,786	3,269	2,695	658	1,467	18,948	3,927
„ Catalogne . . .	28,924	1,259	1,103	49	5,540	35,627	1,308
„ Nord . . .	48,232	7,074	1,309	72	8,677	58,276	7,213
Total . . .	240,654	36,590	12,224	3814	33,504	286,440	40,471
Reserve de Bayonne	4,038	157	36	35	865	4,939	192
General Total . . .	244,692	36,747	12,260	3849	34,369	291,370	40,663

Civic guards attached to the army of the south . . .	6,497	1655	—	—	258	6,755	1497
Troupes Espagnols . . .	33,952	525	—	—	—	33,952	525
Total Espagnols . . .	40,449	2180	—	—	258	40,707	2022

General state, May 15, 1812.

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospitals.	Total.		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Cavalry.	Artil.
Armée de Midi . . .	56,031	12,101	2,787	660	4,652	63,470	7,311	4,340
„ Centre . . .	17,395	4,208	158	37	766	19,203	3,332	420
„ Portugal . . .	52,618	7,244	9,750	1538	8,332	70,700	4,481	3,448
„ Arragon . . .	27,218	4,768	4,458	605	3,701	35,377	2,976	1,980
„ Catalonia . . .	33,677	1,577	1,844	267	6,009	41,530	1,376	279
„ Nord . . .	38,771	6,031	2,560	271	7,767	49,098	4,443	1,163
Total . . .	225,710	35,929	21,557	3378	31,227	279,378	23,919	11,630
Old Reserve at Bayonne	3,894	221	1,642	—	964	6,500	207	—
New Reserve at Bayonne	2,593	116	3,176	—	5	5,769	103	—
General Total . . .	232,202	36,266	26,375	3378	32,196	291,647	24,229	11,630

General state of the French armies, March 15, 1813.

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospitals.	Total.		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Cavalry.	Train.
Armée de Midi . . .	36,605	6,602	2060	1617	7,144	45,809	8,650	2601
„ Centre . . .	16,227	1,966	940	76	2,401	19,568	2,790	451
„ Portugal . . .	34,825	3,654	157	—	7,731	42,713	6,726	2149
„ Arragon . . .	36,315	3,852	55	—	2,442	38,812	6,123	1799
„ Catalonia . . .	27,323	1,109	110	—	2,013	29,446	1,884	635
„ Nord . . .	40,476	1,978	41	—	8,030	48,547	3,171	830
Reserve de Bayonne	5,877	55	80	—	634	6,591	78	21
Total . . .	197,648	19,216	3443	1693	30,395	231,486	29,422	8486

The operations and misfortunes of the French prevented any general states being sent home between the 15th of March and the 15th of August, when a new organization of the armies took place; but the numbers given in the narrative of this history are the result of calculations founded on the comparison of a variety of documents, and are believed to be a very close approximation to the real strength of the armies.

No. XIX.

Especial state of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812. Head-quarters, Tordesillas.

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Total.		
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Cavalry.	Horses.
1st Division . Foy .	5,138	—	319	—	516	5,973	—	—
2nd „ . Clausel .	7,405	—	678	—	613	8,696	—	—
3rd „ . Ferey .	5,547	—	12	—	926	6,485	—	—
4th „ . Sarrut .	5,056	—	214	—	862	6,132	—	—
5th „ . Maucune .	5,269	—	588	—	1,513	7,370	—	—
6th „ . Brennier .	5,021	—	124	—	720	5,865	—	—
7th „ . Thomieres .	6,352	61	—	—	1,905	8,257	61	—
8th „ . Bonnet .	6,681	139	66	—	685	7,432	139	—
Light Cavalry, 13 escadrons } Curto .	1,386	1398	1073	324	246	2,705	1722	—
Dragoons . Boyer .	1,389	1378	47	358	86	1,954	1736	—
Artillery . . .	3,612	2339	513	258	220	4,345	347	2148
Genie . . .	414	9	67	7	84	565	—	12
Equipage . . .	955	1107	51	44	242	1,251	—	1084
Gendarmes et Infirmerie	325	75	—	—	15	340	54	—
Total . . .	54,550	6506	4184	991	8633	67,370	4059	3244

From these 54,550 men, present under arms, must be deducted the artillery, engineers, equipages, and garrisons, the officers and sergeants, and the losses sustained between the siege of the forts and the battle of Salamanca, the result will be about 42,000 sabres and bayonets in the battle.

Reinforcements en marche de l'armée du nord 1,370
 „ de Bayonne 12,676

Note.—These troops did not join before the battle of Salamanca.

Artillery of the army of Portugal, June 15, 1812.—Materiel.

	Poid et calibre.	Nombre.		
	Canon de 12 lbs.	2		
Bouches a feu	„ 8 „	20	Total des canons	60
	„ 4 „	33		
	„ 3 „	5		
	Obusiers de 6 pouces	11		
	„ de 4 pouces 3 lignes 3	3	Total des obusiers	14
Total		74		
Venant de l'armée du nord		8	These guns arrived after the battle.	
		82		

Total loss of the army of Portugal from 10th of July to 10th of August, 1812, including the battle of Salamanca. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls.

		Tués.	Blessés.
Officiers superieurs.	Duke de Raguse	—	1
	General Clausel	—	1
	„ Bonnet	—	1
	„ Ferrey	1	—
	„ Thomieres	1	—
	„ Desgravier Bertholet	1	—
	„ Carrie	—	1 Prisoner.
Aide-de-camp du Duc de Raguse.	„ Menne	—	1
	Colonel Richemont	—	1
	Le Clerc de Montpree	1	—
	Darel	—	1
Total		Tués 4	Blessés 7

Officiers inferieurs et soldats.	Tués ou Pris.	Blessés.	Traineurs.
Officiers	162	232	—
Soldats	3867	7529	645
Grande Total	4029	7761	645
Officiers et Soldats	12,435		
Chevaux	1190		
Canons	12		
Deux aigles de 22eme et 100eme Regt. de ligne.			

No. XX.

Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army under LORD VISCOUNT WELLINGTON, on the morning of the 22nd of July, 1812. Extracted from the original morning state.

Note.—The numbers are exclusive of officers, sergeants, trumpeters, artillerymen, and staff, showing merely the sabres and bayonets in the field.

British cavalry, one division, present under arms	3,314 men	3388 horses.	
British infantry, seven divisions	22,067	—	—
Total British			25,381
D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, three regiments, about	1,500	(These troops not in the state.)	
Portuguese infantry, seven divisions, and two independent brigades	16,017		—
			17,517
Total Anglo-Portuguese			42,898
Carlos d'Espana's Spanish division, about	3000		
Julian Sanchez' cavalry	500		
			3,500
Sabres and bayonets			46,398

No. of British, German, Portuguese, and Spanish guns at the battle of Salamanca.

	Weight of calibre.	Number of guns.
British horse artillery	6 lbs.	18
„ Foot „	9 „	12
„ „ „	12 „	12
German „	9 „	6
Portuguese and British brigaded together	24 lb. howitzers	6
One Spanish battery		54
		6
General total		60 pieces.

No. XXI.

Official report of the loss of the Allies on the Trabancos and Guarena rivers, 18th July, 1812.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and file.	Horses.	Men.
British	3	3	56	59	Killed
	16	7	274	65	Wounded
	—	—	27	21	Missing
Portuguese	1	2	31	—	Killed
	6	3	87	—	Wounded
	—	—	27	—	Missing
Total	26	15	502	145	

Loss of the allies in the batt'le of Salamanca.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and file.	Horses.		Men
British . . .	{ 28 188 —	{ 24 136 —	{ 336 2400 74	{ 96 120 37	{ Killed Wounded Missing	5224
Portuguese . .	{ 13 74 1	{ 4 42 1	{ 287 1436 180	{ 18 13 7	{ Killed Wounded Missing	
Total . . .	304	207	4713	291		

Loss of the German cavalry on the Almar stream, July 23.

Men and Officers.	Horses.	
117	117	117

The British loss by infantry divisions and cavalry brigades.

Cavalry . . .	{ Le Marchant's brigade, lost Anson's " " Vr. Alten's " "	{ Men and Officers " " " "	{ 105 5 31	141
	{ 1st Division General Campbell lost 3rd " " Pakenham " " 4th " " Cole " "	{ Men and Officers " " " "	{ 69 456 537	
Infantry . .	{ 5th " " Leith " " 6th " " Clinton " " 7th " " S. Hope " " Light " " C. Alten " " Artillery " Framingham " "	{ " " " " " " " " " "	{ 464 1198 119 29 14	2886

No. XXII.

Strength of the Anglo-Portuguese army at Vittoria. Extracted from the morning state of the 19th June, 1813.

	Present under arms.	On command.	Total.	
			Present.	On command.
British cavalry . . .	7,791	851		
Portuguese,, . . .	1,452	225		
Total cavalry . . .			9243	1076
British infantry . . .	33,658	1771		
Portuguese,, . . .	23,905	1038		
Total infantry . . .			57,563	2809
		Sabres and bayonets	66,806	3885
Deduct the 6th division left at Medina de Pomar . . .			6320	

Spanish Auxiliaries.

		Sabres and bayonets	60,486
Infantry . . .	{ Morillo's division . about Giron's " " Carlos d'Espagna's " " Longa's " " Penne Villemur " "	{ 3,000 12,000 3,000 3,000 1,000	
Cavalry . . .	{ Julian Sanchez " "	{ 1,000	
			23,000

Grand Total . . . 83,486

No. of Anglo-Portuguese guns at the battle of Vittoria. COLONEL A. DICKSON commanding.

British horse artillery . . .	9 lbs.	45
" "	6 "	80
" "	5½ inch howitzers	15
Total		90

No Spanish guns set down in the return. Number unknown.

No. XXIII.

JUSTIFICATORY PIECES.

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK to SIR E. PELLEW.

SIR,

At sea, June 18th, 1813.

Y. E. has seen the information I have received of a projected attack upon Sicily by Murat, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. It seems necessary that the French fleet should leave Toulon, should reach the coast of Naples, embark the men and land them in Sicily, or cover their passage from Calabria or the Bay of Naples, if the intention be, as in the last instance, to transport them to Sicily in the tonnage and small craft of the country.—The most important question is, whether this can be effected by the enemy.—I have no difficulty in saying, on my part, that in the present disposition of the Neapolitan army in Sicily, and in the non-existence of any national force, and the imperfect composition of the British force, if half the number intended for this expedition should land in Sicily the island would be conquered.

(Signed)

W. BENTINCK.

SIR E. PELLEW to LORD W. BENTINCK.

MY LORD,

H. M. S. Caledonia, June 19th, 1813.

I feel it my duty to state to your lordship that in my judgment the Toulon fleet may evade mine without difficulty under a strong N. W. wind to carry them through the passage of the Hieres islands, without the possibility of my interrupting them, and that they may have from 12 to 24 hours' start of me in chasing them. When blown off the coast, my look-out ships would certainly bring me such information as would enable me to follow them immediately to the Bay of Naples. Your lordship is most competent to judge whether, in the interval of their arrival and my pursuit, the French admiral would be able to embark Murat's army, artillery, and stores, and land them on the coast of Sicily before I came up with them. The facility of communication by telegraph along the whole coast of Toulon would certainly apprise Murat of their sailing at a very short notice, but for my own part, I should entertain very sanguine hopes of overtaking them, either in the Bay of Naples or on the coast of Sicily, before they could make good their landing.

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK to LORD WELLINGTON.

MY LORD,

At sea, June 20th, 1813.

By the perusal of the accompanying despatch to Lord Castlereagh, your lordship will perceive that Murat has opened a negotiation with us, the object of which is friendship with us and hostility to Buonaparte. You will observe in one of the conversations with Murat's agent, that he informed me that Buonaparte had ordered Murat to hold 20,000 men in readiness for the invasion of Sicily, in conjunction with the Toulon fleet. I enclose the copy of a letter I have in consequence addressed to Sir E. Pellew, together with his answer, upon the practicability of the Toulon fleet sailing without the knowledge of the blockading fleet. Your lordship will have received my letter of the 21st of May enclosing a copy of my despatch to Lord Bathurst, relative to the discontent of the Neapolitan troops in Sicily and the consequent state of weakness if not of danger resulting from it to that island. I stated also that this circumstance had induced me to detain in Sicily the two battalions which had been withdrawn from Spain.

LORD WELLINGTON to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.

MY LORD,

Huarte, July 1st, 1813.

In answer to your lordship's despatch, I have to observe, that I conceive that the island of Sicily is at present in no danger whatever.

No. XXIV.

Letter from GENERAL NUGENT to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.

MY DEAR LORD WILLIAM,

Vienna, January 24th, 1812.

I hope you have received the letter I wrote to you shortly after my arrival here by a person sent for that purpose. Soon after his departure the affair of La Tour happened, as King mentions in his letter. It required some time before I could judge of the result it would have and the manner it would be considered by the emperor and the government here, and then to settle again the manner of sending officers down to the Mediterranean, for some of those then destined to be sent were implicated. All these circumstances caused the delay of the present which otherwise you would have had much sooner. Another cause of the delay was that I wanted to inform you of the answer which would be given by this house to the speculations that I was commissioned by the prince-regent to propose relative to the archduke. There was

no decisive answer given, and the only manner of forming an opinion upon that subject was by observing and getting information of their true intentions. I am now firmly convinced that these are such as we could wish, and that it is only fear of being committed that prevents them to speak in a more positive manner. Their whole conduct proves this, more particularly in La Tour's affair, which has produced no change whatsoever nor led to any discovery of views or connections. There is even now less difficulty than ever for officers going to the Mediterranean. They get passports from government here without its inquiring or seeming to know the real object. As it can do nothing else but connive, to which this conduct answers, I think a more explicit declaration is not even requisite, and I am convinced that when the thing is once done they will gladly agree. This is likewise King's, and Hardenberg's, and Johnson's opinion upon the subject, and as such they desire me to express it to you, and to observe that the situation of things here makes the forwarding of the measures you may think expedient in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic the more desirable.

They are here extremely satisfied with the conduct of government in England, and by the accounts we have the latter is much pleased with the conduct of this country, particularly relative to the affairs of Prussia. These are, however, not decided yet. But whatever the consequence may be, and whatever this country may do for the present, I am convinced that your measures will ultimately contribute much to the result. I am happy to perceive by the last information from England that everything seems to have been settled there by you. The recruiting business of Major Burke is going on rapidly. As it was not begun at the time of my departure I can only attribute it to your presence. The letters contain likewise that government is come to the most favourable resolutions relative to the archduke, and I hope the formation of the troops will soon be effectuated. The dispositions of the Adriatic coasts and the Tyrol are as good as can be, but all depends upon establishing a basis, and without that all partial exertions would be useless or destructive. At the same time that some regiments would be formed, I think it would be very expedient to form at the same place a Dalmatian or a Croat regiment, particularly as in the present state of things it will be much easier even than the other. The men could be easily recruited in Bosnia, and sent from Durazzo to the place you should appoint. The bearer will give you every information upon the subject, and at all events, I should propose to you to send him immediately back to Durazzo, and, should you adopt the above, to give him the necessary orders and the commission for recruiting and sending the men to the place of formation. No person can be better qualified than he is. He knows the languages, the country, and the character of the people, and understands everything that relates to commercial affairs. As to the place of formation, I think I already proposed Cephalonia to you. Lissa, or one of the nearer islands, would give too much jealousy in the beginning in those parts, until our capital increases so as to undertake an important enterprise, at all events it is important to form a noyau of the three nations; it is then that we may hope to be joined by the whole of Dalmatia and Croatia after a short time. Major and other officers will shortly proceed to the Mediterranean. They will be directed to Messina, where I request you will send orders for them. It would be very useful and saving to provide means for transporting them to that place from Durazzo, and if possible to establish a more frequent and regular intercourse between you and the latter. Johnson, who soon sets off from here, will in the meantime establish a communication across Bosnia to Durazzo. His presence in those parts will be productive of many good effects. You will find that he is an able, active, and zealous man, and will certainly be very useful in forwarding your views. I can answer for his being worthy of your full confidence; should you adopt the proposition relative to the recruiting it would be necessary to put at his disposal the requisite funds.

You will judge by the account the bearer of this will give you whether cloth, etc., can be had at a cheaper rate from this country or where you are, and he will bring back your directions for this object. Allow me to observe that it would be highly useful to have clothes for a considerable number of men prepared beforehand. Many important reasons have prevented me hitherto from proceeding to the Mediterranean as speedily as I wished. I hope, however, not to be detained much longer, and soon to have removed every obstacle. I think to set off from here in the beginning of March, and request you will be so kind as to provide with the return of the bearer to Durazzo the means of my passage from thence, where I shall come with a feigned name. I hope he will be back there by the time of my arrival. I shall endeavour to hasten my journey as I have important information in every respect. By that time we shall know the decision relative to the north. King has informed you of the reasons which made an alteration necessary in regard to Frozzi's journey. Part of your object is in fact fulfilled already, and there are agents in Italy, etc. As to the other and principal part relative to connections in the army, and the gaining an exact knowledge of it and of the government in Italy, with other circumstances, I expect soon to have a person of sufficient consequence and ability to execute your instructions, and he will go to Milan, etc., as soon as it can be done with safety. His permanent residence in that country seems to be necessary, that he may be able to accomplish fully the object, and as the sum you have assigned for this purpose is sufficient for a considerable time, you can determine whether he is to remain there permanently or not. Frozzi will bring you an exact account of what has been arranged relative to this business, and will himself be a very proper person for communications between you and Italy or this country. He will for that purpose go back to Italy, the obstacle that opposed to hitherto

being now no more. I cannot but repeat the importance of giving all possible extent to the archduke's establishment, and particularly the raising of as much troops as possible, for all will depend upon having the means of landing. We are then sure of augmenting very speedily, and finding the greatest assistance. The place for beginning cannot be determined on exactly, but there is much to be expected in Dalmatia and Croatia where we could be joined by the inhabitants and troops. The lower part would be best adapted in case we begin with a small force. I shall send and bring officers particularly acquainted with the country, and provide every other assistance such as plans, etc., and I think it would be expedient to prevent for the present any enterprise in that country that would alarm them. Since I began my letter a courier has arrived from Paris.

The contingent of the Rhenish confederacy have got orders to be ready for marching. Reinforcements are sending from France to the north and every preparation is making for war. Buonaparte told to Swartzenburg that he would begin in April, and all circumstances seem to agree with this. On the other side Russia is very slow in making peace with Turkey. He entirely neglects Prussia, and for this reason it is to be feared that the latter will place his capital with Buonaparte, notwithstanding that this cabinet is endeavouring to prevent it. I should be then very much afraid for the conduct of this house, well inclined as the emperor is. Proposals were made by France but no resolution has been taken until it is known how things turn out. The worst is that Romanzow is still in credit with Alexander, which prevents all confidence in other houses and makes Russia adopt half measures. This sketch of the situation will give you some idea of the wavering and uncertain state people are in. There is no calculation to be made as to the conduct of government, nor must we be surprised at anything they may do. On the other side our speculations are not built upon them, but upon the disposition of the people; and whatever may happen I am convinced that this is a good foundation if the measures are taken and the means prepared. A principal object of mine in these parts has been to prepare the measures for the case that it comes here to the very worst. The most important thing is the augmenting in every possible manner the force at your disposition. The accounts we have to-day of your return and the powers I hope you have, give me the best hopes of your overcoming every difficulty. I must yet observe that as Johnson's proceedings are entirely subordinate to, and make a part of your plans and operations in general, and that he cannot of course depend upon King, you will be so good as to give him decisive instructions to that purpose, and assign him the means and powers for acting in consequence. I shall combine with him in my passage through Bosnia everything in the hopes that you will approve of this.

Letter from MR. KING to LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.

MY LORD,

Vienna, January 24th, 1812.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the 25th of August, which was delivered to me towards the latter end of October by Captain Frizzi, whom I should immediately have furnished with the means of proceeding to Italy for the purpose of carrying your lordship's instructions into effect, had it not appeared to me that the measures which I had taken on my arrival here had already in a great degree anticipated your lordship's intentions. As a confirmation of this, I beg leave to transmit for your lordship's perusal the reports (marked A) of three messengers whom I sent to the north of Italy for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the public mind, particularly in the ci-devant Venetian territories and adjacent districts. These reports confirm in a very satisfactory manner the assurances, which I have received through various other channels, that the inhabitants of those countries are ready and determined to avail themselves of the first opportunity to shake off a yoke which is become insupportable.—I have also the honour to transmit to your lordship the copy of a letter from Count Montgelas, the minister of foreign affairs in Bavaria, to the commissary-general at Nimpten, from which it appears that the Bavarian government is not altogether ignorant of the intentions of the Swiss and Tyrolese, but I am happy to have it in my power to inform your lordship that the persons who seem to have excited the suspicions of the Bavarian government do not enjoy the confidence of our friends in Switzerland, and have not been made acquainted with their intentions; it is nevertheless indispensably necessary that we should act with the greatest possible caution in the employment of emissaries, lest the French and Bavarian governments should take the alarm and adopt measures which would defeat our projects or at least occasion a premature explosion. On these grounds (having previously consulted with General N—, to whom Captain Frizzi was particularly addressed and who entirely coincides in my opinion), I think it eligible to send this officer back to Sicily, and I trust that in so doing I shall meet with your lordship's approbation. I beg leave to observe that the only service Captain Frizzi could render in Italy at the present moment would be to ascertain the number and distribution of the French forces in this country, but as these undergo continual changes I think it will be sufficient to despatch a confidential agent to your lordship with the latest intelligence from Italy, at a period when the northern war and consequent occupation of the French troops will enable your lordship to derive advantage from such intelligence.

The general opinion is that hostilities will commence between France and Russia in the month of April, at which period the preparations of the French government will be completed, and there is little reason to hope that the Russians will avail themselves of the interval, either

to annihilate the army of the Duchy of Warsaw, or to advance to the assistance of the King of Prussia, who will in all probability ally himself with France notwithstanding his former declarations to the contrary. The latest intelligence from Berlin states that Count St. Marsan had presented the ultimatum of his government, which demands an unconditional surrender of all the Prussian fortresses, and insists on the military force and resources of Prussia being placed at the disposal of French generals. It is positively asserted that the king is inclined to submit to these humiliating proposals, but nothing has been as yet definitively concluded. I am sorry to inform your lordship that the aspect of affairs in this country is highly discouraging; the injudicial financial measures which Count Wallis has thought proper to adopt have rendered it impossible for government to place the army on a respectable footing, and have considerably increased the discontent of the people, who however still retain their characteristic aversion to the French. The government is determined to maintain a strict neutrality during the approaching crisis if possible.

In my former letter I mentioned to your lordship my intention of establishing a person at Durazzo in order to forward messengers, etc., etc., and to transmit to me occasionally intelligence of the state of things in the Adriatic. But having received of late repeated assurances of the increasing discontent of the inhabitants of those parts of the coast who have the misfortune to be under the dominion of the French, and of their willingness to make every effort to shake off the yoke, and being aware how important it is at the present moment not to neglect an object of this nature I have desired Mr. Johnson to proceed thither in order to form connections in Albania, Dalmatia, and to avail himself in every possible manner of the spirit of discontent which has so decidedly manifested itself. Mr. Johnson who has been employed on the continent for some years past as an agent of government, and who has given proofs of his zeal and abilities, will repair to Durazzo, or according to circumstances to some other town in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic and will there reside as agent of the British government. He will communicate his arrival to your lordship with as little delay as possible.

By the following piece of information, which I have derived from an authentic source, your lordship will perceive that the French and Swedish governments are far from being on friendly terms. An alliance has been proposed by the former to the latter and instantaneously rejected. The terms of the alliance were as follows, viz., 1st, a body of 30,000 Swedes to be placed at the disposal of France; 2nd, 3000 seamen to be furnished to the French marine; and 3rd, a regiment of Swedes to be raised for the service of France as was the case before the French revolution. I transmit this letter to your lordship by Captain Steinberg and Ensign Ferandi, two officers who have served creditably in the Austrian army. The former has connections and local knowledge in his native country which may become particularly useful. I fear it will not be in my power to send 50 subaltern officers to Sicily as your lordship desired. I shall however occasionally despatch some intelligent officers who will I think be extremely useful in the formation of new corps.

No. XXV.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF SIR HENRY WELLESLEY, SIR CHARLES STUART, AND MR. VAUGHAN.

MR. VAUGHAN to SIR CHARLES STUART.

"Cadiz, August 3rd, 1813.

"The Spanish troops in Catalonia and elsewhere are starving, and the government are feeding them with proclamations to intendants. Since I have known Spain I have never known the seat of government in a worse state. There is a strong feeling against the English and a miserable jacobin party which is violent beyond measure."

DITTO to DITTO.

"Chichana, November 2nd, 1813.

"Never was anything so disgraceful in the annals of the world as the conduct of all the Spanish authorities on the occasion of the sickness breaking out. It is believed that no persons have the sickness twice, and as almost every family in Cadiz has passed the epidemic of the fever, the interested merchants would not allow it to be said that the epidemic existed, they have continued to issue clear bills of health to vessels leaving the port in the height of the mortality, and did all they could to intimidate the government and Cortes into remaining amongst them."

SIR HENRY WELLESLEY to LORD WELLINGTON.

"September 13th, 1813.

"A curious scene has been passing here lately. The permanent deputation * having been appointed, the Cortes closed their session on the 14th. There had been for some days reports of the prevalence of the yellow fever, which had excited alarm. On the 16th in the evening, I received an official note from the ministers of state apprising me of the intention of the government to proceed to Madrid on the following day, but without assigning any reason for

* Called the Extraordinary Cortes.

so sudden a resolution. At night I went to the regency, thinking this was an occasion when it would be right to offer them some pecuniary assistance. I found Agar and Ciscar together, the cardinal being ill of the gout. They told me that the prevalence of the disorder was the sole cause of their determination to leave Cadiz; and Ciscar particularly dwelt upon the necessity of removing, saying he had seen the fatal effects of delay at Carthage. They then told me that there was disturbance in the town, in consequence of which they determined on summoning the extraordinary Cortes. I went from the regency to the Cortes. A motion was made for summoning the ministers to account for the proceedings of the regency. Never was I witness to so disgraceful a scene of lying and prevarication. The ministers insisted that it was not the intention of the regency to leave Cadiz until the Cortes had been consulted, although I had in my pocket the official note announcing their intention to do so, and had been told by Ciscar that the extraordinary Cortes was assembled for no other reason than because there were disturbances in the town."

DITTO to DITTO.

"Cadiz, December 10th, 1813.

"The party for placing the princess at the head of the Spanish regency is gaining strength, and I should not be surprised if that measure were to be adopted soon after our arrival at Madrid, unless a peace and the return of Ferdinand should put an end to all such projects."

MR. STUART to LORD WELLINGTON.

"June 11th, 1813.

"The repugnance of the admiralty to adopt the measures suggested by your lordship at the commencement of the American war for the protection of the coast, has been followed by events which have fully justified your opinion. *Fifteen merchantmen have been taken off Oporto in a fortnight and a valuable Portuguese homeward-bound merchant ship was captured three days ago close to the bar of Lisbon.*

NO. XXVI.

Extract from a manuscript memoir by CAPTAIN NORTON, 34th regiment.

COMBAT OF MAYA.

"The 39th regiment, commanded by the Hon. Col. O'Callaghan, then immediately engaged with the French, and after a severe contest also retired, the 50th was next in succession and they also after a gallant stand retired, making way for the 92nd, which met the advancing French column first with its right wing drawn up in line, and after a most destructive fire and heavy loss on both sides the remnant of the right wing retired, leaving a line of killed and wounded that appeared to have no interval; the French column advanced up to this line and then halted, the killed and wounded of the 92nd forming a sort of rampart, the left wing then opened its fire on the column, and as I was but a little to the right of the 92nd I could not help reflecting painfully how many of the wounded of their right wing must have unavoidably suffered from the fire of their comrades. The left wing, after doing good service and sustaining a loss equal to the first line, retired.

COMBAT OF RONCESVALLES.

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL COLE'S AND MARSHAL SOULT'S OFFICIAL REPORTS, MSS.

GENERAL COLE to LORD WELLINGTON.

"Heights in front of Pampeluna, July 27th, 1813.

"The enemy having in the course of the night turned those posts, were now perceived moving in very considerable force along the ridge leading to the Puerto de Mendichurri. I therefore proceeded in that direction and found that their advance had nearly reached the road leading from Roncesvalles pass to Los Alduides, from which it is separated by a small wooded valley. Owing to the difficulty of the communications the head of Major-General Ross's brigade could not arrive there sooner; the major-general however, with great decision, attacked them with the Brunswick company and three companies of the 20th, all he had time to form; these actually closed with the enemy and bayonneted several in the ranks. They were however forced to yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley, the enemy attempted to follow them but were repulsed with loss, the remainder of the brigade having come up."

MARSHAL SOULT to the MINISTER OF WAR.

"Linzoin, 26 Juiller, 1813.

"Leurs pertes ont également été considérables, soit à l'attaque du Lindouz par le Général Reille ou le 20^{me} regiment a été presque détruit à la suite d'une charge à la bayonnette exécutée par un bataillon du 6^{me} léger, division Foy, soit à l'attaque d'Altobiscar par le Général Clausel."

Extract from the correspondence of the DUKE OF DALMATIA with the MINISTER OF WAR.

"Ascaïn, 12 Août, 1813.

"Dés à présent V. E. voit la situation de l'armée, elle connaît ses forces, celles de l'ennemi, et elle se fait sans doute une idée de ses projets, et d'avance elle peut apprécier ce qu'il est en notre pouvoir de faire; je ne charge point le tableau, je dis ma pensée sans détour, et j'avoue que si l'ennemi emploie tous ses moyens, ainsi que probablement il le fera, ceux que nous pourrions en ce moment lui opposer étant de beaucoup inférieurs, nous ne pourrions pas empêcher qu'ils ne fasse beaucoup de mal. Mon devoir est de le dire à V. E. quoique je tiennne une autre langue aux troupes et au pays, et que d'ailleurs je ne néglige aucun moyen pour remplir de mon mieux la tâche qui m'est imposée."

NO. XXVII.

EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

Report of the movements of the army of Arragon during the first 15 days of September, 1813.

"Le 12^{ème} toute l'armée d'Aragon se reunit a Molino del Rey; partie de celle de Catalonia et la garrison de Barcelonne se placent a droite a Ollessa et Martorel, pour partir tous ensemble a 8 heures du soir et se porter le droite par San Sadurn, le rest par le grande route d'Ordal sur Villa Franca, ou l'armée Anglaise etait rassemble. General Harispe rencontra a onze heures du soir un fort avant garde au Col d'Ordal *dans les anciens rattrachemens*. Un combat de plus vif s'engagea sous les ordres du general de l'avant garde Mesclop. Le 7^{ème} et 44^{ème} regts. monterent une haute valeur, ainsi qu'une partie d'116^{ème}. Les positions sont prise et reprise, et nous restent enfin, couvert des morts et de blesses Anglais. Dans la poursuite le 4^{ème} hussards se saisirent des 4 pieces de cannon Anglais, etc., avec trois ou quatre cents prisonniers, presque tous de la 27^{ème} reg^{ts} Anglais. Le droit, ayant rencontrer des obstacles et quelques troupes ennemis a combattre dans les passages, est retarde dans sa marche, et n'arriva pas avec le jour au rendezvouz entre L'Ongat et Grenada. Un battalion de 117^{ème} venant á gauche, par Bejas sur Avionet, rejoint l'armée en position, avec des prisonniers.

"Le Marechal Suchet directé une mouvement de cavalerie et de l'artillerie qui tenaient la tête pour donner le tems à l'infanterie d'entrer en ligne. Les Anglais etaient en bataille sur trois lignes en avant de Villa Franca, ils commencerent aussitot leur retraite en bon ordre. On les poursuivirent et on les harcelèrent, la cavalerie fit plusieurs charges assez vive. Ils opposerent de la resistance, essayèrent des pertes, surtout en cavalerie, precipiterent leur marche, brulerent un pont et s'eloignerent vers Arbos et Vendrils, laissant plus que 150 hommes pris et beaucoup des morts et des blesses, surtout des hussards de Brunswick. Nôtre avant garde va ce soir á Vendrils et plusieurs certaines de deserteurs sont ramassé."

NO. XXVIII.

(No. 1).—*Extract from the official state of the allied army, commanded by LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JOHN MURRAY, at the Col de Balaguer, 17th June, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
British and German cavalry	739	12	6	733	—	757
British Portuguese and Sicilian artillery . . .	783	8	199	362	604	990
British engineers and staff corps	78	5	36	—	—	119
British and German infantry	7,226	830	637	—	—	8,693
Whittingham's infantry .	4,370	503	316	—	—	5,189
Sicilian infantry . . .	985	121	272	—	—	1,378
General Total . . .	14,181	1479	1466	1095	604	17,126

(No. 2).—*Extract from the original weekly state of the Anglo-Sicilian force, commanded by LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM CLINTON. Head-quarters, Taragona, 25th September, 1813. Exclusive of officers, sergeants, and drummers.*

	Present fit for duty.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
Cavalry	663	61	215	875	40	939
Artillery, engineers, and staff corps	997	67	58	507	896	1,122
Infantry	9,124	1390	1019	115	429	11,533
General Total . . .	10,784	1518	1292	1497	1465	13,594

(No. 3).—*Extract from the original state of the Mallorquina division (Whittingham's). Taragona, 15th of December, 1813.*

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
Infantry	4014	400	627	110	21	5041

(No. 4).—*Extract from the original state of the first army, commanded by the CAMP-MARSHAL, DON FRANCISCO COPONS ET NAVIA. Head-quarters, Vich, 1st of August, 1813.*

	Under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Horses.	Mules.	Total men.
Infantry disposable	10,219	1535	2207	586	—	13,961
In Cardona	1,182	115	393	—	—	1,695
Seo d'Urgei	984	172	144	—	—	1,300
Artillery, etc.	877	7	59	6	—	1,070
Grand total	13,262	1829	2808	592	—	18,026

(No. 5).—*Extract from the original state of the second army, commanded by the CAMP-MARSHAL, DON FRANCISCO XAVIER ELIO. Vinaros, 19th September, 1813.*

	Present under arms.	Sick.	Command.	Total of Men.	Horses.
Total of all arms	26,835	3181	7454	37,470	4973

Note.—This state includes Villa Campa's, Sarzfield's, Duran's, the Empecinado's, and Roche's divisions, besides the troops immediately under Elio himself.

No. XXIX.

(No. 1).—*Force of the Anglo-Portuguese army under the MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON'S command. Extracted from the original morning state for the 24th of July, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, etc.	Rank and file.	Men.	Horses.	Total.
British and German cavalry } present under arms	916	5,834	6,750	5834	
Ditto, infantry	4665	29,926	34,581	—	
Portuguese cavalry	251	1,241	1,492	1178	
Ditto, infantry	2894	20,505	23,459	—	
Grand Total, exclusive of } sick and absent, on command }	8726	57,566	66,282	7012	{ Infantry and cavalry

The artillerymen, etc., were about 4000.

(No. 2).—*Anglo-Portuguese force. Extracted from the original morning state, 15th of October, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, etc.	Rank and file.	Total.
British and German cavalry and infantry	5,859	37,250	43,109
Portuguese ditto	4,253	21,274	25,527
Grand Total, exclusive of sick, absent on command, etc., etc. }	10,112	58,524	68,636

The artillerymen and drivers about 4,000

Total 72,636

(No. 3).—*Anglo-Portuguese force, from the original morning state, 9th November, 1813.*

	Officers, Sergeants, etc.	Rank and file.	Total.
British and German cavalry and infantry	5356	39,687	45,043
Portuguese ditto	2990	22,237	25,227
Grand Total, exclusive of sick, absent on command, etc. }	8346	61,924	70,270

The artillerymen, etc., etc., about 4,000

Total 74,270

(No. 4).—SIR ROWLAND HILL's force at the battle of St. Pierre. *Extracted from the original morning state, 13th December, 1813.*

		Officers, Sergeants, etc.	Rank and file.	Total.
Second division .	{ British . . .	802	5,371	6,173
	{ Portuguese . . .	277	2,331	2,608
	Lecor's Portuguese divisions . . .	507	4,103	4,670
Total under arms, exclusive of artillerymen		1586	11,865	13,451

(No. 5).—Anglo-Portuguese force. *Extracted from the original morning state, 13th February, 1814.*

		Officers, Sergeants, etc.	Rank and file.	Total.	Cavalry.
British and German cavalry	1093	7515	8408	9,898	Infantry.
Portuguese cavalry . . .	280	1210	1490		
British and German infantry	4853	29,714	34,567	56,306	
Portuguese infantry . . .	2828	18,911	21,739		
General Total, present under arms				66,204	
The artillerymen, etc., about				4000	

(No. 6).—Anglo-Portuguese force. *Extracted from the original morning state, 10th of April, 1814.*

	Officers, Sergeants, etc.	Rank and file.	Total.	
British and German cavalry	1159	7,640	8,799	9,987
Portuguese cavalry . . .	230	958	1,188	
British and German infantry	4946	29,999	34,945	54,550
Portuguese infantry . . .	2622	16,983	19,605	
General Total, present under arms				64,537
The artillerymen, etc., about				4000

(No. 7).—Actual strength of the infantry divisions engaged in the battle of Toulouse. *Extracted from the original morning state, 10th April, 1814.*

		Officers, Sergeants, etc.	Rank and file.	Total.	Grand Total infantry, officers and soldiers, pre- sent under arms.
Infantry, present under arms.					
Second division, British . . .	715	4,123	6940		
	235	1,867			
Ditto Portuguese . . .	529	2,741	4679		
	226	1,183			
Third division, British . . .	531	3,028	5383		
	239	1,585			
Ditto Portuguese . . .	558	3,233	5681		
	246	1,644			
Sixth division, British . . .	378	2,469	4318		
	231	1,240			
Ditto Portuguese . . .	455	3,507	3962		
Lecor's Portuguese division . . .		4343	26,620		
					30,963

Note.—There is no separate state for the cavalry on the 10th of April, but on the 15th of May, 1814, they stood as follows.

		Officers, Sergeants, etc.	Rank and file.	Total cavalry, present under arms.
Cavalry, present under arms.				
Bock's brigade of Germans . . .	112	694		
	188	1221		
Ponsonby's brigade of British . . .	240	1506		
	128	960		
Fane's brigade of British . . .	214	1691		
Vivian's brigade of British . . .		882	6072	6954
Lord Edw. Somers's brigade of British				

Total of Anglo-Portuguese cavalry and infantry, present under arms	37,917
Add the Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, together said to be	14,000
	<hr/> 51,917
Artillerymen etc.	1500
	<hr/> 53,417
General Total	53,417

Note.—My authority for the number of guns employed during this campaign are copies of the returns given to me by Sir Alexander Dickson, who commanded that arm. The number of artillerymen is not borne on the morning states, but in the original weekly state of the 15th of May, 1814, I find the artillerymen, engineers, drivers, and waggon-train, amounted to 4821, with 5030 horses and mules. This may be taken as the average strength during the campaign, but more than half were with Sir John Hope and some with Lord Dalhousie. Wherefore, the number at the battle of Toulouse could not have exceeded 1500, making a total of all ranks and arms of 53,000 combatants.

No. XXX.

(No. 1).—*General state of the French armies under SOULT and SUCHET. Extracted from the Imperial Muster-rolls, July, 1813. The armies of the north, centre, and south being by an imperial decree reorganized in one body, taking the title of the army of Spain.*

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospitals.	Total.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain	97,983	12,676	2110	392	14,074	114,167	13,028
Aragon	32,362	4,919	3621	551	3,201	39,184	5,470
Catalonia	25,910	1,869	168	—	1,379	27,457	1,744
General Total	156,255	19,464	5899	943	18,654	180,808	20,242

(No. 2).—*15th of September, 1813.*

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospitals.	Total.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Army of Spain	81,351	11,159	4004	1438	22,488	107,843	11,272
Aragon	32,476	4,447	2721	320	3,616	38,813	6,305
Catalonia	24,026	1,670	120	—	2,137	26,283	2,497
General Total	137,853	17,276	6,845	2758	28,241	172,939	20,074

Note.—The garrison of San Sebastian, though captive, is borne on this state.

This is the last general state of the French army in my possession but the two following notes were inserted in the Imperial Rolls.

“Army of Spain, 16th November, 1813.—102 battalions; 74 squadrons, without garrisons
 74,152 men present under arms; 100,212 effectives; 17,206 horses.
 18,230 Hospital.
 8,555 Troop horses.
 1,809 Officers' horses.
 5,384 Horses of draft.”

“Army of Spain, 1st December.—93 battalions; 74 squadrons; 17,989 horses”

(No. 3).—*Detailed state of the army of Spain, July, 1813, when SOULT took the command.*

Right wing.—Lieut-General Reille.	Present under arms.		Effective and non-effective.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Total.
First division, Foy, 9 battalions	5922	189	17,235	21,366
Seventh ditto, Maucune, 7 ditto	4186	110		
Ninth ditto, La Martiniere, 11 ditto	7127	151		
Centre.—Drouet, Count D'Erlon.				
Second division, D Armagnac, 8 batt.	6961	116	20,957	23,935
Third ditto, Abbe, 9 ditto	8030	285		
Sixth ditto, Daricau, 8 ditto	5966	223		

				Present under arms.		Effective and non-effective.	
Left wing.—Lieut.-General Clausel.				Men.	Horses.	Men.	Total.
Fourth division, Conroux, 9 battalions				7056	150	17,218	{ 7477 } { 5201 } { 7587 }
Fifth ditto, Vandermaesen, 7 ditto,				4181	141		
Eighth ditto, Taupin, 10 ditto,				5981	141		
Reserve, General Villatte.							
French				14,959	2091		17,929
Foreign				4	battalions of the Rhine, strength not given.		
"				4	ditto Italians, General St. Pol, ditto.		
"				4	ditto Spaniards, General Casabianca, ditto.		
Cavalry, Pierre Soult.						Present under arms. Effective and non-effective.	
				Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.
22 squadrons				4723	4416	{ 5098 } { 2523 }	7621
Ditto, Trielhard				2358	2275		
Total according to the organization, but exclusive of the foreign battalions					77,450		91,086
				Men under arms.			
Troops not in the organization					14,938		16,946
Generals: { Garrison of St. Sebastian, 1st July }					2731		3086
Rey { forming part of this number							
Cassan.— Ditto of Pampeluna, 1st July					2951		3121
Lameth.— Ditto of Santona, 1st May					1465		1674
Second reserve, not in the above					5595		6105
				Effective and non-effective.			
				Men.			
General Total				97,983	12,676.	Present under arms—114,167 13,028	

(No. 4).—Detailed state of the army of Spain, 16th of September, 1813.

				Effective and non-effective.	
				Men.	Men.
Right wing	Foy	5002	} 14,875 present under arms.	}	45,752
	Maucune	4166			
	Menne	5707			
Centre	D'Armagnac	4353	} 15,098 ditto	}	
	Abbé	5903			
	Maransin	4842			
Left wing	Conroux	4736	} 15,789 ditto	}	
	Roguet	5982			
	Taupin	5071			
Reserve	Villatte	8256	} The Italian brigade, about 2000 ordered to Milan.	}	10,424
Provisional troops of the right wing, destined to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne		2168			
Cavalry.—Pierre Soult		4456			
Ditto,	Trielhard	2368	4617 horses	}	8,325
		291	2583 "		
		1210	247 "		
Gens-d'armes	mounted	895	885 "	}	1,399
Park	dismounted	504	127 "		
Engineers		3805	191 "		
Garrisons	Pampeluna	2366	} prisoners of war.	}	115,164
	San Sebastian	1633			
	Santona	4631			
	Bayonne	1786			
	St. Jean Pied de Port	842			
	Navarens	107			
Castle of Lourdes					
				81,064	
Deduct garrison of San Sebastian				2366	
Total, present under arms				78,698	

No. XXXI.

Orders for the several divisions of the allied army for the attack of the enemy's fortified position in front of Toulouse for to-morrow, 1st of April, 1814. Published in the "United Service Journal," October, 1838.

(EXTRACT.)

"St. Jory, 9th April, 1814.

"The front attack of the third division is to extend from the river Garonne to the great road which leads from the village of La Lande to Toulouse (the road from Montauban) inclusive of that road.

"The light division will be immediately on the left of the third division, and it will extend its front of attack from the great road above-mentioned until it connects its left flank with the right of the Spanish troops.

"The operations of these two divisions are meant, however, more as diversions than as real attacks; it not being expected that they will be able to force any of the passes of the canal which covers Toulouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened chiefly at the bridges and at the locks or any other points where the form of the ground, or other circumstances most favour the advance of the troops. A considerable part both of the third and of the light divisions must be kept in reserve."

Note.—The analysis of the allied army on the 10th of April, given in Appendix XXIX. (Nos. 6 and 7), has been very carefully made and faithfully set down; but as the real number of the allies has lately become a point of dispute between French and English writers, I here give the Morning State of the whole army, accurately printed from the original document delivered by the adjutant-general to Lord Wellington on the morning of the 10th of April, 1814. The reader will thus be enabled, with the help of my text, to trace each division in its course and ascertain its true numbers.

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the PENINSULA, under the Command of HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD-MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON, K.G. Head-Quarters, St. Jory, 10th April, 1814.

Date of last State received.	DIVISIONS.	OFFICERS.							Quarter-Masters of Cavalry.	SERGEANTS.					TRUMPETERS OR DRUMMERS.							
		Colonels.	Lieut.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornets or Ensigns.	Staff.		Present.	Present.	Sick.		Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.	Total.	Present.	Sick.		Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.	Total.
												Present.	Absent.					Present.	Absent.			
7th April.	Cavalry	1	13	17	106	139	25	94	25	581	9	17	63	7	682	108	...	8	4	2	122	
" "	1st Dn. Infantry ...	3	16	6	64	53	56	48	...	433	13	40	38	4	528	142	4	3	...	3	152	
9th "	2nd	2	2	10	45	123	29	41	...	320	5	89	68	18	500	143	1	23	3	8	178	
" "	3rd	2	3	10	38	69	30	32	...	231	3	82	47	5	368	114	...	20	7	4	145	
6th "	4th	3	9	42	86	27	30	...	232	3	76	56	4	371	102	1	15	5	6	129	
7th "	5th	1	3	6	35	82	39	38	...	245	28	63	30	10	376	99	10	10	3	8	130	
8th "	6th	4	9	41	102	41	25	...	236	4	59	41	1	341	101	1	19	3	...	124	
5th "	7th	1	4	6	38	74	31	31	...	187	5	62	42	16	312	92	2	8	4	11	117	
9th "	Lt.	2	2	4	24	68	13	19	...	182	2	39	21	1	245	66	1	3	...	3	73	
7th "	Ld. Aylmer's Bde.	6	7	37	74	19	26	...	188	7	7	8	...	210	72	1	4	77	
	Total																					
	PORTUGUESE.																					
7th April.	Cavalry	2	4	4	17	39	15	41	4	64	2	...	28	...	94	40	10	...	50	
9th "	2nd Dn. Infantry	2	2	16	16	28	10	...	122	...	19	32	...	173	39	...	1	4	...	44	
" "	3rd	2	...	2	9	17	23	14	...	101	5	20	39	...	165	58	2	5	6	...	71	
6th "	4th	1	1	1	10	12	24	51	...	103	...	27	23	...	153	36	...	6	5	...	47	
7th "	5th	1	2	3	13	12	22	49	...	105	3	25	18	...	151	34	1	3	2	...	40	
8th "	6th	1	2	3	12	13	16	47	...	119	3	12	20	...	154	33	1	5	3	...	42	
5th "	7th	2	3	4	17	18	27	43	...	110	4	12	23	...	149	33	...	3	2	...	38	
9th "	Lt.	2	3	13	11	26	29	...	101	3	6	27	...	137	51	3	2	7	...	63	
7th "	Unattached Dn. ...	2	4	7	25	22	51	80	...	197	7	47	26	1	278	67	3	6	6	3	85	
8th "	1st Brigade	1	1	6	9	12	27	16	...	137	1	10	20	...	163	64	...	2	2	4	72	
" "	10th	4	4	18	14	23	38	...	124	7	7	15	...	153	31	...	3	5	...	39	
	Total Portuguese ...																					
	Total British																					
	Grand Total																					

3 Men deserted 2nd Line Bn. K.G.L.

2 Man " 1st Line "

1 Man deserted 47th Foot.

1 " " 4th "

MORNING STATE of the FORCES in the PENINSULA, under the Command of
HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD-MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON,
K.G. Head-Quarters, St. Jory, 10th April, 1814.

Date of last State received.	DIVISIONS.	RANK AND FILE.						HORSES.				ALTERATIONS.								Effective Rank and File, Portuguese included.
		Present.	Sick.		Command.	Prs. of War and Missing.		Present.	Sick.	Command.	Total.	Men.								
			Present.	Absent.								Joined.	Dead.	Discharged.	Deserted.	Transferred.	Promoted.	Reduced.		
BRITISH.																				
7th April.	Cavalry	7640	106	406	1071	233	9456	7289	611	602	8502	8144	
" "	1st Dn. Infantry ...	5894	244	632	200	185	7155	4	6	...	4	10	3	5894	
9th "	2nd	4123	112	2251	474	716	7676	11	4	5990	
" "	3rd	2741	75	1352	297	229	4694	1	1	3924	
6th "	4th	3028	44	1700	279	201	5252	4613	
7th "	5th	3277	363	1075	224	315	5254	2	...	2	17	1	...	4438	
8th "	6th	3233	54	1223	309	103	4922	4877	
5th "	7th	2738	114	1074	391	673	4990	4474	
9th "	Lt.	2469	77	696	131	146	3519	2	3709	
7th "	Ld. Aylmer's Bde...	2496	212	312	92	...	3112	2	2	2406	
	Total	37639	1401	10721	3468	2801	56030	7289	611	602	8502	5	24	...	6	33	4	6	...	
PORTUGUESE.																				
7th April.	Cavalry	958	5	73	598	16	1650	855	114	404	1373	
9th "	2nd Dn. Infantry ..	1867	71	472	101	...	2511	1	1	
" "	3rd	1183	105	598	383	...	2269	1	
6th "	4th	1585	30	635	199	...	2449	
7th "	5th	1161	13	550	176	...	1900	69	3	2	1	
8th "	6th	1644	44	469	151	...	2708	
5th "	7th	1736	48	228	211	48	2271	
9th "	Lt.	1240	54	237	394	11	1936	
7th "	Unattached Dn. ...	3507	215	835	219	76	4652	3507	
8th "	1st Brigade	1510	68	328	146	213	2265	1	1510	
" "	10th	1550	115	351	82	4	2102	1550	
	Total Portuguese ...	17941	768	4776	2660	268	26513	855	114	404	1373	70	5	1	...	2	1	
	Total British																			
	Grand Total																			

The Men transferred are Invalids sent home.

NOTE.—The figures belonging to the grand total are wanting in the original.

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